NYSE Group, Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 2, 20212021000337 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 2, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/574,930 12/18/2014 Amy Joy Farnstrom NGI-14-1080R 1999 35811 7590 06/02/2021 IP GROUP OF DLA PIPER LLP (US) ONE LIBERTY PLACE 1650 MARKET ST, SUITE 5000 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103 EXAMINER WARDEN, MICHAEL J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3693 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/02/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): pto.phil@us.dlapiper.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte AMY JOY FARNSTROM, STEVEN G. CRUTCHFIELD, and JAMES HYDE ____________ Appeal 2021-000337 Application1 14/574,930 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before HUBERT C. LORIN, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s Final Rejection2 of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, and 28. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies NYSE Group, Inc. as the real party in interest. 2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action mailed on March 5, 2020 (“Final Act.”). Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 2 SUMMARY OF DECISION We affirm. THE INVENTION Appellant states the invention relates to: “the field of electronic trading systems, and in particular, systems for handling limit and market orders.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A system comprising: one or more specialized computers, in communication with one or more external electronic exchanges through a network, comprising computer-readable instructions stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium and executed by at least one processor, said one or more specialized computers further comprising: at least one monitoring component; an order manager subsystem; and an execution manager subsystem, the order manager subsystem configured to: monitor, over the network, via the at least one monitoring component, one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) prices at the one or more external electronic exchanges; determine, in response to said monitor, that an away BBO price among the one or more away BBO prices is a better price than a display price for an initiating order for at least one external electronic exchange of the one or more external electronic exchanges, wherein the better price comprises a higher price if the initiating order has a sell side and a lower price if the initiating order has a buy side; activate a specifically designed BBO router module when the order manager subsystem determines the better price, the BBO router module configured to perform the specific function Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 3 of dispatching full or partial orders to the one or more external electronic exchanges, said orders having been received by said system, and the execution manager subsystem configured to: identify, via the at least one monitoring component, at least one irregular transaction from among the received orders based on one or more predetermined conditions; and temporarily halt a trading operation, thereby preventing execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction. THE REJECTION Claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, and 28 are rejected under 35 USC § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. FINDINGS OF FACT We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–10 in the Final Office Action and on pages 3–11 in the Examiner’s Answer, concerning the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION We will affirm the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9, and 11–28 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Appellant argues claims 1, 2, 4–9, and 11–28 as a group. (Appeal Br. 3). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015). An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 4 ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 5 mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency 3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 6 management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;4 see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 4 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04 and also supersedes all versions of the USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on now superseded USPTO guidance. 5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54– 55. Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 7 (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.04–2106.05. The Specification states: The advent of certain types of trading has narrowed the spread between available best bids and best offers (defined below), which may decrease profits available to market participants. Additionally, the prices of markets may change significantly relative to bid-offer spreads, which could lead to unexpected Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 8 losses for market participants. These (and other) factors may decrease available liquidity at the best bid and offer prices. As a result, orders (particularly large orders) may expect to receive prices differing from the best bid or best offer prices. Due to the lack of price predictability, market participants making certain types of orders must price these orders by manually contacting other market participants. This manual pricing process is inherently slow and error-prone. Additionally, orders priced outside of an exchange may not fetch an efficient price because some market participants are not consulted. Spec. ¶ 2. In one embodiment, the exchange includes risk management functionality to identify irregular trades. Irregular trades may be identified based on a trade quantity and/or percentage above thresholds set by the exchange and/or market participants. Irregular trades may also be identified based on a series of trades having too many trades having a trade quantity or percentage above thresholds. Spec. ¶ 8. In one embodiment, the exchange monitors best bid and best offer prices at away exchanges and the NBBO (defined below). Based on availability of better prices at an away exchange, the exchange may route all or part of an order. The exchange may include execution instructions that determine how an order interacts with prices at away exchanges. Other execution instructions may cancel an order that is not filled immediately or after a price improvement auction. Spec. ¶ 9. Claim 1 recites in pertinent part: monitor, . . . one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) prices at the one or more external electronic exchanges; determine, in response to said monitor, that an away BBO price among the one or more away BBO prices is a better price than a display price for an initiating order for at least one external electronic exchange of the one or more external electronic exchanges, wherein the better price comprises a higher price if the initiating Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 9 order has a sell side and a lower price if the initiating order has a buy side; . . . when the order manager . . . determines the better price, . . . perform the specific function of dispatching full or partial orders to the one or more external . . . exchanges, said orders having been received by said system, and the execution manager . . . identif[ing], . . . at least one irregular transaction from among the received orders based on one or more predetermined conditions; and temporarily halt[ing] a trading operation, thereby preventing execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction. Accordingly, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites a way of monitoring one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) prices at one or more external exchanges to identify at least one irregular transaction from among received orders and temporarily halting a trading operation of the at least one identified irregular transaction. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is “related to a concept related to the economy or commerce.” Final Act. 3. Preventing irregular trades on commercial exchanges is a fundamental economic principle because conducting trades within thresholds promotes fairness and an even playing field on which transactions take place and, thus, maintains true market equilibrium. Fundamental economic principles are ones of certain methods of organizing human activity that are abstract ideas. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The limitation of “temporarily halt[ing] a trading operation, thereby preventing execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction” is deemed a post-solution activity. See, Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (“The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance. A competent draftsman could attach some form of post- Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 10 solution activity to almost any mathematical formula.”) Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only generically requires “computers,” “a network,” “a non-transitory computer- readable storage medium,” “at least one processor,” and a “BBO router module.” These components are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 33, 34, 50–53, Figs. 1 and 2. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. This is consistent with the Examiner’s findings which we adopt as our own herein: This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because the claims only recites system components for implementing the abstract idea. The claims recite the additional limitations of one or more specialized computers, one or more external electronic exchanges, a network, computer- readable instructions, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, at least one processor, at least one monitoring component; an order manager subsystem; and an execution manager subsystem, and are recited at a high level of generality and amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer. (Final Act. 7–8). Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exception of a certain method of organizing human activity absent computer components and/or of a system so integrated into the judicial exception as to impose a meaningful limit on the judicial exception. That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to financial instruments, does not make them any less abstract. See Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 11 OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). Concerning this step the Examiner found the following: The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because, when considered separately and as an ordered combination, they do not add significantly more (also known as an “inventive concept”) to the judicial exception. Final Act. 8. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer. They do not.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. Limitations such as “wherein the better price comprises a higher price if the initiating order has a sell side and a lower price if the initiating order has a buy side,” are not steps, but a Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 12 recitation of data characterization. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 33, 34, 50– 53, Figs. 1 and 2. Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (monitor/determine/activate/identify/halt operation) and storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 13 We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Appeal Br. 3–20; Reply Br. 1–5). We find that our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same. Appellant argues: “Thus, the distinctiveness of the claimed operations and functions is evidenced by the lack of any prior art rejections in the Final Action. Indeed, the lack of any prior art rejections in the Final Action is, instead, more indicative that the Appellant's claims are indeed unconventional.” (Appeal Br. 5). We disagree with Appellant. Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citation omitted). “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). Appellant asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that “the very purpose of electronic transaction systems is to maximize throughput by automatically executing huge volumes of inbound electronic orders.” (Appeal Br. 6). And Appellant argues that “[b]y introducing an intentional delay into this automatic execution (as in Appellant's invention), the claimed invention is necessarily causing the system to operate in a Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 14 manner that is completely contrary to its very purpose.” (id. (emphasis omitted)). We are not persuaded by Appellant because first, as found above, the limitation of “temporarily halt[ing] a trading operation, thereby preventing execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction” is a post- solution activity. See, Flook, 437 U.S. at 590. Second, the act of temporarily halt[ing] a trading operation, thereby preventing execution of the at least one identified irregular transaction is the product of the mental step of evaluating, which is an abstraction. Although we agree with Appellant that the claims must be read, as a whole (Appeal Br. 13–14), we nevertheless find, on balance, that claim 1 is directed to the abstraction of a way of monitoring one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) to identify at least one irregular transaction. As found supra, claim 1 only includes generically recited device limitations. What remains in the claim after disregarding these device limitations, are abstractions, i.e.; determine, in response to said monitor, that an away BBO price among the one or more away BBO prices is a better price than a display price for an initiating order for at least one external electronic exchange of the one or more external electronic exchanges, wherein the better price comprises a higher price if the initiating order has a sell side and a lower price if the initiating order has a buy side; . . . determine[] . . . : identify[ing], . . . at least one irregular transaction from among the received orders based on one or more predetermined conditions. (Appeal Br. 9–10). “A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90) (emphasis omitted); see also BSG Tech. LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It has been Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 15 clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”). Appellant argues, At a minimum, the elements above certainly amount to significantly more than any abstract idea, and none can possibly be construed as well-understood, routine, and conventional in this art. As such, Claim 1 indeed provides an inventive concept. Any attempted rebuttal by the Office of said inventive concept would necessarily require factual evidence under Step 2B and the Berkheimer standard. (Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis omitted)). We disagree with Appellant because an “inventive concept” is furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim as a whole amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). On page 17 of Appellant’s Brief, Appellant cites to three claim elements which it asserts cannot “possibly be construed as well-understood, routine, and conventional in this art.” (Appeal Br. 17). But, the functions attached to these devices are all items for which a computer is designed, namely, identifying an order, routing dispatches and stopping execution of a command, respectively. Further, the purported solution requires the use of a server, device, and network operating in their ordinary and conventional capacities. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26. The Appellant does not, and cannot, claim to have invented the use of the required “computers,” “network,” “non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,” “at least one processor,” and a “BBO router module.” The Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 16 “focus” of the claim is not “on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities” (Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335) or on the network itself (see Smart Systems Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017)), but rather on using the server, device, and network as tools to implement the abstract idea in the particular field of monitoring away trades. See Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Supreme Court and [the Federal Circuit] have repeatedly made clear that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract.”) Finally we disagree with Appellant that the claimed “monitor[ing], . . . one or more away best bid-offer (BBO) prices” (Appeal Br. 8) does not constitute “data gathering and storing,” and hence is an abstraction. Gathering information of a particular content and analyzing this information in particular ways falls squarely under the abstract idea umbrella. Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For the reasons identified above, we determine there are no deficiencies in the Examiner’s determination of patent ineligibility of the rejected claims. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9, and 11–28. CONCLUSION OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–9, and 11–28 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Appeal 2021-000337 Application 14/574,930 17 Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4–9, 11–28 101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–9, 11–28 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation