QUALCOMM Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 24, 2020

2019003770 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/184,181 06/16/2016 Shaul Yohai Yifrach 151829/1173-281 1453
115309 7590 11/24/2020
W&T/Qualcomm
106 Pinedale Springs Way
Cary, NC 27511
EXAMINER
WANG, HARRY Z
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2185
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
patents@wt-ip.com
us-docketing@qualcomm.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SHAUL YOHAI YIFRACH, AMIT GIL,
JAMES LIONEL PANIAN, and OFER ROSENBERG
_____________

Appeal 2019-003770
Application 15/184,181
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–8, and 11–29. Claims 9 and 10 have been cancelled. We have
jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2018). According to Appellant, the real party in interest
is Qualcomm Incorporated. See Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-003770
Application 15/184,181

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
Introduction
Appellant’s claimed invention relates generally to “coherency driven
enhancements to a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) express (PCIe)
transaction layer.” (Spec., Title, emphasis and capitalization omitted).

Representative Independent Claim 1
1. A method for controlling a host memory m a Peripheral
Component Interconnect (PCI) express (PCIe) system,
comprising:
receiving, at a root complex of a host associated with a
host memory in the host, a request from a first endpoint for
access to a first portion of data stored in the host memory;
requesting, to a coherency agent of the host, an
ownership of an address range associated with the first portion
of the data from the host;
assigning, by the coherency agent, the ownership of the
address range from the host to the first endpoint;
providing data associated with the address range to the first
endpoint; and
receiving, from the first endpoint, modified data
associated with the address range when the ownership of the
address range returns to the host.
Appeal Br. 15, Claims App., disputed limitation emphasized.

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed July 5, 2018 (“Final
Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed November 26, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the
Examiner’s Answer, mailed February 25, 2019 (“Ans.”); and the Reply
Brief, filed April 11, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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Application 15/184,181

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Rejections
A. Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 22, and 27–29 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Gough (US
2007/0233928 A1, published October 4, 2007) in view of Aikas
(US 2013/0066833 A1, published March 14, 2013).
B. Claims 3, 6, 11, 12, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, and 26 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Gough in view of
Aikas, in further view of Milligan (US 2004/0128269 A1,
published July 1, 2004).
C. Claims 5, 20, and 25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Gough in view of Aikas, in further
view of Guddeti (US 2014/0115223 A1, published April 24,
2014).
D. Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Gough in view of Aikas, in further view of
Kuang (US 2005/0198601 A1, published September 8, 2005).
E. Claim 14 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Gough in view of Aikas, in further view of
Guddeti in further view of Milligan.

ANALYSIS
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Brief, the principal and
dispositive issue of whether the Examiner erred in rejecting exemplary claim
1 turns on whether the combination of Gough and Aikas teaches the claim
limitations “requesting, to a coherency agent of the host, an ownership of an
address range” (hereinafter “the disputed ownership limitation”). Appeal
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Application 15/184,181

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Br. 9–11; Reply Br. 2, 3. Independent claims 7, 17, 22, 27 and 29 recite
similar subject matter.4
We adopt the findings of facts made by the Examiner in the Final
Office Action and Examiner’s Answer as our own. We concur with the
decision reached by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer for the specific
reasons discussed below. We have considered Appellant’s Reply Brief, but
find it unpersuasive to rebut the Examiner’s responses. We highlight the
following for emphasis.
Appellant contends Gough does not disclose the disputed ownership
limitation. Appeal Br. 10, 11. In particular, Appellant contends:
Appellant’s electronic word search of Gough indicates that the term
“possession” is never used in the text of Gough, and further indicates
the terms “ownership” and “owner” never appear in Gough. Appellant
notes that, while paragraph 0026 of Gough does use the words
“associating, assigning or allocating,” those terms do not necessarily
connote “possession,” and do not appear to be used by Gough as
synonyms or substitutes for the term “possession.”

Appeal Br. 10.

The Examiner has identified the relevant portions of Gough and has
provided sufficient explanation with corresponding citations to various parts
of the reference for disclosing the disputed ownership limitation (Ans. 9,
10). In particular, the Examiner determines that “as long as the possession
and allocation of the resource prevents the access of the resources from other
users, then it would satisfy the definition of ownership.” (Ans. 7).
In particular, the Examiner finds:

4 Appellant did not provide separate, substantive arguments with respect to
the patentability of claims 2–8, and 11–29.
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Since the reference [Gough] states that assigning a range of
addresses removes it from the resource pool ([0025], “the remaining
resources not assigned to a specific device, i.e. a pool of resources”,
wherein when the ownership of the address range returns to the host
(Gough, Resource Pool)), that means that only the single device is
capable of owning an address range at a time. This matches with the
definition of ownership that the Application specification gives
wherein only a single device can communicate with a range of
addresses when it obtains ownership.
Gough further teaches that when the endpoint device is finished
with accessing the memory address range, it can send a request to
remove ownership of the memory address range ([0038], “a device
may offer a forfeit of some amount of resources ... 1 GB window of
memory, represented by 0x40000000 to 0x x7FFFFFFF, is re-
assigned from controller 106 to the resource pool”, wherein when the
ownership of the address range returns to the host (Gough, Resource
Pool)). Since Gough discloses that [0030], “a pool of resources ...
includes a portion or all I/O addresses, bus numbers, and memory
space not allocated to interconnect devices,” this means that the
resource has been de-allocated and is unassigned, meaning that
ownership has been returned and is once again available.

Ans. 9, 10. (original emphases removed).

In other words, Gough teaches or suggests the disputed ownership
limitation with its allocation of address range. Id. (Citing Gough ¶¶ 25, 26,
30, and 38).

As an initial matter of claim construction, we turn to the Specification
for context, and find no explicit definition for the claim term “ownership.”
Claim 1 (emphasis added). Given the absence of a limiting definition in the
claim or Specification regarding the disputed ownership limitation, on this
record, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s reading is overly broad,
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Application 15/184,181

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unreasonable, or inconsistent with the Specification.5 Based on our review
of Gough and consistent with the Examiner’s stated position (Ans. 9, 10), we
interpret the disputed ownership limitation using the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with Appellant’s disclosure – to include the
allocation of address ranges in Gough. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
On this record, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence, we
are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner's finding of obviousness
regarding the rejection of independent representative claim 1.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
representative independent claim 1 and the rejection of grouped independent
claims 7, 17, 22, 27 and 29, which recite similar limitations of
commensurate scope. The remaining grouped dependent claims also
rejected (and not argued separately) fall with their respective independent
claim 1, 7, 17, 22, 27 and 29. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred with respect to the
obviousness rejections of claims 1–8, and 11–29, over the cited prior art of
record, and we sustain the rejections.

5 We emphasize that, because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their
scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the
applicant or patentee.” In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4, 7,
8, 13, 16,
17, 22, 27–
29
103 Gough, Aikas 1, 2, 4, 7, 8,
13, 16, 17,
22, 27–29

3, 6, 11,
12, 18, 19,
21, 23, 24,
26
103 Gough, Aikas,
Milligan
3, 6, 11, 12,
18, 19, 21,
23, 24, 26

5, 20, 25 103 Gough, Aikas,
Guddeti
5, 20, 25
15 103 Gough, Aikas,
Kuang
15
14 103 Gough, Aikas,
Guddeti, Milligan
14
Overall
Outcome
1–8, and
11–29

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Application 15/184,181

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FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED