Patz, Samuel et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 12, 2019

14235337 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/235,337 01/27/2014 Samuel Patz 129319.00229 6529
26710 7590 12/12/2019
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
ATTN: IP DOCKET
411 E. WISCONSIN AVENUE
SUITE 2350
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202-4426
EXAMINER
CWERN, JONATHAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3793
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/12/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pat-dept@quarles.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SAMUEL PATZ, MIRKO HROVAT, and JAMES P. BUTLER
Appeal 2019–001862
Application 14/235,337
Technology Center 3700
BEFORE JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK,
Administrative Patent Judges.
PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5, 7, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 19, 21, and
29–31.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies The Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Inc. as the
real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to a system and method for portable
magnetic resonance measurements of lung properties. Claim 1, reproduced
below with italics added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A portable magnetic resonance system configured to
acquire magnetic resonance signals generated in a region-of-
interest in a subject’s lung and to calculate therefrom a
quantitative metric indicative of a property of the subject’s lung,
comprising:
a magnet sized to be positioned proximate to a subject and
configured to generate a magnetic field that is substantially
homogeneous in a region-of-interest positioned at a distance
from a surface of the magnet that is sufficiently large so as to
position the region-of-interest in the subject’s lung;
a radio frequency (RF) coil assembly including at least one
RF coil sized to be positioned proximate to the region-of-interest
and configured to apply an RF field to the region-of-interest and
to receive magnetic resonance signals therefrom;
a spectrometer system in communication with the RF coil
assembly and programmed to:
direct the RF coil assembly to produce an RF field
in the region-of-interest at a Larmor frequency such that spins
resonant with the Larmor frequency in the region-of-interest are
excited;
direct the RF coil assembly, during a free-breathing
period of the subject, to receive magnetic resonance signals
produced in the region-of-interest in response to the applied RF
field; and
compute a quantitative metric indicative of a
characteristic of a subject’s lung in the region-of-interest during
free-breathing based on the magnetic resonance signals received
during the free-breathing period.

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Albert US 2001/0037063 A1 Nov. 1, 2001
Driehuys US 2004/0005273 A1 Jan. 8, 2004
Blank US 2006/0084861 A1 Apr. 20, 2006
Hushek US 2008/0048658 A1 Feb. 28, 2008
Mata US 2010/0280358 A1 Nov. 4, 2010
Tropp US 2010/0301862 A1 Dec. 2, 2010
Charles US 2013/0006094 A1 Jan. 3, 2013

REJECTIONS2
1. Claims 1, 3–5, 7, 10, and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Albert and Charles.
2. Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Albert, Charles, and Driehuys.
3. Claims 11 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Blank.
4. Claims 15 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Tropp.
5. Claims 18 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Hushek.
6. Claims 29–31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Albert, Charles, and Mata.

2 A rejection of claims 1–5, 7, 10–12, 14–16, 18, 19, 29–31, 33, and 34
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, and a rejection of claims 33 and
34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are withdrawn in the Examiner’s Answer. Ans.
3.
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7. Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Albert, Charles, and Hushek.
OPINION
Rejection 1 — Obviousness Based on Albert and Charles
Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, and 14
Appellant argues claims 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, and 14 as a group. Appeal Br.
4–13. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we select claim 1 as
representative and claims 3, 4, 7, 10, and 14 stand or fall with claim 1.
The Examiner finds that Albert discloses a portable magnetic
resonance system having many of the limitations of claim 1, but does not
disclose “receiving MR signals during a free-breathing period of the subject
(Albert employs a breath-hold technique), and computing a quantitative
metric indicative of a characteristic of a subject’s lung in the region-of-
interest during free-breathing based on the signals.” Final Act. 3–5. The
Examiner finds that Charles discloses a MR imaging system and “teaches
that either a breath-hold technique or a free-breathing technique can be
employed.” Id. at 5 (citing Charles ¶¶ 11, 30, 172). The Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to use a free-breathing technique
in Albert for “improving accuracy in information regarding actual lung
ventilation in the human lungs, identifying ventilation defects, and making
the system suitable for patients with impaired breathing and/or for pediatric
use.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Charles ¶ 127).
Appellant’s first contention is that because Albert uses magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) with a low applied magnetic field (“0.0001 T–0.1
T”) on a portable MR system, whereas Charles uses an MRI with a high-
field magnet (“above about 0.5 T, typically above 1.0 T, and more typically
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between about 1.5 T and 10 T”) on a non-portable scanner, the proposed
modification based on Charles would undermine and change the principle of
operation of Albert. Appeal Br. 8–9 (citing Albert ¶ 25; Charles ¶ 122).
Appellant argues that “[i]n order to achieve the free-breathing techniques,
Charles et al. requires a high-field strength. . . . In direct contrast, Albert et
al. operates . . . well below the required field strength of Charles.” Id. at 9.
Specifically, according to Appellant,
modifying Albert et al. to include the free-breathing technique
described in Charles et al. would either undermine the stated
principle of operation of Albert et al. by substituting a high-
field system for the low-field, portable system of Albert et al.,
or by undermining the principle of operation of Charles et al. by
utilizing a low-field system that cannot perform within the
expressly-stated operational constraints of Charles.
Id.
The Examiner responds that Charles is relied upon only to teach a
free-breathing technique, as a substitute or in addition to the breath-hold
technique of Albert, and that the rejection does not suggest substituting the
high field MRI apparatus of Charles for Albert’s low field MRI apparatus.
Ans. 4.
Appellant replies that “the teachings of Charles and Albert provide
evidence within the references themselves that would lead a skilled artisan to
expect the free-breathing techniques as taught by Charles to be inoperable in
the system of Albert, at least because Charles expressly defines operating
conditions that exclude the operating conditions of Albert.” Reply Br. 2–3.
For the following reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s inoperability
contention.
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Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings that Albert
discloses “direct[ing] the RF coil assembly . . . . to receive magnetic
resonance signals” or to “compute from the acquired magnetic resonance
signals a quantitative metric.” Final Act. 4; see also Appeal Br. 8–13.
Nonetheless, Appellant contends that Albert’s apparatus would be
inoperable to perform these functions if, during use, the patient is free-
breathing as opposed to holding his or her breath. Although Appellant
correctly notes that Charles and Albert disclose different magnetic field
strengths for their respective MRI devices (Reply Br. 2–3), other than this,
Appellant does not direct us to evidence that would support its attorney
argument that a skilled artisan would “expect the free-breathing techniques
as taught by Charles to be inoperable in the system of Albert.” See id.
Appellant’s inoperability contention is not persuasive because Appellant
does not direct us to evidence that the patient’s breathing pattern affects the
disclosed functions of Albert’s apparatus which functions are not disputed
by Appellant.
Appellant’s second contention is that Albert’s imaging techniques are
specific to a portable MRI apparatus operating at low field strengths (0.0001
T – 0.1 T), and require a breath-hold “to generate a suitable MR signal
intensity,” whereas Charles uses imaging methods for a high-field magnet
MRI system (between 0.5 T and 10 T). Appeal Br. 10. According to
Appellant, “modifying Albert et al. to include the free-breathing technique
described in Charles et al. would require a substantial reconstruction and
redesign of the low field, portable system of Albert et al. to become a high-
field, non-portable system as required by Charles.” Id. Appellant asserts
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that “doing so undermines the express purpose of Albert et al. of providing a
portable system.” Id.
Appellant’s second contention is not persuasive because Albert is not
limited to a portable system. Although Albert’s “MRI can be performed
with small, lightweight, and/or portable apparatus,” (Albert ¶ 7), Albert also
discloses a non-portable system that includes a shielded room 12 with the
imaging elements “configured to be placed inside of each other as shown to
receive the person within bores of the respective elements.” Albert ¶ 26,
Fig. 1. Moreover, as the Examiner correctly notes, the proposed
modification uses Charles’s free breathing technique instead of Albert’s
breath hold technique, and does not require a redesign of the MRI apparatus.
Even if Albert were limited to a portable system, changing how the patient
breathes during imaging, does not undermine the portability of the system.
Appellant’s third contention is that Charles teaches away from the
proposed combination because one of ordinary skill in the art “reading the
disclosure of Charles et al. would be discouraged from incorporating the
free-breathing techniques taught by Charles et al. into the portable MRI
system of Albert.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellant bases this contention primarily
on the fact that Charles and Albert disclose using different magnetic field
strengths. See id. However, merely showing differences between two
references is not sufficient to establish teaching away. See In re Beattie, 974
F.2d 1309, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Appellant’s teaching away contention
is, thus, not persuasive.
Appellant’s fourth contention is that because Charles and Albert
disclose two different MRI systems one of ordinary skill in the art must
“select between the low-field, portable system of Albert et al. or the high-
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field system of Charles et al.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant contends that
combining the systems “is not an option,” and that “[t]he only basis for
considering otherwise is the teachings of Appellant’s own disclosure.” Id.
Appellant thus concludes that “the rejection is predicated on impermissible
hindsight gained from Appellant’s own disclosure.” Id. at 13.
In response, the Examiner notes that the reasoning relied upon in the
rejection comes from Charles, which “provides numerous benefits of using a
free breathing technique such as improving accuracy in information
regarding actual lung ventilation in the human lungs, identifying ventilation
defects, and making the system suitable for patients with impaired breathing
and/or for pediatric use.” Ans. 5 (citing Charles ¶ 127). We are not
persuaded by this contention for the following reasons.
The Examiner does not propose modifying Albert’s disclosed
apparatus in any way. See Final Act. 5. Given that Charles explicitly
discloses that breathing techniques include “breath-held, free breathing or
paced breathing” (Charles ¶ 172), the Examiner’s use of the teachings in
Charles as to how the patient should breathe when gas is delivered during
data acquisition is reasonable as such a disclosure would commend itself to a
person of ordinary skill in the art looking to improve image quality during
data collection. Charles also discloses that using “conventional ‘thermally’
polarized perfluorinated gases (PFx) mixed with oxygen for use as inhaled
inert MRI contrast agents to image lung function . . . . allows imaging
ventilation with a quality similar to that of hyperpolarized 129Xe MRI, but at
lower cost and with reduced technical complexity.” See Charles ¶ 125.
Given that Albert uses 129Xe (see Albert ¶ 25), the disclosures of Albert and
Charles suggests that it is within the abilities of one of ordinary skill in the
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art to use hyperpolarized gas with or without breath-hold. The Examiner has
also provided reasoning to support the rejection, namely, for “improving
accuracy in information regarding actual lung ventilation in the human
lungs, identifying ventilation defects, and making the system suitable for
patients with impaired breathing and/or for pediatric use.” Final Act. 5–6.
This improvement is disclosed in the cited references, rather than stemming
from impermissible hindsight. See Charles ¶ 127. Because the Examiner’s
reasoning for the proposed modification is reasonable and supported by
rational underpinnings found in the prior art, we do not agree that the
Examiner’s rejection is based on impermissible hindsight.
We have considered all of Appellant’s contentions and are not
persuaded of Examiner error. We, thus, sustain the rejection of claim 1.
Claims 3, 4, 7, 10, and 14 fall with claim 1.
Claim 5
Claim 5, depends from claim 1, and requires, inter alia, “an enclosure
in which the magnet is sized to be contained and the enclosure is sized to
receive the subject.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. A–2).
Appellant argues that Albert’s planar magnet 182 is not sized to be
contained in the enclosure of arrangement 180. Appeal Br. 14. The
Examiner responds that because “Figure 15 shows magnet 182 as a small
rectangle within the larger rectangle 180 of the MRI arrangement . . . . the
magnet is sized to be within the enclosure of the MRI arrangement.” Ans. 6.
For the following reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 5.
As the Examiner correctly notes, Figure 15 of Albert shows magnet
182 within enclosure 180. Ans. 6. The disclosure of Albert also supports
the Examiner’s position in that Figure 15 shows “a low-field MRI
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arrangement 180, for use as part of a low-field MRI system, includes a
planar magnet 182.” Albert ¶ 122 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner’s
finding is, thus, supported by a preponderance of the evidence and we
sustain the rejection of claim 5.

