Polaris Industries Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 27, 2022

2021004288 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 27, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/836,223 12/08/2017 Brian E. Brandt PLR-02-27702.01P-US 4988 93175 7590 01/27/2022 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP - Polaris 300 N. Meridian Street Suite 2500 Indianapolis, IN 46204 EXAMINER ANTONUCCI, ANNE MARIE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3666 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/27/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): inteas@faegredrinker.com sue.meyer@polaris.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte BRIAN E. BRANDT, SCOTT D. TAYLOR, KARL J. GRAJKOWSKI, RUSSELL G. OLSEN, DAVID G. HILLE, and TREVOR J. LAJOYE Appeal 2021-004288 Application 15/836,223 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, JAMES A. WORTH, and KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges. ASTORINO, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), the Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, and 5-31. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Polaris Industries LLC.” Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2021-004288 Application 15/836,223 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Subject Matter on Appeal The Appellant’s “disclosure relates generally to supervising and modifying vehicle operation.” Spec. ¶ 2. More particularly, the disclosure relates “to devices and methods allowing a supervisor to alter operation of a vehicle expected to be under the control of a supervisee and for supervising such use.” Id. For example, “parents [may] deem it prudent to supervise and/or constrain vehicle operation controlled by such other users.” Id. ¶ 3. Claims 1, 10, and 24 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter. 1. A vehicle control system for modifying vehicle operation, comprising: an electronic control unit having at least one processor; a vehicle network; a first wireless device having a GPS module, a local wireless communication module, and a distance wireless communication module; a wireless communication module operable to communicate with the first wireless device; and a memory accessible by the processor and memory having software stored thereon, the software being configured for execution by the processor and including instructions for providing at least one boundary map inside of which the vehicle operates under a first operating condition, whereby when the GPS module is inside the at least one boundary map, the first wireless device communicates to the electronic control unit and sends a signal indicating compliance with a boundary condition of the at least one boundary map, wherein the first operating condition is a normal vehicle operating condition. Appeal Br., Claims App. Appeal 2021-004288 Application 15/836,223 3 References The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Aguirre De Carcer et al. (“Aguirre De Carcer”) US 2009/0079555 A1 Mar. 26, 2009 Jin US 2010/0094500 A1 Apr. 15, 2010 Morgan et al. (“Morgan”) US 2014/0279297 A1 Sept. 18, 2014 Rejections Claims 1, 2, and 5-30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Jin in view of Aguirre De Carcer. Claim 31 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Jin in view of Aguirre De Carcer and Morgan. ANALYSIS Independent claim 1 calls for “[a] vehicle control system for modifying vehicle operation” that includes a memory with executable instructions by a processor, where the instructions provide “at least one boundary map inside of which the vehicle operates under a first operating condition . . . , wherein the first operating condition is a normal vehicle operating condition.” Supra. Independent claims 10 and 24 include similar subject matter. See Appeal Br., Claims App. The Examiner relies on Jin to teach the foregoing subject matter of the independent claims. Final Act. 4-5, 8-9, 13; see Ans. 3-6. The Examiner determines that Jin teaches two boundary maps; one on each side of a geofence. See Ans. 4. We note that Jin’s geofence is a boundary and this boundary creates a geofence area; for example, Jin’s Figure 4B shows a Appeal 2021-004288 Application 15/836,223 4 geofence that delineates geofence area A1. The Examiner finds that the area of Jin’s map interface that is outside of the geofence area corresponds to the “at least one boundary map inside of which the vehicle operates under a first operating condition . . . wherein the first operating condition is a normal vehicle operating condition,” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 2-3, 5; Ans. 3-4. Further, we note that Jin teaches that when a vehicle is determined to have entered into a geofence area the vehicle does not operate under normal operations conditions. For example, if a vehicle enters geofence area A1, a controller may actively control the drive speed of the vehicle by not letting the vehicle exceed a preset maximum speed. See Jin ¶¶ 97, 99, 132. The Appellant argues that the Examiner’s finding is in error because “Jin discloses the opposite of what is claimed.” See Appeal Br. 7-8. The Appellant contends that the Examiner’s position implies an interpretation of the claim 1 that makes the term “inside” in “at least one boundary map inside of which the vehicle operates under a first operating condition” either superfluous, ignored, or goes against the plain meaning of the term. Id. at 7; Reply Br. 2. The Appellant submits that “the only reasonable explanation is that being ‘inside’ the boundary [map] means being within the limited area that the boundary [(geofence)] defines” “[b]ecause the portion that is enclosed by the boundary [(geofence)] is limited and the portion that is outside the boundary [(geofence)] is unlimited.” Reply Br. 2. The Appellant relies on the same argument for the rejection of independent claims 10 and 24. See Appeal Br. 8; Reply Br. 2. The Appellant’s argument is persuasive. Appeal 2021-004288 Application 15/836,223 5 We determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that a characteristic of being inside of a boundary map requires the area inside of the boundary map to be enclosed. This understanding is consistent with the Specification. See Spec. Abstract, ¶¶ 5-7, 16-21 (the Specification at paragraphs 16-21 includes a sub-section entitled “Geofencing” (emphasis omitted)). In the Answer, the Examiner suggests that being “inside” of a “boundary map” includes being on one side of “a mere straight line [that] divid[es] an area into two distinct sections” and does not require “an enclosed area (of any geometric shape).” Ans. 5. However, the Examiner does not explain how one of ordinary skill in the art, upon viewing the claimed subject matter in light of the Specification, would reach an interpretation consistent with this suggestion. And, we do not find adequate disclosure in the Specification to support the Examiner’s suggestion. Also, we note that the Examiner does not rely on a straight line divider in Jin. Rather, the Examiner relies on an area outside of Jin’s geofence -- i.e., not the area inside of the geofence -- to correspond to the disputed subject matter of independent claims 1, 10, and 24. See id. at 4; supra. Additionally, we find that the Examiner’s reliance on the teachings of Aguirre De Carcer does not cure the deficiency in the Examiner’s rejection. Thus, we determine that the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 10, and 24 is inadequately supported and do not sustain the rejection of these claims as well as the claims that depend therefrom. The Examiner also does not rely on Morgan’s teachings in any manner that would remedy the deficiency in the Examiner’s rejection as discussed above. Therefore, we likewise do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 31. Appeal 2021-004288 Application 15/836,223 6 CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 5-30 103 Jin, Aguirre De Carcer 1, 2, 5-30 31 103 Jin, Aguirre De Carcer, Morgan 31 Overall Outcome 1, 2, 5-31 REVERSED