Porto Mills, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 9, 1964

149 N.L.R.B. 1454 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

1454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Porto Mills , Inc.' and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Amer
ica, AFL-CIO
Comite Pro -Defensa de los Trabajadores de Porto Mills 2 and
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL -CIO. Cases
Nos. 24-CA-1733, 24-CA-1749, 24-CA-17992, 24-CA-1818, and,
24-CB-469. December 9, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 16, 1964, Trial Examiner Samuel M. Singer issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent
Comite had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner also found that Respond-
ent Comite had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices,
and found that Respondent Company had not engaged in the unfair
labor practices complained of, and recommended that the allegations
of the complaint pertaining thereto be dismissed. Thereafter, excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs were
filed by the General Counsel and Respondent Comite, and cross-
exceptions to certain of the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions,
and rulings and a supporting brief were filed by Respondent
Company.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
these cases to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Leedom and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs, and
the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, con-
clusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the fol-
lowing modifications.
The Trial Examiner finds, and we agree, that the antiunion
employees and their organization, the Comite, demanded that
Respondent Company discharge fellow employee Luz Maria Rios,
and that their reason for such demand was due to Rios' activities on
behalf of the Union. However, we take issue with our dissenting
colleague's conclusion that "By requiring Rios to take a week off,
1 Herein called the Company.
2 Herein called the Comite.
149 NLRB No. 122.
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1455
albeit with pay, the Employer acceded to the unlawful demand of
the antiunion employees and their organization." We are satisfied
that the record demonstrates that the Employer actually refused to,
accede to such demand.
When Plant Manager Jose Martinez arrived at the plant on June 21,
1963, he was confronted with a situation which demanded imme-
diate action. Approximately 270 of 300 employees were milling about
angrily outside the plant, refusing to go to work unless and until the
Company should discharge Rios. After conferring by phone with
Jose Santisteban,' the Company's general manager, who in turn
sought the advice of Henry G. Friedlander, counsel to the parent
company (B.V.D.), it was decided that, in view of the tone of the
angry crowd, it would be best for the Company to wait until the.
antiunion employees had calmed down before talking to them and
trying to convince them to return and work with Rios. In order to
effectuate this, and in order to protect Rios from possible harm,3
Martinez called Rios to him and requested that she take a week off
with pay. Martinez at that time carefully explained to Rios the-
reasons (above set forth) for the request, and assured her that she
could return to her job at the end of the week. It was only after
she refused to accede to the Employer's request, despite the com-
pelling reasons which supported its reasonableness, that Martinez
informed her he was forced to suspend her indefinitely.
We cannot agree with our dissenting colleague that, in the peculiar
circumstances set forth above, the Company can be said to have
acceded to the unlawful demand of the antiunion employees by
requiring Rios to take a week off. In point of fact, the Company
refused to accede to the demand for her discharge. It assured Rios
that she was entitled to, and would continue in, her job. It explained
to her carefully that its request was for the purpose of protecting her
physical well-being, and further to afford it the best chance to
appease the angry employees outside and to instruct them as to Rios'
right to her job in an atmosphere conducive to peaceful acceptance
of such instruction.
In view of these facts, and the entire record, we find, in agreement
with the Trial Examiner, that the Company's termination of Rios
was predicated, not upon the demands of the antiunion employees
and the Comite, but rather upon Rios' refusal to cooperate in the
Company's efforts to resolve the serious dispute between the parties
in the only way which seemed feasible, and that such discharge there-
fore did not run afoul of the statute.
8 Rios had already, on one occasion , been physically assaulted by a fellow employee
outside the plant.
1456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
THE REMEDY
We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that Respondent Com-
pany terminated employee Rios because she would not accept the
reasonable compromise offer it extended to her, and with his conclu-
sion that it did not therefore violate Section 8(a) (3) or (1) of the
Act. We also agree with his conclusion that Respondent Comite vio-
lated Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) by attempting to cause the Com-
pany to discharge Rios discriminatorily.
In view of this finding against Respondent Comite, and because
employees have a basic right under the Act to be free from the coer-
cive effect of such pressure as Respondent Comite herein brought to
bear upon the Company, we shall expand the Recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner, and shall order that Respondent Comite also
notify the Company, in writing, sending a copy to Luz Maria Rios,
that Respondent Comite has no objection to the Company's reinstate-
ment of Rios and that Respondent Comite requests that the Company
reinstate her. The notice shall also be amended to accord with our
Order.4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts, as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner with the following addition, and
orders that Respondent, Comite Pro-Defensa de los Trabajadores de
Porto Mills, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order with
the following modifications :
"(b) Notify the Company, Porto Mills, Inc., in writing, sending a
copy to Luz Maria Rios, that Respondent has no objection to the
Company's reinstatement of Rios to her former or substantially
equivalent job at the Company's Utuado plant and that Respondent
requests that the Company reinstate her." 5
4 The notice to all members of the Comite , which is attached to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and marked "Appendix ," is hereby amended by deleting the second paragraph
thereof, which begins "WE WILL NOT restrain ," and substituting therefor the following
paragraph:
WE WILL NOT In any other manner restrain or coerce employees of Porto Mills,
Inc., in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act , except
to the extent permitted by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as.
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
It is hereby further amended by adding thereto the following paragraph:
WE WILL notify the Company , Porto Mills , Inc, in writing, sending a copy to
Luz Maria Rios, that we have no objection to the Company 's reinstatement of Rios
to her former or substantially equivalent job at the Company's Utuado plant, a_nd
that we request that the Company reinstate her.
It is further amended to provide that said notice may be published in Spanish in a
Spanish newspaper.
6 Paragraphs 2(b), (c), and ( d) shall be redesignated 2(c), (d), and ( e), respectively.
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1457
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting in part :
Contrary to my colleagues, I would find the discharge of Rios to be
a violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
It is patently clear from the record in this case that the Respond-
ent Employer's compromise offer of a week off with pay was made to
Rios in an effort to appease the antiunion employees who refused
to work as long as Rios remained on the job. It is equally clear that
the employees objected to working with Rios because of her activities
on behalf of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO.
By requiring Rios to take a week off, albeit with pay, the Employer
acceded to the unlawful demand of the antiunion employees and their
organization, and thereby discriminated against Rios because of her
activities on behalf of the Union.
It is well settled that the statute imposes a duty upon an employer
to resist all demands that it discriminate against employees because
of union membership or sympathies or the lack thereof." Mindful as
I am of the difficulties confronting the Employer in this case, its duty
was nonetheless clear. As the court stated in Goodyear Tire c Rub-
ber Company, supra:
Difficult as an Employer's position may be under such circum-
stances, its duty is plain. The statute prohibits discrimination
against persons on account of their membership or activities on
behalf of unions. It specifically prohibits the discharge of
employees for the purpose and with the effect of discouraging
membership in a union.... It [is] its duty to resist such violent
domination of its right and power to employ, whether mani-
fested by or toward [the Union]. . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
I do not agree with the Trial Examiner's finding, adopted by my
colleagues, that the discharge of Rios, after she rejected the com-
promise offer, did not violate Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. Indeed, I
find that the Employer failed to satisfy its statutory responsibility
when it made the compromise offer to Rios, and her subsequent dis-
charge further compounded this violation. The Act prohibits unfair
labor practices in all cases. It does not permit "immunity because the
Employer may think the exigencies of the moment require infraction
of the Statute." N.L.R.B. v. Star Publishing Co., supra. To char-
acterize the Employer's offer as a "reasonable compromise" is to
ignore its genesis. The majority finds, as it must, that the .Comite
violated the Act by attempting to cause the Employer to discharge
Rios discriminatorily. Therefore, to regard the compromise, a direct
result of this unlawful activity, as a basis for depriving Rios of her
BN.L.R B. v. Star Publishing Co , 97 F. 2d 465, 470 (C A. 9) ; N L.R B. v Goodyear Tire
Rubber Company, 129 F 2d 661, 664 (C.A. 5). See also Altamont Shirt Corporation,
131 NLRB 112,; Brewton Fashions, Inc, A Division of Judy Bond, 145 NLRB 99.
770-076-65-vol. 149=93
1458 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employment and of her statutory right to support the Union is to
allow illegal conduct to achieve its goal when backed by sufficient dis-
order and threat of force.
Nor was the Employer relieved of its statutory obligation simply
because it was motivated by a desire to get the employees to resume
production. Such motivation, one of the stock arguments advanced
to explain away discriminatory acts, has been conclusively held not
to justify or eliminate the discrimination. N.L.R.B. v. Erie Resistor
Corp., et al., 373 U.S. 221, 228. 'In the circumstances of this case, I
find that the Employer's conduct inherently discouraged union mem-
bership and activities and, as such, is clearly prohibited by the Act.