Rejection 2 — Claim 2
Claim 2, depends from claim 1, and requires that “the quantitative
metric computed by the spectrometer system is at least one of lung
ventilation and lung density.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. A–1). The
Examiner finds that Driehuys discloses “in vivo evaluation of pulmonary
physiology or function using NMR signals of polarized Xe,” and concludes
that it would have been obvious to use spectroscopic analysis of lung
ventilation in the system of Albert, because “this measurement will provide
further detailed diagnostic information to the physician regarding the
patient’s lungs to form a more accurate diagnosis.” Final Act. 8.
Appellant argues that Driehuys uses high-field systems and does not
teach or suggest using a portable, low-field MRI system. Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant concludes that absent such a teaching, the rejection “is predicated
on impermissible hindsight gained from Appellant’s own disclosure.” Id.
In response, the Examiner notes that “Driehuys also does not teach
away from using a low field system, and the techniques described may be
utilized in either low field or high field systems.” Ans. 5.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. For the reasons discussed
above in connection with claim 1, Appellant has not directed us to evidence
to support its arguments that teachings regarding the use of high field
systems are limited to only those systems. In addition, given that both
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Albert and Driehuys use 129Xe gas for lung analysis (Albert ¶ 5; Driehuys
¶ 90), Appellant does not explain persuasively why relying on the teachings
of Driehuys to support using Albert’s apparatus to obtain an additional
measurement using the same gas would be beyond the abilities of one of
ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
416–417 (2007) (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and
a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve
similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its
actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). We, thus, sustain the
rejection of claim 5.

Rejection 3 — Claims 11 and 12
Claim 11
Claim 11, depends from claim 1, and requires that “the magnet
includes a first pole and a second pole that are positioned opposite each
other about the at least one RF coil.” The Examiner relies on Blank for this
feature finding that “Blank teaches that an RF coil may be located between a
north pole and south pole of a magnet.” Final Act. 8 (citing Blank ¶ 201).
The Examiner concludes that “it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art . . . to have positioned the coil between the north and south
poles of the magnet as taught by Blank, in order to maximize the NMR
signal.” Id. at 8–9.
Appellant asserts that the proposed modification does not result in the
claimed configuration because Blank’s “magnetic field (220) produced by
RF coil (210) is positioned perpendicular to the static magnetic field (218)
produced by the magnet (202),” which would produce the same
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perpendicular arrangement in Albert. Appeal Br. 15. According to
Appellant, Blank’s arrangement would not result in the magnet and RF coil
assembly being positioned with respect to the region-of-interest as in claim
1, from which claim 11 depends. Id. In response, the Examiner notes that
“claim 11 does not refer to the direction of the magnetic field, and merely
that the magnet includes first and second poles positioned opposite each
other about the RF coil.” Ans. 6. For the following reasons, we sustain the
rejection of claim 11.
Claim 11 does not require that the magnetic field of the coil have a
particular direction. Appellant’s argument concerning the direction of the
magnetic field is, thus, not commensurate in scope with claim 11. Rather,
Appellant appears to be arguing that the rejection requires a bodily
incorporation of Blank’s magnet arrangement into Albert’s device.
However, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the
primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
[those] references would have suggested.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 423, 425
(CCPA 1981). Appellant’s argument, thus, does not apprise us of Examiner
error and we sustain the rejection of claim 11.
Claim 12
Claim 12 depends from claim 11 and further requires “an enclosure
positioned between a subject and a bed, where the enclosure is sized to
contain the first pole, the second pole, and the at least one RF coil.” Appeal
Br. (Claims App. A–2).
Appellant argues that “Figure 15 of Albert shows that the magnet
(182) is positioned external to the arrangement (180) and, therefore, cannot
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be said to teach or suggest an enclosure that is sized to contain the first pole
and the second pole.” Appeal Br. 16.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. As discussed above, Albert’s
Figure 15 shows “a low-field MRI arrangement 180, for use as part of a low-
field MRI system, includes a planar magnet 182.” See Albert ¶ 122; see also
Ans. 7. Thus, arrangement 180 (enclosure) contains, that is, includes
magnet 182, having first and second poles. Albert also discloses that
arrangement 180 “can be placed on an operating table [bed],” which would
locate the arrangement between a subject and a bed. Id. We, thus, sustain
the rejection of claim 12.
Rejections 4 and 5 — Claims 15, 16, 18, and 19
Claims 15, 16, 18, and 19 depend from claim 1. Appellant does not
separately argue claims 15, 16, 18, and 19. See Appeal Br. 3–25. For the
same reasons discussed above for claim 1, we sustain the rejections of
claims 15, 16, 18, and 19.
Rejection 6 — Claims 29–31
Claim 29 depends from claim 1 and requires that the spectrometer
system “is programmed to monitor lung density at a target region;” claim 30
depends from claim 29 and requires that “the target region corresponds to a
voxel that has a spatial resolution volume between 25 to 30 cubic
centimeters;” and claim 31 depends from claim 30 and requires that “a data
acquisition time includes signal averaging during the free-breathing period
for 20 seconds to about 2 minutes based on the size of the region-of-
interest.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. A–4).

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Claim 29
The Examiner finds that Mata measures lung density. Final Act. 11
(citing Mata ¶ 70). Appellant argues that Mata’s disclosure of “measuring
the density of the lungs” does not correspond to claim 29 because claim 29
“is not ‘measuring the density of the lungs’ but using a spectrometer system
‘to monitor lung density at a target region in the subject’s lung using the
quantitative metric.’” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant contends that “determining
tissue density” in Mata is “not using a spectrometer system ‘to monitor lung
density at a target region in the subject's lung using the quantitative metric,’
as claimed.” Id.
The Examiner responds that “measuring” as used in Mata is the same
as the recited “monitoring,” because “it is clear from reading Mata ([0069]–
[0071] for example) that Mata is referring to hyperpolarized MR imaging of
the lungs (similar to Albert) and observing changes (monitoring) in the
tissue density of the lungs.” Ans. 7. For the following reasons, we sustain
the rejection of claim 29.
Mata uses hyperpolarized Xe-129 (hp Xe-129) to produce distinct MR
signals in order to detect “changes in lung physiology and morphology.”
Mata ¶ 69. Mata’s SB-CSI method measures “the amounts of hp Xe-129 in
different compartments using a combination of magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) and magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS).” Mata ¶ 58.
Notwithstanding the semantic difference between measuring and monitoring
argued by Appellant, based on the foregoing, a preponderance of the
evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that Mata’s use of spectrometry
for observing (monitoring) tissue density changes in different compartments
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(target regions) of the lung meets the limitations of claim 29. We, thus,
sustain the rejection of claim 29.
Claims 30 and 31
The Examiner determines that Albert’s “system would be capable of
evaluating regions of various sizes, such as one having a spatial resolution
volume of 25 to 30 cubic centimeters.” Ans. 11. For claim 31, the
Examiner considers that Albert’s disclosure of “a data collection of ‘about’
5–15 seconds,” is sufficient to meet the claimed range. Id.
Appellant argues that mere capability of evaluating regions of certain
sizes is insufficient. Appeal Br. 17. According to Appellant, the Examiner
cannot “disregard the software/programming elements of the claim.” Id.
The Examiner responds that “claim 30 attempts to further modify the
‘target region’ set forth in claim 29, however the ‘target region’ is not a part
of the system but rather refers to the location in the patient's body which is
being monitored.” Ans. 7. The Examiner notes that this is an intended use
of the claimed system, and that “the system of the combined invention
would be capable of evaluating regions of various sizes in the patient's
body.” Ans. 7–8. For the following reasons, we do not sustain the rejection
of claim 31.
Although, we understand the Examiner’s position that selecting the
size of the target region is an intended use limitation that Albert need only
be capable of meeting, claim 30 requires more than mere capability. Rather,
claim 30 requires that the spectrometry system is programmed to monitor
lung density at a target region that has a spatial resolution volume between
25 to 30 cubic centimeters. Even if Albert is capable of being programmed
for a specific size of a target region, the Examiner does not direct us to any
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portion of Albert disclosing that its programming includes such sizing. We,
thus, do not sustain the rejection of claim 30. Claim 31 depends from claim
30. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 31.

Rejection 7 — Independent Claim 21
The Examiner’s findings in support of the rejection of claim 21 with
respect to Albert and Charles are substantially similar to the findings set
forth in Rejection 1. Final Act. 12–14. Claim 21 differs from claim 1 by
additionally requiring canceling noise in an MRI device, and the Examiner
relies on Hushek for this limitation. Final Act. 14–15. Appellant argues that
this rejection is in error for the same reasons argued above for the
combination of Albert and Charles in connection with the rejection of claims
1. Appeal Br. 18–23. Appellant then argues that “Hushek et al. does (not)
rectify the shortcomings of the rejection” of claim 1. Id. at 23. For the
reasons discussed above in connection with claim 1, Appellant fails to
apprise us of error in the rejection of claim 21 as unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) over Albert, Charles, and Hushek.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–5, 7,
10, 14
103 Albert, Charles 1, 3–5, 7, 10,
14

2 103 Albert, Charles, Driehuys 2
11, 12 103 Albert, Charles, Blank 11, 12
15, 16 103 Albert, Charles, Tropp 15, 16
18, 19 103 Albert, Charles, Hushek 18, 19
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
29–31 103 Albert, Charles, Mata 29 30, 31
21 103 Albert. Charles, Hushek 21
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7, 10–12,
14–16, 18, 19,
21, 29
30, 31

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART