PPG Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1980

251 N.L.R.B. 1146 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

114(, DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
PPG Industries, Inc., Lexington Plant, Fiber Glass
Division and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Help-
ers Local Union No. 391, affiliated with Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Cases
11 CA-7573, 11-CA-7805, 11-CA-7846, and
I I-CA 7928
August 27, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BB CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JIENKINS AND TRUESDALE
On November 5, 1979, Administrative Law
Judge Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The Gener-
al Counsel also filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and the Charging Party filed cross-excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions
2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as
modified herein.
The complaint alleges, inter alia, that Respond-
ent unlawfully interrogated employees by inquiring
as to their union sympathies and their reasons for
supporting the Union. The Administrative Law
Judge dismissed all but one of these allegations,
finding that several of the allegedly proscribed
conversations were not established by credible evi-
dence and that the remaining discussions were not
251 NLRB No. 156
coercive. With regard to the inquiries found to be
not coercive, he noted that the questions were ad-
I Respondent anid he General Counsel have excepted to certain credi-
bility findings made by the Adminisirati e Lass Judge II is the
Board's
established policy not to overrule an dministratise las judge's
resolu-
tions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of
all of
the relevant idence convintces us that the resolutions are
incorrect
Standard Dry Wall Prduct. Inc. 91 NI.RB 544 1950). efd 188 F2d
362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefuily I examined thie record
and find no
basis fi r reersing his findings
IF our dissenting colleague's accout of th e fact, surrounditng
employ ee
Bedsole's discharge were supported by Ihe recird, we s ouId
agree that
Bedsole's terimninall n iolated Sec S(a)(3) f the Act Heer.
e are
unable ti recoticiI t e dsent' versi ii s everal crucial particulars
ssith tit e esidei a credied te Admniisilrati e I a, Judge
Initially
with regardl II Beldsole's miisconduc, Respolldel t require(d cnpl'o.ees
Iti
take their 10-minute breaks at scedlled irriies ad ill designated
areas
unless eplotees obtall id pelnl llisilni to ary lrom this prIcedure he
credited eiderlice slIn ss that ledsl e ias disco r crd sleeping
i a c
eluded area of the plant I ) minuteis the r hiis break was .cheduled
to end
BIedlsile. wo il had slh asked for pernirssioti (i lake
his break in a w,ork
a.rea, had to e a akcncd Supervlisil Ilartlei,
and ( 0,scns I lie sper
· stiors did not tell Bedstole that he was due for termiliallt. hut
ilifrrnied
him that sleepig ,n the job was againil colnpan plilcy
and that he
should report o Area Supervs shr Willial lr ir l ile day
As for the disellt'% clai Ithatl edsole a tile cait lti disparate
treatmeinl, thle Adminislr;ii: e Il as J udge rejected seseral alleged
i-
stances of undiscipe lied epig on the job ecause
the e idcncC failed Ito
establish tha ciplIOees slepl lIIo ssl'rktime r tha;t Respondetll
kne of
the ilfractioi r lsI addit l, Iild e Adnllmisallli e I. as Judg e discounted
a i
incident of aln cmplove's' ",nitilg" ` on her feet as nt comparable
t Bed-
sole' s rnlsconduci i I i act. lie record coitrlain ily
ne example if at
etlpl)cc Ili)t l1 pit il te job ill irirllsaices resembling
Bcd,,ole' and
as rlot ilisharge d he c\diderlce isso shol s , ho. wleer. that
Respolldenlt
terruinated 4 plotces i the pasl It) y ears Fior sleepig
on the iob I
vitew o Rspti Idcnll ' record iIIn Iis area and the s eriousness of Bedsole's
miscoididulI. e til [tfat It' decslIon to reprilianld, rather than
discharge.
one lther mplNce for s leeping ilt orkti me cltes not estahlish
that it
treated Bedsole il a disparate manlier
I lie Admttuistrati e l a J udge. re ltng tin ('erntilid Groters J Cal-
jrniam, Ltei, 227 Nl RB 121 1 11')7). cfinrrcitent denied 57 F
2d 449
th Cir q978). ioncllddcd Ihall R espondent iolated Sec
(a)(1) of the
Act h b derming epioe S ith's rquest for representation at
a nieeting
whichl resulted il disciplitnar actilon agalll st Smith
Siltibbers Jeinkins and
'Iruesda lr i gree itl tile AdmitiIati Ve l.a Judge's cclu,itnri,
but
rely onit thl principles enunciated inl B aton Rouge ater iStrk Coiparnrev,
246 NLRB No 161 1 97)9 . ir hich a Board majority overruled rtjied
(;rot r ill substantial part aild found that no Sec 7 right
tii unill repre-
settialtion exists under ,V L.R B. J H'tngarten. In. 420 U S 251
(1975), lhenl a;it etmiployer meets lth ani employee slely Io
inform him
of a presiously made. finial ecisiotl to
impose certain discipline Unlike
the eplo r in t Bat.i Riouge, Respundell did nt reach
a final. binding
decision concerliing specific discipline prir to its meeting
with Smith.
norr did it merely inirn Smith of a decision In filt. Responden
origi-
nally Iold Smith lie w:as discharged. but changed the discipline
to a writ-
tent rprimanld uponl isestigatll g tlie nalter further anrd
asking Smith
questlilois about his alleged nmriscndu ct Chairman Fanlrliing
also agrees
that Respondenlt ullafully compelled Sith to attend meeting
after
denying his request fir represenltaiol, hut does s fr Ihe
reasons ex-
pressed ill his disseit in Baton Roug.
IIPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 1147
dressed to open and well-known union supporters
and therefore were mere conversation openers
under Stumpf Motor Company, Inc.,3 and B. F
Goodrich Footwear Company.4
We affirm the Administrative Law Judge's dis-
missal of the interrogation allegations where based
solely on his credibility findings. As to the allega-
tions dismissed as not being violative under Stumpf
and B. F. Goodrich, the evidence as credited by the
Administrative Law Judge shows that Foreman
Godwin discussed the Union with employee
Hepler at the latter's work station and asked her
what she thought the Union would do for employ-
ees. Later that same day Foreman Michaels ap-
proached Hepler and solicited her thoughts about
what the Union would accomplish. Foreman Hart-
ley asked employee Lanning whether he would
still be for the Union if he had it to do over again.
Hartley repeated the question after Lanning failed
to respond and asked it once again when Lanning
said he would still support the Union. Hartley also
asked Lanning if he had had an opportunity to sign
a petition for a new election. Foreman Gibson
talked to employee Potts about unions and asked
her why she was for the Union. The record further
shows that Hepler, Lanning, and Potts were active
and known supporters of the Union and were
wearing union insignia at the time of their conver-
sations with the supervisors.
The Administrative Law Judge found the inquir-
ies to Hepler, Lanning, and Potts to be privileged
under Stumpf and B. F. Goodrich. Those cases
found questions concerning employees' union sym-
pathies to be not coercive in view of the employ-
ees' open and active support for the union and the
absence of other threats in the conversations. We
have recently held, however, that inquiries of this
nature constitute probing into employees' union
sentiments which, even when addressed to employ-
ees who have openly declared their union adher-
ence, reasonably tend to coerce employees in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights.5 We have further
found such probing to be coercive even in the ab-
sence of threats of reprisals or promises of bene-
fits.6 The type of questioning at issue conveys an
employer's displeasure with employees' union ac-
tivity and thereby discourages such activity in the
future. The coercive impact of these questions is
not diminished by the employees' open union sup-
port or by the absence of attendant threats. Ac-
3 208 NLRB 431 (1974)
4 201 NL RB 353 (1973)
s 17T Automotive Ectrrcal Productr Divr:won. 231 NLRB 878 (1977):
Paceco. a Division Fruehuuj Crporanton, 237 NLRB 399 (1978). Ana-
conda Co--Wre and Cable Div, 241 NIRB 1091 (1979) See also Esex
Wire Corporation 188 NLRB 397 (1971)
6 Paceco and Anaconda Co.. upra.
cordingly, we hereby overrule Stumpf and B. F.
Goodrich to the extent they hold that an employer
may lawfully initiate questioning about employees'
union sentiments where the employees are open
and known union supporters and the inquiries are
unaccompanied by threats or promises. We find
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by questioning union adherents Hepler, Lanning,
and Potts about their union sympathies and reasons
for supporting the Union.'
We also disagree with the Administrative Law
Judge's findings that statements by Supervisor
Charles Everhardt concerning the cancellation of
expansion plans and by Supervisor McGirt regard-
ing the discharge of employee Drake were not co-
ercive. Employee Watts testified that during a dis-
cussion about the phasing out of a roving depart-
ment product Everhardt stated that, in his opinion,
Respondent planned to open a new weaving proc-
ess in Lexington, but "because of what had hap-
pened, they didn't think that they would." Ever-
hardt did not deny Watts' account of the conversa-
tion. The Administrative Law Judge stated that it
was reasonable to construe Everhardt's comment
"because of what had happened" as a reference to
the union election or campaign, but found the
remark not to be coercive because it merely repre-
sented the opinion of a low-level supervisor. Con-
trary to the Administrative Law Judge, we find
that in the circumstances Everhardt's reference to
the Union as the reason for the cancellation of ex-
pansion plans reasonably tended to coerce employ-
ees and violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. We do
not consider the opinion nature of Everhardt's
statement nor his status as a low-level supervisor to
be conclusive since employees can reasonably
assume that Everhardt is privy to the decisions of
Respondent's management. Further, Everhardt's
comment, which was made in the course of exten-
sive unlawful activity by Respondent, unequivocal-
ly tied the cessation of expansion plans to the
advent of the Union.
With respect to McGirt's conversation with
Wilcox, the Administrative Law Judge credited
Wilcox's testimony that McGirt confirmed Wil-
cox's statement that McGirt had "lost an operator
due to union activity or soliciting for the Union."
McGirt identified the operator as Drake and stated
that she was discharged for "following another
person to their job, talking to them about the
Union." Wilcox replied that it appeared Drake
should have known better and McGirt agreed,
adding that Drake was one of his best employees.
We adopt the Administratime l.av Judlge' dl ,nis;ll Il htc illcrrogal-
tion allegallons w ith respect lo emplo, !c Bcd,orlc land Black, hill. ill
doing so, rely solely on his credihlit', fimlidng,
PPG INDUSTRIES, NC. 147
, .
114X DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Administrative Law Judge found that
McGirt's statements were consistent with Respond-
ent's asserted reason for discharging Drake, i.e., in-
terference with another employee's work, and did
not imply that Drake was terminated solely for her
union solicitation or activity. The Administrative
Law Judge also found that Wilcox's remark that
Drake should have known better indicated an
awareness by Wilcox, based on McGirt's com-
ments, that Drake violated work rules. We dis-
agree. McGirt's comments plainly implied that
Drake's discharge was related, at least in part, to
her activity on behalf of the Union. The credited
evidence shows that McGirt not only confirmed
Wilcox's statement linking Drake's discharge to her
union solicitation, but he again mentioned Drake's
union activity while describing her alleged miscon-
duct. We do not believe that Wilcox's statement
that Drake should have known better necessarily
reflects an understanding that Drake had in fact
violated work rules. Consequently, we find that
McGirt's remarks implying that Drake's union ac-
tivity was related to her discharge reasonably
tended to discourage employees from engaging in
legitimate union activities and violated Section
8(a)(l) of the Act.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 3
of the Administrative Law Judge:
"3. By unlawfully interfering with, restraining,
and coercing employees by threatening to cease
plant expansion plans because of their election of
the Union, by threatening employees with loss of
jobs in the event of their organization by the
Union, by interrogating employees concerning
their union sympathies and activities, by soliciting
employees to withdraw their union authorization
cards, by soliciting grievances of employees and
promising employees benefits to discourage their
union support, by threatening employees that it
would refuse to negotiate a union contract and
would sell out, by threatening employees with
plant closure in the event they elected the Union,
by threatening employees with more onerous
working conditions because of their union support,
by more stringently enforcing work rules to dis-
courage employees in their union support, by in-
forming employees that an employee was dis-
charged for union activities, by requiring that em-
ployees participate in employee interviews or meet-
ings without representation where such representa-
tion had been requested by an employee and rea-
sonable grounds exist for a belief that the matters
to be discussed at the meeting may result in disci-
plinary action, and by actually imposing discipline
at such meeting, Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
PPG Industries, Inc., Lexington Plant, Fiber Glass
Division, Lexington, North Carolina, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(b) of
the Administrative Law Judge's recommended
Order:
"(b) Threatening employees with loss of jobs be-
cause of their union activities or their selection of a
union as a collective-bargaining representative."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting in part:
Contrary to my colleagues, I find that the facts
surrounding the discharge of known union support-
er Ronnie Bedsole establish that the motivating
cause for his discharge was not a single incident of
sleeping on the job, but his ongoing union activity.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Crew
Foreman Hartley, who engaged in other unlawful
conduct, discovered Bedsole asleep a few minutes
after the end of a scheduled 6 a.m. break during
the midnight to 8 a.m. shift. Hartley sent Bedsole
home and told him to report back later to see an-
other company official who, under Respondent's
standard operating procedure, performed the
formal act of discharging employees.
There was evidence that other employees had
been discharged for sleeping on the job. On the
other hand, there was credited evidence that em-
ployees caught sleeping on the job, even in circum-
stances strikingly similar to Bedsole's had not been
discharged. In defending Bedsole's discharge, Re-
spondent took the position, properly rejected by
the Administrative Law Judge, that such an offense
was automatically terminal. The diverse treatment
of this offense shows that an element of judgment
usually preceded the final disposition. By treating
Bedsole's discharge as automatic, thus depriving
him of whatever measure in his favor such factors
as his length of service, satisfactory rating, and the
absence of previous offenses might have afforded,
Respondent demonstrated that union supporters
were particularly vulnerable to discharge. It did so
---- -
PPG INDUSTIES. INC 1140
at a time when it was engaging in other interfer-
ence with its employees' right to organize, includ-
ing the discriminatory discharge of Bedsole's fian-
cee and fellow union supporter, Donna Black. Re-
spondent's treatment of Bedsole as well has all the
elements of 8(a)(3) discrimination.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPI.OYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board having found,
after a hearing, that we violated Federal law by
discharging employees for supporting a union and
by otherwise interfering with our employees' right
to join and support a union, we notify you that:
WE WILl. NOT threaten employees with ces-
sation of plant expansion plans because of their
selection of Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers
Local Union No. 391, affiliated with Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or
any other labor oragnization.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees wih loss
of jobs because of their union activities or
their selection of a union as a collective-bar-
gaining representative.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees con-
cerning their union sympathies and activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees that we
will refuse to negotiate a contract with a union
and will sell out if they select a union to repre-
sent them.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with
plant closure in the event they select a union.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with
more onerous working conditions because of
their union support.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully solicit employees
to withdraw their union authorization cards.
WE WILL NOT solicit grievances from em-
ployees or promise them benefits to discourage
their union activities and support.
WE WILL NOT more stringently enforce
work rules to discourage employees in their
union support.
WE WILL NOT require that any employee
participate in an interview or meeting where
the employee has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the matters to be discussed may
result in his being the subject of disciplinary
action and where we have refused that em-
ployee's request to be represented at such
meeting, and WE WILL. NOT actually impose
disciplinary action at such meetings.
WE wlI. NOT discourage activities on
behalf of the above-named Union, or any other
labor organization, by discharging or issuing
written reprimands or otherwise discriminating
against any employee.
WE WILl. NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended.
WE WILL offer Terri Drake immediate and
full reinstatement to her former job or, if her
former job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, and WE Will. offer Donna
Black immediate reinstatement to a job sub-
stantially equivalent to her former job and for
which she is qualified and physically able, the
reinstatement with respect to both Drake and
Black to be without prejudice to their senior-
ity or other rights and privileges, and W-
WILL make them whole for any loss of earn-
ings or benefits they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them, plus
interest.
WE WILL revoke and expunge from their
personnel and other records the written repri-
mands of Velma Hepler and William Parks
which were found to be discriminatorily
issued.
WE WILL revoke and expunge from his per-
sonnel and other records the written repri-
mand of Hugh Smith dated October 18, 1978,
which was issued following our denial of his
request for representation at a meeting at
which he could reasonably anticipate disciplin-
ary action.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., LEXINGTON
PLANT, FIBER GLASS DIVISION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HUTTON S. BRANDON, Administrative Law Judge:
This case was heard in Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
on February 12-16, February 26-March 2, and March
14-16, 1979. The charges were filed by Chauffeurs.,
Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391. affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein
called the Union, in Case 11-CA-7573 on April 18,
1978' (amended April 20); in Case 11-CA-7805 on
August 15 (amended August 28): in Case I -CA 7846 on
i All dates are in 178 i)' lcS m l hcr,, r% tatcd
PI'G INDUSTRIES. INC I l ... \
I 15() I)ECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
September 7; and in Case I l-CA 7928 on October 20.
The complaint in Case I 1-CA-7573 issued on June 28
and orders consolidating cases and consolidated com-
plaints issued on the subsequently filed charges on Octo-
ber 6 and 19 and December 5. The consolidated com-
plaint, amended at the hearing on February 12, alleges
that PPG Industries, Inc., Lexington Plant, Fiber Glass
Division, hereinafter called the Respondent or the Com-
pany, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, herein called the Act, through
various and numerous acts of its supervisors and agents
which interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em-
ployees, and Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act through
the discharges of three employees (Terri Drake, Ronnie
Bedsole, and Donna Black) and the issuance of written
warnings to two employees (William T. Parks and
Velma M. Hepler), all because of their activity on behalf
of the Union.
Upon the entire record," including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due considera-
tion of the able and helpful briefs filed by the General
Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union, I make the fol-
lowing:
FINI)ING(S oF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is a Pennsylvania corporation with
facilities located in North Carolina, including a plant in
Lexington, North Carolina, herein involved, where it is
engaged in the manufacture of fiber glass products.
During the 12-month period preceding issuance of the
last consolidated complaint, the Respondent received at
its Lexington plant goods and raw materials valued in
excess of $50,000 directly from points outside North
Carolina. During the same period, the Respondent
shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
points located outside the State. The Respondent admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The Respondent also admits, and I find, that the Union
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. TIlE A IE.1G I) UNFAIR ABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent's Lexington plant is a large facility
covering some 27 acres and utilizing some 1,700 employ-
ees in its operations. The work force is divided into three
rotating shifts (crews) and one regular day shift.
The Union's organizational campaign at the Lexington
plant began in early March. The first meetings between
the Union's organizer, Vicki Saporta, and certain of the
Respondent's employees took place at the Lexington
Holiday Inn on March 8. The campaign was overt from
the beginning, and employees at the March 8 meetings
received union decals, badges, and bumper stickers to
either distribute further to the Respondent's employees
2 I'he Ge(neral Counsel's unopposed motion to correct the transcript,
dated June 12, 179, is granted and received in evidence as GC. Exh 51.
or to wear on their person or display on their vehicles.
The customary union authorization cards were signed by
a number of employees at the initial and subsequent
meetings, and some were named by the Union to an "in-
plant organizing committee." The Respondent was ad-
vised by letters from the Union from time to time of
those named to the organizing committee both at the ini-
tial meetings and subsequently. The Respondent was thus
aware early of the identity of the union supporters and
was thereby able to conduct a detailed and comprehen-
sive analysis ("Union Umbrella Committee Profiles") of
the Union's support by plant department, shift, age, sex,
etc.
The Union's organizing efforts apparently found quick
support and the Union filed a petition seeking an elec-
tion, Case 11-RC-4508 on March 27. A hearing on the
petition was held on April 18 and 19, and a Decision and
Direction of Election in the matter was issued by the Re-
gional Director on June 7. An election was conducted
on July 6 and 7 and a majority of the valid ballots cast
were for representation by the Union. However, the Re-
spondent filed objections to the election which were
overruled by the Regional Director in a Supplemental
Decision and Certification of Representative on Septem-
ber 12. A request for review of that decision was grant-
ed. On November 27, the Board directed a hearing on
certain objections of the Respondent and a hearing was
conducted on January 9-12 and 15-19, 1979. Recommen-
dations by the Hearing Officer on those objections had
not issued prior to the time that the hearing in the instant
cases closed.
As could be expected during the course of the cam-
paign, a number of employees opposed the Union's ef-
forts and supported the Respondent. Such support was
marked by the wearing of pro-Respondent T-shirts, rib-
bons, and buttons. Moreover, such supporters, like the
union supporters, engaged in distribution of literature at
the Respondent's plant gates.
It is in the context of this organizational campaign that
the Respondent's alleged unfair labor practices took
place. While a substantial number of the alleged viola-
tions took place prior to the election, the election did not
mark the end of the alleged discriminatory acts and un-
lawful interference by the Respondent according to the
General Counsel. However, because the allegations of
8(a)(l) violations are so numerous and are attributed to
so many different supervisors of the Respondent treat-
ment of such allegations chronologically would be un-
wieldy and perhaps more confusing. Accordingly, con-
sideration of the allegations will be set forth below sub-
stantially in the order such allegations appear in the con-
solidated complaint.
PPG INDUSTRIES. INC. 1151
B. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(l)
I. The alleged offer of money to employees to
revoke union authorization cards
The General Counsel presented a number of it-
nesses3 who testified that "C" Crew Foreman Rudolph
Hartley, in a preshift 4 meeting with employees on March
10, offered to "give" or "pay" employees $5 for any
union authorization card they could get returned to them
by the Union. The statement was made, according to one
of the General Counsel's witnesses, Motes, in the context
of a talk to the entire crew consisting of some 200 em-
ployees.
Hartley admitted in his testimony that he discussed the
signing of union cards with employees at the preshift
meeting, but related that it was in the context of telling
the employees that they should read what they sign and
suggesting that many might have signed their cards in
the parking lot of the plant in the dark without reading
them and "probably already would like to get their cards
back." Hartley admittedly added that "I bet you can't
get them back, I would almost be willing to give $5.00
for any card that you can get back."
Hartley's version of his comments were substantially
corroborated by several employee witnesses presented by
the Respondent. s In addition, two other supervisors,
Lindsay Owens, assistant foreman in the finished prod-
ucts area, and Martha Scott, end-finding foreman for the
"C" crew, testified that Hartley's remarks regarding the
$5 "offer" or "bet" were prefaced by the words
"almost," or "almost willing."
I have considered the testimony of both groups of wit-
nesses on this issue. Both groups testified with apparent
sincerity and honesty. As could be expected, both groups
of witnesses exhibited varying degrees of faulty recollec-
tions concerning Hartley's comments and, predictably,
there were variances between witnesses within each
group as to Hartley's exact wording. The Respondent's
witnesses were generally emphatic that Hartley's "offer"
or "bet" was a limited one restricted by his use of the
word "almost," while the General Counsel's witnesses
were generally as emphatic that Hartley used no words
of limitation. Under these circumstances, I am not per-
suaded that the versions of either group of witnesses is
more reliable or accurate than the other. It cannot be
said, therefore, that the General Counsel has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that Hartley made either
a direct offer of $5 for each card returned from the
Union or a direct $5 bet to induce the withdrawal of
union cards.6
3 Employees Ronnie Bedsole, Donna Black, Doris Coates. Robert
Motes, Lida Smalley, Medford Shoaf, Bobbie Alice Wilcox, and Jerr
Williams.
4 Preshift meetings were customary and were utilized by the Respond-
ent to discuss production problems and schedules and to make announce-
ments regarding work.
5 Dorothy Bailey, Meioa Brewer, Mary Ann Fritz, Annie Ruth Burr.
Catherine Graber, Florence King. Dorothy Mills, Lilly Owens. Vickie
Poole, Doris Smith, and Rita Williams
s The General Counsel has the burden of proof and must make out a
sufficient case to persuade See A.44 Lapco. Inc.. 197 NLRB 274 (1972).
and authority cited therein at 277
The General Counsel urges, nevertheless, that even if
Hartley prefaced his "offer" or "bet" with the term
"almost" or "almost willing" such language implies an
intent by Hartley to "put up money" which could be
tested only by an employee seeking return of his card by
the Union. The test of interference under the Act, the
General Counsel reminds, is whether the conduct may
reasonably be said to have a tendency to interfere with
the free exercise of employee rights and is not dependent
upon successful effect. 7 On the other hand, the Respond-
ent in its brief argues that the use of the word "almost"
by Hartley removes any question of an actual offer of
money for cards or financial inducement to employees to
seek their return.
Because Hartley stopped short of an outright "offer"
or "bet", I am convinced that his comments cannot rea-
sonably be construed as an unlawful inducement of em-
ployees to seek the return of their Union authorization
cards. Contrary to the General Counsel's contention, I
do not view Hartley's statements as reflecting an intent
to "put up money" or as calling for a test by employees
to determine whether he was going to "put his money
where his mouth was." Rather, in context, it appears that
Hartley's remarks were simply directed toward causing
employees to exercise caution in signing the cards be-
cause of the difficulty in obtaining the return of such
cards in the event of a changed mind. I conclude they
had no reasonable tendency to interfere with employee
rights. Accordingly, I do not find that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act through Hartley's
March 10 statement to the assembled crew. s8
2. The alleged threat to cease plant expansion
The consolidated complaint, as amended, alleges that
three of the Respondent's supervisory personnel, Charles
Everhardt, a "D" crew supervisor at relevant times,
Jerry Strong, an employment supervisor in the personnel
department, and Monroe Kennedy, assistant foreman in
the forming department, threatened employees with the
cessation of plant expansion because of employee support
for the Union. It was admitted by Plant Manager James
Doughty, called as an adverse witness by the General
Counsel, that the Respondent had been for a few years
contemplating the addition of a new furnace for its fiber
glass production to be designated the 510 furnace in se-
quential order with the existing furnaces, 501 through
509. Doughty added, however, that there was no active
"510 program." There was other testimony from Dough-
ty that the Respondent in recent years had acquired ad-
ditional land in Lexington. On the other hand, at some
point in the summer of 1978, the Respondent shipped
7 Hartley testified that no one attempted to take him up on any bet in
connection with the cards. and there was no evidence to contradict that
testimony
I make this finding with due regard to the fact that, at the same
meeting in which he made the admitted remarks, Hartley made available
to employees an announcement prepared by the Respondent purportedly
in response to employee questions on union card cancellation and advis-
ing employees how they could seek cancellation or withdrawal of their
union cards The General Counsel concedes the legality of the language
utilized in such announcement, but alleges that its distribution was unlau-
ful as discussed infra
PPCI INDUSTRIES. N 1151
1152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
some of its equipment related to the production of a par-
ticular glass fiber referred to as K-37 to its sister plant in
Shelby, North Carolina, some 200 miles away. In August
the Respondent also ceased an additional function re-
ferred to as its "wet chop" operation, and transferred
that operation to Shelby. While the changes in the K-37
and wet chop operations were not shown to have had an
adverse impact on the Respondent's employees, these
changes in addition to the contemplated 510 furnace and
the land acquisition provide the background in which the
Respondent's alleged threats must be considered.
Employee Linda Ridge, a doffer packer in the roving
department under Everhardt's supervision, testified that
in late July she heard from another employee that the
Respondent was going to phase out the roving depart-
ment. She thereafter inquired of Everhardt when he
came by her work station if he knew anything about it.
Everhardt, according to Ridge, said that that was what
he had been told. Moreover, Everhardt added that he
had been told that Frank Green, Respondent's vice presi-
dent, had been told by the board of directors that they
were going to put a "hold" on all construction work at
the plant; they were not going to rebuild a furnace that
was down.9 Everhardt, who related to Ridge that he had
heard this at a "bossman's meeting" a couple of days ear-
lier, added further that "they" told him that the Re-
spondent was not going to support a plant that had a
union in it.
Ridge also related that she saw Everhardt later that
day in the break room in the presence of employee John
Tesh. In the conversation, Everhardt repeated essentially
the same things that he had told Ridge on the plant
floor. Everhardt concluded, according to Ridge, "PPG
was not going to support no union."
Everhardt denied having made the statements attribut-
ed to him by Ridge, although he admitted having talked
to her about a rumor she had heard. According to Ever-
hardt, he told Ridge in response to a statement that she
had heard that because of the Union the K-37 work was
being sent to Shelby. He had replied that it was simply a
product change which had nothing to do with the
Union.1 0 Employee Tesh denied that he had ever heard
Everhardt talk about plant expansion with Ridge.
I credit Ridge's testimony as to what Everhardt told
her in late July. Ridge, although exhibiting some confu-
sion as to exact statements, created the impression of
honesty in her testimony and it was clear that Ever-
hardt's remarks had an obvious and lasting impact on
her. Moreover, since she was still employed by the Re-
spondent at the time of the hearing and was, in effect,
testifying perhaps at some economic risk, her testimony
Ridge related that Everhardt referred to the 509 furnace as being
down. No evidence was submitted to establish that 509 was in fact
"down" at that time, thus suggesting that Ridge was in error. Even
though Ridge may have been in error on the furnace, I find that such
error does not adversely affect her overall credibility.
'0 Ridge testified that on June 24 Everhardt had told her that the K-
37 product was being transferred to Shelby because Shelby ran a better
"roving product" than Lexington He also made the same statement in
several prior preshift meetings with employees.
was less likely to be false." Everhardt in his testimonial
demeanor was less convincing. The same may be ob-
served of Tesh who could not in any event be consid-
ered as wholly impartial since his interests were clearly
aligned with that of the Respondent as shown not simply
by his outspoken support of the Respondent during the
Union's campaign but also by the fact that he was admit-
tedly under active consideration for promotion to a su-
pervisory position at the time of the hearing.
Based on Ridge's testimony, I find that Everhardt did
threaten a cessation of plant expansion plans because of
the pending union question, a move that clearly had an
impact on employee job interests. Accordingly, I find
that, by Everhardt's remarks to Ridge, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Cathy Watts, an employee in the roving department
working under Everhardt, testified that on July 24 Ever-
hardt announced at a preshift meeting that the K-37
product handled in roving would be phased out. Subse-
quently on August 7, when talking to Watts at her work
station, Everhardt told Watts, according to Watts, that
Frank Green was coming to the plant to discuss future
plans for the roving department and recommendations
were going to be made to cut back seven creel tenders
and two doffers on each crew, and he again reminded
her that the K-37 products were going to Shelby. Watts
testified that on August 15 she again talked to Everhardt
on the work floor and asked him if she could see Green
when he came and explained to Everhardt she wanted to
know why the K-37 was being phased out. Everhardt
replied that he had been told that the reason was because
they had set up a new weaving device in Shelby and the
K-37 products were going to Shelby for that reason.
Further, Everhardt stated that "this was his own opin-
ion, but all of the land that they recently bought up in
Lexington, he thought that they were going to open up a
new weaving process in Lexington but because of what
had happened, they didn't think that they would."
Everhardt did not specifically deny the comments at-
tributed to him by Watts. Based on Watts' testimony the
General Counsel contends that Everhardt's remarks con-
stituted a threat of cessation of expansion plans, and that
the stated basis for such cessation, "because of what had
happened," can be only construed as a reference to the
election won by the Union. The Respondent argues that
there was no evidence that anyone ever had any reason
to suspect or speculate that a new weaving process
would be installed at Lexington, and under such circum-
stances it would be unreasonable to infer that Watts
could have been coerced by Everhardt's remarks which
were nothing more than his own speculation and opin-
ion.
I find that the inference that Everhardt was referring
to the union election or campaign when he indicated that
the weaving process was not being installed "because of
what happened" is a reasonable and logical one. I further
find, in agreement with the Respondent's argument, that
since Everhardt's remarks were clearly stated in terms of
' Victor Wukils d/b/a Vicr Shop'. Save, 215 NLRB 28 (1974); Geor-
gia Rug Mill, 131 NLRB 1304. 13 05 (19l), modified on other grounds
308 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 19762).
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 1153i
his own opinion he did not profess to have inside infor-
mation on the matter. Accordingly, and because of his
status as a low-level supervisor, it is unlikely that his
remark could realistically be perceived as a threat by em-
ployees. I find it had no potential for coercive impact
and that Everhardt's opinion did not therefore constitute
a violation of the Act.
Cathy Watts also testified concerning a conversation
she overheard between Employment Supervisor Jerry
Strong and employee Tesh in the break room around
July 26-28. 2 Watts testified Tesh advised Strong of
rumors "flying around" that there was not going to be
any more expansion at PPG. Strong responded that that
was what the rumor was and stated that what happened
was that the Respondent had put "all expansion on hold
until they see how this thing turns out." In making the
latter remark, according to Watts, Strong pointed to "up-
stairs" where Labor Board people were talking to
"people" that morning.13 The conversation turned to a
speech given by Frank Green and Tesh commented that
the Respondent did not pour any money into its union-
ized plants. 14 Strong replied that "that is what the man
tried to tell them," and added that he did not blame
Green, and that, if it were his company, he would do the
same thing." Finally, Watts related that Strong also said
that "they were looking more seriously to Texas," and
"they had a rumor going around that they were going to
open up a new company in Texas."' 5
Strong denied discussing plant expansion with Watts
or indicating that the Respondent would not do anything
about plant expansion until the National Labor Relations
Board matter was over. Moreover, he could not recall
any conversations with Tesh about plant expansion. Tesh
likewise testified that he had never talked to Strong
about plant expansion.
I credit Watts on the incident. In so doing, I note that
both Strong and Tesh had admitted talking to employees
about plant expansion, and that Strong admitted that he
had told one employee that he had heard the rumor that
the 510 furnace was being put on "hold." Strong did not
deny the rumors and it was not improbable that he
would pass them on. Moreover, Watts appeared sincere
in her testimony, and her testimony was not implausible
in view of the rumors. Finally, Tesh admitted that he
had a cup of coffee with Strong in the roving break
room the morning of July 27 or 28 before being inter-
viewed in the plant by a Board agent. This tends to cor-
roborate Watts' testimony as to the time and place of the
remarks. Accordingly, in agreement with the General
Counsel's contention, I conclude the tenor of Strong's re-
marks was that plant expansion was being delayed be-
cause of the pending union matter and the Respondent
did not put money into unionized plants. Such comments
12 Watts identified employee Sadie Leverez as being present. Leverez
did not testify
': The record does not reflect how Watts was aware that Board per-
sonnel were in the plant, but the fact of such presence or the approximate
time of such presence was not disputed by the Respondent
'' It is undisputed that the Respondent operates several plants whose
employees are represented by labor organizations.
s That the Respondent had some plans regarding a Texas plant is not
disputed Details of its plans in this regard, though proffered bhy the Re-
spondent, were rejected h me as irrelesanl
during the pendancy of a representation issue amounts to
a threat of economic reprisal to employees which tends
to coerce and restrain employees in their exercise of Sec-
tion 7 rights. I find Strong's comments violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
Employee Roger Stevens testified that he had a con-
versation with John Tesh about 2 weeks after the elec-
tion in which Tesh stated that the union supporters had
really "messed up." Tesh related that there had been a
meeting the previous day in which Vice President Green
had announced that the Lexington plant was being
phased out, that expansion funds were canceled, and that
a Texas plant would be completed by 1980, at which
time Lexington would be phased out. Stevens related
that the same day he approached Foreman Monroe Ken-
nedy about the matter and inquired if Kennedy had had
a good meeting with Green the previous day. Kennedy
replied that it looked pretty grim. Stevens asked Kenne-
dy about the expansion funds for the 510 furnace and
Kennedy replied that "510 had been scuttled." Kennedy
inquired about the plant in Texas and Kennedy respond-
ed that it had been approved and they were starting to
build the plant. Stevens then commented that if they
phased out Lexington a lot of employees in Lexington
would be going to Texas to work. Kennedy replied that
he did not think that they wanted any Lexington people
in Texas. Stevens testified that Kennedy did not state
that he had attended the meeting with Green, but indi-
cated the Respondent's plans related by Kennedy to Ste-
vens had been announced by Green.
While Kennedy denied the remarks attributed to him
by Stevens he did admit that Stevens had come to him
and asked him about a meeting with Green about the
completion of the 510 furnace, about the removal of the
"wet chop" operation, and about the establishment of a
Texas plant. Kennedy had stated he had not attended a
meeting with Green and told Stevens he had no informa-
tion regarding his other questions.
Considering the testimony and demeanor of Stevens as
opposed to Kennedy, I credit the latter. Kennedy was
clear and very precise in his recollection of Steven's in-
quiries, and his denials of the remarks attributed to him
by Stevens were emphatic. Moreover, there is no other
testimony in the record that any other employee was
told that the Lexington plant was going to be phased
out. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent did not vio-
late the Act through the remarks of Kennedy. 6
3. The alleged threats of job loss for union activity
The General Counsel presented two witnesses, em-
ployees Ann Hill and Connie Sexton, who testified about
an alleged threat of Robert McGirt, "B" crew foreman,
made in the break room in late June. Sexton related that
i' It is unnecessary to decide whether Tesh made the remarks allribut-
ed to him by Kennedy. Tesh was not shown to be supervisor or agent of
the Respondent at the time of the alleged conversation with Stevens. nor
was he shown to otherwise he pri'y to the Respondent's operational
plans. I find irrelevant the testimony of Nick Baker to the effect that he
was present in a conversation between Tesh and Stevens reg~arding plant
expansion in which the Union was not mentioned In an eeni. it is not
clear that Baker was describing the same conversation ahoult which Ste-
vens testified
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC.
1154 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
she, Hill, and fellow employees Gay Burkehardt, Mil-
dred Burkehardt, and Carolyn Blevins were sitting in the
break room discussing the union, when McGirt joined
the conversation and said "these people will be sorry
after the election when they are out walking the street,
but I am not going to feel a bit sorry for them." Hill tes-
tified McGirt said that people "who were pushing the
Union when they were out walking the streets, he
wouldn't be sorry either that he would be sitting back
laughing at them."
The Respondent presented McGirt, who denied the
specific comments attributed to him by Sexton and Hill.
In his version, when he approached the group they were
talking about the Union's picketing another place of busi-
ness with the help of some of the Respondent's employ-
ees, specifically Velma Hepler, and McGirt commented
that he did not feel sorry for anybody who was walking
the picket line because that was their choice. McGirt's
testimony was supported by that of Gay Burkehardt,
Mildred Burkehardt, and Catherine Daniel. Gay Burke-
hardt testified that she had stated that she had seen
Hepler offer union organizer Saporta a drink of water
while the two were on a picket line established at a local
restaurant and Saporta had poured it out. Burkehardt
then indicated she felt sorry for Hepler. It was at this
point that McGirt made his remark to the group discuss-
ing the matter.
I credit McGirt's version of his remarks since he was
corroborated by Gay and Mildred Burkehardt and Cath-
erine Daniel, who appeared to be credible. Sexton and
Hill were unable to supply the exact context in which
McGirt's remarks were made. Sexton, in particular, was
unconvincing in demeanor and demonstrated a poor rec-
ollection. Accordingly, I find no violation of the Act in
McGirt's remarks on this occasion.e 7
It was the testimony of employee Sandra Hollings-
worth that she attended the first Union meeting in
March and immediately after the meeting went to the
Respondent's parking lot to pass out union cards. She
was wearing at that time union buttons signifying union
support. She observed Foreman Charles Godwin in the
parking lot. Hollingsworth continued to pass out union
material in the plant parking lot during the 2-day break
period she had before returning to work. When she did
return to work on March 10, she inquired of Godwin
about why she had been moved from her previous work
position as a sliver handler on the 508 furnace. Her testi-
mony as to Godwin's response was equivocal. She attrib-
uted to Godwin three different responses. Thus, she said
he replied with a question about whether she knew what
she was doing or what she was getting into or what was
she doing "out there."
? I make this finding with due regard to the extreme union animosity
revealed by McGirt's admission that he had told some employees that
union supporters should be lined up against the wall and shot The
impact of the statement was somewhat tempered on further examination
by McGirt's explanation that the reference was to a newspaper article in-
volving union representatives who had embezzled union funds rather
than employee union supporters. In any event, the statement was not al-
leged or argued by the General Counsel as a violation of the Act.
Subsequently, on another occasion, after Terri
Drake' 8 had been discharged on March 13, Godwin dis-
cussed Drake's discharge with Hollingsworth. Godwin,
according to Hollingsworth, stated he hated that it had
happened, he knew Drake was a good worker because
she had worked for him at one time, and he liked her,
but then he told Hollingsworth, apparently referring to
Drake's discharge, that it could have been Hollings-
worth. It is not clear from Hollingsworth's testimony
whether Godwin made additional remarks in this particu-
lar conversation or in another one on the same subject.
In any event, Hollingsworth testified that Godwin talked
to her about her being the "bread winner" for her
family' 9 and about the "load" she was carrying. He told
her that if she wanted to be for the Union that was her
right, but that she should not have made a show of her-
self whereby the Company would know that she was for
the Union and that she should have just kept it to herself
where they would not have known it. Moreover,
Godwin, referring to Drake, stated that PPG was big
enough and powerful enough so that Drake would not
get her job back, and PPG could drag the thing through
the courts for up to 5 years before anything could be
done.
Godwin denied the specific remarks attributed to him
by Hollingsworth, although he conceded that he was
well aware of her relation to Drake and had seen Hol-
lingsworth pass out union material. He denied that he
knew of Hollingsworth's marital status, and, alt h ough he
admitted that he had talked to Hollingsworth about
Drake, he testified that it was based upon Hollings-
worth's inquiry and he had told her he had no informa-
tion with respect to Drake's discharge. Moreover,
Godwin testified he had not talked to any employee
about the Union because he knew from prior experience
with another employer how statements got "turned
around."
Although Hollingsworth's testimony set no example
for clarity, she conveyed the impression of sincerity, and
I am persuaded that the remarks she attributed to
Godwin were not contrived or false. Godwin's broad as-
sertion that he did not talk to any employees about the
Union was hollow and unconvincing.
The Respondent contends that, even crediting Hol-
lingsworth's testimony, no violation has been established.
In support of this contention, the Respondent relies pri-
marily upon Las Vegas Sun, 209 NLRB 240 (1974), and
Gibson Greeting Cards Inc., 205 NLRB 239 (1973). 1 find
the cited cases distinguishable. In the first cited case, the
foreman issuing the alleged threat found not to be viola-
tive of the Act by the Board was considered by the em-
ployees hearing the threat to be sympathetic to their
cause. Moreover, there was an absence of any pattern of
unfair labor practices by the employer. In the second
cited case, the employees hearing the alleged threats tes-
tified that they did not consider them to be threats. In
the instant case, there is no concession by Hollingsworth
'" Employee Drake is Hollingsworth's sister. Her discharge is alleged
to be an unfair labor practice and is discussed infra.
I" Hollingsworth is a divorcee with children and had recently pur-
chased a new home
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 1155
that she did not consider Godwin's remarks to be threat-
ening, nor did she concede that Godwin was sympathetic
to the union cause. Godwin's remarks may have been
subtle but I believe the coercive impact was inescapable.
Hollingsworth was not likely to miss the point of God-
win's references to her family situation, his warning in
reference to Drake's discharge that it could have been
Hollingsworth, and his warning that Hollingsworth
should not display her union support to management. I
find, as alleged, that Godwin's remarks to Hollingsworth
constituted a threat of discharge for continued union sup-
port, and the Respondent thereby violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
The General Counsel presented Carrey Gosnell, em-
ployed as a glass winder on the "A" crew by the Re-
spondent, who testified that he was approached by
Forming Foreman John Jones at work around July 4,
and Jones told him that he had heard from a good
source that they would like to get rid of Gosnell. Gos-
nell inquired who it was and Jones refused to mention
any names but stated "it came from the front office."
Jones added, "I would suggest that you watch what you
say, what you do, and who you talk to." At the time,
Gosnell was wearing his T-shirt signifying his union sup-
port. Moreover, Gosnell had been listed in the first
group of persons in the in-plant organizing committee
sent by the Union to the Respondent on March 9.
Gosnell testified further that on or about September 20
Jones, whom he described as a friend and golf compan-
ion, came by his work station and told him that he
wanted to warn Gosnell again; that Jones had attended a
meeting with supervision and they were trying to find
ways to counteract the union situation at PPG with re-
spect to the "A" crew. Jones stated, according to Gos-
nell, that "they" had the names of four employees on a
list Gosnell and employees Eugene Perriman, David
Dockery, and maybe Charles Mabry. Finally, Jones
stated that he just wanted to tell Gosnell so that he
could take it for what it was worth.
Similar statements were attributed as being Jones on
September 20, by employee David Dockery. Dockery
related that Jones approached him and Eugene Perri-
man 20 and told them he had a warning for them, adding
that he had just come from a supervisors' meeting that
they had at the "front," that names were mentioned, and
that if "they" could get rid of certain people they could
counteract the Union. Jones said that all he was doing
was giving them a warning because he had worked with
them.
Jones denied that he had attended any supervisory
meetings at which names of employees were mentioned
in connection with union activity. Moreover, Jones in-
sisted that he did his utmost to remain neutral in the
union matter and had very few discussions with anyone
pertaining to the Union. He denied the specific com-
ments attributed to him by Gosnell in July and Septem-
ber. He likewise denied Dockery's testimony.
I found Gosnell to be a clear and straightforward wit-
ness with good recall. I regard him as credible. Dockery
was a much less impressive witness and equivocated with
20 erriman was not called as a witness by any party herein
respect to the date of the conversation with Jones as
well as the content of the conversation. Nevertheless, the
similarity between the comments attributed to Jones by
Gosnell and those attributed to Jones by Dockery sup-
ports the conclusion that Jones made the remark to
Dockery.
Moreover, Jones was not convincing in his denials of
his comments to Gosnell or Dockery. His contention
that he attempted to remain neutral is not inconsistent
with his giving Gosnell or Dockery a "friendly warn-
ing." I therefore credit Gosnell and Dockery.
Considering the foregoing, I find on the credited testi-
mony that Jones did warn Dockery and Gosnell about
their union activities and did tell Gosnell of the Re-
spondent's desire to be rid of him for his union activities.
The Respondent argues again, however, that even ac-
cepting Gosnell's testimony no violation is established
because of the friendly relationship between Jones and
Gosnell and Gosnell's admission that he regarded Jones'
remarks as that of a friend offering advice. I find the ar-
gument to be without merit. While Gosnell may have
considered Jones as a friend, Jones was communicating
to Gosnell a determination of management. The coercive
impact of the threat is obvious and was not diminished
simply because communicated by a friend. I therefore
find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
through Jones' statements to Gosnell and Dockery as al-
leged.
Finally, with respect to the alleged threats of dis-
charge, employee Neil Perrell, who had been hired on
June 12 and who worked as a conveyor operator in the
fabrication department on the "A" crew, testified that he
talked to Ruth Everhardt, a foreman in fabrication, on
the last of June about the Union. According to Perrell,
he said something to Everhardt and Everhardt replied
that "if the Union did get in, there would be a lot of
people looking for jobs." While Perrell could testify to
nothing else either he or Everhardt said, he recalled her
"exact words" because he was a new employee and it
scared him.
Ruth Everhardt denied the remark attributed to her by
Perrell. Moreover, she denied ever having talked to him
about anything, and she testified that she would have
had no occasion to talk to him because he was not under
her supervision and not in her area. Because Everhardt
in relating her denials was very persuasive, because Per-
rell was not able to place Everhardt's remark in any kind
of context, because it is unlikely that Everhardt would
make such a remark to a new employee ineligible to vote
in the election set for July 6, and with whom she had
extremely little, if any contact, and, finally, because no
other remark of a coercive nature was attributed to her
by any other credible employee, I credit Everhardt's de-
nials. Accordingly, I find Respondent did not violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act through Ruth Everhardt as al-
leged in the complaint.
4. The alleged unlawful interrogation
Several instances of unlawful interrogation by nine of
Respondent's supervisors is alleged in the complaint.
Thus, employee Velma Hepler, a sliver handler, testified
I'PG INDUSTRIES, INC.
1156 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that, about the middle of June, Foreman Godwin talked
to her at her work station about the Union and asked
what she thought the Union would do for the employ-
ees. Hepler replied that she was strong for the Union and
thought it was the only thing that would help the plant.
Godwin told Hepler he had been a union steward previ-
ously and he asked her if she would go out on strike if it
came down to a strike. Hepler replied that she certainly
would. Then in the same conversation Godwin inquired
if Hepler knew that a lot of good people were going to
be hurt before this "thing" was over. The conversation
continued for about an hour according to Hepler.
Hepler further testified that shortly after Godwin's
comments above and on the same date, she was ap-
proached by Jerry Michaels, "B" crew foreman in the
forming department, who talked to her about the Union
at her work station and who "wanted to know what my
thoughts were concerning what the Union would do for
us." More specifically, Hepler related that Michaels
asked what she thought the Union would get for the em-
ployees, whether she really knew what she was getting
into, and if she thought that the Union was going to do
anything for the employees.
Both Godwin and Michaels denied the allegations in
Hepler's testimony. Assuming that Godwin and Michaels
did ask Hepler the questions attributed to them, I would
find no unlawful interrogation based thereon. At the time
of the alleged interrogation, Hepler was an outspoken
and vigorous union supporter. Her union sympathies
were a well known fact and her membership on the or-
ganizing committee had been related to the Respondent
by a letter from the Union dated March 9. Moreover,
Hepler had worn a "Go Teamsters" button in the plant
beginning 2 days after the first union meeting in March.
In fact, she was admittedly wearing union insignia at the
time of the alleged questioning by Godwin and Michaels.
Under these circumstances, the questions attributed to
Godwin and Michaels about how she felt about the
Union may be regarded as mere conversation openers
with no coercive impact. Stumpf Motor Company, Inc.,
208 NLRB 431 (1974); B. F. Goodrich Footwear Company,
201 NLRB 353 (1973).
There remains the additionally alleged inquiry of
Godwin whether Hepler knew that a lot of good people
were going to be hurt before this "thing" was over. The
General Counsel alleged, and argued, that Godwin's
remark constituted a threat of retaliation because of em-
ployee union support. I have previously discredited God-
win's testimony that he talked to employees about the
Union. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded that Hepler was
a sufficiently reliable witness to base a finding of the al-
leged violation on her testimony. At times Hepler was a
very unresponsive witness who had to be reminded sev-
eral times to respond to the question asked rather than
reply in areas not asked about. At other times her re-
sponses were oblique and evasive, and it frequently ap-
peared that she was testifying regarding her impressions
rather than directly quoting statements made to her.
Moreover, she impressed me as being angry and defen-
sive. Accordingly, I do not credit Hepler's testimony on
Godwin's alleged threat and find no violation of the Act
in this regard.
According to former employer Ronnie Bedsole, 2
Foreman Rudolph Hartley in early May came up to Bed-
sole in the waste house and asked Bedsole why he
wanted to vote for the Union when he could not see
how it would help the Company. Bedsole responded that
he believed in the Union because his father had been a
member for 25 years. Nothing further was said.
Hartley's version was that in early March Bedsole told
him that a "little girl" tried to get him to sign a union
card and he had responded with a proposition. Hartley
said he laughed about Bedsole's remark, but a couple of
weeks later observed Bedsole wearing a "Smiley Badge"
indicating union support. Hartley told Bedsole that the
girl must have accepted Bedsole's proposition and pro-
ceeded to talk to Bedsole about the Union, but denied
asking why he wanted to vote for the Union.
Bedsole, on rebuttal, denied talking to Hartley about
cards and the proposition referred to by Hartley. He did
not deny that he was wearing a "Smiley Badge" on the
occasion of his discussion with Hartley. Bedsole was, in
fact, an outspoken union supporter, and was named as a
member of the in-plant organizing committee in the
Union's March 9 letter to the Respondent.
I was impressed by Hartley's clear recall of the matter,
and his version was not implausible. Further, I found
him a more convincing witness than Bedsole, and I
therefore credit his testimony on the matter and find no
unlawful interrogation. Even accepting Bedsole's ver-
sion, and given Bedsole's open and well-known union
support, I would not find the alleged interrogation to be
coercive. Stumpf Motor Company, Inc., supra.
Hartley was alleged to have also unlawfully interro-
gated employee Jesse Lanning. Thus, Lanning testified
that on September 2, as he was washing his hands in the
waste house and talking to Hartley about another job,
Hartley asked him if Lanning had it to do over again
would he still "be union." Lanning apparently did not
immediately respond and Hartley repeated the question.
Lanning replied, "Sure, I would," but then, as he was
walking to another location with Hartley, Hartley re-
peated his question a third time and, apparently after a
second affirmative response from Lanning, laughingly
stated that "I didn't believe you would."
Lanning further testified that about October 11 Hart-
ley came up to him and asked him if he had had an op-
portunity to sign the petition, a reference to a petition
for a new union representation election which was being
circulated by employee Ruth Brown. Lanning remarked
that he did not think that Hartley was supposed to ask
that kind of question, and Hartley asked "Why." Lan-
ning answered that it sounded like Hartley was "solicit-
ing" him.
With respect to the alleged September 2 incident,
Hartley denied that he had ever asked Lanning if he had
it to do over again would he still be union. He admitted,
however, that he had had many conversations with Lan-
ning, an avid union supporter, about the Union, and had
joked with him concerning their wearing T-shirts reflect-
ing their respective support of the Union and the Re-
2l Hedsole's discharge hby the Respondcn in August was alleged as
violative of the Act and is discussed inJra.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC I157
spondent. He also admitted that he had asked Lanning
about whether he had had a chance to sign the petition
circulated by Ruth Brown.
While Lanning exhibited some confusion on cross-ex-
amination and even in his prehearing statement as to
whether Hartley asked him in the first related conversa-
tion if he still had it to do over again would he still
"have gone union," have voted for the Union, or "be"
for the Union, I nevertheless was impressed by his testi-
monial demeanor and find him to be credible when
weighing his testimony against Hartley's. In this instance,
since Hartley's inquiry were repeated, it is not likely that
Lanning would have forgotten the matter. '2
The General Counsel contends that, even in light of
the friendly relationship existing between Hartley and
Lanning, Hartley's questioning of Lanning was coercive,
particularly when Hartley directed Lanning to answer.
The October inquiry by Hartley about Lanning's "oppor-
tunity to sign" the petition was clearly a "device to as-
certain the current sympathies of Lanning toward a
union," according to the General Counsel. I do not
concur in the General Counsel's position. Hartley's Sep-
tember questions were hypothetical in nature and innoc-
uous in view of Lanning's continued union support. Lan-
ning admitted on cross-examination that he was still dis-
playing his union support by wearing union T-shirts at
the time of Hartley's questions. Of course, Lanning,
having openly espoused the Union's cause during the
election campaign, did not forfeit the privacy of his
union sentiments and any change thereof. But his open
and continuous wearing of signs of union support renders
Hartley's questions as coercive devices harmless. It must
be remembered that Hartley's questions were directed
only to Lanning and did not seek to ascertain the union
activities or sentiments of any other employees. I there-
fore find that Hartley's questions to Lanning did not vio-
late the Act.
Lanning also testified concerning a conversation with
James Everha, t. a supervisor on the "B" crew. Accord-
ing to Lanring, n October 7, during his break time,
Everhart cled anning over to his work table and
asked him ,' he was keeping a diary. 2 " Lanning replied
that he di:e not have but just so many minutes for break,
and he cald lot keep up with other people's time. Ever-
hart respondt d, "That's good."
Everhart's denials of Lanning's testimony were half-
hearted, ani he conceded that he may have talked to
Lanning in a joking manner about a diary. Accordingly,
I credit Lanning.
The General Counsel contends that the keeping of a
diary was an action clearly associated with, and support-
ive of, the Union's continued campaign, and was an at-
tempt to insure uniformity and reduce disparity in the
treatment of employees. The inquiry of Everhart, so the
argument goes, was an attempt to ascertain his sympa-
22 While I hav, credited Hartley regarding other mailers elsewhere
herein, it is well esta,'ished that a trier of fact ma accept portions of a
witnes's testimony ant. reject the remainder Sourtheastern Motor Fruck
Lines, 113 NLRB 112:,1955)
z' I is undisputed ihat in early October the Union distributed a leaflet
calling upon emplo e to keep a diary of the breaktime and talking lime
of empoyee support r of the Respondent GC Exh 13.
thies and also to restrain him from engaging in acts in
support of the Union. Moreover. Everhart's response in-
dicating his approval of Lanning's failure to keep a diary
made the inquiry more coercive.
The Respondent in arguing the absence of a violation
relies upon the admittedly good friendship existing be-
tween Everhart and Lanning, as well as the fact that the
remark by Everhart was made in a joking manner.
I find the General Counsel's argument more persua-
sive. Notwithstanding Lanning's open union support, he
could not legitimately be required to reveal every ele-
ment of that support. An inquiry into an employee's in-
volvement in the pursuit of lawful union activities in pro-
moting employee interest tends to interfere with such ac-
tivities. The expression of supervisory approval for an
employee's failure to provide the Union with a specifical-
ly requested form of support constitutes a subtle form of
interference. Moreover, friendship with the interrogator
is no defense where the interrogated employee has not
previously and openly demonstrated his support of the
Union in the area inquired about. I conclude that Ever-
hart's question and comment to Lanning about the diary
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Former employee Thomas Edmonds testified that
about 4 weeks prior to the election he was approached at
work by Bobby Lumsden, a supervisor on the "B" crew
in the end-finding area, who asked him his "feeling
toward the Union." Following some discussion in which,
Edmonds testified, he refrained from indicating any
union support, Lumsden told Edmonds not to go into the
glass winding area because Edmonds knew they were all
unionized there.
Lumsden admitted mentioning the Union to Edmonds
but his version was substantially different. He related
that he had observed Edmonds with a yellow T-shirt on,
the same color as the Union's T-shirts, and had told Ed-
monds, "My God, Tommy, turn around and let me see
that shirt." When Edmonds turned around there was no
writing on the T-shirt and Edmonds remarked that there
was no writing on the T-shirt because he had lost his last
job because of the union at another place of business.
Edmonds expressed his satisfaction, said he had not
known how Edmonds had felt, and walked off.
I credit Lumsden over Edmonds in this instance not
only because his version is believable, but also because
Edmonds, after testifying very emphatically about the in-
cident, was contradicted by his pretrial statement both as
to the timing of the event as well as the name of a
nearby employee. I am persuaded that his memory with
respect to the details of Lumsden's alleged remarks are
no more accurate. I therefore find no violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) by the Respondent based on Edmonds' testi-
mony.
It was alleged that Bryce Starr, an "A" crew supervi-
sor in the finished product area, interrogated an employ-
ee regarding his union activities in the latter part of July.
The General Counsel, to support this allegation, relied
again upon the testimony of employee Perrell. Perrell re-
lated that in late August or early September Bryce Starr
asked him, "You didn't sign one of those union cards,
PPG INDUSTRIES. IN 1157
1158 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL ILABOR RELATIONS BO()ARD
did you?" Perrell replied affirmatively. 24 Perrell's testi-
mony suggests that Starr's alleged question about the
union card came out of thin air.
Starr emphatically denied any questioning of Perrell as
to whether he had signed a union card. I credit Starr's
denial not only because I found him more credible gener-
ally and in demeanor than Perrell, but also because Per-
rell admitted that he had worn union T-shirts and insig-
nia in the plant prior to Starr's question and it is improb-
able that Starr would have found it necessary to ascer-
tain Perrell's union sentiments or his status as a card
signer. I find no violation of the Act by the Respondent
through Starr in this regard.
Around April 10, according to the testimony of Donna
Black, 25 she was approached by Martha Scott, a fore-
man in the end-finding area on the "C" crew, who ob-
served the union badge Black was wearing and "wanted
to know" if Black knew what she was doing. Further,
Black related that Scott "wanted to make sure that
Donna did what Donna wanted to do," and that she had
not been brainwashed by any union propaganda. Black
replied that she always did what she wanted to do, and
Scott remarked that Black knew that if there was a
layoff that Black would be one of the first ones to go.
Then Scott wanted to know "what did we want?" A dis-
cussion of a dental and optical plan followed and Scott
commented that Black had not been with the Company
long enough 2 6 to know what the Company could do for
her. Black replied that if she had the chance to make it
better she would take the chance.
Scott admitted the conversation with Black and even
some of the comments therein, but denied asking Black if
she knew what she was doing. Scott said the conversa-
tion began when Black noted Scott observing her union
badge and stated, "This is my idea." Scott testified she
replied that that was fine because she had the right to be
for a union or against the Union as long as it was her
idea and that she was not being brainwashed by someone
else's idea or by propaganda. There followed some dis-
cussion of company benefits.
The General Counsel alleges that Scott's inquiry of
Black, "if she knew what she was doing," constituted un-
lawful interrogation and a violation of Section 8(a)(l) of
the Act. While Black appeared to me to be a sincere wit-
ness, her testimony on the point was less than precise
and leaves considerable doubt that Scott asked that par-
ticular question. Asked the second time on direct exami-
nation how the conversation began and what was said,
Black answered, "'How is it going,' and you know, 'why
would I want to be for a union'; and you know; some-
thing like that." "Something like that" is too indefinite, I
find, to establish unlawful interrogation. I conclude that
Black was testifying as to her impressions of Scott's re-
marks rather than Scott's actual statements. Under these
circumstances, I credit Scott's denial that she asked
24 The record does not reflect when Perrell had actually signed a
union card. However, a letter from the Union to the Respondent naming
more in-plant organizing committee people, including Perrell. was dated
October 18. G.C. Exh. 10
2s Subsequent to the events herein, Donna Black married Ronnie Bed-
sole and at times her name appears in the record as Donna Black Bedsole
and Donna Bedsole.
26 Black had been employed on January 20 or 23.
Black if she knew what she was doing. Even assuming
Scott asked Black if she knew what she was doing, since
Black's Union support was obvious from her union
badge I would find such a question not to be coercive.
Stumpf Motor Company, Inc., supra.
Leon Gibson, "A" crew foreman of the fabrication de-
partment, was alleged to have violated the Act by three
separate incidents of unlawful interrogation. Thus, em-
ployee Jackie Potts testified that in the latter part of
March Gibson came to her work station and told her he
would like to talk to her about the Union. Thereafter, in
the conversation which Potts stated lasted about 15 or 20
minutes, Gibson asked her why she was for the Union.
Gibson admitted the conversation with Potts, but denied
the question attributed to him. Gibson stated that Potts
at the time of the conversation was wearing a badge con-
taining the legend "A woman's place is in the Union." 2 7
Potts impressed me as credible and she was not cross-ex-
amined on the point. However, in view of Potts' known
union support, and since Gibson's inquiry was not made
in the context of other threats, I find that Gibson did not
coercively interrogate Potts.
It was the testimony of former employee Lester Pier-
son that Gibson talked to him almost daily or every
other day about the Union from April through sometime
in September. According to Pierson, Gibson would gen-
erally start off by wanting to know how the frames were
running, and then he "would lead up to different things
about the Union wanting to know why I thought a union
would help, why I thought the PPG needed a union, if I
was dissatisfied with, if I thought that we needed better
representation then we had, and just general stuff of that
nature." Pierson said Gibson wanted to know whether
he was for or against the Union. However, Pierson was
able to recall only one specific occasion when Gibson
questioned him about the Union. That was I or 2 days
before the election when Gibson asked Pierson if he was
coming in to vote, and Pierson had replied that he was.
Gibson then asked, according to Pierson, how Pierson
was going to vote, to which Pierson allegedly replied,
"You should know that by now." Gibson in his testimo-
ny conceded that he had talked to Pierson about the
Union, but claimed it was only about three times. He
denied asking Pierson the questions claimed by Pierson
and testified he knew of Pierson's union sentiments by
virtue of Pierson's wearing a Union T-shirt and badges
signifying union support. 28
I find Pierson's testimony incredible. While I have no
doubt that Gibson probably talked to him on several oc-
casions, it is incredible that Gibson would on each occa-
sion ask him his thoughts about why a union would help
or why he thought PPG needed a union. His inability to
specify any particular conversation or occasion aside
from the one a day or two before the election under-
mined the credibility of his testimony generally. I find it
patently incredible that Gibson would ask Pierson, a
known union supporter who had apparently defended
27 Polts' membership oin the in-plant organizing committee was com-
municated to the Respondent by a letter dated March 22 G C Eh. 3
28 Pierson admitted that Gibson started talking Io him about the Union
around the first time he wore a Union button in the plant
PPG'C INDUSTRIFS,. INC. |I 1 L
the Union in his prior conversations with Gibson. hots
Pierson was going to vote in the election. Accordingly,
and also because I found Pierson unconvincing in demea-
nor, I conclude that the General Counsel has established
no violation of the Act through Pierson's testimony.
5. The alleged unlawful solicitation of withdrawal
of union cards and threats of layoff
The complaint alleges that the Respondent through
Day Crew Foreman Jeff Pope in early April and Fore-
man Gibson in late May unlawfully solicited from its em-
ployees the withdrawal of their union card. In support of
this allegation employee Lisa Hollingsworth testified that
in a prework meeting of about 60 employees in the
bobbin reclaim section in early April Foreman Pope
brought up the subject of employees getting their union
authorization cards back. According to Hollingsworth,
Pope read a letter or paper about employees getting their
cards back and said that if anybody wanted to get their
cards back that he would lay the papers containing the
information he had read on the desk. Pope added, ac-
cording to Hollingsworth, that if anybody wanted one of
the papers they could come up and get one, and if they
needed any help he would be glad to help them.
During the same meeting, Pope was asked by an em-
ployee if they, as part-timers, would be laid off if the
Union was voted in, and Pope had replied that in his
opinion they would be laid off.29
Pope admitted to the reading of a letter concerning
withdrawal of union cards at more than one meeting, but
denied that he offered to help anybody with respect to
such withdrawals. Moreover, he denied that he told the
employees that there would be a layoff. Rather, Pope
testified that he told the employees in response to a ques-
tion about a layoff that he had heard that rumor and he
wanted it stopped, that as far as he knew the Company
had hired them and they would not be laid off, and that
he could not tell them what the Union would do if it
came in. Pope's testimony was substantially corroborated
by two employee witnesses who had attended the meet-
ing, Tami Mabe and Sandra Everhart. Mabe and Ever-
hart were young but impressive witnesses. Accordingly,
I credit Pope's version of his remarks corroborated by
Mabe and Everhart over the uncorroborated testimony
of Lisa Hollingsworth, who impressed me as less reliable.
I conclude therefore that Pope made no threat of a
layoff in the event the employees selected the Union to
represent them. I further conclude he made no offers of
help with respect to the letters.
The "letter" referred to in both Hollingsworth's and
Pope's testimony was prepared by the Respondent and
was made available to employees through supervisors.
The letter, addressed to all of the Respondent's Lexing-
ton employees and dated March 20, reads as follows:
A number of you have been asking your supervi-
sors how you can cancel union authorization cards
you have signed.
29 Employees in that section ere part-timers and onme were still high
school students
We are giving all of you this information in case
you \vant to use it.
If you want to cancel or withdraw a card you
signed and gave to the Union, you can do it by
simply writing a letter to:
[Union's address]
All you have to say in the letter is: "I Hereby
Revoke The Card I Signed Authorizing Teamsters
Local 391 To represent me. Please Return The
Card To Me." Or words to the same effect.
Your card will be cl.xlled and revoked whether
the Union sends the card to you or not.
However, it is a good idea to send the letter by
Certified Mail, return receipt requested, so you can
prove that your letter has been delivered to the
Union.
Because so many of you have asked this question
regarding how you might revoke your union card,
we wanted to take this opportunity to advise you as
to your legal rights.
The letter was signed by Plant Manager James Dough-
ty. The distribution of the same letter by Foreman
Gibson on several occasions, as testified to by Donna
Meisenheimer and Georgianna McBride, is also alleged
to be a violation. Thus, McBride testified that Gibson
distributed copies of the letter at a preshift meeting of
employees around the last of March or first of April. In
distributing the letter, Gibson would put a copy of the
letter on the tables at which the employees sat. On one
occasion, the employees at McBride's table told Gibson
that they did not want a copy, but he replied, "Oh, you
might need it sometime." Around the last of April or
first of May Gibson, after distributing copies of the letter
on the tables at a preshift meeting, announced to the em-
ployees that he had done so and added that if "we" got
enough of these withdrawal cards back we could run
"Ms. Vicki [Saporta] and her belongings out of town."
Occasionally, after putting copies of the letter on the
table, Gibson, according to McBride, would stand for a
minute or two to see if there was any employee response
before moving on. The testimony of Meisenheimer was
substantially in accord with that of McBride. She testi-
fied also that she could recall Gibson continuing to pass
out the papers regarding card revocations up to the time
of the election. McBride said he continued to pass out
the papers even after the election.
Gibson admitted that he had distributed the papers
containing the card withdrawal information thereon to
employees approximately 12 times at preshift meetings
over a period of months. He recalled McBride telling
him on one occasion that she did not want one and he
had replied that if she did no' want one to just leave it
on the table. According to Gibson, the documents he dis-
tribuied had been supplied by the personnel department,
and, while he identified about four employees who had
asked him about getting cards back from the Union, his
testimony suggests that such requests were after he had
distributed the card withdrawal information. Finally,
Gibson admitted that at one meeting he told the employ-
I'PG INDLSTRIFS. INC. It 54
.,.
.... .. .. . ...
1160 DECISIONS O()F NATI()NAL LA13BO()R RELATIONS BO()ARKD
ees that if enough people requested their cards he can-
celed "Vicki" might pack her bags and leave.
It is the argument of the General Counsel that in an
organizational campaign tainted with threats, and absent
evidence that any employees had requested the return of
their cards prior to the time that the Respondent pre-
pared and distributed the information on withdrawal of
union cards, the planting of the revocation idea by
making available and offering assistance in the revocation
process was coercive and violative of the Act. It is fur-
ther argued that supplying the revocation information
coupled with the offer of assistance lends itself to the in-
terpretation that the Re 1(indent was inimical to collec-
tive-bargaining principles. The Charging Party argues
that absent prior requests for information on revocation
it can be inferred that the Respondent's motive for dis-
tributing instructions for revoking cards was to induce
and assist employees to repudiate the Union.
The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
card withdrawal information was distributed to employ-
ees after inquiries by employees, and that the use of the
information was left to the employees, who could use the
information without the knowledge of the Respondent.
Moreover, the Respondent contends that even if the in-
formation had not been in response to initial employee
requests no violation of the Act would have been com-
mitted in its preparation and distribution. In support of
this position, the Respondent cites Aircraft Hydro-Form-
ing, Inc., 221 NLRB 581 (1975). In the cited case, the
employer had mailed its employees letters during a union
organizational campaign indicating how employees might
seek the return of union authorization cards previously
signed by them. The Administrative Law Judge, with
Board approval, found that the letters did not constitute
a violation of the Act, even though the advice in the let-
ters had been unrequested, because there was "no at-
tempt to elicit information as to whether employees
availed themselves of this advice" and "no assistance or
offer of assistance." Id. at 583.
I have canvassed the record in the instant case and
find no direct evidence that any particular named em-
ployee had sought information from the Respondent re-
garding procedures for withdrawing their union authori-
zation cards prior to the time the Respondent prepared
and distributed its document on such procedures. I con-
clude, therefore, that here, as in Aircraft Hydro-Forming,
the information prepared and distributed by the Re-
spondent was not initially requested by the employees.
But under Aircraft Hydro-Forming this fact alone does
not establish the violation where the employer does not
attempt to ascertain whether the employees act upon the
information supplied by the employer and where there is
otherwise no assistance given or offered to the employ-
ees in withdrawing their cards. Here I have found no as-
sistance or offers thereof, and there was no way that the
Respondent could have known whether the employees
acted upon the information even assuming Foreman
Gibson observed which employees picked up the papers
containing the withdrawal information. Aircraft 1Hydro-
Forming would thus appear to dictate a conclusion that
the allegation of unlawful solicitation must be dismissed.
I so conclude with respect to Pope's reading of the with-
drawal information to employees. However, I am per-
suaded that the effect of the Respondent's actions
through Foreman Gibson was substantially different than
that of the conduct of the employer in Aircraft Hydro-
Forming, and requires a different result.
Unlike the situation in the cited case which involved
only the one letter to employees, the Respondent,
through Gibson, repeatedly distributed the withdrawal
information to employees, some of whom, on the basis of
the testimony of McBride and Meisenheimer, whom I
credit, specifically stated they did not want it. That re-
peated distribution, when coupled with Gibson's ad-
mitted comment that if enough employees sent for their
cards back they could send "Ms. Vicki" packing, takes
on the character of an outright solicitation to employees
to withdraw their union cards and constituted more than
"minimal assistance." Moreover, that solicitation assumes
an aspect of coercion when the information on with-
drawals was distributed in a manner which allowed
Gibson to observe which employees elected to pick up
the distributions. The subtle pressures on employees in-
herent in such a situation are obvious. Accordingly, and
in the context of the other violations of the Act by the
Respondent found herein, I find and conclude that the
Respondent did unlawfully solicit employees to with-
draw their union authorization cards and thereby violat-
ed Section 8(a)(l) of the Act as alleged.
6. Alleged solicitation of grievances and promises of
benefits
Robert Motes was employed by the Respondent in
1972, and in May 1978 was working as an equipment
service man (fixer). Motes testified that he attended the
first union meeting in March and subsequently was
named to the in-plant organizing committee. Moreover,
he wore union buttons and insignia in the plant begin-
ning in March.
According to Motes, about 6 to 8 months prior to May
he had talked to Robert Byerly, an area foreman in the
twisting department, about transferring to the day shift.
Motes told Byerly he had been promised by J. A. Dav-
enport, a fixer supervisor on the day shift, that he could
go to "days." Motes claimed that he had also told other
supervisors, including Hartley and Gibson, of his desire
to switch to days. Nevertheless, he had not been able to
receive the desired transfer.
Motes testified that on May 9 he was approached by
Foreman Byerly at his work station and Byerly engaged
him in a discussion about the Union, and inquired of
Motes why he was supporting the Union instead of the
Respondent. Motes replied that it was because or the
way things happened around there and related specifical-
ly the fact that he had wanted a day job and had senior-
ity, but there were other fixers who were working days
while he was still working crew; i.e., rotating shifts.
Byer!ly stated, according to Motes, that he would go up-
stairs and see what he could find out and do about it.
On May 16, Motes talked to Davenport in the presence
of Foreman Hartley and Davenport told Motes that he
was going to bring Motes to "days." While Davenport
initially indicated that the transfer would be immediate,
PPGr INDUSTRIES, INC. 1161
after further discussion with Motes and at Motes' request
the date of the transfer was set for July 3. The following
day Foreman Byerly inquired of Motes if he was ready
to change over from the Union to the Company. Motes
replied negatively and Byerly asked, "Well, you are
going on days, aren't you?" and "That is what you
wanted, wasn't it?" Motes explained that there was more
to it than that.
In late June, according to Motes' testimony, he was
told by Davenport that the transfer on July 3 was going
to be postponed. Ultimately, on September 4, Motes was
transferred to days.
It is the General Counsel's position that Byerly's ap-
proach to Motes on May 9 constituted an unlawful so-
licitation of grievances to discourage Motes' union sup-
port. The General Counsel further urges that Byerly's
offer to see what he could do for Motes relative to the
transfer, as well as Davenport's promise to transfer
Motes to days, constituted a promise of benefit to dis-
courage Motes' union activities.
The Respondent, through Byerly and Davenport, dis-
pute the facts related in the testimony of Motes. Byerly
admitted that he had talked to Motes on May 9, but he
denied that he had any conversation with him at that
time about transferring to days. He subsequently learned
that Motes was to be transferred to days in July, but
after a 5-day break in early July, according to Byerly, he
was surprised to find Motes still on the crew. He talked
to Motes about it and Motes complained about it. Byerly
said he told Motes that he did not know what happened
but added that he would check into it. Byerly admittedly
did not follow through with any kind of a "check." He
denied that he had at any other time told Motes he
would check into his being transferred to days.
Davenport testified that he had no knowledge prior to
June that Motes wanted to transfer to days. He said that
crew and day assignments are generally made on the
basis of seniority but new employees were trained on
days. In June Davenport inquired around of employees
on crew as to who wanted to go to days and found out
from Crew Foreman Hartley that Motes wanted to go to
days. He called Motes in and offered him the day job,
but because Motes had some personal plans for use of an
upcoming 5-day break period he was due Motes had
asked to delay the change until he returned from that
break. Davenport agreed. However, because of some in-
tervening promotions of some fixers on the day shift into
other positions leaving vacancies requiring the training
of new people for the positions on days, Motes' transfer
to days was delayed until those new people could be
trained and then assigned to crews. Davenport denied
that Motes' union activities had anything to do with his
transfer to days, although he admitted he was aware of
Motes' union position.30 He further denied that he had
talked to Byerly about the transfer at all.
The testimony of Motes struck me as being truthful,
and, notwithstanding some confusion on his part as to
dates and the exact sequence of comments, I was im-
pressed with his sincerity. I therefore credit his testimo-
30 Davenport denied the testimony of Motes o the effect that Daven-
port had once told Motes to "get that God damn hit off you." referring
to Motes' union button
ny where it contradicts that of Byerly or Davenport.
Based upon Motes' testimony, it is clear that Byerly was
ascertaining the basis for Motes' union support and the
causes of his dissatisfaction with the Respondent. Upon
learning of one basis for Motes' dissatisfaction, Byerly in-
dicated that he would undertake some action on Motes'
behalf. Thus, Byerly not only solicited Motes' grievances
stimulating his union support, but impliedly promised to
do something about Motes' grievance. The fact that
Motes within a few days thereafter was granted the shift
to days, a remedy for his earlier dissatisfaction, can not
be mere coincidence, particularly in light of Byerly's
subsequent comments to Motes which clearly reflected
that the shift change was brought about to placate
Motes. I conclude that the Respondent, by Byerly's
statements, solicited his grievances to discourage his
union support and promised to remedy them for the
same reason, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Fred Jones Manufacturing Company, 239 NLRB 54
(1978).
Davenport, on the other hand, made no promises of
benefits to Motes as alleged in the complaint, but it is
clear that he was instrumental in granting the benefit im-
pliedly promised by Byerly and did tell Motes he would
be transfered to days. In this regard the Respondent,
through Davenport, also violated the Act.
7. Alleged threats to refuse to negotiate a contract
and to sell out
Motes also testified that he had two additional conver-
sations with Byerly on May 9. In the second conversa-
tion Byerly, according to Motes, noted that Motes was
still wearing his union button and then remarked that it
would not do the employees any good if the Union got
in. When Motes inquired why Byerly stated that Plant
Manager Doughty had guaranteed the supervisors at a
meeting that they had that if the Union got in they
would not negotiate a contract. There followed some
discussions of strikes and the rights of strikers getting
their jobs back.
In a third conversation with Byerly on the same date
and only a few hours later Byerly told Motes that "if the
Union did get in that the Company would probably sell
out to Owens-Corning." Motes had inquired of Byerly
what Owens-Corning did and Byerly explained that they
made fiber glass too. Byerly concluded the conversation
by telling Motes that he wanted him to think about what
they had been talking about.
Byerly in his testimony admitted that he had had three
conversations with Motes on May 9, but denied the spe-
cific remarks attributed to him in the last two conversa-
tions noted above except with respect to the replacement
of strikers. He admittedly opened one of the conversa-
tions by telling Motes that he wanted to talk about the
sale of the Respondent, and, while he mentioned Owens-
Corning, he maintained that it was in relation to Owens-
Corning's losing customers to the Respondent during the
time of a natural gas shortage and that he used that as an
example of how a strike might cause the Respondent to
lose customers.
PP INDUSTRIES. NC.
1162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS B()ARD
I credit Motes' version of Byerly's remarks. I find that
Byerly did in fact threaten that the Respondent would
not negotiate a contract with the Union and that such a
threat was coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. El Rancho Market, 235 NLRB 468 (1978).
The Respondent argues that, even if Byerly did indi-
cate that the plant would be sold if the Union were se-
lected, such a remark was not coercive. In support of
this argument, the Respondent cited Mobil Oil Corpora-
tion, 219 NLRB 511 (1975), where no violation was
found based on a supervisor's comment in response to an
employee question that "I imagine Mobil will put [the
job] up for bid." In finding no violation, the Board spe-
cifically relied upon the casualness of the conversation,
the fact that only one employee heard the remark, and
the apparent camaraderie of the men working together in
close quarters. The case sub judice is different not only
from the standpoint of the absence of apparent camara-
derie, but also because the threat of the sale was only a
part of other coercive and violative statements and con-
duct directed at Motes by Byerly. Under these circum-
stances, and in this context, the threat of the sale in the
event of organization is most likely to be perceived as a
menance to any existing and desirable working condi-
tions. Accordingly, it constituted a threat of economic
reprisal. Seal Trucking Limited, 237 NLRB 1091 (1978).
The Respondent also argues the absence of coercion
based on Motes' testimony that he did not care if the Re-
spondent was sold. That Motes may not have himself
been coerced by the comment is not determinative of the
violation. It is the tendency to coerce which is the criti-
cal point. El Rancho Market, supra; American Freightways
Co., Inc., 124 NLRB 146 (1959). 1 find that Byerly's
threat to sell did have a tendency to coerce employees
generally, and did constitute a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged.
The complaint alleges that Foreman Hartley, in early
June, had also threatened that the Respondent would not
negotiate a contract with the Union if it became the em-
ployee's bargaining representative. Former employee
Jerry Williams31 testified in support of this allegation
that in early July, during a 45-minute conversation con-
cerning the Union, Hartley had told him that the Re-
spondent would never negotiate a contract. Williams
could remember no other details of the conversation.
Hartley admitted his conversation with Williams, but
placed it on May 3 and 4. The conversation related to
the Respondent's right to replace strikers, and, because
Williams had made a statement relative to the nonstrikers
not being able to work 24 hours a day, a remark which
Hartley considered threatening, he made a note of the
conversation. 32 Hartley emphatically denied that he told
Williams that the Respondent would not negotiate a con-
tract.
I was not impressed by Williams either in his manner
of testifying or in the content of his testimony. His recol-
lection was poor as demonstrated by the fact that not-
withstanding earlier statements to the Board he did not
reveal the comments he attributed to Hartley above until
a" Williams had been discharged by the Respondent on September 20
due to allergic reactions to the Respondent's products.
a2 Resp Exh 14
January 29, 1979, more than 7 months after he claimed
they were made. Moreover, his inability to recall other
details of the conversation renders his version suspect
and unreliable in the face of specific contradiction by
Hartley. Accordingly, I do not credit Williams, and I
conclude that the violation alleged with respect to Hart-
ley based on Williams testimony has not been established.
8. Alleged threats to close the plant
Donna Black related in her testimony that about April
27 she had a conversation at her work station in the
plant with Foreman Hartley about the Union. Black at-
tempted to avoid the conversation claiming that she was
busy, but Hartley persisted stating that she got paid for
talking to him just as if she was working. Notwithstand-
ing Black's insistence that she did not want to talk about
the Union, Hartley told her that he did not want a union
in the plant, that the plant manager, Doughty, did not
either, and that he had faith in Doughty. Black reminded
Hartley that the Respondent did not want the Union in
its 40 other plants but they had them. Hartley's alleged
response was a question: "Well, don't you think this
plant could close?" Black replied negatively and Hartley
stated, "Well it could." Black asked Hartley to please let
her go and Hartley waved her back to work and walked
off.
Hartley admitted the conversation with Black and con-
ceded her remark about the other 40 plants.33 His reply
was, however, that he was only interested in the Lexing-
ton plant, and, following that comment, he walked off.
He denied that he had mentioned Doughty's name in the
conversation.
Black was an unwilling participant in the conversation
with Hartley and tried to avoid it. Her testimony on the
point was clear and her recall good. She appeared to be
a reliable witness worthy of belief. Moreover, I find it
not implausible, given Hartley's and the Respondent's ad-
mitted opposition to the Union, that Hartley told Black
that he and Doughty did not want a union in the plant.
Black's "come back" to Hartley regarding the 40 other
plants obviously put him on the spot sufficiently enough
to provoke an ill-considered response. Accordingly, I
find that Hartley made the remark attributed to him by
Black and that that remark implied that the plant was
subject to closure if the Union were selected by the em-
ployees. I conclude that Hartley's remark was an implied
threat of plant closure as alleged in the complaint.
The threat of plant closure by the Respondent's vice
president, Frank Green, alleged in the complaint, is
based upon a speech read by Green to groups of the Re-
spondent's employees concerning the union campaign.3 4
'I Hartley testified that, if the Respondent had 40 other plants that had
union colntracts, Black knew more than he did. However, it is not disput-
ed that the Respondent operates other plants where its employees are
represented by unions.
:4 Green., called as a witness by the (General Counsel under Scc 61l(c)
of the Federal Rules, testified that he read the speech containing the
comments alleged to be coercive by the General Counsel on only one
iccasion June 30. While he subsequently gave the same speech to other
employees, the alleged coercive comments were omitted, according to
Cireen Plant Manager Doughly's testimony suggests that Green gave the
C'ontinued
PPG INDSTRIES, INC 1 163
On June 30, Green spoke to about 250 employees on the
Respondent's "D" crew who were assembled in the fab-
rication lunchroom. On this occasion the Respondent's
twist frame machinery was intentionally shut down prior
to the beginning of the speech, although it had never
before been shut down completely except for power fail-
ures."5 In his June 30 speech Green, responding for the
most part to union campaign literature suggesting that
the Respondent could not afford to take a strike, made
the following remarks which, under the circumstances,
including the shut down of the twist frames, are argued
by the General Counsel to be coercive:
Listen. (Long Pause) This plant is quiet now. In
all likelihood, you've never heard it this way
before. But I want to be heard, loud and clear.
What you are hearing is what a dead plant
sounds like, although right now forming is still op-
erating. But the effect is in essence the same. No
product being made, no money coming in, for
wages, benefits, or profits.
I don't like it. And I sincerely hope that you
don't like it either. But we'd shut it down forever
before we would give up the right to manage it!
Fairness dictates that the paragraph in Green's speech
preceding the above-quoted one also be set forth.
Well, I hope that we have all learned something
here today. First, when we tell you something, it's
true. And I am telling you now that this Union that
hands you leaflets and promises you a pot of gold is
just another union. It has no magic. If it can't get
what it wants by good faith negotiating, as it is
called, its "Last-Resort" [strike] is just what you
have been seeing. And I am also telling you that
this company will never submit to force, from a
union or anybody else.
The General Counsel contends that the quoted com-
ments coming from a high Respondent official given
within a week of the election contained an "ominous
message of closure" brought home to employees by
graphic reference to the absence of the production noise
of the twist machines and could only be construed by
employees as a threat of closure resulting from unioniza-
tion. In support of this contention the General Counsel
cites N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969),
Components, Inc., 197 NLRB 163 (1972), and Russell
Stover Candies, Inc., 221 NLRB 441 (1975).
The Respondent argues on the other hand that the
possibility of the plant being shut down was "mentioned
only in the context of unreasonable union demands, un-
successful negotiations and disabling strike activity, and
was not presented as a probability, as being desirable or
intended, or as having any connection with the mere fact
of unionization." In any event, according to the Re-
spondent's position, Green's speech made no prediction
same speech on several occasions to different employee groups In con-
sidering the existence of a iolation, I find it unnecessary to decide
whether Green's subsequent speeches contained the alleged coerclse re-
marks.
as In Green's subsequent speeches only those twist frames Immediately
adjacent to the lunchrooinm were shut doss n
at all and in essence Green was only expressing concern
over certain union leaflets indicating a willingness to
strike under a misapprehension of the Respondent's will-
ingness to resist such a strike.
In Gissel, supra, the Supreme Court stated that an em-
ployer may make predictions as to the precise effects of
unionization on his company, but "the prediction must be
carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey
an employer's belief as to the demonstrably probable
consequences beyond his control or to convey a manage-
ment decision already arrived at to close the plant in
case of unionization." The Court went on to state that if
the employer in his statement implies that he may or
may not take action solely on his own initiative for rea-
sons unrelated to economic necessities and known only
to him the statement constitutes a threat outside the pro-
tection of the first amendment. Considering the forego-
ing, and viewed in the context of other remarks in the
speech, I am persuaded that Green's statement could be
properly characterized as a threat. Responding as he was
to union contentions that the Respondent could not
afford a strike, Green's statement was more than an ex-
pression of the Respondent's resolve to survive. Rather,
it was a commitment not to continue its plant regardless
of economic concerns and without regard to specific
union demands. This interpretation receives reinforce-
ment from other comments in Green's speech in which
he noted the Respondent's "new approach" in not at-
tempting to appease labor unions anymore. He pointed
out, in effect, that as a result of the "new approach"
three of the Respondent's plants, Clarksburg, West Vir-
ginia, Mount Vernon, Ohio, and Henryetta, Oklahoma,
had been completely shut down. Accordingly, and in
view of the other violations by the Respondent found
herein, I conclude, in agreement with the General Coun-
sel's position, that Green's statement constituted a threat
to close the plant in the event of unionization and there-
by violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
A final threat of plant closure was attributed to Fore-
man Robert Byerly by Jerry Williams. Williams testified
that a couple of days before the election he was ap-
proached by Byerly at Williams' work station and told
by Byerly that Green had said in a meeting "up front"
that they could phase the plant out in a period of 14
months. Byerly prefaced the remark, according to Wil-
liams, by stating that he did not know whether he should
be telling Williams but thought he ought to know.
Byerly denied that he had talked to Williams about
Frank Green, that he made the remarks attributed to him
by Williams, or that he had heard from any management
source that the plant would be phased out in 14 months.
I have previously found Williams to be an unconvinc-
ing witness, and he was unconvincing in his testimony
regarding Byerly as well. His testimony on cross-exami-
nation contradicted his testimony on direct with respect
to exactly how the alleged conversation with Byerly
started and whether Byerly had quoted any comments of
Frank Green. Under these circumstances, and in the ab-
sence of any corroboration, I do not credit Williams. I
therefore base no finding of a violation of the Act on the
testimony of Williams.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC 163
1164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR REI.ATIONS BOARD
9. Alleged threats of more onerous working
conditions
Donna Black testified that on April 27, shortly after
her conversation with Foreman Hartley already related
herein, she was told by Foreman Martha Scott to meet
Scott in the maintenance breakroom after break. Black
did meet with Scott after her lunch break. Scott had
brought in some papers and while looking them over re-
minded Black that Black was still a probationary em-
ployee. Scott commented about Black's absences and in-
dicated they were not excessive. Then Scott stated that
she heard that Black had been talking about her and re-
lated what she had heard.3 6 Black replied that what
Scott had heard and what Black had said were two dif-
ferent things. During the same conversation, still accord-
ing to Black, Scott looked at Black's union badge 37 and
stated that "if things don't turn out the way we hope,
that if we thought that we worked now, we were going
to make production, that she was going to cut out all of
these people taking extra long breaks and all of this talk-
ing that was going on." Scott added, "how I am not
saying that you are doing it," but "I am going to cut it
out for everybody." The conversation ended with Scott's
telling Black that she was satisfied with Black's work
and if she had any complaints she would tell Black.
Scott admitted talking to Black in the maintenance
breakroom concerning a complaint that Black had been
making critical remarks to other employees about Scott's
employee work assignments. Scott, however, placed the
conversation as occurring on May 8, rather than April
27, and testified that she placed a reprimand in Black's
file on May 8. Although she denied telling Black she was
doing a good job, she conceded that she told Black that
Black was doing a fairly good job but that Scott felt she
could do better. She denied the other remarks related in
the testimony of Black, including the remarks about cut-
ting out the extra long breaks and talking.
I have previously found Black to be a sincere witness.
In this instance there is little ambiguity in her testimony
regarding the comments she attributed to Scott, and in
view of the direct contradiction by Scott there is no
basis for any conclusion that Black misconstrued or mis-
interpreted Scott's statements. Black steadfastly main-
tained her version of Scott's remarks through cross-ex-
amination, and I am persuaded that her testimony with
the exception of the date of the event was accurate and
truthful. I find that Scott made the remarks attributed to
her by Black.
Under the circumstances, and in that context, Scott's
remarks indicated that if things did not go the way the
employees hoped with regard to the union campaign
Scott was going to cut out extended breaks and talking
and employees were in effect going to work harder. I
therefore find that Scott's remarks in fact constituted a
'e On cross-examination Black explained that what Scott as com-
plaining about was Black's expression of dissatisfaction to other employ-
ees concerning Scott's operating decisions in the department. Black ad-
mitted that Scott had told her in the same conversation that Scott would
run her department any way she saw fit and she would assign mploees
wherever she saw fit to place them.
31 This particular badge bore the legend "A Woman's Place Is In Her
Union."
threat of more onerous working conditions. Strydel Incor-
porated, 156 NLRB 1185 (1966). The threat violated Sec-
tion 8(a)( 1 ) of the Act.
10. Alleged denial of union representation at a
disciplinary meeting
The complaint alleged that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act through James Williams, area
supervisor of the fabrication department, on October 18,
based upon Williams' denial of union representation to an
employee during a disciplinary meeting with the employ-
ee. To support the alleged violation the General Counsel
relied upon the testimony of employee Hugh Smith.
Smith related that he was called into Supervisor Bryce
Starr's office on October 17 where he was questioned by
Starr and crew foreman Gibson concerning a complaint
that Smith had been estimating the weight of waste yarn
tubes resulting from the warping process rather than ac-
tually weighing the tubes.3 8 Smith conceded that he had
not actually weighed the tubes. He then was advised by
Gibson that estimating and recording the estimate was a
dischargeable offense because it constituted falsification
of company records. However, Gibson was unable to
find a specific rule on the matter in the Respondent's
rule book. Smith was then told to go home and come
back the next day to see Area Supervisor Williams about
the matter.
The following day, Gibson took Smith to the person-
nel office where Smith met with Williams and Employ-
ment Supervisor Jerry Strong. At the outset of the meet-
ing Smith asked Williams if he could have a witness and
Williams replied that that was what Strong was there
for. Then Smith said he wanted a union representative
and Williams responded that this was not a union plant,
would not be a union plant, and he would do anything
he could to keep it out. : 9 Williams then proceeded to
tell Smith that he had committed a dischargeable offense
and he was fired. Smith's version has it that he was then
told to wait outside the office. Gibson and Strong left for
about 30 minutes and when they returned Smith was
asked to come back into Strong's office where Williams
announced that "they had doubt in their minds" that
Smith did not mean to weigh out the tubes. Smith was
allowed to return to work, but an hour later was called
to Gibson's office where he was given a written repri-
mand for the incident.
The versions of the Respondent's witnesses do not
differ significantly from that of Smith. Williams conced-
ed in his testimony that, before his interview with Smith,
Smith had asked for a witness, and subsequently asked
for a union representative. Williams explained that he
had reversed the decision to fire Smith because of infor-
mation from the department superintendent to the effect
that what Smith had done could have been condoned by
:' Smith admitted that while in training he had been told by supervi-
sion to weigh the tubes but subsequently he had been told by an experi-
enced employee to just estimate the weight of the tubes.
: It must be recalled that as of October 17. while the Union had os-
tensibl sk1on the July election the Respondent's request for review of
the Regional Director's Supplemental Decision was still pending before
the Hoard
PPG INDLISFRIES, INC I115
"other people." This, according to Williams, created
enough doubt in his mind to preclude going through
with the discharge. He denied that his initial decision and
the reversal of that decision was related to anything said
to him by Smith on October 18. Although Williams testi-
fied that the discharge decision had been made prior to
the time that Smith was called in on October 18, and
that a payoff authorization form had already been com-
pleted before Smith came in, he conceded that he had
asked Smith some questions during the interview but
could not recall what they were.
Based on the foregoing, it is the General Counsel's
contention that the Respondent's actions with respect to
Smith constituted a denial of his statutory right to repre-
sentation as enunciated in .L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). According to the General
Counsel's argument, it is not necessary to establish a sub-
sisting statutory representative status before employees
can enjoy the benefits of Section 7, and such benefits are
not dependent on union representation for implementa-
tion. The General Counsel further argues that following
the election the pendancy of the proceedings to review
the Regional Director's Supplemental Decision and certi-
fication of the Union did not suspend the "obligation to
recognize" the Union, and the Respondent acted at its
peril in denying Smith union representation. The Charg-
ing Party's position on the issue generally parallels that
of the General Counsel.
The Respondent argues, on the contrary, that Weingar-
ten rights do not extend to employees who have not been
represented at any time by an exclusive bargaining agent.
Moreover, the Respondent contends that, in any event,
no union representative was available at the time of
Smith's request because none existed and no union offi-
cial was shown to be anywhere near the plant. Under
these circumstances, the Respondent claims that the
Board's Decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Ange-
les, 227 NLRB 1276 (1977), is applicable. There the
Board held that a request for the presence of a specified
but unavailable representative could not serve to inter-
fere with the employer's right to hold an interview with
the affected employee without delay. Lastly, the Re-
spondent contends that the interview with Smith on Oc-
tober 18 was not investigatory in nature, and that Wein-
garten does not apply to conferences where the employ-
ee is merely informed of a disciplinary decision.
It is clear that in Weingarten, supra, the Supreme Court
construed Section 7 of the Act as creating a statutory
right for an employee to refuse to submit without union
representation to an interview which he reasonably fears
may result in discipline. Such right has its basis in the
guarantee in Section 7 of the "right of employees to act
in concert for mutual aid and protection." Weingarten.
supra at 256. The parameters of employee rights under
Weingarten have been set forth in numerous Board cases
since 1975 and more recently in United States Postal Serv-
ice, 241 NLRB 141 (1979). If an employee reasonably ex-
pects that discipline may flow from an employer inter-
view and makes a valid request for representation, the
employer may not lawfully continue the interview of the
employee without either granting the employee's request
for representation or giving the employee the choice be-
tween continuing the interview without representation or
having no interview at all. The employee may waive his
right to representation even after he has requested it, but
he must do so with the knowledge of his lawful choices.
United Postal Service, supra. A waiver will not be inferred
simply because the employee continues in the interview
after his request for representation has been rejected by
the employer. Super Valu Xenia. a Division of Super alu
Stores, Inc., 236 NLRB 1581 (1978).
If the meeting with the employee is only for the pur-
pose of announcing a previously determined decision on
discipline and there is no attempt to question the employ-
ee or engage in any manner of dialogue or interchange
typical of an interview, a request for representation may
be lawfully denied. Amoco Oil Company, 238 NLRB 551
(1978); K-Mart Corporation, 242 NLRB 855 (1979); cf.
Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 227 NLRB 1211
(1977), enforcement denied 587 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1978).
Applying the foregoing authority to the instant case, I
find that on October 18 Smith had a reasonable expecta-
tion that the interview with Williams and Strong would
result in some kind of disciplinary action. Indeed, the
day before he had been interviewed and advised that his
actions constituted a dischargeable offense. He could
therefore anticipate that some form of punishment might
be forthcoming. It is equally clear that Smith initially re-
quested an employee witness at the interview and then a
union representative. Accordingly, I find that a valid re-
quest for representation was made by Smith.
Contrary to the Respondent's argument based upon
Amoco Oil Company, supra, that the interview with Smith
was simply to announce a previously made decision to
discharge him, I find that the meeting with Smith on Oc-
tober 18 constituted more than a mere "get together" to
announce a decision. Notwithstanding the fact that at the
outset Williams related to Smith a decision to discharge
him, that decision was clearly not a final and irrevocable
one. Moreover, there followed, by Williams' own admis-
sion, questions and answers of Smith which may proper-
ly be characterized as an interview. While Williams
could not specify the questions asked, I find it difficult to
believe that Smith's responses played no part in the Re-
spondent's ultimate reversal of its decision to discharge
him. There would have been no need for Smith to wait
outside the office after the interview if he had not said
something to Williams and Strong which caused them to
reconsider and check other sources of information. 40
These circumstances make this case more analogous to
the Certified Grocers case, supra, than the Amoco Oil De-
cision. In the former case, while it was argued that the
discipline had been predetermined and disciplinary sanc-
tions imposed, the Board found a violation of an employ-
ee's Weingarten rights based upon the employer's further
conversation with the employee on the subject for which
he was disciplined after he had requested representation.
In the Amoco Oil case the Board found no violation be-
cause the employer there, immediately following the em-
*o It i In this type of situation that representation for an employee can
he most beneficial, for it is representation which seeks to insure that all
factors rele'ant to discipline from the emploee's standpoint are set forth
and considered
['['C, INI)USIRtES. [NC ltt
1166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL, LABOR RELATIONS 1()ARD
ployee's request for representation, announced the disci-
pline imposed and dispensed with any further interview.
There remains the question of whether Smith was enti-
tled under Weingarten to representation at his interview
with Williams and Strong by either another employee or
the Union since the Union's certification had not been fi-
nalized. The Board appears to have answered this issue
most recently in Anchortank, Inc., 239 NLRB 430 (1978).
In that case the Board found a violation of the Act in the
denial of union representation to an employee during an
interview at a time after the union had won a representa-
tion election but prior to certification of the Union. The
Board, noting that the thrust of the Court's concern in
Weingarten "was with the right of employees to have
some measure of protection when faced with confronta-
tion with the employer which might result in adverse
action against the employee," and observing that such
"employee concerns remain whether or not the employ-
ees are represented by a union," concluded that "the
status of the requested representative, whether it be that
of a union not yet certified or simply that of fellow em-
ployee, does not operate to deprive the employees of the
rights which they enjoy by virtue of the plain mandate
in Section 7." Anchortank, supra at 431. See also Newton
Sheet Metal, Inc., 238 NLRB 970 (1978); Glomac Plastics,
Inc., 234 NLRB 1309 (1978).
Based upon all the foregoing, I conclude that Smith
had a reasonable expectation that disciplinary action
would flow from his interview on October 18, that he re-
quested either employee or union representation, that he
was entitled to either employee or union representa-
tion,41 and that the Respondent through Williams denied
the request and continued the interview with Smith,
which interview ultimately resulted in disciplinary action
against Smith. Accordingly, I conclude that the Re-
spondent, by denying Smith representation at the inter-
view on October 18, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
11. Informing employees that an employee was
discharged for union activities
Employee Bobbie Alice Wilcox testified that she had a
conversation with Supervisor McGirt on March 14,42 in
the fabrication lunchroom during which Wilcox re-
marked that she had heard that McGirt "had lost an op-
erator due to union activity or soliciting for the Union."
McGirt answered affirmatively and Wilcox asked who
the operator was. McGirt informed her that it was Terri
Drake. Wilcox then inquired what Drake had done and
McGirt stated that she "was following another person to
their job talking to them about the Union."4 3 Wilcox
commented that it looked like she would have known
better and McGirt agreed, adding that Drake was one of
the best employees he had.
41 Since the Respondent denied Smith's request for union representa-
tion, I find irrelevant the Respondent's argument that no union reprc-
sentative as shown to be available.
42 This was at a time prior to Wilcox's insrvolement in union ati lty
and before any knowledge by the Respondent of her union sympathies
43 As will be discussed below in consideration of the alleged discrimi-
natory discharge of Terri Drake, the Respondent had a rule prohibiting
union solicitation on worktime but did not enforce it
McGirt, in his testimony, acknowledged the conversa-
tion with Wilcox. While he admitted Wilcox had re-
marked that she had heard that "we" had had a girl that
was terminated, he claimed his response was, "Yeah,
Terri Drake was terminated for interfering with Martha
Bowers while she was trying to work." He denied that
he told Wilcox that Drake was fired for union activity.
Wilcox impressed me as a truthful witness. She was
not cross-examined on her testimony regarding McGirt.
McGirt was less persuasive and contradicted himself on
cross-examination regarding his direct testimony that he
had mentioned Bowers' name to Wilcox. I therefore find
Wilcox to be the more reliable witness and I credit her
version where it contradicts that of McGirt's.
Based on Wilcox's testimony the General Counsel con-
tends that McGirt's statement to Wilcox regarding Drake
implied that Drake was fired solely for talking to an em-
ployee about the Union and this constituted a threat in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Respondent
argues, on the other hand, that even accepting Wilcox's
version no violation has been established. Moreover, the
Respondent adds that there was no evidence that
McGirt's response to Wilcox was calculated to convey
any type of threat to Wilcox.
As will be seen below, Drake's discharge involved
Drake's union-related conversations with employee
Martha Bowers, which the Respondent contends, inter
alia, interfered with Bowers' work. Thus, McGirt's re-
sponse to Wilcox had some foundation in fact, and, in
my opinion, implied not simply union solicitation or ac-
tivity as the basis for Drake's discharge but rather im-
proper conduct on her part in "following" an employee
to her job to talk about the Union. Wilcox's admitted
reply to the effect that Drake should have known better
constitutes a recognition by Wilcox of some degree of
misconduct by Drake based on McGirt's assertions as to
what Drake had done. Under these circumstances, and
without regard to McGirt's intentions, I do not believe
that McGirt's statement may be fairly or properly con-
strued as a threat that employees who engaged in legiti-
mate union activity would suffer a fate similar to
Drake's. I therefore find no violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act in McGirt's remarks to Wilcox.
C. The Alleged 8(a)(3) Violations
1. The discharge of Terri Drake
Terri Drake had been employed by the Respondent in
August 1974, and had worked as an end finder in the fab-
rication department on the "B" crew. Her last position
prior to her discharge was as a rack auditor, which re-
quired her to travel throughout her department most of
her working time. It is conceded by the Respondent's
witnesses that she was a good employee, and Drake testi-
fied that she was not aware that she had received any
"write-ups" or reprimands of any kind. The Respondent
stipulated that there was nothing "wrong" with Drake's
past employment record.
Drake attended the first union meeting on March 8
and following that meeting she proceeded to the plant
where she talked to employees in the parking lot about
PPG; INDUSTRIES. INC. 1167
the Union and solicited employees to sign union authori-
zation cards. Although it was her day off she returned to
the plant on March 9 to solicit cards and talk to employ-
ees in the parking lot. She also solicited employees to
sign cards on March 10 and 11. Her name was included
in the list of persons named to the in-plant organizing
committee sent by the Union and received by the Re-
spondent on March 10. On March 11, prior to her work-
time she talked to employee Martha Bowers in the plant
parking lot about the Union. Bowers did not sign a union
card. Subsequently, on March 11, Drake, while on her
way to take a work break, talked to Bowers in the plant
during Bowers' worktime, and, according to Drake,
Drake remarked to Bowers that she hoped that she had
not upset her talking to her that morning. Bowers replied
that she had not. Then Drake inquired if Bowers was
going to a scheduled union meeting and Bowers replied
that she did not think so because her husband was going
to be working and could not go with her. According to
Drake, Bowers did not stop working while Drake talked
to her. Drake testified she left Bowers' work position
after about 2 to 2-1/2 minutes and proceeded on to meet
another employee to take a break with her. As she pro-
ceeded away from Bowers' position she passed Supervi-
sor Bobby Lumsden who was approaching.
On March 12 Drake continued her union activity in
the plant parking lot prior to her scheduled worktime.
While in the break room just prior to starting work she
was summoned by Supervisor McGirt to an upstairs
office where McGirt told her that he was going to have
to suspend her pending investigation and that she would
have to leave the grounds. Drake departed but not
before telling McGirt that she was going to the Labor
Board about the matter.
The following day Drake telephoned McGirt, who
told her to come in and see Bob Kirkendall, personnel
manager. However, upon reporting to Kirkendall's office
at the appointed time, instead of meeting with Kirkendall
she met with Supervisor Jim Williams, McGirt, and Em-
ployment Supervisor Jerry Strong. Drake's request that
employee Dorothy Krotz attend as Drake's witness was
denied by Williams. Williams explained to Drake that a
decision in her case might take longer, that he wanted to
investigate the "whole plant," and that she was still sus-
pended and there was a possibility that she could be ter-
minated. Williams asked Drake her "side of the story"
and Drake responded that she did not know why she
had been suspended.4 4 Williams told her to leave and
that he would be in touch with her by telephone. How-
ever, as Drake was leaving, Williams received a tele-
phone call and he told her to wait. After he hung up, he
told Drake she was terminated "for approaching some-
one, talking union on your break while they were work-
ing." Drake was paid off and she left the plant. It was
stipulated that a "Pay Off Authorization" form utilized
by the Respondent and dated March 12, 1978, states as
the reason for Drake's discharge that she was interfering
with the work of another employee.
4 It is not disputed that up to this particular point in time Drake was
not advised of the offense being attributed to her
It is undisputed that Drake was never advised by the
Respondent at any time the name of the employee she
had allegedly interfered with. Moreover, although the
Respondent contested Drake's subsequent claim for un-
employment compensation, it offered no testimonial evi-
dence in the unemployment compensation proceeding
and again failed to identify whom Drake had interfered
with. The State Employment Security Commission found
Drake had not interfered with anyone and granted her
claim for compensation. 45
Briefly stated, it is the position of the General Counsel
and the Union that Drake had not interfered with the
work of any other employee, and that the discharge of
Drake for the reason asserted was pretextual. In support
of this position the General Counsel and the Union point
to a number of factors, including the Respondent's ad-
mitted knowledge of Drake's union activity, the timing
of the discharge at the start of the union campaign, the
Respondent's alleged failure to fully investigate the inci-
dent upon which the discharge was allegedly based, the
Respondent's demonstrated union animus, and the dispa-
rate treatment accorded Drake as compared to other em-
ployees involved in similar situations but espousing the
Respondent's cause against the Union.
The Respondent takes the position that Drake was dis-
charged on the basis of its belief that Drake had inter-
fered with the work of Martha Bowers on March II,
and such interference violated a posted rule prohibiting
production interference. 46 In this regard, Foreman
McGirt testiied that about March 12 Martha Bowers
came to him accompanied by employee Ruth Chadwick
and complained that she was tired of being harassed, that
she could not do her work, and that Drake had come
over on her job and tried to get her to sign a union card
and had asked Bowers to come to a union meeting.
Bowers, who McGirt described as upset and trembling,
related that Drake had talked to her for about 15 to 20
minutes the preceding day, and had told Bowers not to
tell Supervisor Bobby Lumsden what they had talked
about or Drake would be fired. McGirt's testimony on
what Bowers related to him was corroborated generally
by Chadwick, but Chadwick said Bowers had claimed
that Drake had talked to her only 10 minutes the day
before.
McGirt's description of Bowers as being upset was
supported not only by Chadwick but by Nancy Cope, a
plant nurse, who treated Bowers for her nervous condi-
tion following Bowers' report to McGirt. Cope also testi-
4' GC. Exh 26
4' The posted rule, also contained in a handbook prepared by the Re-
spondent, was set forth within a "Statement on Unionism" expressing the
Respondent's opposition to unions The pertinent section relied on by the
Respondent states:
Everyone should also know that no person ill be allowed to
carry on union organizing activities during working time and hat
anybody that does so and thereby neglects his or her own ork or
interferes with the work of others will be subject to serious disciplin-
ar) action.
The Respondent also maintained a rule in its supervisory manual which
prohibited "unauthorized solicitations of employees during on-the-job
worktime," but this rule was never published to employees and the Re-
spondent conceded that it was not enforced
PPG INDUSTRIES, NC. I li 7
1168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BO()ARI)
fled that Bowers had told her that Drake had "inter-
fered" with her job asking her to sign some papers. 4 7
Following Bowers' complaint about Drake, McGirt
contacted Williams, who in turn told McGirt to check
with Employee Relations Manager Lee Waters since the
matter involved the Union. Waters advised McGirt to
suspend Drake and that was done with instructions for
Drake to return the next day to see Williams.
Williams' testimony regarding the discharge interview
with Drake did not differ significantly from Drake's ver-
sion. Williams explained that, while Drake was in his
office, he received a call from Waters telling him to dis-
charge Drake. Williams conceded that Drake, whom he
described as a good employee and a "fine little girl," was
never told who had complained about her.4 8
Martha Bowers was not called as a witness by the Re-
spondent because of a written statement of her doctor
expressing concern that exposure to the stress of a hear-
ing might be injurious to her health. Accordingly,
Drake's version of her encounter with Bowers on March
II was not directly rebutted. However, the Respondent
did present evidence through former employee Kim Bur-
kehardt that Drake had also approached her while she
was working on two occasions during the week prior to
Drake's discharge and had talked to Burkehardt about
the Union, the first time asking her to attend a union
meeting and the second time indicating that she wanted
Burkehardt to sign a union card. The conversations on
both occasions lasted only a few minutes. Burkehardt
complained to her mother, Gay Burkehardt, who was
also an employee of the Respondent and a strong sup-
porter of the Respondent during the union campaign.
Gay Burkehardt thereafter complained to McGirt, who
testified that he told Supervisor Lumsden to talk to
Drake. In his testimony Lumsden did not indicate that he
ever talked to Drake about Kim Burkehardt or interfer-
ing with the work of any employee, although he stated
that pursuant to McGirt's direction he told Drake about
a week prior to her discharge not to interfere with her
own work by too much talking. The Respondent con-
cedes, however, that it did not rely on the Kim Burke-
hardt-Drake incident in effectuating Drake's discharge.
According to Waters, the Respondent relied basically
upon the Bowers incident in discharging Drake.
Having carefully considered Drake's demeanor while
testifying and the content of her testimony, I credit
Drake. She impressed me as being an honest and trust-
worthy witness. Moreover, her testimony regarding the
critical encounter with Bowers on March 11, stands
without direct contradiction by Bowers. The absence of
any actual interference with Bowers' work as claimed by
Drake, in my opinion, is substantiated by Lumsden's tes-
timony that on March 11 he talked to Bowers about a
production matter immediately after Drake had left
Bowers' position, but Bowers did not make the com-
4" The testimony of McGirt, Chadwick, and Cope on what Bowers re-
ported to them was received as evidence bearing upon the Respondent's
subsequent actions It was not received as evidence of the truth of what
Bowers had reported regarding Drake's conduct. In view of their mutual
corroboration, and in the absence of contradiction, I credit the testimony
of McGirt, Chadwick, and Cope regarding what Bowers told them.
'4 Drake testified that she did not learn that Bowers was involved in
her discharge until she learned of it from the Board attorney.
plaint to him about Drake which she so nervously re-
ported the next day. Lumsdt,.'s testimony also substanti-
ates Drake's regarding the time of the Bowers-Drake in-
cident. Accordingly, I find and conclude that Drake, in
talking to Bowers on March 11, did not interfere with
her own work or that of Bowers. In addition, whatever
the basis of Bowers' subjective distress, whether caused
by her fear as a probationary employee of being dis-
charged for union involvement or simply due to her
emotional makeup, I am convinced that Drake engaged
in no conduct with respect to Bowers which could rea-
sonably be expected to evoke such distress.
Drake's comments to Bowers on March 11 may be re-
alistically regarded as union solicitation because she did
invite Bowers to a union meeting. But the Respondent
emphasizes in its brief that its rule was directed against
work interference, not soliciting.4 9 And the testimony of
Employee Relations Manager Waters was that Drake
was discharged not for violation of any no-solicitation
rule, but for interfering with the work of another em-
ployee. The Act establishes and protects the right of em-
ployees to engage in union solicitation even during
working time in the absence of a valid no-solicitation
rule and so long as there is no interference with produc-
tion. Daylin, Inc., Discount Division d/b/a Miller's Dis-
count Dept. Stores, 198 NLRB 281 (1972). Soliciting
during working time does not constitute an ipso facto in-
terference with production. Switchcraft, Inc., 241 NLRB
985 (1979).
It follows from the above that Drake was engaged in a
protected activity under the Act when she talked to
Bowers. She did not breach a valid no-solicitation rule
because on the Respondent's own admission it had not
enforced any no-solicitation rule. Moreover, Waters in
his testimony disavowed reliance upon Drakes' "solicit-
ing" as a basis for the discharge. Drake, in her testimony
which I have credited above, did not breach any rules
against production interference because she did not inter-
fere with the work of Bowers nor did she interfere with
her own work since she was on her break during her talk
with Bowers. Accordingly, I conclude that Drake was
discharged for conduct protected under the Act. The
fact that the Respondent may have believed that Drake
had engaged in misconduct in connection with such ac-
tivity, i.e., interference with Bowers' work, is no defense
to the Respondent where that misconduct did not occur.
Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964). I therefore
find and conclude that the Respondent in discharging
Drake violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.5 0
"' The Respondent was compelled to make this distinction in order to
avoid a conclusion as to the discriminatory application of its rules against
Drake based upon substantially uncontradicted and credible evidence
produced by the General Counsel revealing that the Respondent had al-
lowed solicitations by supervisors and employees for various causes, per-
sonal and otherwise. during working time However, rules almost identi-
cal to the Respondent's rule here have been previously considered by the
Board to be lawful no-solicitation rules. See, e.g., Dixie Wire Corporation
and Perfection Electrical Products, Inc., 182 NLRB 211 (197()) Pepsi-Cola
Bottlers of Miami. Inc., 155 NI RB 527 (1965).
"' This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the argument of
the Geteral Counsel and the Union regarding the pretextual nature of
Drake's discharge.
PPG INDUSTRIES. INC. 1169
2. The discharge of Ronnie Bedsole
Ronnie Bedsole was employed by the Respondent on
January 3, and at the time of his discharge on August 14,
he was working in the Respondent's fabrication depart-
ment in the finished products area on the "C" crew
under the supervision of Assistant Foreman Lindsay
Owens. Bedsole's job as a waste handler involved the
picking up of waste from operators in the finished prod-
ucts area and taking it to the "waste house" where it was
weighed out. According to evaluation forms filled out by
his supervisors and submitted in evidence, Bedsole's
work was satisfactory. Bedsole became involved in the
union campaign in March, and the Respondent admits
that it was aware of Bedsole's union activities.
On August 14 Bedsole was working the midnight to 8
a.m. shift and was due 10-minute rest breaks at 2 a.m.
and 6 a.m. Bedsole testified that at the time of the 6 a.m.
break he was "trying to catch up on his work" and
worked until 6:09 a.m. when he took his waste to the
waste house which is a segregated and walled off portion
of the plant. There, after weighing his waste, Bedsole sat
down on a stack of burlap bags and closed his eyes for 2
to 3 minutes "thinking on how I was going to get my
job done because I was a good ways behind." When
Bedsole opened his eyes at 6:17 a.m.51 he was confront-
ed by Supervisors Owens and Hartley. He was directed
to accompany them to the fabrication foreman's office.
On the way Bedsole asked what he had done and Owens
replied that he had been found sleeping on the job. In
the office Hartley also accused Bedsole of sleeping on
the job and stated that there was no excuse for that. Bed-
sole was sent home by Owens with instructions to come
back and see Jim Williams at I a.m.5 2
When Bedsole returned to see Williams, he was told
he was discharged for sleeping on the job. Bedsole testi-
fied he had tried to explain that he had worked through
his break to catch up on his job but this argument appar-
ently did him no good. Although Bedsole's testimony
was equivocal and contradictory regarding whether he
ever claimed to Hartley, Owens, or Williams that he had
not been asleep, he testified that in fact he had not been
asleep when Hartley and Owens came up to him in the
waste house.
The General Counsel and the Union argue that Bed-
sole was discharged because of his union activities and
rely in this regard upon the general union animus reflect-
ed in the Respondent's conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) and upon Bedsole's testimony that he had not in
fact been asleep. Moreover, it is argued in support of the
discrimination contention that even if Bedsole was asleep
he was asleep on his own time having worked through
his normal break period, and other employees had slept
during breaks as well as on the job without being dis-
charged.
The Respondent's evidence on Bedsole was presented
through Hartley and Owens. According to Hartley, he
was touring the area when he observed Bedsole in the
sl Bedsole testified that he established the time by looking at a clock in
the waste house
s2 Sending employees home with instructions to come back and see
Williams was, t appears, standard operating procedure in discharge cases
waste house lying in a prone position on a stack of
burlap. Hartley approached Bedsole and stood over him
and then walked to a phone in the area and paged Bed-
sole's direct supervisor, Owens. Owens came at or about
6:20 a.m. and Hartley pointed Bedsole out to him. Owens
walked over to Bedsole and called his name twice before
Bedsole "roused up." Thereafter, Bedsole was taken to
the foreman's office where Hartley told him he had been
found asleep on the job and he was sent home. Hartley's
testimony was corroborated by that of Owens. Both tes-
tified that Bedsole neither claimed to them that he was
on a break or that he had not in fact been sleeping.
Asked if Bedsole had attempted an explanation of his be-
havior when he talked to Bedsole and discharged him,
Williams testified that Bedsole stated only that he was
tired because he had been working so hard but neither
admitted or denied that he had been sleeping.
Weighing the testimony of Bedsole on the one hand
against that of Hartley and Owens on the other, I credit
the latter. Bedsole in demeanor was unconvincing and
his testimony was at times evasive, equivocal and contra-
dictory. Thus, on cross-examination he initially testified
that he did not say anything to Hartley or Owens about
being asleep. On further questioning about any denials to
them about being asleep he avoided direct responses by
claiming he told them that he had had his eyes closed.
Then he claimed that he specifically told them he was
not asleep but then finally contradicted that by saying
that all he said was that he had had his eyes shut. Bed-
sole in his pre-hearing statement to the Board investiga-
tor made no contention that he had denied to Hartley or
Owens that he had been asleep. Accordingly, based upon
the testimony of Hartley and Owens, I find and conclude
that Bedsole was found by them in a prone posture
under circumstances which would cause any reasonable
person to believe that he was asleep, and that Bedsole
never denied to them that he was asleep. I also credit
Williams' testimony that Bedsole did not deny to him
that he had been asleep.
I also credit the testimony of Hartley and Owens that
Bedsole made no claim that he was taking a late break.
Such a claim, even if he had worked through his sched-
uled break, was not likely to be believed under the cir-
cumstances, including the secluded place where Bedsole
was found.
In an effort to show that even assuming Bedsole had
been sleeping his discharge was nevertheless disparate
and discriminatory the Ge-teral Counsel produced evi-
dence to establish that other employees were allowed to
take late breaks or extended breaks without discipline.
This evidence, related in the testimony of employees
Medford Shoaf, Jerry Williams, Linda Ridge, and Lida
Smalley and former employee Doris Coates, was contra-
dicted in part by the Respondent. Supervisor Jim Wil-
liams admitted, however, that occasionally employees
were allowed to take late breaks with the knowledge and
permission of their supervisors and occasionally were al-
lowed to take their breaks in work areas although this
was not generally condoned and employees were expect-
ed to take their breaks in the appropriate lunchrooms.
The policy of taking breaks on a scheduled basis is set
PPG INDUSTRIES. INC.
1170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
forth in the employee booklet entitled "your Lexington
Plant Guide," which states "All personal breaks are on a
scheduled basis in order to maintain the efficiency of our
operation." s3
The General Counsel's evidence on late and extended
breaks is largely irrelevant because Bedsole was not dis-
charged for taking a late or extended break. In any
event, examination of the evidence on breaks reveals that
late breaks were generally determined by work that
needed to be done and not by the whim of the individual
employee. The late breaks which were shown to be
within the knowledge of a supervisor were taken with
his specific permission or in accordance with a practice
he had condoned. These instances of late breaks are dis-
tinguishable from Bedsole's situation and do not serve to
establish disparate treatment of him since there was no
showing on his part of any need to work through the
break period, that he had supervisory permission to take
a late break in the place he took it, or that he had ever
before taken late or extended breaks which were con-
doned by his supervisor. Accordingly, I find no disparate
treatment of Bedsole based on the Respondent's failure
to equate Bedsole's sleeping in the waste house with the
taking of a late or extended break.
The General Counsel also produced evidence to show
that other employees had been asleep on the job without
incurring discipline or discharge. Thus, Lida Smalley and
Doris Coates testified that they saw employee Thomas
Terry in his work area asleep during a break around July
14, and Foreman Hartley, upon being called over, com-
mented that he guessed Terry was "getting himself a
little nap." Assuming, arguendo, the accuracy of the testi-
mony of Smalley and Coates even though contradicted
by Terry and Hartley, their testimony does not clearly
establish that Terry slept on work time to the Respond-
ent's knowledge. Moreover, any "napping" by Terry dif-
fered in form and degree in comparison to the conduct
Bedsole who had absented himself on worktime in a se-
cluded area and dozed. Accordingly, I conclude that any
failure to discipline Terry does not establish disparate
treatment of Bedsole.
The General Counsel also produced the testimony of
employees Arthur Crowell, Coates, Lanning, and Jerry
Williams to the effect that employee Mae Wateman oc-
casionally dozed off while working on the night shift and
standing at her work position without being disciplined.
Crowell testified that he yelled at Wateman to wake her
up while Foreman Owens was within hearing distance,
but he could not state that Owens heard him or saw Wa-
teman asleep. On the other hand, Coates testified that she
once heard Owens tell Wateman to wash her face and
wake up but she could not specify when this occurred.
Accepting the testimony of the General Counsel's wit-
nesses regarding Wateman's dozing it still does not pres-
ent a situation comparable to that of Bedsole or substan-
tiate Bedsole's claim of disparate treatment. In my opin-
ion, there is a considerable difference in the conduct of
an employee who dozes on her feet at her work station
while performing a boring job and one who deliberately
b5 G.C. Exh. 16.
and surreptitiously leaves his work station to take a
"nap" on worktime.
Velma Hepler testified that on one occasion she had
seen employee Annie King sitting at a fixer's bench with
her head bowed when Supervisor Charles Godwin ap-
proached her and kicked her on the foot and they
laughed about the matter. King, called by the Respond-
ent, denied that she had been asleep or that Godwin had
kicked her foot. Rather, she claimed that the only super-
visor who tapped her on the foot was "B" crew Fore-
man Jerry Michaels and he had not found her asleep.
King impressed me as a truthful and straightforward wit-
ness and I credit her denial that she had been sleeping or
caught sleeping. 54
The Respondent's position was that any employee
caught sleeping on the job was automatically terminated.
This position cannot be accorded complete credence be-
cause of an employee personnel report form involving
Sammy Gordon which was received in evidence by stip-
ulation.55 That form, dated September 27, signed by a
foreman named Bell, and approved by Area Supervisor
Wattle and Employment Supervisor Strong, recorded the
finding of Gordon asleep on worktime in an office in the
quality control laboratory. There was no evidence pre-
sented to show that Gordon was terminated or otherwise
disciplined aside from the "writeup," nor was there any
explanation on the record to explain the failure to termi-
nate or discipline him. The circumstances of Gordon's
sleeping would appear parallel to those of Bedsole and
would clearly suggest disparate treatment of Bedsole. On
the other hand, the Respondent produced uncontradicted
and credible evidence that several other employees had
been discharged for sleeping on the job. In this regard,
Hartley testified that he was personally aware of one em-
ployee previously discharged for sleeping, Ruth Cor-
pentry. Owens testified regarding another, McMillen,
while Michaels testified he was aware of two, Epps and
Wyrick, that he had been instrumental in firing for sleep-
ing on the job. Even employee Thomas Terry related
that he was aware of two employees, Friday and Owens,
besides Bedsole who were discharged for sleeping. This
testimony appears to be borne out by the Respondent's
records, for Personnel Manager Robert Kirkendall testi-
fied that, after reviewing the Respondent's records for
the past 10 years, it appeared that 34 employees had been
terminated for sleeping on the job. A list56 compiled by
Kirkendall from those records included the names relat-
ed by Hartley, Owens, Michaels, and Terry.
Considering all the foregoing, I am not persuaded that
the General Counsel has established by a preponderance
of the evidence that Bedsole was the victim of disparate
treatment because of his union activities. Even if the Re-
spondent has not been entirely consistent in discharging
employees for sleeping on the job, I am compelled to
conclude that it has done so in enough cases to preclude
"4 Both Godwin and Michaels denied that they had caught King
asleep. Michaels admitted, however, that he had once heard that King
was asleep but upon checking it out found her awake but sitting on a
fixer's bench and he simply told her to go to work
G.C. Exh 37.
,6 Resp. Exh. 24.
PP' INDUSTRIES. INC 1t71
a finding that Bedsole was the victim of disparate treat-
ment. 57 I therefore find that the Respondent did not vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act in discharging
Ronnie Bedsole.
3. The termination of Donna Black
Donna Black was employed by the Respondent in Jan-
uary and worked as a production service woman under
the supervision of Area Foreman Scott and Crew Fore-
man Hartley until her termination on August 29. The
classification of production service woman encompasses
employees involved in a number of different job func-
tions. Thus, Black had performed duties as a conveyor
operator, rack stripper, segregator, waste stripper, and
sweeper. She had also received training as an end finder
and was apparently qualified to do that work. However.
at the time immediately prior to her termination she was
engaged primarily in segregating, a task which, accord-
ing to Black, involved considerable lifting of yarn tubes
weighing between 20 to 35 pounds.
That Black had been involved in union activity to the
knowledge of the Respondent is not in dispute. Black
had signed a union card in March, and had been named
to the in-plant organizing committee. The Respondent
was advised of Black's membership on the committee by
a letter from the Union dated April 24. The Respondent
was also aware that Black was closely associated with
another union supporter, Ronnie Bedsole, whom she sub-
sequently married. Comments to Black by Supervisors
Hartley and Scott concerning the Union and found by
me to constitute violations of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act
have already been noted.
Black had completed her 6-month probationary period
prior to her termination. Moreover, she had been told by
Scott in late April that her work was satisfactory, al-
though Scott did complain to her about remarks critical
of Scott's work assignments attributed to Black by an-
other employee, Vickie Poole. In July Black was advised
by Scott and Hartley that she had been "written up" for
having a bad attitude and having no respect for authori-
ty. The discussion of Scott and Hartley with Black on
the subject of the "write-up" included references made
to other employees about Scott's work assignments. In-
cluded in the written reprimand itself was a reference to
a statement by Black to another employee that she in-
tended to "take" Scott to the "Labor Board." While
Black denied to Scott and Hartley that she had ever
made such a statement, Hartley refused to omit the refer-
ence to the alleged statement in the reprimand. 58
In the discussion with Scott and Hartley on the repri-
mand Black complained that her work as a segregator
was hurting her back. The discussion ended, according
to Black's testimony, which I credit, without any specific
resolution of Black's problem in this regard and there ap-
pears to have been little talk about the matter. At an-
51 According to the uncontradicted testimony of Kirkendall, even a
foreman's son, George Wray, had been discharged for sleeping on the job
the month prior to edsole's discharge.
as The complaint did not allege that this "'rite-up" violated he Act
in any way, and at he hearing the General Counsel disasowed any alle-
gation that it was unlawful The reprimand itself was never offered n
evidence
other time in mid-July. Black complained to Scott that
her back was hurting her on the segregating job and
asked Scott to put her on a rack stripping job. Scott, ac-
cording to Black, stated that she had all the rack strip-
pers she needed and that if Black could not do her job to
take a leave of absence.
Black continued to work as a segregator and contin-
ued to have problems with her back. About August 8
Black complained to Hartley about her back, explaining
that Scott had been unable or unwilling to assign her to
some other job, and asked if there was something he
could do. He said that he would see what he could do
but later the same day told her to go see Dr. Strader, the
company doctor. Black saw the doctor in the plant and
told him of her back problem and related to him that she
had "pulled" her back in the plant in February. She also
explained she had injured herself years previously but
the injury had related to her shoulders and head. She
had been under chiropractic care for the earlier injury.
Following an examination, the doctor advised Black that,
if she could not be assigned a lighter job, she should take
a 2-week leave of absence and see an orthopedic sur-
geon.
Subsequently, Black talked to Hartley, who told her
that since her back problem was not job related she
would have to take a leave of absence and see an ortho-
pedic surgeon. Black agreed to a 2-week leave of ab-
sence beginning August 11. She was examined by an or-
thopedic surgeon, Dr. Watts, on August 16, who in-
formed her that she had a chronic lombar strain and that
she should do lighter lifting with no lifting above her
head.
On August 29 Black returned to the Respondent's
plant and talked to Employment Supervisor Strong.
Strong at that point had Dr. Watts' report as well as Dr.
Strader's comments thereon. Strong stated that since
Black's problem was chronic it probably would not im-
prove and after checking with Hartley that they had no
jobs that Black could do inasmuch as she was limited to
no lifting above her shoulders. Strong stated that since
there were no jobs for her she would have to be termi-
nated. Black's payoff authorization dated August 29
states as the reason for termination, "Terminated because
she is unable to perform her job due to personal physical
reasons." The form, signed by Foreman Lindsay Owens
and Strong, also contained the statement, "Do not rec-
ommend rehire!"
The General Counsel argues that the termination of
Black was discriminatory and pretextual because there
were many jobs in the plant which Black could have
performed which would have been within the limitations
placed on her by the findings of the doctors. Moreover,
the General Counsel contends that the Respondent's ac-
tions with respect to Black were inconsistent with its
own policies regarding the routine granting of medical
leaves of absence to employees of up to I year.5 9 The
General Counsel further urges that the treatment of
Black was disparate when compared with that of other
"' An employee on a medical leave of ahbsence maintalned seniorit)
and received some monetary compenisalion for a period of p o 2t,
weeks
1172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees who were not terminated or discharged be-
cause of similar medical problems.
The Respondent contends that its actions with respect
to Black were consistent with its policies, including a
policy, admittedly known by Black, that employees with
nonjob-related injuries were not entitled to transfers to
lighter work assignments. The Respondent viewed
Black's problem as nonjob-related. According to the Re-
spondent, and based upon the testimony of Strong and
Hartley, in view of the nonjob-related aspect of Black's
problem, and since there were no available jobs in the
production service classification which Black could per-
form with the apparently permanent restrictions imposed
by the doctors, 6° the discharge was a natural and logical
consequence of Black's back ailment. The Respondent
denied that union considerations played any part in the
termination of Black.
The Respondent's ulterior and discriminatory motiva-
tion with respect to its treatment and discharge of Black
is found initially, in my opinion, in its rather arbitrary
conclusion that Black's back problem was not job relat-
ed. Black had complained to both Doctors Strader and
Watts, who examined her, that, notwithstanding her
shoulder and head problems stemming from her child-
hood injury, her back problem began in February. While
Black's testimony indicates that Strader did not believe
her trouble was work related Watts had told Black that
"no doctor could tell me where or when I hurt my
back." Moreover, Watts' memo to Strader regarding
Black's condition clearly reflects Black's claim that the
back injury was sustained at work. Black's testimony also
indicates that, when she initially hurt her back in Febru-
ary, she informed Supervisor Scott and sought treatment
by the nurse at the plant. Based on other record evi-
dence establishing that written records were maintained
of visits to the plant nurse, it is likely that any visit by
Black to the plant nurse would have been recorded.
However, no such record was submitted into evidence
and the implication of Black's testimony is not contra-
dicted.
With the knowledge of Black's claims which could not
fairly be disregarded, and notwithstanding Black's prior
medical history involving her back and shoulder problem
which Respondent was aware of prior to her employ-
ment, the Respondent's failure to consider Black for reas-
signment to lighter duty becomes highly suspect.
Neither Strong, Hartley, nor Scott made any effort to
ascertain if there were any jobs outside the production
service classification which Black could perform. And
this was so even though the Respondent allowed trans-
fers between departments and did so, according to Per-
sonnel Manager Kirkendall, based upon medical reasons.
That the Respondent was making a determined effort
to find a basis for terminating Black is evidenced by
Strong's acceptance of Black's physical limitations im-
6g Strong testified that his determination of Black's inability to do
other production service work was based upon a comparison of Black's
limitations with a previously prepared analysis of the physical require-
ments for such positions The analysis had been prepared a year earlier in
connection with the Respondent's affirmative action program to hire
handicapped persons All the production service positions required some
reaching above the employees' shoulders.
posed by Strader over those imposed by Watts, the spe-
cialist who had examined Black. Thus, Watts had sug-
gested only that Black not be required to lift weights
above her head. Strader, based on Watts' examination
and report regarding Black, and using a standardized
form of the Respondent's, marked the form so as to indi-
cate a much broader restriction preventing Black from
working on jobs requiring "reaching above [the] shoul-
der." It was upon this broader restriction that Strong
concluded that Black could not perform any production
service work. Comparing Black's physical ability based
on Watts' narrower limitations with the physical job re-
quirements on the Respondent's job analysis worksheets
would have reflected her capability to perform other
jobs in production service. Strader's advice and review
regarding Watts' recommendations were clearly entitled
to serious consideration by Strong, but Strong's ready
acceptance of the broader restriction indicated by
Strader, without questioning it further and in the absence
of evidence that all the production service jobs required
lifting weights above the head, supports the conclusion
that the discharge of Black was pretextual.
There is also substantial record evidence that the Re-
spondent took a more lenient approach to other employ-
ees' medical problems, including nonjob-related ones. It
was the testimony of employee Margie Stevens that, fol-
lowing a back problem she encountered in 1977 which
the Respondent viewed as not work related, Stevens was
given lighter work which she could do. In November of
the following year when she again suffered another non-
work-related back problem, Stevens was not put on
lighter work but was allowed to take a 3-week leave of
absence."' The parties stipulated to admit into evidence
documents reflecting that employee Colleen Hunt, like
Black, suffered a back strain which was not job related
but was not discharged. Based upon another stipulation
the record reveals that employee Rosell Lanier was as-
signed lighter duties after returning to work following
surgery for a nonjob-related condition.
The record also shows that the Respondent freely
granted leaves of absence to employees with medical
problems without discharging or terminating them. Stip-
ulated evidence reveals that employee Jack Rummange
was given a I-year leave of absence during 1978 for a
nonjob-related medical problem. When his problem did
not improve and he was unable to return to work at the
conclusion of his leave, his record was marked as volun-
tarily quit, not discharged like Black's. Likewise, Peggy
Barger suffered a nonjob-related back problem and was
granted two extended leaves of absence in 1978 for that
problem. She was not discharged even though her back
pain was diagnosed by Strader as "chronic" as Watts had
diagnosed Black's. Similarly, employee Betty Hunt was
given several leaves of absence for a nonjob-related con-
dition diagnosed as chronic and was not discharged. Em-
ployee Sonya Speir was granted a leave of absence in
1978 for medical reasons, which leave was extended sev-
eral times without discharge.
61 Under the Respondent's policies, a medical leave of absence could
be granted and extended up to I year
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 1173
Other uncontradicted record evidence reflects that the
Respondent retained employees on leaves of absence for
medical reasons for nonjob-related problems such as
mental conditions, heart ailments, and even terminal
cancer. Such employees were not terminated although
there was apparently little hope that they would ever be
able to return to work for even light duty.
The foregoing demonstrates that the Respondent has
not by any means been consistent in the application of its
policies regarding the assignment of lighter work in
nonjob-related injury situations and the granting of ex-
tended medical leave to employees. Some deviations
from general policies may well be explained by humane
considerations. However, in my opinion too many excep-
tions have been shown by the General Counsel to avoid
the conclusion that Black was the object of disparate
treatment. Assuming that Black's problem was not job
related, and even though her condition was described as
chronic, there was no reason shown why she could not
have been put on medical leave until a position became
available which she could have performed. The Re-
spondent's failure to grant her such an option, particular-
ly in view of its lenient approach to employees having
similar problems, coupled with its refusal to reconsider
Black for rehire at any subsequent time, clearly reveals a
resolve to dispose of Black. 62 That resolve can only be
understood in relation to Black's union support.
I am persuaded by the foregoing that the Respondent's
basis for discharging Black was a pretextual one as
argued by the General Counsel. In view of the Respond-
ent's clear knowledge of Black's strong union support,
the Respondent's union animus revealed in the comments
of Hartley and Scott to Black which I have previously
found to be unlawful herein, Hartley's July reprimand of
Black based in part on his belief that she had told an-
other employee she was taking Scott to the "Labor
Board," and the pretextual nature of the discharge of
Black, I conclude that the General Counsel has estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence that the Re-
spondent's real motivation in terminating Black was her
involvement in union activities. Accordingly, I find that
the Respondent's discharge of Black constituted a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. The reprimand of William Timothy Parks
The complaint alleges that the Respondent, through
Crew Foreman Jerry Michaels in early May, enforced
stricter work rules concerning employee movement
within the plant in order to discourage employee union
activity, and in keeping with the stricter work rules
issued a discriminatory written reprimand to employee
William Timothy Parks. In support of these allegations,
Parks testified that he had been employed by the Re-
spondent in 1971, and had continued to work for the Re-
62 Strong testified that he had terminated other employees "under cir-
cumstances" like Black's, but there was no documentary evidence of such
terminations. Since it i likely that the Respondent would have been able
to substantiate Strong's estimony by documentary evidence had any ex-
isted, I conclude that none did In the absence of corroboration by docu-
mentary evidence or otherwise, and because Strong did not specify the
other employees terminated "under circumstances like Black's. I do not
credit his testimony in this regard
spondent until he voluntarily quit in January 1979. In
May, prior to his quitting, he had worked as an equip-
ment repairman or "fixer" assigned to a group of glass
furnaces referred to as single level furnaces and num-
bered 501 through 506. It 'was Parks' responsibility to
service or "fix" bushings through which glass fibers
were drawn from the furnaces or furnace tanks. A
second fixer was assigned to the Respondent's "double-
level furnaces" numbers 507 and 508 while a third was
assigned to the largest furnace, 509. Parks testified that
the fixers rotated among assignments to the various fur-
naces at 4- to 5-month intervals.
The furnaces adjoin each other but numbers 507-509
are on a different level. Since each furnace covers an
area of about 75 to 100 feet, there are several hundred
feet between 501 and 509.6` For this reason "fixers" uti-
lize a page boy so that they may be paged and called to
a particular assigned furnace when needed. Parks testi-
fied that he had been previously told that he could go
and help other fixers on other furnaces when necessary
and when caught up with his own assigned furnaces.
Parks estimated that he helped other fixers and they
helped him from one to several times a week. Moreover,
according to Parks, his supervisor, Michaels, had ob-
served him in the areas assigned to other fixers many
times without indicating to Parks that he was in violation
of any rules.
In early May Parks went to another fixer, John Beck,
on furnace 507 to obtain some collet knives, tools used
by the furnace operators. Before going to Beck, howev-
er, Parks stopped and talked for a "second" to another
employee, Clodfelter. At that time Parks was ap-
proached by Assistant Foreman Curtis Putnam who told
him that Michaels wanted to see him in the office.
Thereafter, Parks secured some collet knives from Beck
and went to Michaels' office where Michaels in Putnam's
presence inquired of Parks why he had gone to the 507
furnace. Parks explained that he had gone for some
collet knives and Michaels told him not to go back to
507 again. Parks complained that he had never been told
not to go to 507 before, but apparently agreed to stay on
his assigned furnaces and was excused to return to his
work.
About an hour after his office confrontation with Mi-
chaels Parks saw Michaels in the work area and inquired
if he was going to write Parks up for being at the 507
furnace. Michaels replied that he was 64 and Parks asked
for a copy of the writeup. Michaels asked what he
wanted it for and Parks told him it was none of his busi-
ness.
A day or two later, still according to Parks, Parks
talked to the department head, Norman Bell, about his
employment record and the "writeup" by Michaels. Bell
showed him his record, including a 1973 written repri-
mand which Parks stated he had not been aware of. Bell
explained that two writeups in 7-1/2 years was a pretty
good record. Parks inquired if any other fixer had been
'a Michaels estimated that the distance between the beginning (of the
first furnace and the end of the last was approximately a quarter of a
mile
"4 Parks' "sriteup" was dated May 10
1'PG NDUSTRIES. N.
, ,
1174 DECISIONS OF NA IONAL LABOR RELATIONS 13()AR)
written up as P'arks had been for being on another fur-
nace and Bell replied that he could not recall any. How-
ever, Bell told Parks that nobody was out to get him and
reminded Parks that he was supposed to stay in his as-
signed work area.
The General Counsel argues that the written repri-
mand of Parks was in retaliation for Parks' union activi-
ties and was thus a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. That Parks was engaged in union activities was not
disputed by the Respondent and the Respondent did not
deny knowledge of such activities. Parks had been on the
Union's in-plant organizing committee and had worn
union insignia and badges indicating union support in the
plant on almost a daily basis after the Union's campaign
began. The General Counsel also argues that the Re-
spondent's restriction of Parks' and the other fixers' 65
movement to assigned work areas also constituted the
imposition of a more stringent work rule which violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as well as 8(a)(3).
The Respondent, through its witnesses, disputed Parks'
testimony to the effect that fixers were free to leave their
assigned furnaces whenever they were caught up. In this
regard, Area Supervisor Robert Wattle, a superior of Mi-
chaels, testified that fixers never really got "caught up."
Moreover, he related that fixers were not supposed to
secure equipment from other fixers because it interfered
with an accurate determination of costs attributable to
each set of furnace operations. Each furnace set was op-
erated as a separate "cost center," according to
Wattle. 66
Putnam testified that fixers were not free to go to the
assistance of other fixers without supervisory permission.
He admitted, however, that he occasionally sent Parks to
help another fixer on other furnace sets. Assistant Fore-
man Monroe Kennedy supported Putnam's version of the
policies about keeping fixers on their jobs. So, too, did
Michaels and Foreman Godwin. Fixer Leon Coppley,
presented by the Respondent, supported the testimony of
the supervisors and testified he had known for 5 years
that it was against the Respondent's policy for fixers to
leave their work areas. The Respondent, through person-
nel Manager Kirkendall, contended that reprimands for
employees being out of their work area were not unusu-
al. Kirkendall estimated that he observed three or four
such reprimands each month.
With respect to the details of Parks' reprimand, Wattle
testified that he had seen Parks away from his work area
the week prior to his reprimand. It was not Wattle's
habit to personally correct employees except in matters
of safety or of substantial significance, but he did advise
Michaels and Godwin of what he had seen and told
them to see that it did not happen again. Putnam, who
did not directly supervise Parks, related that, on the day
of Parks' reprimand, he saw Parks talking to another em-
s' Fixer John Beck testified for the General Counsel that after he
heard of Parks' reprimand he asked Michaels about his work area and
Michaels told him not to go to the single-level furnaces without permis-
sion from supervision
e6 Parks denied knowing of any "cost center" concept and testified he
had not been told he could not secure equipment from other fixers
Wattle conceded that employees may not have been specifically told
about the "cost centers" but were aware they were required to secure
equipment from supply absent permission from supervision.
ployee, not a fixer, for about 3 minutes at the 507 fur-
nace. 6 7 Putnam inquired of Parks what he was there for
and Parks replied that he was there to get some equip-
ment. Putnam reported the matter to Michaels, who told
him to bring Parks in. The testimony of both Michaels
and Putnam was that in Michaels' office Michaels chas-
tised Parks for being out of his work area, told him that
he was not to get equipment from another "cost center,"
and advised Parks that he was going to "put a repri-
mand" on him for being out of his work area.
Parks, Beck, and Cole impressed me as credible wit-
nesses. Beck and Cole appeared in demeanor to be frank
and truthful. Moreover, since they were employees at
the time of the hearing and were giving testimony
against their employer to their potential economic risk,
such testimony was more likely to be reliable. Parks was
vigorous and emphatic in his testimony. As a former em-
ployee with no potential for economic gain depending
upon the outcome of the proceeding, the probability of
his testimony being truthful was greater. Accordingly, I
credit Parks, Beck, and Cole where their testimony dif-
fers from that of Michaels, Godwin, and Putnam.
Based upon the credited testimony of Parks, Beck, and
Cole, it is clear that the Respondent had maintained a
permissive attitude regarding the movement of the fixers
and their discussions and contact with each other at least
on that particular shift. Under these circumstances, the
sudden crack down or restriction on the fixers contact
with each other is highly suspicious. The suspicion is in-
creased by the fact that the reprimand of Parks was
without a prior warning and smacks of entrapment. After
all, Wattle's instructions to Michaels and Godwin after
seeing Parks in another work area the preceding week
was simply not to let it happen again. The logical way to
prevent a recurrence would be to warn Parks. Yet, there
was no warning prior to his reprimand.
The suspicion as to the discriminatory nature of Parks
writeup approaches certainty when one considers Parks
credited testimony that not only had he and the other
fixers on his shift been allowed to go to each other for
work-related purposes and for assistance, but had in fact
been told to do so by former Supervisor Tommy Bonds
as well as Foreman Godwin. Under these circumstances,
the fact that the Respondent had previously reprimanded
other employees, not fixers, for being out of their work
area becomes irrelevant.
The foregoing, when considered along with the Re-
spondent's demonstrated union animosity shown by its
8(a)(l) and (3) violations previously found, and the Re-
spondent's keen interest in identifying the core union
supporters and union "ringleaders" as reflected by its ad-
mitted study and analysis of the union committee, clearly
reveals the requisite preponderance of evidence that the
writeup of Parks was in fact pretextual and discriminato-
ry. Accordingly, I find that the writeup of Parks consti-
tuted a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act. In
addition, since the restriction on the fixers' movement
into each other's area without special permission, con-
trary to past practice on Parks' shift at least, constitutes
"' Fixer John Beck testified that Parks had also spent from 5 to 10
minutes with Beck in getting the collet knives from him.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 1175
more stringent enforcement of work rules on the fixers,
and because that enforcement was responsive to Parks'
union activities, I find, as alleged, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(l) by such enforcement.
5. The reprimand of Velma Hepler
Velma Hepler worked as a sliver handler in the form-
ing department under the general supervision of Crew
Foreman Michaels. As a sliver handler it was Hepler's
responsibility to monitor a "set" of approximately 12 to
15 positions or "bushings" through which glass strands
are drawn from the furnace tanks onto winders located
on a lower floor or level. Each position in the "set" is
approximately 2 to 3 feet wide so that a sliver handler
has to monitor an area 25 to 35 feet wide to insure that
the strands are being continuously and properly drawn
and wound. If the strand "breaks out" it is the sliver
handler's duty to get the position set up and running
again by "slivering" a new strand down to the winder.
Efficient production requires immediate attention by the
sliver handlers to any position breakout.
The Respondent supports "team work" among the
sliver handlers on adjacent sets and encourages them to
help each other in their work where necessary and also
to assist each other in the cleaning up of positions when
the tanks are running smooth and breakouts are less fre-
quent.
Hepler had no written reprimands in connection with
her work since beginning her second period of employ-
ment with the Respondent in November 1976 prior to
the beginning of the union campaign. Hepler was a
strong union supporter, whose activities in this regard
were well known to the Respondent. In fact, the Re-
spondent had inserted the word "ringleader" by Hepler's
name in its "Union Umbrella Committee Profiles."
In early May, according to Hepler's testimony, she
was working on a "set" of positions on the 508 furnace.
Since the tanks were running "rough" on the next set to
her requiring the full attention of Richardson, the sliver
handler assigned to that set, Hepler undertook to clean
up her position and Richardson's by washing the floor.
In so doing, she washed up to the area between Richard-
son's set, the last on 508, and the first set on 509. At that
point she and Carolyn Owen, the sliver handler on the
first set on the 509 furnace, engaged in a conversation of
some 3 to 4 minutes in the doorway between the two
furnaces; the door had been opened by Hepler to wash
some trash through.
According to Hepler, such conversations were not un-
usual and she had engaged in such conversations within
the presence of, or under the observation of, supervisors
who had said nothing to her. While talking to Owen,
Hepler was some distance from her own set but could
see if any of her positions were to break out because a
light would go on at a position where the winder stops
indicating a breakout. While she was talking to Owen,
Assistant Foreman Godwin came to the 508 furnace.
When she completed her conversation with Owen,
Hepler returned to her position where Godwin, still ac-
cording to Hepler, told her, "Velma, you know I
wouldn't say anything to you, but just be careful right
now about being off your set."
A few days later, after learning that Timothy Parks
had been written up without any notice, Hepler inquired
of Godwin if he had ever written her up without notice
and he told her he had and told her it related to the day
she had talked with Owen. Hepler asked why and
Godwin explained that he did not want to do it but Mi-
chaels directed him to do it. Hepler asked to see her re-
cords and subsequently met with Godwin and Michaels
in an office where Michaels read to her an "Employee's
Personnel Report" signed by Godwin and dated May 8.
The report was Godwin's account of having seen Hepler
off her set and at another tank (furnace) talking to
Owens. In the report, Godwin set forth that he had ex-
plained to Hepler how important it was to keep watch
on her set and "what could happen when she leaves her
tank without proper permission." The report added that
Godwin had told her that if this should happen again
more action would be taken and Hepler had responded
that she understood.
In further conversations with Michaels and Godwin in
the office, Hepler asked when the Respondent had start-
ed writing people up without telling them and Michaels
replied it had always been the policy. Hepler asked if
they were attempting to "set her up" and they both
denied it. Then Hepler stated she had done worse things
and had not been written up. She asked Godwin, if
someone in the "front office" told him to get rid of her,
would he do it and Godwin answered with the question,
"If you were supervisor and I was a sliver handler,
wouldn't you?" Michaels then commented that Hepler
had always been a good sliver handler and told her to go
do her job and not to worry about it. Hepler asked how
many writeups a person could get before being fired and
Michaels replied that it depended on how serious it was
but said some got fired after three and some had as many
as seven or eight without getting fired. Hepler advised
Godwin and Michaels that she would not thereafter
wash floors and would not go off her set to do team-
work.
On May 26, Hepler was called into Michaels' office
and in the presence of Godwin was asked to describe her
job. She did so, leaving out teamwork and cleaning up.
Michaels told her teamwork and cleaning up was part of
her job too, but she replied she was not going to do it
since she had been written up. Then Michaels said she
had a bad attitude, was not doing her job, and was not as
friendly as before, but Hepler contended that she was
doing her job as she had always done it. Then Michaels
remarked that maybe something outside the plant was
what was wrong with Hepler lately.
Hepler was corroborated by Carolyn Owen in her ver-
sion of the events regarding the incident on which
Hepler's writeup was based. Owen had not been repri-
manded. Furthermore, Owen testified that talking among
sliver handlers was not unusual even among sliver han-
dlers on separate tanks. However, she admitted that
Foreman Curtis Putnam in August had found her two
sets away from her own and had inquired what she was
doing there. She immediately returned to her own set
and received no reprimand.
PPG INDUSTRIES, NC.
1176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General Counsel presented two other witnesses,
Donna Rose and Linda Farnesworth, who credibly testi-
fied that they had either witnessed or been involved in
other conversations between sliver handlers, including
Karen McGee and Joan Lambreth, on different tanks
either in the presence of Godwin or Foreman Curtis
Putnam. Neither Rose nor Farnesworth had been repri-
manded for their involvement in any such conversations.
On one occasion, however, Rose testified that Godwin
had taken her by the arm and told her to do him a favor
and go back to her set. Rose also testified that once,
when talking to Godwin about Hepler sometime prior to
the union election, Godwin had said, "We have been
told that she is going to stay on her set, and we are
going to see that the bitch stays there."
Sandra Hollingsworth also credibly testified regarding
a conversation she had with Godwin about August 20
regarding people being written up for being off their
sets. Hollingsworth, referring to Hepler, told Godwin
that he had one person in a situation where she did not
know whether to go off her set to do teamwork or not,
and that if she did not do teamwork he would be on her
for that too. Hollingsworth added that that person did
not know "which way to go or what to do." Godwin
responded, according to Hollingsworth, "We want that
person to feel that way, and we have intentionally done
all of this to make her feel that way."
As further evidence of the Respondent's animosity
toward Hepler, Hepler testified that she had a conversa-
tion with Foreman John Jones in August. Jones told her,
so Hepler testified, that, since she was as active as she
was, she had better be very careful; that "they" would
get her if they could. In addition, she related that
Godwin had once told her after her writeup that "they
had to get stricter on us because that's the way things
are now."
The General Counsel contends that the reprimand of
Hepler constituted the imposition of more stringent
working rules on her and that the reprimand and the im-
position of more stringent rules was retaliatory to her
union activity and violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of
the Act. The Respondent contends that the reprimand of
Hepler was warranted, that it was not inconsistent with
its policies of reprimanding or writing up employees for
being out of their work areas, and that the writeup of
Hepler was not discriminatorily motivated.
The Respondent's witnesses, Michaels and Godwin, do
not dispute the basic facts which provided the basis for
Hepler's writeup as testified to by Hepler. However,
Godwin, contrary to Hepler's testimony, claimed that he
had told her at the time of the event that he was going
to write her up. Moreover, he stated that he had dis-
cussed the matter of writing Hepler up with Michaels
and Michaels had agreed, stating, "By all means."
Godwin denied the remarks attributed to him by Hepler
at the time of the writeup and at the time of the subse-
quent interview with Hepler on May 26 when Michaels
read the content of the writeup to her. Michaels' testimo-
ny generally corroborates that of Godwin.
Godwin denied the other remarks attributed to him by
Rose and Sandra Hollingsworth. Likewise, Foreman
John Jones denied that he ever told Hepler that the Re-
spondent was out to get her.
The Respondent also produced employee witnesses
Karen McGee, Joan Lambeth, and Annie King, who tes-
tified regarding the general rule that sliver handlers were
not to leave their tanks. Both McGee and Lambeth
denied they ever talked away from their tanks in the
presence of supervisors. Nevertheless, they testified that
as sliver handlers they had frequently left their positions
to talk to each other when they were on separate tanks.
According to Lambeth, "everybody" followed this prac-
tice but she further testified that it was not done when
any supervisors were around.
In its brief the Respondent correctly points out that
even Hepler admitted that she had been told many times
not to leave her set and that the general rule in this
regard was well known. The Respondent concedes that
its supervisors were not infallible, however, and that
there may have been occasions when employees bent the
rules and supervisors turned their heads. However, it
contends that it had not given up trying to enforce its
rules and it had not lost its right to do so. The Respond-
ent concludes that its motivation with respect to Hepler's
writeup was pure and its approach through Godwin and
Michaels to Hepler was always conciliatory and not per-
secutory. 6
I have previously found Hepler to be an unreliable
witness. However, I find it unnecessary to rely upon
Hepler's testimony in determining the issue of whether
her writeup was unlawful. This is because there is credi-
ble evidence that the Respondent had followed a permis-
sive approach to sliver handlers' leaving their positions
to go to talk to other handlers on adjacent tanks. The
testimony of Rose and Farnesworth clearly show that,
notwithstanding their involvement in conversations with
other employees outside their areas, they had not re-
ceived writeups. Furthermore, even according to Lam-
beth, presented by the Respondent, all the sliver handlers
at times went away from their tanks and engaged in talk-
ing. McGee's testimony was to the same effect. In view
of this rather widespread violation of the rules regarding
sliver handlers staying completely at their tanks, I think
it not unreasonable to infer, contrary to the testimony of
the Respondent's supervisors, that the Respondent was
aware that its rules were breached with some frequency.
This is not to say, and I do not conclude, that the Re-
spondent made no effort to enforce its rules, for it is
clear, even based on Rose's testimony, that it did. But its
efforts were neither concentrated nor consistent, and,
when enforcement of the rules was attempted, the Re-
spondent's actions, again as in Rose's case, were gentle.
Furthermore, the record is devoid of any other sliver
handlers except from Hepler who received writeups for
being out of position or away from their tanks.69 Under
these circumstances, and in the absence of some prior
sR While Hepler received another "writeup" on August 9, this time for
horseplay and a water fight, it was not alleged to be discriminatory or
violative of the Act.
69 Sandra Hollingsworth referred in her testimony to another sliver
handler. Debbie Waltzer, who had been written up in late August, but
the record is unclear whether Waltzer had received the writeup for being
out of position or away from her tank.
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. I1177
warning to Hepler that the Respondent intended to more
strictly apply its rules, it becomes clear that Hepler was
the object of disparate treatment.
In considering the motivation for Hepler's writeups.
one must note to begin with that the Respondent had al-
ready ascertained that Hepler was one of the "ringlead-
ers" among the union activists. With this designation
Hepler became a clear target for discrimination. Gos-
nell's credited testimony, supra, confirms that the Re-
spondent was not above singling out "ringleaders" for
disparate treatment. That there was an obvious effort to
set Hepler apart was shown by Sandra Hollingsworth's
credited testimony regarding Godwin's comment to the
effect that the Respondent's actions with respect to
Hepler had been intentional in order to create some con-
fusion on her part. Such confusion could only be expect-
/ ed, as I find the Respondent intended, to have an unset-
tling and restrictive effect upon Hepler which would
tend to interfere with her union ardor. While Hepler
could not expect immunity from discipline by virtue of
her union activity, she could expect equal application of
the Respondent's rules to all employees and the imposi-
tion of similar discipline to other employees violating the
rules. Finally, other evidence of clear hostility toward
Hepler is found in Rose's credited testimony that
Godwin told her he was going to see that Hepler (re-
ferred to by Godwin as "that bitch") stayed on her set.
Godwin's uncomplimentary reference to Hepler would
not likely have been provoked by a simple breach of the
Respondent's rules.
Considering the foregoing, and in view of the other
violations of the Act found herein, including similar dis-
criminatory conduct toward Parks, I find and conclude
that Hepler's writeup was discriminatorily motivated
within the meaning of the Act and that it therefore vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
i. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By unlawfully interfering with, restraining, and co-
ercing employees as found herein by threatening to cease
plant expansion plans because of their election of the
Union, by threatening employees with loss of jobs in the
event of their organization by the Union, by interrogat-
ing employees concerning their union activities, by solic-
iting employees to withdraw their union authorization
cards by soliciting grievances of employees and promis-
ing employees benefits to discourage their union support,
by threatening employees that it would refuse to negoti-
ate a union contract and would sell out, by threatening
employees with plant closure in the event they elected
the Union, by threatening employees with more onerous
working conditions because of their union support, by
more stringently enforcing work rules to discourage em-
ployees in their union support, by requiring that employ-
ees participate in employee interviews or meetings with-
out representation where such representation has been
requested by an employee and reasonable grounds exist
for a belief that the matters to be discussed at the meet-
ing may result in disciplinary action, and by actually im-
posing discipline at such a meeting, the Respondent en-
gaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By terminating employees Terri Drake on March
13, 1978, and Donna Black on August 29, 1978, and by
reprimanding, in writing, employees Velma Hepler on
May 8, 1978, and Timothy Parks on May 10, 1978, be-
cause of their activities on behalf of the Union, the Re-
spondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act by discharging Ronnie Bedsole.
7. The General Counsel has not established by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that the Respondent has violated
the Act as alleged in the complaint except to the extent
noted in paragraph 3 above.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it
cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirm-
ative action necessary to remedy the unfair labor prac-
tices and to effectuate the policies of the Act, including
the usual posting of an appropriate notice.
Having found that the Respondent unlawfully required
Hugh Smith to participate in an employee interview or
meeting without requested representation, and, pursuant
to such meeting, issued a written reprimand to Smith, I
shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to
revoke and expunge from its records the written repri-
mand given to Smith. Since I have found that the writ-
ten reprimands issued to Timothy Parks and Velma
Hepler were discriminatorily motivated in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, I shall recommend that the
Respondent be likewise ordered to revoke and expunge
from its records those written reprimands.
Since I have found that the Respondent terminated
Terri Drake in violation of the Act, I find it necessary to
order it to offer her immediate and full reinstatement
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and
privileges previously enjoyed, and make her whole for
any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of
her termination. Backpay with interest thereon is to be
computed in the manner prescribed in F. W Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corpo-
ration, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).70 1 take administrative
notice of the fact that Drake was also the object of dis-
crimination by another employer subsequent to her ter-
mination by the Respondent herein, and that, following a
hearing and Board decision in that case, the employer
there was ordered to offer employment to Drake and to
pay her backpay for the period of the discrimination.
70 See. generally, Isis Plumbing & Healing Co., 138 NLRB 716 1962)
The General Counsel in a supplemental brief aruges for a 9-percent inter-
est rate on the backpay So long as Florida Steel represents the Board's
policy with respect to applicable interest rates, however. I am obligated
to follow that policy
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 1 7
1178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Young Hinkle Corporation, 244 NLRB No. 45 (1979).
Any rights relative to the ascertainment of backpay due
Drake from the Respondent herein and Young Hinkle
Corporation may be resolved in compliance proceedings.
See N.L.R.B. v. Louisville Chair Company, Inc., 385 F.2d
922, 926 (6th Cir. 1967), enfg. 161 NLRB 358 (1966),
cert. denied 390 U.S. 1013 (1968).
I have also found that the Respondent unlawfully ter-
minated Donna Black and I shall recommend that she,
too, be reinstated without prejudice to her seniority and
other rights and privileges previously enjoyed. However,
because Black was physically unable to perform the job
which she held immediately prior to her termination and
since the physical condition which caused that inability
persisted at the time of the hearing herein, I shall recom-
mend that she be reinstated to a substantially equivalent
position for which she is physically able and otherwise
qualified.7 ' Backpay for Black shall be computed in the
same manner as for Drake.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 7 2
The Respondent, PPG Industries, Inc., Lexington
Plant, Fiber Glass Division, Lexington, North Carolina,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with cessation of plant ex-
pansion plans because of their selection of a union as a
collective-bargaining representative.
(b) Threatening employees with loss of jobs because of
their activities on behalf of any labor organization.
(c) Interrogating employees concerning their union ac-
tivities and desires.
(d) Threatening employees that it would refuse to ne-
gotiate a contract with a union and would sell out if they
select a union to represent them.
(e) Threatening employees with plant closure in the
event they elected a union.
(f) Threatening employees with more onerous working
conditions because of their union support.
(g) Unlawfully soliciting employees to withdraw their
union authorization cards.
(h) Soliciting grievances from employees and promis-
ing them benefits to discourage their union activities and
support.
(i) More stringently enforcing work rules to discour-
age employees in their union support.
1' Notwithstanding the Respondent's evaluations of the physical re-
quirements of the production service jobs, it was Black's testimony that
there was a number of such jobs in which she was qualified and which
she was physically able to do. However, the reinstatement order here
provided does not require the Respondent to keep Black on any produc-
tion service job if she proves unable to satisfactorily perform the work.
See The Dayton Tire 4 Rubber Company, a Division of the Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company, 227 NLRB 873 (1977).
72 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(j) Requiring that employees participate in employee
interviews or meetings without representation where
such representation has been requested and where em-
ployees have reasonable grounds to believe that the mat-
ters to be discussed at such meetings may result in disci-
plinary action, and actually imposing disciplinary action
at such meetings.
(k) Discharging, issuing written reprimands to, or oth-
erwise discriminating against any employee for support-
ing Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No.
391, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer,
ica, or any other labor organization.
(I) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Terri Drake immediate and full reinstatement
to her former job or, if her former job no longer exists,
to a substantially equivalent position, and offer to Donna
Black immediate reinstatement to a job substantially
equivalent to her former job and for which she is quali-
fied and physically able, the reinstatement with respect
to both Drake and Black to be without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them
whole for any loss of earnings or benefits they may have
suffered by reason of the discrimination against them as
set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Revoke and expunge from their personnel records
the written reprimands of Velma Hepler dated May 8,
1978, of William Timothy Parks dated May 10, 1978, and
of Hugh Smith dated October 18, 1978.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its Lexington, North Carolina, plant copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 3 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 11, after being duly signed by the Respond-
ent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi-
al.
73 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC. 1179
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not spe-
cifically found.