Pacific Coast Feather Co.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 7, 2002

No. 76015611 (T.T.A.B. May. 7, 2002)

5/7/02
Paper No. 9
RFC

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Pacific Coast Feather Company
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Serial No. 76\015,611
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Clark A. Puntigam of Jensen & Puntigam, P.S. for Pacific Coast Feather
Company.

Thomas J. Gleason, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 109 (Ronald R.
Sussman, Managing Attorney).
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Before Sims, Cissel and Bucher, Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Cissel, Administrative Trademark Judge:
On April 3, 2000, applicant filed the above-identified application to
register the mark “TRUWEAVE” on the Principal Register for “bed sheets,” in
Class 24. The application was based on the assertion that applicant possessed a
bona fide intention to use the mark in connection with these goods in commerce.
THIS DISPOSITION
IS NOT CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE T.T.A.B.
The first Examining Attorney1[1] refused registration under Section 2(d)
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), on the ground that if applicant were
to use the mark it seeks to register in connection with bed sheets, it would so
resemble the mark “TRUWEAR,” which is registered2[2] for “fabrics in the piece,
composed of cotton, linen, wool, rayon or nylon fibers, or mixtures of any of the
said fibers; bedspreads, sheets, pillow cases, blankets, cotton sheeting, and cotton
platform velour in the piece,” in Class 22, that confusion would be likely.
Applicant responded to the refusal to register with argument that
confusion would not be likely, but the second Examining Attorney made the
refusal final with the second Office Action.
Applicant timely filed a Notice of Appeal, followed by an appeal brief. As
noted above, the third Examining Attorney filed a brief in response to applicant’s
brief. Applicant did not request an oral hearing before the Board, so we have
resolved this appeal based upon consideration of the written record in the
application in light of the arguments presented in the briefs and the relevant
legal authority.
The predecessor to our primary reviewing Court listed the principal
factors to be considered in determining whether confusion is likely in the case of
In re E. I duPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).

1[1] Mr. Gleason is the third Examining Attorney to have been
assigned this application for examination. He wrote the brief in
response to applicant’s brief on appeal.
Chief among these factors are the similarity of the marks as to appearance,
sound, meaning and commercial impression and the similarity of the goods.
In the case before us, the goods are in part identical (the application lists
“bed sheets” and the registration includes “sheets” and “cotton sheeting”). Our
focus must therefore be whether confusion is likely by virtue of the use of
applicant’s mark, “TRUWEAVE,” on the same goods listed in the cited
registration for the mark “TRUWEAR.” Because these marks do not create
similar commercial impressions and are otherwise dissimilar, confusion is not
likely.
The position taken by the Office is that the marks are “highly similar in
appearance and commercial impression.” (Brief, p.3). The Examining Attorney
argues that they are similar in appearance because their spellings differ only in
that applicant’s mark ends with the letters “VE,” whereas the registered mark
ends with the letter “R.” He
further contends that the marks convey similar commercial impressions because
they each combine the same descriptive prefix with a term which describes or
names textile products. In support of this contention, he submitted with his
Appeal brief dictionary definitions of “weave” as meaning “the pattern, method
of weaving, or construction of a fabric”; and of “wear” as meaning “clothing,
especially of a particular kind or for any particular use.”

2[2] Reg. No. 2,513,208, issued on the Principal Register to David
Rothschild Company, Inc. on Aug. 2, 1949, and renewed three
These arguments are not well taken. These marks are not similar in
appearance, they are not similar in pronunciation, and their connotations, as
established by the evidence submitted by the Examining Attorney, are not that
similar. This case is analogous to Kellogg Co. v. Pack ‘Em Enterprises, 21
USPQ2d 1142, 951 F.2d 300 (Fed. Cir. 1991), wherein the Court found that if the
marks are dissimilar, even if the products with which they are used (or, as in the
instant case, are intended to be used) are the same, confusion is not likely. In the
instant case, the marks are different in appearance and pronunciation, and the
commercial impression created by applicant’s mark, “TRUWEAVE,” as applied
to bed sheets, is not so similar to the commercial impression created by the cited
registered mark, “TRUWEAR,” in connection with sheets and cotton sheeting,
that confusion would be likely.
DECISION: The refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act
is reversed.

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