Queens Auto Supplies. Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 23, 1973

206 N.L.R.B. 527 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

QUEENS AUTO SUPPLIES, INC. 527
Queens Auto Supplies. Inc. and Local 531, Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America. Case
29-CA-2995
October 23, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On May 14, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Mel-
vin J. Welles issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief, and General Counsel filed a brief
in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Deci-
sion.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record I and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Queens Auto Supplies Inc.,
Queens, New York, its officers, agents, successors and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said rec-
ommended Order.
i As the record, including the exceptions and briefs, adequately presents
the issues and positions of the parties, Respondent's request for oral argu-
ment is hereby denied.
2 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544,
enfd 188 F.2d 362 (C A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MELVIN J. WELLES, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard at Brooklyn, New York, on March 14 and 15,
1973, based on charges filed August 18, 1972, and a com-
plaint issued October 30, 1972, alleging that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the' Act. Respondent
denies any violations of the Act. Respondent and the Gen-
eral Counsel have filed briefs.
Upon the entire record in the case, including my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE
LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent, a New York corporation, is engaged in the
sale and distribution of automobile parts, accessories, and
related products at its store in New York City. During the
year prior to the issuance of the complaint, it received prod-
ucts valued in excess of $50,000 from companies located in
the State of New York, which had received such products
directly from States other than New York. I find, as Re-
spondent concedes, that it is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Toward the end of July 1972, a day or so before July 26,
Union Representative Montanez met Respondent's em-
ployee Abraham Taylor on the street, and asked Taylor if
he was interested in the Union. When Taylor said that he
was, Montanez gave Taylor some union authorization
cards. Taylor obtained the signatures of employees Manuel
Ramirez and Frank O'Ferrall on cards, and turned these
two cards along with his own signed card over to Montanez.
These three employees, Taylor, Ramirez, and O'Ferrall, per-
formed essentially driving duties for Respondent, with be-
tween 70 and 80 percent of their time devoted to
truckdriving.1 Montanez turned the cards over to Joseph
Biasucci, Local 531's secretary-treasurer. Biasucci and an-
other union business agent, Charles Marinconda, met with
Casaccio on July 28 at the store.2 Biasucci asked Casaccio
for recognition, informing him that he (Biasucci) was an
official of Local 531, and that he represented the
Company's dnvers. Casaccio asked Biasucci to hold matters
'Although Respondent's General Manager Anthony Casaccio testified
that he had no drivers as such, but hires employees for "general work,"
requiring that they have a drivers license, it is clear from the testimony of the
employees, as well as Casaccio's that these three did the bulk of the driving
duties, and that the other employees at the store were countermen and
stockmen, who on rare occasions might make a delivery.
2 I base my findings with respect to this meeting on the credited testimony
of Biasucci . Casaccio testified that he had no knowledge of any union activity
when, on July 31, he fired Taylor (discussed infra), and that it was not until
August 5, 6, or 7 that he conferred with any union delegate. However,
Casaccio also said that on August 5, or thereafter, when he first conferred
with a union delegate, a strike had not been called, and all employees except
Taylor were working It is clear from this alone that Casaccio was mistaken.
The actual filing of the petition on July 28, 1972, is confirmatory of Biasucci's
testimony, as it at the very least provides a benchmark for his recollection
of when recognition was requested.
206 NLRB No. 63
528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in abeyance for a few days. The Union, on the same day,
then filed a representation petition with the Board.
On July 31, Taylor took several hours off to pick up his
child at camp. Taylor testified that he asked James Novak
for time off, that Novak said "Okay,"3 and that Casaccio
was not present at the time. Taylor also testified that he left
about 10 a.m., returning about noon. Novak testified that
Taylor told him he was leavmg,4 that "I think he said some-
thing with his child," and that he left about lunchtime,
returning later in the afternoon. Employee O'Ferrall testi-
fied that Taylor left about 10:30 a.m., and returned "about
maybe 1:00, 1:30." Employee Ramirez testified that Taylor
left about 10 and returned "around 12:00, 12:30." Casaccio
testified that Taylor returned "after one, close to 2:00
o'clock." According to Casaccio, Taylor came into his office
and asked for time off for "a personal thing." Casaccio said
he was busy "and if it wasn't too important I would appreci-
ate him not leaving at that time." Taylor replied that "it was
very important he had to pick up his daughter from camp,
and that he would be , back by 11:00 o'clock." Casaccio
added that he "had no alternative" but to give him permis-
sion to go, that he "would have liked him to stay, but he said
it was very important so I couldn't hold the man back."
Despite Novak's "left at lunchtime," it is clear from the
testimony of the other witnesses that Novak left somewhere
between 10 and 10:30 a.m. I conclude that he returned
somewhere between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m. As the testimony
establishes that the very earliest Taylor could have departed
that day was after 10 a.m., it is inconceivable that Taylor
could have told Casaccio that he would be back by 11:00
a.m. Partly for that reason, partly because, as already noted,
Casaccio's recollection seemed hazy as to when matters
occurred, and partly because I fmd Taylor to be an entirely
credible witness, I find that Taylor never spoke to Casaccio
that day before leaving to pick up his daughter, and that at
best Casaccio must have had another occasion in mind.'
Strangely enough, if Casaccio were correct that Taylor
asked him for permission to leave, then Taylor received the
permission, albeit grudgingly on Casaccio's part, by
Casaccio's own testimony.
When Taylor returned to the store, nothing was said to
him, and he continued working until about 5:00 p.m.' Ca-
saccio called Taylor into his office. Casaccio told Taylor he
was going to have to lay him off because he was late. Ac-
cordmg to Casaccio, he told Taylor "that he took much too
much time off and considering all things which includes
slow on deliveries, which includes me to stop selling this
product that he was pushing, and he continued to try selling
it and his arrogant attitude at times, I was going to let him
go." It is not clear that everything in the above-quoted
3 Novak's status with the Company, specifically whether he was a supervi-
sor, or had authority to grant time off, is in dispute . I discuss this question
subsequently.
4 Although at another point in his testimony, Novak said that other em-
ployees told him Taylor was leaving.
Novak's testimony that Taylor left the store without permission, that he
just "took it on his own to go," adding that he (Novak) had no authority to
give permission, reinforces my view that Casaccio was mistaken, for it strong-
ly suggests that Casaccio, the only one, according to Novak, who could give
permission, was absent at the time.
6 Casaccio testified about 4 30. 1 credit Taylor, although this difference is
of no sisnificance.
testimony was told to Taylor, even according to Casaccio,
for wben asked shortly thereafter by his counsel, "What did
he say to you and what did you say to him?" Casaccio
replied "Well, I had mentioned that fact that he was taking
a lot of time off, and that I couldn't tolerate this any longer.
And he said to me, `Well, I'm sorry, there are things that I
have to do at times, and there's nothing I can do about it' "
Sometime later in his testimony, Casaccio respondend to his
counsel's question "Now, let me reiterate what was the rea-
son specifically that you discharged Taylor?" with "Too
much time off." To the followup question "How about his
conduct?" Casaccio answered "Well, his conduct, his refus-
al to listen to orders." Finally, during cross-examination,
the following colloquy took place:
Q. (By Mr. Weinrich) You again tell me the reasons for
Mr. Taylor's discharge?
A. Would I again tell you the reasons, he took lots
of time off, full days, half days, arrogant attitude, at
times refused to obey orders, at times I found and saw
that he made it very difficult for counterman to give
him an order to go out and make a delivery. He was
slow on the deliveries on occasions.
Q. And did you relate all these reasons to Mr. Tay-
lor at the time of his discharge?
A. Yes, in so many words. I don't know if I related
each and everyone of them. I felt telling him that he
took too much time off, and was arrogant was enough
for me to fire him.
After Taylor was fired he called Union Representative
Montanez to tell him about it. The next day Montanez and
Taylor met with Casaccio, and requested that Taylor be put
back to work. Casaccio told him, after a telephone call to
Union Agent Biasucci, that he would get back to Biasucci
the next day, August 2,7 Biasucci then instructed Montanez
to meet with Taylor at the store the next morning and start
picketing. The two, Montanez and Taylor, did start picket-
ing the next morning, in front of the store. Shortly before
8:00 a.m. O'Ferrall and Ramirez approached the store.
Montanez told them that Casaccio refused to put Taylor
back to work, and that was why they were picketing. Rami-
rez and O'Ferrall then joined the picket hne. Casaccio then
came out and asked Ramirez and O'Ferrall if they would
come to work. When they replied that they would not cross
the picket line, and were on strike, Casaccio told them they
were fired. O'Ferrall and Ramirez then took signs and be-
gan picketing along with Montanez and Taylor. The fore-
going facts relative to the morning of August 3 are based on
the credible testimony of Montanez, Taylor, O'Ferrall, and
Ramirez. Casaccio's testimony did not differ in any material
way. He testified that he asked O'Ferrall and Ramirez to
come to work, that they refused, saying they were on strike,
and that he "didn't see why they should have been on
strike," so he told them if they did not "come in to work
you're no longer with Queens Auto Supplies." Casaccio
specifically testified that the only reason for O'Ferrall's and
7 Casaccio did not mention this meeting in his testimony, unless his testi-
mony concerning a meeting on August 5, 6, or 7 was meant to be this meeting.
That Montanez' testimony concerning the meeting and its date was accurate
I have no doubt
QUEENS AUTO SUPPLIES, INC. 529
Ramirez' discharges was their refusal to come to work on
August 3.
On August 2, two days after Taylor's discharge, neither
Ramirez nor O'Ferrall was assigned any truck driving du-
ties, although they normally performed such duties 70 to 80
percent of their working time, and had never before gone a
full day without driving. On that day, three other employ-
ees, one of whom had apparently never worked for the
Company before, with the other two having done only some
part-time chores, performed the driving duties normally
done by O'Ferrall and Ramirez (along with Taylor, already
fired by then). Pete Novak told the two of them to "sweep
and mop the floor and dust around," and "get a broom and
a mop and start sweeping or mopping the floor." The testi-
mony is uncontradicted that the Company had its janitorial
work performed by an outside maintenance company. No-
vak denied having assigned such work to Ramirez and
O'Ferrall on August 2, but I credit the employees' testimony
in this respect.
B. Discussion
The complaint alleges that the discharges of Taylor,
O'Ferrall, and Ramirez were in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act, in Taylor's case, for his union activities,
and in O'Ferrall's and Ramirez' cases, for their protected
concerted activities. The complaint also alleges that Re-
spondent discriminatorily assigned Ramirez and O'Ferrall
to more arduous and less agreeable job tasks because of
their union activities, also in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
Taking first the discharges of O'Ferrall and Ramirez, the
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) is so plain as to require
virtually no discussion, for they were concededly discharged
for refusing to report to work on August 3, when they were
honoring the picket line and engaging in a strike. The fact
that Cassaccio could "not see why they should have been on
strike" in no way lessens the employees' protection, guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act. Indeed, there is no possible
basis for concluding that the strike was not lawful and pro-
tected.8
As to Taylor, the situation is different, and does require
discussion. Whether his discharge was an unfair labor prac-
tice or a lawful discharge turns on Respondent's motivation.
Taylor was discharged on July 31, three days after Local
53l's secretary-treasurer, Biasucci, requested Casaccio to
recognize the Union for its three drivers. There could have
been no question in Casaccio's mind as to which employees
were being sought, for Taylor, O'Ferrall, and Ramirez de-
voted from 70 to 80 percent of their time to driving duties,
and none of the other employees drove other than sporadi-
cally. The testimony is conflicting, as noted above, as to
exactly what occurred on July 31 with respect to Taylor. We
testified that he asked Novak's "permission" to leave; No-
8 This is so whether or not Taylor's discharge, or the assignment of menial
work to Ramirez and O'Ferrall the day before, were unfair labor practices,
for a concerted refusal to work to protest lawful conduct is protected by
Section 7. I discuss under "Remedy" Respondent's argument that Ramirez
should be barred from reinstatement because of alleged misconduct by him
subsequent to his discharge on August 3.
vak testified that he left "without permission," merely'in-
forming Novak he was going, and, indeed; that Novak had
no authority to grant permission to anyone to take time off.
Novak further testified that when Casaccio was absent,
"there's nobody there to give approval or disapproval," that
other employees "may" ask him for permission, but "I have
no authority to do anything." Finally, Novak testified that
when someone wants to leave and Casaccio is not present,
"generally he tells somebody-anybody he's leaving so we
don't go looking for him, and he^just leaves." I find that
Novak, if not actually a supervisor, was at the very least the
person entrusted by Casaccio with de facto authority when
Casaccio was absent-and that notification to him was for
practical purposes equivalent to seeking permission to leave.
It is plain from Novak's own testimony that the employees
regularly left for personal matters without permission from
Casaccio.
Thus, the credible testimony establishes that Taylor's
conduct on the day in question, July 31, involved no dere-
liction whatsoever. For, as I have found, he sought permis-
sion, at least implicitly, from Novak to leave for a few hours,
and was granted such permission even if, based on Novak's
testimony, Novak merely acquiesced by not telling Taylor
that he should stay. Casaccio's own testimony, were Ito give
it credence in this respect, would show explicit permission
given Taylor to leave, for Casaccio testified that he told
Taylor if "it wasn't too important I would appreciate [you]
not leaving at that time," to-which Taylor replied that it was
important, and Casaccio then "had no alternative" but to
give him permission. Casaccio's subsequent testimony that
he regarded this very conversation as a "final warning" to
Taylor, and "then I fired him after his answer," is palpably
false, for there was no warning whatsoever in Casaccio's
own version of the converstion I have found did not even
take place, and Casaccio did not fire Taylor until 5:00 p.m.
(4:30 p.m., according to Casaccio himself).
Casaccio testified, as noted above, that Taylor was dis-
charged for taking too much time off, coupled with his
slowness on deliveries, his "pushing" his own product at the
Company's store, and his "arrogant attitude at times." He
subsequently gave "too much time off" in answer to his
counsel's question "what was the reason specifically that
you discharged Taylor?" and added "his refusal to listen to
orders" when prompted by "How about his conduct?" Fi-
nally, Casaccio ran through the gamut of reasons, when
asked again for them on cross-examination, concluding that
"I felt telling him that he took too much time off, and was
arrogant was enough for me to fire him."
Respondent introduced a "personnel card" for Taylor
into evidence.10 This card shows the following time off for
9 It is clear that the three employees who testified, Ramirez, Taylor, and
O'Ferrall, regarded Novak as a "manager" He often opened and closed the
store, he was the only person other than Casaccio who knew the combination
of, and had access to, the safe, he distributed their pay to the employees, he
kept a record of the employees' attendance which he turned over to Casaccio,
and he assigned work to the drivers. He also, of course, worked as a count-
erman. But when Casaccio was absent, he was plainly the only one in the
store with any authority of any kind I am inclined to find that he was a
supervisor, on the above facts, and not to credit Casaccio and Novak in their
denials that Novak had such authority as described herein.
10 Although the Company's records are obviously kept very loosely, they
Continued
530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Taylor, who began ' work in September 1971: January
1972-4-1/2 days,,February 1972-1-1/2 days, March 1972
-1-1/2 days, April 1972-1 day, May 1972-1 day, June
1972-1 day, and July 1972-2 days, including the 1/2 day on
July 31. Thus the first 3 months of 1972 show 6-1/2 days off,
the next 4 months show 5 days off. According to Casaccio,
Taylor took off "half days many times," "most of the time
with permission and on occasions without permission."
Respondent's records show only 9 "1/2 days" off during his
entire period of employment. "Most" of them "with permis-
sion" must mean only a few "without permission," which
leaves a maximum of perhaps two or three without permis-
sion . Even as to these days, it is evident from Novak's
testimony that either no formal permission was necessary,
or Novak himself gave'at least tacit permission to employees
generally to take off short periods of time . Furthermore,
Casaccio could not pinpoint any dates or times in this re-
spect. Nor is there anything in Casaccio's testimony to sug-'
gest that Taylor ever left the plant after being denied
permission to leave. As noted, Taylor's personnel card
shows a total of 11 days off from September 1971 through
July 31, 1972. Ramirez' card shows 8-1/2 days off from
November 1971 through July 31, 1972; O'Ferrall's shows
4-1/2 days off from June 2, 1972, when he was first em-
ployed by Respondent, through July 31, 1972.
From all of the above, it is clear that the "a lot of time
off" attributed to Taylor by Casaccio was not true in either
an absolute or a relative sense. It is also clear that this
reason, the one Casaccio principally relied upon in dis-
charging Taylor, was seized upon as a pretext for discharg-
ing Taylor the next working day after the Union had sought
recognition for the Company's three drivers.
As to the other reasons assigned by Respondent for
Taylor's discharge, I am satisfied that they were after-
thoughts, and played no part in the determination. In the
first place, I credit Taylor's testimony that Casaccio,gave
only "lateness" as the reason for the discharge when he
called Taylor into his office at 5:00 p.m. on July 31.
Casaccio's testimony, as noted above, that he did not feel
it was necessary to mention other matters, particularly when
the "other matters" had never been mentioned to Taylor,
who had received no warnings, no reprimands, during his
tenure of employment, demonstrate that Respondent did
not regard such other matters as of any great significance,
even when they allegedly took place, let alone at the time
of Taylor's termination. In view of the fact that the precipi-
tating incident was no offense at all, and for all the reasons
set forth herein, I conclude that Respondent violated- Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging Taylor on July 31, 1972.
With respect to Ramirez and O'Ferrall, who were dis-
charged the moment they began striking on August 3, 1972,
I am convinced that Respondent, which did not even have
any kind of a pretext available to discharge them after the
Union's request for recognition as representative of the
three drivers, deliberately took them off truckdriving work,
and assigned them menial tasks, as a punishment for having
selected a union, and probably in order to goad them into
are the only available records, and I accept them as business records of the
Company.
quitting. The fact that when they reacted to the changes in
their duties and to Taylor's, discharge by striking they were
immediately discharged reinforces my conclusion that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by its treatment of
Ramirez and O'Ferrall on August 2, 1972. It is true that
there is no specific evidence of knowledge by Respondent
of the 'union activities of any of the three discriminatees.
Respondent did know, however, that the Union sought rec-
ognition for the three of them, and it is reasonable to infer
that such activities were known to Respondent in these
circumstances, a unit of three drivers requested out of a
total employee complement of at most 10 employees. The
timing of Respondent's conduct, the fact that there was no
explanation for taking Ramirez and O'Ferrall off driving
duties, and assigning them to menial work, and the precipi-
tate discharge of Taylor for taking time off with, according
to Casaccio, explicit permission to do so from Casaccio, all
buttress the conclusion that Respondent knew of the Union
activities and sympathies of the three employees concerned.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
By discharging Abraham Taylor, Frank O'Ferrall, and
Manuel Ramirez because of their union activities or con-
certed activities, and by assigning Frank O'Ferrall and
Manuel Ramirez to more arduous and menial duties be-
cause of their union activities, Respondent engaged in un-
fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent,
during the hearing, made a direct offer of reinstatement to
O'Ferrall.' I O'Ferrall replied to Respondent's offer at the
hearing as follows: "I don't know what really to say, but if
the Union is recognized, I would. Yes, I would." By this
response, O'Ferrall was refusing to accept, on March 14,
1973, an unconditional offer of reinstatement made to him.
I shall therefore not order Respondent to reinstate him, and
shall order backpay as to him only to March 14, 1973.
As to Ramirez, Respondent contends that he should not
be ordered reinstated because of alleged misconduct, steal-
ing a jack handle, during the course of the strike, and after
he had been discharged. The only evidence to support
Respondent's allegation consists of the testimony of Casac-
cio that he saw Ramirez reach into a company truck parked
across the street from the store, take out the jack handle,
worth about $4.00, and put it into the back of a nearby
Buick. Ramirez denied having taken anything from the
truck. Taylor and Montanez also denied that Ramirez had
taken anything. Casaccio called the police, who arrested
11 This followed Respondent's attempt to show an offer of reinstatement
by a letter, which I rejected, that it had earlier sent to O'Ferrall telling him
that if he was interested in coming back to work, he should file an application
and come in for an interview. It is settled law that this kind of letter does not
constitute a valid offer of reinstatement. See, e.g., National Business Forms,
189 NLRB 964, Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 NLRB 5030.
QUEENS AUTO SUPPLIES, INC. 531
Ramirez. He subsequently pleaded guilty to the "violation"
(not a "crime" under New York penal law) of "loitering,"
receiving no sentence. In these circumstances, I do not ac-
cept the uncorroborated testimony of Casaccio, and there-
fore have no reason to deny the normal remedy of
reinstatement and backpay to Ramirez.
I shall, accordingly, recommend that Respondent offer
reinstatement to Abraham Taylor and Manuel Ramirez,
with backpay, computed as provided in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,
138 NLRB 716, and that it make whole Frank O'Ferrall for
the period from his discharge on August 3, 1972, to the time
of Respondent's offer of reinstatement to him on March 14,
1973, computed in accordance with the aforesaid cases.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations be adopted by the Board and become its
findings , conclusions, and Order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
13 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
ORDER 12
Respondent, Queens Auto Supplies Inc., Queens, New
York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Local 531, Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization, by
discharging or in any other manner discriminating against
employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment
or condition of employment.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Abraham Taylor and Manuel Ramirez immedi-
ate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, and make them and Frank O'Ferrall whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered, in the manner set
forth in the section hereof entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or its
agents, upon request, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(c) Post at its store in Queens, New York, and any other
locations where notices to its employees are customarily
posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."13
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 29, shall be signed by an authorized
representative of the Company and posted immediately
upon receipt thereof and maintained for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
at all locations where notices to employees are customarily
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against any employee because of his activity on behalf
of Local 531, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
or because they have engaged in a strike or any other
protected concerted activity.
WE WILL offer reemployment to Abraham Taylor and
Manuel Ramirez and WE WILL pay them and Frank
O'Ferrall for losses they suffered as a result of our
having discharged them.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their right to join or assist that Union or any other
union.
QUEENS AUTO SUPPLIES, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 16
Court Street-4th Floor, Brooklyn, New York 11241, Tele-
phone 212-596-3535.