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Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 4, 2019

12384104 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/384,104 03/31/2009 Roderick A. Hyde GS1-0930-US 4794
80118 7590 12/04/2019
Constellation Law Group, PLLC
P.O. Box 580
Tracyton, WA 98393
EXAMINER
VASAT, PETER S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3785
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ISFDocketInbox@intven.com
Tyler@constellationlaw.com
admin@constellationlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________
Ex parte RODERICK A. HYDE, ROBERT LANGER,
ERIC C. LEUTHARDT, ROBERT W. LORD,
ELIZABETH A. SWEENEY, CLARENCE T. TEGREENE, and
LOWELL L. WOOD JR.
___________________

Appeal 2019-004198
Application 12/384,104
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

KAUFFMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

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DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96,
100, 101, 103, 105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132.
Final Act. 4–14, 19–66. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 40, 79, 80, and 84 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
accepting an indication of a health-related condition of an
individual;
presenting an indication of a combined inhalation therapy,
including at least an inhalation device dispensed bioactive agent
and an artificial sensory experience, via a bioactive agent
dispensing virtual reality headset worn by the individual at least
partially based on the accepting the indication of the health-
related condition of the individual, including at least:
engaging the individual in the artificial sensory
experience via a virtual reality helmet portion of the
bioactive agent dispensing virtual reality headset; and

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Gearbox,
LLC, which is wholly owned by Intellectual Ventures Management, LLC.
Br. 5.
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delivering the inhalation device dispensed bioactive
agent to the individual via an inhalable agent dispensing
portion of the bioactive agent dispensing virtual reality
headset;
measuring at least one effect of the combined inhalation
therapy on the individual via a physiologic activity monitor
portion of the bioactive agent dispensing virtual reality headset;
modifying at least one of the inhalation device dispensed
bioactive agent or the artificial sensory experience at least
partially based on the measuring the at least one effect of the
combined inhalation therapy on the individual via the
physiologic activity monitor portion of the bioactive agent
dispensing virtual reality headset; and
presenting an indication of a modified combined
inhalation therapy, including at least the inhalation device
dispensed bioactive agent and the artificial sensory experience,
via the bioactive agent dispensing virtual reality headset at least
partially based on the modifying the at least one of the inhalation
device dispensed bioactive agent or the artificial sensory
experience at least partially based on the at least one effect,
wherein at least one of the accepting, presenting,
measuring, or modifying is at least partially implemented using
at least one computer processor.
Br. 86 (Claims Appendix).

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REJECTIONS2
I. Claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103,
105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failure to comply with the written
description requirement. Final Act. 4–10.
II. Claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101 103,
105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for lack of enablement. Final Act. 10.
III. Claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103,
105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite. Final Act. 10–14.
IV. Claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 88, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 105, 107–
109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 120, 124, and 128 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, and Martin.3 Final Act. 19–
50.
V. Claim 103 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Booty.4 Final Act. 48–49.

2 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84,
87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120,
123–125, and 127–132 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-
statutory subject matter. Final Act. 15–18. The Examiner withdrew this
rejection in the Examiner’s Answer. Ans. 3.
3 Miller (US 6,168,562 B1, issued Jan. 2, 2001); Trueba (US 7,198,044 B2,
issued Apr. 3, 2007); Martin (US 5,610,674, issued Mar. 11, 1997).
4 Booty (US 2007/0112245 A1, published May 17, 2007).
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VI. Claims 95 and 119 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Jenkins.5 Final Act. 50–53.
VII. Claim 114 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Quinn.6 Final Act. 53–54.
VIII. Claims 117 and 127 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Garon.7 Final Act. 54–55.
IX. Claims 123 and 125 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Burton.8 Final Act. 55–58.
X. Claims 87, 89, 129, and 130 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Gould.9 Final
Act. 58–63.
XI. Claims 131 and 132 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Brown.10 Final Act. 64–66.

ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness—“Artificial Sensory Experience”
Independent claim 1 recites a method including the step of “presenting
an indication of a combined inhalation therapy, including at least an

5 Jenkins (US 6,585,519 B1, issued July 1, 2003).
6 Quinn (US 2008/0281639 A1, published Nov. 13, 2008).
7 Garon (US 6,223,744 B1, issued May 1, 2001).
8 Burton (US 6,431,171 B1, issued Aug. 13, 2002).
9 Gould (US 5,546,943, issued Aug. 20, 1996).
10 Brown (US 6,186,145 B1, issued Feb. 13, 2001).
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inhalation device dispensed bioactive agent and an artificial sensory
experience.” Independent claim 40 recites a system having “means for
presenting an indication of a combined inhalation therapy, including at least
an inhalation device dispensed bioactive agent and an artificial sensory
experience.” Independent claim 79 recites a system having “circuitry for
presenting an indication of a combined inhalation therapy, including at least
an inhalation device dispensed bioactive agent and an artificial sensory
experience.” Claim 80 recites an article of manufacture having at least one
non-transitory computer-readable medium having “one or more instructions
for presenting an indication of a combined inhalation therapy, including at
least an inhalation device dispensed bioactive agent and an artificial sensory
experience.” Claim 84 recites a system having “one or more instructions
[for] presenting an indication of a combined inhalation therapy, including at
least an inhalation device dispensed bioactive agent and an artificial sensory
experience.” (Italics have been added to emphasize the words “artificial
sensory experience” in each quotation.)
The present application is a continuation in part of Application
12/317,934, filed December 30, 2008; Application 12/319,143, filed
December 31, 2008; and Application 12/380,587, filed February 27, 2009.
Spec. 1:23–2:15, 3:25–4:3. Claims in each of these prior applications were
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, on the basis that the
phrase “artificial sensory experience” was indefinite. We reach the same
conclusion here. In particular, we adopt the reasoning as set forth in Ex
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parte Hyde, Appeal No. 2013-003305 (PTAB Nov. 4, 2015) (affirming the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims in Application 12/387,151).
The patent statute requires that a claim “particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as [the]
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. As such, a claim is invalid
for indefiniteness if a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have
understood the scope of the claim, when the claim was read in light of the
specification. See Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Notably too, when a word of degree or a purely
subjective phrase is used in a patent claim, the specification must provide
some objective standard for measuring that degree or the scope of that
phrase. See Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342,
1350–55 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “The scope of claim language cannot depend
solely on the unrestrained, subjective opinion of a particular individual
purportedly practicing the invention.” Id. at 1350 (citation omitted).
The Specification sets forth examples of an artificial sensory
experience:
One example of an artificial sensory experience may include a
virtual world and/or other computer-simulated experience.
Other examples of an artificial sensory experience may include
experiences triggering sight, smell, hearing, touch, and/or taste.
For example, presenter module 104 may present an indication of
an artificial sensory experience including a virtual scent
environment, which may include olfactory stimulation for
improving memory. In an additional embodiment, presenter
module 104 may present an indication of an artificial sensory
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experience including a virtual experience where the user is
exposed to a virtual mountain environment coupled with a
bronchodilator dose from a bioactive agent-dispensing inhalation
collar.
Spec. 14:13–23 (quoted in part at Br. 24). Nevertheless, the Specification
provides no objective definition for identifying an “artificial sensory
experience;” or any objective standard for determining which experiences
are “artificial sensory experiences” and which are not. Nor is any such
objective standard evident from the examples. An artificial sensory
experience may include a “virtual world and/or other computer-simulated
experience.” In fact, it would seemingly appear that whether a particular
experience constitutes an “artificial sensory experience,” e.g., whether the
experience triggers “sight, smell, hearing, touch, and/or taste,” depends on
the subjective reaction of the individual participant.
Appellant contends that, “[i]f the claims, read in the light of the
specifications, reasonably apprise those skilled in the art both of the
utilization and scope of the invention, and if the language is as precise as the
subject matter permits, the courts can demand no more.” Br. 25 (quoting In
re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014), in turn quoting Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 1958)).
The quote does not help Appellant’s position. The phrase “artificial sensory
experience” would not have reasonably apprised one of ordinary skill in the
art of the scope of claims 1, 40, 79, 80, or 84 because the Specification fails
to provide an objective standard for measuring the scope of that phrase. The
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particular examples cited by Appellant as “defining” the phrase are not
sufficiently comprehensive, or tactically chosen, to circumscribe what may,
or may not, be an artificial sensory experience. Furthermore, Appellant’s
failure to identify an objective standard for determining what is, or is not,
within the scope of the phrase forecloses an argument that the phrase is as
precise as the subject matter permits. See Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1350–51
(distinguishing Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d
1565, 1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
We have considered Appellant’s arguments on pages 25 and 26 of the
Appeal Brief, whereby Appellant asserts the Examiner has not provided any
findings or reasons to support the rejection, and, in particular, has not made
any finding related to the claim interpretation that would be given by one
possessing the ordinary level of skill in the art. The Examiner here meets
the burden of establishing a prima facie case by reviewing the claim
language and the Specification; and by pointing out that neither provides an
objective standard for determining what constitutes an “artificial sensory
experience.” Final Act. 11; see also In re Packard, 751 F.3d at 1312
(explaining the Examiner’s burden is met once the Examiner establishes a
prima facie case of indefiniteness under the applicable law). Appellant has
not explained how additional findings regarding the prior art, or the level of
ordinary skill, might change the conclusion the Examiner reaches as to
indefiniteness. See In re Fought, 2019 WL 5687699 at *3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4,
2019) (“Unless the patentee places the level of ordinary skill in the art in
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dispute and explains with particularity how the dispute would alter the
outcome, neither the Board nor the examiner need articulate the level of
ordinary skill in the art.”). In particular, Appellant has not suggested that the
prior art of record uses, much less defines, the phrase “artificial sensory
experience.”
The Examiner correctly concludes that, “since the scope of the term
‘artificial sensory experience’ is not determinable with any degree of
certainty, the scope[s] of all of the claims are considered indefinite.” Ans.
14. We sustain the rejection of claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95,
96, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite.

Indefiniteness – Limitations Invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112, Sixth Paragraph
Claim 40 recites a system including “means for” performing various
functions, including “accepting,” “presenting,” “measuring,” and
“modifying.” Claim 79 recites a system including “circuitry” for performing
these functions. Claim 80 recites at least one non-transitory computer-
readable medium having “one or more instructions” for performing these
functions. Claim 84 recites a system including “instructions for” performing
these functions. The Examiner interprets each “means” recited in claim 40,
each “circuitry” recited in claim 79, and each “one of more instructions”
recited in claim 80 as invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Final Act.
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5–6. Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s conclusion. See
generally Br. 13, 15–19, 29–31.
35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, says that:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.
In January of 2019, the Patent and Trademark Office released guidance for
examining claims subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, for
compliance with the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph. Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim
Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57 (January 7,
2019) (“Jan. 7, 2019, Guidance”). According to the guidance:
In cases “involving a special purpose computer-implemented
means-plus-function limitation, ‘[the Federal Circuit] has
consistently required that the structure disclosed in the
specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or
microprocessor’ and that the specification must disclose an
algorithm for performing the claimed function.”
Jan. 7, 2019, Guidance 59 (quoting Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d
1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Furthermore, “[a]pplicant may ‘express that
algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula,
in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient
structure.’” Id. at 59–60 (quoting Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523
F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
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Appellant’s sole contention is that the Examiner has failed to provide
sufficient findings and analysis to support the rejection of claims 40, 79, 80,
84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120,
123–125, and 127–132 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. See
generally Br. 27–31. The Examiner here meets the burden of establishing a
prima facie case of indefiniteness by reviewing the claim language and the
Specification; and by pointing out that the Specification fails to describe
structure, that is, an algorithm, corresponding to the various “means for,”
“circuitry for,” and “instructions for” recited in the claims rejected on this
ground. Final Act. 11–14; see also In re Packard, 751 F.3d at 1312.
Once again, Appellant has not explained how additional findings
regarding the prior art, or the level of ordinary skill, might change the
conclusion the Examiner reaches as to indefiniteness. See In re Fought,
2019 WL 5687699 at *3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4, 2019) (“Unless the patentee
places the level of ordinary skill in the art in dispute and explains with
particularity how the dispute would alter the outcome, neither the Board nor
the examiner need articulate the level of ordinary skill in the art.”). In
particular, because “the requirement for the disclosure of an algorithm
cannot be avoided by arguing that one of ordinary skill in the art is capable
of writing software to convert a general purpose computer to a special
purpose computer to perform the claimed function,” Jan. 7, 2019, Guidance
at 60 (citing EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d
616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)), Appellant has not persuasively explained what
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additional findings the Examiner should have made concerning the
disclosure of the prior art. For these additional reasons, we sustain the
rejection of claims 40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 105,
107–109, 112–117, 119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as indefinite.

Written Description
According to the guidance published in January of 2019:
When a claim containing a computer-implemented 35 U.S.C.
112(f) claim limitation is found to be indefinite under 35 U.S.C.
112(b) for failure to disclose sufficient corresponding structure
(e.g., the computer and the algorithm), in the specification that
performs the entire claimed function, [the claim] will also lack
written description under 35 U.S.C. 112(a).11
Jan. 7, 2019, Guidance at 61 (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
§ 2163.03). On this basis, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 40, 79, 80,
84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120,
123–125, and 127–132 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as lacking
written description.

11 The guidance published in January of 2019, refers to 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a),
(b), and (f), which supersede 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, first, second, and sixth
paragraphs, respectively.
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Enablement
The Examiner concludes that the Specification fails to enable the
subject matter of claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101,
103, 105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132 because
those claims lack written description. Final Act. 10. Written description and
enablement are separate requirements, Ariad Pharmas., Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and lack of written description
generally does not imply non-enablement. We recognize that the guidance
published in January of 2019 says that, in cases where the specification fails
to describe structure corresponding to a computer-implemented, means-plus-
function limitation:
Examiners should further consider whether the disclosure
contains sufficient information regarding the subject matter of
the [claim] as to enable one skilled in the pertinent art to make
and use the full scope of the claimed invention in compliance
with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
Jan. 7, 2019, Guidance at 61. Nevertheless, the Examiner’s explanation of
the reasons for rejecting the claims for lack of enablement relies solely on
lack of written description, without mentioning the absence of a description
of corresponding structure as support for the enablement rejection. Because
the Examiner has not articulated sufficient findings or reasoning, we do not
sustain the rejection of claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100,
101, 103, 105, 107–109, 112–117, 119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for lack of enablement.

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Obviousness
Before a proper review of the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) can
be conducted, the subject matter encompassed by the claims on appeal must
be reasonably understood without resort to speculation. Because the claims
fail to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, we
reverse, pro forma, the Examiner’s rejections of: claims 1, 40, 79, 80, 84, 88,
91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 105, 107–109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 120, 124, and
128 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, and
Martin; claim 103 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Miller,
Trueba, Martin, and Booty; claims 95 and 119 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Jenkins; of claim 114 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Quinn;
claims 117 and 127 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Miller,
Trueba, Martin, and Garon; claims 123 and 125 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Burton; claims 87, 89, 129,
and 130 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Miller, Trueba,
Martin, and Gould; and claims 131 and 132 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Miller, Trueba, Martin, and Jenkins. See In re Steele, 305
F.2d 859, 862–63 (CCPA 1962) (holding a prior art rejection cannot be
sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have
had to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of claim
language); see also In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) (“If no
reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to certain terms in the claim,
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the subject matter does not become obvious—the claim becomes
indefinite.”). Our decision is based solely on the indefiniteness of claims 1,
40, 79, 80, 84, 87–89, 91–93, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107–109, 112–117,
119, 120, 123–125, and 127–132, and does not reflect on the merits of the
underlying rejections.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 87–
89, 91–93,
95, 96, 100,
101, 103,
105, 107–
109, 112–
117, 119,
120, 123–
125, 127–
132
112, first
paragraph
written
description
1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 87–
89, 91–93,
95, 96, 100,
101, 103,
105, 107–
109, 112–
117, 119,
120, 123–
125, 127–
132

1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 87–
89, 91–93,
95, 96, 100,
101, 103,
105, 107–
109, 112–
117, 119,
120, 123–
112, first
paragraph
enablement 1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 87–
89, 91–93,
95, 96, 100,
101, 103,
105, 107–
109, 112–
117, 119,
120, 123–
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125, 127–
132
125, 127–
132
1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 87–
89, 91–93,
95, 96, 100,
101, 103,
105, 107-
109, 112–
117, 119,
120, 123–
125, 127–
132
112, second
paragraph
indefiniteness 1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 87–
89, 91–93,
95, 96, 100,
101, 103,
105, 107-
109, 112–
117, 119,
120, 123–
125, 127–
132

1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 88,
91–93, 95,
96, 100,
101, 105,
107–109,
112, 113,
115, 116,
120, 124,
128
103(a) Miller, Trueba,
Martin
1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 88,
91–93, 95,
96, 100,
101, 105,
107–109,
112, 113,
115, 116,
120, 124,
128
103 103(a) Miller, Trueba,
Martin, Booty
103
95, 119 103(a) Miller, Trueba,
Martin, Jenkins
95, 119
114 103(a) Miller, Trueba,
Martin, Quinn
114
117, 127 103(a) Miller, Trueba,
Martin, Garon
117, 127
123, 125 103(a) Miller, Trueba,
Martin, Burton
123, 125
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87, 89, 129,
130
103(a) Miller, Trueba,
Martin, Gould
87, 89, 129,
130
131, 132 103(a) Miller, Trueba,
Martin, Brown
131, 132
Overall
Outcome
1, 40, 79,
80, 84, 87–
89, 91–93,
95, 96, 100,
101, 103,
105, 107-
109, 112–
117, 119,
120, 123–
125, 127–
132

AFFIRMED