Ohio Valley Carpenters District Council

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 19, 1976

226 N.L.R.B. 1032 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

1032 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ohio Valley Carpenters District Council , Local Union
No. 415, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America , AFL-CIO (Cincinnati Fix-
tures, Inc.) and Charles Leroy Lynch. Case 9-CB-
3186
November 19, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND PENELLO
Upon a charge filed on February 25, 1976, by
Charles Leroy Lynch, an individual, and duly served
on Ohio Valley Carpenters District Council, Local
Union No. 415, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, herein called Re-
spondent, the General Counsel of the National La-
bor Relations Board, by its Regional Director for
Region 9, on April 16, 1976, issued a complaint alleg-
ing that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and Section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
Respondent timely answered, denying the viola-
tions, and a hearing was held on July 13, 1976, before
Administrative Law Judge Josephine Klein. At the
conclusion of the General Counsel's case, Respon-
dent rested without presenting any evidence. The
parties agreed on the record to waive a Decision by
the Administrative Law Judge, and to have the rec-
ord transmitted directly to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board for decision. Respondent filed a brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the
Board makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. BUSINESS OF EMPLOYER
Cincinnati Fixtures, Inc., herein called Employer,
is engaged in the business of manufacturing and in-
stalling custom interior work, with its principal place
of business in Fairfax, Ohio. During the last calendar
year, the Employer sold and shipped goods valued in
excess of $50,000 directly to customers located out-
side the State of Ohio. We find, on the basis of the
foregoing, that Cincinnati Fixtures is, and has been
at all times material herein, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act, and that it will effectuate the purposes of
the Act to assist jurisdiction herein.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
We find that Respondent is, and at all times mate-
rial herein has been , a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
Respondent has a collective-bargaining contract
with the Employer covering all production employ-
ees employed at the Employer's plant in Fairfax,
Ohio. On July 21, 1975, the Employer laid off four of
the six production employees, including Charles
Lynch and Marvin Walters, who had I and 4 years'
seniority, respectively. It was the first major layoff at
the Company. Lynch was recalled within a week to
drive the Employer's truck, and Walters was not re-
called.
Lynch was classified as a truckdriver and Walters
as a cabinetmaker trainee. However, their duties
overlapped. Lynch and Walters were both in the
same job classification under the contract, and the
parties agree that the specific job titles given employ-
ees are archaic and no longer indicative of job con-
tent. Lynch's duties were to drive a truck, to do
maintenance and cleanup work around the shop, and
to make deliveries and pickups. Similarly, Walters'
duties were to help other people around the shop, to
clean up, to drive the truck, and occasionally to
make deliveries and pickups. Walters was shop stew-
ard.
The collective-bargaining agreement expired on
July 18, 1975. During negotiations for a new con-
tract, the Respondent sought broad seniority rights
for all purposes. The Employer sought seniority to
cover only vacations, as contained in the existing
contract. On July 28, 1975, the parties signed a con-
tract that carried over the seniority provisions from
the preceding contract. The seniority provisions are
contained in article V. Section 5.1 of the article states
that all new production employees shall be proba-
tionary for the first 30 days without any seniority
rights and that at the end of the 30-day period "[n]ew
employees shall be placed on seniority lists for vaca-
tion purposes only." Section 5.2 states that "all pres-
ent production employees' seniority shall be based
on the length of continuous service the Company."
The contract also contains the following provision:
The management of Company and the direction
of the working force, including the right to plan,
226 NLRB No. 144
OHIO VALLEY CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 1033
direct and control plant operation, hire, suspend
or discharge for cause, layoff for lack of work or
other legitimate reasons and the right to intro-
duce new and improved methods of facilities is
vested exclusively in Company.
On September 30, 1975, the Respondent filed a
grievance, alleging that the Employer's failure to re-
call Walters before Lynch violated the contract. A
'week later, a meeting was held on the grievance. Re-
spondent's position was that seniority was control-
ling, and, therefore, Walters should have been re-
called before Lynch. Further, it threatened to strike
if Walters did not drive the truck in place of Lynch.
The Employer's position was that it needed a truck-
driver, and that under the collective-bargaining
agreement it had the right to hire whomever it chose.
The Employer also stated that, under the contract
just executed, seniority rights applied only to vaca-
tions. The meeting ended with the parties agreeing
that the Employer's attorney would negotiate the
grievance with either the Respondent's business
agent or its attorney. Thereafter, the parties resolved
the grievance by agreeing that the Employer would
"terminate" Lynch and would recall Walters before
him. This agreement was confirmed in a letter signed
by both parties.
On October 24, 1975, the Employer laid off Lynch,
stating that the Respondent demanded it. On Febru-
ary 20, 1976, the Employer wrote the Respondent
stating that it needed a truckdriver, and requesting
that it be allowed to recall Lynch. The Respondent
responded that the Employer was required to recall
Walters first.
B. The Parties' Contentions
The General Counsel contends that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (2) of the Act by
forcing the Employer to terminate Lynch and to
agree not to recall him before Walters. Specifically,
General Counsel contends that the Union sought
broad seniority rights during the contract negotia-
tions and that, having failed to gain their inclusion in
the contract, it unlawfully sought to obtain these
rights in this manner. Although it is unclear from the
record,' General Counsel appears to contend that the
combination of the management rights clause, the
Union's failure to gain broad seniority rights, and the
silence of the contract as to seniority rights with re-
spect to layoffs provides the employees with the right
to be laid off or recalled on a basis other than senior-
ity. General Counsel also contends that favoritism
towards Walters, because he was Union steward, mo-
1 The General Counsel did not file a brief
tivated the Respondent to seek Walters' recall before
Lynch.
Respondent contends that it was acting in fur-
therance of a legitimate purpose, and that its actions
were not motivated by malice, nor by an attempt to
encourage union membership. Specifically, Respon-
dent contends that its objective was to persuade the
Employer to recall Walters because he was senior, as
both were in the same classification and essentially
did the same job. Respondent further contends that
the complaint should be dismissed because it alleges
that Respondent demanded and obtained the dis-
charge of Lynch, while the testimony presented evi-
dence of only a demand that Lynch be laid off.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts con-
tained in the record stipulated to by the parties, and
having fully considered the parties' contentions, we
conclude, for reasons set forth below, that the Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of
the Act by causing the Employer to lay off Lynch
and to agree not to recall him before Walters.
The Respondent, as the statutory bargaining repre-
sentative, has a wide range of discretion in serving
the unit it represents, as long as it exercises its discre-
tion in good faith. Ford Motor Company v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). A union breaches its fiduci-
ary duty when it acts against employees in an irrele-
vant, invidious, or unfair manner. Within its discre-
tion, a union has the right to cause an employer to
promote or demote an employee, as long as the union
is acting for the benefit of the membership as a
whole.'
Applying these principles to the facts in the stipu-
lated record before us, we find that the Respondent's
actions were not unlawful. The Union's promotion of
seniority rights in the layoff and recall process is a
reasonable interpretation of the contract, inasmuch
as the contract is vague and there is no past practice
of layoffs and recall. As the Board stated in Wanzer
Dairy Co., 154 NLRB 782, 793 (1965):
It is not necessary for the Union's defense
that its interpretation of the contract be correct.
It is sufficient that the Union did not, as I find,
act unreasonably, arbitrarily, unfairly, in viola-
tion of contract, or without legitimate purpose.
... Engaging in a strike to compel the Com-
2 Marquette Cement Manufacturing Company, 213 NLRB 182 (1974) See
also International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union of
America, Local 7, AFL-CIO (Yonkers Contracting Co, Inc), 135 NLRB 865
(1962), Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers' International Union of America,
Local No 2, AFL-CIO (Wilputte Coke Oven Division, Allied Chemical Corpo-
ration), 135 NLRB 323 (1962)
1034 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pany to accept its seniority demands was a prop-
er prerogative of the Union. [Footnotes omit-
ted.]
Although General Counsel asserted that the Re-
spondent took the action it did because Walters was
the steward, it did not produce any additional evi-
dence to support that claim. The mere fact that Wal-
ters holds the position of union steward is insuffi-
cient to establish improper motivation.
Thus, we find that the Union's activity is within its
discretion as a collective-bargaining representative
and that the General Counsel has failed to establish
that its actions were improperly motivated. There-
fore, we shall dismiss the complaint.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the complaint
herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.