Pearl Bookbinding Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 25, 1974

213 N.L.R.B. 532 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pearl Bookbinding Company, Inc. and Graphic Arts
International Union , Local 16-B, AFL-CIO. Case
1-CA-9517
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company,
I make the following:
September 25, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On June 20, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Mar-
ion C. Ladwig issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Pearl Bookbinding Compa-
ny, Inc., South Boston, Massachusetts, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARION C. LADWIG, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was tried at Boston, Massachusetts, on March 6-8, 1974.1
The charge was filed by the Union on January 2, and the
complaint was issued on January 31 and amended at the
trial. After being ordered by the Board in an earlier pro-
ceeding to bargain with the Union, the Respondent Compa-
ny refused to furnish the Union with the names and
addresses of the employees in the certified bargaining unit.
The primary issue is whether this refusal to furnish the
names and addresses violated the Company's statutory obli-
gation to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the National Labor Relations Board.
Upon the entire record,2 including my observation of the
FINDINGS OF FACT
I JURISDICTION
The Company, a Massachusetts corporation, is engaged
in the business of binding pamphlets for the printing trade
at its plant in South Boston, Massachusetts, where it annual-
ly ships products on which it has performed bindery services
valued in excess of $50,000 to points located outside the
State. I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act,
and that the Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
The Company delayed bargaining over reinstatement of
replaced strikers and over terms of an initial agreement,
from October 1972 until December 1973, by refusing to
bargain during the certification year (which began on Janu-
ary 31, 1972), and by asserting defenses which the Board
ruled were unfounded in the earlier proceeding (discussed
below). The Board ordered the Company to bargain and
extended the certification year.
When the Company and the Union met for bargaining on
December 21 (nearly 16 months after the termination of the
4-month strike on August 25, 1972), the Company delayed
taking a position on the Union's December 7 writen request
(following an oral request) that the names and addresses of
the bargaining unit employees be furnished "prior to our
first meeting" in order "to eliminate any possible delays."
Finally on December 30, Company Attorney Julius Kirle
notified the Union that the Company refused to furnish it
with the names and addresses because the Company did not
want the employees harassed. No substantial progress to-
ward an agreement was made in five bargaining sessions, on
December 21, January 4, 22, and 30, and February 15.
The General Counsel contends that what the Company
.,is attempting by its refusal to give this information is to
deprive its employees of effective representation by the
Union and prevent the Union from effectively performing
its function as their bargaining representative," and submits
that the certification year should be further extended, be-
cause the Company "is continuing to violate its bargaining
obligation," despite the Board's earlier bargaining order.
Although conceding that a "list of names and addresses
may be both relevant and necessary to union in perfor-
mance of its statutory obligation as unit employees' bar-
gaining representative," the Company contends in its brief
that the Union has an "adequate alternate means of com-
munication with such employees" by handbilling them at
the public road near the plant. Also, relying on Shell Oil Co.
2 The General Counsel's unopposed motion to correct transcript, dated
1 All dates are from October 1973 until April 1974 , unless otherwise stated April 12, is granted and received in evidence as G C Exh 4.
213 NLRB No. 87
PEARL BOOKBINDING CO.
v. N.L.R. B., 457 F .2d 615 (C.A. 9, 1972), denying enforce-
ment of 190 NLRB 101 (1971), the Company contends:
"The numerous incidents of violence , harassment including
the loaded gun incident during the strike period as supple-
mented by incidents involving Bucky (Buckley) are clearly
sufficient to support Respondent 's claim that furnishing the
Union with a list of names and addresses of all unit employ-
ees would result in harassment of and possible violence to
those employees."
B. The Prior Proceeding
The Board in Pearl Bookbinding Company, Inc., 206
NLRB 834 (1973), issued on October 31, affirmed Judge
Ordman's findings, discrediting testimony given by Compa-
ny Attorney Kirle (who took the stand as a witness in that
proceeding) "that the Union had disclaimed or abandoned
its status as bargaining representative of Respondent's em-
ployees." (Ordman specifically found, "I conclude that the
testimony of Kirle with respect to the Union's disclaimer or
abandonment cannot be credited, id, JD sec. II-C; and also
cited, id, fn. 7, Insulating Fabricators, Inc., 144 NLRB 1325
(1963), in which a respondent employer, based on Kirle's
conduct as attorney or agent, was found not to have bar-
gained in good faith.) The Board also rejected the
Company's defense that the Union had forfeited its status
as representative of the employees as a result of the merger
of the Union's Bookbinders International with the Lithog-
raphers International, forming the Graphic Arts Interna-
tional Union. The Board affirmed Judge Ordman's finding
that "In all respects Local 16B was a mere continuation of
Local 16 with no change except a technical change in name
and the change in affiliation ," his finding that the
Company's claim that its employees "were not given an
opportunity to participate in the decision to merge and did
not authorize the merger is wholly without foundation," and
his findings that the Company was aware of the proposed
merger before it actually took place, and did not mention
the merger as a defense for refusing to bargain until it filed
its defensive pleadings in that proceeding.
C. Refusals to Furnish Names and Addresses
On December 7 (2 days after receipt of a notice by the
Region's compliance officer concerning the Company's
compliance with the Board's bargaining order), Union Pres-
ident George Carlsen first telephoned Attorney Kirle, and
then wrote him a letter , requesting bargaining "and further,
so as to eliminate any possible delays , I am requesting that
the names, addresses, rates of pay and classification of all
present employees , be sent to me, prior to our first meeting."
(The Company finally, on January 22, orally gave to the
Union the classification and rate of pay of each of the 42
employees then in the bargaining unit. This delay is not
alleged to indicate bad-faith bargaining.)
In the first renewed bargaining session on December 21,
with Attorney Kirle and Company President Arthur Lieb-
man, Union President Carlsen orally requested the informa-
tion . Kirle promised to talk to the Company about it and
to telephone Carlsen on December 27 or 28. Carlsen then
asked Kirle if Kirle would inform him which of the 32
533
employees, who were on a prestrike list of employee names
and addresses, were presently employed. The Company
thereafter named 16 of them who were no longer there-
leaving 16 names of employees presently employed.
On Sunday evening, December 30, Attorney Kirle tele-
phoned Carlsen and "stated that he was not going to give
me the names and addresses because the employer did not
want the employees harassed." Carlsen explained why he
needed the names and addresses , and also referred to the
great turnover of employees since the Company furnished
the last list. Kirle said he would give a "compromise," and
that would be the classification and rate of pay of each
employee, who would be named only by a letter, A, B, C,
etc. Carlsen said that such a compromise (which would not
aid in communicating with the employees) would not be
acceptable.
Carlsen met with Attorney Kirle and President Liebman
on January 4 and again asked for the names and addresses.
Kirle said he was not going to give them because of "vio-
lence on the picket line" and "subsequent harassment."
Carlsen asked Kirle what he meant by "subsequent harass-
ment," but (as Carlsen credibly testified) Kirle said "that
may come out in the future," but Kirle "wouldn't elaborate
on it," and it was never explained-until the trial . (I discre-
dit Liebman's testimony that he then mentioned the name
of employee Buckley as reportedly being recently intimidat-
ed. Liebman did not impress me as being an entire candid
witness-he said , testifying at one point , "I've never been
opposed to the Union," although later admitting that he had
engaged in an antiunion campaign before the election. In
this connection , I also note that Liebman later testified that
when Carlsen previously worked for the Company, Carlsen
was not the one conducting an organizational campaign-
yet upon cross-examination by Carlsen, Liebman testified
that Carlsen had taken "advantage of our holiday" and
worked "on our Yom Kippur day ... when we were not
there . . . to pass out the cards and organize the people at
that particular day when we were not even around.") Kirle
again submitted the ABCD "counterproposal" (that is, the
classifications and rates of pay only), and asked Carlsen "for
the record, are you rejecting the ABCD proposal?" (Empha-
sis supplied.) Carlsen responded , "I would like to see the
ABCD," without waiving his rights to the names and ad-
dresses, "because you know ," there was "no progress being
made in this negotiation." Kirle then advised that he did not
have the ABCD at that time, but would have it at the next
meeting ( 18 days later).
Carlsen asked for the names and addresses at the three
remaining meetings with the Company, but the Company
adamantly refused to furnish them. It orally gave the classi-
fication and rate of pay for each employee (the "ABCD")
at the January 22 meeting, but made no offer of any kind
to assist the Union in communicating with the bargaining
unit employees (by permitting the posting of union notices
in the plant, by permitting handbilling on the parking lot or
on the private driveway between the employee entrance and
the private parking lot, by giving the names and addresses
to an independent mailing service, or otherwise).
The names and addresses are readily available if the
Company is required to furnish them to the Union.
534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. Relevancy
There appears to be no dispute that the Union must be
able to communicate with the bargaining unit employees in
order to represent and bargain for them. As held in Standard
Oil Company of California v. N.L.R.B, 399 F.2d 639, 640
C.A. 9, 1968), "The Union, as the statutory exclusive bar-
gaining agent for all the employees in the unit, was obliged
by the Act to fairly represent the interests of all the employ-
ees in the unit" and "To perform this statutory duty ade-
quately, it was necessary that the Union be able to
communicate with those whom it represented." Similarly,
the court in Prudential Insurance Company of America v.
N.L.R.B., 412 F.2d 77, 83-84 (C.A. 2, 1969), cert. denied 396
U.S. 928 (1969), held that a list of names and addresses was
relevant to the union's fulfillment of its duties as the bar-
gaining representative, and that "This obligation, being
coextensive with the sphere of activities of the exclusive
bargaining representative, extends to the negotiation of new
contracts and also to the administration of collective agree-
ments already adopted. It seems manifest beyond dispute
that the Union cannot discharge its obligation unless it is
able to communicate with those in whose behalf it acts.
Thus, a union must be able to inform the employees of its
negotiations with the employer and obtain their views as to
bargaining priorities in order that its position may reflect
their wishes."
As cited in the Company's brief, Union President Carlsen
testified that he needed the names and addresses of the unit
employees "So that we could have effective bargaining .. .
As in all newly organized shops, we request the desires of
the employees, what their first requirements are. . . . Then
we have a meeting to discuss these things with the people.
Without the names and addresses, there's no way for me to
contact these people . . . which you can't do by just hand-
billing reach all the people presently employed . . . With
the names and addresses, I could sent out literature, I can
send out questionnaires to them. I would receive back as to
what their desires are . . . there's a major changeover in the
shop here. I think there's about 26 now that I've never seen
let alone know the names of them." Carlsen also testified
that he needed the names and addresses to determine if they
were properly classified-a matter of importance because
employees are often misclassified in the bindery trade; to
advise them of their rights; to have employee representation
in the negotiations; and to be able to report on progress in
the negotiations.
E. No Alternative Means
The Company contends that "Although list of names and
addresses may be both relevant and necessary to union in
performance of its statutory obligation," the Union in this
case could stand on the public street about 160 feet from the
employee entrance and communicate with the employees by
distributing handbills.
In 1971, at the beginning of its organizational campaign,
the Union attempted such handbilling. Very few of the em-
ployees (many of whom are Puerto Ricans) would take the
handbills, and the Union got no response from the handbills
which were accepted. (The Union was distributing organi-
zational handbills, with authorizational cards attached, and
none of the cards were signed and returned to the Union.)
The prospects of successful handbilling in late 1973 and
early 1974 had not improved. After the Union's strike, the
Company denied reinstatement to 9 of the 12 strikers who
then sought to return. Thereafter, the Company effectively
isolated the employees from the Union for over a year, while
the Company litigated the unfounded grounds for refusing
to recognize and bargain with the recently certified Union.
Testifying on cross-examination, as an experienced union
representative, Union President Carlsen stated that he did
not attempt to handbill the present employees "because
after the strike they refused to reinstate nine employees for
supporting the Union, and I knew they'd be scared . . . It's
based on experience of mine, Mr. Kirle. . , . When you
have a strike and the employer refused to reinstate people
who are justifiably to be reinstated, other people who they
have hired to replace these people'sjobs are not going to be
responsive . . . to a union representative out there handbill-
ing.. . . You have a parking lot in the back, and the people
... there have carpools, they drive through." (The General
Counsel did not allege that the strikers were legally entitled
to reinstatement.)
Company President Liebman estimated that about half of
the employees walk to and from the plant (using public
transportation), and that the other half ride in cars, which
may be traveling 15 miles an hour upon reaching the public
street after driving the 200 feet on the private driveway
along the front of the plant from the private parking lot.
None of the witnesses had counted the number of employ-
ees who work at other businesses beyond the Company's
plant and who also used the private driveway (the estimates
ranging from a maximum of about 25 to a minimum of "60
or 70 people"), nor counted the number arriving and leaving
at the same time.
Manager Robert Wine, who evidently had seen the ad-
dresses of the 42 present employees, testified that the em-
ployees live within a 20-mile area in the Boston vicinity
(within a 10-mile radius of the plant), except for two em-
ployees who live from 5 to 15 miles farther away. The em-
ployment turnover is relatively high among the lesser-skilled
Puerto Ricans. The Union does not require membership
before the collective-bargaining agreement is signed, and
none of the current employees is a member. In the absence
of an agreement, there are no union stewards in the plant,
no grievance procedure, and no bulletin board privileges.
In the circumstances of this case, including the
Company's effectual isolation of the employees from the
Union for over a year following the strike (by unlawfully
refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union) and the
difficulty in getting both walking and riding employees to
take the handbills, I find that realistically, handbilling is not
a feasible means for the Union to communicate with all or
substantially all of the bargaining unit employees, and that
there is no other alternative means to communicate with
them without the requested names and addresses.
F. Claimed Fear of Harassment
The Company contends that even if the names and ad-
dresses of the bargaining unit employees were necessary for
PEARL BOOKBINDING CO.
the Union to perform its statutory obligation as the bargain-
ing representative, the Company's fear of employee harass-
ment justified its refusal to supply the names and addresses,
"within the criteria set forth in the Shell Oil" case, supra, 457
F.2d 615.
In the Shell Oil case, 457 F.2d at 618-620, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the proper standard was whether there
was a "clear and present danger of violence and harass-
ment," and found that the Company voiced a "good faith"
concern and made "reasonable and serious" proposals of
alternative means of communicating with the employees
(including furnishing "all names and addresses to an inde-
pendent mailing service which . . . would mail all material
which the Union wanted to submit"). In that case, not only
had striking employees "engaged in violence in the form of
mass picketing and harassment of employees who had re-
turned to work, both at the gates of the Company's struck
facilities and at individual employees' homes," but the par-
ties stipulated that violence had occurred "for an indetermi-
nate period" after the strike. The poststrike harassment had
been so severe that one employee transferred from one refi-
nery to another, 4 months after the strike had ended, and
finally quit a month later. Id. at 616. Over a year after the
strike, when the Company referred to "the unrest and rela-
tionships that existed between the Company and the em-
ployees and the Union" as reasons for fearing employee
harassment if the names and addresses were furnished, the
union's district director (Forrester) said he was "aware that
we were having considerable problems" and that there were
"many complaints [which were] unresolved." Forrester ad-
mitted that upon receiving the names and addresses, not
only would regional officers have access to them, but also
presidents and other officials of six locals, including clerical
personnel. Id. at 617. "The General Counsel conceded that
no assurances had ever been given to the Company by the
Union concerning the confidential usage and safeguarding
of the names and addresses. . . . The trial examiner found
that the Company's fear of a leakage and abuse of the name
and address list through rank and file harassment of non-
Union employees justified the refusal to supply the list to
the Union. He reached this conclusion because of the ad-
mitted recent violence by `striking employees whom the
Union apparently could not control,' the absence of any
Union assurances of confidentiality and safeguarding, and
the fact that, even if such assurances had been given, 'the
effectiveness of any such procedure to safeguard the name-
and-address list from improper disclosure and possible
abuse would be doubtful in view of the number of people
to whom it would be available in each of the six locals
according to Forrester's testimony."' Id. at 617-618. The
court held, id. 619-620, "The stipulation of the parties in the
case before us and the testimony of Forrester as to the
extent of intended distribution of the list of names and
addresses within the Union organization, taken together,
establish beyond cavil that there was a clear and present
danger of harassment and violence in this case. . . . On this
record, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the Com-
pany was not voicing good faith concern, or that its propos-
als were not reasonable and serious." (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the Company's contention that the facts in
the present case "fall within the criteria set forth" in the
535
Shell Oil case, I find that even assuming that case was
correctly decided (contrary to the Board's decision), the
court's ruling is clearly inapplicable to the facts here.
There was no evidence here of any similar employee har-
assment or violence since August 1972 (16 months before
the Company refused to furnish the names and addresses).
During that 16 months (most of which time the Company
had isolated the employees from the Union by refusing to
recognize the Union as their bargaining representative),
there was no manifestation of employee unrest or employee
resentment over crossing of the picket line. Throughout 3
days of trial, there was no evidence of even a report of
violence during this time. The only evidence of anything
which might possibly be considered harassment during
those 16 months was a hearsay report, not substantiated at
the trial by either employee involved. Manager Wine (who
was the company-appointed "historian" for the strike) testi-
fied that after the early August 1972 gun incident (discussed
later), "the picket line sort of disappeared and the violence
ended." The next reported incident was in early December
1973, when he said that employee Wolfert Buckley "ap-
proached me and he said that he was told by another em-
ployee in the Company [Richard MacGuire], who had met
Mr. Peter Verrochi and another union member in a bar-
room, and the direct quote was, `Tell Bucky we still remem-
ber him.' . . . Mr. Buckley considered this a threat." This
was what Attorney Kirle had in mind when he assigned
"subsequent harassment" as a reason on January 4 for not
supplying the employee names and addresses, but refused
to explain what he meant by those words. I find that if the
Company had been actually concerned about harassment of
this one employee-despite the ambiguous nature of the
purported threat and the lack of any other indication of
possible harassment-the Company at most would have
used this report as a basis for not supplying the Union with
Buckley's address, but not for refusing to furnishing any
names and addresses. (I note that as another purported
reason for not supplying the information, the Company
presented Wine's further testimony that on February 22-
after the five bargaining sessions-a union employee at one
of the Company's customer's told Wine over the telephone,
"Tell Bucky I say hello.")
In its brief, the Company also emphasizes the "loaded
gun incident" during the strike as justifying a fear of em-
ployee harassment many months later. However, this inci-
dent did not involve any employees whose names and
addresses the Union was seeking. It occurred just before the
picketing ceased in early August 1972, when a drunken
union official, from his car parked about 45 or 50 feet away,
beyond a fence, in another employer's parking lot, pointed
a gun at three people on the shipping dock. The three were
Michael Smith (manager of Pearl Paper Coating Company,
a separate company), Foreman Martin Durant, and an in-
dependent truckdriver. There is obviously no reasonable
basis for fearing such an incident would lead, many months
after the strike, to harassment of present employees whose
confidence and support the Union was seeking.
Concerning the purported incidents of strike violence and
harassment involving employees, virtually all of the
Company's evidence was testimony by management per-
sonnel (over the General Counsel's objections) about reports
536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of such incidents, not corroborated by the testimony of any
of the employees purportedly involved. (The Company did
not offer this testimony for the truth of the reports, but only
for the fact that the reports were received-presumably on
the theory that even if the reports were not accurate, the
Company could have a good-faith belief that the various
incidents had actually occurred.) This testimony, primarily
by the strike "historian," Manager Wine, is questionable for
another reason. Although he kept a log of such reports
during the strike, and read from notes when testifying, he
was not reading from the origmal log, which had been
turned over to Attorney Kirle about 2 weeks before the trial.
Upon advice of Attorney Kirle, he made the notes from the
original log for use on the stand. (Kirle asserted that the
original log was in his office, but he was not able to find it.)
In the absence of the original log, it is of course not possible
to ascertain how accurate or complete Wine's notes were, or
whether the original log included references to the acts of
picket-line violence by the Company's security guards and
others against the strikers (as testified by Carlsen).
But assuming that the purported strike violence and har-
assment involving employees actually occurred as reported,
there was no reasonable cause for the Company to fear a
repetition (with the possible exception of Buckley, previous-
ly discussed). Excluding Buckley, there were, during the
4-month strike, only a single reported incident involving
each of employees Duggan, Prifti, Vega, and an unidenti-
fied company truckdriver, and two involving employee Le-
May (none of whom had been harassed in any way since the
strike, despite the fact that the Union had been furnished
evidently all of their names and addresses before the strike),
and also a single reported incident involving employees
Bernstein and Perlstein (neither of whom was on the payroll
when the Company refused to supply the names and ad-
dresses). These reported incidents included eggs thrown at
Duggan's car; rocks thrown at Pfifti's car in the driveway
of his home, slightly denting the car; egg hitting Vega on the
way home; the company truckdriver having the company
truck "pelted with eggs" as he drove through the picket line,
and at the same time being threatened "to get you"; LeMay
having red paint thrown on his parked car at home on one
occasion, and having two of his tires punctured while his car
was parked in the company parking lot on another occa-
sion; Berstein being struck with a rock thrown through a
plant window (no indication of injury); and Perlstem's car
hit by two or three eggs as he returned from lunch. The
Company offered no reason for believing that any of these
relatively minor, and sporatic (only eight in the 4-month
period of the strike) incidents would recur in the absence of
a strike situation. (If the reports concerning Buckley were
true, he received threatening telephone calls at his home
while the Union was picketing and also in August, after the
picketing ceased shortly after the first of August, causing
him to move and have an unlisted telephone number; and
the front and rear windows were smashed on his car parked
at home. Also, according to the Company's June 5 report
to the Massachusetts registrar of motor vehicles, Buckley,
with (three) other unidentified (female) employees in his
car, was forced by strikers to leave the road "to avoid a
collision" and "cut through the Green & Freedman Bakery
driveway," and on another occasion, was missed by "a frac-
tion of an inch" by an oncoming car driven by a striker. As
indicated above, if the Company was actually concerned
about possible future harassment of this one employee, it
could have expressed its concern, and proposed withholding
his address from the Union.) Concerning the other evidence
(which was admitted over the General Counsel's strong ob-
jection) of strike violence involving window breaking and
other damage, and incidents involving management, truck-
ing firms and other companies, there simply is no reason-
able basis for the Company to fear that such strike-related
incidents would recur if the Union obtained the employee
names and addresses to assist it in effectively representing
the employees long after the strike.
Patterning its defense to the Shell Oil case, supra, the
Company argues in its brief that it "submits that its fear of
a leakage and abuse of the names and addresses list through
Carlsen's and other Union Officials' harassment of non-
union employees justified its refusal to supply the list to the
Union." I find this contention to be unfounded. Union
President Carlsen, who was not involved in any of the pur-
ported violence or harassment involving bargaining unit
employees, assured the Company in negotiations that he
would hold the names and addresses in complete confi-
dence. At the time, the Company informed Carlsen (as he
credibly testified) that he was "subject to votes," and know-
ing how unions are run, "they didn't feel that that was
enough security for them, that other people may have access
to it." I find this company response to be pretextual. (Carl-
sen had been president of the local for about 8 years, and
the next election would be in December 1974. I discredit, as
an afterthought, President Liebman's testimony that he re-
sponded to Carlsen, "I don't think your word is any good."
Carlsen credibly testified that Liebman made no such state-
ment in connection with Carlsen's promise to keep the list
in confidence.)
G. Concluding Findings
After weighing all the evidence, and considering all the
circumstances, I find that the Company's primary concern
was to rid the Company of the Union, by continuing to
isolate the employees from the Union.
I find that the Company did not have any good-faith fear
of violence or harassment of the bargaining unit employees
if their names were supplied to the Union, and that it did
not offer the Union any feasible alternative to providing the
requested information. I further find that the employees'
names and addresses were both relevant and necessary to
the Union in the performance of its statutory duties, and
that adequate alternative means of communication with the
unit employees were not available.
Accordingly I find, that under the circumstances of this
particular case, that the Company did not meet its statutory
obligation to bargain in good faith when it adamantly re-
fused to furnish the Union with the requested names and
addresses of the bargaining unit employees, in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By refusing on and after December 30, 1973, to bargain
PEARL BOOKBINDING CO. 537
in good faith with the Union by refusing to supply the
Union with the names and addresses of the bargaining unit
employees, the Company engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order the Re-
spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
The Respondent having unlawfully refused to bargain
with the Union by refusing to furnish the Union with the
names and addresses of the bargaining unit employees, and
thereby having failed to comply with the Board's October
31, 1973, Decision and Order in the prior proceeding, 206
NLRB 834 (requiring the Respondent to bargain upon re-
quest with the Union and extending the certification year),
I find, in agreement with the General Counsel, that the
certification must again be extended, in the manner set forth
in the Board's prior Decision, from the date Respondent
provides the Union with the requested names and addresses
of the bargaining unit employees.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER3
Respondent, Pearl Bookbinding Company, Inc., South
Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to furnish Graphic Arts International
Union, Local 16-B, AFL-CIO, with the names and address-
es of all employees in the bargaining unit it represents.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act
2 Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, and at reasonable intervals, furnish the
Union with the names and addresses of all employees in the
bargaining unit it represents.
(b) Post at its plant in South Boston, Massachusetts, cop-
ies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." ° Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings , conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board having found, after
trial, that we violated Federal Law by refusing to supply the
Union with the names and addresses of the bargaining unit
employees:
WE WILL NOT refuse to furnish Graphic Arts Interna-
tional Union, Local 16-B, AFL-CIO, with the names
and addresses of all employees in the bargaining unit
it represents
WE WILL NOT in any similar manner interfere with the
efforts of the Union to bargain with us on behalf of our
employees.
PEARL BOOKBINDING COMPANY,
INC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-,
ed to the Board's Office, 7th Floor, Bulfinch Building, 15
New Chardon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02114, Tele-
phone 617-264-0306.