Peter Treman et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 25, 2019

15184382 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 25, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/184,382 06/16/2016 Peter TREMAN 83644590 (FMC6868PUS) 4425
28395 7590 09/25/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
LAFONTANT, GARY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2646
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/25/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PETER TREMAN, JACOB GAISKI,
MATTHEW CHARLES CROSS, and
KAREN S. MACEACHERN
____________

Appeal 2019-000091
Application 15/184,382
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, NORMAN H. BEAMER,
and GARTH D. BAER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction over the pending
rejected claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. (Appeal Br. 2.)
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THE INVENTION
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention is directed to dynamic
localized coordinate download in which a vehicle will have time to
download new local data before reaching a local data set perimeter. (Spec.
¶¶ 1, 6.)
Independent claims 1, 6, and 16, reproduced below, are illustrative of
the subject matter on appeal:
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive vehicle speed and heading;
define a first local data set of map data around a vehicle
location bounded by a perimeter projected to be reachable
by a vehicle traveling within the perimeter within a
predetermined amount of time, based on the received
speed and heading;
define a geo-fence within and at a distance from the
perimeter such that a vehicle reaching the geo-fence at the
received speed will have time to download a second local
data set before reaching the first local data set perimeter;
and
send the geo-fence definition and first data set to the
vehicle.

6. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
responsive to a local data request, define a local data
boundary and a geo-fence within the boundary for
triggering an additional-data request based on a vehicle
speed and data download speed, the local data boundary
defined by coordinates projected to be reachable by a
vehicle within a predetermined time period; and
transmit the geo-fence and map data within the local
data boundary to a vehicle.

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16. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive local map data, a geo-fence around a present
vehicle location and contained within an outer boundary of
the map data, and maximum expected travel speed;
track vehicle progress until the geo-fence is
encountered;
request new local map data upon encountering the geo-
fence; and
redefine the geo-fence to be closer to a vehicle location
than the received geo-fence responsive to vehicle speed
exceeding the maximum expected travel speed.
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, and 4–19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Boes et al (US 2014/0278090 A1; pub. Sept. 18,
2014, hereinafter “Boes”) and Zeng (US 2014/0121932 A1; pub. May 1,
2014). (Final Act. 7–21.)
The Examiner rejected claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Boes, Zeng, and Chmaytelli et al (US 2002/0194325 A1;
pub. Dec. 19, 2002, hereinafter “Chmaytelli”). (Final Act. 21–23.)
The Examiner rejected claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Boes, Zeng, and Leblond (US 2012/0281091 A1; pub.
Nov. 8, 2012). (Final Act. 23–24.)

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief present the following
issues:2

2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the positions of the
Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed Apr. 9, 2018, hereinafter
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Issue One: Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Boes and Zeng teaches or suggests
a first local data set of map data around a vehicle location
bounded by a perimeter projected to be reachable by a
vehicle traveling within the perimeter within a
predetermined amount of time
and
a geo-fence within and at a distance from the perimeter such
that a vehicle reaching the geo-fence at the received speed
will have time to download a second local data set before
reaching the first local data set perimeter,

as recited in independent claim 1. (Appeal Br. 5–7; see also Reply Br. 2–3.)
Issue Two: Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Boes and Zeng teaches or suggests “responsive to a local data request, define
a local data boundary and a geo-fence within the boundary for triggering an
additional-data request based on a vehicle speed and data download speed,”
as recited in independent claim 6. (Appeal Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 3–4.)
Issue Three: Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination
of Boes and Zeng teaches or suggests “receive local map data, a geo-fence
around a present vehicle location and contained within an outer boundary of
the map data, and maximum expected travel speed,” as recited in
independent claim 16. (Appeal Br. 7–9; see also Reply Br. 4–5.)

“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief (filed Oct. 3, 2018, hereinafter “Reply Br.”);
the Final Office Action (mailed Jan. 11, 2018, hereinafter “Final Act.”); and
the Examiner’s Answer (mailed Aug. 3, 2018, hereinafter “Ans.”) for the
respective details.
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner errs. We disagree with Appellant’s arguments,
and we adopt as our own: (1) the pertinent findings and reasons set forth by
the Examiner in the Action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2–
26); and (2) the corresponding reasons set forth by the Examiner in the
Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. (Ans. 3–8).
We concur with the applicable conclusions reached by the Examiner and
emphasize the following.
First Issue
In finding that the combination of Boes and Zeng teaches or suggests
the claim 1 limitations at issue, the Examiner relies on Boes’s disclosure of a
vehicle computing system that identifies relevant points of interest (“POI”)
in which the vehicle could “guess” at which time the vehicle could pass
through POIs. (Final Act. 7–8; see also Boes, Abstract, ¶¶ 47–50, 31–32,
and Fig. 4B.)
Appellant argues that regarding Boes,
[n]owhere is a perimeter as claimed, described. And even if
the “traveling boundary” of paragraph 50 were considered
to be the initial perimeter, the process never defines a
second geo-fence within that perimeter, and especially not a
geo-fence that is defined with the specific condition that it
be “far enough away from the perimeter such that a vehicle
reaching the geo-fence has time to download a new local
data set before hitting the perimeter.”

(Reply Br. 3.)
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that
“[Boes’s] geo-fence data associate with [a POI] which equate[s] to the
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second local data in the claim [and] can be downloaded by identifying that
the car [is] within or close to the perimeter/geofence created by the car”
(Ans. 5), and that “[e]stimating a reaching point of interest according to
vehicle speed and estimating a distance point to start the download of the
POI data is taught in [the] Boes reference but [Boes uses] different language
description than claim 1.” (Ans. 6 (emphasis omitted).)
We agree with the Examiner that the language differences between
Boes and the claims does not discredit the teachings of Boes to one skilled in
the art, because an obviousness analysis is not an ipsissimis verbis test. Cf.
In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that, in an
anticipation analysis, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis
test”).
Here, Boes suggests that “[s]ince many POIs along a route may be
passed quickly, and may have smaller geo-fences associated with them, it
may be useful to pre-load the geo-fences and/or POI information for various
features projected to be along a route” (Boes ¶ 43; see also Final Act. 8) and
further suggests that parameters such as perimeter be adjusted in order to
“provid[e] extra time for data transfer.” (Boes ¶ 50; see also Final Act. 7–
8.)
Thus, Boes provides the elements and the motivation to construct a
system whose goal matches that of “a vehicle reaching the geo-fence
perimeter at the received speed will have time to download new local data
before reaching the local data set perimeter and send the geo-fence definition
and coordinate data within the local data set to the vehicle” (Spec. ¶ 6) with
a slight change in terminology. A skilled artisan would “be able to fit the
teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle” using the
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combination of Boes and Zeng, because the skilled artisan is “a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 420–21.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim
1, and dependent claims 2–5 not argued separately with particularity. (See
Appeal Br. 5–7 and 9.)

Second Issue
Appellant argues that
even if paragraph 50 of Boes is read as teaching defining a
local data boundary, there is nothing where the same
processor that defines this boundary “defines a geo-fence
within this boundary for triggering an additional data-
request.” In Boes, the boundary is a proxy for a larger
vehicle size that can cause a coincidence of vehicle location
(by essentially faking a large scale vehicle location) with a
pre-existing geo-fence around a POI.

(Reply Br. 4.)
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that
[t]he second boundary geo-fence created is obvious using
the transfer data time to advance the triggering point of the
downloadable time (See [Boes ¶¶ 32, 50]). Both perimeter
data are compared when reach or within each other in order
to trigger download and playback information of POI (See
[Boes ¶¶ 39–40, 51–52]).

(Ans. 7.)
Again, independent claim 6 uses slightly different terminology to
arrive at the same goal of Boes: to ensure that parameters such as the
claimed “local data boundary” are defined such that prior to a vehicle
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passing by a boundary, an additional data request is triggered such that the
data arrives prior to the time it is relevant, based on vehicle speed and data
download speed. The combination of Boes and Zeng provide the teachings
and motivation, as shown similarly above regarding claim 1.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim
6, and dependent claims 7–15 not argued separately with particularity. (See
Appeal Br. 7–9.)
Third Issue
Appellant argues that
the Examiner appears to equate the geo-fence provided by
the tracking server to be the perimeter around the vehicle.
Since this is a mobile perimeter, the vehicle will never
encounter the geo-fence and thus it is utterly impossible for
the prior art to teach “track vehicle progress until the geo-
fence is encountered” because this prior-art fence is by
definition a un-encounterable fence as it moves with the
vehicle.

(Appeal Br. 7–8 (emphasis omitted).) Appellant further contends that
there is no way any geo-fence of Boes could actually meet
the single geo-fence limitations of the claims, and the
Examiner cannot bounce between characteristics of both a
perimeter around a vehicle for detecting geo-fences and a
geo-fence around a POI to “aggregate” characteristics of the
geo-fence of the claims, because the claimed geo-fence
would serve no discernable purpose in Boes if the aspects
were aggregated as alleged.

(Reply Br. 8 (emphasis omitted).)
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that
virtual vehicle perimeter is defined in [Boes ¶ 50] taking
into account of vehicle speed and downloadable time.
Multiple virtual perimeters will be created along the way.
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The virtual perimeter created at one point will eventually be
reached at another point in time (See [Boes ¶ 32]). During
the travel, many geo-fences associated with [POIs] will be
trigger[ed] as per vehicle perimeter and geo-fence data
comparison.

(Ans. 8.) Here, one skilled in the art would equate the sizing of perimeter
made by Boes (see Boes ¶ 50) as dependent upon both “estimate[d] arrival
times based on known travel data” (id. ¶ 32) and data download time so that
the goal attained by both Boes and the claimed invention is that data is
downloaded before it is needed for use. (See id. ¶ 50.)
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim
16, and dependent claims 17–20 not argued separately with particularity.
(See Appeal Br. 8–9.)

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–19 § 103 Boes, Zeng 1, 2, 4–19
3 § 103 Boes, Zeng,
Chmaytelli
3
20 § 103 Boes, Zeng,
Leblond
20
Overall Outcome 1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED