POWER, KEVIN M. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 7, 2019

13939406 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/939,406 07/11/2013 KEVIN M. POWER 27098.185931 5935
46169 7590 11/07/2019
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
(Cerner Corporation)
Intellectual Property Department
2555 GRAND BOULEVARD
KANSAS CITY, MO 64108-2613
EXAMINER
NAJARIAN, LENA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/07/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
BPARKERSON@SHB.COM
IPRCDKT@SHB.COM
docketing.shb@clarivate.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte KEVIN M. POWER, MARSHA LAIRD-MADDOX,
and SARA BOSWELL
________________

Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before BARBARA BENOIT, ROBERT WEINSCHENK, and
RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges.

CASS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1 and 5–8 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, which constitute all the claims pending in this Application. Appeal
Br. 7.2 Claims 9–14 have been cancelled and claims 15–20 have been
withdrawn. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant lists Cerner Innovation, Inc. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Brief filed January 30, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) 3.
2 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellant’s arguments in
their entirety, we refer to the above mentioned Appeal Brief, as well as the
following documents for their respective details: the Final Action mailed
August 31, 2017 (“Final Act.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed June 12,
2018 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed August 10, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

2
BACKGROUND
The present invention relates to integrated data capture of clinical
event data from electronic medical records (EMRs) to case report forms
associated with a clinical study. Spec. ¶ 1. According to the Specification,
the invention uses a generic aliasing scheme to facilitate electronic
transcription of clinical event data extracted from an EMR to clinical study
case report forms. Id. ¶ 3. The generic aliasing scheme can include a first
field for specifying a clinical event type or group, a second field for
specifying a particular item of clinical data within the clinical event group,
and a third field that specifies a suffix that describes how the clinical data
within the clinical event group is grouped after extraction from the EMR.
Id. The grouping may be based on, for example, the time and date when the
data was collected or whether a task was completed with respect to a data
element. Id. The groups may be presented to a user on a user interface, and
the user can select one or all of the groups to import to a case report form.
Id. Once a group is selected, it can be automatically imported to appropriate
fields on the case report form based on the aliasing scheme. Id.
The Specification provides an example of a generic aliasing scheme
for grouping clinical event data based on the time and date when the data
was collected and stored in the EMR as: “.DTTM.” Id. ¶¶ 36–37. Using this example, the aliasing scheme
“VS.SYSBP.DTTM” may be used where “VS” is an item group alias for
vital signs, “SYSBP” is an item alias for systolic blood pressure, and DTTM
is the suffix representing a timestamp indicating the date and time that the
systolic blood pressure measurement was taken. Id. ¶ 39. Using this
aliasing scheme, the patient’s systolic blood pressure readings and
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

3
associated time stamps can be extracted from the patient’s EMR, and those
readings that occurred on the same day and the same time can be grouped
together under the item group “vital signs.” Id.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claims at issue, and is reproduced below
with lowercase Roman numerals added at the beginning of each limitation to
allow it to be referred to more easily throughout this opinion:
1. One or more non-transitory computer storage media
having computer-executable instructions embodied thereon that,
when executed by a computing device, perform a method of
using a generic aliasing scheme to facilitate electronic
transcription of clinical event data extracted from one or more
electronic medical records (EMRs) within an EMR system to
one or more electronic case report forms associated with one or
more clinical studies, the method comprising:
[i] receiving inputs specifying the generic aliasing scheme
that defines a set of clinical event data stored in association
with the one or more EMRs and that describes one or more
ways to group the set of clinical event data, the generic aliasing
scheme comprising an item group alias that describes a clinical
event group to which the set of clinical event data belongs[,] an
item alias that describes an individual item of clinical event data
in the set of clinical event data[,] and a suffix that indicates one
or more ways to group clinical event data within the clinical
event group, the one or more ways to group comprising at least
one of a date and time associated with the clinical event data
and whether one or more tasks associated with the clinical event
data were completed;
[ii] automatically extracting the set of clinical event data
corresponding to the generic aliasing scheme from the one or
more EMRs;
[iii] automatically grouping the set of clinical event data
into one or more groups of clinical event data based on the
suffix of the generic aliasing scheme;
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

4
[iv] automatically presenting the one or more groups of
clinical event data on a user interface;
[v] receiving a selection of a selected group, wherein the
selected group is at least one of the one or more groups of
clinical event data; and
[vi] automatically modifying the one or more electronic
case report forms by importing the clinical event data of the
selected group into one or more fields on the one or more
electronic case report forms that correspond to one or more of
the item group alias and the item alias.
Response to Notice of Non-Compliant Appeal Br. Filed February 22, 2018
(“Response to Notice”) 5–6 (Claims Appendix).
PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELATING TO PATENT ELIGIBILITY
I. SECTION 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and
Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

5
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

6
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept” sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
II. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) recently
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO,
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”). Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look
to whether the claim recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

7
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

ANALYSIS
I. THE SECTION 101 REJECTION
A. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellants’ Contentions
In the Final Office Action, the Examiner rejects claims 1 and 5–8
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act.
3. The Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of
“using categories to organize, store and transmit information.” Id. at 2–3;
Ans. 4. The Examiner further determines that the claims do not include
additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. Id. at 4. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the additional
computer-related limitations including a non-transitory computer-storage
media, a computing device, and a record system, are recited at a high level
of generality and perform generic computer functions routinely used in
computer applications. Id. Finally, the Examiner determines that looking at
the limitations as an ordered combination adds noting that is not already
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

8
present when looked at the elements taken individually, and there is no
indication that the combination improves the functioning of a computer or
improves any other technology. Id. Rather, according to the Examiner, the
collective functions in the claims merely provide conventional computer
implementation. Id.
Appellant argues, inter alia, that claim 1 is not abstract under Alice
Step 1. Appeal Br. 8–11; Reply Br. 4–5. Appellant further argues that
under Alice Step 2, the Examiner has not established that the claimed
features that go beyond the abstract idea are well-understood, routine, and
conventional, and that the claims address technological problems associated
with integrated data capture for electronic transcription of clinical data from
EMRs. Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply Br. 6–7.

B. Analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance
Under Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first must
determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the
claim. The 2019 Guidance identifies three judicially excepted groupings:
(1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices, and (3) mental processes. 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–53. Based on existing Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit precedent, the 2019 Guidance has identified “mental
processes” as including “concepts performed in the human mind (including
an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Id. at 53. The “mental
processes” judicial exception also includes concepts that can be performed
by a human with a pen and paper as well as those that can be performed
entirely in the mind. See October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

9
(“October 2019 PEG Update”) at 9 (“a claim that encompasses a human
performing the step(s) mentally with the aid of a pen and paper recites a
mental process”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d
1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims to be patent ineligible because
‘‘with the exception of generic computer implemented steps, there is nothing
in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a
human, mentally or with pen and paper’’).
Here, claim 1 recites various steps involving the grouping of
information and transfer of information from one record to another that can
be performed in the human mind or by a human using pen and paper. More
specifically, claim 1, limitation [i] recites
receiving inputs specifying the generic aliasing scheme that
defines a set of clinical event data stored in association with the
one or more EMRs and that describes one or more ways to
group the set of clinical event data, the generic aliasing scheme
comprising an item group alias that describes a clinical event
group to which the set of clinical event data belongs[,] an item
alias that describes an individual item of clinical event data in
the set of clinical event data[,] and a suffix that indicates one or
more ways to group clinical event data within the clinical event
group, the one or more ways to group comprising at least one of
a date and time associated with the clinical event data and
whether one or more tasks associated with the clinical event
data were completed
This step can be performed by giving a human a piece of paper that
defines a generic aliasing scheme with an item group alias, an item alias, and
a suffix as claimed. For example, a human could receive a piece of paper
defining the generic aliasing scheme as one that will organize data by
clinical event group (such as vital signs) and item (such as systolic blood
pressure). Each entry on the piece of paper could also have a suffix in the
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

10
form of an indication at the end of the data item indicating the date and time
at which it was collected. This suffix would allow the person receiving the
paper to group the information based on the date and time of collection, such
as grouping together all measurements taken on the same date.
Claim 1, limitation [ii] recites the step of “extracting the set of clinical
event data corresponding to the generic aliasing scheme from the one or
more EMRs.” This step can be performed by a human who reviews a
medical record (on a computer screen, a printout, or some other format) and
records information corresponding to the categories defined by the aliasing
scheme (e.g., systolic blood pressure measurements along with the date and
time they were recorded) on a piece of paper using a pen.
Claim 1, limitation [iii] recites the step of “grouping the set of clinical
event data into one or more groups of clinical event data based on the suffix
of the generic aliasing scheme.” A human can perform this step by looking
at the date and time information for each patient measurement read off of the
patient’s medical record and writing on a piece of paper all of the
measurements taken on the same day in a group under a heading containing
that date.
Claim 1, limitation [iv] recites “presenting the one or more groups of
clinical event data.” This step can be performed by a human by reading off
of a piece of paper patient measurements for different vital signs that were
all recorded on the same day.
Claim 1, limitation [v] recites “receiving a selection of a selected
group, wherein the selected group is at least one of the one or more groups
of clinical event data.” This step could be performed having a human
communicate with another human (for example, verbally or by written
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

11
communication) who has identified a particular group of vital signs that
should be captured for a clinical trial.
Claim 1, limitation [vi] recites “modifying the one or more electronic
case report forms by importing the clinical event data of the selected group
into one or more fields on the one or more . . . case report forms that
correspond to one or more of the item group alias and the item alias.” This
step can be performed by a human by taking the information on the selected
vital signs (along with date and time of collection) and entering that into
fields of a case report form.
For these reasons, we are persuaded that claim 1 recites a judicial
exception to patent eligibility, namely, claim 1 recites a judicial exception
that falls within the mental processes category.
C. Analysis under Step 2A, Prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance
Having concluded that the claims recite a judicial exception, we next
consider whether the claims recite “additional elements that integrate the
[judicial] exception into a practical application.” See 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54; MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We determine that
claim 1 does not do so.
In addition to the mental steps discussed above, claim 1 also includes
limitations that recite the performance of these steps on a generic computer
using generic software. More specifically, claim 1 recites “[o]ne or more
non-transitory computer storage media having computer-executable
instructions embodied thereon.” Claim 1 further recites that the
“extracting,” “grouping,” “presenting,” and “modifying” steps in limitations
[ii]–[iv] and [vi] are performed “automatically,” presumably by a computer.
Additionally, claim 1 recites that the groups of clinical event data are
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

12
presented “on a user interface.” We agree with the Examiner that these
limitations all recite generic computer components recited as performing
generic computer functions. See Final Act. 4.
The Examiner’s determination is supported by Appellant’s
Specification, which discloses the use of generic computer hardware and
software for implementing the claimed invention. As to computer hardware,
the Specification explains that the invention can be implemented using
“well-known computing systems, environments and/or configurations” such
as “personal computers, server computers, hand-held or laptop devices,
multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set top boxes,
programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers,
mainframe computers, distributed computing environments that include any
of the above-mentioned systems or devices, and the like.” Spec. ¶ 12.
Similarly, the Specification discloses that the functions recited in claim 1
may be carried out using generic software, explaining that “[t]he present
invention might be described in the general context of computer-executable
instructions, such as program modules, being executed by a computer” and
that “[e]xemplary program modules comprise routines, programs, objects,
components, and data structures that perform particular tasks or implement
particular abstract data types.” Id. ¶ 13.
The 2019 Guidance explains that “[i]f a claim, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation, covers performing in the mind but for the
recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental
processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the
mind.” Id. at 53 n. 14. See also October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility (“October 2019 PEG Update”) at 8 (“The courts have found
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

13
claims requiring a generic computer or nominally reciting a generic
computer may still recite a mental process even though the claim limitations
are not performed entirely in the human mind.”). Federal Circuit precedent
is in accord. See Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811
F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that computer-implemented
method for “anonymous loan shopping” was an abstract idea because it
could be “performed by humans without a computer”); Versata Dev. Grp. v.
SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have
examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the incidental use of
“computer” or “computer readable medium” does not make a claim
otherwise directed to process that “can be performed in the human mind, or
by a human using a pen and paper” patent eligible).
Additionally, the generic computer limitations in claim 1 are not
directed toward an improvement in the functioning of the computer itself.
See October 2019 PEG Update at 11 (“If the additional limitations reflect an
improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to
another technology or technical field, the claim integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application and thus imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception.”) These generic computer limitations merely
automate steps that can be performed in the human mind or using pen and
paper (creating a scheme for grouping information, using this scheme to
extract information from medical records, selecting portions of the extracted
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

14
information, and adding those selected portions to a case report form), and
do not involve improvements in how the computer itself operates.
For these reasons, claim 1 is not analogous to the claim at issue in
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016), upon
which Appellant relies. See Reply Br. 5. In Enfish, the claimed “self-
referential table” was “a specific type of data structure designed to improve
the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory” which was “a
specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Thus, the claims were “directed to an improvement in the functioning of a
computer.” Id. at 1338. Here, by contrast, claim 1 is directed to creating a
scheme for grouping information, using this scheme to extract information
from medical records, and selecting portions of the extracted information,
and adding those selected portions to a case report form, which can all be
performed in the human mind or using pen and paper and therefore are not
directed specifically toward improving the functioning of a computer.
Moreover, the use of generic computer equipment to automate the claimed
mental steps is not comparable to the “specific type of data structure
designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in
memory” at issue in Enfish. 822 F.3d at 1339.
Consequently, the additional limitations in claim 1 beyond the judicial
exception do not serve to integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.
D. Analysis under Step 2B
Under Step 2B, we consider whether claim 1 includes additional
elements individually or in combination that provide an inventive concept
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

15
and, therefore, amount to significantly more than the exception itself. Here,
Appellant has not established that claim 1 includes any such “inventive
concept,” or that claim 1 adds limitations beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, or conventional” in the field. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(d).
Appellant argues that claim 1 includes an “inventive concept” because
it is “directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the
software arts.” Reply Br. 5. Specifically, Appellant argues that claim 1
“address[es] technological problems associated with integrated data capture
used to electronically transcribe clinical event data to EMRs to case report
forms associated with clinical studies,” and that such problems included the
need to “creat[e] custom programs to perform the data capture for a
particular study because only a limited number of discrete data elements
could be pulled from more generic programs.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant
argues that claim 1 “provide[s] a solution to this problem by utilizing a
generic aliasing scheme that can be applied across multiple different clinical
studies, thereby eliminating the need to build custom software on an as-
needed basis.” Id.
We do not find this argument persuasive. The claims explain that the
“generic aliasing scheme” “defines a set of clinical event data stored in
association with the one or more EMRs” and “describes one or more ways to
group the set of clinical event data.” However, as discussed above, because
this “generic aliasing scheme” can be implemented in the human mind or by
a human with pen and paper, it is part of the judicial exception itself. The
fact that this generic aliasing scheme can be used for multiple different
clinical studies does not alter this fact. And, the claims do not include
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

16
specific technological limitations (beyond the claimed mental process steps)
that distinguish the invention from prior systems using custom programs to
perform the data capture for a particular study. To the contrary, the
computer-related limitations of claim 1 merely recite the use of generic
computer equipment to automate the claimed mental process, and do not
reflect an improvement in the functioning of the computer itself. Therefore,
these limitations do not recite an inventive concept that amounts to
significantly more than the judicial exception itself.
Appellant also argues that “the claimed features, by themselves and in
combination, were unconventional and not widely known in the industry at
the time this application was filed.” Reply Br. 7. For example, Appellant
asserts that “it was unconventional for a tool for case report forms at least to
receive inputs specifying a generic aliasing scheme as defined in claim 1, to
extract data according to the scheme, or group data based on the suffix of the
generic aliasing scheme.” Id. As discussed above, however, specifying a
generic aliasing scheme, extracting information according to that scheme,
and grouping data based on the suffix of that scheme are part of the judicial
exception because they are mental processes that can be performed in the
human mind or by a human with pen and paper. And, the computer “tools”
recited in the claim for performing these steps (“non-transitory computer
storage media,” “computer-executable instructions,” “automatically”
performing steps, and a “user interface”) are well-understood, routine, and
conventional, and Appellant does not argue otherwise. Spec. ¶¶ 12–13. See
also Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (whether
a claim element is well-understood, routine and conventional is a question of
fact). As a result, Appellant has not persuaded us that claim 1 includes any
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

17
limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood,
routine, or conventional” in the field.
In summary, Appellant has not established that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. We
therefore sustain this rejection, as well as the rejection of claims 5–8, which
are not argued separately.

II. THE SECTION 103 REJECTION
In the Final Office Action, the Examiner rejected claim 1 as
unpatentable over Larrea (US 2003/0208490 A1; published Nov. 6, 2003) in
view of Davies (US 2003/0046114 A1; published Mar. 6, 2003), Andersson
(US 2002/0187496 A1; published Dec. 12, 2002) and Arond (US
2007/0239484 A1; published Oct. 11, 2007). Final Act. 6. The Examiner
determines that Larrea discloses, inter alia, a method of using a generic
aliasing scheme to facilitate electronic transcription of clinical event data
extracted from one or more EMRs to one or more electronic case report
forms associated with one or more clinical studies, in which the generic
aliasing scheme uses an item group alias that describes a clinical event group
to which the set of clinical event data belongs and an item alias that
describes an individual item of clinical event data in the set of clinical event
data. Id. at 6.
The Examiner relies on Davies to disclose automatically extracting
the clinical event data according to the generic aliasing scheme from the one
or more EMRs, automatically grouping the set of clinical event data into one
or more groups based on the generic aliasing scheme, and receiving a
selection of a group of clinical event data. Id. at 6–7. The Examiner relies
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

18
on Andersson to disclose automatically modifying the case report forms by
importing the clinical event data of the selected group into fields on the
electronic case report forms corresponding to one or more of the item group
alias and the item alias. Id. at 7. And, the Examiner relies on Arond to
disclose a suffix (in the form of “.dttm”) that allows clinical event data to be
grouped based on a date and time associated with the clinical event, and
automatically grouping data based on the suffix. Id. at 7. The Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to combine these references to
achieve the claimed invention because one of ordinary skill would have been
motivated “to automate the clinical documentation process and unlock the
clinical and economic value of patient medical records” (as taught by
Davies) to provide genetic research information to a user” (as taught by
Andersson), to “provide on-demand historical, real-time, and predictive
reports, alerts and recommendations” (as taught by Arond). Id. at 7–8.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in concluding that Arond
teaches the claimed suffix. Appeal Br. 18–19. Appellant acknowledges that
Arond describes an integrated health care delivery system in which data can
be input and output with a “dttm” timestamp indicator at the end of the data
item. Id. at 19 (citing Arond ¶¶ 60, 61, 97, and 213 (Table 3.3), 215 (Table
3.5), 218 (Table 3.8); Figs. 6, 10). Appellant also admits that Arond
discloses having a user enter a particular date range when searching for data
for a report. Id. Appellant, however, contends that “nothing in Arond
suggests that the ‘.dttm’, as used in the disclosed system, indicates a way to
group clinical event data within the clinical event group,” and that “Arond
does not describe using date/time as part of an aliasing scheme for grouping
and extracting data.” Id. Therefore, Appellant argues, Arond fails to cure
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

19
the deficiencies of the other references, which lack this limitation. Id. at 19–
20.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner’s rejection is in error. As
Appellant acknowledges, Arond discloses the use of data with “_Dttm” at
the end to indicate data and time. See Arond ¶¶ 60, 61, 97, 213 (Table 3.3),
215 (Table 3.5), 218 (Table 3.8); Figs. 6, 10. For example, Figure 6 includes
the data items “PatientReady_Dttm,” “NeedsAttention_Dttm,” and
“Action_Dttm.” Id., Fig. 6. Because the “_Dttm” indicator comes at the end
of the data item, it is a “suffix” under the broadest reasonable interpretation
of that term in claim 1. Thus, Arond discloses a suffix that indicates a date
and time associated with the data, as claimed.
Arond also discloses the capability of grouping together data in a
report by date and time. Paragraph 151 of Arond discloses that the user can
“enter[] a date range for the report” and then “select[] how the report is
stratified (by date, day of week, time, or Unit).” Arond ¶ 151. We agree
with the Examiner that, based on this discussion, a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have understood Arond to disclose grouping of data by date
and time based on the “-Dttm” suffix, and that the Examiner correctly relied
on Arond for the suffix limitations in claim 1. See Final Act. 7; Ans. 5.
To the extent Appellant is arguing that Arond does not describe using
data/time as part of an “aliasing scheme” for clinical event data (Appeal Br.
19), such an argument would not be persuasive because the Examiner is
relying on Larrea rather than Arond for the disclosure of an aliasing scheme
using clinical event data (Final Act. 5–6). Therefore, such an argument
would not meet the substance of the Examiner’s rejection, which is based on
a combination of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
Appeal 2018-008263
Application 13/939,406

20
1981) (one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references
individually when the rejection is based on a combination of references).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
Section 103. We also sustain the Section 103 rejection of claims 5–8, which
are not separately argued.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 5–8 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter and under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 5–8 101 Eligibility 1, 5–8
1, 5–8 103 Larrea, Davies,
Andersson, Arond
1, 5–8
Overall
Outcome
1, 5–8

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED