01983561
03-17-1999
Peter Vlastelica, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01983561
) Agency No. 4E-852-0198-97
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
(Pacific/Western Region), )
Agency. )
___________________________________)
DECISION
On April 2, 1998, Peter Vlastelica (appellant) appealed the final decision
of the United States Postal Service (agency), dated March 25, 1998,
which concluded he had not been discriminated against in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e
et seq. Appellant had alleged that he had been discriminated against by
officials at the agency's Dobson Station in Mesa, Arizona, on the basis of
his sex (male), and/or reprisal for engaging in prior EEO activity, when:
(1) his carrier case was moved; (2) his parking space was relocated; and
(3) he was instructed to park his postal vehicle far from the station.
This appeal is accepted in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order
No. 960.001.
The record indicates that appellant was employed by the agency as a Letter
Carrier at its Dobson Station in Mesa, Arizona. Appellant alleged that
after returning from annual leave on June 23, 1997, he found that his
carrier case had been moved and both his personal parking space and his
parking space for his postal vehicle had been moved. Appellant asserted
these actions were prompted by false accusations made about him by
a female coworker. The Station Manager agreed that the actions were
prompted by the conflicts appellant was having with a female coworker.
The Station Manager noted that in December 1996, both employees had
been issued letters of warning because of an altercation. The Station
Manager said that the coworker continued to complain that appellant was
harassing her so it was decided to move appellant's case closer to the
supervisor's desk so that his discussions with the coworker could be
better monitored. The Station Manager also said that the coworker had
accused appellant of attempting to run her over in the parking lot.
While this accusation could not be corroborated by other witnesses,
management said the decision was made to make an effort to limit the
two employees' contact with each other. Therefore, appellant's parking
spaces were moved to the north side of the station, which was the same
side where most of the other letter carriers parked.
On July 29, 1997, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint, alleging
that the agency had discriminated against him as referenced above.
The agency accepted the complaint and conducted an investigation.
At the conclusion of the investigation, appellant waived her right to a
hearing and requested a final agency decision on the evidence of record.
On March 25, 1998, the agency issued its final decision, finding sex
discrimination and/or unlawful retaliation had not been established.
It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.
Appellant's complaint constitutes a claim of disparate treatment which is
properly analyzed under the three-tiered analytical framework outlined
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also,
U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716
(1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253-256 (1981).
Applying this analysis, the Commission finds that while appellant may
have established a prima facie case of discrimination and/or reprisal,
management officials successfully rebutted that initial inference with
an articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions
taken. Specifically, management established that it took the actions
in question in response to complaints from a coworker that appellant
was harassing and threatening her. While these accusations could not
be fully corroborated, management chose to monitor appellant's actions
more carefully and to move appellant's parking spaces to minimize contact
between the two employees. They explained they moved appellant's parking
spaces to the north side of the station because that was where most
of the other carriers parked. After a careful review of the record,
the Commission discerns no basis upon which to conclude that appellant
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's
articulated reasons for its actions in this matter were unbelievable
or that its actions were more likely motivated by discrimination or
retaliation.
Accordingly, based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the
foregoing reasons, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision of no discrimination
or retaliation.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from
the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil
action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY
(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or
to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the
jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil
action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON
WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT
PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 17, 1999
__________________ _______________________________
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations