Omico Plastics, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 1970

184 N.L.R.B. 767 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

OMICO PLASTICS, INC. 767
Omico Plastics, Inc. and United Steelworkers of
America , AFL-CIO. Case 25-CA-3440
July 31, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN , AND JENKINS
On January 22, 1970, Trial Examiner Josephine
H. Klein issued her Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
The Trial Examiner declined to find, however, that
Respondent had engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices on the ground they were not alleged
in the complaint. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting
brief. No exceptions were filed by Respondent.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers' in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in this case, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the modifi-
cations noted below.
The General Counsel excepts to the Trial Ex-
aminer's failure to find Section 8(a)(1) violations
predicated on coercive threats by Respondent's
Vice President and Manager Williams to employee
Alexander, and by Supervisor White to employee
Cooper. Although specifically crediting employees
Alexander and Cooper in these respects, the Trial
Examiner declined to make any specific findings
thereon because of an erroneous assumption that
the complaint contained no allegations with respect
thereto. In view of the fact that the complaint does
contain such allegations, the matters were fully
litigated, and credibility was specifically resolved in
favor of the employees involved, we find merit in
the General Counsel's exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's failure to find that the threats in question
were violative of Section 8(a)(1).
We also find, in agreement with the General
Counsel, that the unfair labor practices committed
by Respondent strike at the very heart of employee
rights guaranteed by the Act and demonstrate
Respondent's hostility to the policies of the Act.
Therefore, we shall order Respondent to cease and
desist from infringing in any manner upon em-
ployee rights safeguarded by the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
below, and hereby orders that Respondent, Omico
Plastics, Inc., Owensboro, Kentucky, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order, as so modified:
1. Delete the phrase "in any like or related
manner" in paragraph 1(a), and substitute therefor
the phrase "in any manner."
2. Delete the phrase "In any similar or related
manner" in the last paragraph of the notice, and
substitute therefor the phrase "In any manner."
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPHINE H. KLEIN, Trial Examiner: Upon a
charge filed against Omico Plastics, Inc.
(Respondent), by United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO (the Union), on July 1, 1969,' a com-
plaint was issued by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 25 on August 20 and amended on October 2
and 13. Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held
in Owensboro, Kentucky, before the Trial Ex-
aminer on October 30 and 31. The General Coun-
sel and Respondent were represented by counsel
and the Charging Party by its staff representative.
All parties were given opportunity to present
evidence and to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses. The parties waived oral argument and
thereafter the General Counsel and Respondent
filed briefs.
Upon the entire record,' observation of the wit-
nesses , and consideration of the briefs, the Trial Ex-
aminer makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
A. Respondent, a Kentucky corporation with its
principal office and place of business in Owens-
boro, Kentucky, is engaged in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of plastics and related
products. During the past year, a representative
' Except when otherwise noted , all dates referred to herein are in 1969.
2 As corrected by order issued January 7, 1970
184 NLRB No. 86
768 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
period, Respondent, in the course of its business
operations, purchased, transferred, and delivered to
its facility, goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 which were transported to said facility
directly from points outside Kentucky. During the
same period Respondent shipped products valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from its facility to
points outside Kentucky. Respondent is now, and
was at all times material herein, an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.'
B. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
H. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The complaint alleges that in April Respondent
interfered with its employees' exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights by interrogating them concerning their
union sympathies and activities, and by threatening
employees with reprisals for union activity and with
plant closure in the event a union came into the
plant. Additionally, the complaint alleges that in
the period April through October Respondent dis-
criminated against employee Brenda Alexander in
various ways because of her union sympathy or ac-
tivity. Respondent denies that any of its conduct
was coercive or otherwise violative of Section
8(a)(1) and denies that any of the action admit-
tedly taken against Alexander was discriminatorily
motivated.4
B. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
1. Interrogation
Respondent's is a small plant, having only four
machines. Its number of production employees va-
ries from around 8 or 10 to 30 or 35, depending on
the volume of business. It normally operates two
shifts per day, but from time to time maintains
three shifts.
On or about April? employee Mary Helen
Young commenced efforts to organize the em-
ployees through the Union. Respondent was aware
of the existence of union organizational activity
from its inception . Young spoke to Alexander, who
signed a union card on April 7. At Young's request,
Alexander spoke to several employees and asked
them to join the Union.
Young arranged a preliminary meeting at her
home on Saturday, April 12.5 On the morning of
National Labor Relations Act, as amended ( 61 Stat . 136, 73 Stat. 519,
29 U S C Sec. 151, et seq ).
4 At the hearing , Respondent moved to dismiss an allegation that Alex-
ander had been discriminatorily laid off on April 15 The ground for the
motion was the fact that a prior charge based on this allegation had been
filed and withdrawn , without prejudice , and the Regional Director had ap-
proved the withdraw] . The Trial Examiner denied the motion to dismiss but
suggested that Respondent present argument thereon in its brief Respon-
April 12, Alexander visited the home of Supervisor
Vivian Sue Sharp White, who is a cousin of Alex-
ander's husband and a social acquaintance of Alex-
ander. Alexander asked White how she felt about
unions and invited her to attend the upcoming
meeting. White declined the invitation, saying she
did not want to become involved with the Union
and, according to Alexander, that Alexander was
not doing anything "smart." The meeting, attended
by five employees, was held, as scheduled, at
Young's home.
On Monday morning, April 14, White reported
to Billie Jean Magruder, Respondent's personnel
manager, concerning the Alexander-White conver-
sation on Saturday. Magruder passed this informa-
tion on to Larry Williams, who is the son of
Respondent's president, W. J. (Jerry) Williams, and
who was then Respondent's vice-president and
manager.
On April 15, Larry Williams called Alexander
into his office, where he asked her what she knew
about the union organizational activity. She dis-
claimed any knowledge. Later that day Alexander
was discharged by Jerry Williams. (This discharge
is discussed below section, II, C, 1.)
Around this time, apparently on April 14, Jerry
Williams asked Supervisor White to find out what
she could about the union activities and report to
him. White thereupon individually questioned each
of the employees on her shift about the Union.
Larry Williams, Respondent's vice president and
manager at the time here involved, conceded that
on April 15 he called Alexander into his office and
asked her what she knew about union organiza-
tional activity in the plant. He maintained that, to
the best of his recollection, he had called Alex-
ander in because she "just happened to be the first
person that [he] could see as [he] walked out" of
his office. However, he further acknowledged that
before calling Alexander into his office he had
learned about the Union's activity from Magruder.
Magruder testified that she had relayed to Larry
Williams White's report that Alexander had invited
White to the union meeting held at Young's home.
On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that when
Larry Williams called Alexander into his office he
knew that she was involved with the Union. This
fact provides corroborative detail for Alexander's
testimony that Williams said to her: "I want to hear
about this union talk that's been going around, and
I want to hear about the meetings that you've been
having." According to Alexander, when she dis-
avowed any knowledge, Larry Williams said: "You
tell me some things or else it's going to cost you
dent 's brief does not mention the issue , and it is therefore deemed waived
In any event, the prior charge, withdrawn without prejudice , is no bar to
the present complaint DeTray Planting Works, Inc, 155 NLRB 1353,
1360
" The witnesses did not explicitly date the meeting on April 12 However,
that date is established by the demonstrated temporal relationship of the
meeting to other events.
OMICO PLASTICS, INC. 769
your job, and maybe some other girls." This
testimony has the ring of truth, not only because of
Alexander's demeanor, but also because the state-
ment would reflect a natural reaction to Alex-
ander's denial of knowledge, which denial Williams
knew to be false.
According to Alexander, when she persisted in
her protestation of ignorance, Larry Williams, with
the use of obscenity, referred to a prior event in-
volving Jolly, the Union's representative. While
Williams denied having used the obscene language
attributed to him, he conceded that he might have
mentioned Jolly and an incident which had previ-
ously occurred during a strike by the Union at Faith
Tool & Die Company, which at the time was
located directly across the street from Respondent.
The Trial Examiner credits Alexander's testimony
in this regard. The reference to an apparently very
unpleasant occurrence at Faith Tool & Die could
have left no doubt as to the fervor of Respondent's
opposition to the Union. Of necessity it contributed
to the coercive atmosphere in which Williams
questioned Alexander concerning the Union's or-
ganizational activities. Along with the statement
that Alexander's refusal to talk might cost her and
other employees' jobs, it establishes union animus.'
Supervisor White corroborated the testimony of
several employee witnesses that she had questioned
all the employees individually concerning their
union sympathies. She conceded that she had done
so in response to Jerry Williams' request that she
find out what she could about the union activities
of the employees, but both White and Williams de-
nied that Williams had instructed or asked her to
question individual employees. Employee Judy
Cooper on the other hand testified that White had
introduced her questioning with a statement that
she had instructions "from the office" to "ask
everybody if they want a union." According to
Cooper, White said that Cooper would be fired if
she answered in the affirmative, whereupon
Cooper, "naturally," said "No."' Despite White's
denial, on the basis of the demeanor of the wit-
nesses, the Trial Examiner credits Cooper's
testimony.
Larry Williams also testified that he asked em-
ployees Hattie Duvall and Glenna Robinson,
separately, how they felt about "unions in general."
While there is no evidence that these questions
were posed in a coercive or threatening manner,
there is equally lacking any suggestion of a legiti-
mate reason for the questioning. While these in-
cidents, if standing alone, might not constitute
violations of the Act, they form part of a pattern of
systematic interrogation of all employees by super-
visory personnel. As such, they are part of the total
evidence on which a finding of unlawful interroga-
tion is made.
Employer Cooper also credibly testified that
Jerry Williams called her into his office and asked
her if she knew "who started " the Union , and that,
when she disclaimed knowledge , he told her that
they did not need a union; that the Company was
losing money ; and that they would " be better
without the union ." This conversation , occurring in
the "boss"' office , could have no effect other than
to impress upon the employee the Company's
strong opposition to unionization and the possible
danger to/ the employees inherent in any such
course . It formed part of an overall course of con-
duct calculated to restrain the employees in the
free exercise of their Section 7 rights. Koch En-
gineering Co., 155 NLRB 1272, 1273.
On all the evidence , the Trial Examiner finds
that , as alleged , Respondent coercively interrogated
employees on their union sympathies and activities
in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
2. Threat
The complaint alleges that on or about April 24
Jerry Williams threatened plant closure if the em-
ployees supported the Union. In support of this al-.
legation, the General Counsel produced evidence
concerning employee meetings conducted. by Wil-
liams on April 17 and 24.
There is no dispute that, prompted by the incep-
tion of the union campaign, Jerry Williams called
an employee meeting on April 17. At this meeting
he read from a lengthy list of "Do's and Don't's"
governing employers' statements during union
organizational campaigns.
Williams testified that he read only the "Do's"
but other witnesses, including some called by
Respondent, indicated that he also read the
"Don't's." For example, Supervisor White testi-
fied that "mainly he was telling us what he couldn't
say. This book gave him all of the rules, I guess,
that he could -what he could and what he couldn't
say to the girls." 8
In his brief, the General Counsel apparently ob-
jects to Williams telling the employees what he was
not permitted to say. However, at the hearing, in
response to the General Counsel's request, Wil-
liams produced the seven-page document, entitled
"What Management Can Say to Employees to
Counter an Organizational Drive," from which he
had read. After examining it, the General Counsel
returned it to Williams, did not offer it in evidence,
and did not move to amend the complaint. Ac-
cordingly, no finding is warranted that the portions
6 Neither of these statements is alleged as independently violative of the
Act. Accordingly, no specific finding is made with respect thereto
' No specific finding is made as to any threat by White since no such al-
legation is contained in the complaint
' Williams' secretary , Deborah Sapp , testified , improbably, that "he said
he could not tell them anything about a union , he couldn 't express his
opinion about a union , the only right he had was if they were threatened,
that he could help them then "
770 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of this document which Williams read included any
threats or other violative statements.
On April 22 the Union filed a charge alleging dis-
criminatory discharge of Alexander on April 15. As
is more fully discussed below ( section II, C, 1), on
April 23 Jerry Williams asked Alexander to return
to work . When she reported the next morning, she
and Williams had a conversation and then Williams
called a meeting of all the employees on the day
shift .9 He informed the employees that he had re-
called Alexander voluntarily because she was a
good machine operator and he needed her. He had
with him an unopened communication from the
Board . He said that he knew what was in the en-
velope and that he had no intention of opening it,
since the charge had nothing to do with his having
recalled Alexander ; there was no outside force or
pressure which could compel him to do something
he did not want to do. When several of the em-
ployees expressed a desire to have the Board com-
munication read to them , he handed it to his secre-
tary, Deborah Sapp , to open and read . When Sapp
came to legal terminology she could not un-
derstand , Williams took over and finished, ap-
parently reading both the charge and the Board's
covering letter.
Williams concededly took this opportunity to
state the reasons why he believed the employees
should not choose to be represented by a union. He
testified that at this meeting he explained that
Respondent "couldn 't economically afford a strike"
and that , in the event 'of a strike , the customers
could take their molds away , 10 "and if that hap-
pened [ he] doubted that there would be any reason
to come back to work."
Several witnesses corroborated Williams'
testimony as to the statements, but two of them
(Magruder and Aaron ) said they were made at the
April 17 meeting , when Williams denies having said
anything of significance other than reading from
the "Do's and Don't 's." Because the two meetings
were held only a week apart , and obviously became
intertwined in the minds of all concerned , it is un-
derstandable how either Williams or the employees
might incorrectly recollect the precise date on
which particular statements were made . Analysis of
the evidence , however, indicates April 24 as the
correct date . In any event, the allegation in the
complaint that the threat was made "on or about
. April 24" would be sufficient even if the
relevant conduct occurred at the April 17 meeting.
Cf. J. A. Olson Company , 180 NLRB 438 (TXD).
Employee Young, the prime mover in the union
campaign , testified that at the April 24 meeting
Williams said that " before he would let a union
come in there he would shut the plant down, and
that the next day if we went on strike the men that
Apparently another similar meeting was held of the evening shift em-
ployees
owned the machines would come there and taken
them out." Similarly, Alexander testified:
Mr. Williams brought the charge that I
had-the Labor Board had sent to him, and he
read the charge, the letter in front of us girls.
And he kind of got a little mad over it. And
that's when he said there wasn't no union, or
nobody else, he would shut the doors before
any union would come in....
Williams denied having made any direct threat to
close the plant before allowing a union to come in.
'No witnesses other than Young and Alexander
testified to any such direct statement. But all the
witnesses on this point, both the General Counsel's
(Alexander, Young, and employee Glenna Robin-
son) and Respondent's (Supervisor Jane Aaron,
Personnel Manager Magruder, and Supervisor
White), corroborated Williams' testimony that he
said, in effect that if there was a strike Respon-
dent's customers could, and undoubtedly would,
take their molds back so that, with no work to per-
form, the employees would be out of jobs.
It is unnecessary to determine whether Williams
actually made the direct threat of plant closure at-
tributed to him by Alexander and Young, since, in
the Trial Examiner's opinion, under the circum-
stances presented, the statements as reported by
Williams himself amounted to an unlawful threat.
There is no suggestion in the record that a strike
was contemplated by the employees or the Union.
The prospect of a strike was conjured up by Wil-
liams solely as the predicate for the syllogistic con-
clusion that unionization would eventuate in the
closure of the plant. Williams' "prediction" of dire
consequences following on unionization took on
plausibility only from his tacit, gratuitous assump-
tion that organization inevitably involves strikes.
Because the assumption was unwarranted, the argu-
ment constructed thereon constituted an imper-
missible threat. As the Supreme Court recently
stated in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 619-620:
... In this connection, we need go no further
than to point out' (1) that petitioner had no
support for its basic assumption that the union,
which had not yet even presented any de-
mands, would have to strike to be heard...
and (2) that the Board has often found that
employees, who are particularly sensitive to ru-
mors of plant closing, take such hints as coer-
vice threats rather than honest predications.
[Footnotes omitted.]
See Kellwood Company, 178 NLRB 20 (TXD), and
cases there cited.
Accordingly, the Trial Examiner finds and con-
cludes that , as alleged in the complaint , Respon-
10 The Company's operations consist of making plastic objects with
molds provided by and belonging to its customers
OMICO PLASTICS , INC. 771
dent, through W. J. Williams, its president, violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening plant clo-
sure in the event the employees chose to be
represented by the Union.11
C. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(3)
The complaint alleges a series of discriminatory
actions directed against employee Brenda Alex-
ander, consisting of a discharge on or about April
15, a layoff on June 3, written reprimands on Sep-
tember 18 and October 1 and 4, and denial of a
wage increase on October 3. Respondent admits
that the enumerated was taken but denies that any
of it was discriminatorily motivated.
1. The discharge on April 15
Brenda Alexander was originally hired by
Respondent in November 1967. She was later
promoted from a machine operator on the day shift
to floorlady on the night shift (12:30 to 8:30 a.m.),
with a wage increase from $1.70 to $1.80 per
hour.12 Sometime in March, at her husband's in-
sistence, she requested a transfer to the day shift.
Her request was granted and she was scheduled to
commence work as a machine operator on the day
shift on Monday, April 7.
Alexander became angered when Magruder
would not allow her to work the night of April 3,
just before the plant closed for the Good Friday
weekend. Jerry Williams, Larry Williams, Sapp, and
White, all appearing on behalf of Respondent,
testified that Alexander at that point walked into
the office and announced to Jerry Williams that she
was quitting. So far as appears, Williams, who was
engaged in a conversation, made no reply and ex-
hibited no reaction to Alexander's statement. Alex-
ander then proceeded into Magruder's office.
Alexander maintains that she did not say she was
quitting but rather that she was thinking of quitting.
Whatever her actual words to Williams, Magruder
and Alexander both testified that, in speaking to
Magruder, Alexander said she was "thinking of
quitting." Magruder testified that she told Alex-
ander to go home and think it over and call
Magruder back about her decision. According, to
Magruder, Alexander left the plant and later
telephonically announced her decision to quit,
whereupon Magruder immediately hired a replace-
ment, Bobbie Jean Welch, who commenced work
on the next regular working day, Monday, April 7.
Alexander denied that she had ever announced (or
even made) a final decision to quit. She maintained
that when she telephoned to say she was not
quitting, Magruder announced that she had already
hired a replacement. Because of subsequent events,
as detailed below, the Trial Examiner finds it un-
necessary to determine precisely what language
Alexander used or whether she actually "quit" on
April 3. On Friday or Saturday, April 4 or 5, after
unsuccessfully attempting to reach Jerry Williams,
she telephoned Larry Williams at his home. He told
her to report to work on Monday. She did so and
worked as a machine operator on the day shift until
April 15.
It was just at this time, around April 7, that the
Union's organizational campaign commenced.
Alexander signed a union card on April? and
thereafter solicited several employees, including
two supervisors, to join the Union. As previously
set forth, on Saturday, April 12, Alexander invited
her husband's cousin , Supervisor White, to attend a
union meeting . On the morning of Monday, April
14, White reported this fact to Magruder.
Magruder relayed to Larry Williams the informa-
tion that she had received from White about Alex-
ander. The next morning, April 15, Larry called
Alexander into his office and questioned her about
the Union, as set forth above (supra, section II, B,
1). Later that same day she was summoned to the
office of Jerry Williams, who peremptorily told her
that he was "accepting [her] resignation."
It is conceded that Respondent's representatives
knew of the -union campaign from its inception. The
inference is inescapable that Jerry Williams, when
he called her into his office, personally knew of
Alexander's involvement, at least to the extent of
her having invited White to the union meeting.13
Alexander's version of her dismissal, uncon-
tradicted by Williams, was:
... Mr. Jerry Williams called me in the of-
fice, and he sat me down, and he said,
"Brenda," he said, "I'm accepting your
resignation."
And I said, "What resignation?"
And he said, "You quit."
And I says, "I haven't quit."
And he said, "Well," he said, "here's your
pay check," the weekly pay check, "and here's
your vacation pay I owe you." And I said,
"Jerry," I said, "I know why you're firing me."
I said, "It's on account of this union talk that's
been going around."
And he said, "What union talk?"
And I said, "Well, just forget it."And he
said, "Well," he says, "Brenda," he says, "why
don't you just go on and clock out and leave?"
Even if we were to assume, as maintained by
Respondent's witnesses, that she had "quit" on
11 The General Counsel apparently also contends that a violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a)(1) should be found on the basis of employee Young 's testimony
that Williams said that "whoever started this talk about the union, if they
weren 't satisfied with their job he wished they'd get up and walk out the
door" and Cooper's testimony that Williams said "the Union would hurt
us " As the complaint contains no relevant allegation covering these mat-
ters and they were not specifically litigated, no finding is made in connec-
tion therewith.
12 In addition to the established shift differential
13 Alexander had also solicited memberships in the Union from a few em-
ployees at work Thus, as the General Counsel argues, even absent
evidence of actual knowledge , knowledge would be inferred under the
small plant doctrine Malone Knitting Co, 152 NLRB 643, 647, enfd. 385
F.2d 880 (C.A 1)
427-835 0 - 74 - 50
772 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
April 3, the indisputable fact is that she had recon-
sidered and had been reinstated by mutual agree-
ment with the loss of only one day, April 3, when
Magruder sent her home. There is no suggestion in
the record that Larry Williams, manager, did not
have authority to "reinstate" Alexander on April 7.
Jerry Williams testified that he did not know that
Alexander had been rehired until he saw her on
April 15. He said he believed he had been out sick
and possibly out of town in the interval between
April 3 and 15. However, his testimony in this con-
nection was vague and Alexander credibly testified
that she had spoken to him at work on Monday,
April 7. Manifestly, Alexander's separation on
April 15 was involuntary and constituted a
discharge.
Indeed, in testifying, Jerry Williams sought to jus-
tify a discharge for cause, as follows:
Now, we had considerable difficulties there,
I suppose you call them difficulties, with
Brenda, these continual shift changes, and so
forth. I just simply made the decision that we
couldn't tolerate that any longer, and accepted
her resignation.
Williams did not elaborate on the phrase "these
continual shift changes, and so forth." As a matter
of fact, Alexander had had four shift changes. Only
one, the most recent, had been at her request,
which so far as appears, had been readily granted.14
Indeed, when she was transferred to the day shift as
a machine operator, she retained the wage rate she
had been receiving as a floorlady. And in May,
after her recall on the day shift, she was trans-
ferred, at Respondent's request, to the midnight
shift, as a floorlady, for 2 weeks.
White testified that she reported to Magruder
about Alexander on April 14 because Magruder
asked White to keep an eye on Alexander because
of her unsatisfactory performance. According to
White and Magruder, Alexander had been guilty of
leaving her machine too often and had displayed an
insubordinate manner when orally reprimanded
therefor by White. Alexander denied that she had
ever been reprimanded or spoken to about leaving
her machine or about low production. Alexander
testified that her production was generally
somewhat higher than that of other employees.
Although Magruder testified that daily production
records are maintained for each employee, no such
records were produced. To support its claim that
Alexander's production had been low in this period,
Respondent refers to the fact that it was con-
siderably higher in September. However, Magruder
acknowledged that the production rate of all em-
ployees had increased in that period, a fact which
Alexander credibly attributed to a new method of
handling the material which had been devised by
one of the employees. On all the evidence, the Ex-
" While she had been working as a floorlady on the midnight shift at Wil-
liams ' request , her husband had complained. She was then permitted to
work from 10 p in. to 6 a in . This bridging of shifts made it impossible for
aminer discredits Magruder and White and finds
that prior to April 14 Alexander's performance had
not been unsatisfactory and she had not been repri-
manded.
Even if one were to credit the testimony of
Magruder and White that Alexander had been
reprimanded, it would not provide a plausible ex-
planation for the April 15 discharge because there
is no evidence that this fact was considered by, or
even known to, Jerry Williams. In its brief, Respon-
dent maintains that Alexander's dismissal was
simply incident to "the termination of an entire
shift," which was economically dictated on April
15. It may be noted that Alexander was not "laid
off" as some other employees were at that time.
Robinson, for example, was not called into the of-
fice, but simply received with her paycheck a pink
slip announcing her "indefinite suspension." There
is no indication that Williams explained to Alex-
ander that there was an economic layoff, that her
work was unsatisfactory, or that her shift changes
made her an undesirable employee.
The very fact that Jerry Williams personally let
Alexander go is most significant, in light of Jerry
Williams' own testimony that the selection of em-
ployees for layoff "is made by other people that
[he] feel[s] maybe closer to any particular
problems." Yet, so far as appears, Jerry Williams
selected Alexander without consulting Larry Wil-
liams, who had reinstated her on April 7, after her
alleged " resignation " of April 3.
Jerry Williams' subsequent conduct reinforces
the conclusion that Alexander did not quit and was
not discharged for cause. Early in the evening of
April 23, Jerry Williams telephoned Alexander at
her home and told her to report back to work the
next day. Later that evening he telephoned Alex-
ander's home again and, in the absence of Mrs.
Alexander, spoke to her husband. Williams asked
Mr. Alexander to tell his wife to return to work the
next day. According to Mr. Alexander, Williams ex-
plained, at some length, that he had discharged
Mrs. Alexander because he believed she was the
chief "agitator" for the Union, but having learned
that he was wrong in that opinion, he was voluntari-
ly recalling her. Williams originally denied having
spoken to Mr. Alexander on the telephone at all.
On further questioning by the General Counsel,
Williams admitted having had the telephone con-
versation, but his memory was vague. The next day,
when called as a witness by Respondent, Williams
could recall unequivocally that he had not men-
tioned union activities to Mr. Alexander. But Wil-
liams never advanced any reason for the second
telephone call to Mrs. Alexander's home. Despite
Williams' denial, the Trial Examiner credits Mr.
Alexander's testimony as to the content of the
telephone conversation.
her to maintain proper production records , as is required of floorladies.
Magruder apparently questioned Alexander's inadequate records, but
withdrew any criticism when the situation was explained
OMICO PLASTICS, INC.
Williams' conduct on April 24 confirms the in-
ference that he was bent on avoiding any ap-
pearance that the recall of Alexander indicated a
"condonation " of union activities . When Alexander
arrived at work on April 24, Williams informed her,
and then all the employees assembled , that he had
recalled her voluntarily because he needed her and
that nobody could compel him to reinstate her if he
did not want to. Such statements were certainly in-
consistent with his present position that Alexander
had been discharged for poor performance. In the
absence of any explanation , one can infer only that
Williams was determined not to allow Alexander's
reinstatement to serve as encouragement to the em-
ployees' exercise of their Section 7 rights.
On all the evidence , the Trial Examiner finds that
Brenda Alexander was discharged on April 15
because of her union sympathies and activities.
2. The June 3 layoff
On June 3 Alexander was laid off along with
three other employees . Respondent contends, and
there is no directly contrary evidence , that the
layoff of four employees at that time was economi-
cally motivated. The General Counsel maintains
that Alexander was chosen for layoff for dis-
criminatory reasons. In support of this view, the
General Counsel points primarily to the undisputed
fact that Alexander was the most senior nonsuper-
visory employee at the plant at the time of the
layoff.
Respondent maintains that Alexander was in-
cluded in the persons laid off because her produc-
tion was low and she frequently left her machine. In
its brief, Respondent says: "The evidence is also
clear that Brenda 's production remained low in
April and May 1969 due to what cousin White
called continued fooling around ...... However, on
direct examination White testified that Alexander's
production in April and May "was fairly good
production-11, 12 boxes a day at the time." Lead-
ing questions on redirect examination of White by
Respondent 's counsel then produced the following
colloquy:
0. Was it during April and May 1969 that
you were aware that Mrs. Alexander 's produc-
tion was low?
A. Yes , sir, it was.
0. And was it during that period when she
was leaving her machine?
A. Yes, I beleive it was.
Q. ... Now , for what reason , if you know,
was her production low during May of 1969?
A. I don 't really know . I couldn't say for-
sure . But like I said , she was off her machine
quite a bit , I mean fooled around.
When , on recross-examination, the inconsistency
within her testimony was called to her attention,
White said that Alexander 's production was erratic:
"Maybe two or three days a week she had good
production, and a couple days a week her produc-
773
tion would be low ." Significantly, although
Magruder testified that daily production records
were maintained and were considered in making
the layoff, none were produced at the hearing.
It will be recalled that on April 24 Jerry Williams
proclaimed that Alexander had been recalled
because she was a good worker . So far as appears,
between April 24 and June 3 Alexander received
no reprimand, written or oral, for low production
or "fooling around ." In May she worked as a floor-
lady for a period of 2 weeks , an assignment hardly
consistent with a low opinion of her performance.
While it is probably true, as Respondent main-
tains, that the Company has not always determined
layoffs strictly according to seniority , it is clear that
seniority has customarily played an important part
in these decisions . Yet in the June layoff employee
Barri Jean Reynolds, who had worked for Respon-
dent only 4 or 5 days , was retained over Alexander.
The Trial Examiner discredits Magruder's
testimony that this situation resulted from
Magruder 's supervisory judgment that the recent
employee was a better operator , particularly since
Magruder also testified that she usually judges em-
ployees' ability on the basis of production figures
for a full month and "it takes a while to apply your-
self to a machine ... [a girl ] should know how to
run the machine well within a month 's time."
Magruder further testified that she had not been
consulted or advised concerning the June layoff.
Alexander credibly quoted Williams as having said
that he was laying her off while retaining Reynolds
for "personal reasons."
Respondent contends that the choice of Alex-
ander for layoff in June could not have been dis-
criminatorily motivated because there were no
union activities going on at the time , all organiza-
tional activities apparently having been abandoned
by the end of April. It is unnecessary to determine
whether the quiescence of the union campaign
reflected the employees ' wishes or the success of
Respondent 's coercive antiunion campaign. What-
ever its cause , the absence of union activity does
not of itself disaprove discriminatory motivation in
the Alexander matter.
As the General Counsel observes , employee
Young , the instigator of the union activity, had left
Respondent's employ early in May . Two other em-
ployees who had been identified as prounion had
also quit by the beginning of June. Alexander and
Glenna Robinson were the only two remaining em-
ployees identified as prounion . Robinson had
started to work on April 14. On April 15, Larry
Williams asked her how she felt about unions and
she replied that she was in favor of them. At the
end of that day she was given her check and a
"pink slip," which stated that she was being
"indefinitely suspended ." Her husband thereupon
called Jerry Williams and said that Mrs. Robinson
badly needed the work . Williams then said to have
Robinson return the next day to see him . When she
arrived , Williams asked her what her conversation
774 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had been with Larry Williams. After she told him,
Jerry Williams said "that wasn't the reason [she]
was fired. And he said he wasn't at all sure that
[she] was fired." She returned to work the next
day. Robinson could hardly have remained unmind-
ful of her narrow escape. Unlike Robinson, Alex-
ander had engaged in union activities and was
"unrepentant." When she was discharged in April,
the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge on
her behalf.15 She thus remained as a constant
threat-a potential instigator of renewed union ac-
tivity.
In the absence of any credible explanation of
Respondent's choosing to lay off a competent ex-
perienced worker, the Trial Examiner can conclude
only that Alexander's layoff on June 3 was dictated
by her known union sympathies.
3. The written reprimands
a. September 18
Before the inception of the union organizational
campaign early in April 1969, Respondent had no
formal or announced system of disciplinary action
and did not give any written reprimands for em-
ployee derelictions. According to Respondent, writ-
ten reprimands were instituted on the advice of the
counsel. is
Alexander was recalled to work on September
9.17 On September 18, Magruder sent the following
typewritten memorandum to Alexander:
On September 17, 1969-the 4:30 to 12:30
Shift-each of the Boxes had every kind of
part we make in it. We can not tolerate this.
You must keep each part in its own box.
ALSO, your production on this machine
went down by 30 percent.
Continued poor work or carelessness may
result in further disciplinary action. A copy of
this will be placed in your personal [sic] file.
Below this typewritten message were two lists of
figures, one marked "Day Production," the other
"Night Production," the latter being Alexander's.
Alexander testified that the box in question was in-
deed in disarray but, as she told Magruder, she had
cleaned her boxes at the end of the shift in question
and her foreman, Darrel Walker, had seen her
doing so. Alexander further testified that Walker
" The complaint does not allege Respondent 's conduct toward Alex-
ander in June and thereafter as violative of Section 8(a)(1) Thus, while
there is reason to believe that Williams ' obvious displeasure at the original
charge motivated Respondent 's subsequent treatment of Alexander, no
specific finding to that effect is being made . In any event , the affirmative
remedy to be recommended would be the same whether Section 8 (a)(3) or
(4) was involved
1° The evidence is confused as to when written reprimands were in-
stituted At one point Jerry Williams testified that they had been recom-
mended by Attorney Rice , who had been consulted after the complaint was
issued on July 1. Magruder indicated that the system was instituted on or
about April 19, when she received telephonic advice to that effect from
Mr. Rice However , there are in the record a memorandum dated March
18 from Magruder to a foreman concerning two employees (one of whom
had confirmed this statement to Magruder. Alex-
ander's testimony in this regard was uncon-
tradicted18 and is credited.
Alexander further testified that she then noted on
the memorandum the times the machine had been
down during her shift. Allowing for the periods of
downtime, which totaled almost 3 hours, shows
Alexander's production as roughly equivalent to
that on the day shift.'9 Respondent did not question
Alexander's report of downtime and did not suggest
that there had been any downtime in the day shift.
On all the evidence, the Trial Examiner cannot
escape agreeing with Alexander's remark, made to
Magruder at the time in question, that "Somebody
[was] trying to mess [her] up around here."
Although both points covered by the reprimand
were shown to be unwarranted, so far as appears,
Alexander's personnel file still contains the dual
reprimand unmodified.
b. October 1
On September 30, Alexander arrived at work some-
time around 4 p.m. and was signed in at 4:30, when
the shift was to begin. Around 4:15 employee
Robinson telephoned the plant and spoke to Sapp,
the secretary. Robinson said that her car would not
run and asked Sapp if she would send Alexander to
fetch her, since Alexander, having transported
Robinson a few times before, knew where Robinson
lived. Sapp said that she did not know if Alexander
was in yet and took Robinson's address. Sapp asked
employee Jerri Rudd to fetch Robinson. Rudd then
asked Alexander to take her because Rudd did not
have sufficient gasoline and Alexander knew where
Robinson lived. Alexander and Rudd thereupon left
the plant and returned with Robinson. On October
1, the following memorandum was addressed by
Magruder to Alexander:
It has been brought to my attention that you
were 10 minutes late for work on Tuesday,
September 30, 1969.
Any reoccurrence of this will be met by
disciplinary action.
A copy of this note is being placed in your
personal [sic] file.
Sapp testified that she looked at the clock when
she saw the three girls come in. However, the
evidence clearly showed that the girls arrived only
4 minutes late.
was being discharged ) and memorandums in the nature of reprimands
dated April 7 and 8 , which coincide with the beginning of the Union's cam-
paign.
Since the complaint does not allege the institution of written reprimands
as independently violative of Section 8(a)( I ), it is unnecessary to deter-
mine precisely when it occurred and if it was an immediate retaliatory mea-
sure for the initiation of the union campaign.
" She was then treated essentially as a new hire See infra, "The
Remedy."
Walker did not testify.
Since three different parts had been produced, in varying quantities, it
is impossible , on the basis of the record evidence, to make a precise com-
parison.
OMICO PLASTICS, INC.
On October 3, the following memorandum signed
by Magruder, but actually dictated by Jerry Wil-
liams, was addressed to Darrel Walker, Alexander's
foreman:
It has been duly noted that the night shift
foreman, Darrel Walker, had stated to Miss
Deborah Sapp and Mrs. Billie Jean Magruder
that he did not know what time Mrs. Alex-
ander arrived for work on Tuesday, September
30, 1969. However, he now states that he did
make note of how late Mrs. Alexander was to
work. He now says she was only five minutes
late reporting to her machine for duty. This in
no way alters the fact that disciplinary action
will be taken if Mrs. Alexander is late again
without showing just cause or notifying in ad-
vance that she will be late. It is also to be
noted here that simple notification in advance
of being late will not necessarily be considered
just cause.
Alexander was advised that the matter of her tardi-
ness has been "straightened out," but she was not
given or shown the sternly worded memorandum of
October 3 to Walker. So far as appears, the Oc-
tober 1 memorandum stands unmodified in Alex-
ander's personnel file.
Respondent maintains that any tardiness, no
matter how short, is a matter of major concern
because the machines are kept in operation con-
tinuously and that if a machine is shut down for any
period, no matter how short, reactivation entails
considerable nonproductive time . The evidence
establishes that if an operator is late on the second
shift, one from the first shift must stay on. Because
the employees, naturally, do not like having to stay
on after the end of their shifts, tardiness is frowned
upon. However, it is clear that tardiness of just a
few minutes has generally been ignored.
Alexander testified that when she first went to
work for Respondent Larry Williams advised her
and a fellow worker that if they were only a few
minutes late (apparently up to 10 or 15 minutes),
they should sign in as of the beginning of the shift,
with no note of minor tardiness. Larry Williams did
not deny Alexander's testimony.
Magruder's records show Alexander as having
been 10 minutes late on September 30, but do not
have any similar notation about Robinson or Rudd.
Further, Magruder's record shows Alexander as
having been 5 minutes late on October 1. Robinson
testified, without contradiction, that she was 15 or
20 minutes late on that day and had been unsuc-
cessful in her attempts to reach Respondent by
telephone before the shift began.
The entire incident leaves no doubt in the Trial
Examiner's mind that Respondent was bent on
building a record against Alexander. Sapp's con-
duct in the matter reinforces this conclusion. She
In its brief Respondent apparently recognizes the inconsistency
between Williams ' testimony and the employment records . It there says:
"Each of the employees who were given the five-cent increase were em-
775
was apparently waiting to "catch" Alexander and
reported a 10-minute tardiness. This was corrected
only when Foreman Walker came forward with the
contrary information. The readiness to accept
Walker's statement strongly suggests that Sapp did
not, as she testified, look at the clock but rather
merely reported a figure which would be con-
sidered substantial.
On all the evidence, the Trial Examiner finds that
the written reprimands given to Alexander and
placed in her personnel file on September 18 and
October 1 were violative of Section 8(a)(3).
4. The denial of a wage increase
On October 3, a 5-cent-per-hour wage increase
was given to 14 of the 16 hourly paid production
workers, including supervisors. Pat Howard, who
had been hired only about 2 weeks earlier and who
was receiving 10 cents per hour less than any other
employee, was not granted this raise. The only
other person denied the raise was Alexander.
Magruder first mentioned the possibility of a
raise early in September. As an incentive for in-
creased production, she told the employees that if
they reached production of $25,000 during the
month of September they might receive a raise.
Around September 23, Magruder spoke to Jerry
Williams about the matter. According to him, after
having the operating figures analyzed, he informed
Magruder that there would be a 5-cent raise at the
end of the month if production continued at its cur-
rent rate. Magruder transmitted this information to
the employees. At that time Magruder indicated
that all employees would receive the raise, with no
qualifications.
At the hearing, Magruder and Jerry Williams
testified that because the raise was based on Sep-
tember production figures, which would reflect
some production actually performed in August, the
raise was restricted to those employees who had
been working during the last week of August.
Williams' testimony was:
And I said, "Well, I think the fair thing,
since the raise was predicated on the produc-
tion that was maintained in September ... ", or
"reached in September," which would of
course include a part of the production in the
last week of August, "Then anyone that was
here from the first day to the last day is enti-
tled to that raise."
And I said, "How many are there that
aren't?"
And it turned out there were two that hadn't
been there from the first to the end.
But the record shows that Robinson was not re-
called from layoff until September 2, yet she
received the October 3 increase.20
ployed at a minimum of three weeks during the period used for calculation
of gross production in determining raise eligibility ." Not a word was ut-
tered at the hearing about a 3 -week qualifying period.
776 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In any event, as heretofore found, Alexander's
failure to work during the last week of August or
for 3 full weeks in September was the result of her
discriminatory layoff in June. Accordingly, it could
not serve to justify Respondent's denying her the
general wage increase on October 3.21
Magruder added, and Respondent's brief
emphasizes, the unrelated explanation that Alex-
ander "was already making as much as ... some of
the girls was out in the plant. "22 The increase was
announced as being an across-the-board reward for
the group effort and included the supervisors. It
was not designed to remove or narrow wage dif-
ferentials, and did not do so for any employees
other than Alexander and the very new, inex-
perienced Pat Howard.
Respondent does not maintain that Alexander's
production or performance was deficient in Sep-
tember. On the contrary, the supervisors testified
that her work had been eminently satisfactory since
her return to work in September.
Absent any credible legitimate explanation for
singling Alexander out, the Trial Examiner is com-
pelled to conclude that her union sympathies and
activity were in considerations motivating Respon-
dent in withholding from her the wage increase
granted to other employees on October 3.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2) and (6)
of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section , 7 of the Act, and thereby
committed unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, by coercively interrogating employees con-
cerning their union sympathies and activities and
the union sympathies and activities of other em-
ployees, and.by threatening plant closure and loss
of jobs if the employees should choose to be
represented by the Union.
4. Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act by discharging Brenda Alexander on April
15, 1969; by laying her off on June 3, 1969; by issu-
ing reprimands to her on September 18 and Oc-
tober 1, 1969; and by failing to grant her a wage in-
crease on October 3, 1969.
5. The unfair labor practices found in paragraph
3 and 4 above are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act, the Trial Examiner will recom-
mend that it be required to cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.,
Respondent will be required to remove from its
records and files and destroy all copies of the repri-
mands given to Brenda Alexander on September 18
and October 1, 1969, as well as the related
memorandum of October 3, 1969, addressed to
Darrel Walker, her foreman. Although Mrs. Alex-
ander was recalled to work on September 9, 1969,
and was employed by Respondent at the time of the
hearing herein, it does not appear that she was fully
reinstated without any prejudice. On the contrary,
it affirmatively appears that, as of the time of the
hearing, she had not been restored to coverage
under Respondent's employee insurance program.
Accordingly, the usual reinstatement order will be
recommended, reinstatement to be at the rate of
pay she would be receiving had she not been
discharged on April 15, 1969, or laid off on Sep-
tember 2, 1969. The Trial Examiner will thus
recommend that Respondent be required to reim-
burse Brenda Alexander for any loss she may have
suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination
against her, by paying to her a sum of money equal
to the amount she would normally have earned as
wages from the dates of her discharge and layoff to
the date of Respondent's offer of full reinstatement,
less her earnings during that period. Such payment
shall include the amount of her loss, if any, caused
by discontinuance of her insurance coverage. The
reimbursement here recommended shall be com-
puted on the basis of calendar quarters, in ac-
cordance with the method ,prescribed in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest at the
rate of 6 percent per annum in accordance with Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, the Trial Examiner recommends
that Respondent, Omico Plastics, Inc., its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unlawfully questioning employees, threaten-
ing them with plant closure or loss of employment
if they choose to be represented by a union, or in
any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing them in the exercise of the
right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist United Steel Workers of
S1 Otherwise viewed, a make-whole remedy for the June 3 layoff would
in itself carry with it a 5-cent per hour increase after October 3, even if
Alexander had never been recalled
" Rudd was raised to $ 1 85 per hour on October 3. White, who for per-
sonal reasons had stepped down from supervisor to machine operator in
August or September, was raised from $1 85 to $1 90 per hour on October
3
OMICO PLASTICS, INC.
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, as
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain
from any or all such activities.
(b) Discouraging membership in United Steel
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization of its employees, by discriminating in
regard to the tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment.
2. Take the following affirmative action in order
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Brenda Alexander immediate and
full reinstatement to her former or substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority and other rights and privileges.
(b) Make whole Brenda Alexander for any loss
of pay and benefits she may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against her, in the
manner set forth in the section of this Decision en-
titled "The Remedy."
(c) Remove from its records and destroy all co-
pies of written reprimands addressed to Brenda
Alexander on September 18 and October 1, 1969,
and of the memorandum dated October 3, 1969,
from Billie Jean Magruder to Darrel Walker relat-
ing to Brenda Alexander.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to the determina-
tion of backpay due and to the reinstatement pro-
vided under the terms of this Order.
(e) Post at its Owensboro, Kentucky, plant co-
pies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."23
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 25, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25,
in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.24
21 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals , the words in the notice reading " Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
777
24 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which all parties had the opportunity
to present their evidence , the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has found that we violated the law and
has ordered us to post this notice telling our em-
ployees what we have been ordered to do and not
to do in the future.
The Board has ordered us to tell you that:
WE WILL offer Brenda Alexander immediate
and full reinstatement to her former job, or a
substantially equivalent job, without any loss of
pay, seniority or other rights and privileges, in-
cluding insurance coverage , and repay her,
with interest , for any loss she may have
suffered because we fired her or laid her off.
WE WILL remove from our records and
destroy written reprimands given to Brenda
Alexander on September 18 and October 1,
1969, and a memorandum from Billie Jean
Magruder to Darrel Walker dated October 3,
1969, concerning Brenda Alexander.
The Board has ordered us to tell you that:
WE WILL NOT question you about your union
sympathies or activities or about the union
sympathies or activities of other employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten that the plant will be
closed or that you will lose jobs if you choose
to be represented by United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any similar or related
manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce you
in the exercise of your right to self-organiza-
tion , to form, join , or assist a labor organiza-
tion , to bargain collectively through a bargain-
ing agent chosen by you, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection , or to refrain from any or all such
activities, except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized in Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
OMICO PLASTICS, INC.
(Employer)
778 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Dated By This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
( Representative ) ( Title ) altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, 614 ISTA Center, 150 West Market
This is an official notice and must not be defaced Street , Indianapolis, Indiana 46204, Telephone
by anyone . 317-633-8921.