NICE-SYSTEMS LTD.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 3, 20202019003832 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/184,728 02/20/2014 David GEFFEN P-77723-US 5201 49443 7590 08/03/2020 Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer Baratz LLP 1500 Broadway 12th Floor New York, NY 10036 EXAMINER ULLAH, ARIF ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/03/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Arch-USPTO@PearlCohen.com USPTO@PearlCohen.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DAVID GEFFEN, YIZHAR RONEN, HOVAV LAPIDOT, OHAD POLLAK, and NADAV DORON ____________ Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,7281 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant2 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s non-final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–17, 19, and 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). A hearing was held on July 1, 2020. 1 Appellant identifies Nice Ltd. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 2 SUMMARY OF DECISION We affirm. THE INVENTION Appellant states: “The present invention relates to a system and method guidance for agents at a contact center that incorporates real-time feedback.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method for providing guidance to agents of a contact center, the method comprising: providing by a server of an agent guidance system a list of key selling points to a plurality of workstations, each of the workstations associated with an agent of the agents of the contact center, each key selling point of the list being associated with an effectiveness status; displaying, by a display of each of the workstations, the provided list of key selling points in an order that is based on feedback from the agents; receiving by the server from a workstation of said plurality of workstations feedback related to an effectiveness of a key selling point of the list, wherein the feedback is based on whether the agents have found the key selling point to be useful or not useful in promoting a product to a customer; analyzing by the server the feedback to determine whether or not a change in effectiveness status is required for an identified key selling point of the list, wherein a change in effectiveness status is required when at least one of a threshold change in an effectiveness score is exceeded, and when the feedback causes a priority of the key selling point to overtake or be overtaken by a priority of another key selling point on the list; automatically modifying the effectiveness status of the identified key selling point of the list in accordance with the received feedback and the analysis; Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 3 providing by the server to said plurality of workstations a modified list that incorporates the modified effectiveness status; wherein providing the modified list comprises updating the list in real time; and wherein a change in effectiveness status comprises a determination of at least one of a new effectiveness score and a new priority for the identified key selling point of the list; and displaying, by a display of each of the workstations, the list of key selling points in an order that is based on the new effectiveness score and the new priority. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Name Reference Date Marks et al. (Marks) US 2001/0051911 Al Dec. 13, 2001 Trauring US 6,513,033 Bl Jan. 28, 2003 Lane et al. (Lane) US 2004/0103089 Al May 27, 2004 David US 2004/0249665 Al Dec. 9, 2004 Lawrence et al. (Lawrence) US 2007/0162542 Al July 12, 2007 The following rejections are before us for review. Claims 1, 2, 4–17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Claims 1, 5–8, 11, 12, 15–17, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)(1) as being unpatentable over Lawrence, in view of Lane and Trauring. Claims 2, 4, 13, and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lawrence in view of Lane, Trauring, and Marks. Claims 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lawrence in view of Lane, Trauring, and David. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 4 FINDINGS OF FACT We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–8, 10–17 in the Non-Final Office Action3 and on pages 3–15 in the Examiner’s Answer, concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION Each of independent claims 1, 12 and 16 recites in one form or another: wherein a change in effectiveness status is required when at least one of a threshold change in an effectiveness score is exceeded, . . . wherein a change in effectiveness status comprises a determination of at least one of a new effectiveness score and a new priority for the identified key selling point of the list . . . .” The Examiner found concerning this limitation that Lane discloses it at paragraphs 39–42 finding that data is then evaluated by the system to rank all solutions. displaying the top ten solutions in the top solutions box 270 shown in FIG. 2. Therefore, the listing reflects those solutions of most recent interest to the users and/or of most frequent interest to the users . . . ranking of the solutions is calculated each night. In another embodiment. the list is refreshed every hour. The list can even be re-ranked each time a solution is accessed. (Non–Final Act. 22 (emphasis omitted)). Appellant argue, although the solutions in Lane can be ranked, there is nothing in Lane that suggests they are displayed in the order they are 3 All references to the Non-Final Office Action refer to the Non-Final Office Action mailed on Sept. 17, 2018. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 5 ranked, as required by Appellant's claim. Moreover, the solutions in Lane are ranked [based] on frequency, recency, and/or an admin, not based on feedback from an agent, as required by Appellant's claims. Accordingly, Lane does not satisfy these new claim elements. (Appeal Br. 9–10). We agree with Appellant. Claims 1, 12 and 16 each requires “at least one of a threshold change in an effectiveness score is exceeded.” Relative rankings do not require a threshold change because a ranking process is an ordering process which is not threshold based. It is not apparent and the Examiner does not explain how the evaluated solutions in Lane, which are ranked based on frequency, recency, etc., are an obvious variant of “at least one of a threshold change in an effectiveness score is exceeded.” Because claims 2, 4–11, 13–15, 17, 19, and 20 depend from one of claims 1, 12 and 16 and because we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 1, 12 and 16, the rejection of claims 2, 4–11, 13–15, 17, 19, and 20 likewise cannot be sustained. Concerning claims 2, 4, 13, and 14, the additional reference to Marks does not remedy the shortfalls of the disclosure in Lane. Likewise concerning the rejection of claims 9 and 10, the additional reference to David does not remedy the shortfalls of the disclosure in Lane. 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION We will affirm the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Appellant argues, and we select, claim 1 as the representative claim for this group (Appeal Br. 11), and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015). An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 6 However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable. ” E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 7 In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 8 Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).4 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or 4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54– 55. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 9 (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). The Specification states: Customer service representatives or agents at a contact center of a company are typically humans (but automated processes exist) tasked with providing services to callers, typically via telephone but also via computer chat, texting, e- mail, or other methods. For example, the services may involve tasks involving a high level of expertise, such as troubleshooting a device or computer application that is provided or maintained by the company, or simpler tasks, such as assisting a customer in completing a form. Agents may also Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 10 be tasked with utilizing the interaction with the customer to generate additional business for the company. Spec. ¶ 2. Agents typically are trained in technical aspects of the company's products or services. Agents may not be trained or experienced in sales, marketing, or other business aspects of the company. Thus, when tasked with generating additional business for the company, they may benefit from real-time assistance with these tasks. For example, a desk or workstation that is manned by the agent may be provided with a guidance application that is configured to offer such assistance. Spec. ¶ 3. The Examiner found the claims are analogous to collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis, where feedback regarding the key selling points are gathered and then analyzed to determine a change in effectiveness (collecting and analyzing information), and then providing a modified list to the workstations (displaying certain results of the collection and analysis). (Final Act. 13). Claim 1 recites in pertinent part, providing . . .a list of key selling points to a plurality of workstations, each of the workstations associated with an agent . . . , each key selling point of the list being associated with an effectiveness status; displaying, . . . the provided list of key selling points in an order that is based on feedback from the agents; receiving . . . feedback related to an effectiveness of a key selling point of the list, wherein the feedback is based on whether the agents have found the key selling point to be useful or not useful in promoting a product to a customer; analyzing . . . the feedback to determine whether or not a change in effectiveness status is required for an identified key selling point of the list, wherein a change in effectiveness status is required when at least one of a threshold change in an effectiveness score is exceeded, and when the feedback causes a Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 11 priority of the key selling point to overtake or be overtaken by a priority of another key selling point on the list; automatically modifying the effectiveness status of the identified key selling point of the list in accordance with the received feedback and the analysis; providing . . . a modified list that incorporates the modified effectiveness status; wherein providing the modified list comprises updating the list in real time; and wherein a change in effectiveness status comprises a determination of at least one of a new effectiveness score and a new priority for the identified key selling point of the list; and displaying, . . . the list of key selling points in an order that is based on the new effectiveness score and the new priority. Accordingly, we find claim 1 recites a method for providing guidance to agents of a contact center using feedback related to the effectiveness of a key selling point that the agents have found to be useful or not useful in promoting a product to a customer. We, thus, agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis because claim 1 recites, for example, analyzing by the server the feedback to determine whether or not a change in effectiveness status is required for an identified key selling point of the list, wherein a change in effectiveness status is required when at least one of a threshold change in an effectiveness score is exceeded, and when the feedback causes a priority of the key selling point to overtake or be overtaken by a priority of another key selling point on the list. This is a form of evaluation that is a mental process, a concept performed in the human mind, which is a judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. In addition, claim 1 recites, for example, receiving …feedback related to an effectiveness of a key selling point of the list, wherein the feedback is based on whether the agents have found the key selling point to be useful or not useful in promoting a product to a customer. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 12 Thus, claim 1 also recites rating a personal interaction i.e., a sales attempt, which is a form of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people, which is one of certain methods of organizing human activity that are judicial exceptions. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only generically requires “a server,” “a plurality of workstations,” and “a display.” These components are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 31, 63–76, Fig. 1. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent- eligible.”). Because no more than a generic computer is required, the claim also does not define, or rely on, a “particular machine.” MPEP § 2106.05(b). Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 13 Thus, we find that claim 1 recites the judicial exceptions of a mental process and a certain method of organizing human activity that are not integrated into a practical application. That claim 1 does not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to contact center guidance, does not make it any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claim must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72–73). Concerning this step, the Examiner found the following: independent claims 1, 12, and 16 are generic computing elements performing generic computing functions and, as a result, do not amount to significantly more. The claims do not recite ‘significantly more’ because the claim is not either: improvements to another technology or technical field; improvements to the functioning of the computer itself; applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine; effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing; or other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 14 Non–Final Act. 14. We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer. They do not.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to receive, analyze, modify, display and apply decision criteria to data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the claim does not effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 31, 63–76, Fig. 1). Thus, claim 1 amounts to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 15 transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–226. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claim 1 adds nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (receive, analyze, modify, display) and storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 10–20, Reply Br. 3–9). We find that our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same. Appellant argues, “the Examiner has failed to provide any evidence whatsoever of the allegations made that the claims are well-understood, routine, and conventional.” (Appeal Br. 11(citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also id. at 15–16). Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 16 We disagree with Appellant. The court in Berkheimer held that “[t]he patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1365 (citing Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The § 101 inquiry ‘may contain underlying factual issues.”’ Id. at 1325.)). But, the court also held that “[w]hen there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the claim element or claimed combination is well-understood, routine, [and] conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field, this issue can be decided on summary judgment as a matter of law.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit made clear that “not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.” Id. In fact, the Federal Circuit in Berkheimer did not require evidentiary support for independent claim 1 because “[t]he limitations [of claim 1] amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with conventional computer components.” Id. at 1370. Here, the Specification indisputably shows the claimed “a server,” “plurality of workstations,” and “a display” are described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 31, 63–76, Fig. 1. There is nothing in the Specification that shows these elements were non–conventional at the time of filing. Accordingly, we find no evidence other than the well-understood, routine, or conventional nature of the components as claimed. Appellant argues: claimed ordered combination of operations amounts to significantly more than the alleged abstract idea at least because it improves computer technology and the technical field of agent guidance systems, e.g., real-time data coordination across Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 17 a plurality of workstations. Appellant submits that, as described in the last office action response and the Declaration of Inventor David Geffen, Appellant’s claimed invention provides an improvement to computing technology. See Geffen Declaration, para. 5. (Appeal Br. 12). We are unpersuaded because the alleged improvement lies in the abstract idea itself, not in any technological improvement. See BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Although the claims purport to improve “computer processing speed and memory availability” (Geffen Affidavit ¶ 5) by using a server to provide “effectiveness status and update the list in real time, without requiring that each workstation execute individually, thus dramatically decreasing required processing power (id. ¶ 8), our reviewing court has held that speed and accuracy increases stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general purpose computer “do[] not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Although a “server” to communicate with plural workstations is in some sense technological, its use in operating system functionality can be said to be so notoriously settled that merely invoking it is no more than abstract conceptual advice to use well known technology for its intended purpose. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612–613 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Using a generic telephone for its intended purpose was a well–established “basic concept”). Even if the advance over the prior art is to “analyz[e]… feedback to determine whether a change of effectiveness of a key selling point being provided is required for a key selling point on the list, automatically Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 18 modifying the effectives status of the identified key selling point in the list in accordance with the received feedback” (Geffen Affidavit ¶ 7), that purported advance is still an abstract idea itself, i.e., a certain method of organizing human activity. It is similar to hedging against financial risk in Bilksi v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010), and collecting and analyzing investment data in SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167–68 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The alleged improvement lies in the abstract idea itself, not in any technological improvement. See BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1287–88. Claim 1 does not solve any purported technological problem. Claim 1 is not focused on any technical improvement, but rather on a scheme for providing guidance to agents of a contact center using feedback related to the effectiveness of a key selling point that the agents have found to be useful or not useful in promoting a product to a customer. On balance, claim 1 is directed to providing guidance to agents of a contact center using feedback related to the effectiveness of a key selling point that the agents have found to be useful or not useful in promoting a product to a customer. As found supra, claim 1 only includes the following generically recited device limitations: “a server,” “plurality of workstations,” and “a display.” What remains in the claim after disregarding these device limitations, are abstractions, i.e., “analyzing …the feedback to determine whether or not a change in effectiveness status is required for an identified key selling point of the list.” Claim 1; see Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90). On page 13 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant lists items 1–3 in support of the asserted improved processing features of the system of claim 1. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 19 However, these items identify mental steps, e.g., “analyzing the feedback to determine whether or not a change in effectiveness status is required for an identified key selling point of the list.” It is well settled that the asserted improvement is, at best, an improvement to the abstract idea. But “[n]o matter how much of an advance in the . . . field the claims recite, the advance lies entirely in the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract application realm.” SAP, 898 F.3d at 1163. Concerning Appellant’s assertion in item 4 on page 13, that the real time aspect to of the claims also effects the asserted improved processing features of the system of claim 1, we note that it is well settled that a computer acts in “real time” and that such a feature is the result of invoking the use of well known technology for its intended purpose. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d at 612–613. .Claim 1 simply recites functional results to be achieved by any means. See, e.g., Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Further, the purported solution requires the use of a server, plurality of workstations, and a display only operating in their ordinary and conventional capacities. See supra; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26. The Appellant does not, and cannot, claim to have invented the use of these devices. The “focus” of the claim is not “on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities” (Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335), but rather on using the server, plurality of workstations, and display as tools to implement the abstract idea in the particular field of contact center guidance. See Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Supreme Court and [the Federal Circuit] have repeatedly made clear that merely limiting the Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 20 field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract.”). Appellant argues, “the systems and methods according to embodiments of the claimed invention provide at least two clear improvements to the computer technology, particularly improving the computer processing speed and memory availability. (Appeal Br. 13). We are not persuaded by Appellant because merely using a computer to perform more efficiently what could otherwise be accomplished manually does not confer patent-eligibility. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Using a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible.”); MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“While running a particular process on a computer undeniably improves efficiency and accuracy, cloaking an otherwise abstract idea in the guise of a computer-implemented claim is insufficient to bring it within section 101.”). Appellant argues, “the presently pending claims represent a patent- eligible technical solution which, in the end, is more complex than any alleged ‘mental process.’” (Appeal Br. 14). We disagree with Appellant because as early as Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court held that calculations, while “primarily useful for computerized calculations producing automatic adjustments in alarm settings,” “can [still] be made by pencil and paper calculations.” Flook, 437 U.S. at 586. As such, the Court did not deem the alleged primacy of computer implementation to be persuasive in its 35 U.S.C. § 101 analysis. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 21 Appellant here has not produced evidence showing that the claimed computations cannot be made by human interaction using a pen and paper. Appellant respectfully asserts that the Examiner has “unnecessarily oversimplif[ied] the claims.” (Appeal Br. 14). We disagree with Appellant. That the claims include more words than the phrase the Examiner used to articulate the abstract idea, and that the Examiner, thus, articulates the abstract idea at a higher level of abstraction than would Appellant is, accordingly, an insufficient basis to persuasively argue that the claim language has been mischaracterized or that the Examiner has failed to consider the claims as a whole. Although Appellant and the Examiner describe, at different levels of abstraction, to what the claims are directed, it is recognized that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does not, “impact the patentability analysis.” See id. at 1241. Appellant’s argument that the claims add specific “limitations other than what is well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field” (Appeal Br. 15) is similarly unpersuasive at least because the features that Appellant identifies as unconventional, i.e., receiving by the server, analyzing by the server, providing by the server to said plurality of workstations (Appeal Br. 16–17), are, as found above, a sequence of data reception-analysis (receive, analyze, modify, display) which are generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See e.g., Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 715. As found above, there is nothing in the Specification that shows these elements were non– conventional at the time of filing. Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 22 Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now- superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered but are not persuasive of error. (See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility- related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”))). For the reasons identified above, we determine there are no deficiencies in the Examiner’s prima facie case of patent ineligibility of the rejected claims. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–17, 19, and 20. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We conclude the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–17, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. DECISION Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). Appeal 2019-003832 Application 14/184,728 23 In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4–17, 19, 20 101 Eligibility 1, 2, 4–17, 19, 20 1, 5–8, 11, 12, 15–17, 19, 20 103 Lawrence, Lane, Trauring 1, 5–8, 11, 12, 15–17, 19, 20 2, 3, 4, 13, 14 103 Lawrence, Lane, Trauring, Marks 2, 3, 4, 13, 14 9, 10 103 Lawrence, Lane, Trauring, David 9, 10 Overall Outcome 1, 2, 4–17, 19, 20 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation