Prudential Insurance Co. of America

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsAug 27, 1980

251 N.L.R.B. 1591 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

1591PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA Prudential Insurance Company of America and In- surance Workers International Union. Case 10- CA- 14669 August 27, 1980 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND TRUESDALE On April 16, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, both the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs, Respondent filed cross-ex- ceptions and a supporting brief and an answering brief to the exceptions of the General Counsel and the Charging Party, and the Charging Party filed an answering brief to the cross-exceptions of Re- spondent. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged, by conducting an interview of em- ployee Neal Bowser without granting his request for union representation where he had reasonable cause to believe that the interview would result in disciplinary action. For the reasons set out below, we disagree with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion and his recommendation that the com- plaint be dismissed in its entirety. Instead, we find and conclude that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, as alleged. The facts, as found by the Administrative Law Judge and as set out more fully in his Decision, are essentially as follows: Employee Bowser is an in- surance agent. On May 4, 1979,2 Bowser's supervi- sor, Sales Manager Bob Snelling, took possession of Bowser's agency record book, which contained records on the policies and policyholders assigned to Bowser for servicing. Thereafter, Bowser was advised that he was to meet with Snelling and Dis- i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi- bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con- vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd 188 F2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings 2 All dates hereinafter are 1979. 251 NLRB No. 213 trict Manager Rance Hornsby immediately follow- ing the regular 10 a.m. sales meeting on May 11. Bowser asked the Union's district office chairman, John Plavcan, to be present at the meeting, because Bowser felt the meeting was going to be of a disci- plinary nature. Bowser and Plavcan asked Hornsby if Plavcan could be present at the meeting. Hornsby agreed, stating it would be held at ap- proximately 11:15 a.m., following the sales meeting. However, it was subsequently decided to cancel the sales meeting. At or about 9:55 a.m., Bowser, unaware that the 10 a.m. sales meeting had been canceled, was asked to go to Hornsby's office. Bowser did so, and was accompanied into Hornsby's office by Snelling. Hornsby thereupon began to question Bowser about specific entries or lack of entries in Bowser's agency record book. After about 5 minutes of such questioning, Bowser asked Hornsby if this was the meeting originally scheduled for 11:15 a.m. Hornsby said yes, and Bowser then asked that his union representative be permitted to be present. Hornsby said no, and Bowser said he woud continue the meeting under protest. After about 25 minutes, a union grievance com- mittee member, Thomas Harkins, asked for and was denied permission to join the meeting as Bowser's union representative. Harkins had been asked by Plavcan to substitute at the meeting as Bowser's representative, and had just found out that the meeting was underway. At the close of the meeting, Hornsby advised Bowser that Respondent's home office would have to be informed of numerous discrepancies and pro- cedural violations which Hornsby said he had found in Bowser's agency record book. Although Hornsby subsequently recommended that Bowser be discharged as a result of the meeting, Respond- ent did not follow that recommendation, nor did it in any other way actually discipline Bowser as a result of the meeting. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree, that the meeting in question was an investi- gatory interview with disciplinary overtones. Con- sequently, it would appear that, under the Supreme Court's Weingarten opinion,3 Bowser was entitled upon his request to have his union representative present. However, Hornsby not only denied his re- quest, but also failed to offer Bowser the options provided by Weingarten of continuing voluntarily the interview unaccompanied by his representative 3 .VL.R B. v J Weingarten. Inc., 420) S 251 (1975), in which ihe Court held, inter alia. that Sec 7 of the Act gives an employee the right to insisl on the presence of a representative at an inrestigatory inlers ies that could, or which the emplo ee reasonably belicrcs would, result in disciplinary action 1592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD or having no interview at all if he did not wish to waive his right to representation. Rather, Hornsby merely continued with the interview, over Bowser's express protest, and without telling Bowser he had the right to discontinue the inter- view then and there. Thus, Respondent would seem to have unlawfully deprived Bowser of his Weingarten rights. However, as stated above, the Administrative Law Judge found no violation on the ground that, although the interview was clearly investigatory, it was "nevertheless not investigatory in the sense of Weingarten." He predicated this rather novel result on his reasoning to the effect that in this case the circumstances gave rise to a conflict betweeen two management rights: (1) to secure the information (which here, he concluded, as a practical matter, could be gotten only from Bowser); and (2) to reject the employee's request for union representa- tion at the investigatory interview. More explicitly, the alleged conflict came about, in his view, be- cause management could under Weingarten reject the representative, cancel the interview, and ac- quire the information in some other manner- except that here the information assertedly could be secured only from Bowser, so Respondent was compelled to interview Bowser. Thus, he conclud- ed that Respondent was faced, if Weingarten repre- sentation rights were applicable, either with giving up its right to secure the information, i.e., not interview Bowser, or giving up its right to reject the "collective course." In the face of this purported conflict, the Ad- ministrative Law Judge held that management's right to conduct its business-ie., secure the necessary in- formation-must prevail over the employee's right to representation. We disagree. There is no management right to secure informa- tion from an employee absent a requested union representative where an investigatory interview with disciplinary overtones is concerned. That is, there is no management right to "reject a collective course" and still pursue the interview in the face of an employee's adamant request for his representa- tive, and we see no merit in the Administrative Law Judge's attempt to create such a management right out of the Supreme Court's statement that the exercise of Weingarten rights by an employee may not interfere with legitimate management preroga- tives. That statement taken in context clearly refers to alternate action open to an employer faced with an employee's demand for the presence of a repre- sentative, and not to any purported right of the employer to ignore an employee's Weingarten right. Accordingly, we find that the Administrative Law Judge erred in finding that Bowser's Weingarten right conflicted with legitimate management pre- rogatives. 4 Furthermore, we find no merit in Respondent's contention that the Union in negotiations waived the unit employees' right to Weingarten representa- tion. 5 In this regard Respondent relies on a con- tract provision stating it has the right "b. To inter- view any Agent with respect to any phase of his work without the grievance committee being pres- ent." However, this provision became a part of the parties' contract some 19 years provision became a part of the parties' contract some 19 years before the Supreme Court's Weingarten opinion and, thus, also prior to the Board cases leading up to that opinion. Obviously then, the provision could not have been intended to be a waiver of Weingarten- type rights and the Union has since Weingarten consistently taken the position that such rights have not been waived. 6 Further, on its face the provision applies to "the grievance committee" and not to a Weingarten representative.7 Consequently, we find that there is no showing of a "clear and unequivocal" waiver8 by the Union of employee Weingarten rights and therefore no showing that such rights, assuming they could be waived, have in fact been waived. 4 In this regard, we further note that Bowser was only the "principal" source of the desired information, and Respondent could have obtained the same information from policyholders, but was reluctant to do so for business reasons. Consequently, any conflict comes down at most to a conflict between the assertion of a statutory right and business conven- ience. We also believe that adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's anal- ysis would effectively obliterate employees' Weingarten rights. As noted, the Administrative Law Judge found that. since Respondent was seeking information which related to the operation of its business from an em- ployee who had access to the information, it was riot required to adhere to its Weingarten obligations The circuity of that analysis is revealed when it is recognized that, i virtually any Weingarten situation, an em- ployer is seeking information concerning operation of its business from an employee it believes has access to that information Thus, the Administra- tive l.aw Judge gives credence to an employer defense that would be present in any Weingarten situation Accordingly, were we to adopt the Administrative Law Judge's analysis, we would be granting employers a veritable per se defense to alleged Weingarren violations. ' In view of his result the Administrative Law Judge found it unneces- sary to pass on this issue. K In furtherance of its position, the Union consistently has tried to ne- gotiate this clause out of the collective-bargaining agreements. Although it was unsuccessful in its attempts so to modify the agreement, the Union adhered to its position that the clause was unlawful and, hence, unen- forceable. In these circumstances, we find that the Union neither under- stood nor agreed that the retention of this clause be construed as a waiver of the Weingarten rights of the employees it represents. 7 At Respondent's offices, a union representative may act at an inter- view as a Wingarten representative and may also on other occasions act as "the grievance committee." However, that latter fact does not in any manner imply that the quoted contractual provision does, or is intended to, apply to him in his capacity as a requested Weingarten representative. A contractual waiver of statutory rights will not be readily inferred, but will be found only if the waiver is "clear and unmistakable." See The Timken Roller Bearing Company N. L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746, 757 (6th Cir 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 971 (1964), Pepsi-Cola Distributing Company of Knoxville. Tennessee, Inc., 241 NLRB 869 (1979) - - PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 1503 Accordingly, in view of all of the foregoing, we find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by denying Bowser the presence of his union representative at an investigatory interview which he had reason to believe could lead to disciplinary action against him. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Prudential Insurance Company of America is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Insurance Workers International Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By denying employee Neal Bowser's request for union representation at an investigatory inter- view conducted by Respondent which said em- ployee could reasonably believe would result in disciplinary action, and in thereafter continuing the interview, over said employee's protest, without of- fering said employee the opportunity to discontinue the interview, Respondent interfered with, re- strained, and coerced said employee in the exercise of his rights guaranteed him by Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice, we shall order Repondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain af- firmative action which we find to be necessary to remedy the unfair labor practice and to effectuate the policies of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Prudential Insurance Company of America, Atlan- ta, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Requiring any employee to take part in an in- terview or meeting without union representation, if such representation has been requested by the em- ployee, and if the employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed at the in- terview or meeting may result in the employee's being subject to disciplinary action. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex- ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is found to be necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its Atlanta, Georgia, place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10. in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. i In the vercnt that this Order is enforced h a Judgment of a ni1td States Court f Appeals, the th ords in I e notlice readlilg Posted h, Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu ant to a Judgment of the United Stares Court of Appeal, Enfilrcing :in Order of the National Labor Relalionll Board APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THEt NATIONAIl LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT require any employee to take part in any interview or meeting without union representation, if the employee requests such representation, and if the employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed at such interview or meeting may result in the employee's being subject to disciplinary action. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HENRY L. JAILETTE., Administrative Law Judge: This case involves an allegation that Prudential Insurance Company of America (herein called Respondent) violat- 1594 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interviewing an employ- ee without granting his request for union representation, where the employee had reasonable cause to believe the interview would result in disciplinary action. This pro- ceeding is based on a charge filed by Insurance Workers International Union (herein called the Union) on May 16, 1979,1 pursuant to which complaint issued on July I1. On January 9 and 10, 1980, a hearing was held in Atlan- ta, Georgia. Upon the entire record, 2 including my observation of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs of the parties, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THI: FACTS Respondent is an insurance company engaged in the sale of insurance contracts throughout the United States, with an office and place of business in Decatur, Georgia, the location of the unfair labor practice alleged herein. 3 Respondent's insurance agents have been represented by the Union for the purpose of collective bargaining for a period in excess of 30 years, and Respondent and the Union have been parties to successive collective-bargain- ing agreements during that period to date. Neal Bowser has been employed as an insurance agent by Respondent about 7-1/2 years. Bowser testified that on Friday, May 4, his agency record book (hereinafter referred to as ARB) which is a record of all policies and policy holders assigned to an agent for servicing, was "confiscated" by his immediate supervisor, Bob Snelling. Thereafter, Bowser was advised that he was to meet with Snelling and District Manager Rance Hornsby on Monday, May 7. Bowser testified that he was unable to meet on Monday, and arranged to meet on Tuesday, but that meeting did not take place because Hornsby was not ready to conduct it. According to Bowser, on Friday the manager general- ly conducts a staff meeting from 10 to 11 a.m., and on Friday, May 11, Snelling told him that Hornsby would like to get together with him after the staff meeting. This was about 9 or 9:30 a.m., Bowser, who was a member of the Union, then contacted John Plavcan, district office chairman for the Union, and asked him to be present at the meeting. Plavcan agreed and both went to Hornsby's office Plavcan asked Hornsby if he could be present during the meeting, and Hornsby said it would be fine. Bowser returned to his desk. About 9:55 a.m., Hornsby asked him to step into his office. Bowser did so. He was followed by Snelling and the door was closed. There- upon, Hornsby proceeded to leaf through Bowser's ARB asking questions about the entries or lack of entries. Bowser would explain as Hornsby went from page to page. After about 5 minutes of this, Bowser asked Hornsby if this was the meeting Hornsby had scheduled to hold Unless otherwise indicated all dates hereinafter are in 1979. 