NXP B.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardOct 6, 2021

2021001579 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/632,907 10/01/2012 Cedric Colnot 81524742US01 9168 65913 7590 10/06/2021 Intellectual Property and Licensing NXP B.V. 350 HOLGER WAY SAN JOSE, CA 95134 EXAMINER LEFFALL-ALLEN, NAKIA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/06/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ip.department.us@nxp.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte CEDRIC COLNOT ____________________ Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before, DAVID M. KOHUT, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–20, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as NXP B.V., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of NXP Semiconductors N.V. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant describes the disclosed and claimed invention as follows: In accordance with the invention, in order to validate a transaction on a mobile handset, PC, tablet or similar device, a user closes the loop between a non-secure display controlled by a host processor and a secure keypad controlled by a secure processor such as a master secure element or trusted execution environment. The user validates the transaction by entering on the secure keypad the data shown on the non-secure display. The transaction is validated because the user only enters the data that the user agrees to and only the user is able to enter the data. Abstract.2 Claims 1 and 7 are independent. Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below: 1. A method of validating a transaction using both a secure input and a non-secure output comprising: (a) storing secret data in the secure processor; (b) sending first data from a host processor to a secure processor; (c) sending a validation request from the secure processor to the host processor in response to receipt of the first data by the secure processor; 2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed April 20, 2020 (“Final Act.”), Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed July 14, 2020 (“Appeal Br.”) and Reply Brief filed December 22, 2020 (“Reply”), the Examiner’s Answer mailed October 29, 2020 (“Ans.”), and the original Specification filed October 1, 2012 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 3 (d) sending second data from the host processor to the non-secure output; (e) accepting a user input of both the second data and authenticating secret data into the secure input; (f) sending both the accepted second data and the accepted authenticating secret data from the secure input to the secure processor; and (g) validating the transaction, in the secure processor, when the first data and the accepted second data are equivalent and the accepted authenticating secret data match the stored secret data. Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.). Rejections on Appeal3 Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Final Act. 6–9. Claim 3 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 9–10. 3 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 1, 7, 12, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement. Ans. 9. Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 4 ANALYSIS I. SECTION 101 REJECTION A. Applicable Law “Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories, the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of [the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)). That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 5 B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the Patent Office issued guidance about this framework.4 Under the Revised Guidance, to decide whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the claim (1) recites one of the abstract ideas listed in the Revised Guidance (“Prong One”) and (2) fails to integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application (“Prong Two”). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51, 54. If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we then determine whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.” Id. at 56. With these principles in mind, we first analyze whether claim 15 is directed to an abstract idea. 4 USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84(4) Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”); see also USPTO, October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Oct. 2019 Update”), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf. 5 Appellant argues claims 1–20 as a group focusing on claim 1. See Appeal Br. 10–16. Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the § 101 rejection of the pending claims based on representative claim 1. Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 6 1. Abstract Idea a. USPTO Step 2A, Prong One Beginning with step 2A, prong one, of the Revised Guidance,6 we determine “whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” including the abstract ideas enumerated in the Revised Guidance. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract idea exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when recited as such in a claim limitation(s) (that is, when recited on their own or per se): (a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations; (b) Certain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and (c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion). Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. For our prong one analysis, we set aside, for consideration below, the technological elements recited in claim 1: “secure input and a non-secure output,” “host processor,” and “secure processor.” Thus, claim 1 recites the following: 6 The Guidance refers to “Step One” as determining whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. This step is not at issue in this appeal. Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 7 [a] method for validating a transaction . . . comprising: (a) storing secret data . . . ; (b) sending first data . . . ; (c) sending a validation request . . . in response to receipt of the first data . . . ; (d) sending second data . . . ; (e) accepting a user input of both the second data and authenticating secret data . . . ; (f) sending both the accepted second data and the accepted authenticating secret data . . . ; and (g) validating the transaction . . . when the first data and the accepted second data are equivalent and the accepted authenticating secret data match the stored secret data.” “Storing” step (a), “sending” steps (b), (c), (d), and (f), and “accepting” step (e) are common examples of inconsequential, data gathering steps the courts have determined are insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31; see also, e.g., Bancorp Servs, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1066 (E.D. Mo. 2011), aff’d, 687 F.3d at 1266 (explaining that “storing, retrieving, and providing data . . . are inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post solution activity”); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (determining that “claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of data” were abstract). “Validating” step (g), in which two pairs of data are compared to determine their equivalency, is an evaluation, analysis, or judgment step that may be performed in the human mind or with pen and paper. Thus, claim 1’s steps (a)–(g) recite concepts relating to a method of organizing human activity, such as commercial interactions (including sales activities and business relations), and mental processes, concepts performed Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 8 in the human mind (including an evaluation, judgment, opinion). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. This is consistent with the Examiner’s characterization of claim 1 as reciting the abstract concept of ‘“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity,’ such as commercial or legal interactions.” Final Act. 7; Ans. 6. To the extent claim 1 recites more than one abstract idea, we note that merely combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). In view of the foregoing, Appellant’s arguments for step 2A, prong one, are not persuasive. See Appeal Br. 10–13; Reply 2–3. In particular, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner mischaracterizes the claims as directed to “authorizing a financial transaction” for the purpose of suggesting they fall within the “certain methods of organizing human activity” category. Appeal Br. 10–11; Reply 2. As discussed above, the Examiner finds that claim 1 falls in that category because is it directed to “commercial or legal interactions,” and not because it is specifically directed to a “financial transaction.” Ans. 6. Then, consistent with Appellant’s argument, the Examiner describes claim 1 as a “process of validating a transaction.” Id. We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner did not follow the proper prong one analysis by not considering the claim as a whole. As the Revised Guidance states, the examiner is to first identify the Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 9 specific limitations in the claim under examination that the examiner believes recite an abstract idea. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If the identified limitations fall within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas, the examiner “should evaluate whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.” Id. This is the procedure followed by the Examiner here. See Final Act. 7–9; Ans. 5–7. We do not, however, agree with the Examiner’s finding that “sending a validation request . . . in response to the receipt of the first data . . .” is optional language that does not limit the claim. Ans. 6. As Appellant argues, and we agree, “sending a validation request” is performed by the secure processor when it receives the first data from the host processor, and “the action taken [by the secure processor] in response to such reception is not optional.” Reply 3. Although we give full effect to “validating” step (g), as discussed supra, the validating step falls within the mental processes grouping of abstract ideas. Accordingly, consistent with our Office Guidance and case law, we determine that claim 1 recites abstract ideas in the method of organizing human activity and mental processes groupings. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. b. USPTO Step 2A, Prong Two Because we determine that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we turn to prong two of step 2A of the Alice analysis and consider whether claim 1 integrates this abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we consider whether there are any additional elements beyond the abstract idea that, individually or in Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 10 combination, “integrate the [abstract idea] into a practical application, using one or more of the considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.”7 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. The Examiner finds that the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application because the additional elements of claim 1, such as the “secure processor” and “host processor,” “merely serves as tools to perform the abstract idea and/or generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment.” Final Act. 8; Ans. 6–7. Appellant argues that the claims are directed to a practical application because they “relate to a specific method for authorizing a secure transaction in a system having a non-secure domain that includes a host processor and a secure domain that includes a secure processor.” Appeal Br. 13–14. According to Appellant, the claim limitations “remedy an issue found in prior art devices that causes those devices to be exposed to security risks, such as tampering, along with a high complexity of their architecture.” Id. at 14. Appellant also argues that the claims “are directed to a specific solution to this specific problem,” and “provide an improvement over existing technology.” Id. Appellant’s arguments for step 2A, prong two, are not persuasive. As an initial matter, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1’s additional elements, “secure input and a non-secure output,” “host processor,” and “secure processor,” “merely serve as tools to perform the abstract idea 7 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Revised Guidance). Solely for purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate it under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A, Prong Two, of the Revised Guidance). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 11 and/or generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment.” Claim 1, and the Specification, recite the use of computer elements and components at a broad, generic level as tools for facilitating the validation of a transaction, without any improvement to computing or software functionality itself. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 13–15, 24–25. In other words, the claims are focused not on an improvement to computers or software itself, but on the use of computers and software as tools to execute the judicial exception. See, e.g., Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that (1) the claims recite “a specific method” for authorizing a secure transaction, (2) the claims are directed to “a specific solution” to the security risks resented in prior art devices, and (3) the claims “provide an improvement over existing technology.” See Appeal Br. 13–14. Although claim 1 recites specific steps, these pertain to the recited abstract idea, not any additional or improved technological element. Narrowing the recited abstract idea or limiting it to a particular field of use in this way does not change our overall understanding of the claims and, thus, does not render the claims non-abstract. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55, id. n.32; see also, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining that even though “some of the eleven steps were not previously employed in this art,” that was “not enough—standing alone—to confer patent eligibility upon the claims at issue.”). Nor is the fact that data is being operated on and manipulated in a particular way evidence of a technological advance. Rather, this merely reflects the manipulation or reorganization of data, which fails to transform an otherwise Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 12 patent-ineligible concept into an eligible one. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In summary, claim 1 does not recite a technological improvement to computers, software, processors, or input and output devices. Rather, “it is clear, from the claims themselves and the specification, that these limitations require no improved computer resources [Appellant] claims to have invented, just already available computers, with their already available basic functions, to use as tools in executing the claimed process.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1169–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018).8 Indeed, the Specification describes the invention at a high level using no more than general-purpose computing elements for performing generic computing functions. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 13–15, 24–25. Nor does Appellant identify any persuasive evidence that claim 1 requires any specialized computer hardware or other inventive technological components, such as a particular machine, for performing the claimed invention. Accordingly, consistent with the Examiner’s findings, and in view of Appellant’s disclosure, we determine that claim 1 does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, and thus is directed to the judicial exception itself. In particular, we determine claim 1 does not recite: (i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer; (ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field; 8 See also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (explaining that courts have identified “merely us[ing] a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea” as an example of when a judicial exception may not have been integrated into a practical application); Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In this case, the claims are directed not to an improvement in cellular telephones but simply to the use of cellular telephones as tools in the aid of a process focused on an abstract idea. That is not enough to constitute patentable subject matter.”). Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 13 (iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a particular machine; (iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; or (v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment. See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). c. USPTO Step 2B — Inventive Concept Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is, whether any additional claim elements “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). This requires us to evaluate whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Examiner finds claim 1’s additional elements of a secure processor and host processor are not sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because these elements amount to “no more than using a computer or processor to automate and/or implement the abstract idea.” Ans. 7. Appellant argues the rejection fails for lack of proper support because the Examiner failed to provide factual support, as required by the Office’s Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 14 Berkheimer memorandum,9 that the additional claim elements are well understood, routine, and conventional. Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply 3. Appellant’s argument does not persuade us the Examiner erred. First, Appellant’s Berkheimer argument is unavailing because Appellant has not established that the instant patent eligibility inquiry contains an underlying issue of fact. The court in Berkheimer held, among other things, that “[w]hen there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the claim element or claimed combination is well-understood, routine, [and] conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field, this issue can be decided on summary judgment as a matter of law.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). Here, although Appellant asserts that certain elements have not been shown as well- understood, routine, and conventional, Appellant does not adequately explain why these elements are not well-understood, routine, and conventional, nor does Appellant identify any passages from the Specification that support its argument. See Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 3. Second, the Examiner’s finding is amply supported by the Specification, which indisputably shows the additional elements of claim 1 were well-understood, routine, and conventional activities at the time of filing because they are described in a general manner without additional details that would distinguish them from conventional components. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 13–15, 24–25. And, as discussed above, we have determined 9 Robert W. Bahr, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.), USPTO 3 (2018) (“Berkheimer Memo”)). Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 15 that claim 1 does not recite a technological improvement to the functioning of computers or computer components. In view of the foregoing, considering claim 1 as a whole, we determine that the additional claim elements do not provide “a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Rather, these elements do no more than “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.” Id. Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 does not have an inventive concept. d. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. For those same reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 7, which recites similar limitations and was not argued separately with particularity. We likewise sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of dependent claims 2–6 and 8–20, which merely narrow the recited abstract idea and were not argued separately with particularity. II. REJECTION UNDER § 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and further recites, “wherein the secure input is a physical keyboard.” Appeal Br. 21 (Claim App.). The Examiner rejects claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement because Appellant’s Specification “does not detail the term keyboard.” Final Act. 10; Ans. 8. The Examiner also finds that the Specification “details the use of a ‘keypad’ versus a keyboard.” Ans. 8–9. Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 16 Appellant argues that the term “physical keyboard” is described throughout the originally-filed application. Appeal Br. 19. Appellant asserts that, for example, paragraphs 22–23, and Figures 3C and 3D, “describe embodiments in which a keypad mask layer is used with a touchscreen display to project a predefined keypad layout on the display.” Id. Appellant also asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art of mobile platforms would have understand that through the use of the term “keypad,” as provided in paragraphs 22 and 23, and illustrated in Figures 3C and 3D, Appellant had possession of the “physical keyboard” of claim 3. Reply 4. The test for compliance with the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). “[T]he disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, the disclosure must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred. Consistent with Appellant’s argument, in describing Figure 3C, paragraph 22 of the Specification states that “[k]eypad mask layer 356 projects predefined keypad layout 310 onto touch screen 135” and that “[k]eypad mask 356 cannot be altered by host processor 115 as it is physically Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 17 integrated into display 130.” Spec. ¶ 22. Although this description refers to a “physical keypad,” we agree with Appellant that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably considered the predefined keypad layout on touch screen 135 as the “physical keyboard.” Reply 4. We also note that paragraph 17 of the Specification describes an embodiment of the invention in which a transaction is validated by a user with a device having a “physical keypad,” rather than a touch screen keypad. In that regard, paragraph 17 describes such devices as “mobile handsets, PCs, tablets and similar devices where keypad 110 is physical (i.e. keypad 110 is not a touch screen keypad on non-secure display 130).” Spec. ¶ 17. Based on these disclosures of a “physical keypad,” we find the Specification provides adequate written description support for claim 3’s “physical keyboard” limitation.10 Although the Specification uses the term “keypad” instead of “keyboard,” the written description requirement does not demand “any particular form of disclosure . . . or that the specification recite the claimed invention in haec verba.” Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1352 (citation omitted). Thus, we also find that the Specification reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the subject matter of claim 3 as of the filing date. Id. at 1351. 10 The written description requirement of § 112, first paragraph, is a question of fact. Ralston Purina Co. v. Far–Mar–Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Thus, “determining whether a patent complies with the written description requirement will necessarily vary depending on the context.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352 (citing Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Appeal 2021-001579 Application 13/632,907 18 III. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. IV. SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20 3 112 3 Overall Outcome 1–20 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).