Oracle International CorporationDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 19, 20212020005702 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/516,280 10/16/2014 Anand N. Katti 088325-0915094 (157200US) 6902 51206 7590 03/19/2021 Oracle / Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER FRUNZI, VICTORIA E. ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3688 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/19/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com oraclepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ANAND N. KATTI _____________ Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, MATTHEW J. McNEILL, and STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32. Claims 2–5, 9, 12–14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, and 26 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2019). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Oracle International Corporation. See Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Invention Embodiments of the disclosed and claimed invention on appeal relate to “on-line advertising and social media, and more particularly to the selection of advertisements based on information available through social media.” Spec. ¶ 1. Representative Claim 1 1. A method comprising: providing, by a computing system comprising one or more processors, consent data associated with a first user, to one or more social media servers including a first social media server, wherein said providing comprises providing consent data to each of the one or more social media servers; receiving, by the computing system, for each of the one or more social media servers, data identifying a scope of a set of publications stored by the social media server, wherein a first scope for the first social media server corresponds to access to a first set of user authored publications having a public level of visibility and stored by the first social media server, but does not provide access to user-authored publications stored by the first social media server that are constrained to be visible to a limited audience; receiving, by the computing system and from each of the one or more social media servers, a user-account specific authorization token, wherein a separate user-account specific authorization token is received from each of the one or more social media servers in response to the consent data provided to the corresponding social media application; maintaining, by the computing system, for each of the one or more social media servers, a mapping between the received scope of publications stored by the social media server Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 3 and the token received from the corresponding social media server; retrieving, by the computing system, using the one or more mappings between the received scope of publications stored by the one or more social media servers and the corresponding tokens, data corresponding to a plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and stored by the one or more social media servers; storing, by the computing system, the data corresponding to a plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers, in a centralized data storage, wherein the centralized data storage further stores a timestamp associated with each publically visible user-authored publication, each said timestamp assigned by the corresponding social media server; [L1] determining, by the computing system, one or more keywords based on the plurality of publically visible user- authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers; receiving, by the computing system, from a user device associated with the first user, a request specifying one or more search query terms; [L2] transmitting, by the computing system, a separate query to an advertising server, the separate query including (i) the one or more keywords determined based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers, and (ii) at least one of the search query terms; receiving, by the computing system and from the advertising server, data identifying one or more advertisements in response to the separate query to the advertising server; Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 4 generating, by the computing system, a search results web page that includes both (a) search results selected based on the search query terms and (b) the one or more advertisements received from the advertising server; and transmitting, by the computing system, the search results page to the user device. Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claim App.) (Disputed limitations L1 and L2 emphasized). Evidence Relied Upon by the Examiner Name Reference Date Polis et al. US 7,673,327 B1 Mar. 2, 2010 Bhatia et al. US 8,631,473 B2 Jan. 14, 2014 Suleman et al. US 9,286,397 B1 Mar. 15, 2016 Mackay US 2007/0288247 A1 Dec. 13, 2007 Won Cho US 2009/0037375 A1 Feb. 5, 2009 Nuzzi US 2012/0239497 A1 Sept. 20, 2012 Park et al. US 2013/0054591 A1 Feb. 28, 2013 Agranat et al. US 2013/0066951 A1 Mar. 14, 2013 Srinivasan et al. US 2013/0086645 A1 Apr. 4, 2013 Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 5 Table of Rejections2 Rejection Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis A 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27–32 101 Eligibility B 1, 6–8, 10, 15, 28, 32 103 Bhatia, Suleman C 24, 25 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Polis D 11, 18 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Mackay E 19 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Won Cho F 21 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Park G 27 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Nuzzi H 29 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Agranat I 30, 31 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Srinivasan ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. Rejection A Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 USPTO 35 U.S.C. § 101 MPEP Guidance In January and October of 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 2 Although the Examiner includes claim 17 in the heading of Rejection B on page 5 of the Final Action, claim 17 is canceled. We have made appropriate correction to the list of claims rejected under Rejection B in the Table of Rejections above. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 6 35 U.S.C. § 101.3 We note the USPTO current eligibility guidance is found in the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (revised June 2020) of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”), and particularly within Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c). Accordingly, all references to the MPEP throughout this Decision are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4 MPEP § 2106, Step 2A, Prong One The Judicial Exception Under MPEP § 2106.04(a), the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas are defined as follows: (1) Mathematical concepts – mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection I); 3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. 51 (Jan. 7, 2019); see also October 2019 Update at 1. 4 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (1) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (2) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 7 (2) Certain methods of organizing human activity – fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions) (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II); and (3) Mental processes – concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion) (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III). Under Step 2A, Prong One, the Examiner determines the claims recite a mental process: The claims recite providing “on-line advertising and social media, and more particularly to the selection of advertisements based on information available through social media”. The limitations fall[] within the category of metal [sic] processes (i.e. concepts that can be performed by the human mind such as evaluation). The comparison of the access token information to the stored data could be done by a mental process. Final Act. 2–3 (emphasis added). Appellant disagrees, and contends that the “recitations in the . . . claims cannot practically be performed in the human mind, and are therefore not abstract ideas.” Appeal Br. 12. In support, Appellant refers to the “receiving,” “maintaining,” and “transmitting” limitations recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–13. We agree with the Examiner that the language of claim 1 requires an evaluation (i.e., a step of determining) that could be performed alternatively by a person as a mental process, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 8 subsection III. We reproduce the “determining” limitation L1 of claim 1 below: [L1] determining, by the computing system, one or more keywords based on the plurality of publically visible user- authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers. Claim 1 (emphasis added). We additionally conclude that the use of a server as an “advertising server,” as recited in claim 1, involves certain methods of organizing human activity, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II, as including fundamental economic principles or practices, such as commercial or legal interactions, further including advertising and marketing or sales activities, We note similar limitations of commensurate scope are recited in independent claims 8 and 15. We emphasize that combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). MPEP § 2106.04(a) guides that “[i]f the identified limitation(s) falls within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas, it is reasonable to conclude that the claim recites an abstract idea in Step 2A Prong One.” In such case, “[t]he claim then requires further analysis in Step 2A Prong Two, to determine whether any additional elements in the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, see MPEP § 2106.04(d).” MPEP 2106.04(a). Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 9 Because we conclude that all claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 recite an abstract idea, as identified above, under Step 2A, Prong One, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two, in which we apply the guidance set forth under MPEP § 2106.04(d).5 Step 2A, Prong Two Under MPEP § 2106.04(d), Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application For example, limitations that are indicative of integration into a practical application under MPEP § 2106.04(d) include: 1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a); 2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b); 3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and 4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e). In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of integration into a practical application include: 1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP § 2106.05(f); 5 We note that each dependent claim includes all the limitations of the claims from which it depends. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 10 2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and 3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use — see MPEP § 2106.05(h). See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I) (Describing Step 2A, Prong Two). Additional Limitations Applying the USPTO guidance under MPEP § 2106.04(d), we consider whether there are additional elements set forth in the claims that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. We note that claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 recite steps or functions that are implemented by a computer and/or a computer system including one or more processors. See supra n.5. We further note the supporting exemplary, non-limiting descriptions of generic computer components found in the Specification. For example, see Spec. ¶ 62: “The client computing devices can be general purpose personal computers including, by way of example, personal computers and/or laptop computers running various versions of Microsoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and/or Linux operating systems.” (emphasis added). We emphasize that McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), guides: “The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where ‘it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.’” 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854)) (emphasis added). Here, we find Appellant’s claimed invention merely implements the abstract idea using instructions executed on generic computer components. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 11 Therefore, we conclude Appellant’s claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 merely use a generic programmed computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(f). Extra- or Post-Solution Activities Under MPEP § 2106.05(g) “[T]he prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant post[-]solution activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–12 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)). Here, we conclude that independent claim 1 recites one or more additional limitations that are extra-solution activities the courts have determined to be insufficient to transform judicially excepted subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). For example, we conclude that the claim 1 steps of “providing,” “receiving,” “maintaining,” “retrieving,” “storing,” “generating,” and “transmitting” recite insignificant extra-solution activities (e.g., data gathering, storing, sending). Cf. buySAFE v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). We note similar limitations of commensurate scope are recited in independent claims 8 and 15. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 12 MPEP § 2106.05(a) — Improvement to the Functionality of a Computer or Other Technology or Technical Field. We consider next the question of whether there are any claimed improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field. We apply the guidance set forth under MPEP § 2106.05(a). Appellant contends that: reformulating the query to use a combination of social media keywords and search query terms improves the technology for searching and retrieving relevant content for the user. This provides a specific improvement over prior systems and integrates the individual recitations of the claims into a practical application. Appeal Br. 14 (emphasis added). But we note that the argued language “reformulating the query” is not expressly claimed. Id. However, the argued reformulating of the query is premised on “determining one or more keywords based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers” (claim 1 (emphasis added)) that could be performed alternatively as a mental process, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III. But “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”). Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 13 Applying this guidance here, we conclude the claim 1 step of “determining” is merely an abstract idea implemented by a generic computer system comprising “one or more processors.” Claim 1. To the extent that Appellant’s independent method claim 1, independent medium claim 8, and independent system claim 15, might arguendo be an improvement over prior-art methods, mediums, and systems, we note that an improved abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 (2012) (holding that a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless patent ineligible). See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (emphasis omitted). To the extent that Appellant’s method of claim 1 automatically performs the step of “determining,” we note that the “‘mere automation of manual processes using generic computers’ . . . ‘does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology,’” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). As set forth in MPEP § 2106.05(a) (emphasis added): To show that the involvement of a computer assists in improving the technology, the claims must recite the details regarding how a computer aids the method, the extent to which the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method. Merely adding generic computer components to perform the method is not sufficient. Thus, the claim must include more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic component or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing technology. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 14 In reviewing the record, we find Appellant does not advance any persuasive arguments explaining how the claimed generic computer components aid the method, the extent to which the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method to improve the recited computer components. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Accordingly, on this record, we conclude that independent claim 1 does not recite an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). As noted above, remaining independent claims 8 and 15 recite similar limitations having commensurate scope. MPEP § 2106.05(b), 2106.05(c) Appellant advances no arguments that any of the method claims on appeal are tied to a particular machine (MPEP § 2106.05(b)), or transform an article to a different state or thing (MPEP § 2106.05(c)). MPEP § 2106.05(e) Meaningful Claim Limitations The Examiner determines that “additional claim elements do not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Final Act. 4. Appellant advances no arguments rebutting the Examiner’s determination under MPEP § 2106.05(e). Because Appellant does not advance any substantive, persuasive arguments explaining how the judicial exceptions are applied or used in Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 15 some meaningful way, as clarified under MPEP § 2106.05(e), we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. We emphasize that merely adding generic hardware and computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (The “mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent- ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”) Accordingly, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h)), we conclude that all claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Inventive Concept – Step 2B As set forth under MPEP § 2106.05(d)), only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application,6 do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well- understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.7 6 This corresponds to Alice part one where it is determined whether the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. If a claim is “not directed to an abstract idea under part one of the Alice [framework], we do not need to proceed to step two.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 7 This corresponds to Alice part two where it is determined whether the claim “contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 16 Under Step 2B, the Examiner finds that “[m]ere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component, and adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception cannot provide an inventive concept.” Final Act. 4 (emphasis added). Appellant advances no arguments rebutting the Examiner’s finding under MPEP § 2106.05(d), Step 2B, the “Inventive Concept.” Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded that Appellant’s claims do more than simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. We again emphasize that an improved abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (emphasis omitted). Moreover, because Appellant does not advance substantive, persuasive arguments regarding any claimed non-conventional and non- generic arrangement of known computer components, we find no inventive concept in any purported ordered combination of these limitations. Thus, we find Appellant’s claims are unlike the claims considered by the court in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in which the court found “an inventive concept . . . in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphases added). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that each of Appellant’s claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept. Therefore, Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 17 on this record, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of all claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 on appeal.8 Rejection B of Independent Claim 1 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Issues: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, did the Examiner err by finding the cited combination of references would have taught or suggested the disputed claim 1 limitations of L1 and L2, within the meaning of representative claim 1?9 We focus our analysis on limitation L2 of claim 1, because we find limitation L2 is dispositive regarding all the rejections set forth by the Examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 103. See claim 1, in context: receiving, by the computing system, from a user device associated with the first user, a request specifying one or more search query terms; [L2] transmitting, by the computing system, a separate query to an advertising server, the separate query including (i) the one or more keywords determined based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers, and (ii) at least one of the search query terms. 8 Based upon Appellant’s arguments, we decide the appeal of Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 based upon representative claim 1. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). 9 Throughout this opinion, we give the contested claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 18 Claim 1 (emphasis added). Regarding the “transmitting” limitation L2 of claim 1, Appellant contends: This rejection should be reversed because Suleman does not transmit a second query that includes a combination of keywords from the specific user’s social media posts and search query terms from the user. While both Suleman and the Appellant’s claims use the user’s search query terms to retrieve content relevant to the search query, they differ in how they then retrieve advertisements. Suleman uses the same search query to also retr[ieve] configurable advertisements that then have blank sections completed with the user’s social media content. In contrast, the Appellant’s claims generate a new search query that adds keywords from the users [sic] social media content to the search for a terms, and this query is used to retrieve the ads. Using social media content to search for relevant ads is not the same as using social media content to fill in blank information in ads that have already been identified without using the social media content. Suleman does not form a separate query; Suleman does not combine keywords from social media posts with search query terms from the user in a single query; and Suleman does not search for advertisements using keywords from social media content. Appeal Br. 17 (emphases added). The Examiner disagrees with Appellant, and further explains the basis for the rejection: The claim limitation only requires a transmission of two queries with one being one or more key words based on what the user has published and one based on search terms used by the user. As shown in the cited portion of Suleman, Suleman shows two queries where the first is the crawling engine collects information related to social graph and sends it to an index engine to be used to select or generate content. The second is a search performed by the user including search terms to generate search results. The Examiner interprets the crawling information being sent to the indexing engine as the Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 19 query sent to the advertising server.10 In the same way, the index is searched by the resource locator when the search query terms are entered by a user. Ans. 8 (emphasis added). However, we find the Examiner has ignored that the “separate query” that is transmitted to an advertising server is expressly claimed as including: “(i) the one or more keywords determined based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers, and (ii) at least one of the search query terms.” Claim 1 (emphasis added). 10 Regarding the Examiner’s statement: “The Examiner interprets the crawling information being sent to the indexing engine as the query sent to the advertising server” (Ans. 8 (emphasis added)), we note the Examiner has it backwards — the correct approach is to interpret the claim under BRI and then read the properly construed claim limitation on the corresponding feature(s) found in the cited reference. Cited prior-art references do not “read on” claim limitations, rather, a particular claim limitation “reads on” the corresponding feature(s) found in the cited prior art reference after the claim language is properly construed in accordance with the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Anticipation of a patent claim requires a finding that the claim at issue ‘reads on’ a prior art reference.”). We note claim construction is an important step in a patentability determination. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Both anticipation under § 102 and obviousness under § 103 are two-step inquiries. The first step in both analyses is a proper construction of the claims . . . The second step in the analyses requires a comparison of the properly construed claim to the prior art.” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)). See also the mapping rule: 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (“When a reference is complex or shows or describes inventions other than that claimed by the applicant, the particular part relied on must be designated as nearly as practicable. The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained and each rejected claim specified.” (emphasis added). Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 20 We emphasize that the antecedent basis for “at least one of the search query terms” is the “one or more search query terms” that is recited in the preceding “receiving” step of claim 1, i.e., “receiving, by the computing system, from a user device associated with the first user, a request specifying one or more search query terms.” Emphasis added. The Examiner reads this preceding “receiving” step of claim 1 on Suleman at column 2, lines 55–65. See Final Act. 10. This portion of Suleman describes, in pertinent part: techniques for generating customized content, such as customized advertisements. The processes may include receiving a search query from a computing device associated with a user. For example, the user may enter keywords into a search engine in order to perform an online search for electronic content associated with those keywords. The processes may also identify user-specific content. For example, the user-specific content may be information about the user that is relevant to the original keywords. For example, if the user is searching for life insurance, then the user-specific content may be the user’s age. Suleman col. 2, ll. 55–65 (emphasis added). We agree with the Examiner that Suleman’s crawling engine 219 (column 8, ll. 44–47) that crawls “user-generated content (of both the searcher and others, e.g., members of the searcher’s social graph), and indexing engine 213” that “may incorporate that content into an appropriate search index” at least suggests the first portion of the transmitted “separate query” that is claimed as including: “(i) the one or more keywords determined based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 21 However, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown that any transmitted “separate query” generated by crawling engine 219 (column 8, lines 43–47) includes (ii) at least one of the search query terms that are mapped by the Examiner (Final Act. 10) to Suleman, at column 2, lines 55–65. Based upon our review of the record, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports Appellant’s argument that “Suleman does not form a separate query; [and] Suleman does not combine keywords from social media posts with search query terms from the user in a single query.” Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis added). Accordingly, for essentially the same reasons argued by Appellant in the Briefs, as further discussed above, we are constrained on this record to reverse the Examiner’s § 103 Rejection B of independent claim 1. For the same reasons, we also reverse obviousness Rejection B of remaining independent claims 8 and 15. Claims 8 and 15 recite the disputed limitations of claim 1 using similar language having commensurate scope. Because we have reversed Rejection B of all independent claims, for the same reasons, we also reverse the Examiner’s Rejection B of associated dependent claims 6, 7, 10, 28, and 32. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 22 Remaining Obviousness Rejections C, D, E, F, G, H, and I of all Remaining Dependent Claims In light of our reversal of Rejection B of independent claims 1, 8, and 15, supra, we also reverse Rejections C, D, E, F, G, H, and I of all remaining dependent claims which variously and ultimately depend therefrom. On this record, the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited tertiary references overcome the aforementioned deficiencies of the base combination of Bhatia and Suleman, as discussed above regarding obviousness Rejection B of claim 1. CONCLUSIONS By applying the Director’s 2019 PEG and October 2019 Update, as now set forth under MPEP Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c), we conclude that all claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32, as rejected by the Examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 101, are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 as being obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, over the cited combinations of references. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 23 DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27–32 101 Eligibility 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27–32 1, 6–8, 10, 15, 28, 32 103 Bhatia, Suleman 1, 6–8, 10, 15, 28, 32 24, 25 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Polis 24, 25 11, 18 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Mackay 11, 18 19 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Won Cho 19 21 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Park 21 27 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Nuzzi 27 29 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Agranat 29 30, 31 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Srinivasan 30, 31 Overall Outcome 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27–32 Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 24 FINALITY AND RESPONSE Because we have sustained at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject all claims on appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 1 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ANAND N. KATTI _____________ Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, MATTHEW J. McNEILL, and STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32. Claims 2–5, 9, 12–14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, and 26 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Invention Embodiments of the disclosed and claimed invention on appeal relate to “on-line advertising and social media, and more particularly to the selection of advertisements based on information available through social media.” Spec. ¶ 1. Representative Claim 1 1. A method comprising: providing, by a computing system comprising one or more processors, consent data associated with a first user, to one or more social media servers including a first social media server, wherein said providing comprises providing consent data to each of the one or more social media servers; receiving, by the computing system, for each of the one or more social media servers, data identifying a scope of a set of publications stored by the social media server, wherein a first scope for the first social media server corresponds to access to a first set of user authored publications having a public level of visibility and stored by the first social media server, but does not provide access to user-authored publications stored by the first social media server that are constrained to be visible to a limited audience; receiving, by the computing system and from each of the one or more social media servers, a user-account specific authorization token, wherein a separate user- account specific authorization token is received from each of the one or more social media servers in response to the consent data provided to the corresponding social media application; maintaining, by the computing system, for each of the one or more social media servers, a mapping Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 3 between the received scope of publications stored by the social media server and the token received from the corresponding social media server; retrieving, by the computing system, using the one or more mappings between the received scope of publications stored by the one or more social media servers and the corresponding tokens, data corresponding to a plurality of publically visible user- authored publications associated with the first user and stored by the one or more social media servers; storing, by the computing system, the data corresponding to a plurality of publically visible user- authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers, in a centralized data storage, wherein the centralized data storage further stores a timestamp associated with each publically visible user-authored publication, each said timestamp assigned by the corresponding social media server; [L1] determining, by the computing system, one or more keywords based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers; receiving, by the computing system, from a user device associated with the first user, a request specifying one or more search query terms; [L2] transmitting, by the computing system, a separate query to an advertising server, the separate query including (i) the one or more keywords determined based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers, and (ii) at least one of the search query terms; receiving, by the computing system and from the Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 4 advertising server, data identifying one or more advertisements in response to the separate query to the advertising server; generating, by the computing system, a search results web page that includes both (a) search results selected based on the search query terms and (b) the one or more advertisements received from the advertising server; and transmitting, by the computing system, the search results page to the user device. Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claim App.) (Disputed limitations L1 and L2 emphasized). Evidence Relied Upon by the Examiner Name Reference Date Polis et al. US 7,673,327 B1 Mar. 2, 2010 Bhatia et al. US 8,631,473 B2 Jan. 14, 2014 Suleman et al. US 9,286,397 B1 Mar. 15, 2016 Mackay US 2007/0288247 A1 Dec. 13, 2007 Won Cho US 2009/0037375 A1 Feb. 5, 2009 Nuzzi US 2012/0239497 A1 Sept. 20, 2012 Park et al. US 2013/0054591 A1 Feb. 28, 2013 Agranat et al. US 2013/0066951 A1 Mar. 14, 2013 Srinivasan et al. US 2013/0086645 A1 Apr. 4, 2013 Table of Rejections Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 5 Rejection Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis A 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27–32 101 Eligibility B 1, 6–8, 10, 15, 28, 32 103 Bhatia, Suleman C 24, 25 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Polis D 11, 18 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Mackay E 19 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Won Cho F 21 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Park G 27 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Nuzzi H 29 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Agranat I 30, 31 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Srinivasan ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. Rejection A Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 USPTO 35 U.S.C. § 101 MPEP Guidance In January and October of 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. We note the USPTO current eligibility guidance is found in the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (revised June 2020) of the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (“MPEP”), and particularly within Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c). Accordingly, all references to the MPEP throughout this Decision are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 6 unless otherwise indicated. Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). MPEP § 2106, Step 2A, Prong One The Judicial Exception Under MPEP § 2106.04(a), the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas are defined as follows: (1) Mathematical concepts – mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection I); (2) Certain methods of organizing human activity – fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions) (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II); and (3) Mental processes – concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion) (see MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III). Under Step 2A, Prong One, the Examiner determines the Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 7 claims recite a mental process: The claims recite providing “on-line advertising and social media, and more particularly to the selection of advertisements based on information available through social media”. The limitations fall[] within the category of metal [sic] processes (i.e. concepts that can be performed by the human mind such as evaluation). The comparison of the access token information to the stored data could be done by a mental process. Final Act. 2–3 (emphasis added). Appellant disagrees, and contends that the “recitations in the . . . claims cannot practically be performed in the human mind, and are therefore not abstract ideas.” Appeal Br. 12. In support, Appellant refers to the “receiving,” “maintaining,” and “transmitting” limitations recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 12–13. We agree with the Examiner that the language of claim 1 requires an evaluation (i.e., a step of determining) that could be performed alternatively by a person as a mental process, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III. We reproduce the “determining” limitation L1 of claim 1 below: [L1] determining, by the computing system, one or more keywords based on the plurality of publically visible user- authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers. Claim 1 (emphasis added). We additionally conclude that the use of a server as an “advertising server,” as recited in claim 1, involves certain methods of organizing human activity, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection II, as including fundamental economic principles or practices, such as commercial or legal interactions, further including advertising and marketing or sales activities, Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 8 We note similar limitations of commensurate scope are recited in independent claims 8 and 15. We emphasize that combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). MPEP § 2106.04(a) guides that “[i]f the identified limitation(s) falls within at least one of the groupings of abstract ideas, it is reasonable to conclude that the claim recites an abstract idea in Step 2A Prong One.” In such case, “[t]he claim then requires further analysis in Step 2A Prong Two, to determine whether any additional elements in the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, see MPEP § 2106.04(d).” MPEP 2106.04(a). Because we conclude that all claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 recite an abstract idea, as identified above, under Step 2A, Prong One, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two, in which we apply the guidance set forth under MPEP § 2106.04(d). Step 2A, Prong Two Under MPEP § 2106.04(d), Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application For example, limitations that are indicative of integration into a practical application under MPEP § 2106.04(d) include: %2. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a); %2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b); %2. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing — see Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 9 particular article to a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and %2. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e). In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of integration into a practical application include: 1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP § 2106.05(f); 2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and 3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use — see MPEP § 2106.05(h). See MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I) (Describing Step 2A, Prong Two). Additional Limitations Applying the USPTO guidance under MPEP § 2106.04(d), we consider whether there are additional elements set forth in the claims that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. We note that claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 recite steps or functions that are implemented by a computer and/or a computer system including one or more processors. See supra n.5. We further note the supporting exemplary, non-limiting descriptions of generic computer components found in the Specification. For example, see Spec. ¶ 62: “The client computing devices can be general purpose Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 10 personal computers including, by way of example, personal computers and/or laptop computers running various versions of Microsoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and/or Linux operating systems.” (emphasis added). We emphasize that McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), guides: “The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where ‘it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.’” 837 F.3d at 1312 (quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854)) (emphasis added). Here, we find Appellant’s claimed invention merely implements the abstract idea using instructions executed on generic computer components. Therefore, we conclude Appellant’s claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 merely use a generic programmed computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(f). Extra- or Post-Solution Activities Under MPEP § 2106.05(g) “[T]he prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant post[-]solution activity.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–12 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)). Here, we conclude that independent claim 1 recites one or more additional limitations that are extra-solution activities the courts have determined to be insufficient to transform judicially excepted subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). For example, we conclude that the claim 1 steps of “providing,” “receiving,” “maintaining,” “retrieving,” “storing,” “generating,” and Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 11 “transmitting” recite insignificant extra-solution activities (e.g., data gathering, storing, sending). Cf. buySAFE v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). We note similar limitations of commensurate scope are recited in independent claims 8 and 15. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 12 MPEP § 2106.05(a) — Improvement to the Functionality of a Computer or Other Technology or Technical Field. We consider next the question of whether there are any claimed improvements to the functioning of a computer or to any other technology or technical field. We apply the guidance set forth under MPEP § 2106.05(a). Appellant contends that: reformulating the query to use a combination of social media keywords and search query terms improves the technology for searching and retrieving relevant content for the user. This provides a specific improvement over prior systems and integrates the individual recitations of the claims into a practical application. Appeal Br. 14 (emphasis added). But we note that the argued language “reformulating the query” is not expressly claimed. Id. However, the argued reformulating of the query is premised on “determining one or more keywords based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers” (claim 1 (emphasis added)) that could be performed alternatively as a mental process, as defined under MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2), subsection III. But “[u]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.”). Applying this guidance here, we conclude the claim 1 step of “determining” is merely an abstract idea implemented by a generic Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 13 computer system comprising “one or more processors.” Claim 1. To the extent that Appellant’s independent method claim 1, independent medium claim 8, and independent system claim 15, might arguendo be an improvement over prior-art methods, mediums, and systems, we note that an improved abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 (2012) (holding that a novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless patent ineligible). See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (emphasis omitted). To the extent that Appellant’s method of claim 1 automatically performs the step of “determining,” we note that the “‘mere automation of manual processes using generic computers’ . . . ‘does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology,’” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). As set forth in MPEP § 2106.05(a) (emphasis added): To show that the involvement of a computer assists in improving the technology, the claims must recite the details regarding how a computer aids the method, the extent to which the computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method. Merely adding generic computer components to perform the method is not sufficient. Thus, the claim must include more than mere instructions to perform the method on a generic component or machinery to qualify as an improvement to an existing technology. In reviewing the record, we find Appellant does not advance any persuasive arguments explaining how the claimed generic computer components aid the method, the extent to which the Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 14 computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the performance of the method to improve the recited computer components. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Accordingly, on this record, we conclude that independent claim 1 does not recite an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). As noted above, remaining independent claims 8 and 15 recite similar limitations having commensurate scope. MPEP § 2106.05(b), 2106.05(c) Appellant advances no arguments that any of the method claims on appeal are tied to a particular machine (MPEP § 2106.05(b)), or transform an article to a different state or thing (MPEP § 2106.05(c)). MPEP § 2106.05(e) Meaningful Claim Limitations The Examiner determines that “additional claim elements do not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Final Act. 4. Appellant advances no arguments rebutting the Examiner’s determination under MPEP § 2106.05(e). Because Appellant does not advance any substantive, persuasive arguments explaining how the judicial exceptions are applied or used in some meaningful way, as clarified under MPEP § 2106.05(e), we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. We emphasize that merely adding generic hardware and computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (The “mere Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 15 recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”) Accordingly, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h)), we conclude that all claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. The Inventive Concept – Step 2B As set forth under MPEP § 2106.05(d)), only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Under Step 2B, the Examiner finds that “[m]ere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component, and adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception cannot provide an inventive concept.” Final Act. 4 (emphasis added). Appellant advances no arguments rebutting the Examiner’s finding under MPEP § 2106.05(d), Step 2B, the “Inventive Concept.” Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded that Appellant’s claims do more than simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. We again emphasize that an improved abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) (emphasis omitted). Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 16 Moreover, because Appellant does not advance substantive, persuasive arguments regarding any claimed non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known computer components, we find no inventive concept in any purported ordered combination of these limitations. Thus, we find Appellant’s claims are unlike the claims considered by the court in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in which the court found “an inventive concept . . . in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphases added). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that each of Appellant’s claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept. Therefore, on this record, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of all claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 on appeal. Rejection B of Independent Claim 1 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 Issues: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, did the Examiner err by finding the cited combination of references would have taught or suggested the disputed claim 1 limitations of L1 and L2, within the meaning of representative claim 1? We focus our analysis on limitation L2 of claim 1, because we find limitation L2 is dispositive regarding all the rejections set forth by the Examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 103. See claim 1, in context: receiving, by the computing system, from a user device associated with the first user, a request specifying one or more search query terms; [L2] transmitting, by the computing system, a Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 17 separate query to an advertising server, the separate query including (i) the one or more keywords determined based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers, and (ii) at least one of the search query terms. Claim 1 (emphasis added). Regarding the “transmitting” limitation L2 of claim 1, Appellant contends: This rejection should be reversed because Suleman does not transmit a second query that includes a combination of keywords from the specific user’s social media posts and search query terms from the user. While both Suleman and the Appellant’s claims use the user’s search query terms to retrieve content relevant to the search query, they differ in how they then retrieve advertisements. Suleman uses the same search query to also retr[ieve] configurable advertisements that then have blank sections completed with the user’s social media content. In contrast, the Appellant’s claims generate a new search query that adds keywords from the users [sic] social media content to the search for a terms, and this query is used to retrieve the ads. Using social media content to search for relevant ads is not the same as using social media content to fill in blank information in ads that have already been identified without using the social media content. Suleman does not form a separate query; Suleman does not combine keywords from social media posts with search query terms from the user in a single query; and Suleman does not search for advertisements using keywords from social media content. Appeal Br. 17 (emphases added). The Examiner disagrees with Appellant, and further explains the basis for the rejection: The claim limitation only requires a transmission of two queries with one being one or more key words based on Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 18 what the user has published and one based on search terms used by the user. As shown in the cited portion of Suleman, Suleman shows two queries where the first is the crawling engine collects information related to social graph and sends it to an index engine to be used to select or generate content. The second is a search performed by the user including search terms to generate search results. The Examiner interprets the crawling information being sent to the indexing engine as the query sent to the advertising server. In the same way, the index is searched by the resource locator when the search query terms are entered by a user. Ans. 8 (emphasis added). However, we find the Examiner has ignored that the “separate query” that is transmitted to an advertising server is expressly claimed as including: “(i) the one or more keywords determined based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers, and (ii) at least one of the search query terms.” Claim 1 (emphasis added). We emphasize that the antecedent basis for “at least one of the search query terms” is the “one or more search query terms” that is recited in the preceding “receiving” step of claim 1, i.e., “receiving, by the computing system, from a user device associated with the first user, a request specifying one or more search query terms.” Emphasis added. The Examiner reads this preceding “receiving” step of claim 1 on Suleman at column 2, lines 55–65. See Final Act. 10. This portion of Suleman describes, in pertinent part: techniques for generating customized content, such as customized advertisements. The processes may include receiving a search query from a computing device associated with a user. For example, the user may enter Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 19 keywords into a search engine in order to perform an online search for electronic content associated with those keywords. The processes may also identify user-specific content. For example, the user-specific content may be information about the user that is relevant to the original keywords. For example, if the user is searching for life insurance, then the user-specific content may be the user’s age. Suleman col. 2, ll. 55–65 (emphasis added). We agree with the Examiner that Suleman’s crawling engine 219 (column 8, ll. 44–47) that crawls “user-generated content (of both the searcher and others, e.g., members of the searcher’s social graph), and indexing engine 213” that “may incorporate that content into an appropriate search index” at least suggests the first portion of the transmitted “separate query” that is claimed as including: “(i) the one or more keywords determined based on the plurality of publically visible user-authored publications associated with the first user and retrieved from the one or more social media servers,” as recited in claim 1. However, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown that any transmitted “separate query” generated by crawling engine 219 (column 8, lines 43–47) includes (ii) at least one of the search query terms that are mapped by the Examiner (Final Act. 10) to Suleman, at column 2, lines 55–65. Based upon our review of the record, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports Appellant’s argument that “Suleman does not form a separate query; [and] Suleman does not combine keywords from social media posts with search query terms from the user in a single query.” Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis added). Accordingly, for essentially the same reasons argued by Appellant in the Briefs, as further discussed above, we are constrained on this record to reverse the Examiner’s § 103 Rejection Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 20 B of independent claim 1. For the same reasons, we also reverse obviousness Rejection B of remaining independent claims 8 and 15. Claims 8 and 15 recite the disputed limitations of claim 1 using similar language having commensurate scope. Because we have reversed Rejection B of all independent claims, for the same reasons, we also reverse the Examiner’s Rejection B of associated dependent claims 6, 7, 10, 28, and 32. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 21 Remaining Obviousness Rejections C, D, E, F, G, H, and I of all Remaining Dependent Claims In light of our reversal of Rejection B of independent claims 1, 8, and 15, supra, we also reverse Rejections C, D, E, F, G, H, and I of all remaining dependent claims which variously and ultimately depend therefrom. On this record, the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited tertiary references overcome the aforementioned deficiencies of the base combination of Bhatia and Suleman, as discussed above regarding obviousness Rejection B of claim 1. CONCLUSIONS By applying the Director’s 2019 PEG and October 2019 Update, as now set forth under MPEP Sections 2103 through 2106.07(c), we conclude that all claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32, as rejected by the Examiner under 35 U.S.C. § 101, are not directed to patent-eligible subject matter. The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27–32 as being obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, over the cited combinations of references. Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 22 DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basi s Affirmed Reverse d 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27–32 101 Eligibility 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27–32 1, 6–8, 10, 15, 28, 32 103 Bhatia, Suleman 1, 6–8, 10, 15, 28, 32 24, 25 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Polis 24, 25 11, 18 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Mackay 11, 18 19 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Won Cho 19 21 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Park 21 27 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Nuzzi 27 29 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Agranat 29 30, 31 103 Bhatia, Suleman, Srinivasan 30, 31 Overall Outcom e 1, 6–8, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27–32 Appeal 2020-005702 Application 14/516,280 23 finality and response Because we have sustained at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject all claims on appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation