Patz, Samuel et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 12, 201914235337 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/235,337 01/27/2014 Samuel Patz 129319.00229 6529 26710 7590 12/12/2019 QUARLES & BRADY LLP ATTN: IP DOCKET 411 E. WISCONSIN AVENUE SUITE 2350 MILWAUKEE, WI 53202-4426 EXAMINER CWERN, JONATHAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3793 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/12/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): pat-dept@quarles.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SAMUEL PATZ, MIRKO HROVAT, and JAMES P. BUTLER Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 Technology Center 3700 BEFORE JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5, 7, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 19, 21, and 29–31.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM IN PART. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies The Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant’s invention relates to a system and method for portable magnetic resonance measurements of lung properties. Claim 1, reproduced below with italics added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A portable magnetic resonance system configured to acquire magnetic resonance signals generated in a region-of- interest in a subject’s lung and to calculate therefrom a quantitative metric indicative of a property of the subject’s lung, comprising: a magnet sized to be positioned proximate to a subject and configured to generate a magnetic field that is substantially homogeneous in a region-of-interest positioned at a distance from a surface of the magnet that is sufficiently large so as to position the region-of-interest in the subject’s lung; a radio frequency (RF) coil assembly including at least one RF coil sized to be positioned proximate to the region-of-interest and configured to apply an RF field to the region-of-interest and to receive magnetic resonance signals therefrom; a spectrometer system in communication with the RF coil assembly and programmed to: direct the RF coil assembly to produce an RF field in the region-of-interest at a Larmor frequency such that spins resonant with the Larmor frequency in the region-of-interest are excited; direct the RF coil assembly, during a free-breathing period of the subject, to receive magnetic resonance signals produced in the region-of-interest in response to the applied RF field; and compute a quantitative metric indicative of a characteristic of a subject’s lung in the region-of-interest during free-breathing based on the magnetic resonance signals received during the free-breathing period. Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 3 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Albert US 2001/0037063 A1 Nov. 1, 2001 Driehuys US 2004/0005273 A1 Jan. 8, 2004 Blank US 2006/0084861 A1 Apr. 20, 2006 Hushek US 2008/0048658 A1 Feb. 28, 2008 Mata US 2010/0280358 A1 Nov. 4, 2010 Tropp US 2010/0301862 A1 Dec. 2, 2010 Charles US 2013/0006094 A1 Jan. 3, 2013 REJECTIONS2 1. Claims 1, 3–5, 7, 10, and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Albert and Charles. 2. Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Driehuys. 3. Claims 11 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Blank. 4. Claims 15 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Tropp. 5. Claims 18 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Hushek. 6. Claims 29–31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Mata. 2 A rejection of claims 1–5, 7, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 19, 29–31, 33, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, and a rejection of claims 33 and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are withdrawn in the Examiner’s Answer. Ans. 3. Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 4 7. Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Hushek. OPINION Rejection 1 — Obviousness Based on Albert and Charles Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, and 14 Appellant argues claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, and 14 as a group. Appeal Br. 4–13. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we select claim 1 as representative and claims 3, 4, 7, 10, and 14 stand or fall with claim 1. The Examiner finds that Albert discloses a portable magnetic resonance system having many of the limitations of claim 1, but does not disclose “receiving MR signals during a free-breathing period of the subject (Albert employs a breath-hold technique), and computing a quantitative metric indicative of a characteristic of a subject’s lung in the region-of- interest during free-breathing based on the signals.” Final Act. 3–5. The Examiner finds that Charles discloses a MR imaging system and “teaches that either a breath-hold technique or a free-breathing technique can be employed.” Id. at 5 (citing Charles ¶¶ 11, 30, 172). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to use a free-breathing technique in Albert for “improving accuracy in information regarding actual lung ventilation in the human lungs, identifying ventilation defects, and making the system suitable for patients with impaired breathing and/or for pediatric use.