Oak Rubber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 26, 1985

277 N.L.R.B. 1322 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

1322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Oak Rubber Company and Local Union No. 39, of
the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic
Workers of America , AFL-CIO, CLC. Case 8-
CA-16442
26 December 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS DENNIS, JOHANSEN, AND
BABSON
On 8 June 1984 Administrative Law Judge
Walter H. Maloney Jr. issued the attached supple-
mental decision. The Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the supplemental deci-
sion and the record in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings,
findings, i and conclusions2 and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Oak Rubber
Company, Ravenna, Ohio, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Order.
i The judge's supplemental decision contains an erroneous citation for
Fibreboard Corp v NLRB The correct citation is 379 US 203 (1964)
We find it unnecessary to pass on the judge's finding that the employ-
ees who suffered either a loss of a job, loss of seniority, or a reduction in
hours as a result of the Respondent's unlawful bad-faith bargaining are
derivatively discrimmatees under Sec 8(a)(3)
2 In adopting the judge's conclusion that the Respondent unlawfully
refused to bargain regarding its decision to relocate part of its manufac-
turing operations and the effects of this decision, we rely particularly on
the fact that, just at the time the Union was offering concessions in an
attempt to meet the Respondent's expressed financial needs regarding
labor costs, the Respondent closed the door to negotiations prior to
reaching impasse
Members Johansen and Babson agree with the judge's conclusion that
the Respondent was obligated to bargain with the Union over its decision
to relocate part of its manufacturing operations In so doing, they find
that the judge's conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's opin-
ion in First National Maintenance Corp x NLRB, 452 U S 666 (1981),
and with any of the views expressed in the Board's decision in Otis Eleva-
tor, 269 NLRB 891 (1984),
In finding the Respondent's decision to relocate unit work to a new
facility to be a mandatory subject , Member Dennis relies on the analyti-
cal approach set forth in her concurrence in Otis Elevator, supra
Frank D. Motil, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Donald C. Scriven, Esq., and John J Adams, Esq., of
Cleveland, Ohio, for the Respondent.
Albert L. Bess, Field Representative, of Akron, Ohio, for
the Charging Party.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
WALTER H. MALONEY JR, Administrative Law Judge.
On November 8, 1983, I issued a decision in the above-
entitled case (JD-491-83), finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by trans-
ferring certain bargaining unit work from its Ravenna,
Ohio plant to a new plant which it established at Reyn-
oldsburg, Ohio, some 150 miles away. The gravamen of
the violation found was that the Respondent transferred
the work in question during a contract term (indeed, at
the outset of the term) in breach of the contract and
without the permission of the other party to the contract,
namely, the Union, who had objected to the relocation
and had asked to bargain concerning the decision to
move and the effects of that decision.'
The decision was premised on Board law extant at the
time and set forth in Milwaukee Spring Division, 265
NLRB 206 (1982) (Milwaukee Spring 1) and other cases,2
holding that recognition clauses in collective-bargaining
agreements should be construed as a recitation of the
physical location of the work at the time of negotiations,
not as a geographical limitation on the scope of the con-
tract. From that premise, it followed that an attempt to
transfer work out from under the coverage of the con-
tract by relocating it at another plant constituted a viola-
tion of Section 8(d) of the Act because it amounted to a
unilateral modification of the contract during its term.
The complaint also alleged, and the General Counsel
also contended, that the relocation was accomplished in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act because the Re-
spondent refused to notify the Union and bargain with it
concerning both the decision to relocate and the effects
of relocation. I declined to pass upon these allegations,
inasmuch as the relief sought by the General Counsel
could be provided by a simple finding that the work re-
location violated the terms and conditions of the out-
standing collective-bargaining agreement.
While this case was pending before the Board on ex-
ceptions, the Board revised the law and issued a second
decision in the Milwaukee Spring case. In Milwaukee
Spring II, 268 NLRB 601, issued on January 23, 1984,
the Board held that conventional language found in con-
tract recognition clauses does not create an implied
work-preservation clause. In the absence of something
more specific, an employer is entitled, during the con-
tract term, to remove work from the bargaining unit and
perform it elsewhere under noncontract wages and con-
ditions without violating Section 8(d) of the Act. On
I At issue in this case is the transfer of portions of the work performed
in department 4 and department 6 at the Ravenna plant This work in-
volves the printing and packaging of rubber balloons and the preparation
of these items for shipment. The bulk of the Respondent's operation re-
mains at Ravenna The effect of this transfer was to eliminate 37 jobs at
Ravenna Some of the displaced employees took optional layoffs and
others were absorbed in other portions of the plant Some suffered a re-
duction in their working hours from a 40-hour week to a 37-1/2-hour
week The theory of the General Counsel is that these individuals are dis-
criminatees in a derivative 8(a)(3) violation, inasmuch as their impaired
status is the result of a violation of Sec 8(a)(5) of the Act I adopted this
theory and recommended, inter alia, a remedy redressing that violation
2 University of Chicago, 210 NLRB 190 (1974), Boeing Co, 230 NLRB
696 (1977), Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co, 235 NLRB 720 (1978),
enfd 602 F 2d 545 (9th Cir 1979)
277 NLRB No. 148
OAK RUBBER CO
April 9, 1984, the Board remanded this case to me for
preparation of a supplemental decision in light of Mil-
waukee Spring II. On April 13, I wrote to the parties and
offered them an opportunity to submit supplemental
memoranda if they chose to do so. The Respondent
moved to reopen the record to submit an affidavit recit-
ing certain events which had taken place at the new
Reynoldsburg plant since the hearing in this case in
August 1983.
In light of Milwaukee Spring II, a resolution of this
case cannot turn upon a construction of the recognition
clause, so I must, as the General Counsel urges in his
supplemental memorandum, proceed to other arguments
advanced in support of the complaint. In doing so, I re-
affirm all of the findings and conclusions which were
made in JD-491-83 as completely and fully as if they
were set forth herein in haec verba, except insofar as
they are in conflict with Milwaukee Spring II
The motivation for relocating part of the work at the
Ravenna plant was to undercut the wage rates and bene-
fit provisions of the Ravenna contract, The Respondent
made no bones about this fact. Respondent's vice presi-
dent Robert M. Baird told the press that this was why
the Company wanted to move a part of the Ravenna
work elsewhere, and he told the Union the same thing.
He estimated that the Company could beat the contract
rate by $4 an hour at the new location. Since labor costs
were the sole motivation for the move, the duty to bar-
gain over this action is unaffected by the Board's recent
decision in Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB 891 (1984). Re-
spondent's duty to bargain in good faith'over the deci-
sion to relocate the work in question is imposed by Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act, as interpreted in such cases as
Ozark Trailers, 161 NLRB 561 (1966); American Needle
& Novelty Co., 206 NLRB 534 (1973); Stone & Thomas,
221 NLRB 573 (1976), and Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S 203 (1964).
Respondent's whole effort to relocate work was
marked by a lack of candor from the outset. The ink was
barely dry on a new collective-bargaining agreement
when the first notice was given to the Union that the
Respondent had decided to look for another site for
some or all of its operations as a cost-cutting measure.
When the Union asked where the Respondent was plan-
ning to move, the only reply which was given to them
by Industrial Relations Director Jerry Beutsch was that
he hoped it would be somewhere in Ohio.
On May 6, in response to a union question presented in
the course of a grievance meeting, the Respondent said
that the move would probably take place during 1982,
but it had no definite timetable and no new plant site had
been located. It was not until July 27 that the Company
notified the Union that it was making a bid on a new
plant site. Even at this point the Respondent did not dis-
close where the proposed site was located. Within 2 days
after receiving this information, Local 39 President Ward
asked the Company to try and work out any problems
which might prompt the Company to relocate. I regard
this overture on her part as a request to bargain concern-
ing the decision to relocate. Making its demand within 2
days after receipt of the first information of any definite
act on the part of the Respondent, the Union can hardly
1323
be charged with delay in pressing its request for bargain-
ing over the decision to relocate. The fact that this
demand was followed up by a more formal, written
demand served upon the Company on October 12 does
not diminish the importance nor detract from the charac-
ter of what was first communicated to the Respondent 2-
1/2 months earlier. Mrs. Ward's further request for infor-
mation, made at or about the same time as her request to
"try and work out any problems" associated with the de-
cision to move, is further indication of a timely request
on the part of the Union to bargain over this question.
Accordingly, any suggestion on the part of the Respond-
ent that the Union waived its right to bargain or was dil-
atory in pursuing its right must be discarded.
There were discussions between the parties on August
6 concerning the forthcoming move. This meeting ended
with a question posed to Baird by union spokesmen to
the effect of what could be done to keep the jobs in
question in the Ravenna area. Baird said he would have
to think about the answer. He wrote a memo to the
Union on August 10, the thrust of which was to berate
the Union for its insensitivity to the Respondent's com-
petitive plight. He insisted that suggestions from the
Union be submitted quickly. Mrs. Ward wrote back the
next day, asking the Company to spell out any consider-
ation in wages, benefits, and hours which would prompt
the Respondent to think better of moving jobs out of Ra-
venna. Baird replied that wage-and-benefit surveys indi-
cate that the Company could expect to employ compe-
tent personnel at $4 less per hour in Columbus than
under the contract.3 He said that the Company also
wanted less restrictive work rules and would expect con-
cessions from those contract rates which the Company
had agreed to some 6 months earlier.
At a meeting on August 23, the Union asked the Com-
pany how many jobs would be affected. The reply was
30 to 50 jobs and possibly 70. The Union suggested that
a 40-cent-an-hour reduction across the board, noting that
such a concession would save the same amount as a $4-
per-hour reduction for 40 employees. It further suggest-
ed that this could be accomplished by a waiver of the
interim wage increase which the contract scheduled for
January 1983. Baird rejected this suggestion but made no
counteroffer. At that point, the meeting terminated. A
week later, he informed the Union that the Company
had completed negotiations for floor space in the Colum-
bus area. By this time the die was cast.
The obligation to bargain collectively in good faith
forbids an employer from unilaterally implementing a
change in wages, hours, and terms and conditions of em-
ployment unless and until the parties have bargained to
impasse. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217
(1949); John L. Gibson, 189 NLRB 219 (1971); Pay 'N
Save Corp., 210 NLRB 311 (1974); Highway Billboards,
206 NLRB 22 (1973); Dust-Tex Service, 214 NLRB 398
(1974). Bad-faith bargaining on the part of an employer
prevents any impasse from occurring which would
permit unilateral implementation of offers which have
been made and rejected. Wayne Dairy, 223 NLRB 260;
3 it came out later that no such survey was conducted
1324 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Metlox Mfg Co., 225 NLRB 1317 (1976); United Contrac-
tors, 244 NLRB '72 (1979); Towne Plaza Hotel, 258 NLRB
69 (1981); Marriott Corp., 258 NLRB 755; South Shore
Hospital, 256'NLRB 1 (1981); NLRB v. Big Three Indus-
tries, 497'F.2d'43'(5th Cir. 1974). A bargaining impasse
has been defined by the Board as follows:
A` genuine impasse in negotiations exists when, de-
spite the parties' best efforts to achieve an agree-
ment, neither party is willing to move from its posi-
tion. Until the collective-bargaining process had
been exhausted, no impasse can occur. [Marriott
Corp., supra, citing Excavation-Construction, 248
NLRB 649, ( 1980).]
In the present case, if we are to take the Employer's
communications ,seriously, the parties appeared on
August 23 to be close to an agreement which would
have met the Respondent's purported reason for relocat-
ing a portion of the Ravenna plant. The Respondent said
that it needed $4 an hour to remain competitive and its
desire to transfer portions of departments 4 and 6 was
prompted by a need to remain competitive. Originally
the $4-an-hour figure was given as an across-the-board
figure for the entire bargaining unit but it later became
clear that the Company was referring to a reduction lim-
ited to those jobs associated with the relocated work.
The Union's proposal of August 23 met this demand and
attempted to effectuate it by spreading the loss through-
out the unit in the form of a 40-cent-per-hour reduction
for each employee. It also sought to soften the impact of
a wage cut on its membership by asking that the reduc-
tion take place in the form of a waiver of a scheduled
increase which was set to take place in January under
the terms of a recently negotiated contract, rather than
as an actual decrease in existing rates. There was nothing
in its attitude which was fixed, uncompromising, or un-
movable. Instead of responding in a positive or coopera-
tive manner to this overture, the Respondent simply said
no and concluded the bargaining session. Its next com-
munication with the Union served to inform the Union
that the Company had leased property in the Columbus
area to facilitate the proposed relocation of work. By
this act the Respondent finalized the decision which had
been in the offing since the spring and effectively pre-
cluded further negotiations on the subject. What fol-
lowed in November was simply an implementation of the
act which occurred on August 31.
When the Respondent set in motion the chain of
events which led to relocation of the disputed work, no
impasse in bargaining had in fact occurred. Accordingly,
it was not free to finalize the decision as it did. The par-
ties were not far apart on this issue (if in fact the Re-
spondent was bargaining in good faith over the decision
itself), and a counterproposal could easily have resolved
any, quibble that the Union had not met the Respondent's
economic objections to keeping the work in Ravenna.
Indeed, a counterproposal might not have been necessary
and a mere clarification of the Union's proposal might
have sufficed to bring about agreement which would
have obviated the asserted need for the transfer. The Re-
spondent has yet to say why the Union's proposal of
August 23 did not meet the economic demands it ex-
pressed when it told the Union about its relocation plan.
In fact, the Respondent was never interested in bar-
gaining about relocation. It was only interested in
moving part of the unit work and its discussions and
communications with the Union on this score were
merely a stall. It was engaging in sham bargaining on the
subject. Respondent was as cagey as it could be through-
out the entire length of the discussions, telling the Union
as little as it could about the proposed move. Whatever
information was forthcoming was grudgingly given and
disclosed only in response to constant inquiry. Part of its
tactic was to berate the Union for even voicing an objec-
tion to the move and making an abrupt demand that the
Union get its proposal in quickly if it wanted it to have
any chance of consideration. Even as late as August 31,
the Respondent refused to disclose exactly where the
new site would be located. If the Respondent was genu-
inely faced with economic competition which necessitat-
ed lower labor costs, these matters could have been re-
solved, or at least discussed in detail, during the negotia-
tions which led up to the contract which took effect on
January 18, 1982. Instead, the Respondent concluded an
agreement containing economic provisions which it im-
mediately began to take steps to avoid. When the Union
went almost all the way to accommodate the Respond-
ent's asserted economic difficulties, the Union was met
with a stone wall. The Company simply refused the pro-
posal and, in its next communication on the subject, told
the Union it had signed a lease on the new factory. It is
clear from this course of behavior that the Respondent
never desired and never intended to come to an under-
standing with the Union which would have obviated the
relocation of work from Ravenna to Reynoldsburg and
the consequent loss of 37 unit jobs. In approaching its
duty to bargain on this issue, the Respondent demon-
strated bad faith and an abiding intention to get on with
the move as soon as it could get the details arranged, ir-
respective of what the Union might want or might offer.
Accordingly, under the cited cases, an impasse permit-
ting it to implement its proposal unilaterally could never
be defined in law, even if it had appeared to take place
in fact. Accordingly, by refusing to bargain in good faith
concerning its decision to relocate work and by unilater-
ally implementing this decision prior to impasse, the Re-
spondent herein violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act. I so find and conclude.
The General Counsel also contends that the Respond-
ent violated the Act by refusing to bargain in good faith
concerning the effects of the transfer. On October 12,
Mrs. Ward wrote Baird a letter specifically requesting to
bargain over both the decision to relocate and the effects
of relocation. She asked a number of probing questions
concerning the details of the relocation and sought a
copy of the survey which supported the Respondent's
contention that its move would save the Company $4 an
hour The Company refused to bargain further over the
decision to relocate, stated that the Company did not
intend to transfer any Ravenna employees to Reynolds-
burg, and added that the Company would only give pre-
ferred consideration to Ravenna employees who had re-
OAK RUBBER CO
established their homes in the Columbus, Ohio area, but
at Columbus area wage and benefit levels. The Company
also admitted that it did not have a wage survey of the
Columbus area.
Baird supplied Mrs. Ward with certain information
concerning the proposed operation of the Reynoldsburg
plant. He also told her that the Company was open to
discussions concerning cutbacks and other matters in-
volved in phasing out departments 4 and 6. No such dis-
cussions ever took place and, on November 29, the Re-
spondent began moving machinery from Ravenna to
Reynoldsburg in preparation for starting up the new op-
eration
Faced with a demand for bargaining over effects, the
Respondent was under an obligation to do something
more than present the Union with a list of predetermined
effects and ask for union comment. This is all that hap-
pened between these parties between October 12 and
November 29, when the actual move began. Having de-
termined the fate of Ravenna employees, their relocation
privileges vel non, and their manner of absorption into
the rest of the Ravenna plant before bargaining to im-
passe or before bargaining at all, the Respondent again
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The employ-
ees who suffered either a loss of a job, loss of seniority,
or a reduction in hours as a result of these two acts of
bad-faith bargaining are derivatively discrimmatees under
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and are entitled to be treated
as such by the Board's remedial processes.
The Respondent's final contention on the merits of the
complaint is that the language in the management-rights
clause of the contract, set forth on page 8 of the original
decision of this case, confers upon it the right to do what
it did without bargaining at all with the Union. Not even
Milwaukee Spring II goes this far. There is nothing in
that clause which affirmatively authorizes the Respond-
ent to transfer bargaining unit work outside the unit nor
is there anything in the record pointing to a bargaining
history which would justify such an interpretation. Ac-
cordingly, I will not place such a gloss on this contract
language.
On the foregoing findings of fact and on the entire
record herein considered as a whole, I make the follow-
ing
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Delete Conclusion of Law 5 in the original decision
and substitute the following.
"5. By refusing to bar gain with the Union in good
faith over the decision to transfer unit work from Raven-
na to Reynoldsburg, by refusing to bargain in good faith
with the Union concerning the effects of a decision to
transfer unit work from Ravenna to Reynoldsburg, and
by unilaterally transferring such work before reaching a'
bona fide impasse, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act."
REMEDY
In a posttrial motion, filed with me on April 23, 1984,
the Respondent asked to reopen the record to include an
affidavit of Personnel Manager Gerald W. Buetsch,
1325
which recites certain events which have occurred at
Reynoldsburg subsequent to the closing of the record in
this case . The General Counsel objects to the motion.
Much of the matter set forth in the affidavit are matters
which can be administratively noticed without opening
of the record. To the extent that administrative notice is
permissible , I notice such facts and, having done so, deny
the motion to reopen.
On November 14, 1983, a representation petition was
filed by the Seafarers Union in Case 9-RC-14387 seeking
an election among the Respondent 's employees at the
Reynoldsburg plant. On January 6, 1984 , an election was
held which the Seafarers won. On January 16, that
Union was certified as the bargaining agent of the Reyn-
oldsburg employees . These facts, having occurred after
the events recited above which form the basis of the
8(a)(5) violation at Ravenna , are irrelevant to the merits
of this case . They are also irrelevant to the remedy. The
injury was done by the Respondent to its Ravenna em-
ployees, not to Reynoldsburg employees , and the fact
that Reynoldsburg employees are organized or unorga-
nized, represented or unrepresented is immaterial to any
remedy to which Ravenna employees are entitled. If the
Respondent is empowered to conduct its business in vio-
lation of the Act, presents the Board with a fait accompli
which is generated by those violations , and then argues
that the Board is powerless to redress the wrong which
the Respondent has committed , then the Board 's process-
es are reduced to shambles and the Act becomes a grand
illusion . For the reasons set forth in the remedy portion
of the original decision , I will again recommend to the
Board that it direct the Respondent to move the trans-
ferred work back to Ravenna from Reynoldsburg and
that Ravenna employees be made whole as indicated
therein.
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and on, the entire record, I make the fol-
lowing recommended4
ORDER
The Respondent, Oak Rubber Company, Ravenna,
Ohio, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with
Local Union No. 39, of the United Rubber, Cork, Lino-
leum, and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC,
with respect to any decision to relocate bargaining unit
work from its Ravenna, Ohio plant to Reynoldsburg,
Ohio, or any other location , and refusing to bargain col-
lectively in good faith with the aforesaid Union with re-
spect to the effects of transferring any bargaining unit
work from Ravenna, Ohio, to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, or to
any other location, when such relocation of work is
prompted in whole or in part by considerations relating
to labor costs.
4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions , and recommended
Order shall , as provided in Sec . 102 48 of the Rules , be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
1326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Unilaterally transferring bargaining unit work from
Ravenna, Ohio, to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, or to any other
location for reasons relating in whole or in part to labor
costs without first bargaining in good faith to impasse
concerning any decision to relocate work and the effects
upon units employees of such decision.
(c) Laying off., -transferring, or reducing the working
hours of any bargaining unit employees as a consequence
of an unlawful unilateral transfer of bargaining unit work
from Ravenna, Ohio, to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, or to any
other location.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Bargain collectively in good faith with Local
Union No. 39, of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum,
and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC with
respect to any decision to transfer bargaining unit work
from Ravenna, Ohio, to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, or any
other place, and also with regard to the effects of any
such transfer of work, when such transfers are proposed
or undertaken because of considerations relating in
whole or in part to labor costs.
(b) Restore to the Ravenna, Ohio plant the work pre-
viously performed at that facility by bargaining unit em-
ployees represented by the Union which has been trans-
ferred pursuant to the unlawful acts referred to above.
(c) Recall or transfer any bargaining unit employees
laid off or transferred as a result of transferring work
from Ravenna, Ohio, to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, and offer
them full and immediate reinstatement to their former
positions or to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to seniority or other rights which they previ-
ously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings which they may have suffered by reason of the
discriminations practiced against them, in the manner set
forth above in the remedy section.
(d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(e) Post at its Ravenna, Ohio plants copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
8, after being signed by the Respondents authorized rep-
resentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi-
ately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where no-
5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in'the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice
WE WILL NOT transfer bargaining unit work from Ra-
venna, Ohio, to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, or anywhere else
for reasons relating to labor costs unless and until we
have first bargained in good faith until impasse with the
Union concerning such transfers and the effects thereof.
WE WILL NOT lay off, transfer, or reduce the working
hours of bargaining unit employees at Ravenna, Ohio,
because of unlawful transfers of bargaining unit work,
and WE WILL recall or transfer any employees laid off or
transferred as a consequence of an unlawful transfer of
bargaining unit work to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, and offer
them' full and immediate reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent employment, without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights which they previously
enjoyed, and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of
earnings by reason of the discriminations practiced
against them.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act These
rights include the right to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for their mutual aid and protection.
WE WILL bargain collectively in good faith with Local
Union No. 39, of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum,
and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC with
respect to any decision to transfer bargaining unit work
from Ravenna, Ohio, to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, or any-
where else because of considerations relating to labor
costs, and WE WILL bargain collectively with the Union
concerning the effects of any such transfers.
WE WILL restore to the Ravenna, Ohio ' plant work
previously performed at that facility by bargaining unit
employees represented by the Union which was trans-
ferred to Reynoldsburg, Ohio, pursuant to the unlawful
decision referred to above.
OAK RUBBER COMPANY