The Radio 0 goers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union,
AFL (A. H. Bull Steamship Company) v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 45.
Moreover, to require Rios to cooperate with the Employer by
accepting the compromise would, in my judgment, enable the
Employer to benefit from its own unlawful conduct? The failure to,
award backpay allows this wrong, which my colleagues concede
exists as evidenced by the scope of their Remedy and Order, to remain
unremedied. Further, such failure allows the Employer to enjoy
the results of dissipation of the Union's support, and allows the
illegal conduct of the Comite and its supporters to achieve their ends,
at least in part.
For these reasons, I would find Rios to have been discharged in
violation of Section 8(a) (3), and would award her backpay in addi-
tion to the remedy given by my colleagues.
4 Brown Transport Corp , 140 NLRB 954, 958 ; Storack Corporation , 147 NLRB 493.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges and amended charges filed on various dates between February 26 and
September 18, 1963, by Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union, General Counsel on September 19, 1963, issued an amended
consolidated complaint alleging that Porto Mills, Inc., herein called the Company,
violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act by engaging in certain acts of interference,
restraint, and coercion, and by discharging one of its employees, Luz Maria Rios; and
that Comite Pro-Defensa de los Trabajadores de Porto Mills, herein called the Comite,
has violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1) (A) of the Act by attempting to cause and
causing the Company to discharge Rios discriminatorily.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Samuel M. Singer in
Santurce, Puerto Rico, on various dates between September 30 and December 4, 1963.
All parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to be heard and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses. Briefs have been received from General Counsel, the
Company, and the Comite.
Upon the entire record in the case, the briefs, and my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Respondent Company is a Delaware corporation, wholly owned by the B.V.D.
Company, Inc., of New York. It maintains plants in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, including one at Utuado (the sole plant here involved ), where it is engaged in
the manufacture and sale of men 's and boys ' underwear . During the past 12 months.
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1459
a representative period, the Company received at its plants in Utuado and Arecibo
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000, from points outside the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico. During the same period the Company shipped its finished
products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the Commonwealth.
I find that at all material times Respondent Company has been and is engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of the Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, and I find, that Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The complaint alleges, but Respondents deny, that the Comite Pro-Defensa de los
Trabajadores de Porto Mills is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act. For reasons hereafter stated, I find that the Comite is a labor organization
within the meaning of that section.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Sequence of events; the settlement agreement; the issues involved
Early in February 1963 1 the Union began an organizational campaign among the
Company's employees. Shortly thereafter, on February 26 and March 20, the Union
filed its original charges in Cases Nos. 24-CA-1733 and 24-CA-1749, alleging,
respectively, that the Company had engaged in acts of restraint and coercion in vio-
lation of Section 8(a) (1), and that it had discriminatorily discharged Luz Maria Rios
for union activity in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. On April 19 the Com-
pany and the Union entered into a settlement agreement, approved by the Regional
Director issued a consolidated complaint setting foith the Company's alleged pre-
to reinstate Rios and not to engage in acts of interference, restraint, and coercion.
The Regional Director reserved the right to cancel the agreement in the event of
breach by the Company On April 22 in compliance with the agreement, the Company
offered reinstatement to Rios and posted required notices. Rios reported to work on
April 29.
On July 1, the Union filed the original charge in Case No. 24-CA-1792, alleging
that, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1), the Company terminated the employ-
ment of Rios at the insistence of the Comite, an antiunion organization. On the
same day the Union filed the original charge in Case No. 24-CB-469, alleging that
the Comite unlawfully caused the discharge of Rios in violation of Section 8(b)(2)
and (1) (A) of the Act. By letter dated August 2 the Regional Director notified the
Company that he was canceling the April 29 settlement agreement and reinstating the
charges in Cases Nos. 24-CA-1733 and 24-CA-1749 because the Company, in vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1), had failed to "protect the reinstatement" and
terminated the employment of Rios on June 21. On August 16 the Regional
Director issued a consolidated complaint setting forth the Company's alleged pre-
settlement violations and unlawful discharge of Rios on June 21, and the Comite's
alleged unlawful action in causing that discharge. On September 19, the complaint
was amended to include additional Section 8(a)(1) violations by the Company
after the settlement agreement.
The amended consolidated complaint alleges that the Company, through its
supervisors, violated Section 8 (a) (1) by acts of interrogation, threats, polling, and
surveillance both prior and subsequent to the settlement agreement; and that it
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discriminatorily discharging Rios both on
March 18 and on June 21. The complaint alleges that the Comite, through a strike
and other conduct, attempted to cause and caused the discharge of Rios on June 21
because of her union membership and activities thereby violating Section 8(b) (2)
and (1)(A). In its answer the Comite (a) denied that it is a labor organization
and within the reach of Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A); and (b) denied that it caused
the discharge of Rios because of her union affiliation or activities. In its answer
the Company admitted that it discharged Rios on March 18 and June 21, but
claimed that Rios' union membership played no role in those actions. The Com-
pany further alleged that it had not engaged in the Section 8(a)(1) conduct
attributed to it and, that in any event, most of the individuals who allegedly
engaged in such conduct were not its supervisors
In accordance with the Board's well-settled practice, I first turn to consideration of
the Company's postsettlement conduct. The Board, with judicial approval, has
'Unless otherwise Indicated, all date references are to 1963.
1460 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL L!BOR RELATIONS BOARD
repeatedly held that unfair labor practice findings regarding presettlement conduct
may properly be made only where there is evidence of substantial unlawful conduct
following the settlement agreement, "or unless the alleged unfair labor practices have
been continued in such a way that it seems necessary for the Board to go behind its
agreement in order to effectuate the policies of the Act." Wooster Brass Company,
80 NLRB 1633, 1634.2 This procedure comports with the statutory objective of
fostering and promoting industrial peace through voluntary settlement of disputes.
Superior Tool & Die Co., 132 NLRB 1373, 1397, reversed on other grounds 309 F.
2d 692 (C.A. 6).3
B. The alleged discriminatory discharge of Rios on June 21
in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act 4
1. Background; Rios' union activities and her two discharges
Luz Maria Rios began work as a machine operator in April 1961. She signed a
union card at the beginning of February 1963, and thereafter attended union meetings,
furnished names of employees to the Union's paid organizers, and accompanied
these organizers to employees' homes. Union organizers frequently stayed overnight
at Rios' home in Utuado because the Union's headquarters are in Santurce, several
hours driving distance from the Utuado plant. Rios was one of the 16 employees
comprising the Union's organizing committee
It is clear, and I find, that the Company had opposed the unionization of the plant
at the outset of the organizational drive. It frankly conceded at the hearing that it had
knowledge of Rios' union sympathies and some of her union activities. Gloria
Jordan, a company supervisor, was in a group of antiunion employees who parked
their cars outside Rios' home the night of February 21 and beamed an antiunion talk
over a loudspeaker at Rios and two paid union organizers visiting her.5 The next
morning, February 22, one of these antiunion employees, Juana Maldonado, accosted
Rios outside the plant. After accusing her of being a union leader, she engaged her
physically in a fight. The encounter, apparently in full view of the office, was wit-
nessed by at least one supervisor, Jordan.
As already noted, Rios was first discharged on March 18. According to the Union,
the Company's action was motivated-by Rios' union activities but according to the
Company, by chronic absenteeism. Pursuant to the settlement agreement of April 29,
already referred to, Rios was offered reinstatement and returned to work April 29.
Some time after her return she remained away from work, allegedly because of illness.
Upon receiving word from Rios that the "state of [her] health is satisfactory," the
Company requested her to come back to work on June 19. Rios reported on June 20
but the next day she was discharged under circumstances hereafter related in detail.
2. The activities of the antiunion employees and the Comite
Prior to Rios' return to the plant some antiunion employees organized two comites-
one headed by employee Demetrio Nadal (known as Comite Pro-Demandas) and
another headed by employee Gladys Negroni (known as Comite pro Defensa Traba-
jadores de Porto Mills, meaning Committee for the Defense of Porto Mills Workers).
2 See also The Wallace Corporation v NI, R B , 323 U.S. 248, 253-255 ; Baltimore
Luggage Company, 126 NLRB 1204, 1208, Larrance Tank Corporation, 94 NLRB 352,
353; Jackson Manufacturing Company, 129 NLRB 460: Lincoln Bearing Company, 133•
NLRB 1069, 1073-1074, enfd in this respect 311 F 2d 48 (CA 6) . Tompkins Motor
Lines, Inc, 142 NLRB 1; Radiator Specialty Coin pang, 143 NLRB 350.
3 Evidence relating to certain events in the presettlement period (such as those bear-
ing on the work history of Rios, her union activities and the Company's knowledge
thereof, and the supervisory status of various individuals) were offered by General
Counsel and received for background purposes to "shed light on the true character of
matters" here in issue (Local Lodge No. 14211, International Association of Machinists,
AFL-CIO (Bryan Manufacturing Co ) v NLR 13, 362 U S 411, 416).
4 The findings in this and in succeeding sections are in large part based on undisputed
and documentary evidence In those instances where it was necessary to resolve a con-
flict in testimony, I did so on the basis of what appeared to me to be more consistent with
the inherent probabilities of the situation, as well as the comparative demeanor of the
witnesses
i The Company contests the supervisory status of Jordan but, for reasons stated be-
low, I reject this contention. There is a sharp conflict in the testimony as to whether
two admitted supervisors, General Forelady Quinones and Plant Manager Martinez, were
also in the group observing Rios' home In view of the disposition of the issues herein,
I do not find it necessary to resolve this conflict
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1461
Theseacomites apparently merged into one at the end of May, assuming the name of
Respondent Comite, with Nadal and Negroni as codirectors or copresidents. The
comites, fearing that the advent of the Union might lead to removal of the plant,
joined forces with a local industrial committee whose avowed purpose was to interest
businessmen in setting up factories in the town. There is no evidence, or even claim,
that the Company in any way instigated, promoted, or played any role in the forma-
tion , operation, or administration of these organizations.6
Respondent Comite, or one of its predecessors, distributed three handbills during the
period here involved. One of the first leaflets (addressed to the workers of the Com-
pany and "the town of Utuado in general") 7 emphasized that the employees of the
Company had been "working without labor unions for 3 years and we haven' t needed
them." Urging the employees not to be misled by "the promises offered by false
apostles," it exhorted them not to jeopardize the 300 jobs at the plant. Adverting to
the first discharge of Rios in March, the leaflet stated that "Rios was suspended for
excessive absences, and not because she belonged to the Union." Another leaflet
(addressed to the workers of Lares Mills in a neighboring town and distributed at the
Company's plant in Utuado) sought to convey a' similar antiunion message. It pointed
to the Union's failure to organize the Utuado plant, and urged them to organize a
comite similar to Respondent Comite in order to "fight these unionists who are trying
to harm the mdustiy in Lares," and to meet and work with the industrial committee of
Lares. The third leaflet (addressed to the "town of Utuado," the Union, and "the
general public") was distributed shortly after the second discharge of Rios on June 21.
It pointed to the harmonious relations between management and labor before the
advent of the Union; castigated the Union's organizers for using "filthy language"
and accusing employees as "boss lovers" merely because they refused to accept union
literature; challenged the organizers to fight the Comite in the open; and called upon
the Union to submit to a Board election in order to determine "who backs" it. The
third leaflet also made extensive reference to the June 21 incident preceding the dis-
charge of Rios (infra), blaming the incident on Rios. It stated that Rios could not
be considered "a desirable person to work with peacefully, after she' s brought us so
much trouble," and further stated, "That's why the whole force of employees refused
to go in to work" on June 21 and would continue to iefuse to work with her. The
leaflet noted that Rios had stayed away from work for weeks, pretending illness, while
"calmly riding around in the car of the union organizer [and] afterwards when she
believes it's convenient to do so, or when the union orders her to do so, she shows up
to work at the factory very tranquilly, thus abusing the regulations of the Company."
Tn addition to spreading its antiunion propaganda through leaflets, the Comite
called upon company employees to attend a rally sponsored by the local industrial
committee at the American Legion Hall on May 30. Approximately 60 or 70 towns-
people attended that meeting, most of them company employees.8 Members of the
industrial committee spoke of the advantages of keeping the town's industry nonunion.
Dr. Villar, a local physician who presided over the meeting , then called upon indi-
viduals in the audience to voice their opinions. Among others, Nadal and Negroni
(the Comite leaders) accepted the invitation, ascended the stage , and delivered anti-
union orations. Both adverted to the necessity of fighting the Union, characterizing
its leaders as "rapacious wolves." h
G The record shows, and I find, that the Company was aware prior to June 21 of the
existence and antiunion objectives of Respondent Comite
The handbill, issued in the name of the Comite's board of directors, was signed by
Gladys Negroni (president), Juana Maldonado and Lydia Pacheco (vice presidents), and
Gloria Vazques (treasurer).
'An antiunion employee. Bula, at first sought to block admission of members of the
Union's oiganizing committee, but all members seeking admission, except Rios and the
paid organizers, ultimately entered
P The foregoing findings are based on those portions of the testimony of Dr Villar (a
Comite witness) and Blanca Sotomayor and Aurora Quiles (General Counsel witnesses
and members of the Union's organizing committee) which I have found mutually cor-
roborative and inherently probable I do not credit those portions of the testimony of
Sotomayor and Quires in which they ouote Nadal as stating that the Comite would take
up "any problems" the employees might have with the Company Sotomayor displayed an
obviously faulty memory relating to the events in question and significantly omitted any
reference to this matter in her prehearing affidavit executed only 12 days after the
meeting Quiles impressed me as an interested, partisan, and unreliable witness I note
that Quiles is the husband of one of the paid union organizers and was one of the em-
ployees on whose behalf the Union had filed a Section 8(a)(3) charge which was sub-
sequently dismissed by the Regional Directoi
1462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. The June 21 incident preceding the discharge of Rios
As noted, Luz Maria Rios reported to work on June 20 after an extended absence.
When she arrived at the plant the next morning, June 21, about 6:45, she was met by
an agglomeration of employees at the employees' entrance gate-numbering approxi-
mately 275 by the 7 o'clock starting time. Some of the employees were shouting and
yelling and were carrying signs reading: "Out Dona Luz, we do not want you";
"We do not need gripers"; "We do not want Dona Luz"; "We are on strike demanding
that Dona Luz leave." The signs were brought by employee Nadal and carried by
him, other Comite leaders (including Gladys Negroni and Juana Maldonado), and
nonunion employees. When Rios asked Negroni why they were demonstrating and
refusing to work with her, the latter replied, "Because you are not better than anyone
of us here," indicating that she went to work whenever she felt like. Cruz Rivera, a
member of the Union's organizing committee accompanying Rios, then said that "if
Dona Luz does not go in to work," the entire prounion group "is not going in either."
Plant Manager Jose Martinez entered the plant through the vehicular gate shortly
before 7 a.m. A group of employees on the porch to the factory entrance informed
him that "they were refusing to go in to work with Dona Luz," saying that they
"associated" Rios with individuals who had leveled "personal insults" against the plant
workers.10 Martinez was also apprised of the situation by his office employees and
his general forelady, Quinones; and he himself observed the commotion outside.11
Martinez immediately called the police and reported the incident to his superior Jose
Santisteban, the Company's general manager, who was in San Juan. He told Santiste-
ban that "he was having serious trouble in the plant," that the girls were parading out-
side with signs and yelling they would not work with Rios, and that he had called the
police. Santisteban instructed Martinez to call him back if the employees failed to
-report by 7 a in. and to keep him abreast of developments. He also told him to get
the paychecks ready for the employees (it was Friday, payday) and pay them off,
apparently in the hope that distribution of the checks might disperse the crowd.
Three policemen arrived around 7 a.m. and one of them asked Nadal who was in
charge of the "strike" that was in progress. Nadal replied that he and a girl (pre-
sumably Negroni) were in charge and that the employees struck because Rios was
persona non grata. The policemen then went into the plant office and asked
Martinez "what was going on." Martinez replied that it was a matter that con-
cerned the girls only and that "he had nothing to do with it." The policemen then
came out and told Rios she could go in to work.
Rios entered the office shortly after 7 a.m., accompanied by two policemen and a
group of employees belonging to the Union's organizing committee When Rios asked
Martinez to explain what had happened, Martinez replied that he had "nothing what-
ever to do with what was going on in front." Cruz Rivera, one of the group, remarked
that if Rios could not work, the group with her would not work either. Martinez
replied that Rios and her associates could work and they punched in about 7:20 a.m.
In the meantime, General Manager Santisteban attempted to contact Vincente
Antoinetti, the Company's local counsel, but was unable to reach him. Santisteban
then put in a long-distance call to Henry G. Friedlander, counsel to B.V.D. (the
Company's parent company), at his home in New York. Santisteban recounted in
detail the "trouble" he was "experiencing" at the Utuado plant and asked for his advice.
io Martinez testified that the employees did not claim that Rios herself had hurled these
insults. He testified that the employees had "associated" certain unpleasant "incidents"
with Rios, specifically mentioning an incident that resulted in an arrest 2 days earlier
on June 19 Respondent adduced evidence showing that one Efrain Melendez Serrano
(Fran) was arrested for and pleaded guilty to a charge of breach of peace for calling
employees certain obscene names (including "prostitutes." "lovers," and "concubines" of
the "bosses") while distributing union leaflets outside the plant General Counsel ad-
duced testimony purporting to show that Melendez was neither employed by nor acted for
the Union. In view of the disposition of the issues herein, I do not find it necessary to
determine whether Melendoz' misconduct is attributable to the Union
"Rios testified that when she saw Martinez standing on the porch, she pleaded with
him to help her get in, saying, "Look Mr Martinez come over here and get me out of this
problem" but that Martinez "turned his back towards" her. Martinez denied hearing
Rios' appeal and I credit his denial It is not likely that Martinez, who was at least
0S0 teet away, surrounded by a shouting and excited crowd, could hear the appeal.
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1463
Friedlander advised Santisteban to make "sure that anybody that wanted to come in
could and that if not enough girls went in ... [he] should pay them and give them
the day off to let them calm down." 12
Santisteban then called Martinez and was told that only 30 girls had entered. San-
tisteban said that he could not possibly operate with 30 employees and directed Mar-
tinez "to go ahead and pay the girls and give them the day off to see whether they
would dissipate [sic] and everything would be quiet-since it was Friday, we had the
whole weekend to cool off." Martinez replied that he had already sent two office girls
outside to distribute the checks, but the demonstrators "would not pick up the checks
and they would not leave either," continuing to yell and scream and blowing the horns
,of their automobiles. Santisteban was afraid that violence and a riot might erupt and
he immediately called back Attorney Friedlander.
Friedlander advised Santisteban to give Rios a week off to provide the Company an
opportunity to "talk to the girls during that week, convince them, calm them down,"
and to tell Rios that at the end of the week she "could come back to work normally."
When Santisteban asked Friedlander what he should do if Rios refused, Friedlander
replied that he "couldn't conceive" of her refusing "a week's vacation with pay."
Santisteban then called Martinez, who advised him that the girls "are still out there"
and he was "afraid that something may happen." Santisteban then instructed Mar-
tinez: "You call Dona Luz inside and tell her that we want her, that we are telling
her she must take one week off-we will pay her for the week, we will not count those
as absences,13 that we are doing this because we are afraid . . . for her personal safety,
that we want to have a chance to talk to the girls and calm them down, that after this
week she can come back to work."
Martinez did as directed. He summoned Rios and told her that the "operators did
not want to work with her"; that "apparently . they were resentful because of
personal insults" leveled against the workers by "strangers" and "were associating
her with those insults"; and that he wanted her "to cooperate with us" by taking off a
week with pay to "let things calm down"; and that she could thereafter "return to work
normally." Rios replied that she "wasn't going to leave the plant at any time but on
the contrary she would report to work every day." Martinez asked Rios to recon-
sider her decision, pointing out that he was doing this "in the best good faith and in
order to avoid any personal encounters " He also told her that unless she followed
his order he would be "force[d] to suspend her indefinitely." When Rios insisted that
"I will come to work as usual," Martinez told her that she was "suspended
indefinitely." 14
Rios worked about three-fourths of an hour that day and left with the other girls
who accompanied her.15 Martinez then announced over the loudspeakers to the
employees outside that he had suspended Rios indefinitely and that all employees were
to report to work the next day. Thereafter Nadal and Negroni addressed the employ-
ees over the loudspeaker attached to a car requesting them to go to town and "cele-
brate" their "victory."
"Explaining his reason for calling upon Friedlander , Santisteban testified: "I had a
problem that was a little bit hard for me because-well, we had just made a settlement
with the Board [ the April 29 settlement agreement , supra] and here was a situation
that I had no experience with , in which the person really involved in the settlement was
also involved , and I wanted to get Mr Friedlander ' ,; counsel on the thing that was going
on " Santisteban impressed me as a sincere and reliable witness and his uncontradicted
testimony regarding his contacts with Friedlander and Plant Manager Martinez on June 21
is credited General Counsel stipulated that Santisteban had made two calls to Fried-
lander on that day
13 Respondent adduced testimony purporting to show that an employee guilty of ex-
cesaive absences receives warning notices that may lead to discharge
"The findings in the foregoing paragraph are based on the credited testimony of
Martinez Rios conceded that Martinez told her, "Dona Luz , you stay home this coming
week at your house , we are going to pay you for It When the plant continues to operate,
we will call you in again ." According to Rios, she protested that she "wasn't guilty
of anything . . . because I haven ' t done anything to anyone , that they had done more
to me"
15 The girls were informed that the plant would have to shut down for the day due to
-the shortage of personnel.
1464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
That afternoon Union Organizer Ramonita Rivera and members of the employee
organizing committee came to the plant to ask Martinez to reconsider his action.
Santisteban , who was present , stated that there was nothing further that he could do,
because Rios had "neglected to cooperate with us" in working out the dispute between
Rios and the antiunion employees.
4. Conclusions with respect to the June 21 discharge
(a)
This case presents a situation where employees in a plant refuse to work with a.
fellow employee whom they consider persona non grata and seek to force the employer
to discharge her. The statute imposes upon the employer in such situation the duty to
resist the pressures to discharge , if such pressures are motivated by antiunion bias.
It is the employer 's "duty to adopt reasonable measures to protect " the union employee
and not to surrender his right to discharge. The Cross Company, 143 NLRB 1005;
N.L.R.B. v Winston Brothers Company and Green Construction Co, d/b/a Winston
& Green, 317 F. 2d 771, 776 (C.A. 9). An "employer who knowingly acquiesces in
the exclusion of employees from its plant by an antiunion or rival union group will-
be regarded as having constructively discharged such employees in violation of Sec-
tion 8 ( a)(3) . . The Act prohibits discrimination against persons on account of
their membership or activities on behalf of unions , and it is an employer's duty to,
resist violent domination of its right and power to employ without such discrimination "
Brewton Fashions, Inc, A Division of Judy Bond, 145 NLRB 99. See also N.L.R.B.
v. Fred P. Weissman Co., 170 F. 2d 952, 954 (C.A. 6), cert. denied 336 U S 972;
N.L.R.B. v. D. W. Newton, d/b/a Newton Brothers Lumber Company, 214 F. 2d
472, 475 (C.A. 5).
On the basis of the entire record, I find that the refusal of the Company 's employees
to work with Rios was based at least in substantial part on Rios ' union activity or iden-
tification with the Union and that Respondent was aware of this fact. I further find,
however, that the Company in the circumstances of this case undertook reasonable
measures to protect Rios' employment , that its discharge of Rios was predicated on
her refusal to cooperate in the Company 's efforts to resolve the dispute between Rios
and the nonunion employees , and that the Company's conduct therefore did not
run afoul of the statute.
(b)
I cannot accept the Company 's contention , as stated in its brief (p. 10), that the-
"resentment towards Rios was totally disassociated from her activities on behalf of the
Union, or her union membership ." While it is true that the reasons articulated by
nonunion employees for their refusal to work with Rios (both in the Comite's leaflets
and on the June 21 picket line) would indicate that they had believed , rightly or-
wrongly, that Rios "was making a mockery of the plant 's rules" concerning absences
and that Rios had associated with "strangers " who had leveled "personal insults"-
against them , the root cause for their animosity and the force that moved them went
far deeper . The overwhelming evidence establishes that Rios had incurred the enmity
of the antiunion group because of her identification with the Union and its organizers.
Indeed, one of the Comite 's pamphlets alluded to her "calmly riding around in the
car of the union organizer " while absenting herself for pretended illness. And insofar
as the "personal insults" are concerned , it is not claimed that Rios herself indulged in
name-calling but only that she had been identified with the culprits-alleged union
organizers-who hurled the obnoxious epithets while distributing literature. The
inescapable conclusion , and I so find , is that the employees ' animosity toward Rios
was no more than a cloak to conceal the real motive underlying their campaign to-
keep the Union out of the plant. It is clear , and I find, that Rios was singled out for-
special treatment because she-more than any other employee on the Union's
organizing committee-rode around with union organizers and played host to them
in her home on visits to Utuado.
I further find that the Company knew of the antipathy between Rios and the anti-
union group and knew that their antipathy was predicated basically on Rios' unionism.
As already found, Jordan , a supervisory employee, was a participant in an anti-
union demonstration in front of Rios' home at the outset of the union campaign (the-
night of February 21) and she had witnessed an encounter between Rios and an anti-
union employee the next morning in front of the plant . Furthermore , the Company
frankly conceded at the hearing that it had known (prior to June 21 ), that Rios was
a member of the organizing committee , that friction had existed between her and the
nonunion group, and that the purpose of the Comite was to fight the Union.
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1465
(c)
As I see it, the crucial questions here are whether the Company had taken reason-
able steps to protect Rios' employment and whether, as it contends, Rios was ter-
minated because she thwarted the Company's reasonable attempts to settle the fac-
tional dispute. While, as already noted, an employer is under an obligation to assure
union employees opportunity to work without interference from antiunion employees,
the employer is not an absolute guarantor of their jobs under all circumstances. See
The Cross Company, 143 NLRB 1005.16 It is clear from the entire record that the
Company had not instigated, abetted, or approved the conduct of the antiunion
employees prior to the June 21 discharge. There is no evidence whatever that it had
foreknowledge of the June 21 "strike" to keep Rios from the plant. From all that
appears, and I so find, the Company through no fault of its own, was caught in the
middle between two opposing factions, and was faced with the possibility of resulting
disruption and shutdown of operations. A crowd of mob proportions was milling
outside its gates, yelling , screaming , and parading with placards demanding Rios' dis-
missal. The Company sought to disperse the mob by summoning the police and pro-
viding Rios and her associates entry to the factory. It then sought to distribute the
paychecks to the demonstrators in the hope of soothing the crowd- a maneuver
ignored by the inflamed mob. The plant manager (Martinez) meanwhile established
contact with his superior (Santisteban), and the latter with the Company's New York
attorney, in order to seek advice and counsel. The Company was particularly cautious,
knowing that Rios was the subject to a recent settlement agreement with the Regional
Director and that the matter was a delicate one. Although the Company desired to
continue operations, finding itself unable to do so with the 30 employees who entered
the plant, it decided to close the plant down for the day. It then summoned Rios,
enlisting her cooperation in adjusting the dispute by taking off a week with full pay in
order to enable it to appeal to the antiunion group under calmer circumstances. Rios
was given assurances that she could return to work the following week. Rios, how-
ever, refused, defiantly insisting that she "would report to work every day." When the
Company asked her to reconsider, she remained obdurate, even when it was pointed
out to her that these measures were for her own protection.
Under all the circumstances, I find that the Company in good faith took reason-
able, sufficient measures to comply with its statutory duty to protect the rights of Rios.
To be sure, as counsel for General Counsel ably argues, the Company might have
taken other or additional measures , including dismissals of antiunion leaders to try
to bring home to the demonstrators that it meant business. But whether or not such
action would have succeeded , considering the depth of the sentiment against Rios as
evidenced by the excitement and mood of the howling crowd, is highly conjectural and
need not, even if it could, be decided. The bona fides of the Company's conduct
should be tested not by hindsight but in the light of the existing situation which called
for formulated judgment then and there. I cannot say that the approach utilized by
the Company-to separate and calm down the opposing combatants and then to
attempt conciliation in a more propitious climate, without resulting economic detri-
ment to Rios (who was to be paid for the week she was to take off)- was unreason-
able. The only inference I can draw from Rios' obstinate refusal to accept the
Company's approach-particularly in the light of a record which shows extended
absences on her part 17-is that she was more concerned with emotional self-gratifica-
tion than with the security of her job. An employer, too, has rights, including the
right to operate his business. In the final analysis, the "ultimate problem is the
balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests" (The Kroger Company, 145 NLRB
235, quoting from N.L.R B. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL
(Buffalo Linen Supply Co.), 353 U.S. 87, 96) 18-in this case the undisputed right of
16 See also the court cases cited by the Board in Brewton Fashions, Inc , etc supra,
footnote 6, including A T L R B v Edinburg Citrus Association, 147 F 2d 353, 354-356
(C A. 5) : N T.R B. v Wytheville Knitting Mills, 175 F 2d 238, 239-240 (CA. 3) ;
NLRB v t Spiewa1V & Sons, 179 F 2d 695, 099-701 (C.A 3) ; AT L R B v P. R
Mallory & Co , Inc , 237 F 2d 437 (C A 7) ; ef. N L R.B. v Superior Tool & Die Co
309 F 2d 692, 695 (CA 0)
17 There is no dispute that Rios had been absent for extended periods prior to June 21
There is a dispute as to whether the absence, were justifiable because of illness, a matter
which I need not, and do not, resolve to dispose of the ultimate issue in this case
18 See also Republic Aviation Corporation v N L.R R , 324 U S 793, 798 ; Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, and Helpers Local Union No 79, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
etc (Redwing Carriers, Inc, et al) v N L R.R., 325 F 2d 1011, 1012 (C.A D C.).
1466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union employees to work without interference from nonunion employees and the right
of the employer to conduct business.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I find that the record as a whole does not support
a finding that the Company failed to take reasonable steps to protect the reinstatement
and continued employment of Rios from interference and coercion by the Comite and
the antiunion employees; or that the Company was party to or unlawfully yielded to,
their pressures to oust Rios from its plant. Here, as in The Cross Company, supra,
before the Company "may be held legally accountable for conduct not engaged in by-
its agents and not shown to have been authorized , approved , inspired , or encouraged
by it, it was incumbent on General Counsel to prove more than was proved in the
instant case ." In the particular circumstances of the case , I find that the Company
discharged Rios because she refused to comply with its reasonable request or order
to cooperate in the peaceful and orderly resolution of the factional dispute between
the union and antiunion employees. Accordingly, I recommend that the Board
dismiss the complaint 's allegations relating to the discharge of Rios on June 21, and
that the discharge not be used as a basis for setting aside the settlement agreement
entered into with the Regional Director in April 1963.
C. Alleged interference , restraint , and coercion in violation of
Section 8(a) (1) of the Act
Paragraph X of the amended consolidated complaint alleges that the Company-
through Carmen Alicia Quinones (its general forelady), Elena Allende (a section
supervisor), Gloria Jordan (its quality control supervisor), and Ramon Molina (its
calendar department head) interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. Respondent denies the commission of the
acts in question and, in addition , disavows responsibility for the conduct of all of these,
individuals, except Quinones, on the ground that they are not supervisors within the-
meaning of the Act. I shall, therefore, first treat the question of the supervisory status
of the individuals in question before turning to the acts involved 18
1. The Company's responsibility for the conduct of Allende, Jordan, and Molina
a. Elena Allende
Jose Martinez, the plant manager , is in charge of the plant 's operations and is the
chief overseer of the 275 employees on its payroll. Martinez is, in turn, responsible
to General Manager Santisteban. Working under Martinez is General Floorlady
Quinones who is in charge of the sewing room The sewing room is divided into 5
identical sections , each staffed with 29 machine operators, 6 inspectors , 4 folders, and
I section supervisor, making a total of 40 in each section. Allende is one of the five
section supervisors.
Each section operates on an assembly line, with the material passing from operator
to operator for the sewing of different parts of the garment. All section supervisors
have the same duties. They wear distinctive jackets, attend supervisors' meetings
where production and other problems are taken up, and are paid at an hourly rate of
$ 1.16 as compared to the basic minimum rate of 931/2 cents for production employees.
The section supervisor supplies the materials to the operators and "is responsible for-
the work in her section to move along ." She periodically visits and watches the
operators to check the rate and quality of their production; admonishes them regard-
ing these matters when necessary ; and suggests improvements in their procedures and
work techniques . In short, as one company witness testified , the section supervisor
"is in charge of the section " and the operators are expected to "obey" their "orders.-
Based on the foregoing and the entire record, it is clear , and I find , that the section
supervisors , including Allende, have "authority , in the interest of the employer .. .
responsibly to direct" employees under them within the meaning of Section 2(11) of-
the Act and, therefore, that they are supervisors for whose conduct Respondent is
accountable. See, e g., N.L.R.B. V. Syracuse Stamping Company, 208 F. 2d 77, 79
(C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v Chautauqua Hardware Corporation, 192 F 2d 492, 494 (C.A.
2); N.L.R.B. v Edward G Budd Manufacturing Co., 169 F. 2d 571, 575, 576 (C.A.
6), cert. denied 335 U.S. 908.20 The circumstances relied on by the Company, that-
the section supervisors have some of the same working conditions as rank-and-file
employees (e.g., they work the same hours , punch timecards, work on an hourly basis,.
19 The complaint also alleged a Section 8(a) (1) violation by Section Supervisor Elba
Iris Mendez, but this allegation was dismissed at the hearing for failure of proof.
20 Allende's designation or formal title of "supervisor " is, in itself , of course , not con-
trolling. N L R.B v Quincy Steel Casting Co., Inc , 200 F. 2d 293, 296 (C A 1).
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1467
are paid for overtime) and do not have all of the attributes that may be found in super-
visors (e.g., the right to hire, fire, demote, and promote), are not determinative
(ibid.).21
b. Gloria Jordan
As noted, each of the five sewing room sections has six inspectors. These inspec-
tors check the garments, separating the defective ones and making a record of the
operators responsible therefor. The quality control section, comprising six girls
including Jordan, in turn spot checks the work of the section inspectors by picking up
bundles of approved work at random. Jordan and one of her assistants in quality
control keep a record of the defects of each operator and the errors made by the sec-
tion inspectors. This information is sent to the office. Jordan also spot checks the
work of the quality control girls in her section and calls attention to carelessness in
their work "like any regular supervisor would." If a particular machine operator has
too many defects, Jordan reports this to the general forelady who then takes over.
She may, however, admonish the section inspectors if their work is defective. Most
of Jordan's duties are also perfoimed by her assistant. This assistant, however, is
paid only 91 cents per hour, whereas Jordan receives $1.16. Jordan wears the dis-
tinctive jacket worn by section supervisors and attends supervisors' meetings.
Under all the circumstances, I find that Jordan responsibly directs employees and is
a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. True, she is not at the top of the mana-
gerial hierarchy but nevertheless she meets the statutory test of supervisor.22
c. Ramon Molina
The status of Molina as a supervisor presents a closer question. Molina has
worked for the Company since August 1961, and is carried on its payroll as receiving
clerk. He spends most of his time in manual labor, loading heavy (100 to 200
pounds) cartons of cloth onto his "push cart," moving the cart from the warehouse to
the calender machines, and delivering the material to the calender operators so that`
they may work on them.23 Molina's other manual tasks include unloading the vans
bringing the cartons of cloth to the plant, stacking the cartons in the warehouse,
classifying waste material as rags or wipers, and baling waste materials
Molina reports directly to Plant Manager Martinez. When he needs help for
unloading and stacking, he may obtain available personnel from the calender depart-
ment or from other departments (such as the shipping department) after consulting
its supervisor. Normally, the vans unload at night and Molina solicits and selects
volunteers to work overtime; if he cannot obtain enough men he reports this to
Martinez who then takes over.
The record shows, and I find, that Molina spends a portion of his time overseeing
the operations of the calender department. He calls defects in cloth coming off the
machines to the attention of the operators; instructs the operators in correct pro-
cedures; and takes over an absent operator's work until a replacement is obtained.
Molina does not have the power to hire or fire; works on an hourly basis like the
calender operators; and does not attend supervisors' meetings . At the hearing Plant
Manager Martinez affirmed allegations in his prehearing affidavit (obtained by
General Counsel) that "Molina, in addition to supplying the material to calendering
[sic] is responsible for the work of the calenders in general and he watches to see how
they work"; that Molina calls to the attention of the calender operators carelessness in
work; and that he regards Molina as the person "in charge of those who work on the
calenders." Similarly, Molina in his prehearing affidavit admitted that he considered
himself to be the "calender supervisor."
-n The findings in this section, relating to the supervisory status of Allende, are based
mainly on the testimony of Plant Manager Martinez, General Manager Santisteban, and
employee Gloria Lafontaine (a company witness) As hereafter noted, I do not in fact
predicate any unfair labor practices on conduct attributed to Allende I nevertheless
did make findings as to her supervisory status because her statue would become relevant
in the event a reviewing authority disagrees with the conclusions reached herein
The findings in this section are based mainly on the testimony of Plant Manager
Martinez and General Manager Santisteban
23All materials must be processed by the calender machines before cutting During
the period here involved the Company had two such machines working simultaneously
during two shifts and these were in continuous operation The Company employed al-
together tour operators and two (or three) substitute operators for both shifts. Molina
supplied the cloth for both shifts.
1468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Based on the foregoing and the entire record, I conclude that, although Molina
spends most of his time as a manual worker carrying supplies to the calender operators,
loading the vans, stacking cartons, and performing other heavy physical work, he
devotes a significant portion of his time overseeing the calender operators' work
under the overall supervision of Plant Manager Martinez I find that Molina is a
part-time supervisor and that Respondent is answerable for his unlawful conduct,
particularly where such conduct is directed at employees working under his direction
in the calender departments. See N L.R.B. v. Fullerton Publishing Company d/b/a
Daily News Tribune, 283 F. 2d 545, 550 (C.A. 9) 24
2. The alleged acts and conduct of the supervisors
a. Carmen Alicia Quinones
(i) William Aquino, a calender operator, testified on direct examination that one
day in June as he passed Forelady Quinones' desk, she asked him "whether I had
signed for the union?" He conceded that this was the only time anyone spoke to him
about the Union. Quinones admitted having talked to Aquino, explaining that one
-day, while discussing school courses they were interested in, Aquino remarked that
some employees were "kidding" him because he was a friend of Perez, a unionman,
and they thought that he had signed a union card. Quinones testified she told him that
this was his problem. She specifically denied asking him whether he had signed a
card.
I credit Quinones' version of the incident. Aquino testified with hesitation and dis-
played a poor memory concerning the details of the incident. On cross-examination
he had extreme difficulty recollecting even the approximate date of the incident.
Indeed, it is not clear from the record whether the incident took place in the post-
settlement period.25
' '(ii) Francisco Perez testified that on one occasion Quinones asked him whether he
belonged to the Union. He then added that Quinones also stated that if the Union
came in, the factory would be closed. Quinones denied the statement attributed to her
and I credit her denial.
Perez impressed me as a confused and biased witness with extremely poor power of
recollection, and eager to testify against the Company. It was only after General
Counsel showed him his prehearing affidavit the second time that he was able to fix
the time of the incident, namely, between August 5 and 9, 1963. Significantly, Perez
had boasted that his union activities were common knowledge in the plant, stating
that he has "made propaganda almost in their [the managerial officials'] faces." He
testified that he had even attempted to sign up Elena Allende, a supervisor who is
herself alleged in the complaint as having interrogated an employee. Under all the
circumstances, it stretches credulity to suppose that Quinones would have asked Perez
whether he was a member of the Union as late as August 1963.26
(iii) The evidence, substantially uncontroverted, shows that during lunch hour on
August 14, an altercation took place on the highway in front of the factory involving
Gladys Negroni, one of the antiunion leaders, and Dimas Quiles, a paid union
organizer. Negroni head accused Quiles of waging a "dirty campaign" against her
and calling her such names as "prostitute," "concubine," and "lover" of Nadal (the
antiunion leader). Words ensued between the two and Negroni struck Quiles in the
face. Thereupon Negroni's friends and Quiles' friends joined the fracas and a near
riot resulted. Two employees called by General Counsel (Cruz Rivera Ramon and
Isabel Gonzalez-both members of the Union's organizing committee) testified that
24 The findings in this section are based mainly on the testimony of Martinez, Santiste-
ban, and Molina. and on the prehearing affidavit of 'Martinez (General Counsel's Exhibit
No 7) which is herewith admitted in the record At the hearing the Company objected to
the admission of the affidavit because, iitter chin, the production of the document would
contravene Section 102 118 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended,
forbidding disclosures of Board documents and records without the prior written con-
sent of the Board or General Counsel I received ruling on the objection The Com-
pany's objection is without merit It is obvious that Section 102 1118 is designed to pre-
serve the confidentiality of official records from encroachment by piivate parties and it is
only the Government that may resist disclosure by claiming the confidentiality privilege
25 Aouino was named as it discriminatorily discharged employee in the charge in Case
No 24-CA-1818, filed August 19, 1963 The amended charge omitted his name (and
others), presumably after investigation by the Regional Director
2a The charge filed August 19 alleged that Perez was discriminatorily discharged on
August 13; the amended charge omitted his name.
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1469
Forelady Quinones, who saw the incident, remarked that "the same thing had to be
done to everybody so that they would leave the plant." Quinones conceded that she
saw the altercation but denied making the statements attributed to her.
The Company seeks to impugn the credibility of Rivera and Gonzalez by pointing to
discrepancies in their testimony; additionally, it argues that the physical position of
Quinones and the employees was such that they could not possibly hear the alleged
comments. I do not deem it necessary to resolve the testimonial conflict. In my view
Quinones' statements, even if made, arose out of and were uttered in the context of
a personal feud unrelated to union activities. Moreover, the remarks are, at worst,
ambiguous and consistent with an expression by Quinones that what happened to
Quiles should happen to all slanderers and vilifiers of women at the plant.
b. Gloria Jordan
Carmen Lydia Rivera testified that on June 20, Jordan, the quality control super-
visor, asked her if she belonged to the Union; and that Rivera replied that she did
not.27 She further testified that on June 22, the day after the "strike" (supra), she
commented to her coworkers that "what had been done was quite wrong." Jordan,
who came by, then remarked that she (Jordan) had been told that Rivera had been
in one of the Union's cars the day of the walkout and "they" already knew about it
in the office. Jordan flatly denied the statements attributed to her.
I credit the testimony of Rivera rather than the general denial of Jordan. I was
impressed by the demeanor and deportment of Rivera. She appeared to be a simple,
unsophisticated, but sincere individual not likely to fabricate. Jordan, on the other
hand, impressed me as a determined individual who, in the light of her strong anti-
union feelings (supra, section B (1) ), would make precisely the type of statements
attributed to her
c. Elba Iris Mendez
Employee Aurora Quiles testified that on Friday, May 3, she signed a union card and
on Monday, May 6,28 Section Supervisor Mendez asked her whether "the union
people" went to her home. Quiles ieplied they had not. Mendez denied the state-
ments attributed to her by Quiles.
I credit Mendez' denial. Mendez impressed me as a humble and honest witness
who would not likely inject herself into the affairs of the employees On the other
hand, as already found in connection with the resolution of another disputed issue in
this case (supra, footnote 9), Quiles was not a trustworthy witness.
d. Ramon Molina
(i) Employee Jaime Sanchez Santiago testified that around the middle of June,
while the calender machine was in operation, Molina came to him and said, "Well,
Jaime, did you also sign the card for the Union?" Sanchez answered, "If I signed or
did not sign it, forget about it." Molina denied asking the question.
While I was generally unimpressed with Sanchez as a witness 29 I am persuaded
from an appraisal of the record as a whole, including the nature of the statement
attributed to Molina, the close contact between the two, and their apparent friendly
relationship at the time, that Molina made the statement attributed to him. I find,
however, that the question was a perfunctory one and that the question put by Molina
stemmed from curiosity rather than intent to interfere with or restrain the union
activity of Sanchez.
(ii) Francisco Perez testified that on several occasions in 1963 (he could not recall
the approximate times), Molina questioned him whether he was a member of the
Union. Perez also testified that about a week after his discharge (supra, footnote 26),
i.e., around August 20, he overheard a conversation between Molina and Padua (the
27 Rivera testified she joined the Union at the end of July She was not on the Union's
organizing committee Rivera is listed as one of the alleged discriminatees in the charge
hied August 19, but her name, like those of others, was subsequently dropped. Rivera
still works for the Company
281n a prehearing affidavit of July 31, in her own handwriting, Quiles recited that she
had signed the card the last week of May. General Counsel introduced in evidence a
union card purporting to show that she actually signed the card May 3 as testified As
already noted (supra, footnote 9), Quiles is the wife of one of the paid union organizers.
p Sanchez was one of the employees alleged in the August 19 charge as having been dis-
charged discriminatorily. He appears to have resented the discharge, claiming that
"there was no reason for them to dismiss me."
1470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
chief of the mechanics and apparently a supervisor) in which they discussed the closing
of the plant if the Union came in. He further testified that Felix Cortez (whom he
described as the "second boss" in the factory) and employee Andupar were nearby.
Molina denied making the statement.
As between Perez and Molina, I have no hesitancy in crediting the testimony of the
latter. I have already found Perez a biased and unreliable witness in connection with
another incident (supra, section B, (2), (a) ). Apart from credibility considerations,
there is no evidence that the August 20 conversation between the two supervisors, if
it took place, was directed at Perez (or any other rank-and-file employee) or that the
participants knew that Perez heard or was in a position to hear it.
3. Conclusions with respect to alleged interference, restraint, and coercion
In view of all of the foregoing, I conclude that the preponderance of evidence
established only the following interrogations or statements by supervisory employees
during the postsettlement period: (a) Quality Control Supervisor Jordan's question-
ing of employee Carmen Lydia Rivera on June 20 as to whether Rivera had belonged
to the Union, and Jordan's further statement to Rivera on June 22 that the Company
was aware of her driving around in a union car; and (b) Supervisor Molina's query
of Jaime Sanchez Santiago around June 15 whether he had signed a union card. I
do not find it necessary to decide, and do not decide, whether these two incidents,
considering their contexts, constituted proscribed conduct under Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. (See N.L.R.B. v. Firedoor Corporation of America, 291 F. 2d 328, 331-332
(C.A. 2) ). I do hold that-in view of the nature of the remarks and their isolated
character,30 the fact that they were uttered by minor supervisors, the absence of any
evidence (or even claim) that any high managerial official (the plant manager or
general manager) was involved in incidents of interference, restraint, and coercion,31
and in view of the finding that the Company was without fault with respect to the ter-
mination of Rios' employment-there appears no basis for setting aside the August 29
settlement agreement between the Company and the Regional Director and litigating
the alleged presettlement unfair labor practices. The Board has repeatedly held that
"findings of unfair labor practices can properly be made on the earlier conduct only
where there is evidence of substantial unlawful conduct following the settlement agree-
ment, for evidence of isolated and minor incidents will not justify the Board in going
behind the agreement." Baltimore Luggage Company, 126 NLRB 1204, 1208. See
also Rice-Stix of Arkansas, Inc., 79 NLRB 1333, 1334, 1337; Jackson Manufacturing
Company, 129 NLRB 460. Accord: Lincoln Bearing Co., et al. v. N.L.R.B., 311 F.
2d 48, 50 (C.A. 6); N.L.R.B. v. Superior Tool & Die Co., 309 F. 2d 692, 695 (C.A. 6).
I conclude that the credible evidence establishes no "substantial unlawful conduct" on
the part of the Company during the postsettlement period and, therefore, that Section
8(a)(1), as well as the Section 8(a)(3), allegations in the complaint against the
Company should be dismissed.
D. The alleged Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) violation by the Comite
1. The amended consolidated complaint alleges that the Comite, a labor organiza-
tion, engaged in a strike and other acts in order to force the Company to discharge
Rios on June 21 because of her union membership and activities. As already found,
the Company did not discharge Rios for any union reason but because she refused to
comply with the Company's reasonable request to cooperate in resolution of the
dispute between the union and antiunion groups in the plant. This, however, is not
dispositive of the question since it is an unfair labor practice for "a labor organization
or its agents" to "attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee"
for union reasons (Section 8(b)(2)), even though the attempt is unsuccessful.
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 513, etc. (Long Construction
Company), 145 NLRB 554; Local 11, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers Interna-
tional Union of America, AFL-CIO (Cooper and Craib, Inc.), 144 NLRB 373. For
30 Cf The Great Atlantic t Pacific Tea Company, Inc, 129 NLRB 757. 75S-760: Ameri-
can Greclings Coipoiat,on, 142 NLRB 2S3 Becker cC Sons. Inc, 145 NLRB 1753;
Middletown Manufacturing Company, Inc, 141 NLRB 234, footnote 1.
311 note that in addition to posting notices required by the April 29 settlement agree-
ment (supra, section A), management voluntarily posted a memorandum on its bulletin
board stating that it had forbidden its supervisors to interfere with "the rights" of its
employees and that any supervisor violating these instructions "is subject to disciplinary
action "
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1471
the reasons stated below, I find that the Comite did attempt to cause unlawful dis-
crimination against Rios; and that the Comite is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
2. The record established that the Comite is a militant antiunion group. As revealed
in its handbills and the statements of its officers, its mission was to bar the establish-
ment of the Union in the plant. There is no question but that in the eyes of the
Comite leadership Rios was a symbol of unionism. One of the Comite's officers,
Juana Maldonado, had accused Rios of being a union leader as far back as February
22. A Comite handbill had attacked her for riding around with a union organizer.
The announced objective of the June 21 work stoppage, engineered and led by the
Comite's chief officers (Nadal and Negroni), was to force the Company to terminate
Rios' employment. Both Nadal and Negroni admitted to a newspaper reporter
covering the June 21 incident that one reason they had opposed Rios was because "she
was trying to make them join a union." To be sure, there is credible evidence that
.the Comite and the antiunion employees had objected to Rios also because she
allegedly took advantage of the Company's rules on absenteeism and wanted special
treatment, but it is crystal clear that the primary and moving cause for their antagonism
toward Rios and their attempt to force her discharge was her union association and
activity. I so find.
3. Section 2(5) of the Act defines the term "labor organization" to be:
... any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation com-
mittee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose,
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
The courts have repeatedly observed that the definition of labor organizations was
"purposely phrased very broadly." Indiana Metal Products Corporation v. N.L.R.B.,
202 F. 613, 621 (C.A. 7). See also Marine Engineers Beneficial Association et al. V.
Interlake Steamship Co., 370 U.S. 173, 182; N.L R.B. V. Standard Coil Products Co.,
Inc., 224 F. 2d 465, 467 (C.A. 1). In N.L.R.B. V. Cabot Carbon Company, and
Cabot Shops, Inc., 360 U.S. 203, 211-213, the Supreme Court pointed out that the
term "dealing with" is broader than the term "bargain with." And a labor organiza-
tion .may encompass a wide variety of entities, such as "associations," "clubs," "com-
mittees," "boards," and "councils." 32 Indeed, in N.L.R.B. v. Kennametal, Inc., 182
F. 2d 817, 818 (C.A. 3), the court held that "the employees who informally joined
together to present their grievances . . . [fell] within the statutory definition," even
though they had taken no steps toward formal organization. The basic test is whether
the organization "exists for the purpose, in whole or part, of dealing with employers"
concerning labor disputes and matters falling within the area of collective bargaining.
The Comite 's contention that it is not a labor organization is predicated on the
claim that its sole -purpose was to combat labor organizations (such as the Charging
Party) and not to act as one. I agree that the Comite's primary objective was just
that, as clearly advanced by its leaflets and propaganda exhorting employees (and the
public, too) to "fight these unionists." Moreover, there is no evidence that the Comite
had made any request of the Company to negotiate a contract on behalf of the Com-
pany's employees. 33 But it is equally clear that the Comite existed, in the words of the
statute, "for the purpose ... in part, of dealing with employers [i.e., -the Company]
concerning grievances, labor disputes ... or conditions of work." Certainly, the non-
union employees, by adamantly refusing to work with Rios because she was persona
non grata (both for union and nonunion reasons) were asserting a grievance and
seeking to effect a change in their working conditions. They were also pressing for a
change in the tenure of Rios' employment. That a labor dispute existed is evidenced
not only by the longrunning controversy between the antiunion and the union employ-
ees but by the Comite's strike of June 21. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum
a3 See, e g., N.L R.B. v Cabot Carbon Company and Cabot Shops, Inc., supra; N.L R B.
v. James H. Matthews & Company, 156 F. 2d 706, 707-708 (C A 3) ; N L R B v Precision
Castings Company, Inc., 130 F. 2d 639, 641 (CA 6) In Simmons, Inc. v. NLRB., 287
F 2d 628 (CA. 1), the court held a "Comite" to constitute a labor organization.
Manuel Menendez, a union official, testified without contradiction, that 1 week after
the events here involved (I e, after June 21) Nadal, the Comite's copresident, told him
that he did not need the Union to represent his group because "he was capable of carry-
ing negotiations to get an agreement for the people " There is no evidence, however,
that the Comite had subsequently requested the Company to negotiate a collective
agreement
1472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Company, Inc., 370 U.S. 9, 15.34 I find and conclude that the Comite by striking,
picketing, and demanding 35 that the Company oust Rios from the plant was attempt-
ing to deal with, and evidenced that it existed for the purpose of dealing with, the
Company concerning labor disputes, grievances, and working conditions. At the
very least, the employees, represeted by the Comite, acted in concert for the purpose
of dealing with their employer concerning these matters and thus constituted them-
selves a "labor organization" within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. See
N.L.R.B. v. Kennametal, Inc., supra, Smith Victory Corporation, 90 NLRB 2089,
enfd. 190 F. 2d 56, 57 (C.A. 2); N.L R.B. v. Tovrea Packing`Company, 111 F. 2d
626, 629 (C.A. 9), cert. denied 311 U.S. 668, enfg. 12 NLRB 1063, 107036
While on the surface at least it appears anomalous that a militant antiunion group
such as the Comite could qualify as a "labor organization," it should be recalled that
one of the major purposes of the comprehensive statutory definition was to reach anti-
union and company-dominated organizations which performed but few, if any, of the
functions usually embraced under the term "collective bargaining." (N.L.R.B. v.
Cabot Carbon Company, et al., supra, 360 U S at 212-213, 1 Leg. Hist. of NLRA
1935 271-272, 1 Leg. Hist., supra, at 1347; U S. Dept. of Labor, BLS Bulletin No.
634, "Characteristics of Company Unions, 1935," pp. 199, 204 (GPO, 1938) )
Congress intended to cover more than the conventional type of labor organiza-
tion so as to reach others that "may be a ready and effective means of obstructing
self-organization of employees and their choice of their own representatives for the
purpose of collective bargaining." N.L.R.B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
303 U.S. 261, 266, 269, 271.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the Comite, a labor organization
within the broad statutory definition of that term, had unlawfully attempted to cause
the Company to discriminate against Rios because of her union sympathies and activi-
ties, thereby violating Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Comite has engaged in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Because of the seriousness of
the Comite's unlawful conduct it will be recommended that it cease and desist in any
manner from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act.
Having found that the Comite has unlawfully attempted to cause the Company to,
discriminatorily discharge employee Rios because of her union sympathies and
activities but that the Company had in fact discharged her for other, nonunion rea-
sons, I shall not recommend any backpay remedy. See Local 983, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, et al. (0. W. Burke Com-
pany), 115 NLRB 1123, 1131; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
513, etc. (Long Construction Company), 145 NLRB 554; Progressive Mine Workers
of America, International Union (Randolph Corporation) v. N.L.R.B., 187 F. 2d 298,
306-307 (C.A. 7).
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. The Company did not discriminatorily discharge Rios in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act on June 21, 1963, nor in breach of the April 29, 1963,
settlement agreement.
2. The Company did not engage in substantial unlawful conduct after the settle-
ment agreement, violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
3. The Company's postsettlement conduct does not warrant setting aside the settle-
ment agreement and litigating the Company's alleged presettlement violations.
31 Section 2(9) of the Act defines the term "labor dispute" to include "any controversy
concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment . . regardless of whether the dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee"
36As noted supra, section B (3), the Comite's leaders, including Nadal and Negroni, had
paraded with picket signs "demanding" the ouster of Rios In addition, a group of anti-
union employees peisonnlly informed Plant Manager Martinez on the day of the strike
that they would not work with Rios.
36 Although the Comite has a full slate of officers, the record does not show the extent
of its membership, the frequency of its meetings, and whether it operates under it con-
stitution or bylaws The Comite refused to produce any of its officers, including Nadal
or Negroni, in response to a subpena issued at the behest of General Counsel Nor did
the Comite call them as its own witnesses The only witness called by the Comite was
Ismael Villar, a physician, who testified respecting the May 30 meeting at the American
Legion Hall (supra, footnote 9).
PORTO MILLS, INC. 1473
4. The Comite is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
5. By attempting to cause the Company to discharge Rios because of her union
sympathies and activities in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the Comite has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) and (1) (A)
of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in this case , Respondent Comite Pro-Defensa de los Traba ) adores
de Porto Mills , its officers , representatives , agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Porto Mills , Inc., to discharge , lay off, or other-
wise discriminate against its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
(b) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act , except to the extent that such is permitted
by Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Post at its offices and meeting halls , if any, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix ." 37 Copies of such notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 24 , shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the
Respondent Comite, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to members and employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Promptly mail to said Regional Director signed copies of the Appendix for
posting, the Company willing , at its plant and place of business in Utuado , Puerto Rico.
(c) Publish said notice for 2 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in Utuado , Puerto Rico.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 24, in writing, within 20 days from
the date of the receipt of this Decision , what steps Respondent Comite has taken to
comply herewith.38
37 If tins Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , the words "a Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words " the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
in the notice In the further event that the Board ' s Order is enforced by a deciee of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals , Enforcing an Order " shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order"
38 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified
to read' "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent Comite has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF COMITE PRO-DEFENSA DE Los TRABAJADORES
DE PORTO MILLS AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF PORTO MILLS, INC.
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act , as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Porto Mills, Inc., to discharge, lay off,
or otherwise discriminate against its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees in any other manner in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
except as a condition of employment as provided for in Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
COMITE PRO-DEFENSA DE Los TRABAJADORES
DE PORTO MILLS,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
770-076-65-vol. 149-94
1474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Fernandez
Juncos Station , P.O. Box 11007 , Santurce , Puerto Rico, Telephone No. 724-7171, if
they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
The American Pad & Textile Company and Upholsterers ' Inter-
national Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 15-CA-
2316. December 9, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 17, 1964, Trial Examiner George J. Bott issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor practices
alleged in the complaint and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Examiner further
found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint. The Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support thereof.
Thereupon, the General Counsel filed a brief in answer thereto and
also cross-exceptions.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire
record in this case, including the Trial Examiner's Decision, the
exceptions and cross-exceptions, and the briefs, and hereby adopts the
Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that the Respondent, The
I The General Counsel filed , in addition , a "Motion To Strike a Portion of Brief for
Respondent on Exceptions From Findings and Conclusions of the Trial Examiner." The
motion is denied . It should be noted, however , that inasmuch as that portion of Re-
spondent 's brief which the General Counsel sought to strike contains a recital of events
alleged to have transpired after the hearing in this matter had been closed and which is
not contained in the record thereof, we have not considered these allegations in reaching
our decision herein.
149 NLRB No. 134.