NG Production Films, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 23, 2018

No. 86906213 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2018)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: January 23, 2018

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re NG Production Films, Inc.
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Serial No. 86906213
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Phillip Thomas Horton, for NG Production Films, Inc.

J. Brendan Regan, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 113,
Odette Bonnet, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Wolfson, Masiello, and Larkin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
NG Production Films, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the mark shown below

Serial No. 86906213
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for “Film production; Video production services,” in International Class 41.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration on two grounds: (1)
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that the
mark so resembles the standard character mark NG shown in Registration No.
3538539 for “television, motion picture and entertainment services, namely, the
production and distribution of motion pictures and television programs featuring
music videos, musical performances, award presentations, entertainment news and
comedy,” in International Class 41,2 as to be likely, when used on or in connection
with Applicant’s services, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception; and (2) under
Trademark Rules 2.52 and 2.53, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.52-2.53, on the ground that the
drawing of Applicant’s mark is not acceptable because it will not create a high quality
image when reproduced.
When the Examining Attorney made the refusals final, Applicant appealed.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed briefs. We affirm both refusals to
register.
I. Record on Appeal and Evidentiary Issue
The record on appeal consists of what Applicant describes as pages from
Registrant’s website at ngtv.com and Applicant’s website at ngproductionfilms.com,

1 Application Serial No. 86906213 was filed on February 12, 2016 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), on the basis of Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark
and first use in commerce on January 20, 2016. The colors turquoise and white are claimed
as a feature of the mark, and the words PRODUCTION FILMS are disclaimed.
2 The cited registration issued on November 25, 2008 and is currently owned by Rebel Media
Ltd. (“Registrant”). In 2013, the Patent and Trademark Office accepted and acknowledged a
combined declaration under Sections 8 and 15 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1065.
Serial No. 86906213
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and pages from the Bloomberg website, all made of record by Applicant;3 and
dictionary definitions of “motion picture” and “video” made of record by the
Examining Attorney.4
Applicant attached to its appeal brief pages from its website, 4 TTABVUE 19-21,
and a caption page bearing the words “NGTV WEBPAGE (no other evidence of NG)”
followed by what is described as a page from Registrant’s website. 4 TTABVUE 22-
23. The Examining Attorney argues that “to whatever extent that the applicant’s
arguments are based on material that the applicant has submitted (apparently for
the first time) with its appeal brief, it was untimely submitted during an appeal,” and
he “therefore objects to this evidence and respectfully requests that the Board
disregard it.” 7 TTABVUE 3.
Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d), provides in pertinent part that the
“record in the application should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal” and that
“[e]vidence should not be filed with the Board after the filing of a notice of appeal.”
“Generally, materials not previously made of record during prosecution of an
application are untimely if submitted for the first time at briefing and will not
ordinarily be considered by the Board.” In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d 1185, 1188
(TTAB 2013); see also In re Fiat Grp. Mktg. & Corp. Commc’ns S.p.A., 109 USPQ2d
1593, 1596 (TTAB 2014).

3 December 6, 2016 Response to Office Action at 22-31.
4 December 28, 2016 Office Action at 3-15.
Serial No. 86906213
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Two of the three pages from Applicant’s website attached to its appeal brief, 4
TTABVUE 19-20, were previously made of record during prosecution,5 but the third
page, 4 TTABVUE 21, differs in content from a similar page submitted as Applicant’s
specimen. We sustain the Examining Attorney’s objection to the third page and have
given it no consideration. The page attached to Applicant’s appeal brief that
Applicant claims to be from Registrant’s website, 4 TTABVUE 23, also differs in
content from a similar page made of record during prosecution,6 and we sustain the
Examining Attorney’s objection to that page and have given it no consideration.7
II. Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). Our determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is based
upon an analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood
of confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). We consider each du Pont factor that is relevant

5 These pages were part of Applicant’s specimen or were submitted with Applicant’s response
to the first Office Action. December 6, 2016 Response to Office Action at 27-28.
6 December 6, 2016 Response to Office Action at 22.
7 Applicant appears to offer these webpages in support of its argument that “there is no
evidence of the [registered] mark being used in commerce.” 4 TTABVUE 10. This argument
“is a collateral attack on the registration, which we cannot entertain on this appeal because
of the statutory presumptions that we must accord the registration under Section 7(b) of the
Trademark Act.” In re Solid State Design Inc., ___ USPQ2d ____, 2018 WL 287909, *1 (TTAB
Jan. 3, 2018) (precedential) (citing In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531,
1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Serial No. 86906213
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and for which there is record evidence. See, e.g., M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns,
Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006); ProMark Brands Inc. v.
GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015). Two key factors in every
Section 2(d) case are the similarity of the marks and the similarity of the goods or
services. “The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect
of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the
marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ
24, 29 (CCPA 1976)).
A. Similarity of the Services, Channels of Trade, and Classes of
Customers
The second du Pont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration . . . .” Stone Lion
Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1159
(Fed. Cir. 2014). The third and fourth du Pont factors concern “[t]he similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels,” and the “conditions
under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. ‘impulse’ vs. careful,
sophisticated purchasing,” respectively. Id. The analysis of each of these factors is
premised upon the identifications of services in the application and in the cited
registration. Id. at 1161-63; Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs. Inc., 918
F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Jump Designs LLC, 80
USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006) (discussing the impact of the relevant
identifications on these factors).
Serial No. 86906213
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1. Similarity of the Services
Applicant acknowledges that the “nature and scope of the goods or services offered
in connection with the Applicant’s and the registrant’s trademarks must be
determined on the basis of the goods or services identified in the application or
registration.” 4 TTABVUE 13. The Section 2(d) refusal must be affirmed if there is a
likelihood of confusion as to either of the services identified in the application. Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981).
The services identified in the cited registration include “the production . . . of
motion pictures . . . featuring music videos, musical performances, award
presentations, entertainment news and comedy.” The services identified in the
application include “film production,” with no limitation or restriction on their nature,
type, or content. The words “motion picture” and “film” in the respective
identifications are synonyms.8
Applicant’s “film production” services are sufficiently broad to encompass the
registrant’s more narrowly identified services of the “production of . . . motion pictures
. . . featuring music videos, musical performances, award presentations,
entertainment news and comedy,” and these services are thus legally identical.9 See,

8 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v.
J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ
505 (Fed. Cir. 1983), including online dictionaries that exist in printed form or regular fixed
editions. In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377 (TTAB 2006). We take judicial notice
that “film” means “motion picture,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (merriam-webster.com,
accessed on January 18, 2018), and the Examining Attorney made of record a dictionary
definition that states that a “motion picture” is also called a “film.” December 28, 2016 Office
Action at 3.
9 Applicant argues, without citing specific evidence, that the services “differ insofar as
consumers hiring Applicant are looking for someone to handle their tv and commercial needs
Serial No. 86906213
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e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocionomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015)
(“Where an applicant identifies its services broadly, we must presume that the
services encompass all services of the type identified.”); In re Hughes Furniture
Indus., Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1134, 1137 (TTAB 2015) (goods found to be legally identical
where “Applicant’s broadly worded identification of ‘furniture’ necessarily
encompasses Registrant’s narrowly identified ‘residential and commercial
furniture’.”). This du Pont factor supports a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
2. Similarity of the Channels of Trade and Classes of
Customers
Where, as here, goods or services are legally identical in part, “it is well
established that, ‘absent restrictions in the application and registration, goods and
services are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of
purchasers.’” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d
1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 725, 159 USPQ
721, 723 (CCPA 1968). No restrictions on the channels of trade or classes of

such as ads and conferences,” while “[c]onsumers who contact Registrant are looking for
reviews on tv, movies, and/or current events.” 4 TTABVUE 15. Even if these claimed
differences were supported by the record, it “is well settled that ‘. . . it is the identification of
[services] that controls, not what extrinsic evidence may show about the specific nature of
the [services] . . . An applicant may not restrict the scope of the [services] covered in the cited
registration by argument or extrinsic evidence.’” In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106
USPQ2d 1163, 1165 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re La Peregrina Ltd., 86 USPQ2d 1645, 1647
(TTAB 2008)). Similarly, “the services recited in the application determine the scope of the
post-grant benefit of registration” and “[p]arties that choose to recite services in their
trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope in
the application.” Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1162-63 (citing Octocom, 16 USPQ2d at 1788).
Serial No. 86906213
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purchasers appear in the respective identifications,10 and these du Pont factors also
support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity of the Marks
This du Pont factor focuses on “‘the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.’” Palm
Bay Imps. Inc. v. Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369,
73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567). “The
proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the
marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that
persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between
the parties.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101
USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The legal identity of the services in part reduces
the degree of similarity between the marks that is necessary for confusion to be likely.
See, e.g., Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1912; Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life
of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

10 Applicant argues, again without citing specific evidence, that its “services travel in
separate and distinct channels of trade apart from the registered trademark’s services,” and
claims that its services reach “the end consumer by and through consumers who are looking
for a company to handle their advertising and commercial needs,” while Registrant’s services
reach their “end consumers by and through conducting online reviews and critiques of tv,
movies, and current events.” 4 TTABVUE 16. Even if these claimed differences in the trade
channels were supported by the record, an “application with ‘no restriction on trade channels’
cannot be ‘narrowed by testimony that the applicant’s use is, in fact, restricted to a particular
class of purchasers.’” Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1162 (quoting Octocom, 16 USPQ2d at
1788).
Serial No. 86906213
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“[L]ikelihood of confusion cannot be predicated on dissection of a mark, that is, on
only part of a mark. On the other hand, in articulating reasons for reaching a
conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating that, for
rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark,
provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their
entireties.” In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
We turn first to a determination of the dominant portion of Applicant’s mark. For
ease of reference in following our analysis, we again reproduce Applicant’s drawing.

“In the case of a composite mark containing both words and a design, ‘the verbal
portion of the mark is the one most likely to indicate the origin of the goods to which
it is affixed.’” Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (quoting CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d
1579, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). “The verbal portion of a word and design
mark likely will be the dominant portion” because it “likely will appear alone when
used in text and will be spoken when requested by consumers.” Id. at 1911; see also
L.C. Licensing, Inc. v. Berman, 86 USPQ2d 1883, 1887 (TTAB 2007) (“[I]t is well
settled that if a mark comprises both a word and a design, then the word is normally
accorded greater weight because it would be used by purchasers to request the
goods.”).
Serial No. 86906213
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This general principle applies to Applicant’s stylized mark. The record suggests
that Applicant and its customers refer to Applicant as “NG Production Films,”11 and
Applicant repeatedly describes its mark as simply the words “NG PRODUCTION
FILMS,” e.g., 4 TTABVUE 9 (“the refusal to register NG PRODUCTION FILMS
should be withdrawn”) and 10 (there is a clear difference between NG PRODUCTION
FILMS and NG” and “Applicant’s trademark NG PRODUCTION FILMS creates a
commercial impression of a company that does film work”).
The letters “NG” are the key source-identifying part of the verbal elements of
Applicant’s stylized mark. The letters, described by Applicant as a “large white ‘N’
adjacent to white shapes that create a stylized large ‘G’ in negative space,” appear in
typeface that is larger than the words “PRODUCTION FILMS.” The letters “NG” are
apparently without any descriptive or suggestive meaning in Applicant’s field of
business and they are, accordingly, inherently distinctive (unlike the remaining
wording of the mark). In addition, “NG” is the first portion of the verbal elements
when the mark is viewed and read from left to right, and it is well settled that “it is
often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a
purchaser and remembered.” Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., 9 USPQ2d
1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988); see also Palm Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1692. This general
principle applies with particular force to Applicant’s mark because the words
PRODUCTION FILMS that follow the letters NG have little source-identifying

11 December 6, 2017 Response to Office Action at 27-29 (Applicant’s webpage, including a
testimonial supplied by one of Applicant’s customers).
Serial No. 86906213
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capacity when used in connection with “film production” services, and have been
disclaimed. See, e.g., In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (Board properly found that DELTA was dominant portion of THE
DELTA CAFE mark for restaurant services where generic word CAFE had been
disclaimed). The letters NG dominate Applicant’s mark because they are the part of
the mark that is most likely to “make an impression upon purchasers that would be
remembered and relied upon to identify the [services] . . . .” In re Appetito Provisions
Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB 1987).
We turn next to a comparison of the marks in their entireties in appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression, giving greater weight in that
comparison to the dominant letters NG in Applicant’s stylized mark than to its other
elements, and taking into account that the dominant portion of Applicant’s mark is
the entirety of the cited mark. Applicant correctly acknowledges that in this
comparison, the “focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally
retains a general, rather than specific impression, of trademarks.” 4 TTABVUE 11.
See, e.g., In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016).
We find that the marks are similar in appearance and sound. The marks sound
similar when verbalized because they both contain the identical source-identifying
letters NG, although Applicant’s mark contains the additional words PRODUCTION
FILMS, which are a point of phonetic difference. The marks are also similar in
appearance for essentially the same reasons that they are similar in sound: the
presence, in both marks, of the identical letters NG. The Examining Attorney
Serial No. 86906213
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correctly notes that because the cited NG mark is a standard character mark, it “may
be displayed in any lettering style,” including in “the same manner of display” as the
identical letters NG in Applicant’s mark. 7 TTABVUE 8. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC
v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1823 (TTAB 2015) (a standard character
mark “could be used in any typeface, color, or size, including the same stylization
actually used . . . [in the cited mark], or one that minimizes the differences or
emphasizes the similarities between the marks.”) (citing Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City
Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
With respect to the connotation and commercial impression of the marks,
Applicant advances several arguments. Applicant first argues that the “words [sic] in
‘NG’ in NG PROCUTION [sic] FILMS could mean anything,” but that the cited mark
NG “is known to be short for ‘Not Good,’ as they [sic] also own the mark NGTV
(Registration No. 3548170).” 4 TTABVUE 10.12 We must assume that consumers will
encounter the marks per se used in connection with the recited services, and without
any extrinsic explanation regarding the meaning of the letters “NG” in either mark.
There is, in any event, no evidence in the record that consumers exposed to the cited
NG mark would be familiar with the alleged NGTV mark or its owner, or would
understand the letters “NG” to stand for “Not Good” (or “No Good”). On this record,
even assuming that the letters “NG” in the marks are abbreviations for longer terms,
there is no basis upon which to conclude that the letters would be understood by

12 We note that a page in the record that Applicant claims to be from Registrant’s website
displays the words “No Good TV” rather than the words “Not Good TV.” December 6, 2016
Response to Office Action at 22. The referenced registration is not in the record.
Serial No. 86906213
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consumers to mean one thing when they are used in the cited mark for the production
of motion pictures featuring music videos, musical performances, award
presentations, entertainment news and comedy, but to mean another thing when
they are used in Applicant’s mark for legally identical services.
With respect to the marks’ connotations, Applicant acknowledges that “the
meaning or connotation of a mark must be determined in relation to the named goods
or services,” 4 TTABVUE 11, but argues that its mark NG PRODUCTION FILMS for
film production services “creates a connotation of a service that helps and works for
clients to handle their tv and commercial production needs,” 4 TTABVUE 12, while
the cited mark, as “used for the production of motion pictures featuring music videos,
musical performances, award presentations, entertainment news and comedy,
creates a connotation of a service that offers critiques and reviews of movies, tv, and
current events.” 4 TTABVUE 12-13. We fail to see how Applicant’s mark NG
PRODUCTION FILMS for “film production” services connotes services pertaining to
“tv and commercial production.” 4 TTABVUE 12.13 Rather, as explained above,
Applicant’s unrestricted film production services must be deemed to encompass
Registrant’s more narrowly described motion picture production services, so we must
consider the connotations of the marks as applied to legally identical services. In that

13 Applicant does not explain the basis for this claim, but as noted above, Applicant claims,
without supporting evidence, that “consumers hiring Applicant are looking for someone to
handle their tv and commercial needs.” 4 TTABVUE 15. In any event, we must consider the
connotations of Applicant’s mark as applied to its identified services. There is no evidence in
the record that “film production” would be understood to mean “TV and commercial
production.”
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context, both marks connote that the services are provided by an entity identified as
“NG.”
Applicant also argues that its mark “creates a commercial impression of a
company that does film work,” but that “the registered trademark creates a [sic] no
commercial impression at all.” 4 TTABVUE 10. Applicant appears to base this
argument on the presence in its mark of the words PRODUCTION FILMS, and the
absence in the cited mark of any matter other than the letters NG. With respect to
Applicant’s mark, the Examining Attorney responds that “it is not disclaimed
wording that ‘creates a commercial impression’ but rather non-disclaimed wording
that does so.” 7 TTABVUE 7. We must, of course, consider Applicant’s mark in its
entirety, including the disclaimed wording PRODUCTION FILMS, Nat’l Data Corp.,
224 USPQ at 751, but matter that is disclaimed because it is descriptive is often “less
significant in creating the mark’s commercial impression,” In re Code Consultants
Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1699, 1702 (TTAB 2001), and in Applicant’s mark for “film
production” services, it has little source-identifying significance. The letters “NG” are
the primary verbal clue to the source of Applicant’s services and they create an
identical commercial impression for each mark when the marks are used for legally
identical services. Id. (finding that the common letters “CCI” in the marks CCI and
CCI CODE CONSULTANTS, INC. made the marks highly similar in commercial
impression).
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We find that the marks are highly similar in appearance, sound, connotation, and
commercial impression when considered in their entireties. This du Pont factor
strongly supports a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
C. Lack of Evidence of Actual Confusion
Applicant argues that “there is no evidence of record indicating that there has
been actual confusion in the marketplace between Applicant’s services and the
registrant’s services.” 4 TTABVUE 16. It is well settled that the relevant test is
likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion, and it is unnecessary to show actual
confusion to establish likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Weiss Assocs. Inc. v. HRL
Assocs. Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1990).14 Applicant also
acknowledges that the “absence of any instances of actual confusion is a meaningful
factor where the record indicates that, for a significant period of time, an applicant’s
sales and advertising activities have been so appreciable and continuous that, if
confusion were likely to happen, any actual incidents thereof would be expected to
have occurred and would have come to the attention of one or all affected trademark
owners.” 4 TTABVUE 16-17. There is, however, no evidence in the record that
Applicant’s “sales and advertising activities have been so appreciable and continuous”
as to make the claimed lack of actual confusion meaningful. This du Pont factor is
neutral.

14 Moreover, unlike in an inter partes case, where evidence of the existence or absence of
actual confusion can be obtained from both mark owners, on an ex parte appeal the record
contains only evidence regarding the applicant’s experience and, as discussed below, that
evidence is lacking here. See In re Kangaroos U.S.A., 223 USPQ 1025, 1026-27 (TTAB 1984).
Serial No. 86906213
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D. Conclusion on Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
All of the relevant du Pont factors support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
The services, channels of trade, and classes of customers are legally identical, and the
marks are very similar. We find that confusion as to the source or sponsorship of
Applicant’s film production services is likely.
III. Refusal for Failure to Provide an Acceptable Drawing
Trademark Rule 2.52, 37 C.F.R. § 2.52, provides in pertinent part that an
“applicant must include a clear drawing of the mark when the application is filed.”
Applicant’s application was filed as a TEAS Plus application, and Trademark Rule
2.52(c) provides that a “drawing filed through TEAS must meet the requirements of
§ 2.53.” Trademark Rule 2.53 requires a special form drawing of the sort filed by
Applicant to “meet the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section,” which include
that “[a]ll lines must be clean, sharp and solid, not fine or crowded, and produce a
high quality image when copied.” 37 C.F.R. § 2.53(c). See In re Peter S. Herrick, P.A.,
91 USPQ2d 1505, 1511 (TTAB 2009). The Examining Attorney argues that Applicant
“thus far has not provided a clear drawing of the mark . . . .” 7 TTABVUE 4.
Applicant’s response to this ground for refusal of registration is simply that
“Applicant has a drawing that matches the specimen, as well as the USPTO
guidelines.” 4 TTABVUE 18. To the extent that this vague statement reflects
Applicant’s claim that its current drawing satisfies the requirements of Trademark
Rules 2.52 and 2.53, we disagree. Applicant’s drawing fails to comply with the
requirement of an acceptable drawing because it has blurry edges around the
Serial No. 86906213
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lettering and appears to have a yellow dot near the upper right portion of the letter
“G,” and we affirm the refusal to register on this ground as well. Peter S. Herrick,
P.A., 91 USPQ2d at 1511.
Decision: The refusals to register under Section 2(d) and Trademark Rules 2.52
and 2.53 are affirmed.