Noritake Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 1, 1962

139 N.L.R.B. 772 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

772 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR, RELATIONS BOARD
EMPLOYEES ENTITLED TO BACKPAY-Continued
Period of backpay entitlement
From- r o-
Pagano, Peter___ ___________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept . 5, 1961
Pietrocarlo , Mary Ann______________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Quinn, Francis______________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Reif, Joseph_ _______________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Rodeghiero, Andrew_________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept . 5, 1961
Rog, Christine______________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Rose, Sharon_______________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Ryan, Michael______________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
San Filippo , Marie__________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept . 5, 1961
Saraceno , Rosario___________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept . 5, 1961
Sarana, Chester_____________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Scarozza, Robert____________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Schoen , George____________________________ _ June 24, 1961 Sept . 5, 1961
Shear, Amelia_ _____________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Short, Shirley------------------------------- June 24 , 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Smith, Patricia Ann_________________________ June 24 , 1961 Sept . 5, 1961
Torella, Armando___________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Tarabula , Edward___________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Turner, Margaret___________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Vujanovich , Peter___________________________ June 24 , 1961 Sept . 5, 1961
White, David L____________________________ June 24, 1961 Sept. 5, 1961
Zunner, Nancy_____________________________ June 24, 19611
' Date of reinstatement.
Noritake Co., Inc. and District 65, Retail , Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union, AFL-CIO. Case No. 2-CA-8469. November
1,1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 5, 1962, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the.
Respondent had not engaged in certain unfair labor practices but
finding that it had engaged in certain other unfair labor practices,
as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report. However, he rec-
ommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. There-
after, the Charging Party and the General Counsel filed exceptions
to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Rodgers, Leedom, and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi-
ate Report, exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case,
and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
The Board adopts the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner.
139 NLRB No. 62.
NORITAKE CO., INC. 773
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
The complaint herein, as amended (issued March 30, 1962; charge filed February
15, 1962), alleges that the Company has violated Section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 519, by discharging Thomas Lee, Ben
Cappellino, George Riker, Robert Hagon, and Peter Burke on or about February
8, 1962, and failing and refusing to reinstate them, because of their union and
other protected concerted activities; and Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
said alleged acts, by unlawful interrogation , threats, and promises of benefits, and
by refusing to recognize or bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective bar-
gaining representative of its employees in an appropriate unit. The answer admits
the discharges but denies the allegations of unfair labor practices.
A hearing was held before Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan at New York, New
York, on June 4 and 5, 1962, and at the close the General Counsel and the Com-
pany were heard in oral argument . Pursuant to leave granted to all parties, a
brief has been filed by the Company.
Upon the entire record in the case , and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR)
I. THE COMPANY 'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It was admitted and I find that the Company, a New York corporation with its
principal office and a warehouse in New York, New York, and other places of busi-
ness in the States of Georgia and Texas, is engaged at wholesale in the sale and
distribution of chinaware and related products ; that it annually sells and distributes
products valued at more than $ 100,000 , of which products valued at more than
$50,000 were shipped from said warehouse to States other than the State of New
York; that it annually purchases products valued at more than $ 100,000, of which
products valued at more than $50,000 are purchased and transported to its places
of business in the United States in foreign commerce from foreign countries; and
that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
It was admitted and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
H. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
The significant events here occurred between February 5 and 8, 1962, with addi-
tional reference to February 9 and May 7 and 8 . Rogers, the warehouse foreman,
went first to the Company's office at the beginning of each day, receiving there va-
rious papers and instructions for the work which he and the five employees at the
warehouse were to perform . From the office he would go to the warehouse, some
five avenue blocks away , arriving at approximately 10 a.m . The warehouse em-
ployees' workday began at 9 a.m., and one of them, Cappellino , had a key.
On February 5, when Rogers arrived at the warehouse about 9 : 45 a.m ., he found
the five playing cards around a table on the mezzanine floor . It is not disputed
that there was work for them which they should have been doing. I do not credit
the denials that they had been playing or the employees ' testimony that they played
cards only during their lunch hour . Rogers testified credibly that he told the
men to get to work and that they did, except for Burke , who told him that he had
a sore back, had called the personnel manager, Miss Yamaguchi, at the office, and
was waiting for her to call back.
At the office the next morning Rogers reported the incident to Miss Yamaguchi,
who at once called a conference which was attended by these two, Matsushita, the
company president , and Sugihara , a chairman of the board of directors . On Miss
Yamaguchi 's recommendation , it was decided that all five warehouse employees
would be discharged when they came to the office for their pay after work on
February 8, the workweek ending on Wednesday, February 7.
In the meantime , on the evening of February 7, the five employees went to the
Union's office , where they signed membership application cards and paid the fee.
As will be noted infra, Nattman , a union organizer , appeared at the warehouse
on the morning of February 8 and told Rogers that he would like to meet and
bargain with management . He was told to notify the office, and on the morning
of the 9th ( after the discharges ) Turbane, another organizer, did go to the office,
declared that he represented the employees , and asked that all five be reinstated.
T urbane warned of a strike, and the office and warehouse have been picketed since.
774 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. The alleged violation of Section 8(a) (3)
Although Cappellino testified that he "always had to answer to somebody
and the way they told you to do work , they sort of like treated you like dirt,"
he cited no instances, recent or remote , of such conditions which , he claimed,
"weren't very good ." Nor did the other employee witnesses refer to ill treat-
ment by the Company . As for job security, Cappellino had himself been
employed for 23 years. I credit the testimony that the five were playing cards on
working time when Rogers arrived on the morning of February 5, and I find as a
fact that the security which they now sought was against discharge for a valid
reason , especially after Miss Yamaguchi 's brother came to the warehouse on Feb-
ruary 6 and charged them with playing cards the day before. The employees' own
evident appraisal of their conduct supports the Company 's; there was sufficient reason
for discharging them.
The reference by Yamaguchi ( the brother ) and Rogers on February 6 to the card
playing and the talk of discharge was something important which had now "come
up" and prompted the employees ' visit to the Union and their joining. (We
shall note, infra , the different testimony concerning the time when this latter was
first discussed among the employees.)
The question remains whether , although it had valid reason for the discharges,
the Company in fact would have ignored such reason but for the union activity,
and thus acted discriminatorily . Here it must be noted that Rogers had not re-
ported occasions when the men played cards beyond their lunch hour ; company
officials had no knowledge of that. At the office on February 6, however, he did
report the incident of the day before because "things was getting too bad. Things
was getting way out of hand. [He] just simply come to the point where [he]
couldn't take much more." This I believe . ( Rogers testified to a scuffle with Riker
after this ; the latter placed it in the preceding week. ) The Company now learned
of the card playing, not merely beyond the lunch hour but presumably through the
morning until Rogers ' arrival from the office; and this was before the men went
to the union office.
The several witnesses for the Company credibly testified that on the basis of
Rogers' report, the Company on the morning of February 6, decided to discharge
the five when they came for their pay on the 8th. As already noted and as we
shall further see, the Union 's first approach was made on the morning of Febru-
ary 8, and its first request for bargaining made to a responsible company repre-
sentative on February 9.
Whatever else might be argued concerning any reaction by the Company to the
report that the warehouse employees had been playing cards during working time,
it was nondiscriminatory , having occurred prior to the employees ' first approach
to the Union and any suggestion of concerted activities ; and aside from the conference
which was immediately held, the seriousness with which the Company viewed this
is suggested by Rogers ' report to Miss Yamaguchi and her brother's visit , infra, to
the warehouse in this connection and his confrontation of the employees. With
respect to Burke, we have seen that he was not to work while he awaited Miss
Yamaguchi 's call. But he was playing and involved with the others , who should
have been working. Nor did he attempt any explanation or remind Miss Yamaguchi
when she questioned the group about their playing. There is no suggestion of
discriminatory motivation or action by the Company in , according to Burke, who
had joined the others in their improper activity ( it can scarcely be said that his
playing was proper ), the same treatment which it gave to the others
The question here is whether the discharges were in fact decided upon on the
morning of February 6 or whether they were prompted by knowledge of union
activities and therefore discriminatory . An element of confusion. if not doubt or
suspicion , was injected by the testimony that Rogers allegedly spoke of discharg-
ing only one man . This was after the decision to discharge all five, which was
based on the incident of February 5; it does not appear that earlier shortcomings
were reported to the Company or played a part in this decision , or that Rogers
was discriminatorily motivated in reporting as he did on February 6. But accord-
ing to Riker, who uncertainly placed this on the morning of February 7, Rogers
also told him that he was to have been discharged but would not be since Rogers
had spoken up for him . Important as this would have been , Riker did not recall
whether it had been told to him on the evening of February 6 or the morning of
February 7 I credit Rogers' denial of any such statement which would suggest
that the Company had not decided to discharge the five. He had been directed not
to tell the employees that they would be discharged ; he did not give Riker a tale of
individual treatment.
NORITAKE CO., INC. 775
We need not speculate whether Riker was sensitive or concerned because of a
recent physical altercation with Rogers . The latter testified that from a sarcastic
remark which he had made and which we are about to consider , Riker "had picked
it up as to where he felt that he was the one that had to be fired ." We are thus
asked to believe that it had been decided to discharge only one, and that this
decision was thereafter changed . I do not believe this. I find rather that the
decision was made on the morning of February 6 to discharge all five, as the Com-
pany's witnesses credibly testified.
The consistency of the latter testimony is marred only by Rogers' alleged refer-
ence to the discharge of one. I credit Rogers' testimony that he explained to
Yamaguchi and the employees that his remark on February 6, when Yamaguchi
had said there were apparently too many men there, to the effect that they should
decide among themselves that one or which one was to be fired , was spoken in
sarcasm: since they were making the decisions , having decided not to work and
to play cards , they could decide on any action to be taken if there were too many
of them.
Whether Riker was telling the truth when he testified that the first time anyone
spoke to him of the Union was on February 6, or Cappellino when he testified that
he asked the others to join a week or two before , need not be decided . Further
on the issue of credibility , it may be noted that a claim of discrimination was early
injected as it was testified that Burke told Miss Yamaguchi that the card playing
concerning which he asked was not the reason for the discharges ; he allegedly said
this after she had given the men their wages for the last payroll period in cash
and for the extra day by check and then told them that they were discharged.
But both Miss Yamaguchi and Riker testified that she first paid them for the 2 weeks,
then asked about the card playing ( Riker said that it was at this point that Burke
suggested that there was another reason ; Miss Yamaguchi testified credibly that
Burke said only that they did not car e to answer her question about playing cards),
and thereafter gave them the checks for the last day. From Miss Yamaguchi's
testimony not only had she not given them the checks , but she had not yet dis-
charged them when she asked about the card playing; there was no basis at that
point for any remark by Burke concerning another reason for discharge.
As for the point that no deduction was made for the time lost while the men
played on the morning of February 5, that is of little moment . However serious
the offense , a deduction therefor would have been trifling in view of the more serious
steps taken, and aside from the credible explanation concerning preparation of the
payroll . If, as the General Counsel argues , the method of payment was "clumsy,"
it was satisfactorily explained and not shown to have been discriminatory.
As noted, the credible evidence indicates that the Company decided to discharge
these employees , and for sufficient reason , before the commencement of union ac-
tivities , and of course before it had knowledge thereof. Employees may join a
union and engage in other protected concerted activities , and they may not be
discharged therefor . But such activities do not immunize them against lawful and
nondiscriminatory discharge , as here. As the General Counsel has recognized,
"We don't have here clearly an anti-union sentiment coming out of the month of"
company officials . Even if the Company is responsible for what Yamaguchi said,
infra, his attitude is not representative of any displayed by or chargeable to the
Company. The employees ' subsequent application to the Union after the decision
to discharge them did not make that decision or the discharges discriminatory.
Nor is it clear how discrimination is indicated by the fact that the Company,
finding it difficult to obtain satisfactory employees , discharged these who proved
themselves to be unsatisfactory . Neither does the fact that the tasks formerly done
by these employees are and have been in part performed by the Company's salesmen
while the Company also avails itself of a public warehouse show discrimination.
Were we called upon to determine the reasonableness of the discharges as a busi-
ness proposition, and that is not our function , the fact is that these employees had not
been replaced at the time of the hearing, 4 months later.
C. The alleged independent violation of Section 8(a) (1)
According to the Company , not even Miss Yamaguchi , who hired personnel and
made the decisions or effective recommendations concerning their discharge, is a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act . And no one at the warehouse responsibly
directed the employees there! Rogers is in charge of the warehouse ; he assigned
work to these employees ; and his recommendation for discharge of an employee
who he found was not suited for warehouse work was followed by the Company.
Without further describing his functions , I find that Rogers is a supervisor within
the meaning of the Act.
776 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As for Yamaguchi, whatever his actual authority, whether because of his stock
ownership, his membership on the board of directors, or his relationship to Miss
Yamaguchi, he was permitted by the Company to act as one with authority and
was so regarded' by the employees and by Rogers, himself a supervisor, to whom
he "gave orders" as Miss Yamaguchi testified. Although Yamaguchi had resigned
on January 25, this fact was not communicated to the employees, and he continued
through February to perform his former duties although to a lesser extent as he
helped to break in his successor and to clear up the inventory in the warehouse.
While he was pictured as rather irresponsible himself (neither side called him to
testify), and even if he did not reflect the Company's attitude, the Company is
responsible for his interference with employees' concerted activities.
On February 8, Yamaguchi came to the warehouse, directed Rogers to gather the
men, and then in substance called them dirty rats for having stabbed him in the
back by joining,the Union. According to Cappellino, Yamaguchi said that he had
lost his job because of their action; and later declared that he did not know why
Cappellino joined the Union, and asked what he wanted to leave it. (We have
seen that Yamaguchi had resigned 2 weeks before.) We can discern interference
or the tendency to interfere by these remarks, which are alleged as both interrogation
and threats; and we can overlook the possible effect of Yamaguchi's statement that
he had already lost his job, his authoritative status still being recognized. I find
unlawful interference here. (The General Counsel's stated position is that, some
of these remarks having been made in Rogers' presence, he is chargeable with them
if, but only if, the Company is not directly chargeable for Yamaguchi' s acts.)
Still on February 8, Yamaguchi then pointed out to Cappellino that he could
have gotten him what he wanted without joining the Union, and suggested to him
that the men leave the Union; he proposed the possibility of replacing Rogers with
Cappellino, and an increase in salary and additional benefits if he would drop out
of the Union, and help for other warehouse employees. Here was further unlawful
interference.
It is also claimed that on or about May 7, during the course of the picketing at
the warehouse, Rogers proposed to Cappellino that the strike be settled between
themselves by an agreement to compromise with respect to the amount of backpay,
the Company to withdraw its objections to the payment of unemployment insurance
compensation to the employees; further that on or about May 8, Weber, the Com-
pany's traffic manager, made a similar proposal for settlement, offering sums of
money to the men in return for statements that their charges or claims against the
Company were false.
According to Rogers, Cappellino told him that he was fed up with the entire matter
and would be glad when it got to hearing, and he replied that it could be cleared
up if the men would tell the truth, admitting that they were fired for playing cards.
I resolve this issue of credibility in Rogers' favor. In support of this I find also that
the alleged suggestion was neither within Rogers' authority nor in keeping with the
authority which he assumed or which the employees recognized in him.
As for Weber, he at first mistakenly placed on May 8 a conversation concerning
payment to four of these five as part of a settlement; then recalled that it occurred
on May 29. The issue with respect to such conversations (several allegedly occurred
in May) is whether Weber promised benefits and thereby interfered with concerted
activities as alleged, or whether the proposals came from the employees. Rogers
also testified that both Hagon and Riker called him many times and proposed
settlement, even to an escrow arrangement with Rogers, to which he replied that
he had nothing to do with it as it was between them and the Company. This latter
testimony stands uncontradicted, as does the testimony that top company officials,
informed of the proposals by the men, took it up with the Board and would not
settle without Board approval, which was not available in the form proposed. In
keeping with the finding that settlement proposals were made by the strikers, and
that company representatives did not make the alleged promises of benefit is Mat-
sushita's uncontradicted testimony that Hagon called him and spoke of settlement
but that Matsushita's stated position was that the Board could not he bypassed.
If with respect to events after February these could still be called employees by
regarding their cessation of employment as connected with a current labor dispute,
or for any other reason, it is clear that whatever Weber's status or apparent status
vis-a-vis these employees, settlement of the strike did not lie within the scope of
his or Rogers' duties or even within their apparent authority. I find also that the
strikers sought settlement in May, being more concerned with their own status than
1 Cf. Florida Steel Corporation ( Tampa Force and Iron Division ), 181 NLRB 1179,
1184 ; Joe Scharfstein, et at, d/b/a Stein-Way Clothing Company, 103 NLRB 1314, 1320 ;
R. & J. Underwear Co., Inc., 101 NLRB 299, 301.
NORITArE CO., INC. X77
with the Union's prospects; just as their original approach to the Union was
motivated by recognition of their own unmeritorious position. (An alleged admis-
sion by Burke to Weber to this effect need not be considered.) I find that Rogers
and Weber did not in fact, and had no semblance of authority to, make the promises
alleged, but that the employees sought such promises. The allegation of unlawful
promises in May must therefore fail.
Of the testimony by the various witnesses who charged interference, I credit
only that laid to Yamaguchi. But as noted supra, the Company's attitude was
correct, and the effect of Yamaguchi's interference minimal in view of his announce-
ment that he had himself lost his job and their own immediately imminent discharge.
D. The alleged violation of Section 8(a) (5)
The warehouse employees have been functionally distinct and homogeneous in
the performance of their duties. As ? stated at the hearing, i find that the following
constitutes an appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the
meaning of the Act:
All warehouse employees, exclusive of office clerical employees, professional
employees, guards, watchmen, and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
I find further that on February 7 the employees in that unit designated the Union
as their collective-bargaining representative.
With these facts recognized, the prior decision to discharge these employees on
February 8 should effectively dispose of any request to bargain made on that or the
following day But further, although the first union organizer to apepar on the
scene testified that he told Rogers at the warehouse that he represented the employees
and "would like to meet with management to negotiate a contract," and that Rogers
replied that "ne didn't handle that . . . he would notify the people in the main office
as soon as possible," he did not give the impression of keen recollection as he even
failed to recognize Rogers at the hearing until the latter was pointed out to him.
Cappellino's version was that Rogers disclaimed authority and said that Nattman
would have to notify the office; and the latter said that he would. According to
Ro,-ers, he told Nattman th,)t the latter was talking to the wrong man and would ha""e
to go to the main office; at Nattman's request he agreed to tell the office that Nattman
had been there Nattman did not communicate with the office. and I find that the
Company did not on February 8 receive any sufficient request to bargain. What the
situation would have called for had a request for recognition and bargaining been
made to the Company after the decision to discharge but before the discharges were
effected, is a question which we need not consider. I find that there was no unlawful
refusal to bargain.
It may be noted that this is hardly a Joy Silk Mills, Inc.,2 situation. In the absence
of discriminatory discharges, and the decision to discharge having been made pre-
viously, it cannot reasonably be found that the interference, to the extent and at the
time when it occurred, prevented an election and constitutes a refusal to bargain-
this aside from the fact that no sufficient request to bargain was made until after the
discharges .3 Certainly it cannot be found that there was a causal relationship be-
tween the intereference found and the General Counsel's or the Union's inability to
establish a refusal to bargain.
III. THE REMEDY
Interference has been found in Yamaguchi's promise of benefit and less readily
defined remarks on February 8, and we have seen that the Company was responsible
for his utterances to the employees. The fact that Yamaguchi was to some extent
in his cups may lessen the violation in this respect but does not negate it. But having
said this, we should add that not only is there no showing that company officials knew
of these violations, so that they could not disavow them; but the Company was itself
dissatisfied with Yamaguchi, as the employees were informed, and had already ob-
tained his resignation. Nor, without minimizing any tendency to interfere inherent
in the remarks, were the employees here restrained or interfered with in their con-
certed activities; the circumstances minimized the possibility. Under these circum-
stances and while still recognizing the violations as such, I find that it will not
effectuate the policies of the Act to issue an order against the company. I shall there-
fore recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case,
I make the following:
2 85 NLRB 1263.
8 Cf Orkin Ecaterminating Company of Kansas , Inc., 136 NLRB 630
778 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. District 65, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. All of the Company's warehouse employees, exclusive of office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees, guards, watchmen, and all supervisors as defined in the
Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. The Union was on February 7, 1962, and thereafter the exclusive representative
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, of all employees in the aforesaid
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
4. By,promise of benefit and other remarks, thereby interfering with, restraining,
and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, the Company has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The Company has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a),(3) of the Act.
7. The Company has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety.
International Union of Operating Engineers , Local 545 and Syra-
cuse Supply Company. Case No. 3-CC-142. November 2, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 26, 1961, Trial Examiner Thomas F. Maher issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter-
mediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi-
ate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner to the extent that they are consistent
herewith.
1. A majority of the Board, consisting of Members Rodgers,
Leedom, and Fanning, adopts the Trial Examiner's findings and con-
clusions that the Respondent violated Section 8 (b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B)
by its conduct at the Bero jobsite.1 The members of the majority
agree with the Trial Examiner that one object of the Respondent
1 As set forth in their separate dissent attached hereto, Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
ber Brown would reverse the Trial Examiner 's findings regarding the Bero site.
139 NLRB No. 50.