Playboy Enterprises International, Inc.v.Rick Worobec

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 18, 2008

No. 91165814 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 18, 2008)

Mailed:
March 18, 2008

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Playboy Enterprises International, Inc.
v.
Rick Worobec
_____

Opposition No. 91165814
to application Serial No. 78430099
filed on June 4, 2004
_____

William T. McGrath of Davis McGrath LLC for Playboy
Enterprises International, Inc.

Claire F. Hawkins of Christensen O’Connor Johnson Kindness
PLLC for Rick Worobec
______

Before Walters, Cataldo and Bergsman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Rick Worobec filed an intent to use application on the
Principal Register for the mark PLAY BODY, in standard
character format, for “clothing, namely, under garments,
swimwear; footwear, namely shoes,” in Class 25 (Serial No.
78430099). Playboy Enterprises International, Inc. has
opposed the registration of applicant’s mark on the ground
of priority of use and likelihood of confusion. Opposer has
alleged that applicant’s mark PLAY BODY, when used in
connection with clothing, is likely to cause confusion with
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Opposition No. 91165814
2
opposer’s famous PLAYBOY trademarks, used in connection with
a wide variety of goods and services, including clothing.1
Applicant denied the salient allegations in the notice of
opposition.
The Record
By operation of Trademark Rule 2.122, 37 CFR §2.122,
the record includes the pleadings and the application file
for applicant’s mark. The record also includes the
following testimony and evidence:
A. Opposer’s evidence.
1. Notice of reliance on a certified copy, showing
the current status and ownership in opposer, of Registration
No. 3140250 for the mark PLAYBOY, in standard character
form, for lingerie, sleepwear, loungewear, wraps, and
robes;2
2. Notice of reliance on applicant’s responses to
opposer’s first set of requests for admission;
3. Notice of reliance on applicant’s responses to
opposer’s first set of interrogatories;

1 Opposer also alleged that the registration of applicant’s mark
will cause dilution of opposer’s famous PLAYBOY trademarks, but
presented no arguments in support of that claim in its brief. We
therefore deem opposer to have waived its pleaded dilution
ground, and we have given it no consideration.
2 The registration issued September 5, 2006. Opposer claimed
first use anywhere and first use in commerce on August 1, 1960.
Opposition No. 91165814
3
4. Testimony deposition of Judy Kawal, opposer’s
Senior Director of Business Management in the licensing
group, with attached exhibits; and,
5. Testimony deposition of Michelle McCoy, opposer’s
in-house trademark counsel, with attached exhibits.
B. Applicant’s evidence.
1. Notice of reliance on opposer’s responses to
applicant’s first set of interrogatories;
2. Notice of reliance on the definition of the word
“Playboy” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language, p. 1737 (1993); and,
3. Notice of reliance on 14 photocopies from the
Trademark Office electronic search system of trademark
registrations including the word “Play.”
Standing
In her testimony deposition, Michele McCoy introduced
into evidence certified copies of opposer’s pleaded
registrations showing their current status and their title
in opposer. The following registrations were made of
record:3

3 We previously noted that opposer introduced a certified copy of
Registration No. 3140250 through a notice of reliance. Opposer
also included a certified copy of Registration No. 2485583 for
the mark PLAYBOY, in typed drawing form, for “clothing articles,
namely, vest and bow ties, cummerbunds and pocket squares,” in
Class 25. That registration issued on September 4, 2001.
However, no declaration of use in accordance with Section 8 of
the Trademark Act of 1946 has been filed. Accordingly, we will
not give this registration any further consideration.
Opposition No. 91165814
4
1. Registration No. 984548 for the mark PLAYBOY and
design, shown below, for “articles of men’s and women’s
clothing, namely, shirts, sleepwear, ties, sweaters, warm-up
shirts,” in Class 25;4

2. Registration No. 1328611 for the mark PLAYBOY, in
typed drawing form, for “clothing articles, namely, shirts,
ties, t-shirts, ski jackets, gym shorts, sweatpants, bathing
suits, briefs, hosiery, sport socks, collared button-down
knit shirts, sweat shorts, sweaters, velour tops, jogging
suits, and shorts,” in Class 25;5
3. Registration No. 1318244 for the mark PLAYBOY and
design, shown below, for “footwear,” in Class 25;6 and,

4 The registration issued on May 21, 1974; Sections 8 and 15
affidavits accepted and acknowledged; second renewal.
5 The registration issued on April 2, 1985; Sections 8 and 15
affidavits accepted and acknowledged; renewed.
6 The registration issued on February 5, 1985; Sections 8 and 15
affidavits accepted and acknowledged; renewed.
Opposition No. 91165814
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4. Registration No. 1320822 for the mark PLAYBOY, in
typed drawing form, for “footwear,” in Class 25.7
During her deposition Ms. McCoy also testified that
Registration No. 0600018 for the mark PLAYBOY, in block
letters, for a monthly magazine is an active registration
and that opposer owns it.8
Because opposer has properly made its pleaded
registrations of record, opposer has established its
standing. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55
USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lipton Industries, Inc.
v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189
(CCPA 1982).
Priority
Because opposer’s pleaded registrations are of record,
Section 2(d) priority is not an issue in the opposition.
King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d
1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974).
Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination of likelihood of confusion under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C.
§1052(d), is based on an analysis of all the facts in
evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the

7 The registration issued on February 19, 1985; Sections 8 and 15
affidavits accepted and acknowledged; renewed.
8 The registration issued on December 28, 1954; Sections 8 and 15
affidavits accepted and acknowledged; third renewal. (McCoy
Dep., pp. 18-20; Exhibits 36 and 37).
Opposition No. 91165814
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likelihood of confusion issue. In re E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567
(CCPA 1973). The relevant du Pont factors are discussed
below.
A. Whether opposer’s PLAYBOY mark is famous?
We turn first to the factor of fame, because this
factor plays a dominant role in cases featuring a famous or
strong mark. Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Arts
Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). Famous marks are accorded more protection
precisely because they are more likely to be remembered and
associated in the public mind than a weaker mark. Id.
Indeed, “[a] strong mark . . . casts a long shadow which
competitors must avoid.” Id. A famous mark is one “with
extensive public recognition and renown.” Id. See also
Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
In determining whether a mark is famous, we may
consider sales, advertising expenditures, and the length of
time the mark has been used. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio
Products Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1309 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Blue Man Productions Inc. v. Tarmann, 75 USPQ2s
1811, 1817 (TTAB 2005). This information, however, must be
placed in context (e.g., a comparison of advertising figures
Opposition No. 91165814
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with competitive products, market share, reputation of the
product, etc.). Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products Inc.,
supra.
Opposer’s primary business is the distribution of a
monthly men’s magazine. Over time, it has expanded into
three separate divisions: publishing, entertainment (i.e.,
wireless, online, and television), and licensing (i.e.,
licensed products and freestanding locations including clubs
and retail stores).9 The first issue of PLAYBOY magazine
was distributed in December 1953, and it has been published
continuously ever since. The first issue featured Marilyn
Monroe on the cover.10 PLAYBOY magazine is the best selling
monthly men’s magazine in the world.11 It is 14th largest
“consumer publication” in the United States.12 It has a
paid circulation in the United States of 3 million, which is
larger than Esquire, GQ, and Men’s Journal combined.13 More
than 10 million people read the magazine each month.14
In addition, opposer publishes, on average, 25 special
editions per year. Those publications have a circulation of
more than 2 million and a readership of approximately 7.5

9 Kawal Dep., p. 7.
10 McCoy Dep., p. 23.
11 McCoy Dep., p. 23.
12 McCoy Dep., p. 24
13 McCoy Dep., p. 23; Exhibits 39-43 (publisher’s statements by
the Audit Bureau of Circulations, an independent third party that
monitors circulation figures).
14 McCoy Dep., p. 24.
Opposition No. 91165814
8
million.15 There is an online edition of PLAYBOY magazine,
and it has more than 15,000 subscribers.16
In addition to its photographic pictorials of women,
PLAYBOY magazine is noted for publishing interviews with
famous people, including Jimmy Carter, Yasir Arafat, Donald
Trump, Michael Jordan, Nicole Kidman, Jack Nicholson, George
Clooney, Bill Gates, and others.17 Also, many noted authors
have contributed to the magazine, including Jane Smiley,
John Updike, Scott Turow, Kurt Vonnegut, Michael Creighton,
and Stephen King.18 Some of the well-known women who have
posed for PLAYBOY pictorials include Marilyn Monroe, Pamela
Anderson, Anna Nicole Smith, Carmen Electra, Cindy Crawford,
Drew Barrymore, Elle MacPherson, and Jenny McCarthy.19
Opposer also operates a PLAYBOY television network.
The PLAYBOY television network is available to
approximately 30 million households in the U.S. and
Canada.20 The PLAYBOY trademark is prominently featured on
network broadcasts.21 Also, opposer operates a radio

15 McCoy Dep., pp. 25-26.
16 McCoy Dep., p. 27.
17 McCoy Dep., pp. 27-28.
18 McCoy Dep., p. 28.
19 McCoy Dep., p. 29.
20 McCoy Dep., pp. 29-30. We understand Ms. McCoy’s testimony to
be that 30 million households have access to the PLAYBOY
television network, not that 30 million households subscribe or
watch the PLAYBOY network.
21 McCoy Dep., p. 30.
Opposition No. 91165814
9
channel on SIRIUS Satellite Radio. It airs 24 hours a day,
7 days a week.22
Opposer has a retail website at www.playboystore.com.
That website averages 500,000 “unique visitors every month,”
and it ships more than 300,000 orders annually.23 In
addition, opposer provides mail order service. It has
distributed catalogs to over 10 million people.24
Opposer’s licensing business began in 1970.25 Today,
opposer licenses a wide variety of PLAYBOY branded products,
including key chains, jewelry, outerwear, undergarments,
shirts, swimwear, lingerie, socks, scarves, ties, footwear,
headwear, apparel accessories, bags, luggage, and
cosmetics.26 In 2006, retail sales for all of opposer’s
PLAYBOY branded products was in excess of $120 million,
including $40 million for apparel items.27 In 2005,
opposer’s retail sales for PLAYBOY branded produces was also
approximately $120 million, and it was approximately $115

22 McCoy Dep., p. 31.
23 McCoy Dep., p. 32; Kawal Dep., p. 18. Subsequently, Ms. McCoy
testified that “We do have a publicly available number for
Playboy on-line, and it looks like we have 6 million unique
visitors, and 68 million page views each month.” McCoy Dep., p.
37. However, it is not clear whether Ms. McCoy’s testimony is
limited to the United States or references worldwide activity.
24 McCoy Dep., p. 35; Kawal Dep., p. 19. It is not clear whether
the testimony is referring to distribution in the United States
or worldwide.
25 Kawal Dep., p. 13.
26 Kawal Dep. pp. 8-9, 11, and 26.
27 Kawal Dep., p. 11. However, Ms. Kawal later testified that
retail sales for apparel items averaged approximately $50 million
per year in 2004, 2005, and 2006. (Kawal Dep., p. 15).
Opposition No. 91165814
10
million in 2004.28 Opposer’s licensees have spent in excess
of $900,000 per year advertising PLAYBOY branded products in
2004, 2005, and 2006.29
PLAYBOY branded products can be found in approximately
3500 different stores in the United States, including Henri
Bendel, Bloomingdales, Urban Outfitters, Hot Topic, Spencer
Gifts, and Kitson.30
Opposer receives unsolicited media attention in
television, online, and in magazines and newspapers on
almost a daily basis.31 For example, in the period between
March 14, 2007 and March 20, 2007, “Playboy” was referenced
on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno (NBC), The Late Show
(CBS), Two and a Half Men (CBS), Real Sports with Bryant
Gumbel (HBO), The Real Housewives of Orange County (Bravo),
and Paradise City (ETV).32 Opposer is also referenced in
the press (e.g., Esquire, Newsweek, Teen Vogue, Chicago
Tribune, Cosmopolitan, New York Post, and the New York Daily
News).33
Opposer also receives unsolicited media attention when
celebrities wear PLAYBOY apparel, including Justin

28 Kawal Dep., p. 12.
29 Kawal Dep., p. 15.
30 Kawal Dep., p. 16.
31 McCoy Dep., pp. 40-41.
32 McCoy Dep., Exhibit 45.
33 Kawal Dep., pp. 38-39; Exhibit 13.
Opposition No. 91165814
11
Timberlake, Britney Spears, Christina Aguilera, Paris
Hilton, Posh Spice, Jay-Z, and Jewel.34
The Wikipedia website reports that “Playboy is one of
the world’s best known brands.”35 Finally, although
applicant denies that the PLAYBOY mark is famous,36 he
admits that the “PLAYBOY trademark is widely recognized in
the United States.”37
In view of the foregoing, opposer has established that
its PLAYBOY mark is famous and thus entitled to a broad
scope of protection.38 In this regard, we note that several

34 Kawal Dep., pp. 36-37; Exhibit 12.
35 Kawal Dep., Exhibit 18 (http://en.wikipedia.org). We note this
evidence simply for what is reported in Wikipedia and how its
contributors perceive the PLAYBOY trademark. We also note that
the May 15, 2003 issue of Rolling Stone magazine identified
opposer’s bunny logo as a significant American logo. The theme
of the May issue was “American Icons.” (Kawal Dep., Exhibit 16).
36 Applicant’s Response to Request for Admission No. 11.
37 Applicant’s Response to Request for Admission No. 10.
38 Although we have found that PLAYBOY is famous for purposes of
opposer’s likelihood of confusion claim, we have not addressed
the question of whether PLAYBOY is famous in the context of a
dilution claim. Fame for likelihood of confusion and dilution is
not the same. Fame for dilution requires a more stringent
showing. Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 UPQP2d 1689, 1694 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 USPQ2d 1164, 1170 (TTAB
2001). Likelihood of confusion fame “varies along a spectrum
from very strong to very weak” while dilution fame is an
either/or proposition – it either exists or it does not exist.
Id. See also Carefirst of Maryland Inc. v. FirstHealth of the
Carolinas Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1492, 1507 (TTAB 2005) (likelihood of
confusion “[f]ame is relative . . . not absolute”). A mark,
therefore, may have acquired sufficient public recognition and
renown to be famous for purposes of likelihood of confusion
without meeting the more stringent requirement for dilution fame.
Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 USPQ2d at 1170, citing I.P. Lund
Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 USPQ2d 1225, 1239 (1st
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he standard for fame and distinctiveness required
to obtain anti-dilution protection is more rigorous than that
required to seek infringement protection”).
Opposition No. 91165814
12
courts have recognized that opposer’s mark is strong and
should be accorded a high degree of protection. Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 687 F.2d
563, 215 USPQ 662, 665 (2nd Cir. 1982) (PLAYBOY is
distinctive and is widely recognized); Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552, 29 USPQ2d 1827, 1833 (M.D.
Fla. 1993) (PLAYBOY is a well-known mark and widely
associated with Playboy Enterprises); Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. P. K. Sorren Export Company, Inc. of Florida, 546
F.Supp. 987, 218 USPQ 795, 800 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (PLAYBOY is
a strong mark, entitled to broad protection). In addition,
we also note that applicant has not introduced any evidence
of third party uses of PLAYBOY that would weaken the
strength of opposer’s mark. The 14 third-party
registrations consisting, in whole or in part, of the word
“play” for clothing are insufficient to show that opposer’s
mark is a weak mark entitled to a limited scope of
protection.
B. The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods
as described in the application and registration.

The goods identified in applicant’s application are
“clothing, namely, under garments, swimwear; footwear,
namely shoes.” Opposer has pleaded and proven ownership of
registrations that include a wide variety of clothing,
including lingerie, briefs, bathing suits, and footwear.
Thus, the goods at issue are at least in part identical.
Opposition No. 91165814
13
The fact that the only some of the products listed in the
description of goods are identical is sufficient to support
finding that there is a likelihood of confusion. Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 648 F.2d
1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981) (likelihood of confusion
must be found if there is likely to be confusion with
respect to any items that comes within the identification of
goods in the application). The fact that opposer’s
registrations include additional items does not obviate the
relatedness of the identical products. Id.
C. The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-
to-continue trade channels and buyers to whom sales are
made.

Given the identical nature of the parties’ goods
(clothing, namely, under garments, swimwear, and footwear)
and the absence of any trade channel restrictions in either
party’s description of goods, we must presume that the
clothing products of the parties would be marketed in the
same channels of trade, to the same classes of purchasers.
Genseco Inc. v. Martz, 66 USPQ2d 1260 1268 (TTAB 2003)
(“Given the in-part identical and in-part related nature of
the parties’ goods, and the lack of any trade restrictions
in the identifications thereof as to channels and
purchasers, these clothing items could be offered and sold
to the same classes of purchasers through the same channels
of trade”); In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ 1531, 1532
Opposition No. 91165814
14
(TTAB 1994) (“Because the goods are legally identical, they
must be presumed to travel in the same channels of trade,
and be sold to the same class of purchasers”); Miles
Laboratories v. Naturally Vitamin Supplements, 1 USPQ2d
1445, 1450 (TTAB 1987).

D. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression.

We now turn to the du Pont factor focusing on the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties
as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression. In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 USPQ
at 567. In a particular case, any one of the these means of
comparison may be critical in finding the marks to be
similar. In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041, 1042 (TTAB
1988). See also In re White Swan Ltd., 9 USPQ2d 1534, 1535
(TTAB 1988). In comparing the marks, we are mindful that
where, as here, the goods are in-part identical, the degree
of similarity necessary to find likelihood of confusion need
not be as great as where there is a recognizable disparity
between the goods. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century
Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Real Estate One, Inc. v. Real Estate 100
Enterprises Corporation, 212 USPQ 957, 959 (TTAB 1981); ECI
Division of E-Systems, Inc. v. Environmental Communications
Incorporated, 207 USPQ 443, 449 (TTAB 1980).
Opposition No. 91165814
15
Opposer’s PLAYBOY marks and applicant’s PLAY BODY mark
are similar in appearance because they share the word “play”
at the beginning of the mark, followed by the letters “BO,”
in “boy” and “body,” and ending in the letter “y.” The
significance of the word “play” is highlighted by its
location as the first word of each mark. Presto Products
Inc. v. Nice-Pak Products, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB
1988)(“it is often the first part of a mark which is most
likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and
remembered”). See also Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692
(Fed. Cir. 2005)(“Veuve” is the most prominent part of the
mark VEUVE CLICQUOT because “veuve” is the first word in the
mark and the first word to appear on the label); Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, supra (upon
encountering the marks, consumers must first notice the
identical lead word). While there are differences between
the appearance of opposer’s PLAYBOY mark and applicant’s
PLAY BODY mark, the similarities outweigh the
dissimilarities.
Likewise, we find that the marks are more aurally
similar than dissimilar.
The marks PLAYBOY and PLAY BODY have different
meanings. The word “Playboy” is a recognized word meaning
“a young and wealthy man who lives a frivolous indolent life
Opposition No. 91165814
16
devoted chiefly to the pursuit of pleasure.”39 On the other
hand, the term “play body” appears to be a coined term
without any recognized meaning. However, because of the
renown of opposer’s PLAYBOY marks, consumers may associate
the marks PLAYBOY and PLAY BODY with a single source because
of the emphasis opposer places on photographic pictorials of
women in its magazines. The marks engender a similar
commercial impression created, on the one hand, by the
above-noted meaning of the word “playboy” and opposer’s
renown for featuring naked women in its magazines, and, on
the other hand, by applicant’s use of the word “body” in its
mark PLAY BODY causing consumers to draw a connection
between PLAY BODY and PLAYBOY featuring photographs of
women’s bodies.
While there are differences between the marks PLAYBOY
and PLAY BODY, we find that on balance the similarities
outweigh the differences.
E. Balancing the factors.
In view of the fame of opposer’s PLAYBOY mark, the
identity of the goods, and the similarity of the marks, we
find that applicant’s use of PLAY BODY, in connection with
“clothing, namely, under garments, swimwear; footwear,
namely shoes,” is likely to cause confusion with the mark

39 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged, 1737 (1993) introduced through applicant’s
second notice of reliance.
Opposition No. 91165814
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PLAYBOY for clothing, including lingerie, briefs, bathing
suits, and footwear.
Decision: The opposition is sustained and registration
to applicant is refused.