PAE Aviation and Technical Services LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Nov 9, 2018

28-CA-203755 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 9, 2018)

JD(SF)-34-18
Tucson, Arizona
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
PAE AVIATION AND TECHNICAL SERVICES LLC
and Case 28–CA–203755
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,
LOCAL LODGE 2949, AFL-CIO
Lisa J. Dunn, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Edward M. Cherof and
Jeffrey W. Toppel, Esqs. (Jackson Lewis P.C.),
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARA-LOUISE ANZALONE, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case in Tucson, Arizona,
on February 13–15, 2018. This case was tried following the issuance of a Complaint and Notice
of Hearing (the complaint) by the Regional Director for Region 28 of the National Labor
Relations Board on November 14, 2017. The complaint was based on an unfair labor practice
charge filed by Charging Party International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Local Lodge 2949, AFL–CIO (the Union) on August 3, 2017, against Respondent PAE Aviation
and Technical Services LLC (Respondent). The General Counsel alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29U.S.C. Sec. 151, et.
seq. (the Act), by denying employee Jonathan Boey (Boey) his requested Weingarten
representative, violated Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act by subsequently suspending him
for engaging in union activity, and violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing or
unreasonably delaying in providing the Union with certain requested information. Respondent,
by its answer to the complaint, denies committing the alleged unfair labor practices.
At trial, all parties were afforded the right to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to
present any relevant documentary evidence, to argue their respective legal positions orally, and
JD(SF)-34-18
2
to file post-hearing briefs.1 The General Counsel and Respondent filed post-hearing briefs,
which have been carefully considered. Accordingly, based upon the entire record herein,2
including the post-hearing briefs and my observation of the credibility of the witnesses, I make
the following
5
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits, and I find, that it has been an employer engaged in commerce within the 10
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union has been a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Accordingly, I find that this dispute affects
commerce and that the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has jurisdiction of this case,
pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
15
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Respondent, a government contractor, provides aircraft maintenance services to Customs and
Border Protection at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona (Davis-Monthan). The
Union is the collective-bargaining representative for a unit of employees employed by 20
Respondent at Davis-Monthan,3 including Boey, who is an aircraft mechanic and member of the
Union. At all relevant times, a collective–bargaining agreement was in effect governing the
terms and conditions of employment of the unit employees (the CBA). (GC Exh. 2; Tr. 28, 29,
112, 113, 138, 159, 184, 237, 265)
25
Allegations Involving Boey
As noted, the General Counsel contends that Respondent issued an unwarranted suspension to
Boey based on his union activities, and additionally denied him his requested Weingarten
representative. Respondent denies all allegations and asserts that Boey’s suspension was based 30
on his refusal to comply with a work directive.

1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.__” for General
Counsel’s Exhibit; “R. Exh. __” for Respondent’s Exhibit; and “R. Br. at __” for Respondent’s post-
hearing brief.
2 I note and correct the following inaccuracies in the transcript: the phrase, “Let’s shoot it up,”
appearing at p. 17, ll.14–15, is corrected to read, “We’re suited up”; and the term, “Weinman [sic]”
appearing at p. 120, l.10, is corrected to read, “Weingarten.”
3 The unit consists of “[a]ll full-time aircraft maintenance and avionic technicians [employed by
Respondent] at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; excluding all office clerk employees,
professional employees, managerial employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.”
JD(SF)-34-18
3
A. Relevant factual background4
1. Airplane logbooks and the “logbook checklist”
Following the performance of maintenance work on an aircraft, the mechanic responsible for 5
the work is required to document it by completing and signing an airplane logbook. Specifically,
the mechanic’s logbook entries indicate the exact nature of the inspection and maintenance work
s/he performed on the aircraft, and the mechanic must sign a “flight record sheet” verifying this
information. This process documents that the aircraft has received the appropriate inspections
and maintenance and is therefore airworthy before it is released to a flight crew for its mission. 10
(Tr. 468–470, 490–491)
In mid-2015, Customs and Border Protection representatives complained to Respondent that
certain inspections were not being properly documented in logbooks, resulting in aircraft
potentially being released for missions in unsafe condition.5 In response, Respondent conducted 15
training on proper logging procedures in June 2015; it is undisputed that Boey attended this
training. Later, in October 2015, Respondent implemented a stream-lined, one-page “logbook
checklist.” The purpose of the checklist was to simplify the logging process and ensure that the
mechanic was properly documenting their inspection. It is undisputed that the checklist was
effective in this regard; following its implementation, the instance of inaccurate documentation 20
was reduced over 75 percent. (Tr. 121, 210–211, 494–495)
All mechanics working on active aircraft, but not all mechanics in Respondent’s Davis-
Monthan operation, are required to complete the log book checklist. On the day shift, during
which some mechanics work in an inspection role, it is customary for only the lead mechanic on 25
an aircraft to complete the checklist. Prior to July 2017, Boey worked in such an inspection role
and was therefore not required to complete the checklist. Fewer mechanics work on the night
shift, making it more likely that a mechanic will be expected to complete the checklist. As
Respondent’s Quality Control Supervisor Steve Wooley (Wooley) explained, whether a
mechanic will be required to sign a checklist “varies day to day with the jobs that are going on 30
and the flights and missions that we’re doing. So the checklist might not be used every day by
every mechanic.” (Tr. 191, 211–212, 227, 469, 489–491)
Around the same time as Respondent’s roll-out of the logbook checklist, Boey attended a
facility-wide training conducted by Respondent’s Project Management Office (PMO), which is 35
responsible for managing Respondent’s contract with Customs and Border Protection.

4 Certain of my findings are based on witness credibility. A credibility determination may rest on
various factors, including “the context of the witness’ testimony, the witness’ demeanor, the weight of the
respective evidence, established or admitted facts, inherent probabilities and reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from the record as a whole.” Hills & Dales General Hospital, 360 NLRB 611, 617 (2014),
citing Double D Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 623
(2001). In making credibility resolutions, it is well established that the trier of fact may believe some, but
not all, of a witness’ testimony. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950). Where
there is inconsistent evidence on a relevant point, my credibility findings are incorporated into my legal
analysis.
5 For example, the failure to document an aircraft’s flight hours could result in “overflight” (i.e., the
aircraft being flown while being overdue for inspections). (Tr. 482, 492)
JD(SF)-34-18
4
According to Boey, employees attending the presentation were warned not to use documents that
were not “approved” and were specifically admonished as follows:
if it isn’t an approved document, you’re not supposed to use it, you’re not
supposed to touch it, and basically if there’s no policy or document 5
number to govern it, that it wasn’t to be used.
(Tr. 208) The record indicates that Boey attributes this statement to one or two individuals:
Fred Janneck (Janneck), who serves as aircraft maintenance manager for Respondent’s entire
Customs and Border Protection program and David Harvey (Harvey), who serves in a human 10
resources role at PMO. At hearing, the parties stipulated that Janneck and Harvey are each
supervisors under Section 2(11) of the Act. (Tr. 28, 121; R. Exh. 3)6
2. Boey’s refusal to complete the logbook checklist
15
The operative facts of Boey’s discipline allegation occurred after he was transferred from the
day to the night shift in June 2017.7 On August 8, lead mechanics Raul Valezzi (Valezzi) and
Eric Walton (Walton)8 unsuccessfully attempted to get Boey to complete a logbook checklist for
an aircraft on which he had worked. In response to their instruction, Boey stated that “no one on
day shift does this,” that the checklist was not a “PAE-approved form” and that he would not 20
complete it. Boey’s refusal was brought to the attention of upper management the same day, and
Site Manager William Phillips (Phillips) instructed Valezzi to document the incident via email.
Maintenance Operations Supervisor John Neely (Neely), who was copied on Valezzi’s email
report, responded, “this will need to be covered tomorrow.” There is no indication as to what, if
anything, was “covered” the following day. (Tr. 172–173, 183–184, 193, 194, 212; GC Exh. 16)25
On August 16, Valezzi again attempted to get Boey to sign a checklist for the aircraft he was
working on; Boey again stated that he had never been required to fill out a checklist on the day
shift and did not know how to do so. Valezzi responded that the checklist was simple to
complete and that Boey had signed a “read and sign” regarding filling out the checklist. A “read 30
and sign” (also referred to as a “read and initial”) is a form whereby a PAE employee
acknowledges that he understands and will comply with a newly implemented procedure).
Referring to the PMO presentation he had attended two years earlier, Boey stated that he did not
believe he had signed such a document and that he had been told by a “higher authority” not to
use documents that did not have “proper approval.” (Tr. 147, 175, 194–195; GC 17)35
Ten minutes later, Maintenance Supervisor John Kautz (Kautz), with Valezzi present, spoke
with Boey. Kautz asked Boey if he had completed the checklist, and Boey responded that he
had been instructed by two individuals from PMO—Harvey and Janneck—to “do no company
paperwork without a policy.” He then repeated his request for a copy of his “read and sign” 40
form related to the checklist. Kautz told Boey that the checklist had in fact been created and

6 I do not credit Boey’s assertion that the individual in question was named “Mr. Love.” (See GC
Exh. 22) There is no indication that such an individual exists, and the weight of the evidence indicates
that Boey in fact attributed the statement to either Janneck or Harvey.
7 Unless otherwise noted, all dates herein refer to the year 2017.
8 Neither Valezzi nor Walton is alleged to be a supervisor under Section 2(11) or an agent under
Section 2(13).
JD(SF)-34-18
5
approved by PMO. Kautz’ note to file regarding the day’s events states that Boey responded as
follows:
He told me the only way he will do it, is if I put it in writing for him and
that he will give that straight to the Union with it.5
(GC Exh. 17) While Kautz’ syntax is somewhat confusing, it is clear that he believed: (a) Boey
was refusing to comply with his directive unless it was put in writing, and (b) he intended, with
the Union’s assistance, to challenge any such written directive.9 Valezzi’s written report of the
incident corroborates Kautz, stating: “Jonathan still refused and warned Mr. Kautz that he was 10
‘going to the [U]nion with this.’” Id. At this point, Kautz left and telephoned Site Manager
Phillips “to inform him of the situation.” Neither man testified as to the substance of that
conversation.
Shortly afterwards, Kautz called Boey to his office, with leads Walton and Valezzi. Kautz 15
asked Boey whether he was willing to fill out the checklist. Boey repeated his request for his
“read and sign” and Kautz responded that it was in Phillips’ locked office, but that he would get
him a copy. Kautz then told Boey that he could either complete the checklist or speak with
“upper management” in the morning. Boey responded that he would pursue the latter. It is
undisputed that Kautz never provided Boey with his “read and sign” form; according to Kautz, 20
he never followed up because, as of the following day, Boey’s situation was handled by a higher
level of management. At hearing, no party offered a copy of the “read and sign.” (Tr. 145–149,
196; GC Exh. 17)
The following day, a clearly exasperated Phillips emailed Harvey for human resources 25
guidance on how to address Boey’s conduct. Attaching Kautz and Valezzi’s written accounts of
the prior day’s events (along with a statement by a third lead), Phillips stated as follows:
See below and attached in reference to the latest act of defiance by Jonathan
Boey. He’s now on Night shift and refuses to do what Leads And Management 30
asked him to do. Claiming unless there is a TS # at the bottom of everything he’s
asked to do, he doesn’t have to comply with ANY of it. Then demanding the
Supervisor TELL him in writing to do it. Further stating and threatening to John
Kautz, that he’ll take said letter to the Steward for action against the company.
35
Our checklist that was approved by Fred Janneck, is used by everyone to scrub
the Green Books before Pilots receive them. This is an extra set of eyes to ensure
we bounce EMRK’s off the Aircraft Discrepancy Book (Green Book), to further
ensure we don’t overfly or forget something. NO ONE has a beef with it but him.
Blatant insubordination. I’d like to proceed to DAF.40
(GC Exh. 18) “DAF” refers to “Disciplinary Action Form.” (See GC Exh. 24)

9 Oddly, Boey himself denied telling management that he planned to take the written directive to the
Union. (Tr. 223) I did not find this portion of his testimony particularly credible, however, as he
appeared quite distracted and anxious during this portion of Counsel for the General Counsel’s
questioning. In any event, it is obvious that Kautz either truly believed Boey to have made the statement
or he and Valezzi fabricated it for the purpose of reporting it to upper management.
JD(SF)-34-18
6
August 16 was not the first time Boey had demonstrated his willingness to challenge
management with the Union’s assistance. In fact, during the prior 3 months, he had done so
several times. The first was in early June, when he grieved the denial of 8 hours of overtime
pay; this grievance was pending on August 16, and would later be resolved in Boey’s favor in
October 2017. In early to mid-July, Boey successfully avoided discipline after the Union 5
convinced management that the discipline was untimely under the parties’ contract. Finally, in
late July, the Union assisted Boey in getting a time-off request approved. In each of these
instances, Boey specifically involved aircraft mechanic Stephanie Karelis (Karelis), who has
served as chief steward for the unit employees for approximately 10 years. (Tr. 71, 75–76, 115,
117, 185–191, 217–218, 264–267, 332–337; GC Exh. 14, 15)10
On August 17, Boey again sought Karelis’ assistance. They discussed his concerns about
completing the logbook checklist, and Boey said that he was going to attempt to obtain from
management a copy of the “policy” regarding the checklist. According to Karelis, whose shift
was scheduled to end approximately ½ hour following their conversation, Boey said, “if he 15
needed me, he would come get me.” There is no evidence, however, that Boey arranged for
Karelis to remain at work or in the vicinity after her shift in order to assist him. (Tr. 345)
3. Boey’s Weingarten Meeting
20
Shortly after 3:00 p.m. on August 17, Boey was summoned to a meeting with Maintenance
Manager Raymond Donahue and Maintenance Supervisor Robert Shelton. At the outset of the
meeting, Donahus asked Boey if he wanted a union representative present, to which Boey
responded, “yes.” The only steward on duty at the time was Mark Hansford (Hansford), a
steward who works on the night shift. Hansford, who had only served as a steward since early 25
2017, was brought into the room. Boey then stated that he wanted Karelis, not Hansford, to
serve as his steward. (Tr. 112, 123–124, 198–200, 220, 237–239, 246)
At the time of the meeting, Karelis’ shift had been over for at least ½ hour, and management
made no attempt to determine her whereabouts and/or availability. Donahue told Boey that 30
Karelis was not at the facility and that he was required to write a statement regarding his refusal
to complete the checklist. Stating that Boey could have until the close of his shift the following
day in which to complete the statement, during which time he was free to meet with Karelis,
Donahue added that he preferred that Boey submit the statement by the end of his current shift.
Hansford played an active role in the meeting, requesting that Respondent provide copies of 35
other employees’ completed checklists, and also suggesting that Boey receiving no discipline.
(Tr. 121–125, 219, 246–249, 253–254, 257)
Prior to the August 17 meeting, it is undisputed that Respondent had requested that Karelis
perform steward duties during her off-duty hours, either by coming to work outside her shift or 40
staying beyond her shift’s end. None of these cases, however, involved Weingarten meetings in
which another steward was already available. (Tr. 126–127, 129, 397–400)
4. Boey’s Suspension
45
On August 20, Phillips summoned Boey to his office. With Hansford present, Phillips
informed Boey that he was suspended until further notice. Boey asked the reason for his
suspension, to which Phillips responded “insubordination.” Phillips was resolute in his
JD(SF)-34-18
7
testimony that the decision to suspend Boey pending investigation was not his; instead, he
explained, he was ordered to do so by Harvey, who did not testify. (Tr. 98–100, 206, 251–253)
On August 26, Respondent convened a Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) regarding Boey.10
Such a body, also referred to a “disciplinary review committee,” only meets when an employee 5
is being considered for discharge. The August 26 DRB consisted of Kautz, Donahue, Phillips,
Janneck and Harvey, along with three additional labor relations/human resources representatives:
Scott Ryan (Ryan), Michael Redmond (Redmond) and Donald Smith (Smith). Of the DRB
members still currently employed at the time of the hearing, only Kautz, Donahue and Phillips
testified. (Tr. 100–102, 459, 499) 10
Prior to the meeting, Phillips provided the DRB members with a packet of documentation
regarding Boey’s refusal to complete the checklist. In addition to Boey’s August 17 statement,
the packet included numerous copies of checklists completed by other mechanics, as well as:
15
 Kautz’ August 16 email (relating Boey threat to take the checklist issue “straight to
the [U]nion”);
 Valezzi’s August 16 report (noting that Boey had warned Kautz that he was “going to
the union with this”); and20
 Phillips’ August 17 email (relating Boey’s threat to take information to steward for
“action against the company”).
(R. Exh. 3; Tr. 476, 495)25
The details of how this meeting proceeded are somewhat sketchy; according to Phillips, he,
along with Kautz and Donahue, advocated for Boey to be discharged, but this position was
overruled by the others on the panel. In any event, Respondent’s minutes of the DRB meeting
indicate that, after a brief discussion, “the Board voted unanimously” for Boey to be issued a 5-30
day suspension. (Tr. 133) According to the minutes (which were drafted by Ryan), Boey was
suspended:
due to his violation of the company policies: #2 Unsatisfactory quality or
quantity of work and #12 Inability or unwillingness to work harmoniously 35
with others, noncompliance company policies and previous disciplinary
actions.
(R. Exh. 3) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that, prior to this suspension, Boey had received
no prior discipline. (Tr. 499)40
On August 27, Phillips met with Boey and handed him a DAF that listed the dates of his
suspension as August 20 through August 24. The document is dated August 24 and contains
Phillips’ signature dated the following day. Thus, it appears that the document was finalized on

10 That the meeting occurred on this date is established by Respondent’s own minutes of the meeting.
I therefore do not credit Phillips’ uncorroborated testimony that it occurred the day before.
JD(SF)-34-18
8
August 25, the day before the DRB meeting during which Phillips claimed to have argued for
Boey to be discharged, not merely suspended.
5. Contractual language and Respondent policies relied upon by the General Counsel
5
The General Counsel contends, inter alia, that Boey’s refusal to execute the logbook
checklist amounted to an attempt on his part to enforce his rights under the parties’ CBA.
Accordingly, a discussion of certain CBA provisions, as well as Respondent’s policies, is
appropriate. The first CBA provision obligates Respondent to provide notice to the Union of
new work rules, which the Union may challenge as unreasonable.11 The second provision 10
provides that Respondent will give 7 days’ notice of any new rule or policy, and further states
that “no employee will be disciplined until this obligation is met.” (GC Exh. 2 at 32, Art. 27 § 5)
Respondent maintains numerous written policies, and even maintains policies governing the
maintenance of its own policies. Specifically, since January 1, 2013, Respondent has maintained 15
a written policy entitled “Policies and Procedures,” which contains the following provision:
2.2 While it is acceptable to convey non-recurring requirements by
memorandum of similar means, recurring requirements should be
documented in the form of a policy or procedure. 20
(GC Exh. 27 at 1) An identical provision is contained within a related policy, entitled,
“Document Control Numbering.” (GC Exh. 28 at 1) Karelis testified that, based on this
provision, if Respondent requires unit employees to complete written forms, “there should be
some sort of documentation” directing and authorizing employees to fill out the form. (Tr. 339; 25
GC Exhs. 27, 28) There is no evidence that either of the policies containing the section 2.2
language was the result of Respondent negotiating with the Union, or that any provision of the
CBA obligates Respondent to “codify” its rules, regulations and policies in writing.
B. Analysis30
1. Boey’s suspension
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent suspended Boey for engaging in union activity
in violation of Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. In the alternative, the General Counsel alleges 35
that Boey was suspended for attempting to enforce his rights under the collective bargaining
agreement. Respondent denies all allegations, asserting that, notwithstanding any union activity
on Boey’s part, it would have suspended him in any event based on his repeated refusal to
complete the logbook checklist.
40
I agree with the General Counsel and find that Respondent violated the Act based on the
General Counsel’s primary, but not its alternate, theory of liability.

11 This provision reads as follows: “[t]he Union and the employees shall be notified prior to
enforcement of new rules or changes in existing work rules. The Union reserves the right to pursue
through the Grievance and Arbitration procedure, as spelled out in this agreement, rules which it believes
to be unreasonable.” See GC Exh. 2 at 6–7, Art. 5 § 2.
JD(SF)-34-18
9
a. The Applicable Law
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that it is “an unfair labor practice for an
employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 5
158(a)(3). Under Section 8(a)(3), the prohibition on encouraging or discouraging “membership
in any labor organization” has long been held to include, more generally, encouraging or
discouraging participation in concerted or union activities. Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 39–40 (1954); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963).
10
As a preliminary matter, while Boey’s alleged insubordination arose in connection with his
announcement that he planned to enlist the Union’s support to challenge the order he refused, I
do not find that his refusal to sign the logbook necessarily occurred in the course of protected
conduct, such that an analysis under Atlantic Steel would be appropriate. Compare Ozburn-
Hessey Logistics, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 177, slip op. at 5 (2018) (applying Atlantic Steel standard 15
to employee’s refusal to return to Weingarten meeting, which was “inextricable intertwined with
his protected request for union representation”) (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814, 816
(1979)). Here, Boey could have, as Respondent puts it, “obeyed first and grieved later,” meaning
that his refusal to sign the checklist was not part-and-parcel with his effort to enlist the Union’s
assistance to challenge the checklist requirement. Therefore, I find that an analysis under Wright 20
Line is appropriate.12
Under that framework, the General Counsel must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that an employee’s protected concerted activity was a motivating factor (in whole or in part) for
the employer’s adverse employment action. “The elements required to support such a showing 25
are union or protected concerted activity, employer knowledge of that activity, and union animus
on the part of the employer.” Libertyville Toyota, 360 NLRB 1298, 1301 (2014). Proof of such
unlawful motivation can be based on direct evidence or can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence based on the record as a whole. Robert Orr/Sysco Food Services, 343 NLRB 1183,
1184 (2004), enfd. 184 Fed. Appx. 476 (6th Cir. 2006); Embassy Vacation Resorts, 340 NLRB 30
846, 848 (2003).
An employer’s antiunion motivation may be established by evidence such as managerial
admissions of hostility toward employee union activities, the timing of an adverse action,
departures from past practice, disparate treatment of discriminatees, shifting, inconsistent or 35
irrational explanations for the treatment of discriminatees, evidence that the employer’s proffered
explanation of the adverse action is pretext, and other contemporaneous unfair labor practices.
Kitsap Tenant Support Services, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 98, slip op. at 14 (2018); Novato
Healthcare Center, 365 NLRB No. 137, slip op. at 16 (2017); Lucky Cab Co., 360 NLRB 271,
274 (2014). In addition, the Board has long recognized that “‘the timing of the [employer’s 40
conduct] is strongly indicative of animus.’” A.S.V., Inc., 366 NLRB No. 162, slip op. at 36
(2018) (quoting Electronic Data Systems, 305 NLRB 219, 220 (1991), enfd. in relevant part 985
F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also N.C. Prisoner Legal Services, 351 NLRB 464, 468 (2007),
citing Davey Roofing Inc., 341 NLRB 222, 223 (2004) (timing of employer’s action in relation to
protected activity provides reliable evidence of unlawful motivation).45

12 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. on other grounds 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
JD(SF)-34-18
10
If the General Counsel makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have taken place
even in the absence of the protected conduct. See Shamrock Foods Co., 366 NLRB No. 117, slip
op. at 26–27 (2018), and cases cited therein. In this regard, it is not sufficient for the employer
merely to produce a legitimate basis for the adverse employment action or to show that the5
legitimate reason factored into its decision. T. Steele Construction, Inc., 348 NLRB 1173, 1184
(2006). Instead, it “must persuade that the action would have taken place absent protected
conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.” Weldun International, 321 NLRB 733 (1996)
(internal quotations omitted), enfd. in relevant part 165 F.3d 28 (6th Cir. 1998); see NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (approving Wright Line and rejecting 10
employer’s claim that its burden in making out an affirmative defense is met by demonstration of
a legitimate basis for the adverse employment action).
That said, under the Wright Line framework, as part of his initial showing, the General
Counsel may also offer proof that the employer’s reasons for the personnel decision were 15
pretextual. Con-Way Freight, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 183, slip op. at 2–3 (2018) (citing Pro-Spec
Painting, Inc., 339 NLRB 946, 949 (2003); National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 324 NLRB 1114,
1119, fn. 11 (1997)). Indeed, where the employer’s proffered reason is shown to be pretextual,
“the factfinder may not only properly infer that there is some other motive, but ‘that the motive is
one that the employer desires to conceal—an unlawful motive….’” Id. (quoting Shattuck Denn 20
Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966) (citation omitted). Thus, as the Board
recently reiterated:
A finding of pretext defeats any attempt by the Respondent to show that it
would have discharged the discriminatees absent their union activities. 25
This is because where “the evidence establishes that the reasons given for
the Respondent’s action are pretextual—that is, either false or not in fact
relied upon—the Respondent fails by definition to show that it would have
taken the same action for those reasons, absent the protected conduct, and
thus there is no need to perform the second part of the Wright Line 30
analysis.
Con-Way Freight, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 183, slip op. at 2–3 (citing Golden State Foods Corp.,
340 NLRB 382, 385 (2003); Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981)). It follows that
“the mere existence of a valid ground for [discipline] is no defense to an unfair labor practice 35
charge if such ground was a pretext and not the moving cause.” Id. at 3 (quoting NLRB v. Yale
Mfg. Co., 356 F.2d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 1966)), enfd. 182 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
b. The General Counsel’s initial Wright Line case
40
For the following reasons, I find the General Counsel has met his initial burden of
establishing that Boey’s union activity was a substantial or motivating factor for Respondent’s
decision to suspend him:
First, the General Counsel clearly established that Boey engaged in protected, union-related 45
activity during the 2 months leading up to his suspension. As noted, he had successfully avoided
prior discipline by involving his union steward, had involved the Union in obtaining requested
time off, and had filed an overtime grievance that was pending at the time he was suspended. On
JD(SF)-34-18
11
August 16, Boey did more than merely engage in a refusal to sign the logbook checklist; he
threatened to continue his practice of challenging management by involving the Union. Whether
the checklist requirement was in fact as objectionable as Boey perceived it, or whether he could
have made his case in a “more efficacious or reasonable manner,” is not the point. See Tamara
Foods, 258 NLRB 1307, 1308 (1981) (finding such factors irrelevant to analysis of protected 5
conduct), enfd. 692 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461 U.S. 928 (1983).
Second, the General Counsel has established Respondent’s knowledge of Boey’s union
activity. Phillips was involved in Boey’s prior clashes with management and knew he had a
penchant for involving the Union in resolving his day-to-day workplace issues. He tellingly 10
characterized Boey’s August 16–17 conduct as only the “latest act of defiance” on his part, an
apparent reference to his habit of second guessing his superiors. Additionally, it is undisputed
that every member of the DRB was on notice that Boey had threatened to involve the Union and
take “action against the company.”13 Finally, it is appropriate to impute knowledge of Boey’s
past grievance filing and reliance on the Union’s advocacy to them, as Respondent failed to 15
adduce any facts that would suggest otherwise. See Airgas USA, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 92, slip
op. at 7 (2018), and cases cited there (“[i]t is well establidshed that the Board imputes a
manager’s or supervisor’s knowledge of an employee’s protected concerted activities to the
decision-maker, unless the employer affirmatively establishes a basis for negating such
imputation”).20
Finally, the General Counsel has clearly established that Respondent had animus towards
Boey’s union activities, as plainly demonstrated by Phillips’ incense at Boey’s announced
intention to involve the Union in second-guessing yet another management decision. Animus is
additionally inferred through the suspect timing of his suspension—within days of his threat to 25
again enlist the Union’s services, something he had done 3 times in as many months. Indeed,
that Boey was summarily suspended after being advised that the “read and sign” document he
sought—which would have put the entire “checklist” issue to rest—was available and would be
provided to him, itself speaks volumes. See Electronic Data Systems, 305 NLRB 219, 220
(1991) (“the timing of the [employer’s conduct] is strongly indicative of animus”), enfd. in30
relevant part 985 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1993). Moreover, while Respondent argues that the ultimate
“ratcheting down” Boey’s punishment to a mere suspension serves as evidence of its lack of
animus, the record as a whole does not support such a conclusion.14
Finally, Respondent’s efforts to prop up its decision to suspend Boey with shifting and 35
unsupported explanations are a strong indication of Respondent’s unlawful motive and are also
highly suggestive of pretext. Phillips initially informed Boey that he was being suspended for

13 To the extent that Boey himself denied making such a threat, I find this immaterial, inasmuch as
the DRB members were under the impression that he had. See Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama,
LLC, 366 NLRB No. 166, slip op. at 2 (2018) (finding unlawful discharge based on decisionmakers’
belief employees engaged in protected concerted activity, “regardless of whether they actually did so”)
(citations omitted).
14 Indeed, I find it more likely that, aware that they were treading on thin ice by disciplining an
employee who had only just announced his intention to “go to the Union,” Respondent’s human resources
representatives (none of whom testified) engineered the DRB to posture his discipline in as benevolent a
manner as possible. This would explain Phillips signing Boey’s suspension notice a day before attending
a meeting only necessary when discharge was being considered.
JD(SF)-34-18
12
insubordination, period. The DRB minutes, however, reflect other seemingly gratuitous,
“bonus” rationales for the action, including Boey’s “unsatisfactory quality or quantity of work”
and prior disciplinary actions which simply did not exist. See Con-Way Freight, Inc., 366 NLRB
No. 183, slip op. at 3 (finding pretext based on unsupported claim in termination documents that
employee “did not work well with customers and others”); see also Shamrock Foods, 366 NLRB 5
No. 117, slip op. at 27–28, and cases cited there (employer’s shifting, false, or exaggerated
reasons for an adverse action are evidence of unlawful motive); Inter-Disciplinary Advantage,
Inc., 349 NLRB 480, 509 (2007) (finding that “an employer’s shifting explanation for a
discharge, or . . . its post hoc attempt to rationalize such a decision, are suggestive of a pretext”);
Harrison Steel Castings Co., 262 NLRB 450, 479 (1982) (finding that employer’s defense “bore 10
all the trappings of pretext” where it involved “exaggeration, implausibility, and contradiction”),
enfd. in relevant part 728 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1984).
c. The General Counsel’s alternate theory under the Interboro doctrine
15
The General Counsel argues that Boey also engaged in protected, concerted conduct by
seeking to enforce his rights under the CBA. Specifically, it is claimed that, by refusing to
complete the checklist, Boey in effect asserted rights under the parties collective bargaining
agreement, rendering his conduct protected. I disagree.
20
The Board—by its Interboro doctrine—has long recognized that an individual employee’s
assertion of a right grounded in a collective-bargaining agreement constitutes concerted activity
“and [is] therefore accorded the protection of § 7.” See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S.
822, 829 (1984) (citing Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 NLRB 1295, 1298 (1966), enfd. 388
F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967); Bunney Bros. Construction Co., 139 NLRB 1516, 1519 (1962)). As 25
one commentator has put it, the doctrine recognizes that the individual assertion of collectively
bargained rights necessarily implicates the rights of all bargaining unit employees, thereby
serving as “an extension of the concerted activity that originally gave rise to the agreement.”15
Thus, such conduct is properly viewed as aimed towards “mutual aid or protection,” regardless
of whether the employee has his own interests most immediately in mind. NLRB v. City 30
Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. at 830.
It does not follow, however, that every action or complaint by an individual employee that
purports to enforce a contractual right in fact qualifies as concerted conduct, and the doctrine
should not be applied to elevate an employee’s purely personal “griping” to protected status. Id.35
at 833 n. 10 (citation omitted). Instead, the employee’s allegedly protected conduct must be
based upon a reasonable and honest (albeit not necessarily correct) belief that there is a perceived
violation of the contract,16 and was reasonably perceived by the employer as such. Id. at 823–
824. For the doctrine to apply to an employee’s refusal to perform work, the General Counsel
must demonstrate that:40

15 Raymond T. Mak, “City Disposal Systems and the Interboro Doctrine: The Evolution of the
Requirement of ‘Concerted Activity’ under the National Labor Relations Act,” 2 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 265,
291–292 (Spring 1985).
16 See NLRB v. H.C. Smith Constr. Co., 439 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971) (employee does not lose
Section 7 protection as a matter of law simply because his understanding of the contract is mistaken);
John Sexton & Co., 217 NLRB 80 (1975) (ultimate merit of asserted contract claim is immaterial).
JD(SF)-34-18
13
the employee’s statement or action is based on a reasonable and honest
belief that he is being, or has been, asked to perform a task that he is not
required to perform under his collective-bargaining agreement, and the
statement or action is reasonably directed toward the enforcement of a 5
collectively bargained right. . .
Id. at 837, 840 (truck driver’s refusal to drive truck he reasonably and honestly perceived as
unsafe amounted to an attempt to enforce contractual provision providing that drivers were
permitted to refuse to drive an unsafe truck unless such refusal was unjustified).10
I do not find Boey’s refusal to execute the checklist to meet this standard. He indicated to
management that he believed “PMO policy”—not a collectively bargained agreement—
precluded him from completing the checklist, because it was an “unapproved document.” It is
true that, as a separate matter, two provisions of the CBA in fact obligate Respondent to provide 15
employees notice of “new rules or changes in existing work rules” (Article 5.02) and “new or
modified Company rules, regulations and policies” (Article 27.05). That said, there is simply no
record evidence that, at the time he refused to complete the checklist task, he reasonably or
honestly believed that, by doing so, he was sought to enforce either of these provisions, or that
Respondent reasonably apprehended this. Put another way, Boey’s conduct did not serve as an 20
extension of the concerted activity that resulted in Articles 27.05 and 5.02, but rather amounted
to his individual attempt to police whether Respondent was following its own internal, PMO
policy. Deeming such conduct protected by Section 7 pursuant to Interboro is therefore
inappropriate.
25
d. Respondent’s Wright Line defense
Having found that the General Counsel has proven that Boey’s union activity was a
motivating factor for his suspension, the burden shifts to Respondent to offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions. As indicated earlier, I find that the record, as a 30
whole, supports a finding that Boey’s refusal to sign the logbook checklist was not, in fact, the
reason Respondent suspended him. Rather, I believe that Respondent seized on Boey’s standoff
over the checklist as a handy pretext on which to discipline him for threatening to enlist the
Union’s assistance in challenging yet another management decision. As noted, both the timing
of the DRB’s deliberation (a day after Phillips had signed Boey’s suspension notice) as well as 35
the piling on of additional, unsupported reasons for the suspension (nonexistent prior discipline
and claimed poor work quality or quantity) compel such a finding.17 Taken together, these
shifting and unsupported post hoc rationales for issuing Boey a suspension Phillips had
inexplicably already signed support a finding that Respondent’s proffered defense is pretextual;
Respondent has thus failed by definition to show that it would have suspended Boey absent his 40
protected conduct.
Furthermore, even were I to find Respondent’s stated reason for suspending Boey (his failure
to sign the logbook checklist) to be non-pretextual, I would further conclude that Respondent had

17 The failure of current manager Ryan, who drafted the DRB meeting minutes, to testify and explain
these apparently fabricated rationales is especially damaging to Respondent’s claims that it suspended
Boey for a lawful reason.
JD(SF)-34-18
14
failed to meet its burden under Wright Line of establishing that it would have taken the same
action against him in the absence of his union activity. Citing the industrial relations maxim,
“obey now, grieve later,” Respondent asserts that it was compelled to discipline Boey because he
refused to sign the checklist. But at hearing, Respondent failed to adduce evidence to support
this theory; there is simply no credible evidence that Boey’s refusal to complete the checklist—5
as opposed to his announced intention to enlist the Union in challenging the requirement—was
singularly on the minds of the decision makers, the majority of who failed to testify. What is
evident is that Phillips—who initiated the disciplinary process—was clearly annoyed by what he
considered Boey’s latest “act of defiance” and that Boey’s only prior “disobedience” had taken
the form of repeatedly enlisting the Union’s assistance to challenge management. Considering 10
all the circumstances, I believe that Respondent has failed to prove that it would have suspended
Boey in the absence of his actual (or perceived) union activity.
For the reasons set forth herein, I find that, based on the preponderance of the evidence,
Respondent suspended Boey based on his union conduct.15
2. Weingarten allegation
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975), an
employee, upon request, is entitled to have union representation at an investigatory meeting in 20
which he has reasonable grounds to fear that the meeting may result in disciplinary action being
taken against him. The Weingarten right arises out of the protections inherent in Section 7 of the
Act, but its exercise may not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. Id. at 256–258.
Once an employee requests that a union representative be present during an investigatory
interview, the employer may grant the request, discontinue the interview or offer the employee 25
the choice of either continuing the interview without a representative or not having the interview
at all. Id. at 258–259. In the present case, I find that, considering the circumstances, Boey had
reasonable grounds to fear that discipline could result from the August 17 meeting, which took
place following his refusal to comply with a management directive to complete the logbook
checklist. Thus, the issue is whether, by providing steward Hanson to represent Boey during the 30
meeting, Respondent satisfied its Weingarten obligation, or whether it was instead obligated to
delay the meeting until Boey’s preferred representative, Karelis, was available. I find the former
to be the case.
An employee facing an investigatory interview must be given a reasonable amount of time to 35
secure union representation; otherwise, the Weingarten right would be illusory. See, e.g.,
Manhattan Beer Distributors, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 192, slip op. at 1 (2015) (employer violated
the Act by discharging employee for refusing to submit to drug test without affording him
reasonable time to secure presence of a representative). Moreover, the designation of a specific
representative, the Board has held, is generally a matter within the discretion of the union, not 40
the employer:
When two union officials are equally available to serve as a Weingarten
representative…the decision as to who will serve is properly decided by
the union officials, unless the employer can establish special 45
circumstances.
JD(SF)-34-18
15
New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 308 NLRB 277, 307 (1992), enfd. 936 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1991). In
particular, the Board has found that an employer violates the Act by insisting that an employee
proceed with an interview with a less experienced or capable representative when a better-
qualified representative is requested and available. See Consolidation Coal, 307 NLRB 976
(1992) (unlawful to require employee choose representative from inexperienced committeemen 5
when experienced union representative available); GHR Energy Corp., 294 NLRB 1011, 1042
(1989) (unlawful to force employee to proceed in interview with shop steward when
international representative available), enfd. 924 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1991).
A different scenario is presented, however, where there are not two “equally available” 10
potential representatives, i.e., where the employee’s preferred representative is not immediately
available, but another representative is present and ready to go forward. In such circumstances,
the Board balances the exercise of Weingarten rights against the employer’s legitimate
management prerogative to investigate employee misconduct, which has understandably led to
case-specific results. For example, in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 227 NLRB 1276 15
(1977), cited by Respondent, the Board found no violation where an employer denied an
employee’s request for a steward who was away on vacation, where another steward was
available and the preferred steward’s vacation schedule would have forced postponing the
meeting from Friday to the following Monday. The Board held that:
20
…there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Weingarten which
indicates that an employer must postpone interviews with its employees
because a particular union representative, here the shop steward, is
unavailable either for personal or other reasons, where another
representative is available whose presence could have been requested by 25
the employee in the absent representative’s place.
227 NLRB at 1276 (citation omitted). In so concluding, the Board stressed the admonition in
Weingarten that the right to choose representation should not interfere with “legitimate employer
prerogatives” such as conducting investigatory interviews without delay. Id.
Thus, under Coca-Cola, accommodating a 3-day delay occasioned by a preferred but absent 30
steward was deemed outside the scope of the employer’s Weingarten obligation. However,
whether a given delay must be accommodated depends on the particular facts. For example, in
Las Palmas Med. Ctr., 358 NLRB 460 (2012), the employer violated the Act by refusing an
employee’s request for an absent representative, where that individual’s work duties would have
caused a 5 to 10–minute delay in commencing the investigatory meeting. In finding unlawful the 35
employer’s refusal to accommodate the preferred steward’s schedule, the Board adopted the
administrative law judge’s finding that the short delay was not unreasonable. Id. at 468.
By contrast, the Board appears less inclined to countenance a delay occasioned by the
absence of a preferred representative who does not typically represent employees such as the
requesting employee. For example, in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 253 NLRB 1143 (1981, also 40
relied on by Respondent, the Board concluded that an employee did not have the right to her
preferred representative, who worked at a facility 20 minutes away and did not usually represent
employees at the interview location; in that case, the Board emphasized that the present,
available representative was in fact the union’s designated representative for the employee’s own
facility. See also Buonadonna Shoprite, 356 NLRB 857 (2011) (employer not required to delay 45
JD(SF)-34-18
16
interview 4 days until employee’s preferred representative was present, inasmuch as a shop
steward who typically served as union representative was available). Such is particularly the
case where the presently available representative was in fact appointed by the union for the
purpose of representing employees on the shift during which the interview takes place. Roadway
Express, Inc., 246 NLRB 1127, 1129–1130 (1979). 5
The General Counsel relies primarily on Smith’s Food and Drug Centers, Inc., 361 NLRB
1216 (2014). Significantly, in that case, the General Counsel alleged that the respondent had
violated an employee’s Weingarten rights by two acts: (a) refusing her requested representative;
and (b) refusing to allow her to speak to that representative via telephone. The Board agreed, 10
finding that the employer had forced the employee, Pfeiffer, to proceed with an investigatory
interview represented by a floor shop steward, instead of the facility’s lead union representative,
Sullivan. Sullivan was absent at the time of Pfeiffer’s request, but had arranged to be in the
vicinity and available by phone. After Pfeiffer asked to phone Sullivan and further said that she
was expecting the call, the manager said no, and that she was entitled only to “the most available 15
union person present and in that situation, it was the steward...” Id. at 1220.
The administrative law judge, applying the New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. rule that an employee
must be allowed her choice of two “equally available” representatives, found that:
20
While it is true that they did not know how long it would take Sullivan to
get to the facility, and, therefore, for how long the interview would have to
be delayed, the matter could easily have been resolved by a phone call to
take Sullivan to determine her location at the time. They would have
easily learned if Sullivan was readily available to come to the store to 25
represent Pfeiffer, as she and Pfeifer testified, or whether she was
unavailable, and if she was not readily available, the choice of [the shop
steward] as her representative would have been permissible. However,
[the manager] was unwilling to let her do that . . .
30
In affirming the judge, the Board agreed that the crux of the matter was that employee Pfeiffer
had been denied the right to contact her representative, as she had requested. Id. at 1217 (“we
affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent unlawfully denied Pfeifer her choice of union
representative at the July 16 investigatory interview when it prevented Pfeifer from calling
Sullivan”).35
Based on the facts presented in this case, I do not find that Respondent violated Boey’s
Weingarten rights. While Boey may have been more familiar with Karelis—as the steward
primarily responsible for representing employees on his former (day) shift—Respondent fulfilled
its obligation to Boey by providing Hansford, the designated night-shift steward who was
immediately available. See Buonadonna Shoprite, supra (no violation where employee provided 40
available, albeit not preferred, steward for meeting in which employee was asked to provide
statement regarding alleged misconduct). Hansford’s conduct in the meeting was consistent with
effective representation; he demanded documents and attempted to resolve Boey’s situation
before it resulted in discipline. Nor is there any indication that Hansford was an inappropriate
steward for Boey.45
Nor do I agree with the General Counsel that the Smith’s Food and Drug decision is
controlling here. Key factors distinguish Boey’s request from the one found to have been
JD(SF)-34-18
17
unlawfully denied in that case. First, there is no evidence that Respondent believed Karelis—
who regularly clocked out at least 30 minutes earlier—to have arranged with Boey to be readily
available when it denied Boey’s request, or that the two had in fact made such an arrangement.
Nor did Boey did actually request an opportunity to contact Karelis; instead, he demanded that
she be present before he was questioned. Thus, unlike the situation presented in Smith’s Food 5
and Drug, satisfying Boey’s request would necessarily delay Respondent’s investigation for an
indeterminate period until Karelis could be tracked down or otherwise became available. I do
not believe the Weingarten right was intended to delay indefinitely an employer’s effort to
investigate employee conduct, where another designated union steward is available.
10
Accordingly, I find that Respondent did not violate Boey’s Weingarten rights as alleged and,
therefore, recommend that paragraphs 6(b) through (d) of the complaint be dismissed.
Information Request Allegations
15
The General Counsel alleges that, between June 13 and July 24, 2017, Respondent
unreasonably delayed in providing 2 categories of information requested by the Union: (a)
copies of Respondent’s policies for maintaining certain publications; and (b) a list of all current
publications that are used by unit employees in Respondent’s Davis-Monthan operation.18 It is
further alleged that, since June 13, Respondent has failed and refused to provide a requested 20
“point of contact” for each such publication, as requested by the Union.19
A. Factual Background
1. The role of “tech data” in the Davis-Monthan operation25
Respondent’s mechanics are required, per FAA regulations, to ensure that they employ the
methods, techniques and practices for performing maintenance set forth in each aircraft
manufacturer’s manual. These manuals, also referred to as “publications,” contain technical data
(or “tech data”), which includes technical and electrical schematics of the aircraft. (See R. Exh. 30
3; Tr. 414) The manner in which Respondent has maintained manufacturers’ publications at
Davis-Monthan has evolved with changing technology. As Wooley testified, until
approximately 5 years ago, a mechanic would access tech data for a particular aircraft by
referring to a paper manual kept updated by Respondent. The manuals were then transferred to a
shared computer network drive maintained by Customs and Border Protection, which employees 35
could access via stand-alone computer terminals at kiosks throughout the worksite. Updates to
these computers were provided either via emails or thumb drives issued to individual employees.
(Tr. 43–44, 425)
In early 2017, Respondent received notice from several airplane manufacturers that they 40
would no longer provide email or thumb-drive updates to their manuals, but would be
transitioning to an Internet-based system. Respondent responded by modifying its stand-alone

18 While the complaint originally alleged that this information was requested on June 29, 2017, and
was never provided by Respondent, this allegation was subsequently amended to state an unreasonable
delay in providing this information from June 13 until July 24, 2017. See GC Exh. 1(f) at ¶ 3; Tr. 8–12.
19 At hearing, I granted Counsel for the General Counsel’s motion to add this refusal-to-provide
allegation. See Tr. 8–12.
JD(SF)-34-18
18
computer terminals to have online capability; under a new protocol, individual mechanics would
be responsible for accessing the most up-to-date manual directly from any given manufacturers’
website. The transition to this new protocol precipitated the Union’s information requests at
issue in this case. (Tr. 425–426)
5
2. Respondent’s written policy regarding the maintenance of “tech data”
Respondent maintains numerous written procedures, including one entitled, “Technical
Publication Library.” Also identified as “Procedure 9002,” this document sets forth the manner
in which tech data is to be maintained and updated. Specifically, Procedure 9002 provides that 10
Respondent will “maintain a master file of all publications held in support of aircraft and
equipment.” This listing is referred to as the Technical Publication Revision Master List, or
simply the “Master List.” At Davis-Monthan, the Master List is kept in a binder in the Quality
Control department, where it is accessible to all employees. It is also available to employees
online. (Tr. 66, 432–436; see GC Exhs. 6, 12(b)) 15
Procedure 9002 also dictates each of Respondent’s worksites, such as Davis-Monthan, keep
“all publications, directives, and forms required to maintain their assigned aircraft and
equipment” in a central location, in either hard copy or electronic format. Finally, Procedure
9002 provides that “[t]he on-site technical library is the responsibility of the Quality Control 20
Supervisor or personnel assigned technical library and duties.” Pursuant to this policy, Quality
Control Supervisor Wooley is responsible for maintaining and updating the Technical
Publications Library at Davis-Monthan. (GC Exh. 6; Tr. 414)
3. The Union’s information requests regarding the maintenance and updating of tech data25
At 11:23 a.m. on June 13, 2017,20 Wooley sent an email to all mechanics and avionic
technicians at Respondent’s Davis-Monthan site announcing the transition. Explaining that most
of its manufacturers were no longer sending updates via paper, compact disc or thumb drive,
Wooley stated that the stand-alone computers could no longer be updated, but rather that 30
employees would be responsible for accessing up-to-date tech data directly via each
manufacturer’s website. Attaching a list of websites, along with access instructions, he advised
that unit employees were expected to be using the Internet-based manuals by June 30.21 During
the transition, he noted, employees using technical data from one of the stand-alone computers
should consider it “for reference only” and instead rely on the information contained on the 35
manufacturers’ websites. (GC Exh. 7)
Shortly thereafter, at 12:06 p.m., Chief Shop Steward Karelis emailed Phillips, passing along
a concern from a unit employee. Specifically, she reported that certain manuals on the stand-

20 I do not agree with Respondent that Wooley’s email was likely sent from Puerto Rico, causing it to
arrive at 2:23 p.m. on the West Coast. While a notation on one of Phillips’ emails that day indicated that
it was sent from Puerto Rico, Wooley’s email contains no such notation. See GC Exh. 7 & 8.
21 Wooley’s direct testimony makes clear that, contrary to Respondent’s assertion in its post-hearing
brief, this attachment did not list “a point of contact for various manufacturers.” (See GC Exh. 7(b); Tr.
431, Q: So… This gave employees an opportunity to easily contact the manufacturer, correct, if they had
a question about current data? A: Not so much. It gave them access to the manuals on that
manufacturer’s website”).
JD(SF)-34-18
19
alone computers had not been updated since January, and that employees had not been informed
of this. Employees, she stated, had received “no notice of this change, and were not told where
the correct manuals were.” She ended her email with the following queries:
 Who is in charge of the publication library?5
 Who is the point of contact to verify that the manuals/tech data are current?
 Do we have a master list of all the publications at the site with the current updates?
Citing safety concerns, she stated, “I believe this issue needs immediate attention.” (GC Exh. 8)
10
Phillips responded minutes later, copying Wooley, whom he asked to answer Karelis’
questions. However, within the hour,22 Phillips again emailed Karelis (copying Wooley). This
time, he stated that he had just learned about the transition from stand-alone to networked
computers; he referred her again to Wooley “for further resolution.” Shortly after 2:00 p.m.,
Karelis emailed Phillips again (copying Wooley). She began by thinking him for “looking into 15
the issue” and stated that she had been unaware that the stand-alone computers were being
upgraded.
On June 22, Karelis emailed Phillips and Wooley, passing along another employee complaint
regarding the transition to Internet-based manuals. This employee apparently was concerned that 20
Respondent was no longer updating the manuals accessed by the stand-alone computers and
management was “looking the other way when we use the older versions.” Philips responded,
stating, “we’ll resolve this in short order.” The following day, Karelis emailed Phillips and
Wooley again; referring to employees’ continued reliance on outdated manuals on the shared
drive, she questioned Respondent’s decision to transition to Internet-based manuals, suggesting25
that employees needed training on the new policy and time to set up their new, website accounts.
Finally, she stated, “[p]lease provide updated policies to the use of electronic manuals to the
union.” (GC Exh. 9)
On June 29—the day before Wooley’s announced deadline for employees to register online 30
to access Internet-based manuals—Karelis filed a Step One written grievance, stating:
The Union requested a copy of company policy(s) regarding publications.
Some employees have been made aware that are publications on the floor
and in the Company’s library [shared] drive are not current. The 35
Company has not responded or provided the policy(s) requested.
She then detailed an incident in which an employee was unable to verify that a particular manual
was current, and unable to access the current publication from a supervisor. She concluded by
asking, “how do we verify for ourselves?” In the “Remedy Requested” portion of the grievance 40
form, Karelis stated:
Requesting copies of company policies for maintaining publications.
If hourly employees are responsible for insuring company provided
maintenance publications/guidelines are the most recent version, 45

22 As noted, it appears that Phillips sent this email from Puerto Rico, as it contains a notation
indicating as such and a time stamp of 9:38 a.m. See GC Exh. 8; Tr. 371–372.
JD(SF)-34-18
20
requesting a list of all current publications that are used at this site. In
addition requesting Point of Contact for each publication so the employee
can contact the manufacturer to verify the tech data is up-to-date.
(GC Exh. 10) Respondent’s written grievance-answer attached no documents, but stated that the 5
most up-to-date technical publications were available online, and that employees had been
provided “on multiple occasions and through multiple avenues…the information required to
retrieve the required publications.” (Tr. 295; GC Exh. 10)
Karelis responded the following day, within the framework of her now-Step Two grievance, 10
stating as follows:
The Union understands that the Company believes there is no violation of
the CBA, however, hourly employees are subjected to disciplinary actions
if incorrect tech data is utilized. And I would like to remind the company 15
that the safety issue was brought up earlier this year and the employee was
completely ignored; employee insisted on filing this grievance and remain
anonymous to avoid retaliation. Company’s step 1 answer ‘multipl[e]
occasions and through multipl[e] avenues’ is based on tribal knowledge.23
Past practice, Quality Control would maintain publications and updates. 20
There is no official training in reference publications. To this day, out
dated publications are still available on the “S” drive. The Company has
failed to provide company policies as requested.
(GC Exh. 10) As Karelis testified, at least one unit employee has in fact been disciplined for 25
using an outdated technical publication; it is unclear, however, whether this occurred before or
after the pendency of her information requests. (Tr. 297, 301–305)
According to Karelis, Respondent never provided the Union with a copy of its “company
policies for maintaining publications,” but she eventually obtained a copy of these procedures on 30
her own. Nor did Respondent provide the Union with the requested “point of contact” for each
publication. At hearing, the parties stipulated that, on July 24, Phillips emailed all unit
employees the latest copy of its “Technical Publication Revision Master List.” The General
Counsel concedes that this list was responsive to the Union’s request for a “list of all current
publications that are used at this site.” (Tr. 110, 111, 307–309, 448–339, 452; GC Ex. 1(a), 10, 35
12, 12(b))
B. Analysis
The General Counsel alleges that, between June 13 and July 24, 2017, Respondent 40
unreasonably delayed in providing its policies regarding publications and its “master list” of
publications, as requested by Karelis. It is further alleged that, since June 13, Respondent has
failed and refused a point of contact for each technical publication.

23 Karelis testified that the term “tribal knowledge” referred to unwritten policies and procedures
used in the workplace. (Tr. 406–407)
JD(SF)-34-18
21
When the certified bargaining agent of its employees requests information, an employer may
fulfill its “bargaining obligation under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act” by providing relevant
information. Diponio Construction Co., Inc., 357 NLRB 1206, 1217 (2011), citing United
Aircraft Corp., 192 NLRB 382, 389 (1971). This obligation “includes the duty ‘to timely
disclose that requested information does not exist.’” Graymont PA, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 37, slip 5
op. at 9 (2016) (citing Endo Painting Service, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 61, slip op. at 2 (2014)).
Generally, information pertaining to terms and conditions of represented employees within the
bargaining unit is presumptively relevant. CVS Albany, LLC, 364 NLRB No. 122, slip op. at 2
(2016); see also Country Ford Truck, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.3d 1184, 1191–1192 (D.C. Cir. 2000),
enfg. 330 NLRB 328 (1999) (citation omitted). Once an initial showing of relevance is made, an 10
employer has a burden of proof to demonstrate the lack of relevance or give sufficient reason(s)
“‘as to why he cannot, in good faith, supply such information.’” ATV/Vancom of Nevada Ltd.
Partnership, 326 NLRB 1432, 1434 (1998), citing San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v.
NLRB, 548 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1997).
15
“The duty to furnish information requires a reasonable good-faith effort to respond to the
request as promptly as circumstances allow,” and it is well established that “[a]n unreasonable
delay in furnishing relevant requested information is as much a violation of Section 8(a)(5) as a
refusal to furnish the information at all.” Linwood Care Center, 367 NLRB No. 14, slip op. at 5
(2018) (citations omitted). Absent evidence of a justification, a delay in providing relevant 20
information “will constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(5) inasmuch ‘[a]s the Union was entitled
to the information at the time it made its initial request, [and] it was Respondent’s duty to furnish
it as promptly as possible.’” Id. (citing Pennco, Inc., 212 NLRB 677, 678 (1974)).
In this case, there is no question that the requested information relates to the working 25
conditions of unit employees, deeming it relevant. Respondent in fact appears to concede this,
insofar as it admits that “the three items requested relate to how an employee can access current
tech data, which is a necessary function for an aircraft mechanic or avionics technician under the
applicable [Federal Aviation Regulations].” (R. Br. at 25) Instead, Respondent asserts that, by
Phillips and Wooley’s communications with Karelis (as well as the remaining unit employees), 30
Respondent timely responded to each request. I cannot agree.
In large part, Respondent’s assertion to have responded swiftly to Karelis’ request is based
on its underlying claim that Wooley’s June 13, 2017 email explaining to the workforce the
transition to an Internet-based document management system was sent after Karelis’ email and 35
therefore served as a response to it. As noted, I do not interpret the record evidence in this
manner. In any event, it is beyond dispute that neither Wooley’s email nor the attachment to it
transmitted documents that clearly would have been responsive to Karelis’ requests, including
Respondent’s written policy regarding publications (Procedure 9002) and its most recent “master
list” of publications. Nor is there any indication that Respondent made a good-faith effort to 40
retrieve the requested information. Thus, to the extent that these requests were straight-forward
and sought basic, simple information easily retrievable by Respondent, I find that its nearly 6-
week delay in responding to the requests was unreasonable and violated Section 8(a)(5). See,
e.g., Linwood Care Center, 367 NLRB No. 14, slip op. at 5 (finding 6-week delay unreasonable);
Postal Service, 308 NLRB 547, 551 (1992) (finding 4-weeks unreasonable); Capitol Steel & Iron 45
JD(SF)-34-18
22
Co., 317 NLRB 809, 813 (1995) (finding 2-week delay unreasonable), enfd. 89 F.3d 692 (10th
Cir. 1996).24
Finally, by Wooley’s own admission, Respondent never provided the Union with a list of
contacts for each manufacturer as Karelis requested. In its defense, Respondent raises no issue 5
of confidentiality regarding its customer contacts, but rather argues that providing a single
contact at each manufacturer “would create confusion,” as this individual would potentially be
inundated with calls from multiple employees. (R. Br. at 27) Respondent’s speculation that it
would somehow be unable to control the manner in which individual employees contacted
customers to ensure up-to-date tech data, however, is simply not a basis for refusing to provide 10
otherwise relevant information. Respondent advances an alternate argument, asserting “there is
simply not one person sitting at a desk were at each manufacturer for employees to call directly,
since there is different equipment in various regions.” (R. Br. at 27) To the extent Respondent
claims that it is unable to identify a contact for each customer, Respondent was obligated to
inform the Union of this fact; its failure to do so violated the Act. See Graymont PA, Inc., 364 15
NLRB No. 37, supra.
Accordingly, I find merit to the General Counsel’s information request allegations.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 20
1. Respondent PAE Aviation and Technical Services, LLC (Respondent) is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 2949, 25
AFL–CIO (the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act with
9(a) status under the Act.
3. The following employees of Respondent (Unit) constitute a unit appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:30
All full-time aircraft maintenance and avionic technicians located at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; excluding all office clerk
employees, professional employees, managerial employees, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act.35
4. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to
supply a manufacturer-point of contact for each publication that is used by unit employees in

24 To the extent Respondent argues that Karelis could have accessed its policies and procedures, as
well as the master list of publications, via Respondent’s intranet site, this defense has been squarely
rejected by the Board. See King Soopers, Inc., 344 NLRB 842, 845 (2005) (“a union’s ability to obtain
requested information elsewhere does not excuse an employer’s obligation to provide the requested
information”), enfd. 476 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 2007). This is particularly appropriate where, as here, at
least one obvious purpose behind the Union’s request was to determine whether Respondent had revised
its policies and/or practices in connection with its transition to Internet-based tech data. Kroger Co., 226
NLRB 512, 513–514 (1976) (“[t]he union is entitled to an accurate and authoritative statement of facts
which only the employer is in a position to make”).
JD(SF)-34-18
23
Respondent’s Davis-Monthan operation, so as to enable the Union to discharge its function as
statutory representative of the Unit employees or, to the extent such information did not exist,
failing to so inform the Union.
5. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unreasonably delaying 5
in supplying the following information to the Union, so as to enable the Union to discharge its
function as statutory representative of the Unit employees:
(a) copies of Respondent’s policies for maintaining publications; and
(b) a list of all current publications that are used by unit employees in 10
Respondent’s Davis-Monthan operation.
6. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by suspending employee
Jonathan Boey from August 20–24, 2017, for engaging in union and other protected conduct.
15
7. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
20
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices in violation of
Sections 8(a)(5), (3) and (1) of the Act, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Therefore, I shall
recommend that Respondent, having discriminatorily suspended employee Jonathan Boey,
should be required to restore the status quo ante by rescinding his suspension and removing all 25
references to it from Respondent’s files. Further, I shall recommend that Respondent should
make Boey whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits. Backpay shall be computed in
accordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1971), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987),
compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). 30
Respondent should be ordered to compensate the above-named employees for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving lump sum backpay awards and to file a report with the Social
Security Administration allocating backpay awards to the appropriate calendar quarters for each
employee. Don Chavas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB 101 (2014).
35
Finally, I shall further recommend that Respondent, having unlawfully failed and refused to
provide relevant information to the Union that is relevant and necessary to its performance of its
duties as exclusive collective-bargaining representative and/or failed to inform the Union that
certain requested information did not exist, should be ordered to supply the requested
information, set forth above, to the Union, or to the extent such information does not exist, make 40
such representation to the Union.
JD(SF)-34-18
24
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended25
ORDER
5
Respondent PAE Aviation and Technical Services LLC, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
10
(a) Suspending its employees for engaging in union activities;
(b) Failing or unreasonably delaying to provide information to International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 2949, AFL-CIO (the Union)
that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-15
bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time aircraft maintenance and avionic technicians located
at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; excluding all office
clerk employees, professional employees, managerial employees, 20
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
25
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish to the Union, in a timely and complete manner, a manufacturer-point of
contact for each publication that is used by unit employees in Respondent’s Davis-Monthan
operation, or, to the extent such information does not exist, so inform the Union. 30
(b) Rescind Jonathan Boey’s discriminatory suspension and make him whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of his discriminatory suspension, in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.
35
(c) Compensate Jonathan Boey for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving
a lump-sum backpay award, and file with the Regional Director for Region 28, within 21 days of
the date the amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allocating
his backpay award to the appropriate calendar year(s).
40
(d) Within 14 days’ of the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files all
references to Jonathan Boey’s August 20–24, 2017 discriminatory suspension, and, notify him in
writing that this has been done and that the suspension will not be used against him in any way;

25 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)-34-18
25
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request following the Board’s Order, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a
reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security
payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of 5
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at Respondent’s facility at Davis-
Monthan Airforce Base in Arizona copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.” Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 28, after being signed by 10
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. 15
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings,
Respondent has gone out of business or closed its operations at Davis-Monthan Airforce Base,
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by Respondent at its Davis-Monthan Airforce Base 20
operation at any time since June 13, 2017; and
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for
Region 28 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that Respondent has taken to comply.25
It is further ordered that the complaint allegations are dismissed insofar as they allege violations
of the Act not specifically found.
30
Dated: Washington, D.C. November 9, 2018
Mara-Louise Anzalone
Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefits and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. Specifically:
WE WILL NOT fail or unreasonably delay to provide information to International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 2949, AFL-CIO (the Union) that is relevant
and necessary to the Union’s performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit (the unit):
All full-time aircraft maintenance and avionic technicians located
at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; excluding all office
clerk employees, professional employees, managerial employees,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT discipline, suspend or otherwise discriminate against any of you for supporting the
Union or because you join and assist the Union and engage in concerted activities or to
discourage you from engaging in these activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with your rights under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish to the Union, in a timely and complete manner, a manufacturer-point of contact
for each publication that is used by unit employees in Respondent’s Davis-Monthan operation.
To the extent such information does not exist, WE WILL inform the Union of that fact.
WE WILL remove from our files all references to Jonathan Boey’s August 20–24, 2017
discriminatory suspension and WE WILL notify him in writing that this has been done and that the
suspension will not be used against him in any way.
PAE AVIATION AND TECHNICAL
SERVICES LLC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
2600 North Central Avenue, Suite 1400
Phoenix, AZ 85004-3099
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
(602) 640-2160
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CA-203755 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National
Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (602) 416-4755.