Norquay Construction, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Dec 6, 2011

28-CA-023412 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 6, 2011)

JD(SF)–46-11
Tempe, AZ
1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NORQUAY CONSTRUCTION, INC.
and Case 28-CA-23412
THOMAS DeMOTT, an Individual
Johannes Lauterborn, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Frederick C. Miner, Esq., (Littler Mendelson, PC.), of Phoenix, Arizona, for the Respondent.
Thomas E. DeMott, Anthem, Arizona, the Charging Party.

DECISION
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LANA H. PARKE, Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to unfair labor practice charges
filed by Thomas DeMott (DeMott), an individual,1 the Regional Director for Region 28 of the
National Labor Relations Board (Region 28 and the Board, respectively) issued a complaint and
notice of hearing (complaint) dated May 31, 2011. The complaint alleges that Norquay
Construction, Inc. (Respondent) violated Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act). This case was tried in Phoenix, Arizona, on October 5 and 6, 2011.

II. Issues
A. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the following conduct:
1. Promulgating and maintaining an overly broad and discriminatory rule
prohibiting solicitation without appointment at Respondent’s jobsite.
2. By the following conduct, denying representatives of the Southwest Regional
Council of Carpenters, a labor organization, access to Respondent’s jobsite and
to employees represented by it who were performing work for employer-
parties to collective-bargaining agreements with it: which employers
performed services at Respondent’s jobsite:
a. Ordering union representatives to leave Respondent’s jobsite.
b. Physically ejecting DeMott from the Respondent’s construction trailer.
c. Inflicting bodily injury upon DeMott by pushing him out of
Respondent’s construction trailer and down its stairs.

1 DeMott at all relevant times was a representative and employee of the Southwest Regional Council
of Carpenters, a labor organization.
JD(SF)–46-11
2
d. Summoning security guards to escort union representatives off
Respondent’s jobsite.
III. JURISDICTION5
At all material times Respondent, an Arizona corporation, with an office and place of
business in Tempe, Arizona, (Respondent’s facility), has been engaged in business as a general
contractor in the building and construction industry doing commercial, industrial, and residential
construction. During the 12-month period ending March 22, Respondent, in conducting its 10
business operations, pursuant to a contract with the City of Phoenix financed by funds from the
Federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided services for the City of
Phoenix, Arizona, valued in excess of $2.8 million for work on the Phoenix central bus station.
At all material times, the Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. At all material times the Southwest Regional 15
Council of Carpenters (the Union) has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act and an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT20
Unless otherwise explained, findings of fact are based on party admissions, stipulations,
and uncontroverted testimony regarding events occurring during the period of time relevant to
these proceedings. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I find 25
the following events occurred in the circumstances described below during the period relevant to
these proceedings.
The City of Phoenix, Arizona, contracted with Respondent to renovate the city’s
municipal transit facility, the Phoenix central bus station (the project or the central bus station), 30
located on Central Avenue in Phoenix (the jobsite). The project was ongoing during 2010–2011.
The construction area of the jobsite was fenced pursuant to the city's project requirements, and
Respondent posted “No Trespassing” signs to prevent public entry. Under Respondent’s contract
with Phoenix, Respondent had exclusive use of a staging area on city property, located about 300
feet south of the construction site. A tall fence, separate from the construction site fencing, 35
surrounded the staging area, which was accessible through a 20-foot opening. In the staging area,
Respondent placed a 24 by 8 foot mobile construction trailer that served as its jobsite offices (the
construction trailer).
The construction trailer stood 4-5 feet off the ground. The trailer’s 3-foot wide entry 40
door was accessible by a metal stairway parallel to and abutting the trailer. The stairway had
four stairs rising to a metal landing measuring approximately 3 by 4 feet positioned immediately
in front of the doorway. The stairway landing was not flush with the trailer door, requiring an
approximately 3-inch step up for entry to the trailer.2 Metal bars surrounded the stairway
perimeters, providing hand railings for the stairs and landing and restricting the trailer door from 45
opening outward more than 90 degrees. On the side of the trailer at the foot of the stairway,

2 The step up estimation is based on photographs of the trailer taken on October 1.
JD(SF)–46-11
3
Respondent posted a company banner identifying the trailer as the offices of Norquay
Construction and setting out its Tempe address and telephone and FAX numbers.
Respondent contracted with various subcontractors, including Progressive Concrete 5
Works, Inc. (Progressive Concrete) to perform work on the project. In October 2010 Progressive
Concrete employed 12 workers at the jobsite. Progressive Concrete was signatory to a
collective-bargaining agreement (Progressive Concrete CBA) with the Southwest Regional
Council of Carpenters (the Union).3 Respondent was not signatory to any collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union.10
The Progressive Concrete CBA provided for union-representative access to company
jobsites during working hours upon reasonable effort to advise Progressive Concrete of union-
representative presence and without interference with work. In the case of a secured access
jobsite, such as the project, the Progressive Concrete CBA provided that where persons entering 15
the project had to be checked through a guarded gate or similar situation, Progressive Concrete
was to make arrangements for union representatives to enter the project. No evidence was adduced
that the Union asked Progressive Concrete to make, or that Progressive Concrete made, any
arrangements for union representatives to enter the jobsite or that union representatives visited
Progressive Concrete employees on the jobsite.20
From August 2010 to August 2011, Kenneth Scott Rankin (Rankin) served as
Respondent’s superintendent and project manager, utilizing the construction trailer served as his
administrative center. It contained two office areas: a rear area where Rankin’s office was
situated and a front or lobby area, out of which the trailer’s entry door opened.25
During August 2010 significant numbers of solicitors called at the construction trailer.4
Among the visitors were various representatives of the Union who came weekly to the
construction trailer and engaged Rankin in desultory conversation for 15-20 minutes per visit. In
September, union representative visits increased. Rankin thought the stream of visitors to the 30
construction trailer wasted his time. In late September, Rankin posted on the entry door the
following sign to which was affixed his business card containing his email address and his
company cell phone number:
NO35
HIRING
ON-SITE
ABSOLUTELY NO
SOLICITATION
W/O40
APPOINTMENT

3 The employees of two other subcontractors worked at the jobsite in October 2010; those
subcontractors were not signatory to contracts with the Union.
4 Solicitors included representatives of labor companies, rental equipment companies, contract-
seeking subcontractors, and construction materials companies. Employment seekers frequently sought
interviews with Rankin at the construction trailer.
JD(SF)–46-11
4
On October 1, 2010, the Union assigned representatives DeMott and Chuck Harrison
(Harrison) the routine job of visiting assigned construction jobsites to speak to the respective
general contractors. The Union gave the representatives “profiles” of the jobs they were to visit. 5
Each profile named the jobsite general contractor and listed known subcontractors working the
jobsite. A profile’s purpose was to aid union representatives in discussing contract concerns
with represented subcontractor employees and/or to promote union interest among unrepresented
subcontractor employees. The representatives also carried listings of various union-signatory
contractors, which the representatives were expected to give to general contractors to advise 10
them of area-standards contractors available to meet a construction project’s subcontracting
needs. One of the October 1 profiles assigned to DeMott and Harrison named Respondent as the
general contractor on the central bus station jobsite and its concrete subcontractor, Progressive
Concrete, as a signatory company.
15
On the morning of October 1, 2010, 12 employees of Progressive Concrete were at the
jobsite running a concrete pour. At about 11:30 a.m., without having made an appointment,
union representatives DeMott and Harrison arrived at the Respondent’s jobsite and went directly
to the construction trailer. DeMott and Harrison intended to find out from Rankin what if any
subcontracting work the Company had yet to bid out. If Rankin told them he planned to hold 20
future subcontract bidding, the representatives planned to give Rankin the prepared listing of
area-standards contractors and to ask him if he would like the Union to invite them to bid on the
projected work.5
Rankin, DeMott, and Harrison testified of the events that occurred after DeMott and 25
Harrison arrived at the construction trailer. I found both DeMott and Harrison to be candid,
reliable, and mainly corroborative witnesses. Much of Rankin’s testimony was essentially
consistent with that of DeMott and Harrison, but where Rankin’s testimony differs materially
from that of DeMott and Harrison, I credit DeMott and Harrison except as otherwise noted. The
following account is a reasonable amalgamation of the credible testimony of DeMott and 30
Harrison.
Upon reaching the trailer, DeMott with Harrison behind him climbed the stairway,
knocked at, and then opened, the unlocked entry door. Two children watching television inside
the trailer pointed to the rear area. Just then Rankin, who was working a half day and expecting 35
the arrival of a Phoenix construction inspector, opened the door from his office and before the
representatives could identify themselves, motioned them into his office. DeMott walked to the
door of the office and said they would like to ask Rankin a couple of questions. Rankin invited
them into his office. DeMott and Harrison identified themselves as representatives of the Union
and said they were looking for subcontractor information on some of the carpentry-related crafts. 40
Rankin said, “If you want any information on this jobsite, you can look it up on the Dodge

5 Harrison testified that another purpose of the October 1 visit was to get information about
Progressive Concrete and that the representatives usually checked in with the superintendent
before going onto a jobsite.
JD(SF)–46-11
5
Reports.” 6 Rankin told DeMott and Harrison, “You [representatives from the Union] are coming
here Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday.” He pointed out that
the notice on the trailer door asked visitors or solicitors to make an appointment. Rankin said he
was trying to get some work done and told them to leave the trailer. 5
Harrison told Rankin that if they had a labor dispute, the Union could picket the job.
DeMott, however, assured Rankin that the Union would demonstrate at the jobsite only if a
contractor there was not paying area standard wages and benefits and such a decision would only
be made by his and Harrison’s bosses. Loudly and profanely, Rankin demanded the two 10
representatives leave the trailer. Harrison reiterated that the representatives were just looking for
subcontractor information, but Rankin repeatedly ordered them out of his trailer.
Harrison urged DeMott to leave and walked toward the exit. DeMott followed, telling
Rankin, “We have a federal right to be on the project.”7 As DeMott moved toward the exit, 15
Rankin pushed him in the back. DeMott told Rankin not to touch him and continued to the
doorway. At the door, DeMott steadied himself on the door frame before stepping onto the
stairway landing. As DeMott steadied himself, Rankin grasped his upper right arm from behind
and, pushing him hard in the middle of his upper back, propelled him onto the landing and down
the stairs.8 During the fall, DeMott struck his neck and hand on the railing. Rankin called to two 20
City of Phoenix security guards, saying he needed help and telling one of them he wanted to
make sure the two representatives got off the property.
There is no evidence the security guards did anything to encourage DeMott and Harrison
to leave the jobsite, and the two did not, in fact, leave the property. DeMott telephoned his 25
supervisor who in turn called the police. DeMott retrieved his camera from his car and took
pictures. When the police arrived, DeMott asked the police to arrest Rankin for assault, which
they declined to do.
Immediately following his fall on October 1, 2010, DeMott experienced severe 30
musculoskeletal pain, and later that day sought treatment at an urgent care facility. 9 In the

6 The Dodge Reports were nationwide area listings of construction work to enable contractors
to bid on construction jobs but did not provide the names of subcontractors on specific projects.
7 DeMott testified that he added, “We should be able to talk to the workers.” Harrison did not
corroborate this statement, which is incongruous with the subcontractor-focus of the interchange. I do
not, therefore, credit DeMott’s testimony that he said anything about talking to any workers.
8 Rankin testified that DeMott, with fists clenched at his side, “squared off . . . in an
aggressive stance.” Rankin grasped the back of DeMott’s upper arm and forearm and escorted
him to the doorway. From the ground facing the entry door, Harrison told Rankin he was just a
f__ing a__hole, and Rankin released his hold on DeMott. Rankin believed that DeMott
intentionally fell. I do not accept Rankin’s testimony.
9 At the time of the fall, DeMott had existing back and hip problems, having had prior neck
surgery with a 70-day work absence. Notwithstanding his continuing back impairment, DeMott
resumed work with the Union with no physical restrictions and continued to perform his usual
and customary work for the Union until October 1, 2010. Between May 2009 and October 2010,
DeMott received seven injections to his back and hip, the last of which was administered on
September 10, 2010.
JD(SF)–46-11
6
following weeks, DeMott filed a claim with the California Department of Workers’
Compensation (DWC), pursuant to which he received additional medical treatment, including
physical therapy. DeMott did not work again in any capacity after October 1, 2010. In early
February 2011, DeMott’s DWC claim was denied, and he was released to return to work with no 5
physical limitations. Shortly thereafter, the Union informed DeMott that it had no position
available for him.
V. Discussion
10
The Board requires general construction contractors to grant union representatives access
to jobsites to enable the union to carry out representational duties owed to a unionized
subcontractor’s employees pursuant to the access provisions of a labor agreement between the
subcontractor and a union. The Board reasons that the general contractor, “by soliciting other
employers to perform work at the jobsite, ‘invited’ subcontractors . . . onto the jobsite, and thus 15
subjected its ‘property rights' to the [u]nion's contractual ‘access’ rights with those
subcontractors.” CDK Contracting Co., 308 NLRB 1117 (1992). See also Wolgast Corp. v.
NLRB, 349 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2003), enfg. 334 NLRB 203 (2001); Ambrose Electric, 330 NLRB
78 (1999). In Swardson Painting Co., 340 NLRB 179–80 (2003), the Board admonished:
20
An employer who denies nonemployee union representatives access to private property
for purposes related to the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights bears a threshold
burden of establishing that, at the time it denied access, it had a property interest that
entitled it to exclude individuals from the property [citations omitted]. If the employer
fails to meet this threshold burden, there is no actual conflict between private property 25
rights and Section 7 rights, and its actions therefore will be found to violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
Absent a showing of an exclusionary property interest, analysis under Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992) is not required.10
30
Even where a general contractor, having subjected its property rights to a union's
contractual access rights with subcontractors, has no exclusionary property interest in its jobsites,
a union's right of access is not without limitation. A contractor has a right to require union
representatives to submit to reasonable and nondiscriminatory restrictions, such as not interfering
with employees’ work or having to check in at a jobsite office. Ambrose Electric, supra at 78;35
Peck/Jones Construction Corp, 338 NLRB 16 (2002), citing Wolgast Corp., 334 NLRB (2001)
(union agents were not entitled to enforce their contractual access right when they failed to
follow general contractor’s reasonable and nondiscriminatory sign-in rule).
The facts in this case prompt discussion of two issues the Board has considered in 40
construction jobsite access cases: (1) whether on October 1, 2010, Respondent had an
exclusionary property interest in the central bus jobsite and/or its construction trailer that

10 Lechmere holds that where access to an employer's private property is sought by nonemployee
union organizers seeking to exercise Sec. 7 rights “derivatively,” the threshold question is whether the
employees are otherwise inaccessible. Id. at 537–538. Only if an inaccessibility showing is made must
employee Sec. 7 rights and employer property rights be balanced. Id. at 538.
JD(SF)–46-11
7
permitted Respondent to restrict access to the jobsite and/or the construction trailer, (2) whether
DeMott and Harrison accessed the construction trailer on October 1, 2010 for a purpose related
to the exercise of employees’ Section 7 rights, and (3) assuming no exclusionary property
interest existed, whether Respondent had nonetheless set reasonable and nondiscriminatory 5
restrictions on access to its construction trailer that the Union was obligated to follow.
Inasmuch as Respondent invited Progressive Concrete to perform work at the central bus
jobsite, it subjected any arguable property rights in the jobsite to the Union’s contractual access
rights with Progressive Concrete. Respondent has not, therefore, met its threshold burden of 10
showing an exclusionary property interest in the central bus jobsite where Progressive Concrete
employees were working. Consequently, Respondent could not lawfully restrict representatives
of the Union from accessing the jobsite to visit or otherwise to provide representational services
to Progressive Concrete’s employees.
While Respondent had no exclusionary property interest in the construction area of the 15
central bus jobsite where invited subcontractors worked, it does not automatically follow that
Respondent had no exclusionary property interest in any other part or component of the jobsite.
By contract, the City of Phoenix allowed Respondent the exclusive use of a staging area at the
jobsite, in which area Respondent placed its construction trailer and administrative office. There
is no evidence that Progressive Concrete or any other subcontractor was invited to perform work20
in the staging area, particularly at or in the construction trailer. In those circumstances,
Respondent has shown that it had an exclusionary property interest in its construction trailer.
Since jobsite employees were not inaccessible by virtue of Respondent’s exercising its
exclusionary property interest in its construction trailer, Respondent was free to deny,
nondiscriminatorily, access to the trailer.25
Even assuming Respondent had not established an exclusionary property interest in the
construction trailer, the Union's contractual right of access was not without limitation, as noted
above. Access could properly be limited to purposes relating to represented employees’ Section
7 rights and be circumscribed by reasonable and nondiscriminatory restrictions. 30
There is no evidence that DeMott and/or Harrison’s purpose in visiting Respondent’s trailer on
October 1 related to the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights. It is clear that DeMott and Harrison’s
objective in visiting the trailer was to glean from Rankin information about Respondent’s subcontracting
plans. As followup, the two representatives intended to present to Rankin a prepared list of area-35
standards subcontractors and to encourage him to select from the list when filling any subcontractor
openings. That objective did not relate to the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights and did not,
therefore, provide any Section 7-protected basis for accessing the trailer.11
40
DeMott testified that one purpose of visiting the trailer was to extend Respondent the
courtesy of checking in with the construction supervisor before talking to Progressive Concrete
employees. If union representatives were required to check in at the construction trailer before entering

11 Wolgast Corp., 334 NLRB 203 (2001), cited by the General Counsel is inapposite. In Wolgast, the
union accessed the jobsite generally, i.e., the actual location where represented employees worked, in
order to investigate a safety complaint lodged by a union member jobsite worker; both the location and
the purpose were clearly linked to Sec. 7 protections.
JD(SF)–46-11
8
the jobsite to provide representational services, then accessing the trailer would be related to the
exercise of employees' Section 7 rights. But there is no evidence of any such check in
requirement.12 Moreover, any courtesy check in could have been easily accomplished by
observing the constraints posted on the trailer and telephoning Rankin at his posted cell phone 5
number. The no-solicitation notice posted on the trailer entry door simply restricted solicitation
without appointment. The notice was nondiscriminatory on its face, and there is no evidence it
was applied discriminatorily or that its conditions were unreasonable. The notice merely
required all persons who wanted to meet with Rankin to make appointments, the scheduling for
which Rankin made himself readily available by posting his cell phone number. 10
Here Respondent had an exclusionary property interest in its construction trailer, which,
particularly given the purpose and circumstances of DeMott and Harrison’s October 1, 2010
visit, permitted Respondent to deny them access. Alternatively, Respondent set reasonable and
nondiscriminatory restrictions on DeMott and Harrison’s access to its construction trailer, the15
failure to follow which lost the two representatives access entitlement. Because DeMott and
Harrison made no effort to schedule a visit before entering the construction trailer, they cannot
claim that their ejection from it violated their contractual right of access. See Peck/Jones
Construction Corp., supra at 17. Under either scenario, Respondent could properly bar DeMott
and Harrison from the trailer. In these circumstances, while Rankin’s violent expulsion of 20
DeMott from the construction trailer was repugnant and inexcusable and while it may have
transgressed civil or criminal laws, it did not violate the Act.
The complaint alleges that Respondent promulgated and maintained an overly broad and
discriminatory rule prohibiting solicitation at Respondent’s jobsite without appointment. The 25
only evidence of any such rule is the no-solicitation sign posted on the construction trailer. The
no-solicitation sign, which I have found set reasonable and nondiscriminatory limitations on
solicitation, cannot, of itself, prove the allegation. No evidence was adduced that the no-
solicitation notice was posted anywhere at the jobsite other than at the trailer, and there is no
evidence Respondent required appointments for solicitations conducted on the jobsite generally. 30
Further, no evidence was adduced that the construction trailer served as a gateway to the jobsite,
thereby compelling jobsite-visit screening through the trailer. Finally, a reasonable reading of
the notice justifies an inference that it applied only to individuals seeking to meet with occupants
of the construction trailer.
35
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by ordering the
union representatives off the jobsite. The evidence shows that after Rankin forcibly expelled
DeMott from the construction trailer, he told a security guard to make sure the two union
representatives got off the property. It is reasonable to infer that Rankin’s order encompassed
the entire jobsite and not just the trailer from which the representatives had already been 40
removed. As already discussed, the Union had an access right to the jobsite, with which access

12 The General Counsel argues that sec. 2620 of the Union’s agreement with Progressive
Concrete required the Union “to make every reasonable effort to advise the contractor or his
representative of his presence on the project.” That provision clearly applies to the contractor,
Progressive Concrete; the agreement is silent as to any obligation owed the general contractor.
JD(SF)–46-11
9
right Rankin’s order interfered. Although no employee was present to hear Rankin’s order, the
Board holds to the principle that acts of unions and their agents can be protected under the Act.
Golden Stevedoring Co., 335 NLRB 410, 414 (2001), citations omitted. As the Board observed,
it would be “curious and myopic” to hold otherwise, for a contrary interpretation would mean 5
that “conduct that is protected when engaged in by . . . employees . . . would lose its protection
if engaged in by the employees' union on their behalf.” BE & K Construction Co., 329 NLRB
717, 724 (1999), enfd. 246 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2001). It is immaterial that the security guard
failed to execute Rankin’s order. Accordingly, I find that when Rankin directed a security guard
to escort DeMott and Harrison off the jobsite, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).10
VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce and in a business affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 15
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by ordering union representatives to leave
a construction jobsite in which it had no exclusionary property interest.20
4. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY25
Having found Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it must be
ordered to cease and desist and to post appropriate notices in the manner set forth hereafter.
ORDER 30
The Respondent, Norquay Construction, Inc., Tempe, Arizona, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from ordering union representatives of Southwest Regional Council 35
of Carpenters or any other union, to leave a jobsite in which it has no exclusionary
property interest.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
40
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Tempe, Arizona,
and any offices operation in connection with the Phoenix central bus station project,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms

13If this order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD(SF)–46-11
10
provided by the Regional Director for Region 28 after being signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. 5
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting
on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such means.14 In the event that, 10
during the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has gone out of business or
left the jobsite involved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by Respondent at any time since October 1, 2010.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn 15
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act
not specifically found.20
DATED: Washington, D.C. December 6, 2011
Lana H. Parke
Administrative Law Judge

14 The question of whether Respondent electronically communicates with employees is left to the
compliance stage of these proceedings.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. More particularly,
WE WILL NOT order or instruct union representatives of Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters or any other union, to leave our customers' jobsites where we have no property right
permitting us to exclude them.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights stated above.
NORQUAY CONSTRUCTION, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
2600 North Central Avenue, Suite 1800, Phoenix, AZ 85004-3099
(602) 640-2160, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER,
(602) 640-2146.