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Charles ¶ 127). Appellant’s first contention is that because Albert uses magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) with a low applied magnetic field (“0.0001 T–0.1 T”) on a portable MR system, whereas Charles uses an MRI with a high- field magnet (“above about 0.5 T, typically above 1.0 T, and more typically Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 5 between about 1.5 T and 10 T”) on a non-portable scanner, the proposed modification based on Charles would undermine and change the principle of operation of Albert. Appeal Br. 8–9 (citing Albert ¶ 25; Charles ¶ 122). Appellant argues that “[i]n order to achieve the free-breathing techniques, Charles et al. requires a high-field strength. . . . In direct contrast, Albert et al. operates . . . well below the required field strength of Charles.” Id. at 9. Specifically, according to Appellant, modifying Albert et al. to include the free-breathing technique described in Charles et al. would either undermine the stated principle of operation of Albert et al. by substituting a high- field system for the low-field, portable system of Albert et al., or by undermining the principle of operation of Charles et al. by utilizing a low-field system that cannot perform within the expressly-stated operational constraints of Charles. Id. The Examiner responds that Charles is relied upon only to teach a free-breathing technique, as a substitute or in addition to the breath-hold technique of Albert, and that the rejection does not suggest substituting the high field MRI apparatus of Charles for Albert’s low field MRI apparatus. Ans. 4. Appellant replies that “the teachings of Charles and Albert provide evidence within the references themselves that would lead a skilled artisan to expect the free-breathing techniques as taught by Charles to be inoperable in the system of Albert, at least because Charles expressly defines operating conditions that exclude the operating conditions of Albert.” Reply Br. 2–3. For the following reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s inoperability contention. Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 6 Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings that Albert discloses “direct[ing] the RF coil assembly . . . . to receive magnetic resonance signals” or to “compute from the acquired magnetic resonance signals a quantitative metric.” Final Act. 4; see also Appeal Br. 8–13. Nonetheless, Appellant contends that Albert’s apparatus would be inoperable to perform these functions if, during use, the patient is free- breathing as opposed to holding his or her breath. Although Appellant correctly notes that Charles and Albert disclose different magnetic field strengths for their respective MRI devices (Reply Br. 2–3), other than this, Appellant does not direct us to evidence that would support its attorney argument that a skilled artisan would “expect the free-breathing techniques as taught by Charles to be inoperable in the system of Albert.” See id. Appellant’s inoperability contention is not persuasive because Appellant does not direct us to evidence that the patient’s breathing pattern affects the disclosed functions of Albert’s apparatus which functions are not disputed by Appellant. Appellant’s second contention is that Albert’s imaging techniques are specific to a portable MRI apparatus operating at low field strengths (0.0001 T – 0.1 T), and require a breath-hold “to generate a suitable MR signal intensity,” whereas Charles uses imaging methods for a high-field magnet MRI system (between 0.5 T and 10 T). Appeal Br. 10. According to Appellant, “modifying Albert et al. to include the free-breathing technique described in Charles et al. would require a substantial reconstruction and redesign of the low field, portable system of Albert et al. to become a high- field, non-portable system as required by Charles.” Id. Appellant asserts Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 7 that “doing so undermines the express purpose of Albert et al. of providing a portable system.” Id. Appellant’s second contention is not persuasive because Albert is not limited to a portable system. Although Albert’s “MRI can be performed with small, lightweight, and/or portable apparatus,” (Albert ¶ 7), Albert also discloses a non-portable system that includes a shielded room 12 with the imaging elements “configured to be placed inside of each other as shown to receive the person within bores of the respective elements.” Albert ¶ 26, Fig. 1. Moreover, as the Examiner correctly notes, the proposed modification uses Charles’s free breathing technique instead of Albert’s breath hold technique, and does not require a redesign of the MRI apparatus. Even if Albert were limited to a portable system, changing how the patient breathes during imaging, does not undermine the portability of the system. Appellant’s third contention is that Charles teaches away from the proposed combination because one of ordinary skill in the art “reading the disclosure of Charles et al. would be discouraged from incorporating the free-breathing techniques taught by Charles et al. into the portable MRI system of Albert.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant bases this contention primarily on the fact that Charles and Albert disclose using different magnetic field strengths. See id. However, merely showing differences between two references is not sufficient to establish teaching away. See In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Appellant’s teaching away contention is, thus, not persuasive. Appellant’s fourth contention is that because Charles and Albert disclose two different MRI systems one of ordinary skill in the art must “select between the low-field, portable system of Albert et al. or the high- Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 8 field system of Charles et al.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant contends that combining the systems “is not an option,” and that “[t]he only basis for considering otherwise is the teachings of Appellant’s own disclosure.” Id. Appellant thus concludes that “the rejection is predicated on impermissible hindsight gained from Appellant’s own disclosure.” Id. at 13. In response, the Examiner notes that the reasoning relied upon in the rejection comes from Charles, which “provides numerous benefits of using a free breathing technique such as improving accuracy in information regarding actual lung ventilation in the human lungs, identifying ventilation defects, and making the system suitable for patients with impaired breathing and/or for pediatric use.” Ans. 5 (citing Charles ¶ 127). We are not persuaded by this contention for the following reasons. The Examiner does not propose modifying Albert’s disclosed apparatus in any way. See Final Act. 5. Given that Charles explicitly discloses that breathing techniques include “breath-held, free breathing or paced breathing” (Charles ¶ 172), the Examiner’s use of the teachings in Charles as to how the patient should breathe when gas is delivered during data acquisition is reasonable as such a disclosure would commend itself to a person of ordinary skill in the art looking to improve image quality during data collection. Charles also discloses that using “conventional ‘thermally’ polarized perfluorinated gases (PFx) mixed with oxygen for use as inhaled inert MRI contrast agents to image lung function . . . . allows imaging ventilation with a quality similar to that of hyperpolarized 129Xe MRI, but at lower cost and with reduced technical complexity.” See Charles ¶ 125. Given that Albert uses 129Xe (see Albert ¶ 25), the disclosures of Albert and Charles suggests that it is within the abilities of one of ordinary skill in the Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 9 art to use hyperpolarized gas with or without breath-hold. The Examiner has also provided reasoning to support the rejection, namely, for “improving accuracy in information regarding actual lung ventilation in the human lungs, identifying ventilation defects, and making the system suitable for patients with impaired breathing and/or for pediatric use.” Final Act. 5–6. This improvement is disclosed in the cited references, rather than stemming from impermissible hindsight. See Charles ¶ 127. Because the Examiner’s reasoning for the proposed modification is reasonable and supported by rational underpinnings found in the prior art, we do not agree that the Examiner’s rejection is based on impermissible hindsight. We have considered all of Appellant’s contentions and are not persuaded of Examiner error. We, thus, sustain the rejection of claim 1. Claims 3, 4, 7, 10, and 14 fall with claim 1. Claim 5 Claim 5, depends from claim 1, and requires, inter alia, “an enclosure in which the magnet is sized to be contained and the enclosure is sized to receive the subject.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. A–2). Appellant argues that Albert’s planar magnet 182 is not sized to be contained in the enclosure of arrangement 180. Appeal Br. 14. The Examiner responds that because “Figure 15 shows magnet 182 as a small rectangle within the larger rectangle 180 of the MRI arrangement . . . . the magnet is sized to be within the enclosure of the MRI arrangement.” Ans. 6. For the following reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 5. As the Examiner correctly notes, Figure 15 of Albert shows magnet 182 within enclosure 180. Ans. 6. The disclosure of Albert also supports the Examiner’s position in that Figure 15 shows “a low-field MRI Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 10 arrangement 180, for use as part of a low-field MRI system, includes a planar magnet 182.” Albert ¶ 122 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner’s finding is, thus, supported by a preponderance of the evidence and we sustain the rejection of claim 5. Rejection 2 — Claim 2 Claim 2, depends from claim 1, and requires that “the quantitative metric computed by the spectrometer system is at least one of lung ventilation and lung density.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. A–1). The Examiner finds that Driehuys discloses “in vivo evaluation of pulmonary physiology or function using NMR signals of polarized Xe,” and concludes that it would have been obvious to use spectroscopic analysis of lung ventilation in the system of Albert, because “this measurement will provide further detailed diagnostic information to the physician regarding the patient’s lungs to form a more accurate diagnosis.” Final Act. 8. Appellant argues that Driehuys uses high-field systems and does not teach or suggest using a portable, low-field MRI system. Appeal Br. 14. Appellant concludes that absent such a teaching, the rejection “is predicated on impermissible hindsight gained from Appellant’s own disclosure.” Id. In response, the Examiner notes that “Driehuys also does not teach away from using a low field system, and the techniques described may be utilized in either low field or high field systems.” Ans. 5. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. For the reasons discussed above in connection with claim 1, Appellant has not directed us to evidence to support its arguments that teachings regarding the use of high field systems are limited to only those systems. In addition, given that both Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 11 Albert and Driehuys use 129Xe gas for lung analysis (Albert ¶ 5; Driehuys ¶ 90), Appellant does not explain persuasively why relying on the teachings of Driehuys to support using Albert’s apparatus to obtain an additional measurement using the same gas would be beyond the abilities of one of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416–417 (2007) (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). We, thus, sustain the rejection of claim 5. Rejection 3 — Claims 11 and 12 Claim 11 Claim 11, depends from claim 1, and requires that “the magnet includes a first pole and a second pole that are positioned opposite each other about the at least one RF coil.” The Examiner relies on Blank for this feature finding that “Blank teaches that an RF coil may be located between a north pole and south pole of a magnet.” Final Act. 8 (citing Blank ¶ 201). The Examiner concludes that “it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art . . . to have positioned the coil between the north and south poles of the magnet as taught by Blank, in order to maximize the NMR signal.” Id. at 8–9. Appellant asserts that the proposed modification does not result in the claimed configuration because Blank’s “magnetic field (220) produced by RF coil (210) is positioned perpendicular to the static magnetic field (218) produced by the magnet (202),” which would produce the same Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 12 perpendicular arrangement in Albert. Appeal Br. 15. According to Appellant, Blank’s arrangement would not result in the magnet and RF coil assembly being positioned with respect to the region-of-interest as in claim 1, from which claim 11 depends. Id. In response, the Examiner notes that “claim 11 does not refer to the direction of the magnetic field, and merely that the magnet includes first and second poles positioned opposite each other about the RF coil.” Ans. 6. For the following reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 11. Claim 11 does not require that the magnetic field of the coil have a particular direction. Appellant’s argument concerning the direction of the magnetic field is, thus, not commensurate in scope with claim 11. Rather, Appellant appears to be arguing that the rejection requires a bodily incorporation of Blank’s magnet arrangement into Albert’s device. However, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of [those] references would have suggested.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 423, 425 (CCPA 1981). Appellant’s argument, thus, does not apprise us of Examiner error and we sustain the rejection of claim 11. Claim 12 Claim 12 depends from claim 11 and further requires “an enclosure positioned between a subject and a bed, where the enclosure is sized to contain the first pole, the second pole, and the at least one RF coil.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. A–2). Appellant argues that “Figure 15 of Albert shows that the magnet (182) is positioned external to the arrangement (180) and, therefore, cannot Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 13 be said to teach or suggest an enclosure that is sized to contain the first pole and the second pole.” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. As discussed above, Albert’s Figure 15 shows “a low-field MRI arrangement 180, for use as part of a low- field MRI system, includes a planar magnet 182.” See Albert ¶ 122; see also Ans. 7. Thus, arrangement 180 (enclosure) contains, that is, includes magnet 182, having first and second poles. Albert also discloses that arrangement 180 “can be placed on an operating table [bed],” which would locate the arrangement between a subject and a bed. Id. We, thus, sustain the rejection of claim 12. Rejections 4 and 5 — Claims 15, 16, 18, and 19 Claims 15, 16, 18, and 19 depend from claim 1. Appellant does not separately argue claims 15, 16, 18, and 19. See Appeal Br. 3–25. For the same reasons discussed above for claim 1, we sustain the rejections of claims 15, 16, 18, and 19. Rejection 6 — Claims 29–31 Claim 29 depends from claim 1 and requires that the spectrometer system “is programmed to monitor lung density at a target region;” claim 30 depends from claim 29 and requires that “the target region corresponds to a voxel that has a spatial resolution volume between 25 to 30 cubic centimeters;” and claim 31 depends from claim 30 and requires that “a data acquisition time includes signal averaging during the free-breathing period for 20 seconds to about 2 minutes based on the size of the region-of- interest.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. A–4). Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 14 Claim 29 The Examiner finds that Mata measures lung density. Final Act. 11 (citing Mata ¶ 70). Appellant argues that Mata’s disclosure of “measuring the density of the lungs” does not correspond to claim 29 because claim 29 “is not ‘measuring the density of the lungs’ but using a spectrometer system ‘to monitor lung density at a target region in the subject’s lung using the quantitative metric.’” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant contends that “determining tissue density” in Mata is “not using a spectrometer system ‘to monitor lung density at a target region in the subject's lung using the quantitative metric,’ as claimed.” Id. The Examiner responds that “measuring” as used in Mata is the same as the recited “monitoring,” because “it is clear from reading Mata ([0069]– [0071] for example) that Mata is referring to hyperpolarized MR imaging of the lungs (similar to Albert) and observing changes (monitoring) in the tissue density of the lungs.” Ans. 7. For the following reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 29. Mata uses hyperpolarized Xe-129 (hp Xe-129) to produce distinct MR signals in order to detect “changes in lung physiology and morphology.” Mata ¶ 69. Mata’s SB-CSI method measures “the amounts of hp Xe-129 in different compartments using a combination of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS).” Mata ¶ 58. Notwithstanding the semantic difference between measuring and monitoring argued by Appellant, based on the foregoing, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that Mata’s use of spectrometry for observing (monitoring) tissue density changes in different compartments Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 15 (target regions) of the lung meets the limitations of claim 29. We, thus, sustain the rejection of claim 29. Claims 30 and 31 The Examiner determines that Albert’s “system would be capable of evaluating regions of various sizes, such as one having a spatial resolution volume of 25 to 30 cubic centimeters.” Ans. 11. For claim 31, the Examiner considers that Albert’s disclosure of “a data collection of ‘about’ 5–15 seconds,” is sufficient to meet the claimed range. Id. Appellant argues that mere capability of evaluating regions of certain sizes is insufficient. Appeal Br. 17. According to Appellant, the Examiner cannot “disregard the software/programming elements of the claim.” Id. The Examiner responds that “claim 30 attempts to further modify the ‘target region’ set forth in claim 29, however the ‘target region’ is not a part of the system but rather refers to the location in the patient's body which is being monitored.” Ans. 7. The Examiner notes that this is an intended use of the claimed system, and that “the system of the combined invention would be capable of evaluating regions of various sizes in the patient's body.” Ans. 7–8. For the following reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 31. Although, we understand the Examiner’s position that selecting the size of the target region is an intended use limitation that Albert need only be capable of meeting, claim 30 requires more than mere capability. Rather, claim 30 requires that the spectrometry system is programmed to monitor lung density at a target region that has a spatial resolution volume between 25 to 30 cubic centimeters. Even if Albert is capable of being programmed for a specific size of a target region, the Examiner does not direct us to any Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 16 portion of Albert disclosing that its programming includes such sizing. We, thus, do not sustain the rejection of claim 30. Claim 31 depends from claim 30. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 31. Rejection 7 — Independent Claim 21 The Examiner’s findings in support of the rejection of claim 21 with respect to Albert and Charles are substantially similar to the findings set forth in Rejection 1. Final Act. 12–14. Claim 21 differs from claim 1 by additionally requiring canceling noise in an MRI device, and the Examiner relies on Hushek for this limitation. Final Act. 14–15. Appellant argues that this rejection is in error for the same reasons argued above for the combination of Albert and Charles in connection with the rejection of claims 1. Appeal Br. 18–23. Appellant then argues that “Hushek et al. does (not) rectify the shortcomings of the rejection” of claim 1. Id. at 23. For the reasons discussed above in connection with claim 1, Appellant fails to apprise us of error in the rejection of claim 21 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Albert, Charles, and Hushek. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–5, 7, 10, 14 103 Albert, Charles 1, 3–5, 7, 10, 14 2 103 Albert, Charles, Driehuys 2 11, 12 103 Albert, Charles, Blank 11, 12 15, 16 103 Albert, Charles, Tropp 15, 16 18, 19 103 Albert, Charles, Hushek 18, 19 Appeal 2019–001862 Application 14/235,337 17 Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 29–31 103 Albert, Charles, Mata 29 30, 31 21 103 Albert. Charles, Hushek 21 Overall Outcome 1–5, 7, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 19, 21, 29 30, 31 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED IN PART Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation