nullDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 2, 201914539463 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/539,463 11/12/2014 Hwa-Yong KANG 0202-1042 5057 68103 7590 12/02/2019 Jefferson IP Law, LLP 1130 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 420 Washington, DC 20036 EXAMINER HARRIS, DOROTHY H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2625 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/02/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): usdocketing@jeffersonip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte HWA-YONG KANG, MOON-SOO KIM, JIN-HONG JEONG, YOUNG-KWON YOON, and TAE-HO KIM ____________________ Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before LINZY T. MCCARTNEY, BETH Z. SHAW, and ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges. YAP, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20–22.1 (Final Act. 1 (Final Office Action, mailed March 19, 2018, “Final Act.”).) We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. as the real party in interest. (Appeal Br. 2.) Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction According to the Specification, Appellant’s invention “relates to a method for performing of sensor functions and an electronic device thereof.” (Spec. ¶ 2 (Specification filed November 12, 2014, “Spec.”).) Claim 1 is illustrative, and is reproduced below (with minor reformatting): 1. A method in an electronic device, the method comprising: receiving a light from at least one of a subject or a periphery of the electronic device, using an image sensor formed with one pixel array which consists of a plurality of pixels; reading out a pixel value of a preset pixel group of the plurality of pixels, wherein each of the plurality of preset pixel groups includes one or more pixels within a portion of the plurality of pixels and is set to perform a separate function which is performed using the light received through the image sensor; and performing the function corresponding to the preset pixel group using the read out pixel value; wherein the function includes one of a face recognition function, an illumination recognition function, a proximity recognition function, an iris recognition function, or a gesture recognition function, and; wherein at least two preset pixel groups of the plurality of preset pixel groups include at least one common pixel, the at least one common pixel being set to perform at least two functions which the at least two preset pixel groups respectively are set to perform. Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 3 Prior Art and Rejections on Appeal The following table lists the prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal: Name Reference Date McKendall US 6,028,949 February 22, 2000 Bradski et al. (“Bradski”) US 2004/0125222 Al July 1, 2004 Hershey et al. (“Hershey”) US 2006/0066738 A1 March 30, 2006 Rothkopf US 2007/0156364 Al July 5, 2007 Foster US 2011/0211073 Al September 1, 2011 Chang et al. (“Chang”) US 2014/0231625 Al August 21, 2014 Claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. (See Final Act. 3–7.) Claims 1, 2, 10, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hershey, Rothkopf, and Chang. (See Final Act. 8–14.) Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, and Bradski. (See Final Act. 16–18.) Claims 5 and 7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, and McKendall. (See Final Act. 14–15.) Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 4 Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, Bradski, and McKendall. (See Final Act. 18–19.) Claims 11, 12, 20, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, and Foster. (See Final Act. 19–27.) Claims 13 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, Foster, and Bradski. (See Final Act. 29–31.) Claims 15 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, Foster, and McKendall. (See Final Act. 27–29.) Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, Foster, Bradski, and McKendall. (See Final Act. 31–32.) ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred. We are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, but we Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 5 are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Written Description Rejection The Examiner rejects claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20–22 for failing to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. (Final Act. 4.) According to the Examiner, It is not readily apparent from the claim language or Applicant’s disclosure what functionality, algorithm or method is to be attributed to “function” wherein the function includes one of a face recognition function, an illumination recognition function, a proximity recognition function, an iris recognition function, and a gesture recognition function. Further, it is not readily apparent how (i.e. algorithm, steps) object tracking function based on the read out pixel group is performed. (Id. at 4–7.) The Examiner explains that “Applicant’s disclosure does not include any specific descriptions, algorithms or methods for performing the recited recognition and tracking function.” (Id. at 4–5; Ans. 3–5.) The Examiner further notes that “the specification fails to provide an algorithm or necessary steps for one of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the Appellant had invented all known and potentially unknown, ‘function’ of object tracking, a face recognition function, . . . , or a gesture recognition function.” (Ans. 5.) Appellant, however, contends that “Computer-implemented inventions are often disclosed and claimed in terms of their functionality[,] . . . because writing computer programming code for software to perform specific functions is normally within the skill of the art once those functions have been adequately disclosed.” (Appeal Br. 5.) Appellant explains that it is “not claiming how, for example, face recognition is performed, only that it is performed in with respect to the read out pixel group.” (Id.) Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 6 The purpose of the written description requirement is to “ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent specification.” Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000). To that end, to satisfy the written description requirement, the inventor “must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.” Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations.” Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphases in original). It is not necessary for the specification to describe the claimed invention ipsissimis verbis; all that is required is that it reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention. Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d at 1563–64; In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351–52 (CCPA 1978). Here, we agree with Appellant that the Specification provides sufficient written description support for the limitation at issue. For example, the Specification notes that “at least one sensor function is . . . one of a face recognition function, an illumination recognition function, a proximity recognition function, an iris recognition function, and a gesture recognition function” and the “sensor function [is performed] based on the read out pixel group.” (Spec. ¶¶ 7, 83; see also claim 1 of original claims.) “It is not necessary that the application describe the claim limitations Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 7 exactly, but only so clearly that persons of ordinary skill in the art will recognize from the disclosure that appellants invented processes including those limitations.” In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (CCPA 1976) (citation omitted); see also Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In order to satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.”).2 For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20–22 for failing to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Obviousness Rejections The Examiner rejects claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20–22 as unpatentable over different combinations of Chang with Hershey, Rothkopf, Bradski, Foster, and McKendall. (Final Act. 8–32.) Appellant contends that “Chang’s switching from one function to another is not the same as the ‘at least one common pixel being set to perform at least two functions which the at least two preset pixel groups respectively are set to perform.’” (Appeal Br. 9.) According to Appellant, Chang does not teach the limitation at issue because “Chang’s pixel is only set to perform one function and then reset to perform one other function,” as “switching from one function to another is not the same as the ‘at least one common pixel being set to perform at least two functions which the at least two preset pixel groups respectively are set to perform.’” (Id.; Reply 4.) In other words, Appellant 2 We do not, however, opine on whether the Specification enables one of ordinary skill in the art to perform the claimed invention. Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 8 appears to suggest that the limitation at issue requires the functions to be performed simultaneously. We agree with the Examiner that “the claim language does not require ‘performing’ simultaneous ‘functions[,’ it] . . . merely requires that [at least] . . . two functions are performed with a common pixel” and Appellant does not argue persuasively why the Examiner’s construction is overly broad or unreasonable. (Ans. 7.) For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, as well as independent claim 11, which contains a similar limitation at issue. (Appeal Br. 5–12.) We also sustain the Examiner’s rejections of dependent claims 2–7, 10, and 12–17, and 20–22, which depend from either claim 1 or 11 and are not argued separately. (Id.) CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–7, 10–17, and 20–22 112, first paragraph Written Description 1–7, 10– 17, and 20–22 1, 2, 10, and 21 103 Hershey, Rothkopf, and Chang 1, 2, 10, and 21 3 and 4 103 Hershey, Chang, Rothkopf, and Bradski 3 and 4 Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 9 Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 5 and 7 103 Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, and McKendall 5 and 7 6 103 Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, Bradski, and McKendall 6 11, 12, 20, and 22 103 Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, and Foster 11, 12, 20, and 22 13 and 14 103 Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, Foster, and Bradski 13 and 14 15 and 17 103 Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, Foster, and McKendall 15 and 17 16 103 Hershey, Rothkopf, Chang, Foster, Bradski, and McKendall 16 Overall Outcome 1–7, 10– 17, and 20–22 DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7, 10–17, and 20–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Appeal 2019-001012 Application 14/539,463 10 We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–7 10–17, and 20–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2017). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation