PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Oct 16, 2018

06-CA-212627 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 16, 2018)

JD–67–18
Pittsburgh, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A
PITTSBURGH POST–GAZETTE,
and
THE NEWSPAPER GUILD OF PITTSBURGH Case 06–CA–212627
A/W COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA,
AFL–CIO, CLC, AND ITS LOCAL 38061,
PITTSBURGH MAILERS UNION NO. M-22, A/W THE Case 06–CA–217525
PRINTING, PUBLISHING, AND MEDIA WORKERS
SECTOR OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF
AMERICA, AFL–CIO, AND ITS LOCAL 14842,
PITTSBURGH TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 7, A/W Case 06–CA–217527
THE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, Case 06–CA–217529
AFL–CIO, AND ITS LOCAL 14827,
NEWSPAPER, NEWSPRINT, MAGAZINE AND FILM Case 06–CA–217980
DELIVERY DRIVERS, HELPERS AND HANDLERS, A/W
THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
AND ITS LOCAL UNION NO. 211 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
PITTSBURGH NEWSPAPER PRINTING PRESSMEN’S/ Case 06–CA–218637
PAPER HANDLERS LOCAL UNION NO. 9N, A/W THE
GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE/
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
AND ITS LOCAL 24M/9N,
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING Case 06–CA–220480
ENGINEERS, AFL–CIO, LOCAL 95.
Decision and Recommended Order
DAVID I. GOLDMAN
Administrative Law Judge
For the General Counsel: Zachary A. Hebert,
Esq. (NLRB), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
For the Respondent: Howard M. Kastrinsky,
Esq., Richard C. Lowe, Esq. and Michael D.
Oesterle, Esq., (King & Ballow), Nashville,
Tennessee
For the Charging Parties: Joseph J. Pass,
Esq. (Jubelirer, Pass & Intrieri, P.C., and
Marianne Oliver, Esq. (Gilardi, Oliver &
Lomupo, P.A.), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Richard Rosenblatt, Esq. (Rosenblatt &
Gosch, PLLC), Greenwood Village, Colorado
JD–67–18
Table of Contents
Page
Decision................................................................................................................................ 1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the case ..................................................................................................... 2
Jurisdiction...................................................................................................................... 3
Unfair Labor Practices..................................................................................................... 3
Findings of Fact......................................................................................................... 3
Background ......................................................................................................... 3
Employee health care coverage under the 2014 Agreements.............................. 5
Employer contributions to the Fund in 2015, 2016, and 2017 .............................. 7
Negotiations for successor agreements to replace the 2014 Agreements............ 8
Expiration and/or extension of the 2014 Agreements........................................... 8
The PG’s refusal to pay the Fund contribution rate increase for 2018.................. 8
Analysis................................................................................................................... 12
1. The statutory duty to maintain the status quo of terms and
conditions of employment requires the PG to continue to
pay the annual increase in the Fund contribution rate.................................. 12
2. Various contractual defenses (contract coverage, waiver,
sound arguable basis) and 2014 bargaining ................................................ 19
3. The waiver-by-inaction defense in fall 2017 and early 2018......................... 22
4. The Section 302 defense............................................................................. 23
5. The Unions’ contention that the PG’s statutory
status quo obligations require it to fund the
existing health care coverage (without a cap) .............................................. 25
Conclusions of Law ................................................................................................. 26
Remedy................................................................................................................... 29
Order .................................................................................................................... 30
Appendix
JD–67–18
1
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
DAVID I. GOLDMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. These cases consider an employer’s5
obligation under federal labor law to maintain the status quo in employment terms and conditions
while it negotiates with its employees’ unions for new labor agreements to replace expired (or
temporarily extended) collective-bargaining agreements.
As established under each of the seven collective-bargaining agreements between the 10
employer and its employees’ unions, beginning January 1, 2015, the employees’ health care
coverage was to be provided through a plan sponsored by a Taft-Hartley health and welfare fund,
paid for by the employer’s monthly contributions to the fund of $1,229 for each participating
employee. A schedule of the benefits purchased by these contributions was attached to and part
of each labor agreement. The labor agreements provided that for calendar year 2016, and again 15
in 2017, the employer would increase the monthly per employee contributions as established by
the fund, with the only limitation being that the employer would not be responsible for any portion
of an annual increase in excess of 5.0%. The employer paid the annual increases in 2016 and
2017, as required under the labor agreements. It continued to pay the 2017 monthly contribution
rate after the March 31, 2017 expiration and/or temporary extension of the labor agreements20
while the parties negotiated for new agreements.
The problem that became these cases arose in the fall of 2017, when the fund announced
its annual contribution rate increase for January 2018. The employer refused to pay the increase.
As a result, the fund reduced the health care benefits for the employees beginning April 2018. 25
The National Labor Relations Act (Act) requires that (until impasse or agreement) an
employer must continue the status quo in the terms and conditions of employment while the
parties negotiate for a new labor agreement. Here, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board (Board) contends that this statutory obligation required the employer to continue 30
providing the annual increases in fund contributions, as it did in 2016 and 2017 under the labor
agreements. The General Counsel contends that the employer’s 2018 discontinuance of the
annual increases up to 5%--which resulted in a reduction of the existing level of health care
benefits for employees—constitutes an unlawful unilateral change in terms and conditions in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 35
As discussed herein, I find that the employer’s refusal in 2018 to continue to pay the fund
annual contribution was a violation of the Act, as alleged. As discussed herein, Board precedent
amply supports this result, and does not support the employer’s claim that its refusal to continue
the annual increases—but simply to maintain the 2017 rate—satisfies its obligation under the Act. 40
I find the employer’s various defenses—whether rooted in the terms of the labor agreements, in
the unions’ response to the employer’s plans to discontinue the increases, or the claim that
increased funding would violate Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act—to be without merit.
In reaching this result I do not reach the General Counsel’s alternative argument (GC Br. 45
at 23–25) that the duty to continue the annual increases in contributions became a term and
condition of employment through a “traditional past practice analysis.” I also do not reach the
unions’ argument—not advanced by the General Counsel, and not posed, to date, by the facts—
that should there be future annual contribution increases above 5%, the employer’s statutory duty
to maintain the status quo will not be limited by the 5% cap that limited its contractual obligations 50
in 2016 and 2017.
JD–67–18
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 5, 2018, the Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh a/w Communications Workers of
America, AFL–CIO, CLC, and its Local 38061 (the Guild) filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging violations of the Act by the PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a/ Pittsburgh Post–Gazette 5
(Employer or PG), docketed by Region 6 of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) as Case
06–CA–212627. The charge was amended by the Guild on April 25, 2018.
Based on an investigation into this case, on April 26, 2018, the Board’s General Counsel,
by the Regional Director for Region 6 of the Board, issued a complaint and notice of hearing 10
alleging that the PG had violated the Act. The PG filed an answer to the complaint on May 8,
2018, denying all alleged violations of the Act.
On March 30, 2018, the Pittsburgh Mailers Union No. M–22, a/w the Printing, Publishing,
and Media Workers Sector of the Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local 15
14842 (the Mailers Union) filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging violations of the Act by the
PG, docketed by Region 6 of the Board as Case 06–CA–217525. The charge was amended by
the Mailers Union on May 3, 2018.
On March 30, 2018, the Pittsburgh Typographical Union No. 7, a/w the Communications 20
Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local 14827 (the Typographical Union) filed two unfair
labor practice charges alleging violations of the Act by the PG, docketed by Region 6 of the Board
as Cases 06–CA–217527 and 06–CA–217529. The charges were amended by the
Typographical Union on May 2, 2018.
25
On April 6, 2018, the Newspaper, Newsprint, Magazine and Film Delivery Drivers, Helpers
and Handlers, a/w the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local Union No. 211 of
Allegheny County (the Delivery Union) filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging violations of
the Act by the PG, docketed by Region 6 of the Board as Case 06–CA–217980. The charge was
amended by the Delivery Union on May 2, 2018. 30
On April 18, 2018, the Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s/Paper Handlers Local
Union No. 9N, a/w the Graphic Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and its Local 24M/9N (the Pressmen’s Union) filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging violations of the Act by the PG, docketed by Region 6 of the Board as Case 06–CA–35
218637. The charge was amended by the Pressman’s Union on May 2, 2018

On May 18, 2018, the International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO, Local 95 (the
Operating Engineers) filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging violations of the Act by the
PG, docketed by Region 6 of the Board as Case 06–CA–2200480. The charge was amended by 40
the Operating Engineers on May 24, 2018.
Based on an investigation into these cases, on June 28, 2018, the Board’s General
Counsel, by the Regional Director for Region 6, issued an order consolidating cases 06–CA–
212627, 06–CA–217525, 06–CA–217527, 06–CA–217529, 06–CA–217980, 06–CA–218637, and 45
06–CA–220480, and issuing a consolidated amended complaint and notice of hearing in all of the
foregoing cases alleging that the PG had violated the Act. The PG filed an answer to the
amended consolidated complaint on July 9, 2018, denying all alleged violations of the Act.
A trial in this case was conducted on August 21, 2018, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. At the 50
commencement of the trial, counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the PG moved to
amend the complaint and answer to conform to certain stipulations reached between the parties.
JD–67–18
3
The motions were granted and the stipulations reached by the parties were admitted into
evidence as Joint Exhibits 1–16.
Counsel for the General Counsel, the Union,1 and the Respondent filed posttrial briefs in
support of their positions by September 25, 2018. 5
On the entire record, I make the following findings, conclusions of law, and
recommendations.
JURISDICTION10
At all material times, the PG has been a Pennsylvania corporation with an office and place
of business in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and has been engaged in publishing the The Pittsburgh
Post–Gazette, a newspaper. Annually, in conducting its operations, the PG derives gross
revenues in excess of $200,000 and publishes various nationally syndicated features, advertises 15
various nationally sold products, and holds membership in and subscribes to various interstate
news services, including the Associated Press. Annually, the PG purchases and receives at its
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania facility products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $5,000
directly from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It is alleged, admitted, and I
find, that at all material times, the PG has been an employer engaged in commerce within the 20
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It is alleged, admitted, and I find, that at all
material times, the Guild, the Mailers Union, the Typographical Union, the Delivery Union, the
Pressman’s Union, and the Operating Engineers, have each been a labor organization with the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
25
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects commerce and that the Board has
jurisdiction of these cases, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
30
FINDINGS OF FACT
Background
The PG publishes The Pittsburgh Post–Gazette, a daily newspaper. For many years the
PG has recognized the Guild as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a bargaining 35
unit of editorial employees,2 the Mailers Union as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit

1Throughout this decision, references to “the Unions” are to the Charging Parties in the
consolidated amended complaint, collectively. References to “each Union” are to each of the
Charging Parties.
2This “Editorial Unit” is composed of:
All employees in the Editorial Department and in all sub-divisions of the Editorial
Department, excluding those employees provided for in other existing Union
Agreements and all Publishers and Associate Publishers, Publisher and Editor-in-
Chief, Executive Editor, Editor of the Editorial Page, Managing Editor, Deputy
Managing Editor, Senior Assistant Managing Editor, Assistant Managing Editor,
City Editor, Sports Editor, Sunday Editor, Technology Systems Editor, Business
Editor, Night Operations Manager, Seen Editor, Associate Editor of Opinion
Pages, Editorial Cartoonist, and Confidential Secretaries.
JD–67–18
4
of mail room employees,3 the Typographical Union as the exclusive representative of a
bargaining unit of advertising employees4 and of a unit of finance employees,5 the Delivery Union
___________________________
3The “Mailing Room Unit” is composed of full-time employees described in the most recent
collective-bargaining agreement (Jt. Exh. 1(b)) between the Mailers Union and the PG as:
All employees covered by this Agreement. The words "employee" and
"employees" when used in this Contract apply to journeymen and apprentices. It is
recognized and agreed that the terms and conditions of employment covering
Part-Time mailer employees shall be as set forth in a separate agreement covering
such employees.
4The “Advertising Unit” is composed of:
All regular full time and regular part-time employees of the Advertising
Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employees, guards,
professional and supervisors as defined in the Act, and those specifically
excluded.”
Specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit is:
All employees in the Marketing, Research and Promotion Division, including
supervision, managerial, confidential, and all other employees, as well as such
employees added in the future, are excluded from the Advertising Unit. In
addition, the following positions are specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit:
Chief Revenue Officer Secretary to Classified Managers
Advertising Director Display Advertising Manager
Classified Manager Advertising Operations Manager
Classified Real Estate Manager Market Research Manager
Retail Manager Classified Recruitment Manager
Mgr. of Training and Sales Dev. Classified Operations Manager
Database Marketing Manager Production Services Supervisor
Co-Op and Special Sections Mgr. Product Design Manager
Classified Call Center Manager Research Analyst
Online Sales Manager Sales Manager - Automotive
Production Services Manager Sales Manager - Real Estate
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Online Sales Manager - Retail (Territories)
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Classified Sales Manager - New Business Dev.
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - National Sales Manager - Recruitment
Executive Assistant to Adv, Director Sales Manager – Major/National
Preprint Distribution Manager Sales Supervisor – Major/National
Retail Territory Sales Manager Sales Manager - Digital/Direct
Classified Automotive Sales Manager Production Services Manager
Quality Control Specialist
5The “Finance Unit” is composed of:
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the Financial Department;
excluding all other employees, confidential employees, guards, professional and
supervisors as defined in the Act. The following are recognized as being
confidential or supervisory employees excluded from the coverage of this
Agreement: Controller, Assistant Controller, Office Manager and their confidential
JD–67–18
5
as the exclusive representative of a unit of delivery employees,6 the Pressmen’s Union as the
exclusive representative of a unit of pressroom employees,7 and the Operating Engineers as the
exclusive representative of a unit of operating engineers.8
The recognition of these unions as the representative of the various bargaining units has
been embodied in successive collective-bargaining agreements between the PG and each Union, 5
with a separate collective-bargaining agreement covering the terms and conditions of each of the
seven bargaining units described above.
On September 11, 2014, the Unions, negotiating together as the “Unity Council,” reached
a settlement agreement with the PG for new labor agreements covering these seven units.9
Each of these successor agreements, one covering each bargaining unit, became 10
effective on various dates in October or November 2014, and continued by their terms to at least
March 31, 2017 (the 2014 Agreements).
Employee health care coverage under the 2014 Agreements
In recent years, before 2015, the collectively-bargained health care coverage for
employees had been provided through a self-insured plan sponsored by the PG. The PG paid for 15
___________________________
secretaries, Accounting Manager, Auditor, Credit Manager, Cashier Manager,
Circulation Accounting Supervisor, Advertising Accounting Supervisor, and Payroll
Supervisor.
6The “Delivery Unit” is composed of all employees performing the delivery-related work
described in more detail in Sect. 2 (Jurisdiction) of the most recent collective-bargaining
agreement between the Delivery Union and the PG. See, Sect. 2 of Jt. Exh. 1(e).
7The “Pressmen’s Unit” is composed of:
All journeymen pressmen, paperhandlers, paperhandling pressmen, and
apprentice pressmen who work in the Company's pressroom and paperhandling
departments.
8The “Operating Engineers Unit” is composed of”
all employees employed by [the Respondent] at its facility located at 2201
Sweeney Drive, Clinton, P A; but excluding guards, office clericals, managerial
personnel, confidential personnel, supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, and all other personnel.
The parties stipulated that on March 9, 2017, the PG and the Operating Engineers tentatively
agreed to change the facility address listed in the above-unit description and the change will be
incorporated into any successor labor agreement entered into by the PG and the Operating
Engineers.
9For some years, going back to the 1990s, the various Unions negotiated together with the
PG (and until it ceased printing, with another Pittsburgh newspaper, the Pittsburgh Press) in a
multi-union bargaining organization composed of all the union-represented units at the PG. This
multi-union bargaining group was called the Unity Council, and from its inception was represented
in bargaining by Attorney Joseph Pass.
JD–67–18
6
the health care coverage (Tr. 31), although beginning in 2006, the PG bargained for a wage
“diversion” which offset some of the health care costs with a reduction from wages.
In the 2014 Agreements, a significant change was made to the health care coverage, one
that set the stage for the instant dispute. Pursuant to each of the 2014 Agreements, beginning
January 1, 2015, health care coverage for participating employees was no longer provided5
through an employer-sponsored plan but, instead, through participation in a multi-employer Taft-
Hartley health and welfare fund. The 2014 Agreements provided that beginning January 1, 2015,
bargaining unit employees would be able to participate in the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters
and Employers’ Welfare Fund (the Fund). The parties stipulate that on January 1, 2015, the PG
began participating in the Fund. 10
The schedule of benefits that the PG employees would receive from the Fund’s plan 9PG
was attached to or made an exhibit to each of the 2014 Agreements. The schedule of benefits
summarized the deductibles, out-of-pocket maximum, and coverage for various procedures and
care under the plan. The schedule of benefits also compared the 9PG benefits to the benefits
offered by the existing PG health care plan that remained in effect under the 2014 Agreements 15
until January 1, 2015.
Under the terms of each of the 2014 Agreements, beginning January 1, 2015, the PG
would pay the Fund a per-employee monthly rate. In addition, under the terms of the 2014
Agreements, the wage “diversion” continued, with a percentage of employee wages being held
back.10 However, the employees contributed nothing to the Fund for their health care—the PG20
paid the full contribution rate set by the Fund.
The 2014 Agreements provided a set rate for the PG’s 2015 contributions to the Fund,
which was $1,229 per month for each participating employee. The 2014 Agreements also
recognized the prospect of annual increases to the Fund’s contribution rate, but expressly limited
the amount of increase that the PG would be required to pay in 2016 and 2017, to a 5.0% annual 25
increase. More precisely, the 2014 Agreements read in pertinent part:
(1) Effective January 1, 2015, all eligible bargaining unit employees will participate
in the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund (the
"Fund"). Participation in the plan is limited to employees averaging annually more
than 30 hours per week. 30
(2) The required PG contributions for the calendar year 2015 will be $1,229 per
month for each participating full-time bargaining unit employee (regardless of
family size) and regardless of the option chosen.
(3) The PG contributions for years 2016 and 2017 will not exceed a 5.0% annual35
increase above the $1,229 per month set forth above for calendar year 2015. Any
such increases must be based upon the plan design effective January 1, 2015.
The PG will receive from the Fund at least 60 days notice of any such annual
contribution increase prior to January 1. . . .
40

10Under the different 2014 Agreements, there was some variation among the bargaining units
in the amount and ceiling of the diversion. The differences are not material to the issues at hand.
JD–67–18
7
Under the terms of the Agreements, any increase in the Fund’s contribution rate in 2016
and 2017 beyond the 5.0% cap would be the financial responsibility of the employees. The PG
agreed to perform the withholding of these additional amounts from employee pay under limited
and prescribed circumstances. Paragraph 3, above, continues:
5
Increases in excess of 5% will be the responsibility of the bargaining unit members
via direct billings from the Fund. If direct billing is not available, the PG will only
assume responsibility for any withholding of any additional amounts after receiving
the expressed written consent of each member and will not assume any other
responsibility for collection of any other amounts, or be liable for any other 10
payment to the Fund, other than as stated above.11
After the September 2014 settlement agreement, questions arose between the parties
over how the 5% cap would operate. On October 13, 2014, PG Human Resources Vice-
President Stephen Spolar sent Union attorney Pass a document that Spolar described to Pass in 15
a cover memo as “our explanation of the 5% cap.”
The document was an Excel spreadsheet prepared by the PG’s outside benefits
consultant, Elliot Dinkin, and reviewed internally by PG representatives before being provided to
the Unions. The spreadsheet provided hypothetical examples for a variety of future Fund 20
contribution rate increases to show how the cap would affect annual increases paid by the PG.
The spreadsheet was titled “PG Determination of share of benefit costs–2015-2017,” and
projected hypothetical annual Fund contribution rates and increases to be paid by the PG for the
years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018.
25
Employer contributions to the Fund in 2015, 2016, and 2017
As set forth in the labor agreements, for the calendar year 2015, the PG contributed
$1,229 per month for each bargaining unit employee participating in the Fund.
30
In the fall of 2015, the Fund notified the parties that for the calendar year 2016, the
contribution rate was going to increase by 5.9%—0.9% more than the contractual cap on the
PGs’ annual contributions increase. As a result, the PG increased its contribution rate by 5% for
2016, or $1,290.45 per employee per month. However, as to the shortfall of 0.9%, instead of
employees making up the difference as originally envisioned under the contracts, the Fund, with 35
the agreement of the Unions and the PG, reduced the health care benefits to employees,
increasing the deductible applicable to participating PG employees and their families. In a
conversation with Teamsters Union President Joe Molinaro, PG Human Resources Vice-
President Stephen Spolar agreed to this change in the deductibles as a resolution of the issue.
40
In the fall of 2016, the Fund notified the PG that the contribution rate would increase by
5% for the calendar year 2017. Accordingly, in calendar year 2017, the PG increased its monthly
contributions to the Fund by 5%, to $1,354.97 for each participating employee.
45

11I have reproduced and quoted (in pertinent part) the language from Exhibit A of the
September 11, 2014 PG-Unity Council Settlement Agreement. This language on health care was
part of each unit’s collective-bargaining agreement. (Any minor variations in the labor
agreement’s active employee health care language are nonmaterial). Each of the 2014
Agreements included this language, along with a schedule of benefits of the Fund’s plan 9PG,
included by exhibit or attachment, which was the plan covering employees.
JD–67–18
8
As discussed below, the 2014 Agreements expired (or in two cases were extended) as of
March 31, 2017. The PG continued paying into the Fund (at the 2017 contribution rate) for all
units after March 31, 2017, as the parties negotiated for new agreements.
Negotiations for successor agreements to replace the 2014 Agreements5
The 2014 Agreements were scheduled to expire on March 31, 2017. In January 2017, the
PG notified the Unions of its intention to negotiate a successor labor agreement separately with
each Union and not through the multiunion Unity Council bargaining as had been done in past
years. Pursuant to the PG’s demand, bargaining commenced with each unit bargaining
separately. Since then, and to date, the PG has met with each of the Unions for bargaining and 10
has exchanged bargaining proposals. The PG’s proposal for health care coverage under the
successor agreements provides that employee health care coverage will no longer be provided
through the Fund.
However, to date, no successor collective-bargaining agreements have been reached
between the PG and any of the Unions. 15
For these negotiations for successor agreements to the 2014 Agreements, Attorney Pass
specifically represents all of the Unions for purposes of the health care coverage issues, for which
common proposals are being made by the parties. More generally, Pass represents the Guild
and the Teamsters, although he has also appeared at meetings for some of the other unions.
Expiration and/or extension of 2014 Agreements20
As of March 31, 2017, the agreements expired for the mailing room unit, the advertising
unit, the finance unit, the delivery unit, and the pressmen’s unit. Since March 31, 2017, the
employees in these units have been working without an agreement while their Union and the PG
attempt to bargain a successor agreement.
The situation is nominally different for two of the units, the Guild-represented Editorial 25
Unit, and the Operating Engineers-represented unit of operating engineers. On March 29, 2017,
before expiration of their Agreement, the Operating Engineers and the PG entered into an
agreement extending the 2014 Agreement while the parties negotiate a new agreement. Under
this extension agreement, either party has the right to terminate the contract upon ten days
written notice. As to the Guild unit, the 2014 Agreement between the Guild and the PG contains30
a clause that provides that “the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall remain in effect as
long as negotiations continue” for a successor agreement. Thus, the Guild’s agreement remains
in effect on this basis.
The PG’s refusal to pay the Fund contribution rate increase for 2018
In the fall of 2017, the Fund sent a memo to Employer participants in the health and 35
welfare fund notifying them of the new monthly contribution rate to be effective January 2018, and
that would appear on the December 2017 invoice from the Fund. For the PG’s Fund plan, the
new announced rate was $1,422.49 per month per employee, an increase of $ 67.52 per month,
just under a 5% increase from the monthly rate the PG was paying in calendar year 2017.
40
JD–67–18
9
On October 25 and 26, 2017, the PG, by Human Resources Manager Linda Guest, sent
letters to the Fund, and to each Union representing a PG bargaining unit, regarding the “Annual
Rate Adjustment,” and stating that the PG was not obligated to pay the increased contribution
rate.
A separate letter was sent to the Fund regarding each Union, and a corresponding letter 5
sent to each Union, but notwithstanding any individual differences, in each letter the PG
maintained that under the applicable labor agreement “there is no provision for any increase in its
contribution to the Fund, after December 31, 2017.”
Each letter to the Fund concluded by stating: “We will be discussing this matter with the
Union. If, and when, a different contribution rate is agreed to with the Union, the Fund will be 10
informed.”
Each letter to a Union with which the 2014 Agreement had expired asserted that under the
expired agreement, “it appears that the Company is not contractually obligated to pay the Fund’s
increased contribution rate for 2018,” and asserted that “Our obligation under the law is to
maintain the dynamic status quo conditions created by the expired CBA, that is, to continue to 15
pay the current contribution rate.” The letter to the Guild and the Operating Engineers—the two
agreements that remained in effect due to extension—asserted that ”Our obligation under law is
to continue to pay the current contribution rate, which is the status quo.”
The letters to each Union then stated: “Therefore we think it is important to meet with the
Union to discuss how to address this development” and requested that the Union contact Guest 20
“to arrange a date and time for that meeting.”
By letter dated November 6, 2017, Attorney Pass responded to Guest (on behalf of all the
unions), contending that,
As I am sure you have been advised, if there is no new collective-bargaining
agreement in effect dealing with healthcare for 2018, and thereafter, the terms and 25
conditions of the existing agreement must continue. You also are aware that the
provisions of those agreements clearly provide that the “Company will provide a
health insurance and prescription drug plan . . .” and that the Company’s
obligation for any increase is capped for the years 2016 and 2017 at 5% each
year. There is nothing in the agreement that provides for caps for any years 30
thereafter. As a result consistent with the Company’s commitment it must pay for
any increase needed in 2018 and thereafter to maintain the agreed upon
insurance program. . . .
. . . . Fortunately for the PG, it appears that the increase for 2018 is going to be 35
5%. However, regardless of the amount of the increase, that obligation rests
squarely with the Post-Gazette.
Any unilateral change to the contractual terms obviously would be an issue
which we will deal with in an appropriate manner. If you have questions please 40
don’t hesitate to contact me. [Emphasis in original.]
JD–67–18
10
The PG’s Manager Guest responded to Attorney Pass in a letter dated November 15,
2017. In the letter, Guest stated that the “Welfare Fund is reserving the right to continue to
provide health insurance coverage under a reduced benefit structure if the Company does not
pay the requested 5% increased contribution rate . . . beginning January, 2018.” Guest then
noted that “Unfortunately, under the expired collective-bargaining agreements, any proposed 5
increase by the Welfare Fund must be based upon the plan design effective January 1, 2015,
unless the parties agree otherwise.” Guest then told Pass:
We respectfully disagree with your assertion that the Company must pay
for any increases assessed by the Welfare Fund for 2018 and thereafter. The
Company does not believe the expired collective-bargaining agreements for the 10
Unions you represent address Welfare Fund contributions for 2018 or thereafter.
We recognize our obligations under law to continue to pay the current
contribution rate, which is the status quo. However, because of the positions
taken by the Welfare Fund, we again request to meet to address these
developments. Time is of the essence because the Welfare Fund will impact our 15
employees’ insurance coverage in 2018.
Please contact me to arrange a date and time to meet separately with each Union
Pass responded to Guest by letter dated November 20, 2017. In his letter he asserted
that “the law is quite clear and unequivocal that the maintenance of the status quo requires the
Employer to continue what they promised, and that is to provide the health insurance program 20
they currently have.” In response to Guest’s request to meet over the health insurance
contributions, Pass responded that
“[a]s always, all of the named Unions are more than willing to meet with you at any
mutually agreeable time. Please understand however that none of the Unions are
interested in bargaining over one particular subject. A new agreement entails 25
more than the health insurance program. As you know, the Employer has put on
the table a new health insurance program [in] which the Unions have little interest.
Nevertheless, we are always willing to discuss any issue that is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. . . .
30
. . . . As you know, there are additional meetings being scheduled between
your team and the various Unions, and they will be able to discuss these issues,
including the health insurance, at each of the negotiating sessions they participate
in. . . .
35
. . . . Finally, so there is no ambiguity of positions, please advise, absent
mutual agreement to do otherwise, will the Employer pay the necessary premiums
to maintain the current health insurance program through the Western
Pennsylvania Health and Welfare Fund beginning January 2018? [Emphasis in
original.]40
JD–67–18
11
Attorney Pass, along with the Guild representatives met with the PG’s Attorneys, Michael
Oesterle and Richard Lowe (and perhaps Guest), for a regularly scheduled meeting on November
22. As Pass testified, at that meeting there was a “vigorous discussion about the fact that they
were not going to be paying any increase to our health insurance that we have under the [Fund]
contract to keep it in place.” The Union position, as articulated by Pass was “that we had agreed 5
to a schedule [of] benefits and our position was that those scheduled benefits are your obligations
to maintain.” Indeed, Pass told the PG that “[y]our caps [on increases] were for only ’16 and ’17.
There were no caps thereafter. That was our position and . . . there was a schedule of benefits
that had to be and we said that in the agreement.” The union position and proposal was that the
PG “maintain those benefits.” Attorney Lowe, for the PG, made it clear that he did not agree. 10
Pass proposed that the Union would pay the 5% increase if the PG granted the employees a
7.5% “wage increase right now.” According to Pass, the PG did not respond—and did not
agree—to this. Lowe told Pass that “he would have another discussion with the [F]und to see
what could be done and he would let us know his answer by December 12.”
On December 12, Pass met again with Attorney Lowe, and other PG representatives, this 15
time at a meeting with the Teamsters Union, although, as noted above, Pass represented all the
Unions with regard to health care coverage issues. At this meeting Pass reiterated his view that
the PG had to pay the health insurance increase. Lowe told him “We’re not interested in paying.”
Pass reiterated his proposal that the Union would pay the 5% increase if the employees received
an immediate 7.5% wage increase.” Lowe indicated he would continue talking to the Fund.20
The PG did not pay the increased Fund contribution for or after January 1, 2018. It
continued to contribute at the 2017 monthly level. In January 2018, the Fund notified the
employees that it had it had “modified the medical benefit plan applicable to Post-Gazette
participants” by increasing the annual deductible beginning April 1, 2018, for single and family
participants “in order to correspond the plan coverage to the contribution level provided under the 25
Post-Gazette.” The Fund stated that these actions
were necessitated when the Post-Gazette did not pay the premium increase for
2018. Effective January 1, 2018, the Trustees approved a 5% increase in the
premium cost in order to maintain the 2017 level of benefits for Plan PG. The
2017 premium rate was $1,354.97 per month, the 2018 rate needed to maintain 30
the benefit level is $1322.49 per month, an increase of $67.52 per month per
member.
Pass attended subsequent bargaining sessions in January and February. No resolution of
the dispute between the Unions and the PG over the health care coverage was reached. The
PG’s position was that the Unions should accept the new health care proposal that the PG35
proposed as part of a successor labor agreement. There was no agreement reached. The Fund
increased employee deductibles under the plan effective April 1, 2018, from $850 to $1,100 for
single coverage, and from $1,700 to $2,200 for family coverage.12

12The PG attacks Pass’ credibility as to his testimony regarding the parties’ discussions at the
November-February meetings. I note that Pass’ testimony is unrebutted, even though two of the
Respondent’s attorneys who were identified as being in meetings with Pass were present
throughout the hearing in these cases. The Respondent did not call them or any other witness to
testify about these November-February meetings. I credit Pass’ unrebutted testimony.
JD–67–18
12
Analysis
1. The statutory duty to maintain the status quo requires the PG
to continue to pay the annual increase in the Fund contribution rate
5
The General Counsel alleges that the PG’s failure to pay the annual increase in Fund
contribution rates for employee health care coverage on January 1, 2018, as it had under the
terms of the 2014 Agreements in 2016 and 2017, and which resulted in a reduction of employee
health care benefits in April 2018, constituted an unlawful unilateral change in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1).13 10
It is settled that—with exceptions not relevant here—while parties negotiate a successor
collective-bargaining agreement the employer must maintain the status quo in terms and
conditions of employment until the parties reach agreement or a valid bargaining impasse.
Marina Del Rey Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 22, slip op. at 3 (2015); Bottom Line Enterprises, 302 15
NLRB 373, 374 (1991) (footnote omitted), enfd. mem. 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). Accord RBE
Electronics of S.D., Inc., 320 NLRB 80, 81 (1995); Intermountain Rural Electronics, Inc., 305
NLRB 783, 786 (1991), enfd. 984 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1993).
The genesis for this rule is the Supreme Court’s recognition that a fundamental corollary 20
of the statutory duty to bargain is that—as much as a flat refusal to negotiate—“an employer’s
unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is similarly a violation of §
8(a)(5), for it is a circumvention of the duty negotiate which frustrates the objectives of § 8(a)(5)
as much as does a flat refusal.” NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). Such “[u]nilateral
action by an employer . . . must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional 25
policy.” Katz, supra at 747.
Under Section 8(a)(5) “most terms and conditions of employment are not subject to
unilateral change.” Litton Financial Printing v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991). After the
expiration of contractual obligations, these terms and conditions are “no longer agreed-upon 30
terms; they are terms imposed by law, at least so far as there is not unilateral right to change
them.” Id. This statutory requirement exists as to any employer action on a mandatory subject of
bargaining that is “an established practice and a term and condition of employment.” Daily News
of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB 1236, 1237–1238 (1994), enfd. 73 F.3d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1996). It
is undisputed that employer contributions to employee fringe benefit funds are a mandatory 35
bargaining subject. See N.D. Peters & Co., 321 NLRB 927, 928 (1996); Southwestern Steel &
Supply, Inc. v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 1111, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
The unfair labor practice inquiry is focused on whether there is a change in existing
employment conditions, as “‘[t]he vice involved in [a unilateral change] is that the employer has 40
changed the existing conditions of employment. It is this change which is prohibited and which
forms the basis of the unfair labor practice charge.”’ Daily News of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB at
1237 (bracketing added) (quoting NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, Inc., 434 F.2d 93, 98 (5th Cir. 1970)
(court's emphasis)), enfd. 73 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that discontinuance of
discretionary merit raises constituted unlawful unilateral change). 45

13An employer's violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act is also a derivative violation of Sec. 8(a)(1)
of the Act. ABF Freight System, 325 NLRB 546 fn. 3 (1998); Tennessee Coach Co., 115 NLRB
677, 679 (1956), enfd. 237 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1956).
JD–67–18
13
However, it is important to note that a prohibited “change” can take many forms. The duty
to maintain the status quo is in force whether the employer’s challenged action was a
“continuance or a discontinuance, or an increase or a decrease . . . of a condition of
employment.” Daily News of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB at 1237. In the Daily News of Los Angeles,
the Board endorsed and quoted from the Fifth Circuit’s decision in NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, 434 5
F.2d 93, 98 (1970):
The cases make it crystal clear that the vice involved in both the unlawful
increase situation and the unlawful refusal to increase situation is that the
employer has changed the existing conditions of employment. It is this 10
change which is prohibited and which forms the basis of the unfair labor
practice charge.
. . . .
In other words, whenever the employer by promises or by a course of 15
conduct has made a particular benefit part of the established wage or
compensation system, then he is not at liberty unilaterally to change this
benefit either for better or worse during . . . the period of collective
bargaining. . . .
20
In our view, the standard set forth in Dothan Eagle, which looks to whether a
change has been implemented in conditions of employment, captures best what
lies at the heart of the Katz doctrine. It neither distinguishes among the various
terms and conditions of employment on which an employer takes unilateral action
nor does it discriminate on the basis of the nature of a particular unilateral act. It 25
simply determines whether a change in any term and condition of employment has
been effectuated, without first bargaining to impasse or agreement, and condemns
the conduct if it has.
Daily News, 315 NLRB 1237–1238 (quoting, Dothan Eagle, 434 F.2d at 98 (emphasis in 30
original)).
As the Court of Appeals explained, enforcing the Board’s decision in Daily News of Los
Angeles:
35
it makes absolutely no difference under Katz whether the change at issue adds to
or subtracts from employees' wages, or whether it institutes a new employment
policy or withdraws one that already exists. Thus, in some circumstances it will be
an unfair labor practice to grant unilaterally a wage increase, and . . . . in other
circumstances it will be an unfair labor practice to deny unilaterally a wage 40
increase. The Act is violated by a unilateral change in the existing wage structure
whether that change be an increase or the denial of a scheduled increase. . . . It
cannot be doubted that, under the prevailing case law from the Supreme Court,
the circuit courts, and the Board, the relevant inquiry here is whether any
established employment term on a mandatory subject of bargaining has been 45
unilaterally changed.
Daily News of Los Angeles v. NLRB, 73 F.3d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (first ellipses by
court; internal quotation omitted).
50
JD–67–18
14
In this case, the decisive issue is whether the Fund’s annual contribution rate increases,
which were required to be paid under the terms of the 2014 Agreement, were themselves terms
and conditions of employment that must be continued during bargaining for a successor
agreement. The General Counsel and the Unions say yes, the PG says no. The PG contends
that by continuing to pay the 2017 Fund contribution rate in effect when the agreements expired 5
(or were temporarily extended) it was maintaining the status quo. It contends that it was free to
ignore the Fund’s 2018 annual contribution rate increase.
The problem with this defense is that it is at odds with settled precedent that holds that the
status quo is not determined, as the Respondent would have it, by reproducing a snapshot of the 10
employer’s obligations at the expiration of the labor agreement, but by continuing the employees’
employment terms and conditions. These are not always the same thing.
As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed out in response to an argument much
like that mounted by the PG here, an employer cannot “define the status quo by taking a 15
snapshot . . . at the moment the [2014] CBA expired.” Rather “the terms of the expired
agreement define the post-expiration status quo . . . not . . .[t]he . . . circumstances at the time of
expiration.” Wilkes-Barre Hospital v. NLRB, 857 F.3d 364, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2017) enforcing Wilkes-
Barre Hospital, 362 NLRB No. 148 (2015) (finding violation after labor contract expired and
employer refused to continue to increase employee wages based on longevity-based wage 20
increases that were set forth in the contract). Accord, Intermountain Rural Electric Ass’n, 305
NLRB 783, 784–785 (1991) (Board finds failure to pay increased medical and dental insurance
premium rates was unlawful alteration of employee terms and conditions of employment and
Board rejects judge’s approach that “focuses narrowly upon the Respondent’s preexisting
financial obligations” at contract expiration); enfd. 984 F.2d 1562, 1567 (10th Cir. 1993) 25
(“preserving the status quo required [employer] to pay 100% of the increased health and dental
insurance premiums upon expiration of the Agreement”); Finley Hospital, 362 NLRB No. 102
(2015) (finding violation in employer’s refusal to continue anniversary wage increases after
expiration of one-year collective-bargaining agreement that provided for annual wage increase for
each employee his/her anniversary date for the duration of agreement); enf’t. denied in relevant 30
part, 827 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2016).
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, there is nothing foreign to the statutory status quo
obligations under the Act to requiring an employer to continue to provide increases that had been
required under a now expired agreement, precisely in order to avoid being found to have changed35
the terms and conditions of employment. The issue is never whether an employer action is a
“continuance or a discontinuance, or an increase or a decrease.” As far as the duty to bargain is
concerned, this is “a distinction without a difference.” Finley Hospital, 362 NLRB No. 102, slip op.
at 5. The issue is always whether “the employer has changed the existing conditions of
employment. It is this change which is prohibited and which forms the basis of the unfair labor 40
practice charge.”’ Daily News of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB at 1237.
In this case, the conclusion that the increase in contribution rates was a term and
condition of the contracts that must be continued under the Act is clear from a review of the terms
and operation of the 2014 Agreements.
JD–67–18
15
The 2014 Agreements establish the Fund’s plan as the employee health care coverage
effective January 1, 2015.14 The Fund’s schedule of benefits that employees are to receive under
the new plan was attached to and entered into evidence as part of the agreements. The 2014
Agreements set a precise dollar amount for the PG’s funding obligation for calendar year 2015.15
The 2014 Agreements do not specify a set predetermined amount for the contribution rate for the
remaining years of the contract. Rather, the Agreements provide for the Respondent to meet the
Fund’s annual contribution increases in 2016 and 2017, capped at 5% each year. There was no
discretion for the Respondent—up to 5% it had to pay the annual increases denoted by the
Fund.16 The Respondent admits this.17 There is also no dispute that the Respondent met these
contractual obligations. The increases had to be based on the Fund maintaining the same plan
design as in 2015. The sole limitation on the Respondent’s obligation to pay the Fund’s rate
increases was that for 2016 and 2017 the portion of the contribution increase the PG was
required to pay was not to exceed a 5% annual increase.
Thus, the language and operation of the agreement prescribes as a term and condition of
employment under the contract that during the term of the contract the Respondent was required
to pay the annual Fund increases (up to 5%). Accordingly, by failing to meet the funding increase
(up to 5%) prescribed by the Fund in 2018, the PG violated its statutory—not its contractual—duty 5
to continue the status quo of funding the increase in contribution rates to pay for the Fund’s
health care for employees. By refusing to continue the increase the PG did not continue—but
rather, altered—the status quo in terms and conditions.
This conclusion stands by itself, based solely on the terms and operation of the 2014 10
Agreements regarding the contribution rate increases and the admitted contractual obligation of
the Respondent to pay these contribution rate increases during the term of the Agreement. In
addition, the conclusion is forcefully buttressed by the fact that the health care coverage schedule
of benefits attached to each 2014 Agreement could only be maintained with contribution rate
increases. These benefits were amended by the parties beginning in calendar year 2016, to 15
accommodate a Fund contribution rate increase that exceeded the cap, but the schedule of
benefits—as amended—was part of the terms and conditions of employment when the 2014
Agreements expired (or were temporarily extended) at the end of March 2017.

14“(1)Effective January 1, 2015, all eligible bargaining unit employees will participate
in the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund (the
"Fund"). Participation in the plan is limited to employees averaging annually more
than 30 hours per week.”
15“(2) The required PG contributions for the calendar year 2015 will be $1,229 per
month for each participating full-time bargaining unit employee (regardless of
family size) and regardless of the option chosen.”
16“(3) The PG contributions for years 2016 and 2017 will not exceed a 5.0% annual
increase above the $1,229 per month set forth above for calendar year 2015. Any
such increases must be based upon the plan design effective January 1, 2015.
The PG will receive from the Fund at least 60 days notice of any such annual
contribution increase prior to January 1.”
17R. Br. at 6 (“For 2016, the bargaining agreements required Respondent to pay up to a 5%
increase over the 2015 contribution rate”; “For 2017, the Expired Contracts required that any
contribution increase up to 5% would be paid by Respondent”).
JD–67–18
16
The statutory duty to maintain and not unilaterally change the status quo in employee
health care coverage while negotiating for a new agreement is axiomatic. In this case, that
statutory duty would be meaningless if the Respondent’s duty to continue the contribution rate
increases—contractually mandated in 2016 and 2017—was not a term and condition of 5
employment and could be unilaterally altered.
Finally, it is notable that this case is very much like that of Intermountain Rural Electric
Association 305 NLRB 783 (1991). There, the labor agreement, which was in effect from
December 1, 1987, through November 30, 1988, provided for employee medical and dental 10
insurance coverage under a variety of available plans, with the employer’s “maximum contribution
to any of the medical insurance plans in effect for its employees covered by this Agreement”
capped at “one hundred percent (100%) of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Insurance Company
premiums.’’ The agreement stated that the employer’s contribution “shall not exceed” the BC/BS
premium. When the contract expired on November 30, and the health care insurers raised their 15
premiums on December 1, the employer refused to increase the amount it had been paying for
premiums under the old plans and forced employees to make up the difference.
The administrative law judge dismissed the complaint, reasoning, as to the status quo
issue, “that because the Respondent did not change the amount of its medical premium 20
contributions and continued to pay the same amount it had paid prior to the contract’s expiration,
there was no change in the status quo as to that premium.” The judge interpreted the contract’s
reference to a “maximum contribution” with respect to premiums and the limiting words “shall not
exceed” as limiting “the Respondent’s obligation of no more than the exact dollar amount of the
Blue Cross/Blue Shield rates in effect from December 1987 through November 1988.” The judge 25
found that “[b]ecause the Respondent continued to provide the same dollar amount toward
medical insurance premiums in December, he found that the Respondent made no change with
respect to such insurance contributions.”
The Board reversed, in reasoning worth repeating here:30
There is no question that contractually provided health plans survive
contract expiration and cannot be altered without bargaining. Here the contractual
medical . . . plans were provided at no cost to employees, but with a limitation
upon the Respondent’s maximum financial liability on medical premiums. The 35
judge’s approach focuses narrowly upon the Respondent’s preexisting financial
obligations, i.e., the amount of money it paid for the expiring medical and dental
plans, but completely disregards employees’ expectations, i.e., medical and dental
coverage under noncontributory insurance plans, and the absence of any limit on
the Respondent’s liability that would preclude any possible increase. Although the 40
contract language relating to medical insurance clearly refers to a maximum, no
particular dollar figure is identified. Instead, the Respondent’s maximum liability is
described as not to exceed 100 percent of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield rates. Thus,
when the dollar amount of those rates increases, so too does the Respondent’s
maximum dollar obligation. . . . Accordingly, by paying only the premium rates 45
which had been in effect under the previous medical and dental plans and by
making [employees] cover the higher costs, the Respondent unlawfully altered
employees’ terms and conditions of employment.
Id. at 784–785.50
JD–67–18
17
Here, the PG is engaged in precisely the conduct condemned by the Board in
Intermountain Rural Electric. It “focuses narrowly” on its financial obligations when the contract
expired and ignores that its obligation is not “a particular dollar figure” but a rate set by an outside
source of health care. “[W]hen the dollar amount of those rates increases, so too does the
Respondent’s maximum dollar obligation.” That is the way it worked under the terms of the 5
contract, and that is the Respondent’s statutory obligation thereafter while the parties negotiate a
successor agreement. As in Intermountain Rural Electric, the Respondent’s refusal to increase
what it pays, “unlawfully altered employees’ terms and conditions of employment.”
As to its arguments, the Respondent is quite clear as to the source of its objection to10
continuing the contribution increases in 2018. But its position flows from a basic error as to what
it means to maintain the statutory status quo. It is an error expressed over and over again
throughout its brief.
The Respondent repeatedly stresses that it never agreed to pay the post-contract 15
contribution increases, in the 2014 Agreements or elsewhere.18
But this is beside the point. The Respondent confuses this case, which is premised on its
statutory obligation to maintain the status quo, with one based on a contractual duty that survives
contract expiration. As the Supreme Court has explained, 20
The difference is as elemental as that between Nolde Bros. and Katz. Under Katz,
terms and conditions continue in effect by operation of the NLRA. They are no
longer agreed-upon terms; they are terms imposed by law, at least so far as there
is no unilateral right to change them.” 25
Litton, 501 U.S. at 207, referencing Nolde Brothers v. Bakery Workers, 430 U.S. 243 (1977)
(contractual duty to arbitrate severance pay may survive contract termination when dispute is
over an obligation arguably created by expired contract).
The issue here is not whether the General Counsel can point to language in the 2014 30
Agreements showing that the Respondent agreed to pay annual increases in 2018 and thereafter.
Rather, the issue is whether the Respondent can point to language showing that the parties
intended to preclude the Respondent from continuing the status quo of contribution increases in
2018 and thereafter. Unless it can show that the parties intended for it to be free of the statutory
duty to maintain this status quo obligation, the Respondent is required to continue paying the 35
contribution rate increases (until impasse or agreement). “Absent language specifically limiting

18See, R. Br. at 11 (“The clear and unambiguous terms of the Expired Contracts do not
require Respondent to pay any 2018 Fund contribution rate increase. Therefore, Respondent was
not obligated under the terms of the Expired Contracts to pay that rate increase”); R. Br. at 12
(“Here, none of the Expired Contracts are ambiguous. . . . There is no reference to any obligation
to pay for increases in that rate for 2018, or for any period of time after the last increase took
effect on January 1, 2017”); R. Br. at 15 (“Given that there was no written agreement allowing for
unilateral Fund contribution rate increases after 2017, Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5)
by continuing to make contributions at the 2017 Fund rate”); R. Br. at 20–21 (“Here, the dispute is
solely one of contract interpretation. . . . Respondent is relying on the clear and unambiguous
terms of the Guild and Operating Engineers' Expired Contracts as the basis for its argument that
those contracts do not require it to pay the 2018 Fund contribution rate increase”). R. Br. at 33
(“None of the terms of any of the Expired Contracts require Respondent to pay the 2018 Fund
contribution rate increase”).
JD–67–18
18
the applicability of the provision [for increases] to the term of the contract, that provision continues
in effect.” Wilkes-Barre Hospital, 362 NLRB No. 148, slip op.6.
In fact, the Respondent concedes that the 2014 Agreements are absolutely silent as to
what happens with contribution levels after 2017. R. Br. at 5 (“The agreed-to provision did not 5
address health insurance contributions for 2018 or any period after the expiration of the
bargaining agreements”). As it admits, there is no language at all in the agreements limiting the
amount the Respondent must pay in 2018, and thereafter, to what it paid in 2017.
Moreover, the Respondent agrees that it must continue to pay the 2017-level of 10
contributions, thus recognizing that nothing in the 2014 Agreements prohibits post-expiration
contributions to the Fund.19 But more pertinently, and just as surely, no reading of the 2014
Agreement can support the view that by its terms it precludes continuation after 2017 of the
annual contribution rate increases. There is no basis on which the Respondent can claim that
terms of the 2014 Agreement—or anything else—reflect an agreement that the Respondent does 15
not have to continue the status quo of paying the annual increase set by the Fund.
Notably, the durational clause of the 2014 Agreements does not do it. As a matter of law,
standard “durational” contract language does not serve as evidence of an intent by the parties to
alter the status quo after contract expiration. Wilkes-Barre Hospital v. NLRB, 857 F.3d at 375, 20
citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 125, 128, 132–133 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Under Katz
and Litton, however, an expiration date in a standard contract duration clause without more,
cannot defeat the unilateral change doctrine”); Finley Hospital, supra at 3–4.
The 5% contractual cap that protects the PG from unduly large annual increases for the 25
specific years of 2016 and 2017, does not do it. That cap is a shield for the years 2016 and 2017;
it cannot be turned into a sword that alchemically bars the Respondent from paying any increase
to maintain the status quo after 2017.
The Respondent’s reliance on Hempstead Lincoln Mercury Motors Corp., 351 NLRB 1149
(2007) is misplaced—although instructive. In Hempstead the employer’s refusal to increase
pension fund contributions was based on a contract (as renewed) that prescribed a
predetermined precise dollar amount per employee that the employer was required to pay to the
pension fund each year. One year it was $175 per employee per month. The next, $0.00. The
year after that a $50 monthly increase from the year before last was prescribed requiring
payments of $225 per employee. When the agreement expired the employer continued paying
$225, and refused some months later to make an increase in contributions. The Board agreed
that the employer was not required to meet (or set aside in an escrow fund) the increased
contributions. But here, unlike in Hempstead, the contract provides for an undetermined annual
increase in the base amount—capped at 5%--in each successive year of the contract, based on
the outside Fund’s establishment of a new contribution rate. By contrast, in Hempstead the
employer’s dollar amount of contributions was set by contract and predetermined for each year.
In our case, the increase is the agreement (up to 5% for 2016 and 2017). The increase is the
status quo. Hempstead shows only that the PG has the wrong contractual language to underlie
the statutory status quo argument it pursues.
30
The only language in the 2014 Agreements advanced by the PG as language allowing it
to unilaterally cancel its obligation to continue the status quo in 2018 (or any time after the labor

19R. Br. at 13 (“Respondent remains obligated to pay the 2017 contribution rate which was in
effect on March 31, 2017, when the Contracts expired and which became the status quo”). See
also, Tr. 15; Jt. Exhs. 5(b), 6(b), 7(b), 8(b), and 9(b), 10(b), and 13.
JD–67–18
19
agreements expired) is the language stating that it is not “liable for any other payment to the
Fund, other than as stated above.” But any surface appeal of that argument evaporates when the
language is read in the context in which it appears in the agreements:
(3) The PG contributions for years 2016 and 2017 will not exceed a 5.0% 5
annual increase above the $1,229 per month set forth above for calendar
year 2015. Any such increases must be based upon the plan design
effective January 1, 2015. The PG will receive from the Fund at least 60
days notice of any such annual contribution increase prior to January 1.
Increases in excess of 5% will be the responsibility of the bargaining unit 10
members via direct billings from the Fund. If direct billing is not available,
the PG will only assume responsibility for any withholding of any additional
amounts after receiving the expressed written consent of each member
and will not assume any other responsibility for collection of any other
amounts, or be liable for any other payment to the Fund, other than as 15
stated above. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the PG’s “[non]liability” “for any other payment to the Fund” is part of two sentences
devoted to limiting the PG’s liability for handling employee portions of the contributions to the
Fund “in excess of the 5%.” This no-additional-liability language simply is not addressed to the 20
issue of post-2017 contributions.
Accordingly, absent impasse or agreement, and as a matter of statute, not contract, the
Respondent must pay the Fund annual contribution rate increases just as it did in each
successive year of the contract. When it failed to do so in January 2018, it altered the status quo
of the employment conditions.
Finally, I note that in concluding that the 2014 Agreements establish terms and conditions
that make the annual increases part of the status quo, I do not reach the General Counsel’s
alternative argument (GC Br. at 23–25) that the duty to continue the annual increases in
contributions became a term and condition of employment through a “traditional past practice
analysis.” In my view, this argument is superfluous. The Respondent admits that it was
contractually required during the term of the 2014 Agreements to pay up to a 5% annual increase
to the Fund. R. Br. at 6 (“For 2016, the bargaining agreements required Respondent to pay up to
a 5% increase over the 2015 contribution rate”; “For 2017, the Expired Contracts required that
any contribution increase up to 5% would be paid by Respondent”). As set forth, above, on that
basis the annual increases were terms and condition of employment, there is no need to consider
a “traditional past practice” analysis.
2. Various contractual defenses (contract coverage,
waiver, sound arguable basis) and 2014 bargaining25
The Respondent also asserts a defense based on the “contract coverage” analysis that
some courts of appeals have adopted to analyze contractual defenses to refusal to bargain
allegations.
30
Of course, as the Respondent recognizes, the Board does not apply the “contract
coverage” standard, but rather, the long-established “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard for
claims involving the waiver of statutory rights. Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB
808, 811 (2007). The Respondent—reasonably—does not even mount that argument, as it is a
non-starter on the facts here. As the Board explained in Graymont Pa, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 37, 35
slip op. at 2–3 (2016):
JD–67–18
20
This [clear and unmistakable waiver] standard--endorsed by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421 (1967)—“requires bargaining partners to
unequivocally and specifically express their mutual intention to permit unilateral
employer action with respect to a particular employment term, notwithstanding the 5
statutory duty to bargain that would otherwise apply.” Provena, supra at 811. In
order to find a waiver based on contractual language, that language must be
“sufficiently specific.” Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 NLRB 180, 189 (1989). Further,
while “[w]aiver of a statutory right may be evidenced by bargaining history, [ ] the
Board requires the matter at issue to have been fully discussed and consciously 10
explored during negotiations and the union to have consciously yielded or clearly
and unmistakably waived its interest in the matter.” Id. at 185. As the Board
explained in Provena, supra:
The waiver standard ... effectively requires the parties to focus on 15
particular subjects over which the employer seeks the right to act
unilaterally. Such a narrow focus has two clear benefits. First, it
encourages the parties to bargain only over subjects of importance at the
time and to leave other subjects to future bargaining. Second, if a waiver
is won--in clear and unmistakable Language--the employer's right to take 20
future unilateral action should be apparent to all concerned. [Id at 813.]

In this case, nothing in the 2014 Agreements approaches this standard. As discussed
above, no language in the 2014 Agreements evidences an intent of the parties to not pay rate
increases after contract expiration, or after 2017.
However, the Respondent’s argument would fail even if the Board applied the PG’s
preferred “contractual coverage” analysis. As discussed, supra, there is simply is no language in
the agreement limiting the Unions’ statutory rights, no language covering the subject of the
Respondent’s right to cease maintaining the status quo in 2018 or beyond. The 2014
Agreements are silent as to what happens post-expiration. As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
held in Honeywell Int’l v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2001), applying the “contractual
coverage” analysis the “standard durational clause . . . without more, cannot cover and thereby
vitiate the Union’s statutory claim to continued” contribution increases. Wilkes-Barre, supra at
377 (original emphasis, omitting internal quotations and bracketing), quoting, Honeywell Int’l v.
NLRB, 253 F.3d at 128, 132–133. Here, the Respondent’s “contract coverage” defense will fail
before a court just as certainly as the employer’s similar defense failed before the D.C. Circuit in
Wilkes-Barre Hospital, supra at 376–377. It can point to no language covering the topic. Silence
does not defeat the Unions’ statutory claims.
The Respondent is also wrong in its claim that, as to the Guild and Operating Engineers’
agreements that were extended and remain in effect, it may rely on the “sound arguable basis”
standard to justify its unilateral change of the status quo. The Respondent misconceives the
General Counsel’s claim.
The Board applies the “sound arguable basis” defense in 8(a)(5) cases alleging a
“midterm modification claim, i.e., a failure to abide by a collective-bargaining agreement in
violation of section 8(d) of the Act. Cases alleging a violation of Section 8(d) of the Act are
focused on allegations that the employer has modified and failed to abide by the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement. In 8(d) cases, “[w]here an employer has a ‘sound arguable
basis' for its interpretation of a contract and is not ‘motivated by union animus or … acting in bad
faith,’ the Board ordinarily will not find a violation. In such cases, there is, at most, a contract
JD–67–18
21
breach, rather than a contract modification.” Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 NLRB 499, 502 (2005)
(footnotes, internal quotations and citations, omitted), enfd. 475 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2007).
Essentially, these cases are best understood as instances in which the Board effectively defers to
another forum to determine the meaning of the contract.
However, at least since the Board’s decision in Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 NLRB 499
(2005), it is pellucid that the “sound arguable basis” standard does not apply, where, as here, the
General Counsel alleges an unlawful unilateral change in the status quo and not an 8(d) mid-term
modification violation.20
I note that the Respondent appears to recognize and endorse the distinction—See R. Br.
at 10—citing cases for the proposition that an 8(d) contract modification violation may not be
found where only an unlawful unilateral change theory was litigated, and vice-a-versa. This is
very much the point. It is well-settled that the General Counsel is the master of the complaint.
Here, he has not pursued an 8(d) midterm modification claim, and the “sound arguable basis”
defense is not relevant.21
Finally, beyond the contracts, the PG does not offer any other non-contractual waiver
evidence supporting a claim that during bargaining “the matter at issue . . . [had] . . . been fully
discussed and consciously explored during negotiations” and that “the union [had] consciously
yielded or clearly and unmistakably waived its interest in the matter.” Johnson-Bateman Co., 295
NLRB at 185. To the contrary, the evidence precludes a finding of waiver on such grounds. 5
Thus, in October 2014, when questions arose between the parties over how the health
care coverage cap would operate, the PG provided the Unions with an Excel spreadsheet—titled
“PG Determination of share of benefit costs–2015-2017”—showing hypothetical projected
contribution rate increases not only for the years of the contract—2015, 2016, and 2017, but also 10
for 2018. This spreadsheet was created by the PG’s benefit consultant, and vetted internally by
PG representatives before being provided to the Union as an explanation for how the cap would
affect future contribution rates. At a minimum, this spreadsheet necessarily precludes any claim

20Bath Iron Works, supra at 501 (“In ‘unilateral change’ cases, where all that is alleged is that
a union had a statutory right to bargain before an employer's proposed change, the Board has
considered whether the union has clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain over the
change,” but that “is not the correct standard for an allegation of an 8(d) contract modification”);
Baptist Hospital of East Tennessee, 351 NLRB 71, 72 fn. 5 (2007) (applying clear and
unmistakable waiver standard to find unilateral change lawful, and finding that while “[a]t various
times during the litigation of this case, the General Counsel appeared to make the argument that
the Respondent's actions ‘modified’ the contract, in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5)—Sec. 8(d) . . . the
General Counsel [is] master of the complaint” and “did not clearly pursue an 8(d) contract
modification theory in this case”); Finley Hospital, supra at slip op. 5 fn. 8 (“under current Board
law, the ‘sound arguable basis’ standard invoked by the Respondent applies only where the issue
is whether the employer made a mid-term unilateral modification of the collective-bargaining
agreement”) (Board’s emphasis).
21The ramifications of the decision to prove a unilateral change case, and not a contract
modification case, include a more favorable standard for the General Counsel, but also limitations
in terms of remedy. “The remedy for a [an 8(d)] contract modification is the more substantial one
of ordering adherence to the contract for its terms; the remedy for a unilateral change permits the
restoration of the change after bargaining to an impasse.” Bath Iron Works, supra.
JD–67–18
22
that there was a conscious or clear and unmistakable waiver of the Unions’ statutory right to have
the increases continue past 2017, while the parties bargained new agreements.22
3. The waiver by inaction defense in fall 2017 and early 2018
5
The Respondent contends (R. Br. at 28–29) that the Unions’ waived the right to bargain
over the PG’s failure to pay the 2018 contribution increase by failing to adequately respond when
the PG announced its intentions.
This defense is a non-starter, for multiple reasons. For one, given that it was in the midst 10
of bargaining for a new collective-bargaining agreement, the Respondent was not privileged to
make a discrete unilateral change. See, Intermountain Rural Electric Association 305 NLRB 783,
786 (1991) (distinguishing a union’s duty to request bargaining in response to announced
intentions to make a change in periods of non-negotiations from the situation where parties are
already engaged in negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement). As the Board explained 15
in Intermountain Rural Electric:
When parties are engaged in negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement,
however, their obligations are somewhat different. Because the parties are in fact
bargaining on various proposals, there is no need for additional requests for 20
bargaining on those proposals. During negotiations, a union must clearly intend,
express, and manifest a conscious relinquishment of its right to bargain before it
will be deemed to have waived its bargaining rights. Absent such manifestation by
the union, an employer must not only give notice and an opportunity to bargain,
but also must refrain from implementation unless and until impasse is reached on 25
negotiations as a whole. [footnotes omitted.]
More specifically, an increase in health care premiums or contributions does not justify a
unilateral change. Oak Hill School, 360 NLRB 359, 403 (2014). There is no exception for routine
increases in health care costs to the requirement that an overall impasse must be reached before 30
changes in employment conditions can be implemented. Oak Hill, supra at 403 (absent specified
exceptions, “During negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement, an employer may not
unilaterally change any terms or conditions of employment without having bargained to impasse

22At the hearing, the parties expended a significant bit of effort highlighting the inclusion of
2018 on the spreadsheet (in the case of the General Counsel) and attempting to explain its
insignificance (in the case of the Respondent). The intensity over this spreadsheet continued into
the PG’s post-trial brief (R. Br. at 23–25 & 33 fn. 20) where counsel for the PG launched a
calumnious attack on opposing counsel, accusing them of ethical violations relating to the
introduction into evidence of a copy of this spreadsheet that omitted the title. The PG moves for
costs, attorneys’ fees, or other sanctions. Counsel for the General Counsel moves to strike the
portions of the PG’s brief containing the accusations. I deny both motions. The PG’s accusations
are entirely baseless and the outburst suggests a veritable panic over this spreadsheet and the
admission within it that contribution rate increases in 2018 were contemplated by the parties.
Putting aside that the omission of the title appears to be an inadvertent copying error, and putting
aside that the PG is as likely the source of the error as is the Union counsel or counsel for the
General Counsel, the most salient point is that no one would commit this crime because this
crime could not pay. Contrary to the PG’s claim, the omission of the title has no impact on
whether the PG is obligated to pay the 2018 Fund contribution rate increases. I note that the
omission of the title was corrected at the hearing by the PG when it introduced the version of the
spreadsheet with the title, which I have relied upon in the text.
JD–67–18
23
for the agreement as a whole”). Here, there is no claim of overall impasse, or valid claim of an
applicable exception to the requirement of an overall impasse before implementation.23
Second, there is no evidence that a continuation of 2017 contribution-rates and refusal to
provide increases was part of the Respondent’s bargaining proposal for a new agreement. Were 5
there an overall impasse or other exception justifying implementation, only changes reasonably
comprehended within the Respondent’s bargaining proposal could be implemented. Peerless
Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 734, 735 (9th Cir. 1981).
Third, even as to the piecemeal issue of the Respondent’s continued funding of the 10
Fund’s 9PG health care plan, there is no evidence of waiver on this record. To the contrary,
Attorney Pass’ unrebutted testimony is that he made a proposal to permit the Respondent to
avoid the contribution increases if the Respondent provided employees with a pay raise. Pass
received no definitive answer from the Respondent’s representatives on this proposal until long
after January 2018 when the increased payments were due to the Fund. This is the opposite of a 15
waiver of bargaining by a union.
4. The Section 302 defense
The Respondent contends throughout its brief that Section 302 of the Labor Management 20
Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 186, prohibits it from paying the increased contribution rate to
the Fund, and, therefore, that it should not be required to do so under the Act.
Section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA requires, inter alia, that the basis for payments to an
employee benefit trust fund be “specified in a written agreement with the employer.” The PG
contends that there is no written agreement.
However, the applicability of the Board’s status quo doctrine to employee trust funds
governed by Section 302 has long been recognized by the Supreme Court. Laborers Health &
Welfare Trust Fund for Northern California v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539,
544 fn. 6 (1988). “Consequently, any unilateral change by the employer in the pension fund
arrangements provided by an expired agreement is an unfair labor practice.’” Id.
Numerous courts have held that the Section 302 “written agreement” requirement is
satisfied by a collective-bargaining agreement, including an expired one. See, e.g., Cibao Meat
Prods. v. NLRB, 547 F.3d 336 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Today, we join several of our sister circuits in
holding that an expired collective-bargaining agreement satisfies the written-agreement
requirement of § 302(c)(5)(B). This follows from both the requirement that an employer maintain

23Citing Stone Container Corp., 313 NLRB 336 (1993), the Respondent suggests that the
“Stone Container” exception privileges it to unilaterally change the practice of contribution funding
increases without bargaining to an overall impasse. R. Br. at 32 fn. 19. However, the Stone
Container “analysis is applicable only to first contract situations, where the parties have not yet
established their own practices through contract that they can rely upon in the future.” Oak Hill
School, 360 NLRB 359, 409 (2014). It does not apply to “negotiations for successor contracts, as
here.” Id. In this case, the payment of annual contribution increases was established as a term
and condition of employment through the 2014 Agreements. It is a part of the status quo and
subject to the rule on overall impasse. Contrary to the suggestion of the Respondent (R. Br. at 32
fn. 19), the requirement that parties maintain the status quo until overall impasse is not something
the General Counsel is required to plead, it is governing precedent. Indeed, a claim of impasse
justifying a unilateral change is an affirmative defense, though not one pled by the Respondent.
JD–67–18
24
the status quo following expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement, and that such continued
payments under an expired collective-bargaining agreement do not implicate the purpose of §
302”) (citations omitted); Dugan v. R.J. Corman Railroad, 344 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2003) (“the
cases hold that an expired agreement—one that has no contractual force—nevertheless can
satisfy the statutory requirements [of Section 302], in part because even after expiration of such
an agreement, an employer has a duty to bargain in good faith and maintain the status quo as to
wages and working conditions until a new agreement or an impasse is reached”) (internal
quotations omitted); Alaska Trowel Trades Pension Fund v. Lopshire, 103 F.3d 881, 883 (9th
Cir.1996) (“The requirement of a written agreement may be satisfied by a collective-bargaining
agreement even after it has expired. . . . An expired § 9(a) agreement satisfies the § 302(c)(5)(B)
writing requirement in part because even after expiration of such an agreement, an employer has
a duty to bargain in good faith and maintain the status quo as to wages and working conditions
until a new agreement or an impasse is reached”); Peerless Roofing, 641 F.2d at 736 (rejecting
employer’s argument and noting that “the collective-bargaining agreement itself survives its
expiration date for some purposes. During negotiations, the employer is required by section
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), to maintain the status
quo as to wages and working conditions, even following the expiration date of the agreement. If
the employer's obligation to make trust fund payments were terminated by the expiration of the
agreement, the union would never have an opportunity to bargain over those contributions. This
result would not advance national labor policy as articulated in the National Labor Relations Act”).
Notably, the Respondent agrees that it lawfully made contributions to the Fund based on
the 2014 Agreements during the term of the 2014 Agreements—and after the expiration of the
2014 Agreements (at 2017 rates). In other words, the Respondent recognizes that the 2014
Agreements satisfy Section 302’s requirements even after expiration. Thus, the Respondent’s
Section 302 dispute is simply with the Board’s application of the status quo doctrine. But the5
point of the doctrine is that based on the written terms and conditions of the 2014 Agreements,
annual increases are the required status quo employment condition. Thus, this case—including
the Respondent’s Section 302 defense—rises or falls on the determination of the amount of the
Respondent’s status quo obligations under Section 8(a)(5). If the status quo is correctly applied
to find that the contribution increase is an employment condition under the terms of the expired 10
agreement, then the Respondent’s Section 302 argument disappears.
Section 302’s “purposefully rigid structure . . . is design[ed] to insure that employer
contributions are made only for proper purposes and that fund benefits reach only proper parties.”
Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union, Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512
F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1975). “Strict compliance . . . is not an end in itself but a means of 15
ensuring” that there is no corruption in the form of companies making payoffs to unions through
trust fund payments, or that union officials misuse these funds. National Stabilization Agreement
of Sheet Metal Industry Trust Fund v. Commercial Roofing & Sheet Metal Trust Fund, 655 F.2d
1218, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Courts recognize that employers “cannot invoke section 302 of the
LMRA as a loophole through which to escape obligations to the Funds.” Bricklayers Local 21 of 20
Illinois Apprenticeship and Training Program v. Banner Restoration, Inc., 385 F.3d 761, 772 (7th
Cir. 2004).
Here, the Respondent’s status quo obligations are based on written terms of the expired
collective-bargaining agreements. The Respondent’s status quo-determined contribution 25
obligations under the Act satisfies Section 302.
30
JD–67–18
25
5. The Unions’ contention that the PG’s status quo obligation requires
it to fund the existing health care coverage and benefits (without a cap)
The Unions contend that the status quo in increased contribution funding that the 5
Respondent is required to maintain is not limited by the 5% cap.
There is much to recommend in this argument. The 5% cap in the 2014 Agreements
are—arguably—expressly stated for the specific years of 2016 and 2017, not as a general term of
the agreements. As discussed above, nothing in the agreement limits increases in contribution 10
funding post-expiration, but the cap is expressly for 2016 and 2017. And as the Unions point out,
the status quo in employment conditions for unit employees includes maintenance of the
schedule of benefits (as amended in 2016) attached to each of the 2014 Agreements and entered
into evidence as part of the 2014 Agreements.
15
However, the case litigated by the General Counsel is a more limited one. In both the
complaint and in his brief, the General Counsel contends that “[i]n order to preserve the status
quo as required by extant Board law, the Respondent was required to continu[e] paying up to a
5% increase in contribution rates annually to the Fund for employee health insurance.” (GC Br. at
20); see also complaint at ¶9(a)-(g) (“Respondent discontinued its practice of paying up to the 5% 20
increase in contributions for [the unit’s] health insurance benefits to the [Fund] as set forth under
[the relevant article] of the collective-bargaining agreement”).
Thus, the violation of the Act alleged by the General Counsel in this case is the failure to
pay up to a 5% increase. It is well-settled that the General Counsel is the “master of the 25
complaint and controls the theory of the case.” Fineberg Packing Co., 349 NLRB 294, 296
(2007), enfd. 546 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, “A charging party may not expand the
scope of the complaint without the consent of the General Counsel.” Planned Building Services,
330 NLRB 791, 793 fn. 13 (2000). Thus, the Unions’ theory is not one I reach in this litigation.
30
While the scope of the unfair labor practice alleged is within the control of the General
Counsel, it is well settled that a charging party may argue for, and the Board may adopt, a
remedy for an unfair labor practice whether or not the General Counsel pursues that remedy.
Kaumagraph Corp., 313 NLRB 624, 625 (1994).
35
In their brief, the Unions attempt to frame their argument that Respondent must pay
increases necessary to maintain the current schedule of health care benefits, without regard to
the cap, as a as a request for a remedial relief. However, this relief does not follow from the
scope of the violation alleged by the General Counsel. As Judge Clifford Anderson explained, in
reasoning adopted by the Board, “if a particular violation of the Act is not alleged by the General 40
Counsel and such a violation is necessary for a particular remedy to be invoked then the General
Counsel has, by refusing to allege such a violation, precluded the Board from directing such a
remedy.” New Breed Leasing, 317 NLRB 1011, 1019 (1995), enfd. 111 F.3d 1460 (9th Cir.
1997); ATS Acquisition Corp., 321 NLRB 712, 712 fn. 3 (1995), enfd. mem. 127 F3d. 1105 (9th
Cir. 1997) (“a charging party is not free to seek remedies contingent on an amendment to the 45
complaint or a theory of the case different from that of the General Counsel”).
50
JD–67–18
26
Accordingly, I reject the Unions’ effort to expand the remedy beyond the scope of the
unfair labor practice alleged.24
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5
1. The Respondent PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post–Gazette is an employer within
the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh a/w Communications Workers of America,10
AFL–CIO, CLC, and its Local 38061 (the Guild) is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act, and at all times material the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the following appropriate unit of the Respondent’s employees (the Editorial
Unit):
15
All employees in the Editorial Department and in all sub-divisions of the
Editorial Department, excluding those employees provided for in other existing
Union Agreements and all Publishers and Associate Publishers, Publisher and
Editor-in-Chief, Executive Editor, Editor of the Editorial Page, Managing Editor,
Deputy Managing Editor, Senior Assistant Managing Editor, Assistant 20
Managing Editor, City Editor, Sports Editor, Sunday Editor, Technology
Systems Editor, Business Editor, Night Operations Manager, Seen Editor,
Associate Editor of Opinion Pages, Editorial Cartoonist, and Confidential
Secretaries.
25
3. The Charging Party Pittsburgh Mailers Union No. M-22, a/w the Printing, Publishing, and
Media Workers Sector of the Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local
14842 (the Mailers Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act, and at all times material the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
following appropriate unit of the Respondent’s employees (the Mailing Room Unit):30
full-time employees described in the most recent collective-bargaining
agreement [Jt. Exh. 1(b)] between the Mailers Union and the Newspaper as:
All employees covered by this Agreement. The words "employee" and 35
"employees" when used in this Contract apply to journeymen and apprentices.
It is recognized and agreed that the terms and conditions of employment
covering Part-Time mailer employees shall be as set forth in a separate
agreement covering such employees.
40

24Notably, because, as of the close of the record in this case in August 2018, there as yet to
be a post-expiration request for an annual Fund contribution increase of more than 5%, the
General Counsel’s more limited case is sufficient—to date—to remedy the existing violations,
even under the Charging Parties’ view. I do not reach the issue of whether, in the event there are
subsequent annual Fund contribution rate increases beyond 5% necessary to maintain the
existing health care coverage, and the Respondent fails to pay the amount necessary to maintain
the existing health care coverage, the Unions could allege and the General Counsel could litigate
in a future unfair labor practice case, that the Respondent has violated the Act anew.
JD–67–18
27
4. The Charging Party Pittsburgh Typographical Union No. 7, a/w the Communications Workers
of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local 14827 (the Typographical Union) is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and at all times material the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the following appropriate unit of the Respondent’s advertising
employees (the Advertising Unit):5
All regular full time and regular part-time employees of the Advertising
Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employees, guards,
professional and supervisors as defined in the Act, and those specifically
excluded. 10
Specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit is:
All employees in the Marketing, Research and Promotion Division, including
supervision, managerial, confidential, and all other employees, as well as such
employees added in the future, are excluded from the Advertising Unit. In 15
addition, the following positions are specifically excluded from the Advertising
Unit:
Chief Revenue Officer Secretary to Classified Managers
Advertising Director Display Advertising Manager 20
Classified Manager Advertising Operations Manager
Classified Real Estate Manager Market Research Manager
Retail Manager Classified Recruitment Manager
Mgr. of Training and Sales Dev. Classified Operations Manager
Database Marketing Manager Production Services Supervisor 25
Co-Op and Special Sections Mgr. Product Design Manager
Classified Call Center Manager Research Analyst
Online Sales Manager Sales Manager - Automotive
Production Services Manager Sales Manager - Real Estate
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Online Sales Manager - Retail (Territories) 30
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Classified Sales Manager - New Business Dev.
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - National Sales Manager - Recruitment
Executive Assistant to Adv, Director Sales Manager – Major/National
Preprint Distribution Manager Sales Supervisor – Major/National
Retail Territory Sales Manager Sales Manager - Digital/Direct 35
Classified Automotive Sales Manager Production Services Manager
Quality Control Specialist
5. The Charging Party Typographical Union is and at all times material has been the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the following appropriate unit of the Respondent’s 40
finance employees (the Finance Unit):
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the Financial
Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employees, guards,
professional and supervisors as defined in the Act. The following are 45
recognized as being confidential or supervisory employees excluded from the
coverage of this Agreement: Controller, Assistant Controller, Office Manager
and their confidential secretaries, Accounting Manager, Auditor, Credit
Manager, Cashier Manager, Circulation Accounting Supervisor, Advertising
Accounting Supervisor, and Payroll Supervisor.50
JD–67–18
28
6. The Charging Party Newspaper, Newsprint, Magazine and Film Delivery Drivers, Helpers and
Handlers, a/w the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local Union No. 211 of
Allegheny County (the Delivery Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act, and at all times material the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the following appropriate unit of the Respondent’s employees (the Delivery Unit):5
all employees performing the delivery-related work described in more detail in
Section 2 (Jurisdiction) of the most recent collective-bargaining agreement
between the Delivery Union and the Newspaper. [See, Section 2 of Joint Exh.
1(e).]10
7. The Charging Party the Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s/Paper Handlers Local
Union No. 9N, a/w the Graphic Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and its Local 24M/9N (the Pressmen’s Union) is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and at all times material the exclusive collective-15
bargaining representative of the following appropriate unit of the Respondent’s employees
(the Pressmen’s Unit):

All journeymen pressmen, paperhandlers, paperhandling pressmen, and
apprentice pressmen who work in the Company's pressroom and 20
paperhandling departments.
8. The Charging Party Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO, Local 95 (Operating Engineers), is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and at all times material the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following appropriate unit of the 25
Respondent’s operating engineer employees (the Operating Engineers Unit):
all employees employed by [the Respondent] at its facility located at 2201 Sweeney
Drive, Clinton, P A; but excluding guards, office clericals, managerial personnel,
confidential personnel, supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, and 30
all other personnel.25
9. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, beginning on or about January 1,
2018, by unilaterally discontinuing to pay up to a 5% annual increase in contribution rates to
the Western Pennsylvania Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund, 35
for health care coverage for employees in the above-referenced bargaining units, resulting in
a reduction in health care coverage for employees commencing April 1, 2018.

10. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.40
45

25The parties stipulated that on March 9, 2017, the PG and the Operating Engineers
tentatively agreed to change the facility address listed in the above-unit description and the
change will be incorporated into any successor labor agreement entered into by the PG and the
Operating Engineers.
JD–67–18
29
REMEDY

Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that
it must be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act. 5
The Respondent, having unlawfully unilaterally discontinued paying annual increases up
to 5% in Fund annual contribution rates shall rescind the unilateral change, and before
implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of unit employees,
notify and on request bargain with the Unions to a lawful impasse. 10
Having found that the Respondent unlawfully discontinued increased annual contributions
to the Fund, the Respondent shall be ordered to reinstitute payments of annual increases to the
Fund and make the Fund and employees whole by making all delinquent Fund contributions on
behalf of those employees, including any additional amounts due the fund in accordance with 15
Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216 fn. 7 (1979).26 Further, the Respondent shall
be required to reimburse its unit employees for any expenses ensuing from its failure to continue
to pay the increased annual contributions to the Fund, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating,
252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981), including all medical
expenses that were not covered by the Fund’s health care plan as a result of the Fund’s reduction 20
in benefits attributable to the Respondent’s failure to pay the required contributions. Such
amounts should be computed in the manner set forth in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682
(1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest as prescribed in New Horizons, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356
NLRB 6 (2010). To the extent that an employee has made personal contributions to a fund that 25
are accepted by the fund in lieu of the employer's delinquent contributions during the period of the
delinquency, the Respondent will reimburse the employee, but the amount of such
reimbursement will constitute a setoff to the amount that the Respondent otherwise owes the
fund.27
30
The Respondent shall post an appropriate informational notice, as described in the
attached appendix. This notice shall be posted at the Respondent's facility wherever the notices
to employees are regularly posted for 60 days without anything covering it up or defacing its
contents. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic 35
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. In the
event that during the pendency of these proceedings the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by
the Respondent at any time since January 1, 2018. When the notice is issued to the40
Respondent, it shall sign it or otherwise notify Region 6 of the Board what action it will take with
respect to this decision.

26The question of whether the Respondent must pay any additional amounts into the Fund in
order to satisfy the “make whole” remedy is appropriately left to the compliance stage.
Merryweather Optical Co., supra.
27I note that the record suggests that employees were not permitted to directly contribute to
the Fund. However, the issue was not directly litigated. Therefore, as a precaution, I include the
standard direction regarding reimbursement of employee personal contributions.
JD–67–18
30
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended28
ORDER5
The Respondent PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post–Gazette, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:10
(a) Unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of employment of its unit
employees by discontinuing to pay up to a 5% annual increase in contribution
rates to the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund
(Fund), for health care coverage for unit employees, without providing the 15
employees’ collective-bargaining representative notice and an opportunity to
bargain to a lawful impasse.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.20
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions 25
of unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Newspaper Guild of
Pittsburgh a/w Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, and its Local
38061 (the Guild) Union to a lawful impasse as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the following bargaining unit:
30
The Editorial Unit:
All employees in the Editorial Department and in all sub-divisions of the
Editorial Department, excluding those employees provided for in other
existing Union Agreements and all Publishers and Associate Publishers, 35
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief, Executive Editor, Editor of the Editorial Page,
Managing Editor, Deputy Managing Editor, Senior Assistant Managing
Editor, Assistant Managing Editor, City Editor, Sports Editor, Sunday
Editor, Technology Systems Editor, Business Editor, Night Operations
Manager, Seen Editor, Associate Editor of Opinion Pages, Editorial 40
Cartoonist, and Confidential Secretaries.
45

28If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the
Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
JD–67–18
31
(b) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions
of unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Mailers
Union No. M–22, a/w the Printing, Publishing, and Media Workers Sector of the
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local 14842 (the Mailers
Union) to a lawful impasse as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of5
the employees in the following bargaining unit:
The Mailing Room Unit:
full-time employees described in the most recent collective-bargaining 10
agreement between the Mailers Union and the Newspaper as:
All employees covered by this Agreement. The words "employee" and
"employees" when used in this Contract apply to journeymen and
apprentices. It is recognized and agreed that the terms and conditions of 15
employment covering Part-Time mailer employees shall be as set forth in a
separate agreement covering such employees.
(c) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions
of unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Pittsburgh 20
Typographical Union No. 7, a/w the Communications Workers of America, AFL–
CIO, and its Local 14827 (the Typographical Union) to a lawful impasse as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the following
bargaining units:
25
The Advertising Employees Unit:
All regular full time and regular part-time employees of the Advertising
Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employees,
guards, professional and supervisors as defined in the Act, and those 30
specifically excluded.
Specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit is:
All employees in the Marketing, Research and Promotion Division,
including supervision, managerial, confidential, and all other employees, as 35
well as such employees added in the future, are excluded from the
Advertising Unit. In addition, the following positions are specifically
excluded from the Advertising Unit:
Chief Revenue Officer Secretary to Classified Managers 40
Advertising Director Display Advertising Manager
Classified Manager Advertising Operations Manager
Classified Real Estate Manager Market Research Manager
Retail Manager Classified Recruitment Manager
Mgr. of Training and Sales Dev. Classified Operations Manager 45
Database Marketing Manager Production Services Supervisor
Co-Op and Special Sections Mgr. Product Design Manager
Classified Call Center Manager Research Analyst
Online Sales Manager Sales Manager - Automotive
Production Services Manager Sales Manager - Real Estate 50
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Online Sales Manager – Retail (Territories)
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Classified Sales Manager - New Business Dev.
JD–67–18
32
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - National Sales Manager - Recruitment
Executive Assistant to Adv, Director Sales Manager – Major/National
Preprint Distribution Manager Sales Supervisor –Major/National
Retail Territory Sales Manager Sales Manager - Digital/Direct
Classified Automotive Sales Manager Production Services Manager 5
Quality Control Specialist
The Finance Employees Unit:
10
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the Financial
Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employees,
guards, professional and supervisors as defined in the Act. The following
are recognized as being confidential or supervisory employees excluded
from the coverage of this Agreement: Controller, Assistant Controller, 15
Office Manager and their confidential secretaries, Accounting Manager,
Auditor, Credit Manager, Cashier Manager, Circulation Accounting
Supervisor, Advertising Accounting Supervisor, and Payroll Supervisor.
(d) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions 20
of unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Newspaper, Newsprint,
Magazine and Film Delivery Drivers, Helpers and Handlers a/w the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local Union No. 211 of Allegheny County (the
Delivery Union) to a lawful impasse as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the following bargaining unit:25
The Delivery Unit:
all employees performing the delivery-related work described in more detail
in Section 2 (Jurisdiction) of the most recent collective-bargaining 30
agreement between the Delivery Union and the Newspaper.
(e) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and
conditions of unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the
Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s/Paper Handlers Local Union 35
No. 9N, a/w the Graphic Communications Conference/International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local 24M/9N (the Pressmen’s Union)
to a lawful impasse as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the following bargaining unit:
40
The Pressmen’s Unit:
All journeymen pressmen, paperhandlers, paperhandling pressmen, and
apprentice pressmen who work in the Company's pressroom and
paperhandling departments.45
50
JD–67–18
33
(f) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and
conditions of unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the
International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO, Local 95 (the
Operating Engineers) to a lawful impasse as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the following bargaining unit:5
The Operating Engineers Unit:
all employees employed by [the Respondent] at its facility located at 2201
Sweeney Drive, Clinton, P A; but excluding guards, office clericals, managerial 10
personnel, confidential personnel, supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, and all other personnel.29
(g) Rescind the change in terms and conditions of employment for its unit employees
that was unilaterally implemented on January 1, 2018, when it discontinued paying 15
up to a 5% annual increase in contribution rates to the Fund for health care
coverage for employees in the above-described units.
(h) Make all annual increases in contributions to the Fund that it failed to make,
including any additional amounts due to the Fund on behalf of unit employees in 20
the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision, and continue to make
the annual increase in contributions until the Respondent bargains with the Unions
in good faith to an impasse or to an agreement.
(i) Reimburse unit employees for any expenses resulting from the failure to pay the 25
annual increases in Fund contributions up to 5% in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this decision.
(j) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 30 Copies of the 30
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being signed
by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical
posting of paper notices, notices in each language deemed appropriate shall be 35
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the 40
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy

29The parties stipulated that on March 9, 2017, the PG and the Operating Engineers
tentatively agreed to change the facility address listed in the above-unit description and the
change will be incorporated into any successor labor agreement entered into by the PG and the
Operating Engineers.
30If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
JD–67–18
34
of the notice in each appropriate language, to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time since January 1, 2018.
(k) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for
Region 6 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the 5
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 16, 2018
10
David I. Goldman
U.S. Administrative Law Judge
ht,t CIL
JD–67–18
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the terms and conditions of employment of unit employees by
discontinuing to pay up to a 5% annual increase in contribution rates to the Western
Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund (Fund), for health care coverage without
providing the employees’ collective-bargaining representative notice and an opportunity to
bargain to a lawful impasse.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise
of the rights listed above.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh a/w
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, and its Local 38061 as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of employees in the following unit:
The Editorial Unit:
All employees in the Editorial Department and in all sub-divisions of the
Editorial Department, excluding those employees provided for in other
existing Union Agreements and all Publishers and Associate Publishers,
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief, Executive Editor, Editor of the Editorial Page,
Managing Editor, Deputy Managing Editor, Senior Assistant Managing
Editor, Assistant Managing Editor, City Editor, Sports Editor, Sunday
Editor, Technology Systems Editor, Business Editor, Night Operations
Manager, Seen Editor, Associate Editor of Opinion Pages, Editorial
Cartoonist, and Confidential Secretaries.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Mailers Union No. M-22, a/w
the Printing, Publishing, and Media Workers Sector of the Communications Workers of America,
JD–67–18
AFL–CIO, and its Local 14842 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees
in the following unit:
The Mailing Room Unit:
full-time employees described in the most recent collective-bargaining
agreement between the Mailers Union and the Newspaper as:
All employees covered by this Agreement. The words "employee" and
"employees" when used in this Contract apply to journeymen and
apprentices. It is recognized and agreed that the terms and conditions of
employment covering Part-Time mailer employees shall be as set forth in a
separate agreement covering such employees.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Typographical Union No. 7,
a/w the Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local 14827 as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of employees in the following units:
The Advertising Employees Unit:
All regular full time and regular part-time employees of the Advertising
Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employees,
guards, professional and supervisors as defined in the Act, and those
specifically excluded.
Specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit is:
All employees in the Marketing, Research and Promotion Division,
including supervision, managerial, confidential, and all other employees, as
well as such employees added in the future, are excluded from the
Advertising Unit. In addition, the following positions are specifically
excluded from the Advertising Unit:
Chief Revenue Officer Secretary to Classified Managers
Advertising Director Display Advertising Manager
Classified Manager Advertising Operations Manager
Classified Real Estate Manager Market Research Manager
Retail Manager Classified Recruitment Manager
Mgr. of Training and Sales Dev. Classified Operations Manager
Database Marketing Manager Production Services Supervisor
Co-Op and Special Sections Mgr. Product Design Manager
Classified Call Center Manager Research Analyst
Online Sales Manager Sales Manager - Automotive
Production Services Manager Sales Manager - Real Estate
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Online Sales Manager – Retail (Territories)
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Classified Sales Manager - New Business Dev.
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - National Sales Manager - Recruitment
Executive Assistant to Adv, Director Sales Manager – Major/National
Preprint Distribution Manager Sales Supervisor –Major/National
Retail Territory Sales Manager Sales Manager - Digital/Direct
Classified Automotive Sales Manager Production Services Manager
Quality Control Specialist
JD–67–18
The Finance Employees Unit:
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the Financial
Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employees,
guards, professional and supervisors as defined in the Act. The following
are recognized as being confidential or supervisory employees excluded
from the coverage of this Agreement: Controller, Assistant Controller,
Office Manager and their confidential secretaries, Accounting Manager,
Auditor, Credit Manager, Cashier Manager, Circulation Accounting
Supervisor, Advertising Accounting Supervisor, and Payroll Supervisor.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Newspaper, Newsprint, Magazine and
Film Delivery Drivers, Helpers and Handlers, a/w the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and
its Local Union No. 211 of Allegheny County as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of employees in the following unit:
The Delivery Unit:
all employees performing the delivery-related work described in more detail
in Section 2 (Jurisdiction) of the most recent collective-bargaining
agreement between the Delivery Union and the Newspaper.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing
Pressmen’s/Paper Handlers Local Union No. 9N, a/w the Graphic Communications
Conference/International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local 24M/9N (the Pressmen’s
Union), as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in the following unit:
The Pressmen’s Unit:
All journeymen pressmen, paperhandlers, paperhandling pressmen, and
apprentice pressmen who work in the Company's pressroom and
paperhandling departments
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO, Local 95
(the Operating Engineers) as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in
the following unit:
The Operating Engineers Unit:
all employees employed by Pittsburgh Post-Gazette at its facility located at 2201
Sweeney Drive, Clinton, PA; but excluding guards, office clericals, managerial
personnel, confidential personnel, supervisors as defined in the National Labor
Relations Act, and all other personnel.
WE WILL rescind the unlawful change in terms and conditions of unit employees that was
unilaterally implemented on January 1, 2018, when we discontinued paying up to a 5% annual
JD–67–18
increase in contributions to the Fund for health care coverage for employees in the above-
described units.
WE WILL make all annual increases in contributions to the Fund that we have failed to make,
including any additional amounts due to the Fund on behalf of unit employees in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of this decision and WE WILL continue to pay the annual increase in
contributions until we bargain with the Unions in good faith to an impasse or to an agreement.
WE WILL reimburse you for any expenses resulting from our failure to pay the annual increases
in Fund contributions up to 5%, including losses incurred as a result of the Fund’s reduction in
benefits caused by the our failure to pay increased annual contributions.
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC.
d/b/a PITTSBURGH POST–GAZETTE
(Employer)
Dated By
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the
Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional
Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
William S. Moorhead Federal Building, Room 904, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4111
(412) 395-4400, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/06–CA–212627 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (412) 690-7117.