Painters Local No. 452

National Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsDec 14, 1979

246 N.L.R.B. 970 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

l)t('lSIO()NS ()1' NAII()NAI I\B()OR RA IIONS I(BOARD) Painters Local No. 452 and Henry ('C. Beck (ompany. ('ase 12- C 6 ['acts December 14, 1979 DECISION AND ORI)ER Upon a charge filed by Htenry '. Beck ('ompans (Beck), the General Counsel for the National Labol Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 12. issued a complaint on September 8 1978. against Painters Local No. 452, herein called Respondent or the Union. Copies of the charge and the complaint and notice of hearing before an administratixe law judge were duly served on Respondent and the Charging Party. In substance, the complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(g) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by picketing at the premises of a construction project immediately adja- cent to the Kirkwood Out-Patient Center (Kirkwood) and the Clemmons Convalescence Pavilion (Clem- mons) without first giving 10 days' written notice of' its intent to do so to Palm Beach-Martin Count Medical Center. Inc. (Palm Beach-Martin County). the owner and operator of Kirkwood and Clemmons. and to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser- vice. The answer duly filed by Respondent admitted the jursidictional allegations of the complaint. but denied the factual allegations and the commission of any un- fair labor practices. Thereafter, however, on December 22. 1978, and January 2 and 4, 1979, Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General Counsel, respectively, entered into a stipulation in which they agreed that the charge, complaint, answer to complaint, motion to dismiss complaint, terrestrial site plan (Jt. Exh. I ) and the stipulation of facts shall constitute the entire rec- ord herein, and that no oral testimony is necessar or desired by any of the parties. Thus, the parties ex- pressly waived all intermediate proceedings before an administrative law judge, and petitioned that this case be transferred to the Board for the purpose of making findings of fact and conclusions of' law, and issuing an appropriate order, reserving to themselves on1l the right to object to the materiality or relevancy of ally of the stipulated facts. By order dated March 27, 1979, the Board ap- proved the stipulation, transferred the proceedings to itself' and set a date for the filing of briefs. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs. which have been duly considered by the Board. The Board has considered the entire record herein as stipulated by the parties. as well as the briefs filed by Respondent and the General ('ounsel. and makes the following findings and conclusions: I. II11 II SlN.ISS 1) I I' II I I ()N RS ('harging Part\ Beck is a Delav'are corporation with an ofice and place ot business located at Jupiter Florida. where it is engaged in the building and con- struction indlustr: ias a ceneral contractor. I)uring the past 12 months, in the course anld conduct of' its busi- ness operations, Beck 1purch;ased and received at its Jupiter. Florida location goods, materials. and sup- plies valued in excess of $500()00 which were shipped directl, to it fronl points outside the State of' Florida. Fleischer's. Inc.. is a Florida corporation with its principal place oh business in West Palm Beach, Flor- ida, where it is engaged in the building and construc- tion industry as a painting contractor. During the past 12 months. Fleischer's Inc., has performed ser- vices valued in excess of $50,000 for Beck a company which meets the Board's jurisdictional standards, as set forth above. Palm Beach-Martin ('ountt Medical Center. Inc.. is a Florida nonprofit corporation engaged in the business of' constructing, maintaining. owning and operating or providing foir the operation of' medical facilities. As stated earlier, its owns and operates Kirkwood Out-Patient ('enter. which is an outpatient clinic, and ('lemmion s ('onvalesccnce Pavilion. which is a private nursinlg home. The parties stipulated, and e find, that Hlenry (C. Beck ('ompan}. leischcr's Inc.. and Palm Beach- Martin Count\ Medical ('enter Inc.. are now, and at all times material herein have been. employers en- gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com- merce within the meaning of' Section 2(6) and (7) of' the Act, and that Kirkw'ood Out-Patient ('enter and ('lemmons (Convalescence Pavilion are health care in- stitutions within the meaning of' Section 2(14) of' the Act.' We further find that it will eft'ectuate the pur- poses of' the Act to assert jurisdiction in this proceed- ing. 11. 1111 I It()R (R(\NIZAII(N I\\I()1,\ l) Ihe parties stipulated, and we find, that Rspon- clent is noe,, and at all times material herein has been. a labor organization within the meaning of' Section 2(5) of' the Act. I SC. 2(14 pr~ilcd I l I rll "healillh torc IrsItt.,ln" shall nclude n hopltil. cr Jd- JCILC `11 1 h Ip dl.ll. l ICMtllltl llll tCllla.t ogIlgmollltll. health 'ntirc. nursing 1S/l 1C. eicX IieiL L. are tacIill\, ir ohe! 1llIlRiltlu0ll I\1c d to the arc oJ' 'ILk. iilirl, r iged peroli 246 NI.RB No. 148 970 PAIN ItRS I ()(A N() 452 111. IIi t NIAIR I ABIIOR P'RA( I1( IS A. I/i' lsA1uc The question presented is w hether Respondent io- lated Section 8(g) of the Act hb picketing Fleischer's at two reserved gates at the premises o' a construction site at which there are two health care institutions. without first giving 10 days' written notice of its in- tent to do so to the health care institutions and to the Federal Mediation and C(onciliation Service. B. 7Th Silpl/awd Flc. In September 1977. Beck, pursuant to a contract with Palm Beach-Martin County. began construction of George Ford Hospital, a new five-story hospital. George Ford Hospital is located directly north of and adjacent to Kirkwood, and northeast of Clemmons. When George Ford is completed, a breezeway will connect it with Kirkwood. Fleischer's has a contract with Beck. valued in e.- cess of $50,000, to perform certain painting services on the George Ford construction project. In July 1978, and at all times material herein. Respondent has had a labor dispute with Fleischer's, but did not and does not have any dispute with Palm Beach-Mar- tin County, the corporation which owns and operates Kirkwood and Clemmons, or with Beck. Respondent. in furtherance of its dispute with Fleischer's, picketed Fleischer's for 8 days. from August 9 to 24, 1978. The picketing occurred at two locations, the driveway to the parking lot used by the construction workers, and at Gate 2 the west entrance/exit to Kirkwood and Clemmons. The construction workers' parking lot is ne.t to Kirkwood, while Gate 2 is northwest of Kirk- wood. and northeast of Clemmons. Both are on the property surrounding the two health care institutions. Neither location was used by patients, employees. suppliers, emergency vehicle operators. or visitors to get to Kirkwood or Clemmons. They were, however, used by construction workers. In addition, ambulance drivers with patients for Kirkwood came within a few feet of gate 2, since the ambulance used a driveway which intersected with Gate 2. No Kirkwood or Clemmons employees engaged in a work stoppage or other refusal to work as a result of the picketing, and there has been no disruption of any of the services offered by either health care facility. Employees of Beck, however, and various other union subcontrac- tors performing new construction work at the George Ford Hospital jobsite, including individuals classified as electricians, plumbers. pipefitters glaziers sheet metal workers, and elevator workers, elected from time to time to honor the picket line established bh Respondent against Fleischer's. At no time did Re- spondent give notice of its intent to picket Fleischer's to Kirkwood. Clemmons. or to the F:ederal Mediation and Conciliation Service. (C. ( ollentions r/f thc Parics The General Counsel relying on C,'iled ,.vvr iion of JourneVm'nI and .pprenticcs ofI/ the Pum}ing and ipe/ltiing Iduurl, of I/IC United Slaites and ( ana1(. Local 63() .4 L (IC10 (.cin-Siccn,/hcr)g. contends that the Inlion violated Section 8 (g) of the Act hb. failing to notifyL the health care institutions and the I deral Mediation and conciliation Service of its intent to picket Fleischer's at least 10 das before such picket- ing began. arguing that the section proscribes an% picketing by any labor organization at the premises of any health care institution in the absence of proper notice. On the other hand, Respondent. rel\ing on two circuit court opinions' one of which denied en- forcement of our Decision in Le.in-Steenhcerg con- tends that the notice requirement of Section 8(g) ap- plies only to labor organizations which are directing concerted activitv at the health care institution. pur- portedly on behalf of the employees of the institu- tion.4 Since Respondent was picketing an employer that is not a health care institution, and was picketing on behalf of that employer's employees. Respondent ar- gues that it was not required to give notice pursuant to Section 8(g). Alternatively. it argues that it was not. in an event, picketing at a health care institu- tion, since the pickets were located bh entrances used solely by construction employees. D. DInscusv.,ion In 1974 Congress amended the Act to include non- profit hospitals within the Act's coverage.' Specifi- cally. these amendments deleted from Section 2(2) of the Act the e.emption of nonprofit hospitals from the definition of "employer" and added Section 2(14) which defined a new category of employers. termed "health care institutions." to include, as noted above, all hospitals. The amendments further contained, in Section 8(g). special notice requirements as follows: 2219 NLRB 837 (1975). wo companion cases. Laborers' Iniernauonal U,'nion of Vorlh Amenrca, A Fl CIO. locl 'non Vo 105 (Merci Hospital of lredo), 219 Nl.RB 846. and Case & Glass. Inc. 219 NlRB 698. issued at the same time ' 1. R B s Iniernaumnal Brothcrhad of Ehictru lor a l ir 1cr .