2 Respondent's unopposed motion to correct the record is hereby granted. Respondent's post-hearing offer of proof is rejected 3 Jurisdiction is not in issue. Respondent admits, and I find, that Re- spondent meets the Board's standard for the assertion of jurisdiction over insurance companies. with him. Hornsby said yes, Bowser thereupon requested that his union representative be present. Hornsby denied the request and Bowser said he would continue the meet- ing under protest. Hornsby continued to leaf through Bowser's ARB pointing out inaccuracies or problems and making notes. After about 25 minutes, the meeting was interrupted by a call on Hornsby's intercom with Hornsby stating he was not to be interrupted. A few minutes later Hornsby was called on his extension, and Bowser overheard Hornsby's secretary, whose desk was right outside the door of his office, say that Thomas Harkins, an insurance agent and a union representative, was at her desk and wanted to be present at Bowser's meeting. Hornsby told her Harkins was not to be admitted. A few more minutes elapsed and there was a loud knock on the door. The knock was not answered and the meeting continued for about 1-1/2 hours. At the end, Hornsby told Bowser he would have to let the home office know about the viola- tions he had found in the ARB. Nothing happened there- after as a result of the meeting. 11. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS On the basis of the foregoing, General Counsel con- tends that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent denies that it has violated the Act for a number of reasons. First, Respondent denies that Bowser requested union representation. According to Hornsby, when Plavcan and Bowser came to his office on May 11 before the time for his meeting with Bowser, no request was made for Plavcan to be present. Assertedly, all that Plavcan said was "I understand you want to see us," and Hornsby told him, "no, not now." Snelling, who was present, testified that it was Bowser who spoke about a meeting, and not Plavcan, but he corroborated Hornsby's testimony that no request was made for Plavcan to be present. As to Bowser's assertion that he requested union representation during that meeting, both Hornsby and Snelling denied he did. I do not credit Hornsby and Snelling. In my judgment, several circumstances support a finding that a request for union representation was made. Thus, it is undisputed that Plavcan and Bowser went to Hornsby's office before the scheduled meeting. If not to assure that Bowser had Union Representation, why? Moreover, it is undisputed that during the meeting in Hornsby's office union representative Harkins tried to gain admission, and was turned away. The only reason that Harkins would have sought admission was that given by Plavcan and Harkins; namely, that Plavcan had to leave the office and asked Harkins to act in his stead. And Plavcan would not have asked Harkins had he not been asked by Bowser. And, it is difficult to believe that Bowser would have asked Plavcan to be present before the meeting started, and then remain silent when the meeting was being conducted without him. Finally, it is noteworthy that after the interview, Bowser filed a grievance claim- ing he was denied union representation. Such contempo- raneous conduct lends credence to his testimony. Further credence can be found in the fact that in denying the PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 1 595 grievance Respondent did not assert that no request had been made. Hornsby's explanation for such omission was not convincing. The finding that Bowser requested union representa- tion, and that Respondent denied the request, does not necessarily mean that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In order to establish a violation of the Act in this regard, it must appear that the interview with the employee is an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believes may result in disciplinary action. N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). In the instant case, General Counsel and the Union con- tend that the interview of May 11 was such an interview. Respondent contends that the interview herein was "work related" and essential to the proper performance of its obligation as an insuror. To describe an interview as "work related" appears to beg the question whether it is investigatory within the meaning of Weingarten. Yet, it appears to be a mode of expressing the idea that the in- terview in question was integrally related to and insepa- rable from the many routine duties of an agent. In any event, whatever mode of expression be used, Respondent contends, and I agree, that the interview of Bowser on May 11 was not subject to the Weingarten right of union representation. As noted earlier, an ARB is a record of all policies and policy holders assigned to an agent for servicing. It is the only record Respondent has to determine the status of policies, such as whether they are current or lapsed. According to Hornsby, the ARB's are audited at least every 2 years in the case of agents with 5 or more years of service. An audit can be done by a manager without the presence of the agent, but when the audit re- veals discrepancies or omissions, or raises questions that only an agent can answer, the agent must be called in. The record does not indicate how frequently this is nec- essary. In Bowser's case, he had been audited on or about March 5, and it appears he may have been called in for the audit.4 He was being audited again in May, ac- cording to the uncontradicted testimony of Snelling and Hornsby, because Hornsby had been asked to certify Bowser's account (a separate procedure done annually), and was unable to do so because the account did not bal- ance. For this reason, it became necessary to audit his ARB again. Hornsby did the initial audit work by himself, and was left with some 50 questions about the status of policies, entries, or the lack of entries in the ARB, which could only be answered by Bowser. For example, one entry in the ARB reflected a policy paid-to-date of December 1978. There was a check in a pocket of the ARB for 2 months more premium, but Hornsby could not tell whether the policy was lapsed, to be lapsed, or what. There were questions of a similar sort on about 20 poli- cies and different questions on about 30 others. It is clear from the description of the audit interview that it was investigatory and it is clear that the process persuaded Hornsby that Bowser was not performing his 4 Bowser testified that previous to May 11 he had received a letter stating that management deemed he had been in iolation of company rules from a previous interview. I assume from this that he had been called in for an audit of his ARB job as he was required to, because he recommended Bowser's discharge. (The recommendation was evidently rejected and Bowser heard no more about the interview.) One might argue, therefore, that the Weingarten right ap- plied, and that Bowser's fear of discipline was reasonably based. In my judgment, however, analysis cannot end here. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court enumerated the var- ious elements that enter into consideration in determining in any given case whether or not the right to union rep- resentation exists, including at 420 U.S. 258, 259, the fol- lowing: Fourth, exercise of the right may not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. The employ- er has no obligation to justify his refusal to allow union representation, and despite refusal, the em- ployer is free to carry on his inquiry without inter- viewing the employee, and thus leave to the em- ployee the choice between having an interview un- accompanied by his representative, or having no in- terview and foregoing any benefits that might be derived from one. As stated in Mobil Oil: The employer may, if he wishes, advise the employee that it will not proceed with the inter- view unless the employee is willing to enter the interview unaccompanied by his representative. The employee may then refrain from participat- ing in the interview, thereby protecting his right to representation, but at the same time relinquish- ing any benefit which might be derived from the interview. The employer would then be free to act on the basis of information obtained from other sources. 196 NLRB at 1052. The Board explained in Quality: This seems to us to be the only course consist- ent with all of the provisions of our Act. It per- mits the employer to reject a collective course in situations such as investigative interviews where a collective course is not required but protects the employee's right to protection by his chosen agents. Participation in the interview is then vol- untary, and, if the employee has reasonable ground to fear that the interview will adversely affect his continued employment, or even his working conditions, he may choose to forego it unless he is afforded the safeguard of his repre- sentative's presence. He would then also forego whatever benefit might come from the interview. And, in that event, the employer would, of course, be free to act on the basis of whatever in- formation he had and without such additional facts as might have been gleaned through the in- terview. 195 NLRB at 198-199. It can readily be seen that the foregoing options did not exist here. Respondent had the right to obtain the in- formation essential to the management of its business. and Bowser was the principal source of that information. 1596 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (While Respondent could have obtained the same infor- mation from the policy holders, for obvious reasons, noted by Hornsby in his testimony, that is not a desirable alternative.) Respondent also had the right to reject a collective course. But, if Bowser was entitled to union representation in an audit interview, Respondent had to relinquish either its right to information essential to the management of its business, or to forego its right to reject a collective course. In either case, the exercise of the Weingarten right would require interference with a legitimate employer prerogative. In short, given the purpose and nature of the audit in- terview, I am persuaded and find that while it may be investigatory and may lead to discipline of an employee, it is nevertheless not investigatory in the sense of Wein- garten, and Bowser was not entitled to union representa- tion.5 s In light of the foregoing. I deem it unnecessary to decide whether the Union had waived the right to union represenation, and whether such a right may he waived CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Prudential Insurance Company of America is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Insurance Workers International Union is a labor or- ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent was not required to accord its employee union representation, upon request, at the audit interview of May 11, 1979. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 6 The complaint is dismissed in its entirety. 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the Rule, and Regulations of the National Labor Rleations Board, the find- ings conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions. and Order, and all objections thereto shall he deemed waived for all purposes.