Painters (Meiswinkell/RFJ, Inc.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 24, 1999

327 N.L.R.B. 1020 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1020
District Councils Nos. 8, 16 and 33 of the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Painters and Allied
Trades, AFL–CIO; and Local Union No. 4 of the
International Brotherhood of Painters and Al-
lied Trades, AFL–CIO (Meiswinkel/RFJ, Inc.)
and Thomas Matulis. Case 20–CB–9268
March 24, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND HURTGEN
The principle issues presented in this case1 are whether
the Respondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
by: (1) failing to inform bargaining unit employees of
their rights under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying dues to support un-
ion expenditures nongermane to its role as a collective-
bargaining representative; and (2) continuing to charge
employees who filed Beck objections for expenses re-
lated to nonrepresentational functions.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.
The Respondents are Local 4 and District Councils 8,
16, and 33 of the International Brotherhood of Painters.3
The Employer, Meiswinkel/RFJ, Inc., is a member of the
Northern California Drywall Contractors Association
(the Association), which is the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative for Meiswinkel and various other employer-
members engaged in the painting and drywall taping and
finishing business. From 1989 to July 1993, the Associa-
tion and the Respondents were party to a collective-
bargaining agreement containing a union-security clause
which stated: “[a]ny workmen employed by the employ-
ers for a period of thirty days . . . shall as a condition of
employment become members of the Union by tendering
full and uniform initiation fees. . . . and . . . thereafter shall
maintain their continuous good standing in the Union . . .
by paying regular dues.”

1 On October 19, 1995, Administrative Law Judge Clifford H. An-
derson issued the attached decision. Respondents District Council 8
and Local 4 filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief. Respondent
District Council 16 filed a brief in opposition to the General Counsel’s
limited exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.
2 Respondents District Council 8 and Local 4 have excepted to some
of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is
not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully exam-
ined the record and find no basis for reversing the finding.
3 District Council 33 merged with District Council 16 in 1994.
There are no exceptions to the judge’s finding that District Council 16
thereafter became liable for the prior acts and conduct of District Coun-
cil 33. We note that there also are no exceptions to the judge’s findings
that timely service of the charge on Respondent District Council 8
constituted service on Respondent District Councils 16 and 33.
Employees met their financial obligations under this
union-security arrangement through payments to both the
District Councils and their member locals. Dues and fees
owed to the District Councils are known as “working
assessments.” They are generally deducted from em-
ployees’ paychecks pursuant to checkoff authorizations
and are submitted to the District Council in whose juris-
diction the employee worked. Moneys owed the locals
are paid directly “over-the-counter.”
Charging Party Thomas Matulis was a member of Re-
spondent Local 4. He testified that, during the term of
the 1989–1993 contract, he paid dues to Local 4 and
working assessments to the three Respondent District
Councils when he worked in their respective geographic
jurisdictions. On March 29, 1993, Matulis notified the
Respondents in writing that he was resigning his union
membership, and he asserted a Beck objection to the ex-
penditure of his dues and working assessments for non-
representational purposes.4 Matulis credibly testified that
after he raised a Beck objection the Respondents failed to
provide him with any information regarding the percent-
age breakdown of funds spent on representational and
nonrepresentational activities, and that he was continu-
ously charged full dues and working assessments.
The judge found “that there is no obligation in law” for
a union to notify employees of their Beck rights or to
maintain a procedural system to enable employees to
exercise their Beck rights. He further concluded, how-
ever, that a union choosing not to have a Beck system
may not collect “any dues whatsoever” from an objecting
employee pursuant to a contractual union-security clause
and must give notice of this fact immediately to an ob-
jecting employee. Accordingly, the judge dismissed the
complaint allegations that the Respondent District Coun-
cils unlawfully failed to maintain a Beck system, but he
found that they violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act,
after Matulis filed his Beck objection, by failing to in-
form Matulis that he had no financial obligations under
the union security clause and by thereafter collecting
working assessments from him.
The judge reached the same result with respect to Re-
spondent Local 4. Although he acknowledged that Local
4 may have had a valid Beck policy, the judge credited
the testimony of Matulis and found that after he filed his
Beck objection he received no notice or information
about his financial obligations and that dues were col-
lected from him on at least two occasions after he ob-
jected. Accordingly, the judge found that Local 4 vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
4 The Respondents concede that they spend dues and working as-
sessments on nonrepresentational activities, although District Council
16 asserts such expenditures are “de minimis.”
327 NLRB No. 180
PAINTERS (MEISWINKEL/RFJ, INC.) 1021
Finally, having found that it was unlawful to collect
any money from Matulis after his Beck objection, the
judge found it unnecessary to address the complaint alle-
gations that the Respondents unlawfully charged Matulis
for nonrepresentational activities and for representational
activities not attributable to his bargaining unit. For the
reasons explained below, we disagree with several of the
judge’s findings and conclusions.
Subsequent to the judge’s decision, the Board ad-
dressed a number of Beck-related issues in California
Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub
nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S.
813 (1998). There, as here, bargaining unit employees
were covered by a contractual union-security clause re-
quiring the payment of dues and fees as a condition of
employment. Interpreting and applying Beck, the Board
held that there was a statutory duty to inform nonmember
unit employees of their rights under Beck and that the
duty attaches “at the time the union first seeks to obli-
gate” them to pay dues pursuant to a union-security
clause. 320 NLRB at 233. Specifically, the Board held
that:

when or before a union seeks to obligate an employee
to pay fees and dues under a union-security clause, the
union should inform the employee that he has the right
to be or remain a nonmember and that nonmembers
have the right (1) to object to paying for union activities
not germane to the union’s duties as bargaining agent
and to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities; (2)
to be given sufficient information to enable the em-
ployee to intelligently decide whether to object; and (3)
to be apprised of any internal union procedures for fil-
ing objections. If the employee chooses to object, he
must be apprised of the percentage of the reduction, the
basis for the calculation, and the right to challenge
these figures. [ Id.]

The Board explained that these notice requirements
furnish significant protection to the interests of the indi-
vidual nonmember unit employee vis-a-vis Beck rights,
without compromising the countervailing collective in-
terests of bargaining unit employees in ensuring that
every unit employee contributes to the cost of collective
bargaining. The Board further emphasized in California
Saw that a union is afforded a wide range of reasonable-
ness under the duty of fair representation in satisfying its
notice obligation.5 “We stress that the union meets [its
notice] obligation as long as the union has taken reason-
able steps to insure that all employees whom the union
seeks to obligate to pay dues under a union-security
clause are given notice of their Beck rights.”6

5 Id. at 235.
6 Id. at 233.
We find that the Respondents failed to abide by the
foregoing requirements of California Saw.7 First, the
record shows that the Respondents failed to give Matulis
and other unit employees initial notice of their Beck
rights and, second, upon receipt of a Beck objection from
Matulis, they failed to provide him with information
about the percentage breakdown between representa-
tional and nonrepresentational expenditures, the basis for
the calculation, and the right to challenge these figures.
See e.g. Teamsters Local 443 (Connecticut Limousine
Service), 324 NLRB 633 (1997). They also continued to
charge him the full amount of dues and working assess-
ments, including amounts spent on unspecified nonrepre-
sentational activities. We find that by this conduct the
Respondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.8
Although we have found that the Respondents unlaw-
fully charged Matulis for nonrepresentational expenses,
we disagree with the judge’s conclusion that “absent a
sufficient ‘Beck’ system the collection of any dues what-
soever is impermissible and a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A).” The Board specifically rejected this notion
in Weyerheuser Paper, holding that notwithstanding the
unlawful failure of the union therein to inform employees
of their Beck rights, it was “still entitled to collect dues
for expenses related to representational activities” Id. at
350 fn. 4.9 The basis for this holding is that to deny a
union use of an employee’s dues to finance the costs of
performing its functions of a bargaining representative
would clearly defeat one of the essential goals of the
Act—to eliminate “free riders,” i.e., “employees who
receive the benefits of union representation but are un-
willing to contribute their fair share of financial support
to such union.”10 There is no question here that the Re-
7 In Paperworkers Local 1033 (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320
NLRB 349 (1995), enf. denied in part sub nom. Buzenius v. NLRB, 124
F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated 525 U.S. 979 (1998), a companion
case to California Saw, the Board held that a union’s initial Beck notice
obligations extended to all unit employees, including current union
members who did not receive notice at the time they entered the bar-
gaining unit.
8 In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondents continued to
collect full dues from Matulis after he filed an objection, we rely solely
on Matulis’ credited testimony. We do not rely on the adverse infer-
ence drawn by the judge from the failure of the Respondents to produce
subpoenaed financial records pertaining to employee payments of dues
and working assessments. Local 4 and District Council 8 assert that
they provided documents bearing on Matulis’ dues payments in a sub-
poena enforcement proceeding, yet the General Counsel did not intro-
duce them at the hearing. The General Counsel has not contested that
assertion. As those documents could have been introduced by either
the Respondents or the General Counsel, we find it inappropriate to
draw an inference adverse to any of the parties.
9 Accord: Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 117
F.R.D. 413, 415 fn. 1 (N.D.Ill. 1987) (holding on remand from the
United States Supreme Court that objectors are not entitled to complete
restitution of all fees paid under unconstitutional procedure; they could
only recover that portion of the fees used to support political causes to
which they objected).
10 Beck, 487 U.S. at 749–750, quoting Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1022
spondents negotiated the 1989–1993 collective-
bargaining contract on behalf of Matulis and incurred
expenses in carrying out this and other statutory func-
tions of benefit to Matulis. The costs of these and any
other functions which the Respondents can establish sat-
isfy the test of representational expenses under Beck are
lawfully chargeable to Matulis.
The foregoing analysis brings us to issues that the
judge’s analysis foreclosed; that is, what, specifically,
were the Respondents entitled to charge Matulis, after his
Beck objection, as expenses related to representational
activities? In this regard, the General Counsel contends
that the Respondents unlawfully charged Matulis for
political expenses, charitable contributions, and organiz-
ing expenses, and for expenses incurred by representa-
tional activities outside of Matulis’ bargaining unit.
For the reasons discussed below, the issues pertaining
to the chargeability of these expenses shall be severed
from the instant proceeding and remanded to the judge.
At the time this case was litigated, the Board had not
issued its decision in California Saw defining the Beck
obligations of unions in general or, specifically, the stan-
dard to be applied in determining the chargeability of
union expenditures. With respect to the latter, the Board
in California Saw held that the legality of charging ob-
jectors for a particular union expense depends on
“whether they are germane to the union’s role in collec-
tive bargaining, contract administration and grievance
adjustment.” 320 NLRB at 239. The Board further held
that a union does not act unlawfully by charging objec-
tors for representational expenses on other than a unit-
by-unit basis (id. at 237);11 nor does it act unlawfully “by
charging . . . for litigation expenses as long as the ex-
pense is for ‘services that may ultimately inure to the
benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of
their membership in the parent organization.’” Id. at
239, citing Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507,
524 (1991).
As for organizing expenses, the Board has yet to de-
cide the applicable standard by which to measure their
chargeability to objectors. In Connecticut Limousine
Service, supra, a Board majority identified several ques-
tions relevant to that determination including, for exam-
ple, whether the expenditures for organizing were neces-
sary to “preserve uniformity of labor standards in the
organized workforce” as asserted by the union therein
and “what kinds of employers, either in the Employer’s
specific industry or in competing industries, the Union
might attempt to organize in order to preserve uniform
labor standards.” 324 NLRB at 637.12

11 See also Communications Workers Local 9403 (Pacific Bell), 322
NLRB 142, 143–144 (1996), enfd. sub nom. Finerty v. NLRB, 113 F.3d
1288 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
12 The Board remanded these questions to an administrative law
judge for further record development and for issuance of a supplemen-
tal decision setting forth to what extent, if at all, organizing expenses
In the absence of this defining precedent at the time
that the instant dispute arose, we find it appropriate to
sever these chargeability issues from this proceeding and
remand them to the judge for further proceedings, includ-
ing, if necessary, a reopening of the hearing to adduce
additional evidence, and for the issuance of a supplemen-
tal decision containing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and a recommended Order. In deciding the charge-
ability of these expenses, the judge shall consider the
guidelines set forth by the Board in California Saw and
Connecticut Limousine.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents violated Section
8(b)(1)(A), we shall order them to cease and desist and
take certain affirmative action that will effectuate the
policies of the Act. In accordance with California Saw,
supra, we shall order the Respondents to notify all bar-
gaining unit employees of their rights under Beck and
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).13
The Beck notice shall contain sufficient information, for
each accounting period covered by the complaint to en-
able those employees to decide intelligently whether to
object. See, e.g., California Saw, 320 NLRB at 233. We
shall order the Respondents to notify in writing those
employees whom it initially sought to obligate to pay
dues or fees under the union-security clause on or after
October 8, 1992, of their right to elect nonmember status
and to make Beck objections with respect to one or more
of the accounting periods covered by the complaint.
With respect to any such employees who, with reason-
able promptness after receiving their notices, elect non-
member status and file Beck objections with respect to
any of those periods, we shall order the Respondents, in
the compliance stage of the proceeding, to process their
objections, nunc pro tunc, as it would otherwise have
done, in accordance with the principles of California
Saw. The Respondents shall then be required to reim-
burse these objecting nonmember employees for the re-
duction in their dues and fees, if any, for nonrepresenta-
tional activities that occurred during the accounting pe-
riod or periods covered by the complaint in which they
have objected.14 We shall further order the Respondents

are chargeable to objectors. However, subsequent to issuance of the
decision in Connecticut Limousine, the case was settled and, hence, no
supplemental judge’s decision will be forthcoming.
13 The General Counsel does not allege, as a separate violation, the
failure of the Respondents to notify unit employees of their General
Motors rights. As stated in California Saw, however, “Beck rights
accrue only to nonmembers. Thus, in order to fully inform nonmember
employees of their Beck rights, a union must tell them of this limitation
and must tell them of their General Motors right to be and remain
nonmembers.” 320 NLRB at fn. 57. Weyerhaeuser expressly extended
this concomitant notice obligation to all unit employees, including
“those who are still full union members and who did not receive those
notices before they became members.” 320 NLRB at 349.
14 Except with respect to the date set forth in this reimbursement
remedy, it is consistent in all respects with the remedy provided in
Teamsters Local 435 (Mercury Warehouse & Delivery Service), 327
PAINTERS (MEISWINKEL/RFJ, INC.) 1023
to provide Thomas Matulis, as a Beck objector, with the
financial information and additional notice of rights re-
quired by California Saw. Finally, we will order the
Respondents to reimburse Matulis for the dues collected
from him that are not germane to the Respondents’ rep-
resentational activities. Interest on the amount of propor-
tionate back dues and fees owed to objectors shall be
computed in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
following Respondent Unions, their officers, agents, and
representatives, cease and desist from the actions noted
below and take the affirmative actions set forth in full
below following their names.
A. District Council Nos. 8 and 16 of the International
Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO,
and Local 4 of the International Brotherhood of Painters
and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to notify unit employees, when they first
seek to obligate them to pay fees and dues under a union-
security clause, of their right to be and remain nonmem-
bers; and of the right of nonmembers under Communica-
tions Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to
paying for union activities not germane to the Unions’
duties as bargaining agents, and to obtain a reduction in
fees for such activities.
(b) Failing to provide unit employees who have filed a
Beck objection with information about the percentage of
the reduction in dues and fees charged to Beck objectors,
the basis for that calculation, and the right to challenge
these figures.
(c) Charging employees for nonrepresentational ac-
tivities after they have filed a Beck objection.
(d) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Notify all unit employees in writing who have
been obligated to pay dues and fees under the union-
security clause of their right to be or remain nonmem-
bers; and of the rights of nonmembers under Communi-
cations Workers v. Beck, supra, to object to paying for
union activities not germane to the Unions’ duties as

NLRB No. 87 fn. 16 (1999), and Association for Retarded Citizens
Employees Union (Opportunities Unlimited of Niagara), 327 NLRB
No. 88 fn. 14 (1999). In those cases, the complaint allegations were
specific as to dates subsequent to commencement of the 10(b) period
when employees, without being informed of their Beck rights, were
subjected to applicable union-security clauses. Accordingly, the com-
mencement date of the reimbursement remedy was tied to those post-
10(b) period specific dates. Here, by contrast, the complaint generally
alleges that “at no material time” have the Respondents provided notice
of Beck rights and, therefore, the reimbursement remedy is appropri-
ately dated from commencement of the 10(b) period—October 8, 1992.
bargaining agents, and to obtain a reduction in fees for
such activities.
(b) For each accounting period since October 8, 1992,
provide Thomas Matulis and other unit employees who
file a Beck objection with information about the percent-
age of the reduction in dues and fees charged to Beck
objectors, the basis for that calculation, and the right to
challenge these figures.
(c) Notify in writing those employees whom the Re-
spondents initially sought to obligate to pay dues or fees
under the union-security clause on or after October 8,
1992, of their right to elect nonmember status and to
make Beck objections with respect to one or more of the
accounting periods covered by the complaint.
(d) With respect to any employees who, with reason-
able promptness after receiving the notices prescribed in
paragraph 2(c), elect nonmember status and file Beck
objections, process their objections in the manner set
forth in the amended remedy.
(e) Reimburse, with interest, Thomas Matulis, and
other unit employees who file objections for any dues
and fees exacted from them for nonrepresentational ac-
tivities in the manner set forth in the amended remedy
section.
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all records necessary to analyze the amount of
back dues to be paid Matulis.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region post at
its business offices and meeting halls copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix A.”15 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 20 in English and such additional languages as
the Regional Director determines are necessary to fully
communicate with employees, after being signed by the
Respondents’ authorized representatives, shall be posted
by the Respondents immediately upon receipt and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to en-
sure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(h) Sign and return to the Regional Director copies of
the notice for posting by employers, if willing, who are
signatory to the collective bargaining agreement with the
Respondents at all places on their premises where notices
to employees are customarily posted.
(i) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
15 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1024
testing to the steps that the Respondents have taken to
comply.
B. Local 4 of the International Brotherhood of Painters
and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to acknowledge Thomas Matulis’ resig-
nation from union membership
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of their rights protected by
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Acknowledge in writing Thomas Matulis’ resigna-
tion from union membership.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region post at
its business office and meeting hall copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix B.”16 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20
in English and such additional languages as the Regional
Director determines are necessary to fully communicate
with employees, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representatives, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(c) Sign and return to the Regional Director copies of
the notice for posting by employers, if willing, who are
signatory to the collective-bargaining agreement with the
Respondents at all places on their premises where notices
to employees are customarily posted.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint alle-
gations pertaining to the chargeability of certain union
expenses to Beck objectors are severed from this pro-
ceeding and remanded to the judge for further proceed-
ings consistent with this Decision and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for those issues pre-
sented to the judge, he shall prepare and serve on the
parties a supplemental decision containing credibility
resolutions, findings of facts, conclusions of law, and
recommendations to the Board. Following service of the
supplemental decision on the parties, the provisions of
Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations
shall apply.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

16 See fn. 15, above.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT fail to notify unit employees, when we
first seek to obligate them to pay dues and fees under a
union-security clause, of their right to be and remain
nonmembers; and of the rights of nonmembers under
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988),
to object to paying for union activities not germane to the
Unions’ duties as bargaining agents, and to obtain a re-
duction in fees for such activities.
WE WILL NOT fail to provide unit employees who
have filed a Beck objection with information about the
percentage of the reduction in dues and fees charged to
Beck objectors, the basis for that calculation, and the
right to challenge these figures.
WE WILL NOT charge employees for nonrepresenta-
tional activities after they have filed a Beck objection.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL notify all unit employees in writing of their
rights to be or remain nonmembers; and of the rights of
nonmembers under Communications Workers v. Beck,
supra, to object to paying for union activities not ger-
mane to the Unions’ duties as bargaining agents, and to
obtain a reduction in fees for such activities.
WE WILL notify in writing those employees whom we
initially sought to obligate to pay dues or fees under the
union-security clause of their right to elect nonmember
status and to make Beck objections with respect to one or
more of the accounting periods covered by the com-
plaint.
WE WILL process the Beck objections of any employ-
ees whom we initially sought to obligate to pay dues or
fees under the union-security clause on or after October
8, 1992, who elect nonmember status and file such objec-
tions with reasonable promptness after receiving notice
of their right to object.
WE WILL, for each accounting period since October 8,
1992, provide Thomas Matulis and other unit employees
who file a Beck objection with information about the
percentage of the reduction in dues and fees charged to
PAINTERS (MEISWINKEL/RFJ, INC.) 1025
Beck objectors, the basis for that calculation, and the
right to challenge these figures.
WE WILL reimburse, with interest, Thomas Matulis
and other unit employees who file objections for any fees
exacted from them for nonrepresentational activities for
each accounting period since October 8, 1992.

LOCAL 4 OF THE INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS & ALLIED
TRADES, AFL–CIO
DISTRICT COUNCILS 8 AND 16 OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS
& ALLIED TRADES,
AFL–CIO

APPENDIX B

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to acknowledge Thomas Matu-
lis’ resignation from union membership.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL acknowledge in writing Thomas Matulis’
resignation from union membership.

LOCAL 4 OF THE INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED
TRADES, AFL–CIO

Jonathan J. Seagle, Kathleen C. Sneider and Ivan Rodriguez,
Esqs., for the General Counsel.
James E. Eggleston, Esq. (Eggleston, Siegel & Le Witter), of
Oakland, California, for Respondent Local 4 and District
Council 8.
David A. Rosenfeld, Esq. (Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger & Ro-
senfeld), of Oakland, California, for Respondent District
Council 16 and Respondent District Council 33
Thomas Matulis, pro se.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard the above-captioned case in trial on February 14 and 15,
1995, in San Francisco, California. Posthearing briefs were
submitted on March 21, 1995.
The matter arose as follows. On April 7, 1993, Thomas
Matulis, an individual, filed a charge with Region 20 of the
National Labor Relations Board docketed as Case 20–CA–9268
against District Council Nos. 8, 16, and 33 of the International
Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO (Re-
spondent District Council 8, Respondent District Council 16,
Respondent District Council 33 sometimes collectively Re-
spondent District Councils) and Local 4 of the International
Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO (Re-
spondent Local 4 and, collectively with Respondent District
Councils, Respondents or the Unions). The Regional Director
for Region 20 issued a complaint respecting the charge on May
21, 1993. The matter came on for trial before Administrative
Law Judge George M. Christensen on March 9, 1994 and, after
a day of hearings, was indefinitely postponed pending resolu-
tion of certain matters.
On October 21, 1994, Deputy Chief Administrative Law
Judge Earldean V. S. Robbins issued an order reassigning the
matter from Judge Christensen to me. On October 31, 1994, I
issued an order ruling on motions and notice of reconvened
hearing scheduling the matter for reopening on February 14,
1994.
The complaint alleges and the answers of Respondents deny
that the Unions, in various ways since on and after March 29,
1993, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act) by failing to accord the Charging Party the
procedural and substantive rights required by the Supreme
Court in its decision in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735 (1988).
All parties were given full opportunity to participate at the
hearing, to introduce relevant evidence, to call, examine, and
cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file post-
hearing briefs. On the entire record here, including helpful
briefs from the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the
Respondents,1 and from my observation of the witnesses2 and
their demeanor, I make the following.3
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. The filing and service of the charge
The complaint alleges the charge was filed on April 7, 1993,
and served on the Respondents on April 8, 1993. The answer
of Respondent District Council 8 and Respondent Local 4 ad-
mits the filing of the charge as alleged and the service of the
charge on them “some time after.” The answer of Respondents

1 Respondent District Council 16’s brief contains ad hominem ref-
erences to the Charging Party which are impertinent and pernicious and
therefore will be stricken.
2 By agreement of the parties, the matters placed in evidence in the
hearing before Judge Christensen were not retried de novo before me,
but rather were simply incorporated into the record.
3 As a result of the pleadings and the stipulations of the parties at the
trial, there were few disputes of fact regarding collateral matters.
Where not otherwise noted, the findings here are based on the plead-
ings, the stipulations of counsel, or unchallenged credible evidence.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1026
District 16 and District 33 denies both the filing and the ser-
vice.
In evidence are both a charge bearing the regional date stamp
and docket date entry of April 7, 1993, and an affidavit of ser-
vice of the charge indicating service on District Council 8 and
Local 4 by means of prepaid certified mail deposited in the mail
on April 8, 1993.
At the March 9, 1994, hearing before Judge Christensen,
counsel for District Councils 16 and 33 argued and the General
Counsel conceded that service was not accomplished on Dis-
trict Councils 16 and 33 until November 1993 admittedly after
the 6-month period following the filing of the charge.
I find that the charge was filed on April 7, 1993, and was
served on Local 4 and District Council 8 on or about April 12,
1993. I further find that neither District Council 16 nor 33 was
physically served with a copy of the charge within 6 months of
its filing.
II. JURISDICTION
Northern California Drywall Contractors Association (the
Association) is an organization composed of various employ-
ers, including Meiswinkle/RFJ, Inc., which represents its em-
ployer-members in negotiating and administering collective-
bargaining contracts with various labor organizations including
the Respondents. At all relevant times the constituent em-
ployer-members of the Association during the course and con-
duct of their business operations have annually purchased and
received at their California facilities goods and materials valued
in the aggregate in excess of $50,000 directly from points out-
side the state of California.
I find that the employer-members of the Association, includ-
ing Meiswinkle/RFJ, Inc., are employers engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
III. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
The Respondents, and each of them, at all times relevant to
these proceedings, have been and are now,4 labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
IV. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
District Councils 8, 16, and 33 have had a longstanding col-
lective-bargaining relationship with the Association on behalf
of its employer-members. The General Counsel entered into
evidence a collective-bargaining agreement between District
Councils 8, 16, and 33 and the Association that was effective
by its terms from 1989 through July 31, 1993, and covered
painting and drywall employees (the contract).

The contract includes the following language:

Article 6: Employees and Hiring Practices Section 8

Any workmen employed by the employers for a period of
thirty days. . . . shall as a condition of employment become
members of the Union by tendering full and uniform initiation
fees in effect, and all workmen accepted into membership
thereafter shall maintain their continuous good standing in the
Union as a condition of employment by paying regular dues.
In the event that a workman fails to tender the required fee or

4 Respondent District Council 33 merged into District Council 16 in
1994 after the issuance of the complaint and is no longer an existing,
independent entity.
dues in accordance with the section, the Union shall notify the
Employer in writing, and the Employer shall discharge the
workman within forty-eight hours.

The contract also contains dues-checkoff provisions. Other
employers have adopted the terms of the contract and other
contracts entered into by the District Councils with other em-
ployers cover classifications other than tapers including, for
example, painters.
There is no dispute that the District Councils engaged in col-
lective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance ad-
justment on behalf of Association member-employer’s employ-
ees covered by the contract. The District Councils also re-
ceived working assessments at relevant times of 50 cents per
employee working hour. These working assessment moneys are
deducted by the employers from employee paychecks and sent
via trust fund intermediaries to the District Councils in whose
jurisdiction each employee undertook his or her employment
during the applicable period.5 Union membership is held in
local unions which are members of the respective District
Councils. The constituent local unions of the District Councils,
including Local 4 within District Council 8, receive member-
ship initiation fees and periodic dues from employees covered
by the contract’s union-security provisions.
B. Events Respecting Thomas Matulis
Thomas Matulis had been a member of Respondent Local 4
and worked under the contract. On March 29, 1993, Matulis
resigned his union membership, asserted “Beck” rights under
that designation, expressed willingness to pay only moneys
expended in representing him, and sought an accounting of
moneys expended by the District Councils.6
The record is confused respecting Thomas Matulis’ work
history regarding what geographic areas he worked in at par-
ticular times, whether or not he had signed dues-checkoff au-
thorizations for the District Councils and to what extent moneys
were either deducted from his paycheck and/or paid by em-
ployers to District Councils through their trust payments.
At the time of his resignation on March 29, 1993, Matulis
was employed by Meiswinkel/RFJ, which is a San Francisco
based painting contractor. He testified to working in San
Mateo County, the City of Oakland, Alameda County, and in
the city and county of San Francisco following his resignation.
He testified that dues were taken out of his paychecks respect-
ing District Council payments without specificity. Respecting
Local 4 dues, it appears that Local 4 consistently refused to
accept dues from Matulis after his resignation save in one dis-
puted instance in 1994. In that case the Union’s agent, Rodney
Reclus, testified money was received not as dues but as a vol-
5 District Council 8 includes the California counties of San Fran-
cisco, Lake, Marin, Mendocino, and Sonoma. District Council 16
covered the counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, El Dorado, Napa,
Placer, Sacramento, Sierra, Solano, and Yolo prior to its merger with
District 33. District 33 prior to its subsumption into District 16 in-
cluded counties Monterey, San Benito, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and
Santa Cruz. Respondent Local 4 is located in San Francisco and is a
member of District Council 8.
6 In so doing Matulis made it clear to the Respondents that he was
objecting to paying any amount to the Respondents in excess of mon-
eys spent by the Respondents on representational expenses. Matulis
and others who take similar positions are referred to on occasion in this
decision as objectors
PAINTERS (MEISWINKEL/RFJ, INC.) 1027
untary payment to the Union and has been held in escrow to
date pending the resolution of this case.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Matters concerning District Councils 16 and 337
a. The issue of the service of the charge
Respondent District Councils 16 and 33 argue that the lack
of timely service of the charge upon them requires dismissal of
the complaint as to them. The same argument was advanced to
Judge Christensen during the period he was presiding over the
case and was opposed by the General Counsel. Judge Christen-
sen denied the motion by Order dated April 5, 1994. There is
no evidence the order was appealed to the Board. The Order
held, in essence, that the timely service on District Council 8
constituted service on all identified collective-bargaining repre-
sentatives of employees under the contract including District
Council 16 and District Council 33 citing, inter alia, The Ore-
gon, Southern Idaho and Wyoming District Council of Labor-
ers, 243 NLRB 405 (1979); Electrical Workers IUE (Spartus
Corp. ) 271 NLRB 607 (1984).
Judge Christensen’s analysis was cogent and his cases on
point. No arguments presented on brief undermine his holding.
I specifically adopt Judge Christensen’s April 5, 1994 order.
Accordingly I also find Respondent District Councils 16 and 33
were timely served by means of the service of the charge on
District Council 8 as found, supra.
b. The Beck allegations: the failure to maintain a Beck policy
as a per se violation of the Act
The complaint alleges at paragraph 9(f) that the Respon-
dents, including District Councils 16 and 33, at no relevant time
either had in place or applied to Matulis or any other unit em-
ployee:

a “Beck” system to apprise and allow Unit employees to exer-
cise the rights accorded them under CWA v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735 (1988). . . .

The complaint at subparagraphs 11(b), in part, and 11(c) and
(d) similarly allege that the Unions failed to provide Matulis
various procedural rights required of labor organizations by the
Court in Beck.
District Councils 16 and 33 have never had a procedure of
any kind respecting dues objectors.
Rejecting the primary assumption of the complaint as well as
the specific allegations noted above, I find that there is no obli-
gation in law, the Act, or the doctrine of fair representation as
enunciated by the Board and the courts that a labor organization
subject to the provisions of the Act must have a Beck policy in
place, if the union has entered into a contract or contracts with
an employer or employers containing union security. More
particularly, I find that a labor organization does not, by that
fact alone, violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Since I con-
strue complaint allegation 9(f) and the noted subsections of
complaint paragraph 11 in the context of paragraph 9 and the
remainder of the complaint to be no more than such an allega-
tion in differing degrees of detail, I shall dismiss each of the
noted allegations as to District Councils 16 and 33.

7 District Council 33 had been merged into District Council 16. The
merger and the contract, see further discussion immediately below, is
sufficient in my view to hold District 16 liable for the acts and conduct
of District Council 33.
It is important to understand the theoretical foundation on
which this conclusion rests. The General Counsel’s complaint
and, to a certain extent, the arguments of the parties on brief
deal with the sufficiency of a procedural mechanism for dealing
with dues objectors under union-security clauses—a Beck pol-
icy—as a free standing or independent matter respecting which
the Act may be violated. Thus, the General Counsel contends
that, if a labor organization has a union-security clause in a
contract under the jurisdiction of the Act and has no valid Beck
policy, Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act is violated. This is the
theory underlying complaint subparagraph 9(f) quoted above.
I view the entire set of issues respecting Beck procedural re-
quirements as properly analyzed in the context of a labor or-
ganization’s defense to allegations that employees were not
fairly represented in a unit covered by a union-security clause.
Thus, if a union has and applies a valid Beck policy respecting
objectors, certain actions consistent with that policy may not
violate the Act whereas the same conduct, not in conformity
with a valid Beck policy, may violate the union’s duty of fair
representation.
As discussed below, a current, valid Beck policy may be a
necessary precondition to enforcing or even attempting to en-
force union-security obligations by a labor organization. Other
rights and obligations of both unions and employees may be
effected by the existence of a valid Beck policy. If violations of
the Act are to be found within regard to such actions and con-
duct however, it is the union’s dealings with the unit members
regarding union-security obligations which violate the Act not
the conceptually different proposition that the union did not
have or did not follow a particular policy approved by Beck.
c. The allegation that District Councils 33 and 16 did not ac-
knowledge Matulis’ resignation from membership in Local 4 or
recognize him as a Beck objector
Complaint subparagraph 11(a) alleges the Respondents
failed to grant and/or acknowledge Matulis’ request to resign
from membership in Local 4. Complaint subparagraph 11(b)
alleges the Respondents failed and refused to recognize and
treat Matulis as a Beck objector.
Counsel for Respondent District Councils 33 and 16 argued
at trial that only Local 4 had any obligation whatsoever to deal
with Matulis concerning his membership in Local 4. I agree as
to the narrow issue of membership as opposed to matters con-
cerning union-security payments which are elsewhere ad-
dressed here. I shall therefore dismiss paragraph 11(a) as to
District Councils 33 and 16. I have earlier dismissed the por-
tion of complaint subparagraph 11(b) that alleged the Unions’
failure to have a Beck procedure as a freestanding violation of
the Act.
Complaint subparagraphs 11(a) and (b) also put in issue, in
my view, the District Councils’ obligations as beneficiaries,
under the union-security language of the contract, of union-
security payments deducted from employees wages. This is so
because when the District Councils learned of Matulis’ resigna-
tion, they were also put on notice that he was a dues objector.
I find that all Unions signatory to the contract, which did not
have a valid Beck system in place, violate the rights of objec-
tors if they fail to inform objectors, immediately on learning
that particular employees are objectors, that the union-security
provisions of the contract will not be applied to them in any
manner whatsoever and will not in future be applied to them,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1028
unless and until a valid Beck system is established and put into
operation.
Objectors who are working under a contract with union-
security provisions—and employees like Matulis who may be
assigned work within the jurisdiction of any of the signatory
District Councils are such employees irrespective of whether or
not they have in fact actually worked in a particular District
Council’s jurisdiction, must be timely informed by all signatory
unions that the union-security provisions of the contract do not
apply to them and will not be applied unless and until a valid
Beck system is put in place.
As discussed supra, a union has no obligation to have a Beck
system. If it does not however, it must make clear to objectors
that the union-security provisions of all the union’s contracts do
not apply to such objectors because no Beck system is main-
tained by the union. This is an affirmative obligation on the
part of the union arising out of the fact that it has entered into a
contract with union-security provisions and does not have a
Beck system in place. Since objectors have no obligation to
pay any moneys to the union in the absence of a Beck proce-
dure, and the language of the union-security clause does not
fully inform them of this fact, the union as to objectors has
created a situation where the objector employees it represents
are not fully informed of their rights and obligations under the
contract. In such a situation the Board explicitly requires a
union under its duty of fair representation to immediately and
completely inform them of their rights. Electrical Workers IUE
Local 444 (Paramax Systems), 311 NLRB 1031 (1993).8
Since there is no question that the District Councils did not
notify Matulis upon learning of his objector status, that the
union-security clause of the contract—insofar as it compelled
employee union-security payments to District Councils—would
not be applicable to him, each District Council failed in its duty
of fair representation and therefore violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act. To this extent complaint subparagraph 11(a) and (b)
are sustained.
d. The Unions’ alleged wrongful collection of Matulis’
union-security payments
The complaint alleges at subparagraph 11(e) that the Re-
spondents, including District Councils 16 and 33, collected full
union-security fees from Matulis which, as further alleged at
complaint subparagraph 11(f), included charges for non-
representational expenditures.
The District Councils argue however that there is no evi-
dence that Matulis or, for that matter, anyone else who objected
to the payment of dues, ever worked under the contract in their
jurisdiction and/or had District Council dues deducted from his
or her paycheck and remitted to the District Councils.

8 Paramax addressed a union’s failure to inform employees that the
union-security clause which facially required them to become and
remain “members of the Union in good standing” as a matter of law
required only, under the Supreme Court’s holding in NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), the tender of dues and initiation
fees without any obligation to join the union. The union-security clause
in the instant case makes it clear that employees need only pay dues
and initiation fees to the Union, not join it, in order to satisfy the union-
security obligation. The fact that dues objectors who have made their
views known to the Union have no obligation to pay anything at all, if
the Union has no objector fee determination mechanism, is the ambigu-
ous aspect of objecting employee rights under the contract requiring
full union explanation in the instant case.
On this record, I reject the factual contention that no deduc-
tions were made from Matulis’ paycheck and remitted to the
District Councils for two reasons. First, even if confused and
imprecise, Matulis did testify to having District Council dues
taken from his paycheck and further testified to having worked
within the jurisdiction of District Council 16. Thus there is
testimony that such deductions occurred. Second, Respondents
could have introduced their business and financial records re-
specting Matulis as a dues payer during relevant periods and
chose not to do so. I draw an adverse inference respecting this
fact. Thus, I find that at relevant periods District Council 16
received, even if unknowingly, funds deducted from Matulis
wages after he had notified Respondents of his resignation and
objector status.
This factual finding ripens the issue previously rejected in an
isolated context, supra. If a union receives union-security pay-
ments from an objector, the receipt must be consistent with a
properly applied Beck objector policy. The law is clear that,
absent a sufficient “Beck” system, the collection of any dues
whatsoever is impermissible and a violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. I find therefore that District Council 16
and District Council 33 each violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act when they received moneys collected from Matulis as a
known dues objector under the compulsion of the union-
security clause of the contract.
I therefore sustain subparagraph 11(e) of the complaint as to
District Councils 16 and 33 to the extent it alleges that the Re-
spondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) in continuing to collect
dues without having a valid Beck system in place.
Complaint subparagraph 11(e) alleges that the Respondents
collected “full” dues from Matulis and complaint subparagraph
11(f) alleges that the collected dues were expended by the Un-
ions in part on nonrepresentational matters. Again, I find the
allegations to be theoretically unsound and an improper admix-
ture of elements of a Beck defense with elements of a prima
facie case of improper fee collection. If a valid Beck objector
policy is not in place and properly applied to a particular objec-
tor, any collection of union security compelled payments of any
amount is a violation of the Act irrespective of whether the
compelled payments are: (1) full dues or some other lesser
amount or (2) in what manner or for what purpose the labor
organization expended the moneys received.9 The issues of the
amount of fees compelled and the use of those fees are relevant
only to a Beck defense which is not at issue here. This being
so, the addition aspect of complaint paragraph 11(e) alleging
“full” dues and complaint subparagraph 11(f) do not allege
facts material to the finding of a violation of the Act on this
record. I shall therefore not address them further.
e. Summary of findings and conclusions respecting
District Councils 16 and 33
Respecting a preliminary matter, I found that the charge was
not in fact served on District Council 16 or District Council 33
within the 6 months following its filing. I further found how-
ever, that as a result of the joint responsibility of the District
Councils for the collective-bargaining agreement, the timely
9 There are situations where the amount of the payments deducted or
the representational or nonrepresentational nature of the union’s expen-
ditures are relevant to determine if a particular objector policy is valid
or if a particular policy is, in fact, being properly applied to a particular
objector. On the facts of the instant case, however, the District Coun-
cils had no such policy.
PAINTERS (MEISWINKEL/RFJ, INC.) 1029
service on District Council 8 was sufficient service on District
Councils 16 and 33 as well.
Although there was no question that District Councils 16 and
33 were at all times without any policy for establishing union-
security payment amounts for dues objectors as delineated in
the Supreme Court’s decision in Beck, I found that there is no
obligation on the part of a labor organization to maintain such a
policy. I therefore dismissed the General Counsel’s complaint
allegations in that regard in subparagraphs 9(f), a portion of
11(b), (c), (d), and aspects of (e) and (f).
There is no doubt that the District Councils did not respond
to Matulis when informed that he was resigning his member-
ship in Local 4 and objecting to the payment of union security
obligated fees expended by the Unions for nonrepresentational
activities. I found that District Councils 16 and 33 had no obli-
gation to deal with Matulis respecting his membership in Local
4, but were required, on learning of his dues objector status, to
inform him that he had no obligation under the contract’s un-
ion-security provisions to pay any money to the District Coun-
cils and would not have such an obligation unless and until a
valid policy for determining dues objector fee amounts were
applied to him.
Accordingly I found no merit to the General Counsel’s alle-
gation in complaint subparagraph 11(a) that the District Coun-
cils wrongfully failed to communicate with Matulis respecting
his union membership and shall dismiss that allegation. I found
merit to the General Counsel’s allegation in subparagraph 11(b)
that the District Councils violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
when they wrongfully failed to inform Matulis, on learning of
his dues objector status, that he had no obligation under the
contract union-security provisions to pay any money to the
District Councils and would not have such an obligation unless
and until a valid policy for determining dues objector fee
amounts were applied to him.
I found that the District Councils wrongfully caused dues
deductions to be made from Matulis’ wages and remitted to the
District Councils in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
and therefore sustained the portion of the General Counsel’s
complaint subparagraph 11(e) alleging that violation. I further
found that such a violation existed irrespective of whether the
amount withheld from Matulis was “full” dues or whether or
not the Unions did or did not spend moneys for non-
representational matters. Thus I did not find merit to these
additional contentions in complaint subparagraphs 11(e) and
(f).
2. Matters concerning Local 4 and District Council 810
a. The contention that the union-security clause was never
applied to Matulis after his resignation from Local 4 and noti-
fication to the Unions that he was a dues objector
An initial contention of District 8 and Local 4 is that neither
labor organization at any time after Matulis’ resignation sought
nor collected dues from Matulis and thus no union-security
obligation was ever in force at relevant times. I reject this de-

10 While certain of the contentions respecting District Council 8 and
Local 4 as opposed to District Councils 16 and 33 differed, the bulk of
the allegations addressed all the Respondents and the factual situations
presented were identical. In those similar situations the full analysis
and consideration set forth, infra, as to District Councils 16 and 33 is
not repeated in complete detail as to District Council 8 and Local 4.
Full and equal consideration of the allegations and arguments of the
parties occurred, however, as to each allegation and each Respondent.
fense on two grounds. First, neither District 8 nor Local 4, on
this record, made it clear to Matulis that he had no obligations
under the union-security provisions of the contract to pay funds
to the Unions. Simply put, there is no evidence that Matulis
and the Unions had reached some common, unambiguous un-
derstanding after his resignation that he would have not union-
security obligations under the contract.
Second, I find that District 8 has not met the affirmative tes-
timony of Matulis that he had District Council dues deducted
from his paycheck after his resignation from the Union. I draw
the same adverse inference as to District Council 8 that I did as
to District 16, supra. District Council 8 could have introduced
records of dues payments made on behalf of Matulis, but did
not do so. As to Local 4, it is clear that on at least one occasion
moneys were paid by Matulis and received by Local 4. Local
4’s agent Rodney Reclus testified the moneys were retained by
Local 4 in escrow to await the outcome of this proceeding.
This means the moneys were taken and/or retained under a
continuing, if conditional, claim of right. I find this is suffi-
cient without further resolution of the conflicting versions of
events to rebut any suggestion that Local 4 made it clear to
Matulis that the union-security provisions of the contract did
not apply to him and that he had no obligation to pay whatso-
ever.
b. The complaint allegations respecting District
Council 8 and Local 4
As discussed in greater detail under the Section of this deci-
sion dealing with matters concerning District Council 16 and
District Council 33, the General Counsel has made a variety of
allegations that the Respondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act because of their absent or invalid Beck dues objector
policies. Even though District Council 16 and District Council
33 had no Beck policy at all at relevant times, I dismissed all
these allegations as to them because I found there is simply no
obligation for a union to have a Beck policy and therefore the
Act is not violated when one does not exist or exists but is in
some way inadequate.
Accordingly, based on the analysis concerning the noted al-
legations of the complaint respecting District Councils 16 and
33, supra, I shall dismiss the following sections of the com-
plaint as to District Council 8 and Local 4: complaint subpara-
graph 9(f), the portion of 11(b) dealing with a Beck policy,
11(c), 11(d), and the aspects of complaint subparagraphs 11(e)
and (f) dealing with the contention that “full” dues were paid
and contention as to the representational or non-
representational nature of the Unions’ expenditures.
Further, as noted above, I find that unions must immediately
inform objecting employees employed in units covered by un-
ion-security provisions either of the valid Beck provisions
maintained by the labor organization or, in the alternative when
no such valid provisions exist or are disclosed and applied, that
the union-security provisions of the contract will not be applied
in any manner to the objector and therefore he or she need not
pay anything under them. Having found that District Council 8
and Local 4 were obligated to but did not explicitly inform
Matulis on learning of his resignation and dues objector status,
either that he did not have to pay any union-security obligation
moneys whatsoever to the Unions or that it was applying a
valid Beck dues objector policy to him, I further find they each
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Electrical Workers IUE
Local 444 (Paramax Systems), supra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1030
Accordingly, I sustain the General Counsel’s complaint sub-
paragraph 11(a) as to Local 4 respecting its failure to acknowl-
edge Matulis’ resignation and sustain complaint subparagraph
11(b) as to its failure to inform him of his rights as a dues ob-
jector. For the reasons noted supra, I shall dismiss subpara-
graph 11(a) as to District 8. I sustain complaint paragraph
11(b) as to District Council 8 for its failure to inform him of his
rights as a dues objector.
Further, having found that District Council 8 and Local 4 re-
ceived union-security payments from Matulis after he notified
them of his resignation from Local 4 and his dues objector
status, I find that both District Council 8 and Local 4 violated
their duty of fair representation to Matulis and in so doing vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Thus, I sustain the General
Counsel’s complaint allegations in subparagraph 11(e) dealing
with union-security moneys without further characterization as
“full.”
c. The relevance of Beck to the decision here
The parties litigated whether or not Local 4’s policy respect-
ing objectors was in place at relevant times and whether or not
it met the requirements of Beck and subsequent cases. I find
these issues are simply not ripe for decision on the facts of this
case. First, as discussed, supra, I have rejected the General
Counsel’s contention that a union must have a valid Beck pro-
cedure in place to avoid violating the Act. Given this threshold
conclusion, there is no need to test the validity of any given
Beck policy unless it is otherwise relevant to the remaining
allegations of the complaint.
Second, I have declined to resolve the issue of whether or
not the Unions in fact charged Matulis “full” as opposed to
some other type of dues and declined to determine whether or
not the Unions undertook expenditures for nonrepresentational
expenses. Neither contention, even if true, is relevant to the
violations found because no Union contended its Beck policy, if
any, had ever been applied to Matulis or any other employee.
There is only one objector at issue in this case on this record:
Matulis. There is no dispute that the Beck program of Local 4,
was ever applied to Matulis. Thus, valid or not, the Local 4
Beck program may not constitute a defense to any collection of
dues from Matulis by any Respondent nor may it constitute a
defense to Respondent’s wrongful failure, as found above, to
notify him that the union-security provisions of the contract
simply did not apply to him.
d. Summary of findings and conclusions respecting
District Council 8 and Local 4
With the exception of the responsibility I have found on Lo-
cal 4’s part to acknowledge the resignation of Matulis and for
the same reasons as set forth in the section of this decision con-
cerning them, my findings regarding the allegations of the
complaint against Local 4 and District Council 8 parallel those
made supra as to District Councils 16 and 33.
Thus, I found that there is no obligation on the part of a labor
organization to maintain a valid Beck policy. I therefore dis-
missed the General Counsel’s complaint allegations in that
regard in subparagraphs 9(f), a portion of 11(b), 11(c), 11(d),
and aspects of 11(e) and (f) without determining if Local 4’s
policy was sufficient under Beck or if it was in place at relevant
times.
I found that District Council 8 had no obligation to deal with
Matulis respecting his membership in Local 4. Accordingly I
found no merit to that portion of complaint subparagraph 11(a)
that that alleges District Council 8 wrongfully failed to com-
municate with Matulis respecting his union membership and
shall dismiss that allegation. I found merit to subparagraph
11(b) that the District Council 8 and Local 4 violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when they wrongfully failed to inform
Matulis, on learning of his dues objector status, that he had no
obligation under the contract union-security provisions to pay
any money to the Unions and would not have such an obliga-
tion unless and until a valid policy for determining dues objec-
tor fee amounts were applied to him. In this context I found
that Local 4 also violated the Act as alleged in subparagraph
11(a) in failing to acknowledge Matulis’ resignation by provid-
ing him with this information.
I found that the District Council 8 wrongfully caused dues
deductions to be taken from Matulis’ wages and remitted to the
District Council. I also found that Local 4 received and held
moneys from Matulis under claim of right, at a time when
Matulis was not properly under any valid compulsion under the
union-security provisions of the contract to pay such moneys.
In so acting District Council 8 and Local 4 were each in viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. I therefore sustained the
portion of the General Counsel’s complaint subparagraph 11(e)
alleging that violation. I further found that such a violation
existed irrespective of whether the moneys withheld from
Matulis were “full” dues or whether or not the Union’s did or
did not spend moneys for nonrepresentational matters. Thus I
did not find merit to these additional contentions in complaint
subparagraphs 11(e) and 11(f).
3. Final summary and conclusions
The General Counsel’s complaint alleged at paragraph 9(f)
that Respondents violated the Act in having no valid Beck pol-
icy, I found as a matter of law that no labor organization need
have such a policy and that it is not a violation of the Act for a
union to be without such a policy. I therefore dismissed com-
plaint subparagraphs 9(f), a portion of 11(b), 11(c), and 11(d)
as to all the Respondents.
Rather I found that the relevance of such a Beck policy is
that, absent a valid policy which provides procedural mecha-
nisms for the calculation of a proper fee amount for objectors, a
union may neither enforce a union-security provision against
objectors nor create the impression—through other than full
and immediate disclosure of the fact of the absence of a legal
obligation of any declared objector to pay—among objectors
that the union-security provisions would or could apply to such
persons at all. I concluded that, if a union seeks to collect
money from objectors pursuant to the compulsions of a union-
security clause, it must have a valid Beck policy and must prop-
erly and timely inform objectors of that fact. If there is no such
valid Beck policy, the union may not compel objectors, either
through affirmative collection efforts or through inaction and
failure to disclose to objecting employees their rights, to satisfy
union-security obligations irrespective of whether or not the
Union spends collected dues and fees on nonrepresentational
expenses.
I have further found that Respondents, and each of them,
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing to affirma-
tively inform Matulis, immediately on learning of his objector
status, that the union-security provisions of the collective-
bargaining contract would not apply to him and that he would
have no obligation whatsoever to pay dues or initiation fees
directly or by means of checkoff unless and until Respondents
applied the terms of a valid Beck policy to him. I therefore
PAINTERS (MEISWINKEL/RFJ, INC.) 1031
sustained complaint subparagraph 11(b) to the extent it alleges
the Unions failed to properly inform Matulis of his rights once
he had indicated he was an objector.
I found the Unions received funds directly or indirectly from
Matulis following his resignation and announcement of objec-
tor status at a time when he was under no union-security obliga-
tion. Accordingly, Respondents, and each of them, violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by wrongfully receiving, directly
or indirectly through checkoff, moneys from Thomas. I there-
fore sustain the relevant portion of complaint subparagraph
11(e).
Since there was no contention that Local 4’s policy had ever
been fully communicated to Matulis or applied to him, the
validity of that policy is not relevant to the resolution of the
issues of the complaint and will not be further addressed. Fur-
ther since I found on this record that it is immaterial whether or
not the Unions individually or collectively expended funds for
nonrepresentational expenses, I have made no findings with
regard thereto and will dismiss complaint subparagraphs 11(e)
and (f) to the extent they deal with the quantum of dues re-
tained by Respondents and the nature of the Unions’ expendi-
tures.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act,
I shall order that they cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
I shall order Respondents to refund all moneys collected
from Matulis since his notification to the Unions of his resig-
nation and objector status, with interest calculated in accor-
dance with Board policy.11 Further, each Respondent will be
required to inform Matulis in writing and all other objectors
immediately upon learning of their objector status, in writing,
that all union-security provisions in agreements between Re-
spondents and any employer will not apply to the objector and
the objector will therefor not be obligated to pay any dues or
fees whatsoever under the union-security provisions unless and
until a valid objector policy is disclosed to, and properly ap-
plied to the objector.
The General Counsel seeks a remedy directing the Respon-
dents to put in place and maintain valid Beck policies. I decline
to grant the requested relief. I found no obligation on the part of
the Unions to have a Beck policy and no violation of the Act by
the Unions for the failure to have such a policy. The General
Counsel’s requested remedy may not be imposed under any
theory that unions should have such a policy.
The Respondents are directed to collect no dues or initiation
fees from any objectors, including Matulis, under compulsion
of union-security arrangements unless and until valid Beck
policies are timely disclosed and applied to such objectors. As
noted supra, no labor organization, including the Respondents
here, need have such a policy so long as no dues and initiation
fees are collected from objectors and objectors are immediately
informed of their rights once they communicate their objector
status to the union. If the Respondents, or any of them, seek to
collect such fees, then they must first create and implement a

11 See New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). See
also Florida Steel Corp., 23l NLRB 651 (1977), and Isis Plumbing Co.,
138 NLRB 716 (1962).
valid Beck policy and thereafter collect appropriate fees as es-
tablished pursuant to the major application of that policy.
The General Counsel seeks, in the alternative to the Beck
policy request discussed, supra, that the Respondents be obli-
gated to notify certain individuals including nonunion members
and others who joined the Union during the 10(b) period, who
are or become unit members, that the Unions will not apply the
union-security provisions of the contract to objectors. The
General Counsel also urges that I require the Union to give
these same individuals their “initial Beck notice” and imple-
ment the remaining elements of a Beck policy. While the stan-
dard Board remedial notice which I have directed to be posted,
infra, will accomplish in part what the General Counsel desires
he seeks a regular, recurrent disclosure obligation on the part of
the Respondents to non member employees before they become
objectors as well as to objectors who have perfected their
status. Thus, the General Counsel is seeking to obligate the
Unions to notify preobjecting unit employees of their rights: (1)
to become objectors and (2) of their rights, if they become ob-
jectors.
The Board has recently held that the Court’s decision in Beck
has caused it to rethink the entire area of a labor organization’s
obligations under the Act to fully disclose to employees the
nature and extent of their obligations under union-security
clauses. Electrical Workers IUE Local 444 (Paramax Sys-
tems), supra. The Board in Paramax explicitly obligated a un-
ion to notify each employee in writing of the employee’s rights
under NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to
pay dues and initiation fees without being obligated to join the
union. The Board held that because the wording of the union-
security clause itself was ambiguous with respect to the em-
ployee’s obligation to join the union, the union was obligated to
explain to the employees their legal rights and obligations un-
der it.
The Board’s announcement in Paramax that in light of Beck
it would now obligate unions to fully disclose employee rights
and obligations under union-security clauses could be argued to
extend to requiring unions to explain to employees their Beck
rights when the contract union-security clause or other explana-
tion distributed to employees does not make such rights clear.
A closer reading of the decision clearly indicates this is not the
Board’s holding, however. Rather the decision in declining to
require a union to explain Beck rights to employees augurs
strongly to the contrary. Thus, the Board’s remedy in Paramax
did not require the union to notify objecting employees in writ-
ing about their Beck rights, the remedy limited itself to obligat-
ing the union to inform employees of their General Motors
rights even though the union-security clause in the case did not
explain Beck rights.
Paramax is current law. Thus, the Board currently requires
union explanation of General Motors rights to employees, but
does not require union disclosure and explanation of employee
Beck rights. Given the Board’s holding, I find it is not appropri-
ate to grant the General Counsel’s request that I require the
Unions to explain Beck rights to employees before they have
indicated to the union that they object to the expenditure of
their union-security clause obligation fees for nonrepresentation
matter.12
12 Special union disclosure remedies have also historically been re-
quired where there is evidence that a union is affirmatively misleading
employees as to the operative rules under the contract, see, e.g., Elec-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1032
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The employer-members of the Association are employers
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondents are, and each of them is, labor organi-
zations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondents violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
by engaging in the following acts and conduct:
(a) Failing to inform nonunion member-employees who ob-
ject to paying dues in excess of the amounts the union spends
on representation matters that the union-security provisions in
collective-bargaining agreements entered into by the Respon-
dents and various employers do not and will not apply to the
objectors unless and until the Respondents notify them of a
valid Beck objector policy and timely apply it to them.
(b) Enforcing the union-security clause of the contract as to,
and collecting dues and fees from, nonunion member-
employees who object to paying dues in excess of the amounts
spent on representation.
4. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair la-
bor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
5. The allegations of the complaint not specifically sustained
above are without merit and shall be dismissed.

[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]

trical Workers IBEW Local 6 (San Francisco Electrical Contractors
Association), 318 NLRB 109 (1995). I do not find that such is the case
here however.
PAINTERS (MEISWINKEL/RFJ, INC.) 1