-, l] - l t, n Ao .88 /HlTrimaTn Complmnl /. 548 F 2d 704 (7th (ir 1977). cert dented 434 l S 837: 1 uh,'rcr n l lr natlotti l U'nl,, ,f \: orh 4n wr'., 4a f/ ( IO1. , ' al Lnon .oi / VS1 / fcrv ,m1-ptlalif arehdo] . R B. 567 i1:2_ I(2 (.(' Cir 1977) Ihe issue scas tIamed this sa) h, the <-urtl il appc;i in I R B IRBt. i4, oal ?Y' /Hit iian (ompnsan-, iuprli at 7} P 93 160. 93d ('ong. S 3203. 88 Still 395. eetile uXigust 25. 1974 I)tL(ISIONS ()1: NA I IONAI. lABOR REI.A IONS BOARI) A labor organization befire engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not less than ten days prior to such action, notifh the in- stitution in writing and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of that intention, except that in the case of bargaining for an initial agree- ment following certification or recognition the notice required by this subsection shall not be given until the expiration of the period specified in clause (B) of the last sentence of section 8(d) of this Act. The notice shall state the date and time that such action will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended by written agree- ment of both parties. In Lein-Steenherg, the Board held, with then-Mem- ber Fanning and Member Jenkins dissenting, that any labor organization which engaged in picketing at the premises of a health care institution was required to give notice pursuant to Section 8(g). As held by the majority, the legislative history showed that Congress intended the Board "to interpret Section 8(g) accord- ing to its plain language and that, therefore, any, strike or picketing at the premises of a health care institu- tion, even primary reserved gate picketing directed at a subcontractor, is proscribed in the absence of proper notices."6 As support for this interpretation. the majority cited statements by Senators Taft and Javits which referred to the notice requirements as broadly applying to "any picketing." as well as a statement by Senator Williams that the Board should use "extreme caution" in giving the amendments an interpretation which is not contained in the amend- ments themselves, the Senate report, and the explana- tion thereof.7 In addition, the majority found that their interpretation was consistent with congressional concern that the public be protected from undue dis- ruptions in health care services caused by labor dis- putes. The dissenters, on the other hand, would not have required the union to give notice of its intent to picket, since they believed that Section 8(g) was not concerned with labor disputes between parties who are not in the health care industry. Rather, by its terms, it applied only to concerted activity against a hospital by a labor organization which represents, or seeks to represent, employees of the health care insti- tution. Member Jenkins further dissented on the grounds that the picketing was directed at construc- tion work, and not hospital functions, yet it was only the latter functions which were accorded special pro- tection by Congress. In later decisions the Board further explained the '219 NLRB at 840, second emphasis supplied. 7219 NLRB at 839. meaning of Section 8(g). hus, the Board, with Mem- ber Jenkins dissenting, held in United ilospitals f AvcwarAk that Section 8(g) applies to informational picketing directed against a health care institution, as well as other forms of concerted activity, like strikes. since "the mere act of picketing" creates the risk of disruption of health care. Then, in Saint Joseph Ilos- pita,9 decided recently, the Board held, with Member Jenkins concurring, that the 8 (g) notice requirement applied to all picketing directed at hospital employ- ees, even though the union (Painters) did not repre- sent and, apparently, was not seeking to represent any hospital employees. As the picketing was aimed directly against the hospital, and was conducted at one of the hospi- tal's two main entrances, no argument can be made that the Hospital was a neutral employer not directly affected by the labor dispute, or that the picketing was in a location, such as at a re- served gate, which would have isolated it from the Hospital's patient care activities. 0 In the meantime, while the Board was deciding the cases discussed above, Lein-Steenherg and the related decisions were denied enforcement by the circuit courts of appeals in the two decisions cited previously at footnote 4, supra.I Thus, both the District of Co- lumbia Circuit and the Seventh Circuit concluded that Section 8(g) did not apply to labor organizations which epresent employees of other employers, not involved in any dispute with a health care institution, but whose labor activities take place on the premises of the health care institution. According to both courts, the primary and obvious purpose of the amendments was "the inclusion of non-profit hospitals and their employees within the terms of the Act."' 2 Consistent with this purpose, the courts interpreted Section 8(g) as regulating only the concerted activity of newly covered employees, and not that of employees who were previously covered by the Act. The courts recognized that Congress, in enacting Section 8(g), was concerned with minimizing disruptions to health care. Unlike the Board majority in Lein-Steenberg, however, the courts believed that Congress' concern in Section 8(g) was directed only at the newly covered employees since, prior to the hospi- tal amendments, employees, as defined by the Act, were permitted to direct concerted activities against ID stri II 199. ,Natinal Union of Itospital and Health Care Employees. RWDSL:. A11. (10 (United Iloipiali ,f NeuarA), 232 NLRB 443, 444 (1977). 9 Orange Belt District Council of Painters No. 48, Internarional Brotherhood il Painfcr and .Allied Trades. AFI. (I0 (Saint Joseph Ilospital), 243 NLRB 609 ( 1979). 'Id at 612. " The Seventh Circuit's decision in Hoffman Copuany issued before the District of Columbia Circuit Court's decision in Lein-Steenberg and its com- panion case, Mercy Hospital of Laredo. ' 548 F.2d at 708. 567 F.2d at 1010. 972 PAINTERS I.(L'AL NO. 452 health care institutions without any statutory restric- tion. Accordingly, the amendments did not increase the risk of disruptions to health care by non-health care employees. Labor activity by [non-health care] employees was already subject to the general controls sup- plied by the Act, and had not previously been thought of as a threat to patient care of a magni- tude requiring further restriction. [567 F.2d at 10l1 1]. Thus, both courts reasoned, if Congress hqad intended to alter the status quo for non-health care employees, that intention would be clearly stated in the legisla- tive history.'3 As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pointed out: [We] are struck by the complete absence any- where in the not insubstantial legislative history of any reference whatsoever to labor activity in- volving non-health care employees. [548 F.2d at 709.] The District of Columbia Circuit found the legislative history's silence "most eloquent."' 4 Both courts, therefore, concluded that the legislative history did not support the Board's finding that Congress in- tended to impose a notice requirement on non-health care employees. Finally, both courts e.amined the interaction of Section 8(g) with the remainder of the health care amendments and concluded that the amendments were an integral whole only when "labor organiza- tion" and "employer" were limited to those involved with health care. By contrast, if an all-inclusive defi- nition were used, the result would be that, under Sec- tion 8(d)(1), the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service would be powerless to require meetings be- tween the parties unless employees of a health care institution were involved, even though Section 8(g) would require the labor organization to notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 10 days before it engaged in any activity directed against the non-health care employer. The courts found that Congress did not intend such an anomalous result. Rather, Congress required notice to the Federal Me- diation and Conciliation Service so that it would offer its services to the disputing parties." In the instant case, the Board is presented with the same issue which was before it in Lein-Steenherg, whether the Painters Union, which represents em- 0l Both courts, however, were careful to note that the facts in the cases before them "do not require us to reach the issue of whether employees engaged in work activities necessary to the present operation of the health care institution, hut not employed directly hb the institution, should be deemed health care employees." 567 F.2d at 1009. fn. 15. quoting Hloffman Company, 548 F.2d at 707, fn. 5. 4 567 F.2d 1012. ' 567 F.2d at 1015, and cited cases therein. ployees of paint subcontractors, was required under Section 8 (g) to give notice to Kirkwood and (lem- mons of' its intent to establish pickets. in urtherance of its dispute with Fleischer's at the premises of the two health care institutions. In Lein-Steenberg. a Board majority answered this question affirmatively, on the grounds that Section 8 (g). interpreted literally, and without reference to other parts of the amend- ments, required that any labor organization which en- gaged in concerted activity at the premises of a health care institution must give prior notice of its intention to do so. We are of the view-shared by the courts that Section 8(g) does not require a labor union, like the one herein, to give notice of its intention to engage in concerted activity against an employer which is not a health care institution, simply because the activity is to take place at the premises of a neutral health care institution, as health care institution is defined by the Act.' In so concluding, we note that the 8(g) notice requirement seeks to eliminate spontaneous concerted activity by labor organizations so that health care in- stitutions may secure their patients' care. Concomi- tantly, Section 8(g) encourages negotiated settlement of disputes through the provision in Section 8(d) fr Federal mediation, in special recognition of the sensi- tive nature of health care operations. To this end, Section 8(g) requires a union to give notice of its in- tent to engage in concerted activity when that activity will be directed against the health care institution, as defined in the Act. However, we are satisfied, and the two circuit courts that have passed on the matter share our view, that Section 8 (g) was not intended to apply to disputes like the one herein where the health care institution is an admitted neutral and the only link to the health care institution is the presence of pickets on its premises. Rather, Section 8(g) becomes operational only when the concerted activity is di- rected against the health care institution. In the in- stant case, both Clemmons and Kirkwood were neu- trals in the dispute between the Painters Union and Fleischer's, and the separate gates established by the Union preserved their neutrality. Accordingly. in this circumstance we are persuaded that Congress did not intend for Section 8(g) to apply to the instant con- certed activity simply because it occurred on the premises of a health care institution. 7 Moreover, we agree with the courts that Congress, in enacting the hospital amendments, was primarily concerned with bringing health care employees '6 Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, who both dissented from Lein- Steenberg, adhere to their dissenting positions. Member Truesdale, who was not a member of the Board at the time Lein-Steenberg was decided, shares their view. 7 Because of our disposition of this case, we find it unnecessary to reach Respondent's alternative contention that it was picketing a construction site. and not at the premises of a health care institution. 973 I)E('ISIONS OF: NAl IONAI. I.ABOR REI.A' IONS BOARD) within the protection of' the Act, and as part of this purpose, ensuring continuity of health care. In meet- ing these purposes. Congress did not intend to alter the status quo with respect to non-health care em- ployees who had never been required to notify em- ployers of their intent to engage in concerted activity against non-health care employers.'B The Board's in- terpretation in Lein-Sleenherg was contrary to this legislative intent, and reflected a mechanistic ap- proach to a section of the law which Congress did not intend for us to interpret rigidly.' 9 Here, although the picketing was adjacent to the health care institutions, it was not directed at either facility, and the Union honored reserved gates which ensured the continued neutrality of the health care institutions. Under these circumstances, we find that the Union was not re- quired to give notice of its intent to picket.2" and that its picketing was lawful. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. MEMBER MURPHIY, concurring: I agree with my colleagues that Section 8 (g) does not require a labor union, like the one herein, to give notice of its intention to engage in concerted activity against an employer which is not a health care insti- tution simply because the activity is to take place at the premises of a neutral health care institution. Ac- 1t Thus. we note with interest, as did the District of Columbia ('ircuit. that the sponsors of the amendments Senators Williams and aft disavowed the Board's interpretation of congressional intent in l.ein-Sieenherg and Mer- cv, Hospital of Laredo. and stated that the amendments were not intended to change the law with respect to non-health care employees. 14 We recently stated in Bio-Medical Applications of Ne Orleans. hI., d/h/a Greater New Orleans Artticial Kidnre (enter, 240 NLRB 432, 435 ( 1979): IT]he legislative history of the health care amendments demonstrates not only Congress' concern for the continuity of patient care. but also its concern that Section 8(g) not be rigidly applied in light of serious conse- quences flowing from noncompliance with its provisions: i.e. the strik- ers' loss of employee status under the Act. There the Board found that Sec. 8(g) was satisfied where the labor union had made reasonable efforts to comply with Sec. 8(g). and the health care institu- tion had received actual notice. 20 On the other hand. with all due respect to the two courts of appeals, we do not agree. nor do we hold, that Congress intended that Sec. 8(g) should apply only where the union engaged in the concerted activity represents or seeks to represent health care employees. Thus, in Saint Joseph we found. "[iln view of Congress' general proscription of picketing of health care insti- tutions without the 10 days' notice ." that Sec. 8(g) applied to picketing by the Painters Union. even assuming that the picketing was not intended to forward any representational purpose. As here. this decision was based on the legislative history which "expressly indicates that such activity is to he regulated by Section 8(g) whether or not it is related to bargaining, and moreover, even in instances where it would constitute 'stranger picketing.' " Saint Joseph Hospial, 243 NI.RB at 61 1. cordingly. I join them in overruling Lein-.S'ltenher. 21 Since I was part of the majority in l.ein-Sleenherg, a brief explanation is in order. The issue is one of statutory interpretation, namely, whether Section 8(g)., which requires a 10-day notice to be filed by a labor organization "engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any health care institution," (I) applies only to ac- tivity directed at the health care institution, or (2) also applies to activities which take place against other employers but on the premises of the institution. As the Seventh Circuit correctly observed, there is much to be said for both views. 2 At the time Lein-Steenherg was decided, I joined a majority of the Board in concluding that the second view was the correct view. for the reasons set forth in that decision. Since that time, two circuits, the Sev- enth Circuit 23 and the District of Columbia Circuit.24 have had occasion to deal with the issue, and in ex- tremely well-reasoned decisions both have concluded that the first view is the correct one. After further reflection and based on over 4 ears of experience with cases which have required application of the health care amendments and, to a lesser extent, spe- cifically Section 8(g)., I have concluded that the cor- rect interpretation of Section 8(g) is that set forth in the majority opinion herein. Thus, in agreement with the Seventh C'ircuit and the District of Columbia Cir- cuit, I find that Section 8(g) was not intended to ap- ply to disputes like the one herein, where the health care institution is a neutral, simply because the pick- eting occurs on the premises of that institution. In reaching this determination. I note that in Lein- Steenherg the Board relied heavily on statements by Senators Taft and Williams as supporting the view taken therein. Since that time, both of those Senators have disavowed the Board's interpretation of their re- marks. While these disavowals are not technically part of the legislative history, thev do have a ten- dency to erode the basis for the Board's determina- tion in Lein-Sleenberg. Here Respondent Union had a dispute with a painting subcontractor and picketed at the entrance to construction work being done on health care facil- ity premises. Since I find that Section 8(g) does not apply to concerted activity simply because it occurs on the premises of a health care institution, I con- clude there was no violation by Respondent Uinion, and I join my colleagues in dismissing the complaint. I.nili'd .4 sociation f'Jourenioeln and 4pprentice, o/ he United States and ('anada. Local 6.3(L Fl. ('10 l.ein-Steenherg), 219 N LRB 837 (1975). 122 1. R B v. International Broherhod of Electrical 'orAers, lxocal Union V.o 388 Hoffman Company], 548 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 839. * V IR. RB v. IBEW. Lcal .?8 11oflman ('orpanv]. upral 24 Ilhorer,' Interniional 'tion ,/'Norih .4meria, A F. ('10. lwcal Union Vo, 1/5 7 / er.c Hompal of' laredo! v. N I..R B, 567 .2d I(X)6 (1)(C (r. 1977) 974 PAINTFRS l.O(CAI. NO. 452 MEMBER PENELLO, dissenting: I adhere to the view expressed by the Board in Lein-Steenherg, supra, that "Congress intended us to interpret Section 8(g) according to its plain language and that, therefore. am' strike or picketing at the premises of a health care institution, even primary reserved gate picketing directed at a subcontractor. is proscribed in the absence of proper notices." Accord- ingly, I would find that Respondent Union. hN picket- ing Fleischer at the George Ford Hospital jobsite without first giving the required notices. violated Sec- tion 8(g) of the Act. 975