Quality Rubber Manufacturing Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 21, 1969

176 N.L.R.B. 40 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Quality Rubber Manufacturing Company , Inc. and
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, Case
30-CA-780
May 21, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND ZAGORIA
On December 6, 1968, Trial Examiner Sidney D.
Goldberg issued his Decision in the above -entitled
proceeding , finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He
also found that the Respondent had not engaged in
other unfair practices alleged in the complaint and
recommended that such allegations be dismissed.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision
and supporting briefs, the Charging Party limiting
its exceptions to questions of remedy. The General
Counsel filed a brief in support of the Trial
Examiner ' s Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed . The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner 's Decision , the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record' in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, ' conclusions ,' and recommendations' of the
Trial Examiner, as modified herein.
'The Respondent 's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the
briefs and record adequately present the issues and the positions of the
parties.
rrhe Respondent excepts to portions of the Trial Examiner's Decision on
the grounds of alleged bias and partiality . After a careful review of the
record we specifically reject the Respondent 's contentions, there being no
evidence that the Trial Examiner prejudged this case or made prejudicial
rulings . Canton Sign Co., 174 NLRB No. 133 . The Respondent further
excepts to various findings of the Trial Examiner , on the ground that he
erred in crediting the testimony of certain witnesses . It is the established
policy of the Board not to overrule a Trial Examiner ' s credibility
resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect. Standard Dry Wall
Products. Inc.. 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). We find no
sufficient basis for disturbing the credibility findings in this case.
'We find , in agreement with the Trial Examiner , that the discharge of
Sibley, Pikka, and Johnson violated Sec. 8(axl) of the Act , and we adopt
his recommended remedy as to them . In these circumstances , we find it
unnecessary to decide whether these discharges also violated Sec. 8(a)(3).
American Art Clay Company. Inc.. 142 NLRB 624, in. 1; Pepperidge
Farm, Inc.. 134 NLRB 1245, fn. 1.
'The Charging Party excepts to the Trial Examiner's failure to
recommend that the Respondent be ordered to make employees whole for
losses suffered as a result of the Respondent 's refusal to bargain; mail
copies of the notice to employees; and permit the Union to address
In view of the Respondent's numerous violations
of the Act directly preceding and subsequent to the
Union's recognition and bargaining requests, we find
that the Respondent acted in manifest bad faith by
its refusal to bargain with the Union as the majority
representative of its employees in an appropriate
unit. We thus agree with the Trial Examiner's
finding that the Respondent ' s refusal to bargain
violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act. We
further find that an order directing the Respondent
to bargain with the Union, upon request, is
necessary to remedy the effects of its unfair labor
practices. The record shows, and we so find, that the
Union represented a majority of the employees in an
appropriate unit and the Respondent, by its course
of unfair labor practices , engaged in unlawful
conduct designed to prevent the Union from
establishing its majority status and, in so doing,
clearly evinced a determination to reject the
principle of collective bargaining. Therefore, we
shall order the Respondent to bargain , upon request,
with the Union to remedy both its violations of
Section 8(a)(5) and its violations of Section 8(ax 1)
and (3) of the Act.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Order recommended by the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent , Quality Rubber
Manufacturing Company , Inc., Wakefield,
Michigan , its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner ' s Recommended Order , as modified
below.
1. Add the following as paragraph 1(b) of the
Recommended Order , and renumber 1(b) as 1(c):
"(b) Discouraging membership in United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization of its employees, by laying off or
discharging its employees or discriminating against
them in any other manner in respect to their hire or
tenure of employment, or any other term or
condition of employment."
2. Add the following as paragraph 1(d) of the
Recommended Order:
employees , and a Board agent to read the notice and answer questions, on
company property. We deem it inappropriate in this case to depart from
our existing policy with respect to remedial orders in cases involving
violations of Sec. 8(aX5), or violations of Sec . 8(aX3) and ( 1) where, as
here , the record affords insufficient basis for additional remedial action.
We therefore find no merit in these exceptions . See Monroe Auto
Equipment Company, Hartwell Division, 164 NLRB No. 144; Marine
Welding and Repair Works. Inc.; Williamson Engine and Supply. Inc.,
Greenville Manufacturing and Machine Works, Inc.; Greenville Propeller
Work, Inc.. 174 NLRB No. 102, In. 5.
'See Bryant Chucking Grinder Company, 160 NLRB 1526, 1530, enfd.
389 F.2d 565 (C.A. 2) (Member Jenkins dissenting on other grounds)
Fabricators, Incorporated, 168 NLRB No. 21; Louisburg Sportswear Co,
173 NLRB No. 101.
176 NLRB No. 7
QUALITY RUBBER MFG CO
"(d) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the
Act, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment, in
conformity with the proviso of Section 8(aX3) of the
Act '
3 Substitute the following for the fourth indented
paragraph of the notice
We assure you that WE WILL NOT do anything
that interferes with these rights, we specifically
assure you that WE WILL NOT discourage you
from membership in United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, by discharging, laying off, or
discriminating against you in any other manner
with respect to hire or tenure of employment or
any other term of employment We further
specifically assure you that WE WILL NOT ask any
employee why he joined the Union and WE WILL
NOT threaten you with harder working conditions,
cancellation of pay raises, loss of your jobs or
that the plant will close, if you choose to be
represented by a Union
4 Add to the list of names of those to be offered
reinstatement and backpay, appearing in paragraph
2(a), the name of Douglas Twiggs
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
SIDNEY D GOLDBERG, Trial Examiner This case was
commenced, pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act),
by the issuance of a complaint' alleging that Quality
Rubber Manufacturing Company, Inc (herein called
Respondent or the Company), through its plant
superintendent, violated Section 8(axl), (3), and (5) of the
Act by coercively interrogating employees, by threatening
to discharge them and close the plant if they chose to be
represented by a union, by discriminatorily discharging 12
employees , on February 21, 26, and 28, 1968, to
discourage their union activities and membership, and by
refusing to recognize United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO (herein called the Union), as the
collective-bargaining representative of the employees
although the Union was designed as such by a majority of
the employees in an appropriate unit
Respondent answered, denying that it had violated the
Act as alleged in the complaint, and the issues so raised
came on for trial before me at Wakefield, Michigan, on
June 26 and 27, 1968 During the course of the trial, the
General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege
the wrongful discharge of an additional employee on May
5, 1968 The motion was denied but the Board, on appeal,
directed that the amendment be permitted Respondent
thereupon denied having wrongfully discharged that
employee and this issue came on for trial before me at
Wakefield, Michigan, on August 14, 1968 At all sessions
of the trial, the General Counsel, the Union, and the
Respondent were represented by counsel, were afforded an
opportunity to adduce evidence, cross-examine witnesses,
'April 30 1968, on a charge fled March I and amended charges filed
March 11 and 26 1968
41
and argue upon the facts and the law Briefs were filed by
the General Counsel and by counsel for the Respondent
and they have been considered
For reasons hereinafter set forth in detail, I find that
Respondent unlawfully discharged 11 of the 12 employees
terminated in February but that the May 5 discharge was
not unlawful, I also find that in February and March the
Union was designated by a majority of Respondent's
employees , in an appropriate unit , as their
collective-bargain mg representative and that, therefore,
Respondent 's refusal to bargain with it was also unlawful
Upon the entire record, and the demeanor of the
witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE EMPLOYER
Respondent operates a plant at Wakefield, Michigan,
where it produces rubber gaskets for use, primarily, in
automobiles It admits that during 1967 it shipped out of
the State of Michigan products valued at more than
$50,000, and imported products valued at more than
$50,000, and that it is an employer engaged in commerce
I so find
11 THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits that the Union is a labor
organization
III THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A Background
Respondent operates similar plants at Chicago , Illinois,
and Wakefield, Michigan, but only the Wakefield plant is
involved in this case William Tersmar, plant
superintendent at the Wakefield plant since it was opened
in July 1967, had previously been plant superintendent at
Chicago for about 14 years
The Wakefield plant consists of a single, rectangular
building, about 100 feet wide and 224 feet deep, divided
into four rooms, each the width of the building but
varying in depth The front entrance is in the center of the
west wall of the building and the openings between the
rooms are in the center of the partitions A rough sketch
showing the relative positions of the rooms and the
approximate location of the furniture and machinery
referred to herein (but not precise distances or dimensions)
is set forth below '
In the pressroom there are several rows of machines,
each containing an oven and a set of molds Raw
material , usually pellets of rubber, is placed by the
operator into each of the hundred or more cavities in the
mold, which is then closed and moved into the oven where
it is heated for the necessary interval, usually 8 minutes,
when it automatically comes down The operator then
pulls the mold out of the oven, pries it open, takes out the
formed gasket, cleans the cavities with compressed air,
and fills them for the next operation The estimates for
this operation varied from 1-1/2 minutes claimed
sufficient by Plant Superintendent Tersmar3 to the 4 to 8
minutes claimed necessary by employee Donald Pikka
'[See p 42]
42
Each pressroom employee was responsible for three
machines, filling and closing them in turn so that, when
the third machine had been filled, the first had completed,
or almost completed, its process and become ready to be
opened and refilled. The only opportunity for the
pressmen to rest would be during the time between the
closing of the third mold and the necessity for opening
and refilling the first one.
After the formed gaskets are removed from the molds,
they are placed in the tumbling machines where, at a
temperature of 60 degrees below zero, they are tumbled to
smooth their surfaces. They are then placed on a conveyor
belt which takes them to the inspecting tables where the
women employees check them for defects and, if not
rejected, pack them for shipping.
In February 1968, the plant operated on two shifts: the
"day" shift, from 7 a.m. until 5 p.m. on the first 4 days of
the week and from 7 a.m. until 3 p.m. on the fifth day;
and the "afternoon" shift, from 5 p.m. until 3 a.m. There
were no scheduled "breaks" on either shift.
B. Outline of Relevant Events
While there can be no dispute concerning the broad
outline of the important events in this case, the detailed
accounts of each of them, as given by the General
Counsel's witnesses, were almost entirely controverted by
Respondent. The record, however, shows that in January
and early February, according to employee-witnesses, they
discussed among themselves their dissatisfaction with their
working conditions, particularly the lack of any lunch
period.4 During the week February 12-16, the employees
on the afternoon shift, after notifying John Tersinar, in
charge of that shift, of their intention, took a 10-minute
break for lunch. John Tersinar, the employees testified,
appeared dissatisfied with their conduct but said nothing
until the end of the week when he said that anyone who
continued the practice would be discharged. The break
was not thereafter taken.' On Wednesday of the following
week, however, William Tersinar returned to the plant in
the evening and discharged Ray Sibley. As Sibley was
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 North
West Laboratory
leaving, he stopped to talk with employees Donald Pikka
and Herbert Johnson. Tersinar thereupon directed them to
leave and not to return.
During the following weekend, a number of
Respondent's employees signed cards authorizing the
Union to represent them, William Tersinar admitted that
on Sunday afternoon he had a telephone call reporting
this activity.
On Monday morning, when the men reported for work,
William Tersinar told them, they testified, not to clock in
but to sit down and wait. At starting time, it is clear,
seven of the eight employees left the plant and the
remaining employee went to work. Later that morning, a
representative of the Union telephoned Tersinar, informed
him that a majority of the plant employees had designated
the Union as their representative and requested that the
seven men be returned to work. Tersinar refused, stating
that they had quit. In later telephone calls that day and
the day following, the union representative again stated
that the Union was the agent of a majority of the
employees and requested an opportunity to bargain with
Respondent.
On Wednesday afternoon George Golembeski, a
day-shift employee who had been ill and not present
Monday morning, telephoned the plant to say he was
ready to return to work but Tersinar told him to stay
home.
On March 15, after an exchange of letters, the union
representative met with Respondent's counsel and plant
superintendent. Photocopies of the Union's authorization
cards were examined by Respondent's representatives, who
then announced that, since several of those cards had been
signed by people who were no longer employed, the Union
did not represent a majority of its employees, and they
refused to bargain with the Union.
1".. if the man is fast."
'Plant Superintendent William Tersinar admitted having been asked
about a lunch hour "early in the year" and having answered that there was
"no such thing in the pressroom."
'John Tersinar denied this entire incident.
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Pressroom I Millroom
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Women's Men's lockets
washroom and washroom
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South
QUALITY RUBBER MFG. CO. 43
C. The Issues
The General Counsel contends that Respondent, by
William Tersinar's threats and coercive interrogation from
September 1967 through April 1968, interfered with the
employees' rights of self-organization; that the discharges
of 13 employees on February 21, 26, and 28, and May 5,
1968, were discriminatory and to discourage union
membership; and that the Company's refusal to bargain
with the Union on February 27, March 25, and thereafter
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Respondent's counsel points out that the basic issue
herein is whether the terminations of employment on
February 21 and 26 were valid actions by the Company
because, if they were, the Union did not represent a
majority of the employees when it made its demand for
recognition. With commendable candor, however,
Respondent's counsel concedes that, if those terminations
were unlawful, the Union did represent a majority and the
refusal to bargain was also unlawful.
No issue is raised by Respondent concerning the
validity of the card authorizations or the appropriateness
of the unit.
D. Discussions and Conclusions
1. Union animus
As background evidence of Respondent's basic hostility
to self-organization among its employees, the General
Counsel adduced evidence from Raymond Monti, an
employee from June 21, 1967, until he was terminated on
February 26, 1968, of a conversation he had with William
Tersinar in April 1967. Monti testified that Tersinar was
showing him around the machinery then being installed in
the plant, in connection with the possibility that he,
Monti, might apply for a job. At one point in their
conversation , according to Monti, Tersinar stated that the
"one thing" that would not be tolerated in the plant was a
union ; that the Chicago plant had a union but that "it did
not pay" for the employees because "they got nothing but
5 cents an hour." Tersinar did not deny the incident,
except to testify that he had not "at any time told
anybody" that he did want a union in the plant.
2. Interference, restraint, and coercion
The complaint includes nine subparagraphs alleging
incidents of coercion and restraint perpetrated by Plant
Superintendent Tersinar against employees. Seven of these
subparagraphs deal with statements closely connected
with, or subsequent to, the alleged discharges on February
21 and 26, and they can be best discussed in connection
with those actions by Respondent.
Employee Nels Luoma testified that, around the
beginning of October 1967, a fellow employee, Ralph
Olsen, was laid off; that the following day he asked Plant
Superintendent Tersinar why this had been done and that
Tersinar answered: "Because he ' s a union organizer."
Employees Verner Mattson and Glen LeGassa testified
that they overheard this conversation and they
corroborated Luoma's testimony. Tersinar denied having
made this statement. For the reasons set forth later in this
decision, I do not credit Tersinar's denial and find that he
made the statement. It constituted a clearly coercive
threat of similar treatment to any employee who might
attempt to exercise the right of self-organization
guaranteed in the Act and, therefore, it violated Section
8(a)(l) thereof.'
Employee Donald Pikka testified that, on the Friday
preceding New Year's Day in 1968, i.e., December 29,
1967, he applied to Plant Superintendent Tersinar for
work; that Tersinar asked him whether he belonged to a
union and said they didn't want a union in the place; that
he was hired and started work on January 2. Tersinar
admitted, of course, that he had hired Pikka but testified
that he did not remember the incident. He nevertheless
denied having ever made these statements to Pikka or to
"anybody in the plant or outside...." Here, again, I do
not credit Tersinar's denial: I find that he asked the
question, stated his determination not to have a union in
the plant and that, in context, these were coercive in
violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
3. The lunch break and the discharges of February 21
The employees of the plant were dissatisfied with the
absence of a lunch break but had been unsuccessful in
obtaining one.7 On Monday, February 12, according to
employees Donald Pikka and Raymond Sibley, they
conferred with Herbert O. Johnson, another employee on
the afternoon shift, and decided to ask John Tersinar, in
charge of that shift,$ for a 10-minute lunch break.
They appointed Johnson as their spokesman and he
asked John Tersinar to permit the break. Tersinar told
Johnson, Sibley testified, that "we can't let the molds
stop, we've got to keep them running ." Nevertheless,
according to Pikka and Sibley, they, plus Johnson, Matt
Mattson, and George Golembeski, took a 10-minute break
for lunch that evening and on Tuesday, Wednesday, and
Thursday of that week. They testified that John Tersinar
made no protest, but that his manner was harsher toward
them than toward the other employees on the shift and
that he assisted other employees but would not assist
them. On Friday, however, as they were about to take the
break, John Tersinar told Sibley and Pikka that, if they
took a break that evening, "not to bother to come out
Monday." They did not take the break again . About 2:30
'This incident is alleged in the complaint as violative of Sec . 8(aXl) and
testimony fixes its occurrence well within 6 months prior to the filing of
the charge . The statement in the General Counsel's brief that this incident
cannot be found to be a violation by reason of Sec. 10(b) is regarded as
inadvertent.
'Plant Superintendent Tersinar first denied but, when confronted with
the contrary statement in his pretrial affidavit , admitted that at the
beginning of the year an employee had asked him why they didn't have a
lunch hour and that he had answered that "there was no such thing as a
lunch hour in the pressroom."
'John Tersinar, son of Plant Superintendent William Tersinar , was less
than 22 years old at this time. He had, however , been employed by
Respondent for 4-1/2 years, the first 3 at the plant in Chicago and
thereafter at Wakefield since it opened. Despite William Tersinar 's effort
to downgrade his son's position by testifying that he "wasn 't assigned to
anything" and describing his duties as "a teacher of the employees," he
admitted that his son was "running the second shift " of the press
department , that his duties were "to we that everything was running to the
orders I left him correctly and that everybody were on their job"; that he
recommended hiring , promotions, and discharges and that he "responsibly
directed" the work of the employees on the second shift . He also testified
that he expected the men on the afternoon shift to take instructions from
his son and that his son did relay his orders to the men . Both Sibley and
Pikka, who were on the afternoon shift, testified that they took their
orders from John Tersinar and that they had requested and been granted
time off by him. It seems clear , and I find , that John Tersinar , although
not empowered to hire and fire , did have the power "responsibly to direct"
the pressmen on the afternoon shift rather than merely to relay orders and
that he was a supervisor within the meaning of Sec . 2(11) of the Act
44 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a.m., their normal quitting time that night , John Tersinar
directed them to put another load in their molds and that
this required them to work about 15 or 20 minutes longer.
On Wednesday evening , February 21, Plant
Superintendent Tersinar returned to the plant about 7:30
and summoned Raymond Sibley to the office. Sibley
testified that he found Tersinar there alone; that Tersinar
asked him whether he "liked to work there" and he said
he did ; that Tersinar was "saying something" when he,
Sibley, said: "Well, quit beating around the bush, are you
going to lay me off, or what?"; and that Tersinar then
said : "Yes, that's the idea ." Sibley then asked the reason
for his layoff and Tersinar said it was "for giving his son
trouble." Sibley asked for a layoff slip and Tersinar told
him to come back for it and for his pay the following day.
Sibley testified that as he passed along the row of
machines he told Pikka that he had been laid off and that
he then went to the picnic table to pick up his lunch pail
whereupon William Tersinar told him to "get out." As he
was about to leave, he testified, Tersinar said, without
apparent reason; "I've dealt with the Labor Boards and
the unions for 20 years."
The following day, Sibley testified, he came to the plant
for his pay and a layoff slip; he found both Pikka and
Herbert Johnson there. He asked Tersinar for a layoff slip
and Tersinar said : "What do you mean, I fired you." At
that time John Tersinar and Johnson were having a
discussion about the adequacy of the time on the molds
and Johnson said that John Tersinar was too young to
handle men; that William Tersinar then repeated the
statement that he had dealt with the unions and Labor
Boards for 20 years and could handle them.
Pikka testified that on Wednesday evening , as Sibley
returned from the office and passed along the line of
machines , he told him he'd been laid off; that Johnson
came over and they were standing together when John
Tersinar came over to him and said : "You go, too."
Pikka testified that he went to the picnic table to put on
his coat when William Tersinar came to him and told him
to punch out; that Johnson was close behind him and
Tersinar told him, also, to punch out. According to Pikka,
Johnson asked William Tersinar why Sibley was being
laid off and Tersinar said he didn't have to tell him.
At that point, Pikka testified, he told William Tersinar
that he had been scheduled to get a raise in 30 days and
he didn't get it whereupon Tersinar said he'd get whatever
was coming to him . Tersinar continued , according to
Pikka, by saying: "If you get a union in the place you'll
have to work a lot harder." The three employees then left.
The next day, Pikka testified, he came to the plant for
his check and found Sibley and Johnson there; they
received their checks and asked for layoff slips; William
Tersinar said that they had quit but that they might get
layoff slips the following week if the Company decided to
grant them; and that Tersinar repeated his statement
about having "dealt with Labor Boards for 20 years."
Respondent ' s account of this incident is radically
different: John Tersinar testified that Sibley's work was
poor the first week of his 3-week employment and there
was no improvement the second week ; that during the
second week Sibley started to throw bits of material
around and to wander away from his work. He stated that
he called his father and told him about Sibley and that his
father said to warn Sibley; he also testified that his father
talked to Sibley, perhaps more than once, either in the
pressroom or the office but he couldn't remember 'when
that occurred. The evening of Sibley's discharge, John
Tersinar testified, "was the worst"; that Sibley was
throwing metal around and walking away from his press,
so he called his father, who came to the plant and told
him to send Sibley to the office. When Sibley came out of
the office, Tersinar stated, he ran over to Pikka and
Johnson and said: "I'm fired," whereupon both Pikka and
Johnson said: "Let's go, then" and they waved to the
other employees asking them to go out also but none of
the others did. He also testified that nobody except Sibley
ever threw metal or rubber about the plant.
William Tersinar, who testified before his son, stated
that he hired Sibley in January and that he thought,
during the first week, that Sibley "was going to make a
pretty good man"; but that then Sibley started to throw
things about and fail to stay on the job. He told his son to
warn Sibley that, if the horseplay continued, he would be
let go and he testified that he once warned Sibley himself.
On February 21, he testified, his son telephoned him and
said he couldn't keep Sibley on the job and that he was
throwing metal around; he went to the plant and
summoned Sibley to the office; that Sibley came into the
office saying: "You're going to fire me" but that he said:
"Well, let's don't put it as `fire', we just can't use you if
you're going to continue this horseplay." According to
Tersinar, Sibley turned right around, went into the
pressroom, waving his arms, and saying, "I got fired, let's
get out of here." He saw Pikka and Johnson walking
along with Sibley, Tersinar stated, so he went over to
them and told them: "punch out, if you boys are going
out, and don't come back."
Both John and William Tersinar denied that there had
been a lunch break in the pressroom or a request for one.
Herbert Johnson did not testify.
The two accounts of the events leading to and
surrounding these discharges are in absolute conflict and
neither is inherently improbable.' The testimony of each
of the Tersinars, except for the relatively minor conflict as
to whether Sibley was, during the second week of his
employment, a good or poor employee, is mutually
corroborative, and the testimony of Sibley and Pikka is
also mutually corroborative. The interest of all who
testified on this matter is also apparent: Sibley and Pikka
are discharged employees who seek reinstatement and the
Tersinars, as operators of the plant, are endeavoring to
defend their own actions. It becomes necessary, therefore,
to take into account the credibility of the witnesses. In
this area, however, the task is easier : John Tersinar was
very clearly-and not unnaturally-under the complete
domination of his father, and William Tersinar made
much of the fact that his son had no managerial discretion
(although I have found to the contrary). As a witness,
William Tersinar was agressive, yet frequently evasive,
and he was forced to withdraw several of his testimonial
denials when confronted with the contents of his pretrial
statement. His manner in testifying convinced me that his
answers were designed to justify his actions and support
Respondent's defense rather than disclose the facts. After
denying that the subject of a lunch break had ever arisen,
he conceded that it had, and his answers with respect to
this subject, constantly comparing the plant to those of
other companies, were obviously based upon how he felt
Respondent's plant should operate. Most important,
however, in my conclusion that William Tersinar was not
a credible witness, is his testimony in connection with the
events of Sunday, February 25, the next incident to be
discussed herein.
'Excepted from this comment are the statements , attributed to William
QUALITY RUBBER MFG. CO. 45
The testimony of William and John Tersinar is rejected,
therefore, and that of Sibley and Pikka is accepted. I find
'that Sibley, Pikka, Johnson, and some of the other
employees on the afternoon shift took a 10-minute lunch
break February 12 to 15 and discontinued it under threat
of discharge . Only this background gives a reasonable
explanation for the Tersinars ' animosity toward Johnson
and Pikka which led to their discharge on no greater
provocation than their momentary conference with Sibley
after his discharge , since neither of the Tersinars testified
to any action by them that could be reasonably construed
as walking out. Moreover , William Tersinar conceded that
they were both good workmen whom he had not
theretofore considered firing . I find that Sibley , Johnson,
and Pikka were discharged in retaliation for their having
sought and having taken a 10-minute lunch break.
The complaint alleges that these three employees were
"discriminatorily terminated . . . because of their union
sympathy, and in order to discourage the union
membership and activities of their fellow employees" and
the argument, in the General Counsel's brief, that these
three employees were discharged "to discourage union ...
activities" is based upon his contention that the evidence
shows that William Tersinar was aware of "union"
activity.10 The credible evidence, however, does not
support a finding that Respondent had knowledge of
union - as distinguished from concerted - activity
among the employees at this time.
The final paragraph of the complaint, however, alleges
that all the conduct set forth therein constituted "unfair
labor practices , as defined in Section 8(a)(l), (3 ), and (5)
of the Act" and the General Counsel argues, alternatively,
Tersinar on both February 21 and 22 , that he had "dealt with the Labor
Boards and the unions for 20 years " and that : " if you get a union in the
place you ' ll have to work a lot harder ." There is nothing to indicate that
Respondent then had any knowledge of union activity and nothing in the
record that gives these statements probability at that time , although I find
that they were made at the time of the additional discharges on February
26. Accordingly, I do not find that Tersinar made these statements on
February 21 and 22.
"The General Counsel relies upon William Tersinar's antiunion
statement to Raymond Monti in April 1967 that Respondent would not
have a union in the plant ; upon Tersinar 's statement that the reason for
Olsen 's layoff was because he was a "union organizer " (herein found
violative of Sec . 8(aXl) of the Actk upon Tersinar 's statement to Pikka
before he hired him in late December 1967 that he didn 't want a union in
the place (also found herein violative of Sec . 8(aXl) of the Act); upon the
statements of William Tersinar that he had "dealt with unions and Labor
Boards for 20 years"; upon William Tersinar's statement that "if a union
came in" the men would have to work harder; upon Mrs. Vilencia's
testimony that William Tersinar warned her that her husband's
involvement in union activities might get him diaduxged and that this
occurred prier to her telephone converaatim with hhn on February 25
(altho, g her affidavit places this conversation on February 26), and upon
the fact that such knowledge by Respondent is inferable because both the
plant and the community are small.
A serious difficulty with the General Counsel ' s reliance upon these
factors is that LaGassa's testimony shows that the first overt activity in
support of the Union occurred on Saturday , February 24, when he
obtained blank authorization cards and began soliciting signatures among
his fellow employees. For this reason , there appears to be no foundation of
probability for the statements attributed to Tersinar , at the time of these
first discharges , concerning his dealings with Labor Boards and unions and
to the likelihood that the men would have to work harder if a union came
in, and I do not find that they were made . For the same reason I cannot
justify an inference that Tersinar knew , because of the small size of the
plant and the community, that there was current activity in support of the
Union . Finally, Mrs. Vilencia's testimony concerning Tersinar 's warning to
her concerning union activity by her husband fixes the date of that warning
both before and after her February 25 telephone call and , accordingly,
proves neither date.
that these discharges were to coerce the employees for
their exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
i.e., concerted activities for mutual aid or protection.
While it now appears, by the exercise of hindsight, that
it would have shown better judgement to have included an
express allegation that Respondent ' s conduct also
constituted " interference , restraint, and coercion ," rather
than simply using the less satisfactory shorthand device of
stating that, by its conduct, "Respondent has engaged in .
.. unfair labor practices , as defined in Section 8(a)(l), (3)
and (5) of the Act," the Board and courts have
nevertheless held that due process does not require rigidity
in the relationship of pleading and proof but that the real
questions are whether Respondent was adequately
informed of the claims to be adjudicated and whether the
issues were, in fact, fully litigated." I think that there can
be no doubt that Respondent herein was adequately
informed that the discharge of employees Sibley, Pikka,
and Johnson on February 21 would be litigated as an
unfair labor practice; whether the General Counsel's proof
at the trial was on the basis of their concerted activity in
seeking a lunch break or on the basis of their
"membership in a labor organization" could not, and did
not, have any material effect on the nature of
Respondent's defense that Sibley was discharged for
misconduct in throwing material around and that William
Tersinar, when he saw Pikka and Johnson about to walk
out, told them that if they did so they need not come
back.
Accordingly, I find that Sibley, Pikka, and Johnson
were discharged in retaliation for having engaged in
concerted activity in an attempt to affect their conditions
of employment and that their discharge by Respondent for
this activity interfered with their exercise of the right
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act to engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection and that
Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(l) thereof.'I
Moreover, Section 2(5) of the Act clearly indicates, and
the Board has frequently held, that no particular formality
of organization for concerted activities is necessary and
that any group of employees, united for the purpose of
dealing with their employer concerning conditions of their
employment, constitutes a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act." Accordingly, I find that
Respondent's discharge of these three employees also
constituted discrimination "to discourage union .
activities" and an unfair labor practice as defined by
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. Respondent's notice of union activity
During the weekend of February 24-25, employee
LeGassa persuaded many of his fellow employees to sign
union authorization cards . The progress of the campaign,
however, was not entirely smooth and an argument
occurred at a gasoline station which resulted in a
telephone call to William Tersinar by Mary Vilencia, wife
of Mike Vilencia, a pressroom employee . Mrs. Vilencia
told Tersinar that her husband had nothing to do with
"Independent Metal Workers , Local I (Hughes Tool Company). 147
NLRB 1573, 1576-77; The Frito Company v. N L R B., 330 F.2d 458
(C.A. 9).
"Washington Aluminum Company. 126 NLRB 1410, enforcement
directed 370 U.S. 9.
"Phaostron Instrument and Electronic Company, 146 NLRB 966, 1006;
Dove Manfacturing Company. 128 NLRB 778; and see Latex
Industries , Incorporated, 132 NLRB 1.
46 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"the group of employees who were involved in union
activities at the plant." According to Mrs. Vilencia,"
Tersinar answered that he had heard rumors of a union at
the plant but didn't believe them; that "he hoped this
didn't close the plant due to the high overhead" and that
the men "should have waited a couple of years before they
organized and had they waited the wages might have gone
up to possibly $2.65 per hour this summer."
Although William Tersinar admitted having received
the call from Mrs. Vilencia and that she said her husband
was threatened by some people "trying to have him sign
some card," he claimed he was "not interested" in her call
because he was watching television. He also said he could
not recall that she said her husband "didn't have anything
to do with union organization in the plant" although a
portion of his pretrial affidavit, received in evidence, so
states. Similarly, he was unable to recall, both when he
gave a pretrial affidavit and when he testified, having said
anything about plant closing or a raise in wages. He did
not, however, dispute the testimony of Clarence Johnson,
who is still employed, that he telephoned him at 6:30
Sunday evening to ask whether he had been asked to sign
a union card and that he said "I'll tell you right now, if
the union comes in we're going to close the doors."" Not
only does Clarence Johnson's testimony refute Tersinar's
statement that he was "not interested" in Mrs. Vilencia's
message concerning the Union's card campaign, but it
corroborates and recasts in clearly coercive language Mrs.
Vilencia's testimony concerning his statement to her
concerning the plant's closing. Based upon this incident, as
well as the others noted herein and his demeanor while
testifying, I conclude that William Tersinar was not a
credible witness. Accordingly, I find that Tersinar
threatened to close the plant if a union came in and held
out a promise that, if the employees would forego
self-organization, their wages might rise substantially" in
the near future. Both the threat and the "promise""
constituted restraint and coercion of the employees in
their exercise of the right of self-organization and were
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The February 26 discharges
The first pressroom employees at the plant on Monday
morning, February 26, were Verner Mattson and Nels
Luoma, who arrived at 6:30 a.m., met in the parking lot,
and walked into the plant together. According to both of
them, William Tersinar met them at the door and said
that he wanted the employees to "help" him; that he had
had a telephone call from Mrs. Vilencia saying that her
husband had been asked to join a union, had refused, and
felt that he was being threatened. Tersinar then asked
"Mrs. Vilencia was a most reluctant and hostile witness: she quarreled
with counsel and refused to answer questions . When confronted with her
pretrial affidavit , she claimed not to remember the facts set forth in it,
although she conceded that the information given to the investigating agent
was true . Accordingly, the affidavit was received in evidence as past
recollection recorded (3 Wigmore , Evidence 734, 746 (3d ed .) and has been
considered as if testimomally given.
"While being questioned concerning evidence that he had made a similar
statement to employee Whitburn in April 1968 , Tersmar denied that he
had ever told "anybody" that the plant would be closed if the Union came
in. I do not regard this generalization as a denial of the specific testimony.
"Six employees stated their wage rates : two received $I; five received
$ 1.90; and two received $2.05.
"While the complaint does not allege promises of benefit as interference,
restraint , or coercion , it does allege "suspension of contemplated benefits"
and this fits within that allegation.
Luoma whether it was true that a union was trying to
organize the plant and Luoma said that it was. Luoma
testified that he also said that he did not know anything
about a phone call. As the men moved toward the
timeclock, Tersinar told them not to punch in, so they sat
down at the picnic table, located in the same room. Both
Luoma and Mattson testified that Tersinar then began
talking to them about the Union, saying he didn't want a
union and if it came in he would shut the plant down; that
he drew comparisons between their own situation and that
in Chicago, where there is a union, saying that at Chicago
the men used to receive hams and turkeys at Thanksgiving
and Easter and a bonus at Christmas and that he had
intended to give his men hams for Easter. He also said
that, although the men at Chicago had a 10-minute break
before and after dinner, they wished they did not have the
union and that, if the Union came in, each man would be
given four presses instead of three and they would still get
no break. Mattson and Luoma testified that at that time
other employees began coming in.
Leonard Westeen, a millroom employee, testified that
he arrived at 6:40 with Douglas Twiggs and they were
about to punch in but Tersinar told them not to do so but
to sit down. Glen LeGassa testified that he arrived at
6:45, that he saw Luoma and Mattson at the picnic table
and that Tersinar told him not to punch in. He testified
that Tersinar, after saying that the men at the Chicago
plant had received a $10 bonus the previous year, said
that he was going to lay the employees off or fire them.
At 6:50, according to employee Raymond Monti, he
came in , saw the men around the table and went to it,
asking Luoma what the trouble was. Luoma said, "We
have labor trouble." Monti testified that Tersinar then
said: "I will have nothing to do with the Union: I will not
tolerate it: you fellows are all fired." Shortly thereafter,
George Monti, who had arrived with his father but had
been delayed in the parking lot, came in and also sat
down at the picnic table.
During all of this time, according to Mattson, Luoma,
and LeGassa, Tersinar was walking back and forth near
the picnic table, leaving the area for short intervals and
then returning; that he was mumbling inaudibly some of
the time and talking at other times to the men at the
table. The testimony concerning Tersinar's statements was
given by all five of the foregoing employee-witnesses: they
did not all testify to all of the statements and their
accounts of the order and terms in which Tersinar made
the statements did not coincide with precision. Their
combined testimony, however, adequately and credibly
describes an intermittent and emotional declamation by
Tersinar in which each of the described statements was
made by him once or more and in which the paramount
theme was his insistence that the plant would not operate
if the men were represented by the Union.
Mike Vilencia, the last to arrive, testified that he came
in at 6:55 and that Tersinar directed him to sit at the
picnic table. At that time, therefore, pressroom employees
Mattson, Luoma, LeGassa, Twiggs, Raymond Monti,
George Monti, and Vilencia, and millroom employee
Westeen, were present.
All of the foregoing employees who testified" agree that
Tersinar then asked Mattson and Luoma, in turn, whether
they were going to work and that they answered: "Not if
the others don't"; that Tersinar then addressed the same
question to some of the others with the same result except
"Mattson , Luoma , LeGassa , Raymond Monti , Westeen , and Vilenc,a.
QUALITY RUBBER MFG. CO.
that Vilencia answered: "I have to go to work. I have a
family to support."
The employees all testified that Tersinar then said-
"You are all laid off; no, you are all fired," and that he
walked over to the timeclock and pulled out a number of
timecards. All the employees at the picnic table, except
Vilencia, thereupon went to the locker room, picked up
their working clothes, and left the plant.
William Tersinar's account of the morning's events is
as follows: he arrived at the plant about 6:15; shortly
thereafter he saw Luoma and Mattson coming in and he
told them not to punch in "too early"; that he left that
room, where the picnic table is located, to turn on some
machinery and that, when he returned, he saw the two
men and several others sitting at the picnic table and he
saw some other men walking around that room or in the
locker room. He testified that a few minutes--not more
than 5-before 7 o'clock he went to the table and "saw
that they weren't going to work" so he said, "Aren't you
going to work?" Someone said "no" so he walked toward
them and pointed to Luoma, who said "no"; he then
pointed to Mattson and said "are you going to work?"
and Mattson said "no," and he pointed to Twiggs, and
Twiggs said "no."
About that time, according to Tersinar, Mike Vilencia
said "I have to go to work, I have a family to support,"
so he told Vilencia to punch in and get on the job.
Tersinar also said that he told the others that it was time
to go to work; that he said "get out of the plant" to the
three people who said they didn't want to go to work; and
he testified that, as they left, they took the rest of the
pressroom with them.
Tersinar admitted that he was at and away from the
picnic table several times between the arrival of Mattson
and Luoma at 6:30 and his inquiry, just before 7, as to
whether the men were going to work, but he testified that
he had no conversation with them. He also testified that
he had been pacing back and forth in that room but
insisted that he was only "watching the machines." He
flatly denied having talked to the men at all prior to 5
minutes before 7 when he asked them whether they were
going to work.
Respondent also produced as witnesses several of the
female employees who work as inspectors in the same
room where the picnic table and timeclock are located.
The one who claimed to have arrived earliest, Genevieve
Salo, testified that she arrived between 6:35 and 6:40,
having left her home at 6:30 and driven the "mile or so"
to the plant; that she took off her winter coat and
overshoes in the cloakroom, put on her shoes and jacket,
and then entered the room containing the timeclock, the
picnic table, and the conveyor belts. She saw "all the
men" sitting at the picnic table as she passed on her way
to the timeclock; she testified that the table was
"crowded," and named five of the men she could recall,
while stating that she was "sure there was more ." After
punching in, she went over to the conveyor belt and sat
down. She testified that Tersinar was walking near the
picnic table; that "just before time for working" she heard
him ask the men whether or not they wanted to work and
that the men "picked up their pails and they walked out
the door."
Mary Anderson testified that she arrived at the plant
between 6:45 and 6:50 that morning; that she first went to
the cloakroom where she took off her jacket and changed
her shoes; that she went into the larger room, punched her
timecard and was about to sit down at the picnic table
when she noticed that "all the men were there" so she
47
went and sat down with Mrs. Salo near the conveyor
belts. After 5 or 6 minutes, she testified, it got to be 2 or
3 minutes before 7 and time to begin work so she walked
toward the picnic table to put her purse and lunch pail on
it; as she approached the table, she heard Tersinar ask the
men whether they were going to work or not, after which
they left.
Florence Beber testified that she arrived between 6:45
and 6:50, having left home at 6:40 and made a brief stop
with her husband. She testified that she left her jacket in
the cloakroom, changed her shoes, and entered the
inspection room between 6:45 and 6:50. She saw the men
sitting at the picnic table as she went to the clock so she
punched in and then went over to sit with Mrs. Salo and
Mrs. Anderson near the conveyor belts. A few minutes
before 7 she walked toward the picnic table and saw
Tersinar with the men there; she heard him ask them if
they wanted to go to work, after which they picked up
their lunch pails and started out of the plant. As the men
went out, one of them she believed it was Luoma -
said that she could work if she wanted to.
Patricia Juopperi" testified that she arrived 10 minutes
before 7, punched in her timecard, and went to the
conveyor belt where the other women were seated. At that
time, she believed, most of the pressroom men were at the
picnic table and she saw William Tersinar also near it.
She testified that she heard Tersinar ask all the men at
the picnic table whether they wanted their jobs and they
said "no" and walked out. She testified that it was about
3 minutes after she arrived at the plant that the pressroom
employees walked out.
Verna Morrison testified that she arrived at the plant
between 6:50 and 6:55, took "a few minutes" to put away
her coat and change from boots to shoes, and that she
then went into the room with the picnic table; that when
she entered the room she did not see any of the men at
the picnic table but that she met them as they were
coming out the door with William Tersinar directly behind
them. She testified that she heard Tersinar say something
similar to "alright, boys that's all" or "alright, boys,
that's it," and that one of the men, Douglas Twiggs, said
to her that the women could either work or go home.
As stated above in connection with some of the
incidents prior to February 26, I cannot regard William
Tersinar as a credible witness. That conclusion is
reinforced by the conflict between his testimony that on
this date, other than cautioning Mattson and Luoma not
to punch in "too early," he did not instruct anyone not to
punch in, with the testimony of Respondent' s witness,
Vilencia, who testified that, when he arrived at 6:55,
Tersinar told him not to punch in. Tersinar also testified
that, although he was pacing to and fro in the room near
the picnic table, he was only "watching the machines" but
the record is clear that none of the machines in that room
- conveyor belts and tumbling machines - had been
turned on.
Moreover, I find it completely improbable that Tersinar
had nothing to say to the men on the morning after being
informed that a union organizational campaign was being
conducted among them - particularly since the report he
received featured "threats" by the union solicitors and his
asserted lack of interest in that report is belied by his
prompt investigatory telephone call to Johnson. On the
contrary, the probability appears to me to lie with the
"Mrs. Juoppen was called by the General Counsel but only identified
her union card ; the balance of her testimony was elicited by Respondent on
cross-examination.
48 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
account given by the male employees who testified."
Accordingly, I find that William Tersinar made the
statements set forth in the testimony of the male
employees; that he threatened to shut the plant down if
the Union came in ; threatened that , if the men were
represented by a union, they would be required to attend
four instead of three presses and that they still would have
no breaktime; and that he threatened to lay off or
discharge the employees . All of these statements were
coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Moreover , I find that by these statements , when viewed in
context, Tersinar implied that the employees could not
remain members of the Union and continue to be
employed by Respondent . These statements also gave rise
to a belief among the employees that some or all of them
were scheduled for immediate discharge because of their
self-organizational activity and their answers that they
were not going to work unless the others did were an
affirmance of their right to remain members of the Union
rather than a refusal to go to work . I find that none of the
employees quit , as Respondent contends , but that
Tersinar's inquiry as to whether they were going to work
was simply a part of his diatribe of threats and
denunciations which really constituted a demand that, to
continue in employment , they would be required to
renounce their union activity and which , when most of the
men expressed their solidarity with the others , culminated
in his discharge of all the employees at the picnic table21
except Vilencia . These discharges were discriminatory and
for the purpose of discouraging membership in the Union.
Accordingly, they were in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
6. The refusal to bargain
a. Demand and refusal
Later in the morning on February 26, Staff
Representative Soltis of the Union telephoned Tersinar to
request reinstatement for the seven employees who had
been discharged. Tersinar refused, saying that they had
quit but that he might reemploy one or two of them at
some future time . Soltis protested , saying that the men
had the right to organize and that a majority had
designated the United Steelworkers as their representative.
Tersinar said that, if the men wanted a union , he "would
have got" them the union representing the employees at
the Chicago plant. 22 Tersinar admitted that Soltis told
him that a majority of Respondent 's employees had
authorized the Union to represent them. On the same day,
the Union , over Soltis ' signature , wrote Respondent that
it represented a majority of the employees in a specifically
"The testimony of the women employees does not contradict that of the
men since I find that they minimized the time necessary to change from
boots to shoes and tended to make the time of their arrival at the plant
earlier than it was . Moreover, they merely testified that they heard nothing
until Tersinar demanded to know , less than 5 minutes before 7, whether
the men were going to work . Mrs. Salo , who arrived first , testified that
when she came in at 6 40 "all the men " were at the picnic table , although
Raymond Monti , whom she specifically named, testified that he arrived at
6:50.
"Nell W . Luoma , Verner Mattson, Raymond Monti, George Monti,
Douglas Twiggs , Glen LeGassa , and Leonard Westeen. The complaint also
alleges that Respondent discharged Gary Lame but there is no evidence
that he was present on the morning of February 26 or at any time
thereafter . Respondent contends that Laine voluntarily quit by his failure
to report for work and , since the record contains no evidence to support
the allegation of the complaint as to him , it will be dismissed.
described production and maintenance unit;" requested a
prompt meeting for bargaining , and offered to submit the
signed authorization cards to a representative of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service for
verification of its claim to majority status.
The next day Respondent answered the letter by listing
its employees - 18 in number - and stating its readiness
to bargain "with any organization when shown that said
organization has been designated as the collective
bargaining representative of our employees."
On March 15 , the Union responded , offering to meet
with the Company on March 25 , at the company office
"for the purpose of agreement that the United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, has been designated
by the majority employees . ." and, on the 18th,
Respondent wrote , agreeing to the meeting.
Pursuant to this exchange of letters , Soltis, representing
the Union , met with William Tersinar and Respondent's
counsel . Soltis submitted photocopies of 20 signed cards
and Tersinar gave them to Eivind Arentz , the plant
chemist , who left the room with the photocopies. When
Arentz returned , small "x 's," not previously there, were
on the photos of seven cards . 24 Tersinar then refused to
recognize the Union on the ground that he saw copies of
cards signed by "only five people" who were employees
and that he regarded the "other fifteen " as no longer
employees because "they refused to work and walked out
. they quit ." " The meeting lasted only 15 minutes
and none was held thereafter.
b. The unit
At the trial, Respondent produced a list of its
employees as of February 20, 1968, before any of the
terminations in issue herein , which contained 34 names.
One of these was an office clerk, specifically excluded
from the unit for which the Union requested recognition;"
another on this list is John Tersinar, found herein to be a
supervisor and, therefore, also excluded. Accordingly, on
that date, Respondent had 32 employees in the unit. The
list of employees as of February 22 is the same, except for
the omission of the three employees terminated on the
21st.
Respondent's list of employees as of February 27 omits
the three terminated February 21 and the seven
terminated February 26. The names of Gary Laine and
George W. Golembeski are also omitted from the list,
with notations that these men failed to report for work on
the day and evening shifts, respectively, on February 26.27
"This statement is not alleged in the complaint as a violation of the Act.
""All production and maintenance employees , at your Wakefield,
Michigan Plant No . 2, excluding office clerical and professional employees,
guards and supervisors , as defined in the Labor Management Relations
Act."
"Mrs. Juopperi , Taisto Hendrickson , Clarence Johnson , Eanar Johnson,
Mrs. Morrison , Robert Whitburn, and Kathlyn Auvmen.
"Tersinar's testimony that there were only five employees ' cards is
refuted by the photocopy sheets which are in evidence and show "x's," on
seven cards . His testimony that there were only five cannot be regarded as
an attempt to prove the fact - that would be absurd - but as another
instance of his readiness to weight his testimony in any way he believed
would Justify his adamant opposition to union organization at this plant.
The number 15 - of employees he testified "had quit" - was fixed,
however , by his counsel 's question , probably by the simple subtraction of
Tersinar 's conceded 5 employee cards from the 20 card photos admittedly
exhibited at the meeting.
"Respondent concedes that the unit is an appropriate one and admitted
the allegation thereof in the complaint.
"The letter written by Respondent to the Union on February 27, giving
QUALITY RUBBER MFG. CO. 49
As noted above, there is no evidence that Gary Lame
reported for work on February 26, or any subsequent day,
and Respondent ' s contention that Laine quit as of the
beginning of work on February 26 is accepted. The matter
of the termination of Golembeski is treated hereafter and
his discharge found unlawful. Accordingly, by adding
Golembeski and the 10 employees also found to have been
unlawfully discharged to Respondent's list of 20
employees as of February 27, 1 find that there were 31
employees in the unit when the Union requested
recognition.
Respondent does not contest the adequacy of the cards
as authorizations of union representation or the validity of
any employee ' s designation but bases its defense upon its
contention that the employees terminated on February 21
and 26 had quit and that Golembeski was not unlawfully
discharged, so that they were not employees when
recognition was demanded and, therefore, their
designations may not be considered.
Since I find that these 11 men were unlawfully
discharged, they continued, by virtue of Section 2(3) of
the Act, to be employees in the unit. Accordingly, the
Union, having been designated as bargaining
representative by 1918 of the 31 employees in the unit,
represented a majority when it demanded that Respondent
bargain with it and Respondent's refusal violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act.
7. Discharge of Golembeski
George Golembeski had worked in the pressroom since
November 6, 1967, and was on the afternoon shift during
the week of February 12 to 16. He was one of those who
took a 10-minute lunch break until John Tersinar
threatened to discharge anyone who continued to do so.
He was ill and did not report for work any day during the
following week.
On February 26, after the discharge of the seven
employees on the day shift, he attended a meeting with
the union representative and the discharged employees
but, since he was still ill, he did not report for work that
afternoon. The next day, while he was still ill and at
home, he received a telephone call from LeGassa, who
reported that the men on the afternoon shift had been
assigned to the day shift.
At 6:15 on Wednesday morning , February 28, he
telephoned William Tersinar at the plant and asked
whether it was true that employees on the afternoon shift
had been transferred to the day shift. Tersinar said that
the afternoon shift had been discontinued and the
employees moved over to the day shift. Golembeski said
he would be ready to go to work that day but Tersinar
answered, according to Golembeski: "No, you'd better
stay home, too."
Tersinar testified that Golembeski called in on March
1, "four days after the 26th of February" and asked
whether his job was still open; that he answered that he
had warned Golembeski about staying home without
calling in and that, since he, Golembeski, had not called
in for 4 days, he could stay home. Tersinar testified that
Golembeski's employment was terminated on March 1,
the day he called in.
a list of its employees , also omits George Grant and Anton Thorson, who
appear on the list prepared for the trial This discrepancy has not been
noted by any party herein and , since it makes no difference in the
determination of any issue , it is ignored.
"The card of Gary Laine is not counted.
It is important to note that, on the basis of Tersinar's
testimony, Golembeski's employment was not terminated
by Respondent until he called in and that this occurred, as
Tersinar insisted, after 4 days of absence .29
As Tersinar testified in connection with the Washburn
discharge, however, any employee who fails to report for
work is required, pursuant to company policy and the rule
posted on the bulletin board, to call in "within three
working days" and failure to do so results in his removal
from the payroll. Had this rule been applied to
Golembeski, as it was to Washburn, Golembeski would
have been routinely terminated no later than the beginning
of the fourth day of his absence - Thursday, February 29
- and Tersinar would, I am convinced, have pointed this
out to Golembeski when he called. Moreover, Tersinar did
not controvert Golembeski's testimony that he had been
absent the entire previous week but nevertheless,
according to his own testimony, Tersinar's reference to
Golembeski's absence specified that it was for 4 days. It is
a fair inference that Golembeski had already given
Respondent proper notice of the reason for his absence
some time during the prior week and had, therefore,
complied with the company rule.
For these reasons, as well as my refusal to regard
Tersinar as a credible witness, I reject Tersinar's
testimony that he referred to Golembeski's absence as a
reason for discharge and I accept the testimony of
Golembeski that, when he called in on Wednesday, stating
his readiness to go to work that day, Tersinar's answer
was: "No, you'd better stay home, too." This answer,
particularly in its use of the word "too," convinces me,
and I find, that Tersinar, recalling Golembeski's
participation in the taking of the 10-minute lunch break,
bracketed him with the seven employees he had discharged
2 days earlier, after he learned of the Union's organizing
campaign. Accordingly, I find that Respondent's real
reason for discharging Golembeski was its belief that he
was involved in the organizational activity and that its
purpose was to discourage union membership or activity
among its employees. It follows, therefore, that the
discharge was violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
8. Additional interference, restraint, and coercion
Mrs. Vilencia's pretrial affidavit, which was received in
evidence, states that before noon on Monday, February
26, the day following her telephone conversation with
William Tersinar, she went to the plant to get some
insurance forms and met Tersinar there." Tersinar said:
I'm very disappointed. I understand Mike has been
mixing with the fellows who have been talking union. I
"Tersmar's testimony that he discharged Golembeski for unreported
absence on March I is also contradicted by the fact that, when he listed
the plant employees in his letter to the Union on February 27,
Golembeski 's name was not included . Moreover , it is mconsistent with the
fact that, on the list of employees as of February 27, prepared for the trial
of this case , Golembeski's name is also omitted with the explanatory note
that he had failed to report on the 26th and had called in on the 29th
"In her testimony , Mrs. Vilencia stated that her visit to the plant to get
insurance forms did not occur on the day following the telephone
conversation but "quite awhile before that ." In view of this contradiction
as to the time of the conversation as well as the probabilities of the events
involved, I refused to find, as set forth above , that her conversation with
Tersinar occurred prior to the discharges of Sibley, Pikka, and Johnson, as
the General Counsel contends in his brief. Nothing in Mrs . Vilencia's
testimony , however, detracts from the evidence in her affidavit that she had
a conversation , in the form set forth therein , with Terstnar , on February
26, and I find that it occurred as set forth. -
50 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
just hope it ' s not true , I might have to let him go if he
is the instigator.
It would be difficult to formulate a threat more clearly
than this statement which, I find, Tersinar made to Mrs.
Vilencia . It is no less restraint and coercion , violative of
the Act, because made to the wife of an employee -
particularly one who had already been in communication
with Respondent ' s plant manager on the subject of union
activity involving her husband - than if made to the
employee." Accordingly, I find that by this statement
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Robert Whitburn was hired in October 1967, and
worked as a press operator on the day shift until February
22, when William Tersinar transferred him to the
afternoon shift, and he worked on that shift Friday,
February 23.
At 4:40 p.m. on Monday, February 26, Whitburn
testified, he reported for work and found both William
and John Tersinar standing at the timeclock with
employees Clarence Johnson, Eanar Johnson, and Taisto
Hendrickson. William Tersinar said that the Company
didn't want the Union in there and, if it came in, the
doors would be closed. He also said that some of the
employees at the Chicago plant had been fired and
thought the union there could help them but it never did;
that the employees at the Chicago plant didn't like the
union and wanted to get rid of it; that if the men at
Wakefield did get a union, they wouldn't want it.
Whitburn testified that William Tersinar then asked
him whether he had signed a card and, when he answered
"yes," Tersinar said : "It didn't help you very much, did
it?"
The threat of plant closing is, of course, violative of
Section 8(a)(l). Tersinar's inquiry as to whether Whitburn
had signed a card was not justified since it was not part of
a properly conducted poll of employees to determine
whether the Union represented a majority as claimed and,
therefore, is also violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
Whitburn also testified that , some time in April, he was
standing with the plant carpenter and employees Grant
and Swearingen near the office , when Plant
Superintendent Tersinar came out and told them that he
had orders from Chicago to close the plant because of the
Union's activity but that he and the plant chemist had
purchased homes in the area and , therefore, he wanted to
keep the plant open . He also said that , if the Union came
in, he would close the plant. Whitburn testified that he
heard Tersinar make the same statement to other
employees in the plant about the same time. While
Tersinar denied making these statements , I reject his
denial and find that they were made . By these statements,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9. The discharge of Whitburn
The facts concerning this incident are not in dispute.
Robert Whitburn, an employee since October 15, 1967,
worked as usual Friday, May 3 , on the afternoon shift.
On Sunday , May 5, he learned of a wedding in Superior,
Wisconsin , 115 miles away , which he was to attend.
Accordingly, he went to Superior and did not report for
work on either Monday or Tuesday, May 6 or 7. He
conceded that he did not inform Respondent of his
proposed absence and did not call in on either of those
"Redwing Carriers , Inc., 125 NLRB 322, 323, enfd . on this point 284
F.2d 397 (C.A. 5), an almost identical factual situation; see also Oswego
Street Supermarkets . 159 NLRB 1735, 1737
days.
On Wednesday, May 8, Whitburn reported for work at
the usual time, 6:45 p.m., but could not find his timecard
in the rack. He went into the office and asked Plant
Superintendent Tersiner where his card was. Tersinar said:
"We don't need you no more, you're fired." Whitburn
asked for the reason and Tersinar said he had missed too
much work; Whitburn protested that he hadn't missed as
much work as employee Dave Swearingen, whereupon
Tersinar responded that Swearingen had also been
discharged and added that Whitburn was supposed to call
in but hadn't done so.
Respondent's stated defense to the allegation of the
complaint concerning Whitburn's discharge was that the
employee "was discharged for not complying with the
rules . posted on the bulletin board." In support,
Respondent produced a sheet of paper which, plant
chemist Arentz testified, had been posted on the bulletin
board "right next" to the timeclock a couple of months
after the plant began to operate in July 1967 and had
remained there until removed the day before the August
14 session of the trial for use in this case. This notice
reads as follows:
Any employee who can not show for work, is required
to call this office or have someone call, within 3 -
three - working days. If no message has been received
by such time, the employee will be removed from the
payroll.
Management
Whitburn denied having ever seen this notice. He
testified, however, that he didn't know how often he
looked at the bulletin board, saying, "Every day, I
imagine ." His testimony , considering the hesitant manner
in which it was given , is not sufficient to overcome
Respondent's evidence on this point and I find that this
notice was posted on the bulletin board.
Tersinar testified that he discharged Whitburn "for
three or four different reasons" but specified that, when
he actually terminated Whitburn's employment on May 8,
the reasons were his absenteeism and his failure to call in.
Tersinar also testified that his other reasons included the
fact that Whitburn was an inefficient employee, that he
made "an awful lot of rejects" and that he "was holding
back production."
Whitburn's timecard for the week May 6 - 11 shows
no entry except the notation, in the space for Thursday,
"Disch 5/9/68" which, plant chemist Arentz testified, he
inserted at 7 a.m. on Thursday, May 9, at the direction of
William Tersinar.
The General Counsel's case with respect to Whitburn
draws a comparison between this employee and employee
Swearingen who, he contends, was absent at least as often
as Whitburn and, when discharged for absenteeism, was
rehired." Reliance is also placed upon Respondent's union
animus as demonstrated by the February discharges and
the coercive statements of William Tersinar; upon the fact
that Whitburn had signed a union card - known to
Respondent since March 25; upon the contention that
Tersinar improperly applied the posted rule to Whitburn;
and upon Tersinar's shifting reasons for Whitburn's
discharge.
"Tersmar testified , without contradiction, that Swearingen was
discharged for absenteeism on May 6; that he was rehired May 13 on his
promise to report more regularly and that he was finally discharged, again
for absenteeism , on July 13.
QUALITY RUBBER MFG. CO. 51
Respondent ' s union animus has been amply
demonstrated by Tersinar's conduct in the incidents
described above in this decision. Moreover, the record
shows that Tersinar knew that Whitburn had signed a
union card and that Swearingen had not. It is not,
however, clear that Tersinar's reasons for discharging
Whitburn were shifting or false, or that Whitburn's
admitted shortcomings were so similar to those of
Swearingen that upon the differences in Respondent's
treatment of the two men an inference of discrimination is
required to be drawn. Tersinar testified that, although
Swearingen was guilty of considerable absenteeism, he or
his wife usually called when he could not report" and that
Swearingen was a competent employee. Tersinar also
testified that he rehired Swearingen upon Swearingen's
promise to report regularly." Moreover, there is no
evidence that Whitburn promised to do better in the areas
of dissatisfaction or that he applied to be rehired.
There is no dispute that Whitburn absented himself
from work on May 6 and 7 without notifying Respondent
and Whitburn's own testimony shows that Tersinar
referred to the fact that an absent employee was
"supposed to call in." Tersinar's reference at the time, to
Whitburn's absenteeism" and his testimony that he took
into consideration his unfavorable estimate of Whitburn's
competence do not, in my view, convert his stated reason
for firing Whitburn into a pretext. Finally,
notwithstanding the General Counsel's suggestion that
Tersinar's interpretation of the rule was "strained," I
cannot find that it was so obviously unjustified by its text
that I am required to infer that this, also, was a pretext.
To sum up my view of this incident, it appears to me
that at the time of Whitburn's discharge, the atmosphere
at the plant had lost the highly charged quality created in
Tersinar's mind by the activities of the Union and which,
I have found, made the February discharges unlawful.
Furthermore, it seems to me that Whitburn's absence
from work for two days without notification may well be
considered by an employer as employee conduct justifying
discipline or discharge. Accordingly, I cannot find that the
General Counsel has proved, by a fair preponderance of
the evidence, that Whitburn was discriminatorily
discharged to discourage membership in the Union and I
shall recommend dismissal of the complaint insofar as it
so alleges.
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged and is
engaging in unfair labor practices, it will be recommended
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, including the posting of an appropriate
notice, to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discriminatorily
discharged Raymond Sibley, Donald Pikka, Herbert O.
Johnson, Nels W. Luoma, Verner Mattson, Raymond
Monti, George Monti, Douglas Twiggs, Glen P. LeGassa,
Leonard Westeen, and George W. Golembeski in violation
of the Act, it will be recommended that they be offered
immediate and full reinstatement to their former, or
substantially equivalent, positions without prejudice to
their seniority and other rights and privileges and that
they be made whole for any loss of pay they may have
suffered, computed in the manner prescribed by the Board
in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and with
interest as prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,
138 NLRB 716.
Having found that the Union is the designated
representative of Respondent's employees in an
appropriate unit and that Respondent has engaged and is
engaging in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain
collectively with it, it will be recommended that
Respondent cease and desist from refusing so to bargain;
that it shall, upon request, so bargain and, if an
agreement is reached, embody such agreement in a signed
contract.
In view of the nature and extent of the unfair labor
practices found herein to have been engaged in by
Respondent, which indicate its determination to interfere
aggressively with its employees' rights of self-organization
and its rejection of the principle of collective bargaining, I
shall recommend a broad cease-and-desist order herein.36
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case, I reach the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above , occurring in connection with its operations
"Whitburn testified that on one occasion in April Swearingen was absent
2 days and, on the 3rd day when he asked Tersinar where Swearingen was,
Tersinar answered : " I don't know , he hasn ' t called in ." While Tersmar was
not questioned concerning this testimony and did not deny it specifically,
Whitburn' s comparison between himself and Swearingen, when it reached
this point, became too perfect for belief and I do not credit it.
"Although I have rejected William Tersinar 's testimony in most
instances where it was contradicted by credible testimony of other
witnesses or incompatible with the probabilities of the situation , neither of
these is present here and I do not feel justified in rejecting his testimony on
this point.
"Whitburn admitted that "some time" in March he came to the plant to
pick up his paycheck, although he had not reported for work that day
because of a sore throat , and that Tersinar said to hiln : "Missing too much
work is going to hurt you." Whitburn also testified that, between that date
and the day of his discharge , he was absent 4 or 5 days, not counting the 2
days immediately preceding it.
1. Quality Rubber Manufacturing Company, Inc., is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their union membership and activities; by threatening its
employees that, if they exercised their rights of
self-organization, scheduled benefits would be withheld;
they would be subjected to more onerous conditions of
employment, they would be discharged and operation of
their place of employment would be terminated, said
Employer has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act and has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
"See N L R B v Entwistle , Mfg. Co., 120- F.2d 532„ 536 (C.A. 4),
Wabana , Inc , 146 NLRB 1162, 1186.
52 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4. By terminating the employment of Raymond Sibley,
Donald Pikka, and Herbert O. Johnson because they
engaged in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual
aid or protection, Respondent interfered with, restrained,
and coerced said employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in the Act and engaged and is engaging in an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
5. By terminating the employment of Raymond Sibley,
Donald Pikka, and Herbert O. Johnson because they
engaged in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual
aid or protection, Respondent discriminated against them
in their tenure of employment to discourage their
membership in a labor organization and engaged and is
engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
6. By terminating the employment of Nels W. Luoma,
Verner Mattson, Raymond Monti, George Monti,
Douglas Twiggs, Glen P. LeGassa, Leonard Westeen, and
George W. Golembeski because of their membership in,
or activities on behalf of the above-named labor
organization, Respondent has discriminated against them
to discourage their membership in the said labor
organization and has engaged and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
7. The employees of Respondent in the following
described unit constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees at the
Wakefield, Michigan , plant, excluding office clerical
and professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
8. At all times since February 26, 1968, United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, has been the
exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
9. By refusing on February 26, 1968, and thereafter, to
bargain collectively with the above-named labor
organization , Respondent has engaged and is engaging in
an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(aX5) of the Act.
10. By the commission of the aforesaid unfair labor
practices, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
11. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
12. Respondent's discharge of Robert J. Whitburn was
for cause and it did not thereby engage in an unfair labor
practice.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in this case, it is
recommended that Quality Rubber Manufacturing
Company, Inc., Wakefield, Michigan, its officers , agents,
successors, and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their membership in or activities on behalf of United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, threatening employees with loss of benefits,
threatening the imposition of more onerous conditions of
employment or threatening loss of employment for
exercising the rights of concerted activity for mutual aid
or protection guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
(b) Refusing , upon request , to bargain with the said
labor organization as the collective-bargaining
representative of its employees in the following described
unit:
All production and maintenance employees at the
Wakefield , Michigan , plant , excluding office clerical
and professional employees , guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Raymond Sibley , Donald Pikka, and
Herbert O. Johnson immediate and full reinstatement to
their former positions , or to positions substantially
equivalent to those which they held immediately prior to
February 21, 1968 , without prejudice to their seniority and
other rights and privileges ; offer to Nels W. Luoma,
Verner Mattson , Raymond Monti , George Monti , Glen P.
LeGassa, Leonard Westeen , and George W. Golembeski
immediate and full reinstatement to their former
positions , or to positions substantially equivalent to those
which they held immediately prior to February 26, 1968,
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and
privileges ; and make each of them whole , in the manner
set forth in the section of the Decision entitled "The
Remedy ," for any loss of pay they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them.
(b) Notify Raymond Sibley, Donald Pikka , Herbert O.
Johnson , Nels W . Luoma, Verner Mattson , Raymond
Monti , George Monti, Glen P . LeGassa, Leonard
Westeen , and George W. Golembeski , if presently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to
full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the
Board or its agents , for examination and copying, all
payroll records , social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Recommended Order.
(d) Upon request , bargain with United Steelworkers of
America , AFL-CIO, as the collective-bargaining
representative of its employees in the unit described above,
with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an
agreement is reached , embody such agreement in a signed
contract.
(e) Post at its plant in Wakefield , Michigan , copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix ."" Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 30 , after being duly signed by its representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places , including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
QUALITY RUBBER MFG. CO.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.JB
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the allegations of the
complaint , insofar as not found in the Decision herein, be
dismissed.
event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
"in the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 30, in writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
After a trial at which all sides had the opportunity to
give evidence, it has been found that we, Quality
Rubber Manufacturing Company, Inc., violated the
National Labor Relations Act, and that we should be
ordered to post this notice to inform our employees of
their rights under that Act.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves and to act together for
mutual aid or protection;
To form, join, or help unions;
To bargain as a group through a representative
they choose;
To refuse to do any or all of these things.
We assure you that WE WILL NOT do anything that
interferes with these rights; we specifically assure you
that WE WILL NOT ask any employee why he joined the
Union and WE WILL NOT threaten you with harder
working conditions, cancellation of pay raises, loss of
your jobs or that the plant will close, if you choose to
be represented by a union.
It has also been found that United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, was chosen by a majority of our
53
employees to represent them as their only
collective-bargaining representative in the bargaining
unit which is:
All production and maintenance employees at the
Wakefield, Michigan, plant, excluding office clerical
and professional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
Accordingly, if that Union requests, WE WILL bargain
with it on wages, hours, and conditions of employment,
and any agreement we reach will be put in writing and
signed.
It has also been found that we discharged Raymond
Sibley, Donald Pikka, and Herbert O. Johnson because
they asked for and took a 10-minute break during their
shift and that this was conduct for mutual aid which is
protected by the Act; that we discharged Nels W.
Luoma, Verner Mattson, Raymond Monti, George
Monti, Douglas Twiggs, Glen P. LeGassa, Leonard
Westeen, and George W. Golembeski because they
joined the Union, and that all of these discharges
violated the Act.
WE WILL, therefore, give back to these employees the
jobs which they held when they were discharged, with
all their seniority, and make up any pay which they
lost, plus 6 percent interest.
If any of these employees is now in the Armed
Forces of the United States, WE WILL notify them of
their right to full reinstatement, upon application, in
accordance with the Selective Services Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after their discharge from the Armed Forces.
Dated By
QUALITY RUBBER
MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions , they may communicate
directly with the Board ' s Regional Office, 2nd Floor,
Commerce Building , 744 North Fourth Street,
Milwaukee , Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 414-272-3861.