Rajesh G. ShakkarwarDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 23, 201913651219 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/651,219 10/12/2012 Rajesh G. Shakkarwar VERI/0017USP1 7524 107456 7590 08/23/2019 Artegis Law Group, LLP John Carey 7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104 Houston, TX 77095 EXAMINER MAGUIRE, LINDSAY M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3693 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/23/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): algdocketing@artegislaw.com jmatthews@artegislaw.com kcruz@artegislaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte RAJESH G. SHAKKARWAR __________ Appeal 2018-0037451 Application 13/651,2192 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before HUBERT C. LORIN, MICHAEL W. KIM, and BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 9–13, 23–27, and 29–32, which are the only claims pending in the Application, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 Our Decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Oct. 30, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 22, 2018), the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 22, 2017), and the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Mar. 23, 2017). 2 Appellant identifies “Verient, Inc.” as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2018-003745 Application 13/651,219 2 CLAIMED INVENTION Sole independent claim 9, reproduced below with added bracketed matter, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 9. A method of transmitting a financial product data from a NFC enabled device to a reader device for a payment transaction, comprising: [(a)] receiving, at the NFC enabled device, the financial product data; [(b)] storing the financial product data in a first storage device of the NFC enabled device, wherein the first storage device is not activatable and not accessible by the reader device; [(c)] during the payment transaction, transmitting the financial product data from the first storage device to a second storage device of the NFC enabled device, wherein the second storage device is activatable and accessible by the reader device; [(d)] transmitting the financial product data from the second storage device to the reader device; and [(e)] removing the financial product data from the second storage device after transmission to the reader device. Appeal Br. 20, Claims Appendix. ANALYSIS Principals of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). Appeal 2018-003745 Application 13/651,219 3 In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). USPTO § 101 Guidance The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under Step 2A, Prong One of the Guidance, we determine if the claim recites a judicial exception, including particular groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, or mental processes). Id. at 52–53. If so, we then analyze the claim to determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception under Step 2A, Prong Two of the Guidance. Id. at 53–55; MPEP Appeal 2018-003745 Application 13/651,219 4 §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). Only if the claim fails to integrate the exception and thus is “directed to” the judicial exception, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the field or whether the claim simply appends well- understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Alice Step 1 Does claim 9 recite a judicial exception? Under the first step of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determined “the claims are directed towards an information managing scheme for financial product data. Managing financial product data is a method of organizing human activity and/or a fundamental economic practice and thus, the claims include an abstract idea.” Final Act. 3. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s characterization of the abstract idea. In that regard, where we reproduce claim 9, we identify in italics the limitations we believe recite an abstract idea, and the one that is consistent with the Examiner’s and Appellant’s understanding. The recited italicized limitations, i.e., “receiving,” “storing,” “transmitting,” and “removing” “financial product data,” individually and collectively, describe not only mental processes but, as a general matter, the collection and communication of financial product data, which is a fundamental economic practice in the exchange of goods and services. Thus, this case implicates subject matter Appeal 2018-003745 Application 13/651,219 5 groupings (b) “Certain methods of organizing human activity” and (c) “Mental processes” under Prong One of Step 2A of the Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Is claim 9 “directed to” the recited judicial exception? Appellant argues that claim 9 is not directed to an abstract idea. Appeal Br. 9. Under the Guidance’s Step 2A, Prong Two, we now determine whether there are additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also MPEP 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). A claim may integrate the judicial exception when, for example, it reflects an improvement to technology or a technical field. Id. at 55. To the end, Appellant contends that “under Enfish, the claimed approach improves computer capabilities, as opposed to simply invoking a computer as a tool.” Appeal Br. 10. In particular, Appellant argues the claimed approach enables a near field communication (NFC) enabled device to store and transmit data to a reader device in a more secured manner relative to prior approaches. In that regard, the NFC enabled device stores financial product data in a first storage device that cannot be activated by (i.e., is not activatable by), and is not accessible by, the reader device. During a subsequent payment transaction, the financial product data is transmitted from the first storage device to a second storage device of the NFC enabled device, the second storage device being activatable and accessible by the reader device. The financial product data is then transmitted from the second storage device to the reader device and the financial product data is removed from the second storage device after transmission to the reader device. Appeal 2018-003745 Application 13/651,219 6 Typically, an NFC enabled device stores data only on a single storage device that is activatable and accessible by a reader device. The stored data is read by the reader device when the NFC enabled device is placed in close proximity to the reader using near field communication. Electromagnetic energy emitted from the reader causes the storage device to power on and then automatically transmit the stored data to the reader. Because the data is automatically transmitted, an attacker may illicitly obtain the stored data from the NFC enabled device using an unauthorized reader (referred to as "eavesdropping"). Appeal Br. 10–11 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3–5, 25, 26, 69); see also Reply Br. 3–4 (asserting the same). In response to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner summarily concludes that “the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools” (Ans. 3) without looking to the Specification. We look to the background of the Specification to assess the problems recognized and solution advanced by the Appellant, because “[t]he ‘abstract idea’ step of the inquiry calls upon us to look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex. v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016 (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). According to the Specification: Personal data is stored on the NFC chip embedded in the mobile device. The stored data may be read by a reader when the mobile device is placed in close proximity to the reader. Appeal 2018-003745 Application 13/651,219 7 Electromagnetic energy emitted from the reader may power on and automatically transmit the stored data to the reader. A potential problem exists with near field communications due to eavesdropping. Because the stored data is automatically transmitted, an attacker may obtain the stored data from the NFC chip using an unauthorized reader. There is, therefore, a need for apparatus and methods of preventing eavesdropping of data from the NFC chip. Theft of credit/debit/prepaid card numbers from merchant repository is a problem in the industry. It would be desirable to allow customers to pay for goods and services to merchants without exposing their card number to the merchant. There is a need therefore, for apparatus and methods of making financial transactions without exposing the real card number. Spec. ¶¶ 6–8. “[I]n prior art approaches, an NFC enabled device stored data only on a single storage device that is activatable and accessible by a reader device, thereby causing the stored data to be easily obtained by any unauthorized reader that is within range of the NFC enabled device.” Appeal Br. 11. With reference to the Specification, Appellant asserts that this problem was solved by including a first storage device into the payment device’s NFC tag that is not accessible by a NFC reader device, and a second storage device that is accessible by the reader device. Spec. ¶ 25. Prior to a transaction, financial data is transmitted from the first storage device to the second storage device so that financial data is available and accessible to conduct the transaction. Id. After transmission of the data to the reader device, the financial data is removed from the second storage device and unavailable for eavesdropping by an unauthorized reader device. Id. The financial data remains securely stored in the first storage device and available for future use. Id. Appeal 2018-003745 Application 13/651,219 8 We are persuaded that the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art is not to simply manage a financial transaction, as asserted in the Final Office Action and Answer, but rather, to enable devices to store and transmit data more securely, thereby improving the functionality of those devices, as indicated in the Specification and reflected in the claims. There is a fundamental difference between computer functionality improvements, on the one hand, and uses of existing computers as tools to perform a particular task, on the other. The Federal Circuit applied this distinction in Enfish in rejecting a § 101 challenge at the step one stage in the Alice analysis because the claims at issue focused not on asserted advances in uses to which existing computer capabilities could be put, but on a specific type of data structure, i.e., a self-referential table for a computer database, designed to improve the way a computer carries out its basic functions of storing and retrieving data. 822 F.3d at 1335–36. Like Enfish, we are persuaded that Appellant has shown adequately that claim 9 recites an improvement in the way NFC enabled devices securely store and transmit data, which is an improvement in computer capabilities and function. We agree with Appellant that “the claims focus on a technique to achieve the useful result of securely storing and transmitting financial product data using near field communication.” Appeal Br. 13. Claim 9 “achieve[s] this result by securely storing, on the NFC enabled device, the financial product data in a first storage device that is not activatable and not accessible by the reader device.” Id. We find that claim 9 is not directed to an abstract idea, but rather, to a specific improvement to the way NFC enabled devices operate. Appeal 2018-003745 Application 13/651,219 9 Accordingly, we conclude the claimed invention is integrated into a practical application, and claim 9 has not been shown to be patent-ineligible because it is not “directed to” a judicial exception. Under Alice’s framework, if a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception, the inquiry ends. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is reversed. REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation