Poloron Products of Indiana, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1969

177 N.L.R.B. 435 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

POLORON PRODUCTS OF INDIANA, INC. 435
Poloron Products of Indiana , Inc. and William H.
King and James Pool and Terry T. Pavlack and
Richard L . Eldridge and William Loggins and
Albert Green , Charging Parties and United
Steelworkers of America , Local Union No. 3889,
Party of Interest . Cases 25-CA-3179-1,
25-CA-3179-2, 25-CA-3179-3, 25-CA-3179-4,
25-CA-3179-5, and 25-CA-3179-6
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
hereby orders that the Respondent , Poloron
Products of Indiana , Inc., Michigan City, Indiana,
its officers , agents , successors , and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
June 30, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND ZAGORIA
On March 21, 1969, Trial Examiner Frederick U.
Reel issued his Decision in the above-entitled cases,
finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial
Examiner also found that the Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and
recommended that these allegations of the complaint
be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
exceptions and the Respondent filed cross-exceptions
to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and supporting
briefs. The Respondent's brief was also in answer to
the General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with these cases to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
'Chairman McCulloch concurs in the result reached by the majority of
the Panel . In his view , all of the evidence points to the fact that the strike
of June 13 was precipitated mainly by the unresolved economic demands of
the employees who walked out. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. N.L.R. B.. 350
U.S. 270, the Supreme Court held that a standard no-strike clause should
not be construed to apply to strikes directed against flagrant employer
unfair labor practices . Chairman McCulloch believes that the clear
implication of the Court' s decision , as well as the best interests of
labor-management relations , dictates that a strike , such as this, which is
motivated primarily by economic causes should not be deemed protected
activity where the employees have bargained away their right to strike for
such purposes.
Statement of the Case
FREDERICK U. REEL , Trial Examiner : This case, tried
at Michigan City, Indiana , on January 21 and 22, 1969,'
pursuant to charges filed the preceding July 9, an
amended charge filed September 23, and a complaint
issued October 31 and amended January 9, 1969,2 presents
questions whether a strike arising in part out of an
unlawful discharge has no statutory protection because it
was in breach of contract and was not authorized by the
bargaining representative , and if so , whether Respondent,
herein called the Company , violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act when , following its alleged "condonation " of that
strike, it relied on the fact of participation therein to
differentiate in the discipline it meted out for participation
in a second unprotected strike.
Upon the entire record ,' including my observation of
the witnesses , and after due consideration of the briefs
filed by General Counsel and the Company, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Company, a New York corporation, engaged at
Michigan City, Indiana , in the manufacture of riding
lawnmowers and related products, annually ships products
valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the State,
and is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background - the Contract
Late in 1967 the Company purchased the Michigan
City plant from the prior owner, and, in the course of
continuing the preexisting operation , continued to give
effect to the collective-bargaining agreement which its
predecessor had made with United Steelworkers of
America for itself and on behalf of the members of its
Local Union No. 3889, herein called the Union. This
agreement, which ran from October 1, 1967, to July 31,
1970, contained a detailed grievance procedure,
culminating in arbitration , which was specifically
applicable to suspensions and discharges as well as to
' All other dates herein refer to the year 1968 unless otherwise noted.
'The amendment named an additional discriminatee, discharged at the
same time , and as part of the same series of events , as the six Charging
Parties . The amendment was permissible . NL.R.B v. Dinion Coil
Company , Inc, 201 F .2d 484 , 491 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B v. Gaynor News
Company , Inc., 197 F.2d 719, 721-722 (C.A. 2), affd. 347 U.S. 17, 34, In
30; N.L.R.B v. Kohler Company, 220 F.2d 3, 6-8 (C.A. 7).
'The parties after the hearing executed a stipulation clarifying one of the
exhibits . This stipulation is hereby admitted into evidence as G.C. Exh
3A General Counsel filed a motion to correct certain errors in the
transcript . This motion is hereby granted.
177 NLRB No. 54
436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
other matters. Section 4 of the contract recited in part:
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages, or
interruption or impeding of work. No officer or
representative of' the Union shall authorize, instigate,
aid, or condone any such activities. No employee shall
participate in any such activities.
The applicable procedures of the Agreement will be
followed for the settlement of all grievances.
Section 8 of the contract provided in part:
In the event of suspension or discharge, the employee
may, within 5 calendar days after notice of such action,
file a grievance in the second step of the grievance
procedure. Final decision shall be made by the
Company in this step within 5 calendar days from the
date of filing thereof. Such grievance shall thereupon be
handled in accordance with the procedures of Section 6
- Adjustment of Grievances and Section 7 -
Arbitration.
B. The Discharge of Bailey, the Ensuing Strike, and
the Settlement
Early in June 1968 certain employees in the welding
department expressed dissatisfaction with their wages and
with other working conditions, notably ventilation. On the
morning of June 13 Plant Superintendent Robert
Hammond, pursuant to an arrangement he had made
previously with the welders, met with them as a group.
Hammond informed them that the Company would grant
no increases at that time. One member of the group,
William Bailey, said that, if the Company could not help
them, he would get someone who could. Hammond
promptly asked Bailey his name, and upon hearing it told
Bailey he was fired as of that moment. Bailey replied that
he was going to quit anyway, and warned Hammond that
the Company would hear further in the matter from some
"board." Bailey thereupon left the plant. The record
establishes that earlier that morning the Company had
decided to terminate Bailey's employment (he was a
probationary employee) at the end of the shift.'
A few minutes after Hammond fired Bailey, the
meeting broke up, but a group of welders continued to
discuss the matter among themselves, and decided to
strike. Shortly after 10 a.m. eight men (the six Charging
Parties, Rudolph Divijak, and Donald Young) "punched
out" on the timeclock and commenced picketing. Several
employees testified that the immediate cause of the
walkout was their resentment of the treatment of Bailey
and some of the picket signs referred to the discharge.
Thirty-six more employees joined the strike after 12 noon
that day.
When the strike started, the Company conferred with
the Union's plant committee, and at its suggestion sent for
Eugene Chlebowski, who is an International staff
representative of the United Steelworkers, and
administrator of the local union. When Chlebowski
arrived, some time after 12 that afternoon, he reiterated
'The foregoing findings represent my synthesis of the credited testimony
Some witnesses did not hear Bailey ' s statement that he would get help
elsewhere , and Hammond testified that he discharged Bailey because "I
felt he was disturbing these people , that something most unpleasant could
result from this, perhaps a walkout or perhaps something physical
And observing the people around him , they were becoming more agitated
the longer we talked ." 1 credit Bailey , and other witnesses (Pavlack,
King , Divijak, and Green) that Bailey mentioned resorting to outside help,
and that this apparently " triggered" the discharge As noted infra,
however, I would find the discharge unlawful even if I accepted
Hammond 's version of its cause
the view, previously expressed by the plant committee,
that the Union had not authorized the strike and was not
responsible for it, but he agreed to discuss the matter with
the strikers in an effort to get information which would
lead to a resolution of the issues. Chlebowski then
ascertained that the strikers were concerned over wage
rates, poor lighting, ventilation, and cooling, as well as the
discharge of Bailey.
After a further conference with Chlebowski, the
Company agreed that it would take steps to improve the
lighting and ventilation, and that within the next few
weeks it would institute a complete wage review of the
entire roster to see what increases , if any, would be given.
The Company also offered to reemploy Bailey with his
seniority unimpaired but as a new probationer. (Bailey
refused this offer when Chlebowski communicated it to
him.) Finally, Chlebowski asked the Company to promise
that there would be no reprisals so he could "get the
people back to work," and the Company agreed. All the
employees, except Bailey, returned to work the next
morning.
C. The Strike of July I and the Disciplinary Action
Taken That Day
On the morning of July 1 the Company commenced the
wage reviews it had agreed to as part of the strike
settlement on June 13. The review interviews had barely
commenced (one welder, Nixon, had been notified of a
10-cent increase) when another "walkout" occurred. The
record is far from clear as to what caused this walkout,
but apparently some of the employees were dissatisfied
with the progress made in improving the working
conditions and were also disturbed because they learned
that not all the employees would receive increases and the
increases granted would not become effective for several
weeks. In any event, whatever the cause or fancied cause,
not only did the same employees who initiated the
walkout of June 13 punch their clocks on July 1 and start
picketing, but a large number of other employees also
punched out at the same time . More precisely, six of the
eight who walked out on June 13 punched out at 10.20 on
July 1, and the other two punched out at 10.22. In
addition 6 other employees (who had either not struck at
all on June 13, or had joined that strike after 12 noon)
also punched out at 10.20, 3 at 10.22, 14 at 10.24, 2 at
10.25,' and 11 at later points before 1 p.m.
Again the Company summoned Chlebowski, and again
he made it clear that the Union had not called, and did
not condone or support, the strike. Chlebowski
ascertained from the strikers that their complaint centered
on the delay in making the merit increases effective. He
and the Company then arranged a satisfactory
compromise, setting July 15 as the effective date for the
increases , even if the protracted "merit review" process
had not been completed as to all employees by that date.
The Company stated, however, that it would not let the
July 1 walkout pass without disciplining the participants.
It suspended for the balance of that week all who walked
out that day, except for the eight men who had also
walked out on the morning of June 13. These men the
Company discharged on July 1, advising them that the
discharge was "for violation of union contract, sec. 4.""
'The time is expressed in decimals and not in minutes. Thus, 10 20 is
10 12 a m., 10.22 is 10:13, 10.24 is 10:14, and 10 25 is 10.15
'There is some evidence that one of these men, Pool, told the plant
superintendent that he had quit , and that this occurred before the
POLORON PRODUCTS OF INDIANA, INC. 437
After their discharge, several of the affected employees
wrote the Company on July 3 to "submit the following
grievance concerning our unjustified discharge ...." The
Company replied on July 10 that the letter did not
constitute a "grievance" within the meaning of the
contract, and that, even if it did, the discharge was for
cause and was proper. On July 15 the Union gave notice
that it desired to appeal the grievances concerning the
discharges to the third step of the grievance procedure,
and to discuss them on July 18. On July 23 the Company
replied that after discussion it adhered to its decision as
set forth in its letter of July 10. The Union did not press
the matter to the next stage, arbitration.
D. Contentions and Conclusions
The Company distinguished between two groups of
strikers on July 1, suspending some but discharging
others. General Counsel contends that in meting out the
harsher penalty the Company was motivated by the fact
that the eight dischargees had led the walkout on June 13.
General Counsel further contends that the June 13
walkout was an activity protected by the Act, or in the
alternative that the Company had condoned it and could
not lawfully use participation therein as a basis for
discriminatory treatment. The Company argues that the
discharges were based on the July 1 walkout, that in any
event the June 13 walkout was not a protected activity,
and that the doctrine of condonation is inapplicable.
1. Basis for selection for discharge
The parties agree , and the record is clear , that the
walkout of July 1 enjoyed no statutory protection. The
Company was free, without offending the statute, to
discharge employees for having participated in that
walkout. But the Company could not lawfully differentiate
in the discipline it invoked on that occasion if the basis for
the differentiation was an activity protected by the Act.
To take an obvious illustration, the Company could not
lawfully say that because all employees participated in an
unprotected strike it would discharge those who were
union members and merely suspend the rest. It could,
however, lawfully take the position that it would discharge
the leaders of the walkout and merely suspend the
followers. Thus we reach the first issue in the case: did the
Company discriminate between the two groups (those
suspended and those discharged) because of the latter's
leadership of the earlier walkout, or solely because of their
activity on July 1?
This question, I believe, must be answered in favor of
the General Counsel's contention. The Company makes
some effort to establish that it believed the June 13
leaders to have instigated or led the July 1 walkout, and
to claim that its decision as to whom to discharge rested
solely on the events of July 1. For example, Plant
Manager Harmyk testified that on July 1 he at first saw
only "a small handful" on strike, and that he ascertained
who the leaders were by checking the timecards. Similarly
Personnel Manager Andrews testified that "the ones that
were discharged we felt were the primary leaders of the
walkout on July 1," and that only one or two other men
punched out at the same time. And the Company brief
quotes the opening statement of General Counsel that
Company sent him his discharge notice . Pool was not called as a witness.
If necessary to resolve the point, I would find adversely to Pool in view of
his failure to testify
"the same eight welders . again walked out on the
morning of July 1, leading another walkout." The
Company's own records establish, however, that the
walkout on July 1 involved 33 men who punched out
between 10:12 and 10:15, inclusive, that 12 men punched
out at 10:12, of whom only 6 were discharged, and that 5
men punched out at 10:13, of whom only 2 were
discharged. Moreover, Harmyk expressly testified:
We discharged the people who punched out during
working hours on July 1 who had also punched out
during working hours on June 13.
Andrews similarly testified:
That we would, those people that walked out on July
1 would receive a week's suspension, those that walked
out on both occasions would receive a discharge.
and again:
(By Mr. Wolfe) Mr. Andrews, directing your
attention back to July 1st, 1968, wherein the company
decided to discipline employees, now, isn't it true that
the company in making their decision on who to
discharge based their selection . . . on the fact that the
people who were ultimately disciplined and were then
selected for discharge were those employees who
clocked out on June the 13th at 10:16 or whatever
Exhibit 2 will show?
A. That is correct.
Although it is doubtless true that, but for the walkout
of July 1, no one would have been discharged, I find that
the reason for meting out the harsher penalty to the eight
men here involved was their leadership of the June 13
walkout.
2. Was the June 13 walkout protected?
The walkout on June 13 was a wildcat strike, and in
breach of the no-strike clause. Under familiar principles,
employees who engage in such a strike do not ordinarily
enjoy the statutory protection normally given strikers.
General Counsel urges, however, that this strike was
caused by an unfair labor practice, the discharge of
Bailey, and that the statutory protection therefore adheres.
I agree with General Counsel that the discharge of
Bailey was an unfair labor practice. Bailey and the other
welders were engaging in a protected concerted activity
when they met in a group with Plant Superintendent
Hammond to discuss wage increases. Hammond fired
Bailey, apparently in irritation at Bailey's remark that, if
Hammond was not going to give increases, Bailey would
get help from outside sources.' Even accepting
Hammond's version of the episode, Bailey's discharge
resulted from statements he made in the meeting tending
to foment discontent among the assembled employees.
Bailey 's comments at this meeting were within the ambit
of statutory protection, and he could not lawfully be
discharged therefor. N.L.R.B. v. Thor Power Tool
Company, 351 F.2d 584 (C.A. 7). As his discharge was
one of the causes of the strike which followed immediately
thereafter,' it was an "unfair labor practice strike," even
though economic factors (dissatisfaction over wages and
working conditions) also contributed to the strike.
'The Company made no contention that this remark was unprotected
because Bailey already had a bargaining representative For all that
appears on the record Bailey might have been referring to the Union. Only
after he was fired did he mention going to "CORE" or a "board."
'The Company argues that the original charge in the case fails to
mention Bailey's discharge as a cause of the June 13 strike , and that one
of the strikers , King , in later conversations with his helper referred only to
other causes. But the testimony of several witnesses , the language on the
438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I further find , however , that even though the strike was
an unfair labor practice strike , it did not enjoy statutory
protection . Mastro Plastics Corp., and French -American
Reeds Mfg. Co, Inc v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270, is
sometimes cited as holding that an unfair labor practice
strike is a protected activity even though in breach of
contract, but analysis of Mastro and of subsequent
decisions construing it suggest that its scope is less far
reaching. See particularly Arlan 's Department Store of
Michigan , Inc., 133 NLRB 802, holding that under a
"no-strike" clause a strike to protest the discriminatory
discharge of a union steward was not protected by the
Act. Arlan's seems to me to be controlling here, and in
reliance thereon I find that because of the no -strike clause
the June 13 walkout was not protected by the Act.'
3. Effect of the condonation
The Company agreed to take back all the June 13
strikers and to visit no reprisals on them because of their
participation in that walkout. General Counsel contends
this constituted a "condonation" of the June 13 strike,
and that the Company could not lawfully rely on the fact
that an employee was one of the leaders of that strike to
justify enforcing more stringent discipline on him for the
July l walkout than it imposed on other employees who
also walked out on July 1.
Laying to one side as inapplicable several so-called
"condonation" cases which can be explained on other
grounds, we are left with a hard core of Board and court
decisions which stand for the proposition that, if an
employer following an unprotected concerted activity such
as a strike in breach of contract "condones" that activity
by reinstating the employees, he violates the Act if he
subsequently visits reprisals on them for that activity. See
the general discussion in Brantly Helicopter Corporation,
135 NLRB 1412, 1414, 1417-18.
The doctrine of those cases is easier to state than to
rationalize. The original activity never was protected; its
"protected" nature was forfeited by some characteristic
(such as the breach of contract) which inhered in the
activity and accompanied it throughout its existence. Thus
if an employee struck in breach of contract, was thereafter
reinstated, and then is discharged for the original activity,
it is easy to see that the employer's action is a breach of
his agreement, but it is somewhat more difficult to find
the statutory violation, for that must hinge on protected
activity of the employee. The policy of the cases appears
to be that strike settlements are to be favored, and that
employers must therefore be held to promises made as
part of such settlements. But to establish violations of the
Act it has been necessary to couch the matter in terms of
activity protected by the statute. This has been achieved
by declaring that once "condoned" the originally
unprotected concerted activity lost its "unprotected"
character so that only "concerted activity" remained, or
by arguing that by "condoning" the employer
demonstrated that he "forgave" the "unprotected"
character, so that the real reason for his subsequent
reprisal was his dislike of the "concerted" aspect. General
Counsel in his brief states the matter in terms of estoppel,
arguing that, because the men abandoned their strike on
picket signs, and Chlebowski 's representations to the Company establish
that the Bailey matter was one of the causes of the strike
'I note Arlan 's expressly modifies some of the language in Ford Motor
Co, 131 NLRB 1462, cited by General Counsel See 133 NLRB at 808,
fn 13.
the promise that no reprisal would be visited upon them,
the Company "is estopped from now asserting that the
concerted activity of June 13 was unprotected ...."
The authorities cited by the parties and my independent
research in the matter have not led me to any case in
which, as here, the discipline was invoked after subsequent
unprotected activity, and the severity of the penalty was
determined by reference to the condoned activity. In the
"condonation" cases thus far decided the employer
ostensibly visited the reprisal on the employee for the very
activity the employer had condoned. I have little doubt
that the doctrine would apply even in cases where the
employer "revived" the condoned misconduct in an effort
to justify disparate treatment for subsequent offenses
unrelated to the condoned offense. For example, if some
weeks following a condoned but otherwise unprotected
strike, two employees were tardy, the employer, in my
opinion , would violate the Act if he varied the discipline
meted out for the tardiness because one of the two
employees had been involved in the prior activity. In the
instant case, however, the subsequent offense was a
repetition of the very activity which had originally been
condoned. As the Company puts the matter in its brief,
the employees were reinstated after the first walkout with
the implicit understanding that they would remain at
work, and their subsequent walkout less than 3 weeks
later, and for a related cause,10 constituted a breach by
them of their part of the "condonation" agreement.
I find merit in the Company's approach To be sure,
the employees did abandon the June 13 walkout and
returned to work, and this was the immediate quid pro
quo for the condonation. But fairly implied, it seems to
me, was an understanding to remain at work for a
reasonable period, and not to walk out again in the
immediate future for a similar cause. Of course the
Employer was free to invoke penalties against the second
walkout, and the complaint here is that by invoking
disparate discipline he reneged on his condonation. But by
participating in the second walkout, the employees also
reneged on their part of the settlement. The policy
favoring strike settlements, which is the real heart of the
condonation doctrine, requires more than just a temporary
abandonment of the strike. Analogy to the Board's own
policies on settlements seems appropriate. If, after a
settlement agreement procures a dismissal of a complaint,
the employer commits new unfair labor practices, the
Board will vacate the agreement and will hold the
employer liable for his presettlement, as well as his
postsettlement , conduct. The Wallace Corporation v
N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248, 254-255; N.L.R.B. v. Western
Meat Packers, Inc., 368 F.2d 65, 70 (C.A. 10). I therefore
conclude that the employees who led the walkout on June
13 and who again walked out on July 1 cannot, in the
circumstances of this case , rely on the condonation of the
June 13 walkout to render illegal the Company's action on
July 1 in visiting harsher discipline on them than on other
participants in the latter walkout.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company by discharging William Bailey on the
morning of June 13 because of statements he made in the
course of activities protected by the Act engaged in an
unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the
meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
"The desire for wage adjustments was a partial cause of the June 13
walkout and the sole cause on July 1
POLORON PRODUCTS OF INDIANA, INC.
2. The Company has not engaged in the other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint.
THF REMEDY
As the record demonstrates that Bailey would have
been discharged at the end of his shift on June 13, 1 shall
recommend that he be given backpay for that day only,
with interest in accordance with the formula approved in
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. General
Counsel points out that Bailey was offered the opportunity
to return the next day as a beginning probationer, and
correctly observes that while this was less than full
reinstatement it demonstrates the Company's willingness
to keep Bailey on the job. The offer, however, was part of
a strike settlement. So far as the Board's remedial power
goes, restoration of the status quo ante is achieved by
paying Bailey for the time he lost because of his
premature discharge. The Company was not legally
obligated to hire him back, and as he rejected the offer I
see no reason for the Board to reimpose it. I shall also
recommend the customary cease-and-desist order and
notice posting. I have some doubt as to the advisability of
a notice under all the circumstances, but I have decided to
adhere to the convention although the Board may wish to
reconsider the matter if the case is reviewed. Also if the
Board should disagree with me on either of the two close
questions of law discussed above (the scope of Mastro
Plastics and the condonation), it may wish in framing a
notice to consider the problem dealt with in Brantly
Helicopter, 135 NLRB at 1419, 1420.
Accordingly, upon the foregoing findings and
conclusions, and upon the entire record, I recommend,
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, issuance of the
following:
ORDER
Respondent, Poloron Products of Indiana, Inc., its
officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from discharging, or threatening to
discharge or otherwise discriminate against, any employee
for engaging in concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make William Bailey whole in the manner described
in the portion of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled
"The Remedy" for any loss of earnings suffered by reason
of the discrimination against him.
(b) Post at its plant at Michigan City, Indiana, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 25, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the
439
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.':
In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order "
"In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our
employees that:WE WILL pay William Bailey back wages and
interest thereon for June 13, 1968.
WE WILL NOT take or threaten to take any action
against any employee for engaging in protected
concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, but
employees are hereby cautioned that a strike in breach
of a no-strike clause in a contract is not ordinarily
regarded as a "protected" concerted activity.
POLORON PRODUCTS OF
INDIANA, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 614 ISTA
Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana
46204, Telephone 317-633-8921.