Parikh, Nirmit et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 9, 2019

14171674 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/171,674 02/03/2014 Nirmit Parikh 127075-194630 (P63341) 9326
31817 7590 12/09/2019
SCHWABE, WILLIAMSON & WYATT, P.C.
1211 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1600
Portland, OR 97204
EXAMINER
BROMELL, ALEXANDRIA Y
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2167
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/09/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPDocketing@SCHWABE.com
intelparalegal@schwabe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte NIRMIT PARIKH and TANMAY HIREN DESAI
___________

Appeal 2019-001408
Application 14/171,674
Technology Center 2100
_________________

Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, DAVID J. CUTITTA II, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.

CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10, 13–16, 18–21, and 24–32, all the
claims pending on appeal.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Intel
Corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 11, 12, 17, 22, and 23 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 24, 26, 27; Final
Act. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Invention
Appellant’s invention “relates to improved summarization of
online/offline content to provide dynamic summaries from a plurality of
points of view.” Spec. ¶ 2.3

Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 is exemplary of the claimed subject matter and is
reproduced below with claim element labels added in brackets:
1. An apparatus comprising:
[a] one or more physical computer processors;
[b] a content processing engine to be operated by
the one or more physical computer processors to process
content, wherein to process content, the content
processing engine is to identify constituent parts of the
content, and
[c] a summarization engine to generate summaries
of the content, wherein to generate summaries of the
content, the summarization engine is to score the
constituent parts of the content using a plurality of
scoring methods, and to generate a plurality of
summaries from a plurality of points of view for the
content, based at least in part on the scores of constituent
parts, [c1] wherein at least one of the plurality of
methods provides ranks to sentences of the content based
on coherence of roots of words between sentences of the

3 We refer to: (1) the originally filed Specification filed February 3, 2014
(“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action mailed January 26, 2018 (“Final
Act.”); (3) the Appeal Brief filed June 25, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); (4) the
Examiner’s Answer mailed October 4, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief
filed December 4, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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content, and wherein at least one of the summaries is
formed with constituent parts extracted from the content;
[c2] wherein the method that provides ranks to
sentences of the content based on coherence of roots of
words between sentences of the content includes joining
related sentences together based on one or more rules,
prior to providing the ranks.
Appeal Br. 23 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1–10, 13–16, 18–21, and 24–32 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as reciting patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–7.

ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).

I. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the US Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice and Mayo.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim recites. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On
their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated
settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk.”).
If the claim recites an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the
Alice and Mayo framework, in which “we must examine the elements of the
claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
The Office published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) as revised by the October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance
Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (October 2019 Update)
(together hereinafter “Guidance”). Under the Guidance, in determining
whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we first look to whether
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the claim recites:
(1) Step 2A — Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity, such as a fundamental
economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) Step 2A — Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP4
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55 (“Revised Step 2A”). Only if a claim (1)
recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a
practical application, do we then look to whether the claim (Step 2B):
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56 (“Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.”).

II. The Examiner’s § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines that exemplary5 claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception: an abstract idea. Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 8–9. According to
the Examiner, claim 1 is “directed towards the concept of collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and

4 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) citations herein are
to MPEP 9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
5 Appellant argues claims 1–10, 13–16, 18–21, and 24–32 as a group with
respect to the § 101 rejection. Appeal Br. 12. We, thus, select independent
claim 1 as representative of the claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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analysis,” and thus recites an abstract idea. Final Act. 4. The “Examiner
determines that the additional elements of the limitation do not amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception.” Id. at 5.

III. Appellant’s Arguments
We summarize Appellant’s arguments in favor of eligibility as
follows: (1) the Examiner fails to “compare the claim to claims already
found to be directed to an abstract idea in a previous court decision” (Appeal
Br. 11); (2) “there is no indication that the claimed elements have been
considered sufficiently as an ‘ordered combination’ under the second part of
the Alice framework” (id. at 14); (3) “[n]one of the step 2B analysis in the
Office Action includes any statements of fact regarding whether the
elements, or combination of elements, of claim 1 is/are well-understood,
routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field” (id. at 16);
(4) “[i]n contrast to the claims in Electric Power Group,6 the present claims
go beyond the mere collection, analysis, and display of available information
in a particular field” because “the novel approach of generating the ranked
summaries as recited by the present claims improves the quality of search
results, and reduces the number of search results required to be provided in
response to a search query” (id. at 18); (5) “[s]imilar to the claims at issue in
Amdocs,7 the benefits of claim 1 are possible because of the distributed

6 Appellant cites Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
7 Appellant cites Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288,
(Fed. Cir. 2016)
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architecture that produce an unconventional result––improved and better
ranked content summaries.” (id. at 21).

IV. Our Review, Guidance, Step 1
We analyze the exemplary claim and the Examiner’s rejection in view
of the Guidance, and we adopt the nomenclature for the steps used in the
Guidance. As an initial matter, the claims must recite at least one of four
recognized statutory categories, namely, machine, process, article of
manufacture, or composition of matter. MPEP § 2106(I); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Appellant’s independent claims 1, 15, 18, and 24 each recite an
apparatus (i.e., a “machine”). Thus, the pending claims recite a recognized
statutory category of § 101 and we turn to the two-step Alice/Mayo analysis
applied in accordance with the Guidance.

V. Step 2A, Prong 1 in the Guidance (Alice/Mayo–Step 1)
(Judicial Exceptions)
Here, we determine whether exemplary claim 1, being directed to a
statutory class of invention, nonetheless recites a judicial exception.
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51.
Appellant argues the Examiner has not demonstrated the claim recites
an abstract idea because “it is appropriate to compare the claim to claims
already found to be directed to an abstract idea in a previous court decision”
and “[n]o such comparison exists in the Office Action.” Appeal Br. 11.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because the Examiner
determines, and we agree, that claim 1, similar to the claims in Electric
Power, recites “essentially mental processes.” Ans. 14. According to the
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Guidance, mental processes include concepts capable of practically being
“performed in the human mind.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
Apart from additional element(s) discussed separately below, at a high
level, claim 1 recites processing content by performing the steps of: [b]
“identify[ing] constituent parts of the content”; and [c] “generat[ing]
summaries of the content . . . [by] scor[ing] the constituent parts of the
content using a plurality of scoring methods, and “generat[ing a plurality of
summaries from a plurality of points of view for the content, based at least in
part on the scores of constituent parts.” Appeal Br. 23. Limitations [c1] and
[c2] further define the content processing by requiring the claimed scoring
methods provide “ranks to sentences of the content based on coherence of
roots of words between sentences of the content” including “joining related
sentences together based on one or more rules, prior to providing the ranks.”
Appeal Br. 23. Analyzing the claim in view of Appellant’s Specification we
agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites a mental
process. Limitation [b] recites, in part, “identify[ing] constituent parts of the
content.” Id. Appellant relies, in part, on paragraph 117 of the Specification
to disclose the limitation. Appeal Br. 4. This paragraph discloses that
constituent parts may be sentences of an offline textual article. Spec. ¶ 117.
A person could identify sentences in an article mentally without analyzing a
large amount of data and therefore this limitation can be practically
performed in the mind.
Limitation [c] recites, in part, “generat[ing] summaries of the content
. . . [by] scor[ing] the constituent parts of the content using a plurality of
scoring methods,” and “generat[ing a plurality of summaries from a plurality
of points of view for the content, based at least in part on the scores of
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constituent parts.” Id. Appeal Br. 23. Appellant relies, in part, on
paragraphs 54–62 and 115 of the Specification to disclose the generating of
summaries based on assigned scores. Appeal Br. 4. This paragraph
discloses that the “determining ranking [is] based on weight/relation
between sentences (nodes).” Spec. ¶ 54. The ranking “may determine the
number of relations that the node has with other nodes” and “[t]he node with
the maximum relations may have a higher score and more weight.” Id. In
addition, the ranking “may increase the score of sentences that include
keywords and title words” and “may include ranking sentences according to
the scores of the sentences based on the sentences having nodes with more
weight receiving a higher score.” Id. at ¶¶ 55, 62. Then, “a plurality of
summaries [are generated] from a plurality of points of view for the content,
based at least in part on the scores of constituent parts.” Id. at ¶ 115. A
person, mentally or using pen and paper, could have assigned higher scores
to sentences with certain keywords and generated summaries using only
sentences having a threshold score. As indicated above, limitations [c1] and
[c2] further define the mental process by requiring the claimed scoring
methods provide “ranks to sentences of the content based on coherence of
roots of words between sentences of the content” including “joining related
sentences together based on one or more rules, prior to providing the ranks.”
Appeal Br. 23. These limitations can also be practically performed in the
mind. See Spec. ¶¶ 35–53, 117, 142, 147, and 149.
In view of our analysis of limitations [b], [c], [c1], and [c2], we
determine claim 1 recites steps related to generating a content summary that,
when considered in the context of the claim as a whole, can practically be
performed in the mind or with pen and paper. “If a claim, under its broadest
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reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the
recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental
processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the
mind.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52, n.14 (citing Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we
conclude claim 1 recites an abstract idea, i.e., a mental process, as provided
for in the Guidance.

VI. Step 2A, Prong Two in the Guidance
(Integration into a Practical Application)
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now determine whether
the claim is directed to the abstract idea itself or whether it is instead
directed to some technological implementation or application of, or
improvement to, this idea, i.e., is integrated into a practical application. See,
e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 187
(1981). We determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated
into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether
there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception or exceptions; and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. This
evaluation requires an additional element or a combination of additional
elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. Id.
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Appellant argues claim 1 is similar to the claims in Amdocs because
“the present claims require communication among multiple networked
devices, such as the recited apparatus (which may be implemented in various
user devices, and a content processing cloud computing service[)]. In this
way, the present claims recite an inventive concept through the system’s
distributed architecture.” Appeal Br. 21 (footnote omitted).
We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive. In claim 1, the
additional limitations include [a] “one or more physical computer
processors,” [b] “a content processing engine,” and [c] “a summarization
engine.” Appeal Br. 23. The Examiner determines the additional limitations
“are recited at a high level of generality” and “provide conventional
computer functions that do not add meaningful limits to practicing the
abstract idea.” Final Act. 4.
We agree with the Examiner. Under a broadest reasonable
interpretation, the claimed “one or more physical computer processors,” can
mean a single physical processor. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments that
“the present claims require communication among multiple networked
devices . . . [and] recite an inventive concept through the system’s
distributed architecture” are not commensurate with the scope of the claim.
Appeal Br. 21. Moreover, in view of Appellant’s Specification, we
determine the terms “content processing engine,” and “summarization
engine” do not recite additional structure and, thus, merely refer to
functional limitations performed by the claimed processor. See Spec. ¶ 31,
34 (“The computing device may be any one of a smartphone, a phablet, a
computing tablet, a laptop or desktop computer, a game console, and so
forth, communicatively coupled with content processing engine 10, or on
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which the content processing engine 10 may be installed.”) (emphasis
added). Thus, claim 1 merely generally links the use of the judicial
exception (i.e., an abstract idea in the form of a mental process, including
observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion) to a particular technological
environment (i.e., a processor). Such linking is insufficient to integrate the
underlying abstract idea into a practical application. Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 55
Moreover, the problem being solved by Appellant’s claimed
invention—summarizing content—is old and well known in the pre-internet
world. Appellant’s Specification notes current summaries “are from only
one point of view, if any at all” and thus “result in wasted time reviewing
articles and content online that does little to help a user in finding
information of interest.” Spec. ¶ 6. Here, the described improvement is to
“a content processing engine that reviews online or offline content to
dynamically recreate a summary or a plurality of summaries from different
points of view.” Spec. ¶ 18 (emphasis added). Essentially, the disclosed
invention seeks to use a processor to summarize content from different
points of view rather than from a single point of view. To solve this non-
technical problem, claim 1 uses a computer “to generate a plurality of
summaries from a plurality of points of view for the content, based at least in
part on the scores of constituent parts.” Appeal Br. 23. In this way, claim 1
is unlike the technology-based integrations cited by Appellant. See Amdocs,
841 F.3d 1300 (holding that claims in a patent for reporting on the collection
of network usage information from a plurality of network devices possessed
an inventive concept), cited in Appeal Br. 21. Considering claim 1 as a
whole, Appellant’s invention lacks a technical solution to a technical
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problem because the mere presence of a processor in the claim does not
necessarily indicate a technical solution. So, although claim 1 recites a
processor, this does not preclude the claim from being directed to the recited
judicial exception.
Alternatively, an additional element may integrate a judicial exception
into a practical application when the “additional element implements a
judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a
particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim.” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 55. In this case, claim 1 lacks such a machine. At best, the
processor simply executes the abstract idea. Notably, the recited processor
can be a general-purpose computer. See Spec. ¶¶ 100, 101 (“Each of these
elements [including the claimed one or more processors] may perform its
conventional functions known in the art.”). But a general-purpose processor
that merely executes the judicial exception is not a particular machine.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
cited in MPEP § 2106.05(b)(I).
In addition, Appellant’s claimed additional elements do not transform
matter; at best, they transform information. That is, the claim simply
collects, and manipulates content data by generating summaries of the
content. Appeal Br. 23; see MPEP § 2106.05(c); see also Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (holding that a computer based
algorithm that merely transforms data from one form to another is not
patent-eligible). As such, the claim has no other meaningful limitations (see
MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and merely recites instructions to execute an abstract
idea on generic computer hardware (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
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We determine, therefore, claim 1 is not directed to a specific asserted
improvement in computer-related technology or otherwise integrated into a
practical application and thus is directed to a judicial exception.

VII. Step 2B in the Guidance (Alice/Mayo, Step 2) (Inventive Concept)
Next, we determine whether the claim includes additional elements
that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby
providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73). To determine whether the claim provides an inventive
concept, the additional elements are considered—individually and in
combination—to determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field or (2) simply append well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
The Examiner determines the claim does “not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because the additional computer elements, which are recited at a
high level of generality, provide conventional computer functions that do not
add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract idea.” Final Act. 4; Ans. 11.
Appellant argues that “[n]one of the step 2B analysis in the Office
Action includes any statements of fact regarding whether the elements, or
combination of elements, of claim 1 is/are well-understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field.” Appeal Br. 16 (citing
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
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We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive. In Berkheimer, the
Federal Circuit held that “[w]hether something [(i.e., additional elements
beyond the abstract idea)] is well-understood, routine, and conventional to a
skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.” See
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. In response to Berkheimer, the USPTO
issued a new examination procedure (“the Berkheimer Memorandum8”),
requiring the Examiner to support expressly a finding that limitations
beyond the abstract idea are well-understood, routine, and conventional.
The Examiner, however, although not expressly mentioning
Berkheimer, does comply with the Berkheimer Memorandum’s requirement
to support expressly a finding that an additional limitation beyond the
abstract idea is well-understood, routine, and conventional. See also
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. The Examiner identifies claim 1’s content
processing engine and summarization engine and finds the limitations do not
go “beyond a generic enhancement of data . . . as required in Amdocs.”
Ans. 18. Thus, the Examiner cites to relevant case law to find certain
additional limitations are well-understood, routine, and conventional as set
forth the in the Berkheimer Memorandum. Berkheimer Memorandum 4 (III.
A. 2 “[a] citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II)).” Moreover, as noted above, the terms “content processing
engine,” and “summarization engine” are terms lacking sufficient structure
and, thus, merely preface functional limitations performed by the claimed

8 April 19, 2018 Memorandum to the Patent Examining Corps, entitled
“Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility,
Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.).”
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processor. Spec. ¶ 31, 34. Accordingly, the Examiner’s finding was
sufficient to meet the evidentiary requirement imposed by Berkheimer.
Moreover, Appellant’s own Specification supports the Examiner’s
finding that the claimed processor is well-understood, routine, and
conventional. For example, referring to the claimed “one or more
processors,” Appellant’s Specification states “[e]ach of these elements may
perform its conventional functions known in the art.” Spec. ¶¶ 100, 101.
Still further, the MPEP instructs examiners that courts recognize that
using a computer for performing repetitive calculations may be well‐
understood, routine, and conventional when claimed generically. MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II)(ii) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978);
Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278). Claim 1’s apparatus, as noted by the Examiner,
uses the processor for collecting and manipulating data and to execute the
claimed abstract idea. Final Act. 4. For these reasons, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding that the recited processor adds nothing more than well-
understood, routine, conventional activities, “recited at a high level of
generality,” to the abstract mental process. Id.
Next, Appellant argues “there is no indication that the claimed
elements have been considered sufficiently as an ‘ordered combination’
under the second part of the Alice framework.” Appeal Br. 14.
We find this argument unpersuasive because Appellant does not
identify any inventive concept in the recited combination of steps or any
specific arrangement of computing components. Indeed, the claim’s focus is
on generating summaries of content and therefore claim 1 merely recites an
abstract idea executed by a generic processor, as discussed above.
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Next, Appellant argues “the arrangement of the present application is
not so broadly described to cause preemption concerns.” Appeal Br. 22.
“While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the
absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015). “[Q]uestions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101
analysis,” which has been applied here. Id. Claim 1 simply appends well-
understood, routine, conventional components previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the claimed abstract idea.
We, thus, conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in claim 1 do not provide
significantly more than the recited judicial exception. Accordingly, claim 1
does not recite patent-eligible subject matter.
CONCLUSION

In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–10, 13–
16, 18–21,
24–32
101 Eligibility  1–10, 13–
16, 18–21,
24–32

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED