Pepsi-Cola-Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 22, 1975

219 N.L.R.B. 1200 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

1200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Strange and Lindsey Beverages , Inc., and Dr. Pepper
Bottling Co., Inc., Joint Employers d/b/a Pepsi-
Cola-Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. and Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local
Union No. 991 , a/w International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers
of America . Case 15-CA-5454
August 22, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND PENELLO
On April 16, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
James M. Fitzpatrick issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, except
as modified herein, and to adopt his recommended
Order.
1. The Administrative Law Judge found that on
June 6, 1974,' the Union indicated a change in its
bargaining position which was sufficient to break the
existing impasse in the parties' contract negotiations.
Accordingly, he concluded that Respondent's subse-
quent refusal to meet and bargain with the Union
constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. We disagree .2
The facts are fully set forth in the attached Deci-
sion. The Administrative Law Judge found that as of
January 17 an impasse existed in the collective-bar-
gaining negotiations between Respondent and the
Union. In May and June, Herbert Belt, the Union's
business agent and chief negotiator, and Willis Dar-
by, attorney for Respondent, also participated in
contract negotiations between the Union and anoth-
er of Darby's clients , Gulf Plating Company. On
June 6, Belt and Darby reached agreement on the
Gulf Plating contract. At the end of that meeting,
Belt made certain statements to Darby which the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge summarized as follows:
Belt told Darby they had been able in those ne-
1 All dates herein are in 1974 unless otherwise indicated.
1 However , we agree with the Administrative Law Judge in finding no
merit in Respondent's contention that its willingness to meet at the call of
the Federal mediator is a defense to the alleged unlawful refusal to bargain.
See F A. Reynolds Co, Inc., 173 NLRB 418, 423-424 (1%8).
gotiations to reach agreement with neither party
getting all it wanted. He noted that the contract
proposals made on behalf of Gulf Plating were
basically the same as those made on behalf of
Respondents. Belt wanted to adjust the language
to meet the needs on an agreement between the
Union and Respondents.
Early in the hearing, after Belt had testified to this
conversation with Darby, the General Counsel
sought to introduce into evidence the Gulf Plating
agreement . The Administrative Law Judge sustained
Respondent's relevancy objection, but stated on the
record that the General Counsel could resubmit the
contract at a later point if he thought it was "neces-
sary or helpful for [his] case." This the General
Counsel failed to do.3
Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge con-
cluded that Belt "adopted by reference the terms
agreed upon with Gulf Plating" and "thus made a
counteroffer of sorts." Relying on Webb Furniture
Corporation 4 and Sharon Hats,' the Administrative
Law Judge held that, although the Gulf Plating
agreement was not received in evidence, Belt's pro-
posal constituted a sufficient change in the Union's
prior bargaining position to break the impasse and
require Respondent to resume negotiations.
The Administrative Law Judge's reliance on Webb
Furniture Corporation and Sharon Hats as authority
for finding an 8(a)(5) violation herein is clearly mis-
placed. Those cases establish that a substantial
change in the bargaining position of one party is nec-
essary to break an existing impasse. Thus, the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's conclusion that " [i]t is un-
necessary to find precisely what the [Union's] offer
included" is erroneous . Inasmuch as the Gulf Plating
agreement was not received in evidence , it is impossi-
ble to determine whether Belt's reference to the terms
of that contract constituted any change , much less a
substantial change, from the Union's prior position
in negotiations with Respondent.
Under these circumstances , we can only conclude,
contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, that Belt's
statements to Darby on June 6 did not relieve the
existing impasse . Accordingly, Respondent's subse-
quent refusal to meet and bargain with the Union did
not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
2. However, we agree with the Administrative
Law Judge's conclusion that Respondent failed to es-
tablish by a showing of objective facts that it had a
7 The General Counsel has not excepted to the Administrative Law
Judge 's ruling excluding the Gulf Plating contract.
152 NLRB 1526, 1529 (1965), enfd 366 F.2d 314 (C.A. 4, 1%6).
Sharon Hats, Incorporated, 127 NLRB 947 , 956 (1960), enfd . 289 F.2d
628 (C.A. 5, 1961).
219 NLRB No. 190
PEPSI-COLA-DR. PEPPER BOTTLING CO. 1201
reasonable doubt as to the Union' s continuing ma-
jority status on August 5 when it withdrew recogni-
tion.
Respondent relies on the following factors to sup-
port its claim: high employee turnover, lack of sup-
port for the strike, and employee statements to man-
agement expressing dissatisfaction with the Union.
In regard to the first of these factors, high employee
turnover, the Board has consistently held that "new
employees will be presumed to support a union in the
same ratio as those they may replace." 6 In regard to
the fact that a substantial number of employees
crossed the picket line and returned to work during
the strike, the Board does not presume that such ac-
tion demonstrates a rejection of the Union as the
employees' bargaining representative.' Finally, con-
cerning the expressions of employee sentiment,
Respondent's evidence indicated that some of these
employees only asked why they had to pay money to
the Union to keep the jobs they already had and
others merely stated that they did not want to get
involved. Such expressions do not indicate that these
employees no longer wanted to be represented by the
Union.8 Furthermore, even assuming that the state-
ments constitute expressions of employee dissatisfac-
tion with the Union as their collective-bargaining
representative, according to Respondent's evidence,
less than one-third of the employees in the bargain-
ing unit made such statements.9
Upon consideration of all the factors on which Re-
spondent relies , we find that they are insufficient to
demonstrate that Respondent had reasonable
grounds for believing that the Union no longer com-
manded majority employee support at the time of its
withdrawal of recognition.10 Accordingly, we con-
clude, in agreement with the Administrative Law
Judge, that Respondent's admitted withdrawal of
recognition on August 5 was violative of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and we shall adopt his
recommended Order.
3. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusion that Respondent's unlawful withdrawal
of recognition in August prolonged the strike of its
employees. Accordingly, we find that the strike was
converted from an economic to an unfair labor prac-
tice strike on August 5, 1974.11
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Strange and Lindsey Bever-
ages, Inc., and Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., Inc., Joint
Employers d/b/a Pepsi-Cola-Dr. Pepper Bottling
Co., Mobile, Alabama, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order.
MEMBER FANNING, dissenting in part:
In agreement with my colleagues, I would adopt
the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the Re-
spondent failed to establish by objective facts that it
had a reasonable doubt of continued majority status
when it withdrew recognition from the Union on Au-
gust 5, 1974, and also would not characterize this
record as revealing "widespread dissatisfaction with
the Union" among the employees.
However, contrary to their view, I would adopt the
8(a)(5) finding made by the Administrative Law
Judge concerning the Respondent's refusal, begin-
ning June 6, 1974, to meet and bargain in good faith,
thus converting-at that time rather than August 5-
the strike into an unfair labor practice strike. On
June 6, Union Representative Belt clearly indicated
to Respondent Attorney Darby a change in bargain-
ing position with respect to this certified unit.
Though made in the course of negotiations concern-
ing another area employer, Belt specifically said that
the terms of the contract which had just been final-
ized would be agreeable to the Union in this case as
well. Belt had on five occasions during May demand-
ed resumed bargaining and was put off by Darby. On
June 6, with the certification year about to expire on
July 2, Belt renewed this request and in addition in-
dicated this significant and specific change in its bar-
gaining position. As usual Darby was verbally coop-
erative but did nothing about it. In these
circumstances I would find that the Union broke the
impasse which lead to the strike and that the Respon-
dent by failing to respond violated 8(a)(5) by its re-
fusal to meet and confer at reasonable times on and
after June 6, 1974.
6 King Radio Corporation, 208 NLRB 578 (1974), enfd . 510 F 2d 1154
(CA. 10, 1975).
7 Id
B Cf Kentucky News, Incorporated, 165 NLRB 777, 778-779 (1967)
9 For this reason , we do not agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
characterization of the record as revealing that "widespread dissatisfaction
with the Union existed among the employees"
10 Contrary to the Administrative Law Judge, we do not believe that
Respondent's subsequent re-recognition of the Union is an event which
should be considered in making this finding , "since facts ... ascertained
after the refusal to bargain are not controlling , or even guiding , in determin-
ing whether the Employer had a reasonable basis for doubt at the time it
refused to bargain." Orion Corporation, 210 NLRB 633 (1974), enfd. 515
F 2d 81 (C.A. 7, 1975).
We also disclaim reliance on the Administrative Law Judge' s comment in
sec. III, B , 9, par. 2, that he "do[es] not take seriously" Respondent's con-
tention that the complaint 's assertion of a continuing obligation to meet
with the Union caused it to re-recognize the Union on December 3
,, Cantor Bros., Inc, 203 NLRB 774, 779-780 (1973), enfd . 86 LRRM
2572, 75 LC ¶ 10,568 (C A 9, 1974)
1202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES M. FITZPATRICK, Administrative Law Judge: This
case arose from unfair labor practice charges filed Septem-
ber 25, 1974,1 by Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers, Local Union No. 991, affiliated with Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men & Helpers of America (the Union), against Strange
and Lindsey Beverages, Inc., and Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.,
Joint Employers doing business as Pepsi-Cola-Dr. Pepper
Bottling Co. (the Respondents). Based on these charges the
Regional Director for the National Labor Relations
Board's Region 15 issued a complaint on November 13
alleging that Respondents had engaged in unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act).
The central allegation of the complaint is that Respondents
did not bargain in good faith with the Union in that they
engaged in dilatory tactics, and refused to meet at reason-
able times and confer in good faith. The complaint further
alleges that a strike of employees begun earlier was pro-
longed by the unfair labor practices and thus became an
unfair labor practice strike. Respondents filed an answer to
the complaint admitting various allegations, including jur-
isdiction, but denying (a) that since June 22, 1973, the
Union has been the exclusive representative of the employ-
ees, (b) that Respondents bargained in bad faith, and (c)
that their conduct prolonged the strike. As set out below, I
find that Respondents did not bargain as required by law
and that their conduct prolonged the strike.
The case was tried before me at Mobile, Alabama, on
December 19 and 20, 1974, and January 6, 1975.
Based on the entire record, including my observation of
the witnesses and consideration of the briefs of the General
Counsel and Respondents, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE EMPLOYERS INVOLVED
Strange and Lindsey Beverages , Inc., and Dr. Pepper
Bottling Co., Inc., both Alabama corporations, are bottlers
and distributors of soft drinks and related products in Mo-
bile, Alabama. They operate jointly from common prem-
ises.
In the conduct of their business they annually purchase
and receive goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside Alabama. They are
joint employers engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED AND ITS CERTIFICATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act. On June 22, 1973, the Board con-
ducted an election (Case 15-RC-5151) among the produc-
1 All dates herein are in 1974 unless otherwise indicated.
tion and maintenance employees of Respondents in which
a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit selected
the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. On
July 2, 1973, the Board's Regional Director for Region 15
certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees in that unit consisting of all
production, maintenance, sales, and delivery employees,
including the merchandiser, special events salesmen, pre-
mix-post-mix salesmen, vendor mechanic, driver-salesmen,
and helpers; excluding office clerical employees, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act. Respondents admit,
and I find, that this unit is appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act.
Whether after March 25 the Union has continued to be the
lawful exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
is an issue in dispute.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Early Negotiations
1. The initial meetings between the Union and
Respondents
Following the certification on July 2, 1973, representa-
tives of the Union and Respondents met and engaged in
collective bargaining on a number of occasions. The
Union's chief negotiator was its business agent, Herbert
Belt, sometimes accompanied by Mort Sherman, the union
business manager, and at other times by other union repre-
sentatives. Respondents were represented by Attorney Wil-
lis Darby (in whose office the early meetings were held)
and by Crawford Lindsey, president of Strange and Lind-
sey Beverages, Inc., vice president of Dr. Pepper Bottling
Co., and general manager of their joint operations.
Before any meetings were held the Union delivered to
Respondents a proposed agreement, the only written pro-
posals the Union has made to Respondents. Thereafter at
the second and third negotiating sessions Respondents pre-
sented written counterproposals for parts of an agreement.
The discussions continued using both the Union's initial
proposal and Respondents' partial counterproposals. At
the end of the third session Belt asked Darby to put togeth-
er a complete package of proposals containing the essential
terms which the Union had to have. He did not specify
those essentials. Darby agreed. In accordance with his
promise he delivered to Belt on August 27, 1973, a com-
plete draft of a proposed agreement. Although Belt found
the terms of this package counterproposal unsatisfactory,
the document thereafter formed the basis for discussions
between the parties.
During the earlier meetings agreement had been reached
on some terms but progress had been slow. Toward the end
of August Belt asked the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service for assistance.
2. Meetings with the Federal Mediator prior to the strike
Around August 28 Federal Mediator Leland Dean en-
tered the negotiations. He conducted a series of joint meet-
ings with the parties in the Mobile offices of the Federal
PEPSI-COLA-DR. PEPPER BOTTLING CO. 1203
Mediation and Conciliation Service during which further
agreement was reached on a number of terms . However,
on other items no agreement was reached . At one of these
sessions Respondents proposed a 10-cent-per -hour raise ef-
fective September 13 for all employees except salesmen.
Belt refused to agree . At a joint session on October 3, 1973,
Dean indicated an impasse existed between the parties. On
October 4 he met separately with each. Thereafter he called
them together for a joint meeting on October 31 to explore
whether either had moved from their earlier fixed posi-
tions. They had not. Dean adjourned the meeting without
scheduling further meetings . It is clear that at that point an
impasse existed.
3. The strike
With matters in that state, the Union on November 5,
1973, called a strike. The strike continued thereafter and so
far as this record shows may still be going on. It was still in
effect on June 30, 1974. There is no contention now that at
its inception the strike was in protest of employer unfair
labor practices. Whether the strike was prolonged by unfair
labor practices is a question dealt with later herein.
On November 12, 1973, shortly after the strike began,
the Union filed 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) unfair labor practice
charges against Respondents with the Board (Case 15-
CA-5070). These were amended on November 30, 1973,
but the same sections of the Act were involved in the
amended charges . After an investigation which included
taking the affidavits of both Belt and Lindsey , the charges
were withdrawn . On December 26, 1973 , the Regional Di-
rector approved the withdrawal.
B. The Alleged Dilatory Tactics of Respondents
1. The issues
As already noted the complaint alleges , and the answer
denies, that commencing on or before March 25 Respon-
dents bargained in bad faith with the Union by engaging in
dilatory tactics and refusing to meet and confer at reason-
able times . Respondents admit that on August 5 they with-
drew recognition of the Union and thereafter refused to
bargain . Respondents contend that reasonable doubt as to
the continued majority status of the Union justified the
withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bargain.
2. Negotiations in early 1974 in Dean 's office
On January 17, 1974, after the matter had been closed
on the records of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, Commissioner Dean called the parties together for
a further meeting in an effort to see if there was further
need for mediation assistance . His call was precipitated by
a letter of January 10 from Lindsey to Belt noting that
Respondents' competitor Coca-Cola had increased its
prices at the end of 1973, that Respondents had followed
with a price increase on January 7 and in accordance with
past practice intended to give their salesmen a raise of 1
cent per case sold effective January 10. Lindsey's letter
indicated willingness to meet with Belt regarding the pro-
posed increase at a mutually convenient time prior to the
close of business January 17. On January 14 Belt sent a
reply to Lindsey indicating he would be happy to meet
with him and thanking him " . . . for including me in your
meeting on this proposal." Belt testified that as a result of
this correspondence they met on January 17 at Dean's of-
fice.
Present at the January 17 meeting in addition to Dean
were Darby and Lindsey for Respondents and Belt and
Tony Lepoma, another business agent of the Union, on
behalf of the Union. At the start of the meeting Lindsey
proposed the increase as indicated in the company letter of
January 10. Belt responded that the Union had no objec-
tion. It is undisputed that the parties agreed on that propo-
sition.
Belt testified, and I find, that they also discussed other
articles of the Company's counterproposals and agreed on
four or five of them. • Lepoma testified that Belt left the
meeting to make a phone call about 15 to 20 minutes be-
fore its end and was absent about 10 to 15 minutes. During
this time the parties reviewed various articles for possible
agreement but had made no progress by the time Belt re-
turned. He did not testify about any agreements beyond
the wage increase. Lindsey in testifying also said nothing
about any discussions on anything other than the proposed
raise. But he did not deny there were such discussions and
in fact testified that Belt stated that , if Respondents were
not willing to move on their items, they were all wasting
Dean's time . It was at that point , apparently, that Belt got
up to make his phone call. Lindsey testified that Lepoma
accused him of being too bullheaded. But Lindsey said that
the Union made neither proposals nor concessions.
Based on a synthesis of the testimony of these witnesses
I find that, in addition to agreeing to the raise for the sales-
men, discussion was had on various other items in the
Company's counterproposals and that insofar as any dis-
cussion related to these other items the position of the par-
ties remained unmoved and neither indicated to the other
any willingness to make a concession.
Belt testified that January 17 was the first time he had
been able to get Respondents back in a bargaining session.
But there is no evidence of any union efforts to resume
negotiations between the last prior meeting with the media-
tor on October 31, 1973, and the January 17 session which
resulted, not from any affirmative move by the Union, but
from company efforts to legally effect a wage increase.
The continuing strike, which started after the parties
reached an impasse, certainly was a changed circumstance
suggesting the possibility that an impasse may no longer
have existed. They did meet and discuss the proposed raise
and other items. They agreed on the raise but on nothing
else. The evidence shows that except for the proposed raise
the relative positions of the parties remained fixed. Neither
made any concessions.'Respondents held to their outstand-
ing counterproposals . The Union made no proposals of its
own. On this evidence I find that following the effort on
January 17 an impasse existed between the parties insofar
as contract negotiations were concerned. No further meet-
ings were scheduled at that, time.
There is conflict in the record as to whether a further
meeting in Commissioner Dean's office was held about
1204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
March 1. Lindsey denied such a meeting occurred and in
fact denied any contact between Belt and himself between
the January 17 meeting and their later exchange of letters
in December. Lepoma corroborates Lindsey in that he tes-
tified that the January 17 meeting was the last he attended
and he assumed there were no further meetings because
Belt would have called him if there were. I credit the ver-
sion of Lindsey as corroborated by Lepoma and find that
no meeting between the parties occurred in March 1974. I
do not credit the testimony of Belt to the effect that such a
bargaining session occurred because of the contradictory
testimony , because he admittedly was unsure of dates, and
because in a pretrial affidavit given to a Board investigator
on October 3, 1974, at which point he likely would have
had a better memory than at the time of the later hearing,
he referred only to the January 17 meeting.
On cross-examination Belt agreed that after he asked
Dean to intervene in 1973, Dean scheduled all of the other
meetings that were held between the parties . Belt was also
asked on cross-examination if anything was agreed to after
the Union went on strike . He testified that he thought so,
that something was agreed to in January 1974, but he was
unable to point to what it was; he knew something was
agreed to but he did not know what. He also agreed that
since the strike the Union has had no written proposals;
that the Union has been trying to reach agreement based
on the company proposals.
Belt also agreed that at the time of the last meeting be-
tween the parties no agreement was reached nor movement
made from their preexisting positions . On earlier occasions
agreement had been reached on some particular items but
he was unable to indicate what they were because he had
lost his notes . Topics on which no agreement had ever been
reached included the practice of the Company holding
back 10 percent of the salesmen's earnings for extended
periods , the right of unrestricted access to the plants by
union representatives to investigate and process grievances,
and employer liability for injury to union agents while on
company property. Other items on which the differences
between the parties had been narrowed but not eliminated
included the grievance procedure , and the definition of
various grounds for discipline or discharge such as disobe-
dience, disorderly conduct , neglect of duty , failure to re-
port for duty, and the like.
3. The Neese Lumber meeting
In the Mobile area the Union represents employees of
various employers . In his capacity as a union representa-
tive Belt deals with a number of these employers. On the
management side a somewhat similar situation exists. Re-
spondents' attorney Darby also represents other employ-
ers.
On or about April 4 the paths of Belt and Darby again
crossed at Dean's office in connection with the labor rela-
tions of another concern , Neese Lumber Company. Ac-
cording to the uncontradicted testimony of Belt he turned
to Darby during a break in this meeting and proposed that
they get together and clean up the Pepsi-Cola (Respon-
dents) situation . Darby indicated he would like to clean it
up because he did not get paid for these things until he
concluded them . He said something to the effect that he
would get back with Belt as soon as he could . In fact he
never did get back with him.
The question thus arises whether this brief encounter
broke the impasse between the parties . I find that nothing
occurred at the Neese meeting to indicate a change in cir-
cumstances so that one could say that the impasse did not
continue . Neither representative indicated any change in
position in the demands of their principle . Neither indi-
cated a willingness to make any concession . Belt, who
made the move, was indicating a willingness to meet to
resolve the dispute and in response to this Darby indicated
a like willingness . But absent some indication of a change
in circumstances signaling that a resumption of meetings
would be more than a futile replay of earlier scenarios,
neither party had an obligation to meet . N.L.R.B. v. Cam-
bria Clay Products Company, 215 F.2d 48 , 54-55 (C.A. 6);
N.L.R.B. v. United States Cold Storage Corporation, 203
F.2d 924 (C.A. 5). All Belt had to do was give some indica-
tion the Union had altered its bargaining stance . Any con-
cession on a pertinent matter or a counteroffer to the em-
ployers ' outstanding proposals would have served. But he
did nothing to suggest a change . He did not even suggest a
time and place for further meetings.
4. The Gulf Plating negotiations
What happened in April at the Neese Lumber meeting
was repeated in May and June with respect to another
company. In those months Belt and Darby were involved
in negotiating an agreement between the Union and anoth-
er of Darby's clients, Gulf Plating Company. The bargain-
ing took place in Darby's office on five occasions in May
(May 3, 9, 13, 14, and 21) and on June 6.
After each of these meetings Belt asked Darby to resume
negotiations on behalf of Respondents . Each time Darby
assured Belt that he was going to get together with his
client and attempt to set up a negotiating meeting. But
there was always some reason why he could not do it im-
mediately. Once he said he was tied up in court. Another
time he said Lindsey was out of town.
On June 6 they reached agreement on a contract be-
tween the Union and Gulf Plating Company. At the end of
that session Belt told Darby they had been able in those
negotiations to reach agreement with neither party getting
all it wanted. He noted that the contract proposals made
on behalf of Gulf Plating were basically the same as those
made on behalf of Respondents. Belt wanted to adjust the
language to meet the needs on an agreement between the
Union and Respondents. Darby indicated that he would
recommend to Respondents that they get together and
clean things up but that he could not promise Belt anything
because his client did not always follow his recommenda-
tion . He said he would get back to Belt, but he never did.
The above findings are based on the uncontradicted tes-
timony of Belt as corroborated by that of Wesley Charles
Young, a Gulf Plating employee who was in those negotia-
tions with Belt.
It is apparent, of course, that the Gulf Plating sessions
did not directly involve Respondents. None of Respon-
dents' officials were present. Commissioner Dean who
PEPSI-COLA-DR. PEPPER BOTTLING CO. 1205
since the prior August had been in all meetings involving
Respondents was not present . A different industry was in-
volved. And while Belt was indicating to Darby that ad-
justments in language could lead to an agreement similar
to what had occurred in the Gulf Plating negotiations,
there is no evidence of a union proposal designed for Re-
spondents.
Like the Gulf Plating negotiations , the prior negotiations
involving Respondents had been based on written propos-
als drafted by Darby. It is clear that what Belt wanted was
an amicable adjustment of that language to suit the
Union's needs . That is apparently what had occurred in the
Gulf Plating negotiations . But of course Respondents had
no obligation to agree to the same adjustments as Gulf
Plating . Nor did Darby as a professional representative
have any obligations to act in the same manner on behalf
of one client as he had on behalf of another.
Nevertheless, Belt's suggestions in May and June vis-a-
vis Respondents contemplated that the two parties would
meet again and generally discuss the Company's outstand-
ing proposals with the idea that agreement might result
from their discussions. On June 6, as testified to by Young,
Belt adopted by reference the terms agreed upon with Gulf
Plating by telling Darby he would accept that language for
an agreement with Respondents . Belt's testimony is consis-
tent with Young 's account. Belt thus made a counteroffer
of sorts . It is unnecessary to find precisely what the offer
included or that the terms could have been a viable con-
tract for Respondents . I disagree with Respondents' argu-
ment that because the Gulf Plating agreement was not re-
ceived in evidence it is impossible to construe Belt's
proposal as a sufficient movement in the union position to
require a return to the bargaining table. This was a new
circumstance in the relationship between the Union and
Respondents . It indicated as of that time some change
from the Union 's prior bargaining position . It thus carried
the possibility that further negotiations could be produc-
tive . Respondents could no longer assume that a resump-
tion of bargaining would be a futile exercise . Accordingly,
their failure to respond to the Union's request for meetings
was a refusal to meet and bargain in good faith and was an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act. Webb Furniture Corporation, 152 NLRB
1529 (1965); N.L.R.B. v. Sharon Hats, Inc., 289 F.2d 628
(C.A. 5, 1961). This refusal continued until December 3.
On June 6 the strike was still in effect . By failing to meet
with the Union and avail themselves of the opportunity to
resolve the continuing dispute , Respondents prolonged
that strike.
There is no question but that Darby put Belt off during
May and June . It makes no real difference whether he was
just too busy to attend to the matter or whether he acted
deliberately . The whole course of events indicates that in
the circumstances Respondents were unwilling to meet
during that period . Respondents' defense is that they were
not obligated to meet because of a continuing impasse and
the absence of any union proposals or indication of a
change in bargaining position from either side. But as
found above , that defense lacks merit.
Respondents also rely on the fact that they attended all
meetings called by Dean. They contend that, "after the
federal mediator has taken jurisdiction, it would subvert
the statutory purpose of employing the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service for the parties-or one of the
parties-to seek to arrange meetings other than those set
by the mediator or to seek to arrange meetings at which the
mediator would not be present." Respondents' point seems
to be that there could be no obligation to meet except on
call of the mediator. I disagree. Nothing in the statutes
authorizing that service or in the statutes administered by
the Board suggest that the "jurisdiction" of a mediator in a
dispute is exclusive or preempts direct contact between
negotiators.
5. The Construction Trades meeting
The paths of Belt and Darby crossed again on June 30 at
a meeting of the Mobile Building Trades Council and the
Mobile Chapter of Associated General Contractors of
America which had been called to deal with a construction
industry strike threatened for the following day. Belt was
present because his union is affiliated with the Mobile
Building Trades Council.
After the meeting broke up Belt observed Darby talking
to Tom Olinger, chapter president of the Associated Gen-
eral Contractors. What then occurred is best described in
Belt's own words, as follows,
. - .. I approached him and Mr. Darby said to Mr.
Olinger, he said Mr. Olinger this is Herbert Belt. I
know what Herbert Belt wants . He wants me to settle
another strike for him. He said Herbert I'll settled the
damn thing for you but first I've got to take care of
this one because this one is costing my client money.
This incident has no significance to indicate any change
in the Union 's position . It does not even establish an effort
by the Union to meet with Respondents at that time. All
Belt did was walk up to Darby. He did not propose any-
thing. The significance of the incident is Darby's reaction
to Belt's mere presence . His reaction reveals a continuing
attitude that it was still not possible for him to do anything
at that time to resolve the dispute between the Union and
Respondents . Respondents' position remained unchanged.
But Darby held out a carrot in the form of a promise that
he would do something to settle the strike of Respondents'
employees. According to Belt,
He said to me that he was going to get with me, he
didn't think this one would last long and when he said
this one he was talking about the construction strike.
He didn't think that would last long but that he would
get with me as soon as he could finish with that one.
Thereafter Darby did not contact him. The record does
not reveal why and in any case it is immaterial. Respon-
dents were already failing to bargain as required by the
Act. This chance encounter of Darby and Belt added noth-
ing to that.
6. Union phone calls to arrange meetings -
Margy Broschart, a secretary in the union office , testi-
fied that between the latter part of May and the first part
1206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of September she telephoned Darby at Belt's request be-
tween a half dozen and a dozen times for the purpose of
arranging a meeting between the Union and Respondents.
According to her she reached Darby on about half of these
calls . On the occasions that she talked with him she did not
succeed in arranging a meeting . He gave her various re-
sponses . On some occasions he said he would have to
check his schedule and would get back to her, which he
never did. On other calls he told her he could not meet on
the date she suggested or that he could not meet at all
during the week suggested . She reported her lack of success
to Belt.
Broschart testified that on some of her calls she made
notes at the time and that on others she did not make
notes . Her failure to follow a uniform procedure is satisfac-
torily explained by the fact that if she was able to make the
call immediately upon Belt's request she made no note of it
but if she was busy at the time she made a note to remind
her to do it later . Her notes indicate she made calls to
Darby on June 6 and 20 and on August 6 and 20. I credit
her clear and uncontradicted testimony.
Belt also testified that in addition to having his secretary
call Darby he also contacted Dean weekly to arrange meet-
ings. Broschart also called Dean for assistance . She testi-
fied that he indicated to her that he would try to set up a
meeting . Although Dean did not testify, Lindsey admitted
on cross-examination that between January 17 and Sep-
tember he heard that Dean had contacted Darby and
asked Darby if he was interested in meeting with the
Union. Darby informed Lindsey that he told Dean that
Respondents did not have anything to offer but would be
willing to meet with the Union. On this evidence I find that
Dean pursuant to requests from Belt in fact contacted Dar-
by and was told that Respondents' position was unchanged
but that they nevertheless were willing to meet . Dean did
not in fact set up any meetings during this period. From his
failure to set up a meeting I infer that he concluded neither
party had changed its prior position. He was in error in this
because, as already found, the Union had changed its pos-
ture on June 6.
7. Company withdrawal of recognition
The complaint alleges , and the answer admits , that be-
ginning August 5 Respondents withdrew recognition of the
Union as the collective -bargaining representative of the
employees . The record does not otherwise indicate the
method by which this withdrawal of recognition was put
into effect . Based on the pleadings I find that the with-
drawal of recognition commenced on August 5. I further
find , based on the credited testimony of Belt that in a tele-
phone conversation with Darby in early September Darby
stated that he would not meet with the Union because it no
longer represented a majority of the employees . This was
the first indication Belt had of any doubt regarding the
majority status of the Union . Apparently Respondents' po-
sition is that they had such doubts for some time before
communicating them to the Union. In this connection I
note that Lindsey testified that between January 17 and the
anniversary of the certification (July 2) he was prepared to
meet with the Union at any time on call from Commission-
er Dean but that no such meetings were called.
Respondents offered evidence of substantial turnover of
employees in the bargaining unit . Thus of the 52 employees
eligible to vote in the election , only 16 were still employed
a year after the certification.
Respondents also offered evidence that during the strike
which began November 5, 1973, and apparently continued
throughout the events involved in this case , a substantial
number of employees continued working . Thus, of the 13
salesmen in the unit , 1 resigned when the strike began but
all of the others continued working. Also, only a portion of
the salesmen 's helpers employed in the unit joined the
strike . Payroll records reflect that , excluding salesmen, 30
unit employees worked at least 1 of the first 3 days of the
strike. Twelve of these were not on the election eligibility
list. The evidence also shows that at least four pickets
abandoned the strike and returned to work? During the
second week of the strike 67 employees in the unit (count-
ing nonstrikers and replacements ) worked.
Respondents also offered evidence of management
knowledge of substantial employee dissatisfaction with the
Union. The evidence indicated that one or another man-
agement official had heard such sentiments expressed by
20 individuals in the unit .4 These employee sentiments re-
portedly varied from expressions of a lack of interest in the
Union, such as not wanting to get involved , to expressions
of dissatisfaction with the Union , and even to expressions
of dislike for the Union . For example , Respondents ' Assis-
tant general manager and comptroller, Charles Wittman,
testified that in June 1974 employee Martha Smith told
him the Company had been good to her, had loaned her
money when she needed it, and that she could not go to the
Union and get it. She asked him why she had to pay her
money to keep her job that she already had. Louis Davis
made a similar statement to Wittman and told him he did
not want anything to do with this Union. Virtually the
entire sales staff expressed dissatisfaction with the Union.
Three of the salesmen and two production employees
asked Lindsey how to get out of the Union.5 Various em-
ployees during the strike indicated concern because of the
pickets outside the plant and voiced the wish that they
would leave. The employees who went out on strike and
later returned to work, according to Lindsey, expressed dis-
gust with the Union.
Some of these asserted expressions of employee dissatis-
faction are suspect in that employees may have expressed
what they thought their superiors wanted to hear irrespec-
tive of their true feelings in the matter . Another ground for
suspicion is the lack of management knowledge of any sen-
2 The evidence indicates that three to four helpers struck while all other
helpers worked . But the record does not establish the total number of help-
ers employed.
J Lindsey testified that Nathan Fair, Lorraine Hodges, Marguite Petta-
way, and Leo Smith abandoned the strike and that there were others, the
names of whom he could not recall, who did likewise.
4 None of the 20 disenchanted employees testified . But management wit-
nesses identified them as Martha Smith , Louis Davis, Gary Nolan, Frank
Courquett . James Sanky, Sam Dailey, Roy Sweatmen , Charlie Williams,
Allan Nelson , Don Roulhac, Jessie Jackson , Jerry Miller , Emma Miles,
Mike Bryant , Jefferson Davis, Buster Fay , Nathan Fair, Lorraine Hodges,
Marguite Pettaway , and Leo Smith.
5 The record does not establish that they were ever in it.
PEPSI-COLA-DR. PEPPER BOTTLING CO.
timent favorable to the Union although the Union won the
election in June 1973 by a vote of 27 to 20 and some of the
reported antiunion sentiment among the employees was
heard around that time.
Nevertheless , one cannot look at the record as a whole
without concluding that widespread dissatisfaction with
the Union existed among the employees . Belt himself indi-
cated that in the late summer or autumn of 1973 employees
were critical of the results of his bargaining efforts. Al-
though it was the Union that called the strike on Novem-
ber 5 , 1973, over the long pull there was not sufficient em-
ployee support of the strike to halt Respondents'
operations or force them to agreement.
But in view of the unlawful failure to bargain beginning
June 6, the question of majority status is academic. The
certification was not yet a year old. The presumption of
majority status arising from the certification must continue
until the unfair labor practices are remedied . But even if
those unfair labor practices had not occurred I would find
evidence of lack of majority status insufficient to overcome
the rebuttable presumption 6 that a majority of employees
continued to support the Union as their representative
even after the certification year. The evidence of employer
doubts of continued majority status must be weighed with
Respondents ' re-recognition of the Union on December 3,
as detailed later herein. Although Respondents should not
be penalized for that re-recognition , it was an event which
must be assessed in evaluating employer good -faith doubt.
In all the circumstances I find Respondents did not have
sufficient reason to withdraw recognition because of doubt
of majority status.
8. Union letters to arrange meetings subsequent to
withdrawal of recognition
Considering that recognition of the Union was with-
drawn on August 5, it is perhaps academic that the Union
through Broschart telephoned Darby's office on August 6
and 20 to arrange meetings . The same may be said of a
series of four letters in August and September from Belt to
Darby requesting meetings for the purpose of bargaining.
Thus on August 7 his letter asked for a meeting on August
9; on August 22 his letter asked Darby to set a date; on
September 17 his letter asked for a response as soon as
possible; and on September 20 he again asked Darby to set
a date for a meeting . In each letter he alluded to prior
unsuccessful efforts to arrange meetings . None of the let-
ters were answered.
9. Efforts to negotiate subsequent to issuance of
complaint
Having received no response to his letters in August and
September , Belt on September 25 filed the unfair labor
practice charges giving rise to the present proceeding.
These resulted in the issuance on November 13 of the com-
plaint.
Following issuance of the complaint Respondents re-
6 Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664.
1207
versed their field and re-recognized the Union. I do not
take seriously the contention , first made in Respondents'
posthearing brief , that the complaint's assertions of a con-
tinuing obligation to meet with the Union caused them to
re-recognize the Union. The re-recognition took the form
of a letter on December 3 from Lindsey to Belt, with a
copy to Dean, referring to the past involvement of Dean in
efforts to resolve the parties' dispute, indicating Respon-
dents were prepared to meet with the union representatives
" ... for the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement for the unit found appropriate by the National
Labor Relations Board . . . at such time and at such place
as Mediator Leland R. Dean or his alternate may sched-
ule" and also indicating that, if the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service declined further involvement, Respon-
dents would meet with the Union upon its written request.
Lindsey enclosed three copies of the agreement proposed
by Respondents, including various revisions which Lindsey
and Darby understood had been agreed upon. He request-
ed Belt to review the complete proposal and to indicate
those sections acceptable to the Union by writing opposite
each such section the word "accepted" and the date of
acceptance, and by returning one copy so marked to Lind-
sey and forwarding another to Dean. As to each section
found unacceptable Lindsey requested Belt to submit a
written, dated, and initialed counterproposal to himself
and Dean when he returned the company proposal. The
letter further stated (for the first time) that Lindsey was the
only person authorized to communicate with Belt except at
a scheduled negotiation session.
Two days later on December 5 Belt responded by a letter
to Lindsey, and a copy to Dean, indicating the Union's
willingness to meet at such time and date as could be ar-
ranged and indicating that he was studying the Company's
proposals. In apparent response to Lindsey's reference to
the prior involvement of Dean, Belt wrote,
At this time I would like to clarify the fact that Media-
tor Leland R. Dean in no way nor at any time took
jurisdiction over this dispute, his only position was to
assist the Company and the Teamsters Local Union
991 in their effort to reach an agreement.
Also on December 5 Belt wrote Dean asking him to ar-
range a meeting as soon as possible.
On December 9 Lindsey replied to Belt in a letter (with a
copy to Dean) in which he took exception to Belt's conten-
tion that Dean had never taken jurisdiction of the dispute.
He again set out the provisions of his prior letter asking
Belt to accept the company proposals or counter with writ-
ten proposals.
As a result of the request of both parties Dean on De-
cember 10 arranged a meeting for 10 in the morning of
December 13. Both parties were advised and agreed to at-
tend. However, the meeting was never held because on the
morning of the meeting Belt asked Dean to cancel it. He
testified he wa& unable to attend because election for union
officers was in progress and he did not have access to his
files or know if he was authorized to act. There is no expla-
nation as to why this was not apparent earlier.
The next day, December 14, Lindsey again wrote to Belt
(with a copy to Dean) referring to the cancellation and
1208 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
again asking him to respond to the contract proposals.
Lindsey closed his letter by asking Belt to inform him in
writing whether or not he intended to comply with his re-
quest regarding contract proposals and if so, when, and if
not, why not.
On December 18 Belt replied to Lindsey (with a copy to
Dean). In this letter he explained his inability to meet on
December 13 because of the election of union officers. He
advised Lindsey that he had gone over the contract propos-
als submitted to him ; that they were the same as submitted
by Respondents at the beginning of negotiations . His letter
went on:
If you will check with your Attorney and take a look
at his records, you will find that his records will indi-
cate all of the Articles of Agreement that this Local
Union has agreed to in various meetings held with
your Company and that these Articles are marked and
dated by your Attorney.
I am in hopes that this will serve as an answer to your
questions in your most recent letter ... .
This last letter, then, was a refusal by Belt to indicate in
writing union agreement or disagreement to the specific
proposals submitted by Lindsey on the ground that Re-
spondents already had that information. It also adopted by
reference whatever Darby's files showed the Union negoti-
ators had previously agreed to and was at least some indi-
cation that the Union currently would agree to those same
terms.
This appears to have been a concession. Lindsey testified
without contradiction that in the earlier meetings union
negotiators repeatedly rehashed topics which he under-
stood had already been agreed to and which he had
marked in his notes as agreed to. He also testified credibly
that it was his uncertainty as to the firmness of these tenta-
tive agreements that caused him on December 3, 1974, to
resubmit the proposals in writing and to request a current
indication of those accepted and written counterproposals
for those not accepted.
The hearing in the present matter began on December
19, the day after Belt wrote his December 18 letter. Lindsey
received it on December 20, the second day of the hearing.
In a letter to Belt on December 23 Lindsey acknowledged
receipt of the December 18 letter and pointed out Respon-
dents' problem resulting from uncertainty as to whether
the Union remained willing to abide by earlier tentative
agreements . He enclosed three additional copies of Re-
spondents' proposals on which he had inserted his initials
and the dates of earlier tentaive agreements for each sec-
tion. He further indicated willingness to sign the proposals
submitted if the Union found them acceptable. He urged
Belt to initial each acceptable paragraph in the same man-
ner as Lindsey had done and to note any discrepancies on
the copy to be returned to Lindsey. He again asked for
written counterproposals for paragraphs which were unac-
ceptable to the Union.
On December 30 Belt responded in a letter to Lindsey,
with a copy to Dean, in which he returned a copy of Re-
spondents' proposals previously initialed by Lindsey. Belt
had added his own initials to most of the same paragraphs
initialed by Lindsey thereby indicating the Union's current
agreement to those provisions. This still left numerous
paragraphs unagreed to. As to these he did not submit writ-
ten counterproposals but wrote in his letter:
We feel at this time that there are articles left una-
greed to in your December 3 proposal that we could
discuss and possibly agree to provided that we have an
opportunity to bargain in good faith.
Trust that this letter will satisfy you. Looking forward
to seeing you at the bargaining table.
The record of the resumed hearing in this proceeding on
January 6, 1975, does not indicate any events subsequent
to Belt's letter of December 30. It is obvious from these
recent events that the parties are communicating in writing
with each other, in effect have resumed negotiations to a
limit to degree, are again working through the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, and that they both
look forward to returning to the bargaining table.
Respondents argue that as of December 30, 1974, the
Union position was the same as on October 3, 1973, and
that this shows an unaltered position during the interven-
ing span of time. There is some logic to this contention. But
the inference to be drawn is not sufficient to overcome the
events of June 6 which, as of that time, suggested that bar-
gaining might not be futile. Had that opportunity been
seized then, the dispute might have been resolved.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents found to constitute
unfair labor practices as set forth in section III, above,
occurring in connection with their operations described in
section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents are employers within the meaning of
Section 2(2), engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production, maintenance , sales and delivery em-
ployees of Respondents, including the merchandiser, spe-
cial events salesmen, pre-mix-post-mix salesmen, vendor-
mechanic, driver-salesmen and helpers; excluding office
clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of
the Act.
4. At all times since June 22, 1973, the Union has been
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in
the aforesaid appropriate unit within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(a) of the Act.
5. By (a) failing to meet with the Union upon request
between June 6 and December 3, 1974, and bargain in
PEPSI-COLA-DR. PEPPER BOTTLING CO. 1209
good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment of employees in the above-de-
scribed unit, and (b) by withdrawing recognition of the
Union as the collective-bargaining representative of those
employees between August 5 and December 3, 1974, Re-
spondents engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
6. By failing to collectively bargain as aforesaid, Re-
spondents have interfered with , restrained , and coerced
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act and have engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. Such unfair labor practices prolonged the strike of
Respondents' employees.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents engaged in unfair labor
practices, I recommend that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action to effectuate the
policies of the Act. In this connection I recommend that
Respondents be ordered, upon request from the Union, to
meet and bargain with the Union as the representative of
the employees in the unit herein found appropriate and, if
an understanding is reached , embody the same into a writ-
ten, signed agreement . Even though Respondents and the
Union may now be bargaining, I deem such order appro-
priate in view of the unfair labor practices found herein
which will have a continuing effect . I further recommend
that Respondents post appropriate notices.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this proceeding , and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following rec-
ommended:
ORDER'
Respondents , their officers, agents, successors , and as-
signs, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing or refusing to recognize and bargain collec-
tively with Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Help-
ers, Local Union No. 991 , with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment of employ-
ees in the bargaining unit found appropriate herein.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining or coercing employees in he exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following action to effectuate the policies of
the Act:
(a) Upon request of the Union, meet with it at reason-
able times and bargain collectively with it as the exclusive
representative of employees in the above-described unit,
and, if an understanding is reached , embody such in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post at both of Respondents' facilities in Mobile, Al-
abama, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 15, after being duly signed
by an authorized representative of the Respondents, shall
be posted by Respondents immediately upon receipt there-
of, for a period of 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily, posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondents' to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondents have taken to comply herewith.
7 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 .46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations : be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
8In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had a chance to give
evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act by re-
fusing to meet and bargain with Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 991. It has
ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL meet and bargain collectively with Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local
Union No. 991 as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees of our plants in Mobile,
Alabama.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the
aforesaid Union as the exclusive representative of all
employees in the appropriate unit, described above,
with regard to rates of pay, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the fAct.
PEPSI-COLA -DR. PEPPER BOTTLING CO.