New Orleans Laundries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 16, 1955

114 N.L.R.B. 1077 (N.L.R.B. 1955)

NEW ORLEANS' LAUNDRIES, -INC. 1077
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor,, practices, the
Trial Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent on and after April 30, 1954, failed and
refused to reinstate the employees whose names are listed on Appendix A; that the
Respondent failed and refused to reinstate the employees whose names are listed
on Appendix B until the dates set forth opposite their names;- and that the Respond-
ent failed to reinstate employees Edna Robinson and Sarah Worthington to their
former or substantially equivalent positions. It' will be recommended that the
Respondent offer the employees listed on Appendix A and employees Edna Robin-
son and Sarah Worthington immediate and full reinstatement to their former or
substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges. It will he further recommended that the Respondent make whole
said employees for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of Respond-
ent's discrimination by payment of a sum of money equal to that which they would
have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination, to the date of an offer
of reinstatement, or to the date of reinstatement as in the case of the employees
listed on Appendix B, less their net earnings during such period. Said loss of pay
shall be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter, or portion thereof,
during the period from Respondent's discriminatory action to the date of the offer
of reinstatement. The quarterly periods, herein called "quarters" shall begin with
the first day of January, April, July, and October. Loss of pay shall be determined
by deducting from a sum equal to that which the employee would normally have
earned for each such quarter or portion thereof, his net earnings, if any, in other
employment during that period. Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no
effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter. In order to ensure com-
pliance with the foregoing back-pay and reinstatement provisions, it is recommended
that Respondent be required, upon reasonable request, to make all pertinent records
available to the Board and its agents.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCI.usioNS of LAW
1. American Federation of Labor is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 -(5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating against the employees named in Appendices A and B, the
Respondent has 'engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (a) (3) and (1) oftheAct.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7- of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
New Orleans Laundries, Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers of America, CIO, and its New Orleans Joint Board and Al-
bert H. Bernadas, Representative and Laundry Workers Inter-
national Union, Local 402, AFL, successor to Local 320, AFL.
Cases Nos. 15-CA-460 and 15-CB-93. November 16, 1955
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 20, 1954, Trial Examiner Eugene E. Dixon issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent Employer and the Respondent New Orleans Joint
Board and Albert I-1. Bernadas, its representative, had engaged in and
114 NLRB No. 157
1078 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached here-
to. The Trial Examiner also found that these Respondents had not
violated the Act in certain other respects, and that the evidence did not
establish that the Respondent Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, CIO, was responsible for any of the unfair labor practices
committed. He therefore dismissed the complaint in its entirety as
against the Respondent Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
CIO. Thereafter, the General Counsel, the Respondent Employer, the
Respondent New Orleans Joint Board and Bernadas, and the Charg-
ing Union filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting
briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme-
diate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings,' conclusions,
and recommendations with the following additions and modifications :
1. As „the Respondent Employer continued to furnish unlawful as-
sistance to the Respondent Joint Board well within the 6-month period
preceding the filing of the amended charge in which such support to
the Joint Board was first alleged to be an unfair labor practice, we
deem it unnecessary, in deciding that the proviso to Section 10 (b) has
been complied with, to rely on the rationale of Cathey Lumber Com-
pany, 86 NLRB 157, and the other cases cited by the Trial Examiner.
2. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the evidence will not
sustain a finding that Louis Stark, as manager of the Respondent Joint
Board, was also thereby an agent of the Respondent Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, CIO. The General Counsel and the attorney for
the Amalgamated stipulated at the hearing that in administering the
affairs of a local which was not affiliated with the Joint Board, Stark
was serving as a national representative of the Amalgamated. No
other evidence was presented bearing on the scope of Stark's authority,
if any, to act for the Amalgamated. In these circumstances, we may
not assume that Stark's status as a national representative with respect
to one local carried over to his functions as Joint Board manager.
'After the hearing and pursuant to an order of remand , the General Counsel, the
Respondents, and the Charging Union stipulated that during 1952, a representative year,
the Respondent Employer performed laundry and dry-cleaning services valued at over
$200,000 for concerns which produced or handled goods and shipped such goods outside,
or performed services outside, the State of Louisiana valued at $50,000 or more, or to
interstate transportation systems which grossed $100,000 or more annually from interstate
operations , or to public utilities whose annual gross business exceeded $ 3,000,000. This
stipulation is hereby received and made part of the record we find, contrary to the
Respondent Employer 's contention , that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
Jonesboro Grain Drying Cooperative , 110 NLRB 481.
NEW ORLEANS LAUNDRIES, INC. 1079
3. We find merit in the Joint Board's exception to the Trial Exam-
iner 's finding that the Joint Board was responsible for the threats
uttered by Josephine Anderson and Brown Gus. Anderson and Gus
held elective positions as delegates to the Joint Board and were also
shop committeemen who called the attention of shop stewards to
grievances when requested by employees to do so. Only shop stew-
ards, however, could present such grievances to management officials,
and employees could go directly to the shop stewards without the inter-
cession of a committeeman. There is absolutely no evidence as to the
authority of Anderson and Gus as delegates to the Joint Board. In
this state of the record, we have no alternative but to find that the
General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that under the laws of agency, the Respondent
Joint Board was responsible for the threats uttered by these two
individuals.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that :
1. Respondent Employer, New Orleans Laundries, Inc., New Or-
leans, Louisiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
A. Cease and desist from :
(1) Contributing support to the New Orleans Joint Board, Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, or to any other labor
organization of its employees.
(2) Recognizing the New Orleans Joint Board, Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, CIO, or any successor thereto, as the
representative of its employees for the purpose of dealing with it con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment, unless and until such
labor organization shall have been certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as such representative.
(3) Performing or giving effect to its current collective-bargaining
agreement with the New Orleans Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, CIO, or to any modification, extension, supple-
ment, or renewal thereof or to any other contract, agreement, or under-
standing entered into with the said labor organization relating to
grievances, disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment, unless and until said organization
shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board.
(4)' In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
i
1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
condition of employment as authorized by Section 8,(a).;(3), of the
Act.
B. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(1) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from the New Orleans
Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, or
any successor thereto, as the representative of any of its employees for
the purpose of dealing with the Respondent Employer concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or other terms or conditions of employment unless and until said labor
organization shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations
Board as the representative of the employees concerned.
(2) Post at its plant in New Orleans, Louisiana, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix A." 2 Copies of such notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the Respondent Employer's representative,
be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it
for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent Employer to insure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(3) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region in writ-
ing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps it
has taken to comply herewith.
II. Respondents New Orleans Joint Board, Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers of America, CIO, its officers, representatives, agents, and
successors, and Albert H. Bernadas, shall :
A. Cease and desist from :
(1) Threatening employees at New Orleans Laundries, Inc., with
discharge because of their activities on behalf of Laundry Workers
International Union, Local 402, AFL, successor to Local 320, AFL,
or any other labor organization.
(2) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees of New
Orleans Laundries, Inc., its successors or assigns, in the exercise -of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that
such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized by
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
B. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
3In the event that this Order is enforced by. a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Puirsuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
NEW ORLEANS LAUNDRIES, INC. 1081
(1) Post at the Joint Board's business office and meeting hall in
New Orleans, Louisiana, and all other places where notices to mem-
bers are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto
marked "Appendix B." 3 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, shall, after being duly
signed by a representative of the New Orleans Joint Board, Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, and by Albert H. Berna-
das, be posted by them immediately upon receipt thereof and main-
tained for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps
.shall be taken by these Respondents to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(2) Mail to the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, signed
copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix B" for post-
ing, the Company willing, in places where notices to employees and
applicants for employment are customarily posted.
(3) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region in writ-
ing, within ten-(10) days from the date of this Order, what steps they
have taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, CIO, violated the Act; that the Respondent Employer dis-
charged Amanda Smith, Nevetta Harris, and Mae Dochie Walker in
violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act; and that Respond-
ent New Orleans Joint Board or Albert H. Bernadas caused or at-
tempted to cause said discharges in violation of Section 8 (b) (2) and
(1) (A) of the Act.
MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
,,ee footnote 230
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recognition from the New
Orleans Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, CIO, or any successor thereto, as the representative of
any of our employees, for the purpose of dealing with us concern-
ing grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em-
ployment, or other terms or conditions of, employment unless and
until said labor organization shall have been certified by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board as the bargaining representative.
1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
f
WE wn.L cease performing or giving effect to our current agree-
ment with the New Orleans Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, CIO, unless and until -said organization
shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board
as bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT contribute support to the New Orleans Joint
Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, or
to any other labor organization of our employees.
WE wxLL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees,in the exercise of the right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join Laundry Work-
ers International Union, Local 402, AFL, successor to Local 320,
AFL, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all
of such activities, except to the extent that such rights may be af-
fected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a)
(3) of the Act.
NEW ORLEANS LAUNDRIES, INC.,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Re-
lations Act,, as amended, we hereby notify our members that:
WE WILL NOT threaten • employees of New Orleans Laundries,
Inc., with discharge because of their activity on behalf of-Laundry
Workers International Union, Local 402, AFL, successor to Local
320, AFL, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in,any other manner restrain or coerce employees
of New Orleans Laundries, Inc., in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in-Section 7 of the Act, except to the-extent that such
rights may be affected -by an agreement requiring membership
NEW ORLEANS LAUNDRIES,, INC. 1083
in a, labor organization as, a. condition, of employment , as author-
izedin Section 8'(a) (3)' of the Act.
(ALBERT H,. BERNADAS)
NEW ORLEANS JOINT BOARD ', AMALGAMATED
CLOTHING . WORKERS or, AMERICA, CIO,.
Labor Organization.
Dated'--------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60, days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered; by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, brought under Section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136), was heard in New Orleans, Louisiana, October 26
to 30, 1953, pursuant to due notice. The consolidated complaint, issued July 31,
1953, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board 1 and' based on
charges , duly filed and served, alleged in substance that the Company had engaged in
unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8 (a) (1), (2), and (3) of the Act by:
(1) Discharging Amanda Smith, February 28, 1952,2 Nevetta M. Harris, February
29, and Mae Dochie Walker, March 2, because of their activity on behalf of the
Laundry Workers; and (2) by telling employees of'the Company they had to join or
remain members of CIO as a condition of employment; obtaining signed CIO appli-
cation and deduction cards from employees without'their consent; assisting employees
at behest of the CIO in the execution of the above cards; and deducting dues, assess-
ments, and initiation fees from its employees' wages on behalf of the CIO and deliv-
ering same to the CIO.
The complaint further alleged that Amalgamated, the Joint Board, and Respondent
Bernadas had engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
and (2) of the Act by: (1) Threatening and warning employees they had to belong to
the CIO as a condition of employment with Respondent Company, refusing to handle
grievances for employees because of their AFL membership; threatening and warn-
ing employees with discharge if they engaged in AFL activities; telling employees the
CIO would furnish replacements if they struck on behalf of,the AFL; and telling an
employee his activity on behalf of the AFL had been observed and reported to the
Company; and (2) requesting the Company to discharge the above-named employees.
In their answers Respondents admitted certain allegations of the complaint but
denied the alleged unfair labor practices.
Prior to the hearing Respondent Company moved for a bill of particulars which
was granted in part by Trial Examiner Alba Martin. Also prior to the hearing the
Company issued a subpena for John F. LeBus, Regional Director for the Fifteenth
Region , and for certain Board records. A petition to revoke the subpena was filed
by the General Counsel. In the meantime the Company, on October 20, addressed
communications to George J. Bott, the Board's General Counsel, and Frank M. Kleiler,
Executive Secretary, advising of the subpenas. and asking that LeBus or someone
designated to speak for him be permitted to, testify and produce the documents.
This request was denied by the Board which in effect confirmed my ruling at the
hearing revoking the subpena.
Toward the end of the hearing I asked for certain employment data which was to
have been submitted to me by stipulation after the close of the hearing. On Decem-
ber 2, Company's counsel wrote me advising that since the parties could not agree on
1 The General. Counsel and his representative at the hearing are referred to herein as
the General Counsel, and the National Labor Relations Board as the Board. New Orleans
Laundries , Inc., is referred to as the Company, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
CIO, as Amalgamated, New' Orleans Joint Board as the Joint Board or the CIO, and
the Charging , Party) as-the Laundry Workers or, the AFL.
0 All dates are in 1952 unless otherwise stated.
1084 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
what it was hhad requested they were unable to enter into a stipulation. Subsequently
a stipulation regarding the matter was received under covering letter dated December
17. It did not reflect completely the information I had in mind. In any event, in
view of my disposition of the case it becomes immaterial and is hereby rejected.
Another stipulation entitled, "Stipulation Relative to Amanda Smith," unsolicited,
was received after the close of the hearing which I accepted as Trial Examiner's
Exhibit No. 1 by order reopening record and receiving stipulation, dated February 5,
1954.
Indicating that the Joint Board is the administrative body of 2 autonomous local
unions; .1, representing the drivers of the Company and the other representing the
inside workers, the CIO counsel moved at the beginning of the hearing that the com-
plaint be dismissed because it apparently was directed to the inside local, yet was
vague and indefinite as to which of the locals had violated the Act. In the alterna-
tive, it also moved that in any event the complaint be dismissed as to Amalgamated
since all the people and matters referred to in the complaint were peculiar to the
Joint Board and Albert Bernadas,3 both of whom were independent and had no con-
nection with, Amalgamated "except the usual affiliations." After hearing from the
General Counsel I denied both motions. There was no intention on his part to sepa-
rate the locals in question. The complaint was issued "against the Joint Board and
any part of that Board." The record shows that there is no division between the
two locals. Negotiations are carried on by the Joint Board. One contract cover-
ing both locals is entered into, signed only by the Joint Board for the employees. I
reaffirm my ruling on the point .4
As to the motion regarding Amalgamated, it was the General Counsel's representa-
tion that one of the individuals named in the complaint, Louis Stark, was an official
not only of the Joint Board but of Amalgamated. Since this statement was not
established by the evidence, I hereby revise my ruling at the hearing and grant the
motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety as against Amalgamated Clothing.
Workers of America, CIO.
During the hearing Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that the Charging Party had not been in compliance with Section 9 (h), (g), and (f)
of the Act at the time the complaint was issued, either by failure to file the necessary
affidavits or by reason of Local 320 being defunct. Certain facts as to the compli-
ance status of the principals involved herein were disclosed on the record by the
General Counsel and stipulated by the parties. These facts, as appears in a letter
to me from the General Counsel dated November 20, 1953, after the close of the
hearing, were in certain aspects incorrect.5 Although I expressed the view on the
record that compliance with that section of the Act is not litigable in unfair labor
practice hearings, nevertheless, I reserved ruling on the motion which I hereby deny.6,
I might add, however, that in view of the composite information as to compliance
revealed by the representations at the hearing and the General Counsel's letter of
November 20, I would be inclined to deny the motion on its merits.
All parties were represented by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, to
argue orally, and to file briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Briefs were filed on behalf of all Respondents.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT COMPANY
New Orleans Laundries, Inc., is a Delaware corporation licensed to do business in-
the State of Louisiana, maintaining its principal office and place of business at New
Orleans, Louisiana, where it is engaged in the processing, laundering, and dry cleaning
of clothing under such trade names as Chalmette Laundry and Cleaners, Zelon Laun-
dry and Cleaners, and Chalmette Rug Service. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of As-
s Originally referred to as Mike Bernadas but corrected to Albert Bernadas by amend-
ment at the hearing.
6 Respondents in their brief renewed all motions made at the hearing
5In view of the unusual circumstances connected with this question and the somewhat
complicated facts involved, I had suggested at the hearing on the record that the General
Counsel might reexamine the matter of compliance after we closed the bearing. I am
making this letter part of record as the Trial Examiner's Exhibit No. 2.
e Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Company, 105 NLRB 727; American Cable & Radio
Corp., 101 NLRB 1759, 1760. Dalton Telephone Company, 82 NLRB 1001, enfd 187 F. 2d'
811 (C A. 5).
7EW ORLEANS LAUNDRIES, INC. 1085
sociated Baby Services , Inc., whose - principal office and place of business is 149
Madison Avenue, New York, New York. Associated Baby Services, Inc., owns
several= corporations throughout the country engaged `in diaper service and owns a
controlling interest in a publishing company which publishes a trade paper distributed
in connection with-diaper services.
During the calendar year of 1952, which period is representative,of all times ma-
terial herein, Respondent Company performed services in excess of $100,000 for the
following commercial customers , each of whom sells goods or-perform s services'in
States other than the State of Louisana and in foreign -countries- in excess of $25,000
a year: Alcoa Steamship Company; Agencia Maritina; Chicago 'and Southern Air
Lines; Federal Barge Line; Green Line Steamer; Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad;
Gulf Shipping Company; Gulf and South America Steamship Company; Gulf Trans-
port Company; Illinois Central Railroad; Isthmian Steamship Company; Louisville
& Nashville Railroad ; Lykes , Brothers, a steamship company; Mississippi Shipping
Company; National Airlines; Norse-Caribbean, Inc.; Pan American Airways; The
Pullman Company; Seatrain Lines; Southern Railroad; Standard Fruit and Steamship
Company; Texas & New Orleans Railroad; Texas & Pacific Railway Company; United
Fruit Company; Waterways Transportation Company; Overseas Navigation, Inc.; and
Tennessee Coal and Iron Railroad.
The Board having found jurisdiction in the representation proceeding , I find Re-
spondent Company to be engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, and its New Orleans - Joint
Board are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.
At the hearing the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint changing
the Charging Party to Laundry Workers International Union, Local 402, AFL,
successor to Local 320, AFL, on the grounds that Local 320 had become defunct.
The evidence shows that by letter dated July 6, 1953, Dan Boland was appointed
temporary special trustee by the International 's president to make a special in-
vestigation of the affairs of Local 320. By letter dated July 31, 1953, the Inter-
national's president appointed Boland special trustee of Local 320. On August 6,
Boland declared an emergency in Local 320 and terminated the functions of all exist-
ing officers . On September 17, the members of Local 320 voted to affiliate with
Local 402 and the merger of the two was then effected-Local 320 at that time losing
its identity. On the basis of the foregoing , and the admissions in Respondent's
answers that Local 320 was a labor organization , I hereby grant the above motion
and find that Laundry Workers International Union , Local 402, AFL„ successor to
Local 320, AFL, is also a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. Cf.
Cheney Forest Products, Inc., 102 NLRB 136 (footnote 1).
in. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background facts and motions to dismiss the 8 (a) (2) allegations
A bargaining relationship had existed between the Company and the CIO since
1944. Prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments of the Act this relationship included a
closed-shop contractural provision. Although - the closed shop was banned- by the
Taft-Hartley amendments , no attempt was made by the CIO to institute a union-shop
arrangement with the Company as permitted under the new law. Notwithstanding
this fact and the loss of the closed shop , out of the several hundred employees 4 eligible
for membership in the CIO at the time of the unfair labor practice hearing, only
three did not belong to the organization.8
7 The evidence does not reveal the exact number of people employed by the Company at
the time of the hearing . There was, however, a stipulation that as to September 1, 1951,
there were 800 on the Company's payroll. This apparently included all the Company's
New Orleans ' establishments of which the Chalmette plant was the largest and which
employed perhaps a majority of that number.
8 Bernadas , the Joint Board business agent, so testified, naming Mabel Roundtree, a
Miss Le Gan, and a man named Batiste who worked for the engineers. Roundtree, ,who
"testified before me, was a white woman. There is no evidence as to race of the other two.
Nor` does the evidence show whether or not the majority of the Union's rank-and -file mem-
bers were Negroes ( although all,that testified before me were colored). Any conjectures
I might have regarding these matters do not affect any findings or conclusions I" make
herein -
1086 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. Res judicata
In the fall of 1951 the AFL began an organizing campaign among the Company's
employees and was successful in soliciting enough signatures to support a petition to
the Board on March 5 for a certification of representations. Among the many AFL
adherents were Amanda Smith, Nevetta Harris, and Mae Dochie Walker, all members
of the CIO, of course, whose terminations a few days before the petition was filed are
alleged by the General Counsel to have been effectuated by the Company at the
CIO's instigation in violation of the Act.
Only a matter of days before the AFL filed its petition, the Company and the
Joint Board had entered into a new collective-bargaining contract. This contract
was relied upon by the CIO as a bar to the petition and was attacked by the petitioner
as providing for illegal union security. A 3-day hearing on the matter was held
before a hearing officer of the Board wherein evidence was received regarding the
contract provision under attack and the hiring procedures of the Company. The
Board's decision on the matter,9 dated August 29, held that the contract contained
no illegal union-security provision and thus constituted a bar to a then determination
of representatives. From its decision it is apparent that the Board considered and
made its determination solely on the terms of the contract and their interpretation.
Indeed, the Board specifically pointed out that the legality of the company practices
as such was not a matter that could be litigated in a representation proceeding-a
policy of long standing with the Board.'° Such being the case, Respondent Company's
motion to dismiss the Section 8 (a) (2) allegations of the complaint on grounds of
res judicata is denied. It is clear that the issue decided by the Board in the representa-
tion matter was not the 8 (a) (2) issue presented in this case. Accordingly, notwith-
standing the fact that the evidence relied on herein is similar to and even to a large
extent the same evidence appearing in the record of the representation case it is
obvious that the matter is not disposed of by res judicata.
2. The Section 10 (b) question
At the outset of the hearing the Company also moved to dimiss the 8 (a) (2) alle-
gations of the complaint on the grounds that the conduct relied upon as a violation of
that section of the Act occurred more than 6 months prior to the filing of charges
"referring specifically" to such conduct.
The first charge against the Company was filed March 4. Four amended charges
were subsequently filed. It was not until September 18, in the fourth amended
charge, that Section 8 (a) (2) was alleged to have been violated by the Company-
the previous charges all pertaining to Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act. In ac-
cordance with Cathey Lumber Company, 86 NLRB 157, and subsequent" deci-
sions I denied Respondent's motion and reaffirm that ruling herein. However, had
I ruled in favor of Respondent's view, the probative evidence would be changed very
little as will be seen in the following discussion.
3. The merits of the 8 (a) (2) allegations
The complaint alleges that Respondent Company assisted, dominated, contributed
support to, and interfered with, the administration of the CIO by:
a. Telling employees they had to join the CIO as a condition of employment and
requiring such membership of its employees.
b. Obtaining from the employees without their consent signed application cards
for membership in the CIO and signed authorizations to deduct CIO dues, initiation
fees, and assessments.
c. Assisting employees at behest of the CIO in execution of the foregoing cards
and authorizations.
d. Deducting from the wages of its employees, on behalf of the CIO, dues, assess-
ments, and initiation fees, and delivering same to Respondent CIO.
To prove these charges the General Counsel called several witnesses and relied on
the testimony given by three other witnesses in the representation hearing.12 Most
Y New Orleans Laundry, Inc., 100 NLRB 966.
10 Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Incorporated, 97 NLRB 597, 599, Parks-Belk Company of
Dlizabethton, 77 NLRB 429; Flint Manufacturing Company, 62 NLRB 1003.
u Tennessee Knitting Mills, Inc., 88 NLRB 1103; Stokely Foods Inc., 91 NLRR 1267,
1268 ; Deaver Machine A Tool Co., Inc., 97 NLRB 33, 38.
n Those who testified at the -representation hearing were Joe Schmidt , Alma -Wilson,
and August F. Jones ( mistakenly referred to as Augustine Jones in the record).
NEW ORLEANS LAUNDRIES, INC. 1087
of this testimony pertained to matters occurring outside the permissible 10 (b) pe-
riod and was admitted over an early objection on the General Counsel's representation
that it was not relied on as evidence of violation of the Act but was being offered solely
for background purposes.ls All of this testimony pertained to alleged assertions by
Louise Gallishaw, the Company's personnel clerk, to prospective employees that they
had to join the CIO as a condition of employment and to Gallishaw's obtaining signed
authorizations for CIO membership and CIO deductions. All was flatly denied by
Gallishaw on the stand. No object is seen in resolving these conflicts or making spe-
cific findings regarding these extra 10 (b) matters since they neither could be used as
proof of violations themselves nor do they lend credence to or connect with any
similar facts, since none were shown to have occurred within the 10 (b) period.
The only testimony appearing in the General Counsel's case-in-chief on this matter
pertaining to occurrences within the 10 (b) period was by Joe Schmidt and August F.
Jones.
Schmidt testified as follows: He was employed by the Company in April-being
hired by Supervisor Artigno who said nothing to him about a union. After being
hired, Schmidt was taken to Gallishaw who disposed of the company paperwork re-
garding his employment and then told him he would have to see the CIO represen-
tative "in order to get the job"; that he waited 45 minutes for the CIO business agent,
Bernadas, who told him everybody had to belong to the CIO and told him he had
to sign a CIO- application card. Going over the story a second time Schmidt's testi-
mony revealed that Gallishaw told him he would have to see the CIO representative
before he "could go to work" and that Bernadas "didn't necessarily say" everybody
had to belong to the CIO. Furthermore, in Schmidt's second version Bernadas
asked him if he wanted to join the CIO. Schmidt said he did and signed the card
without reading it.
Jones' first testimony was that Gallishaw told him the Company had a union and
asked him if he belonged to any other union. He told her he "didn't want to join no
jive union." " She said that anyone who wanted to work had to join. He said he did
not care to join. She said "OK, you can't work." Needing a job, he signed a_CIO
application card. In subsequent testimony Jones admitted that Gallishaw may have
said he did not have to have dues deducted if he did not so desire. He further testi-
fied that she told him it was all right for him to go to work even if he did not belong
to the CIO.
None of the above people, Schmidt, Jones, or Gallishaw, testified before me.
Nevertheless, on its face, there is very little of the above testimony that is worthy
of serious consideration in support of the General Counsel's allegations. At most
there is the possibility that Gallishaw held Schmidt for an interview with Bernadas
before permitting him to go to work. Since Schmidt by his own admission had al-
ready been hired at the time, it is obvious that the only aspect of violation of Section
8 (a) (2) if any that this evidence would support would be assistance of the CIO
by the Company in making Schmidt wait to see Bernadas before going to work.
But in her testimony Gallishaw denied she had anything to do with Schmidt's hiring.14
While Gallishaw's testimony is not unassailable, Schmidt's, revealing such a funda-
mental inconsistency, is less worthy of credence on its face than Gallishaw's. Ac-
cordingly, having nothing but the cold record to go on, I credit Gallishaw.
That Gallishaw assisted employees at behest of the CIO in execution of CIO ap-
plication cards 15 is admitted by the testimony of Gallishaw and Bernadas. The
substance of the hiring procedure and related facts as revealed by their testimony
and by others of Respondent's witnesses is as follows:
After the closed shop was eliminated, Gallishaw, at Bernadas' request, began
keeping a supply of CIO application cards in an extra desk in the personnel office
solely as a personal accommodation to Bernadas; that she never obtained an em-
ployee signature on a CIO card on her own initiative or in the absence of Bernadas;
that he rarely missed a morning check at the company personnel office for the sole
purpose of soliciting new employees to join the CIO; that an average of 3 or 4
new or former employees were hired each day; that a high rate of turnover existed
(perhaps as high as 50 percent) and that about 50 to 60 percent of all hirings are
- Gagnon Plating and Manufacturing Co., 97 NLRB 104, 107; N. L. R E. v Gererar
Shoe Corporation, 207 F 2d 598' (C. A. 6).
14 In addition to Gallishaw, it appears that another employee in the personnel office,
Miss La Fontaine, also processed job applicants -performing the same functions as would'
Gallishaw.
Is The application for membership and the autliorization for deduction of dues, initiation
fees, and assessments were all covered by the same card.
1088 DECISIONS Oh NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
former employees; that at all times material herein Gallishaw had no hiring authority
and her only contact with applicants was after they had been hired by the personnel
manager or foreman and sent to her for the necessary paper work; and that it was
at this general stage,is but definitely after they had been hired, that Bernadas first
solicited the employees individually in the personnel office some 12 feet away from
Gallishaw and Schultz.
Gallishaw testified that when the new contract eliminated the closed shop, Welch,
the then personnel manager, "instructed" her that it was no longer necessary for em-
ployees to belong to the CIO as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment
with the Company. She further testified that she never heard what Bernadas told
the employees in his solicitation of them.
By his own admission, Bernadas very seldom failed to sign an employee on the
first try. Occasionally someone might ask for time to consider the matter which
request, according to Bernadas, was readily granted. Consistent with this testimony
of Bernadas, and with Gallishaw's testimony that she never signed an employee into
the CIO in Bernadas' absence, is a list of 17 new hires from September 4, 1951, to
October 26, 1953, whose CIO authorization cards were dated from 1 to 6 days
after the dates of their hirings.
After talking to the employee and prevailing upon him to join the CIO, Bernadas'
practice, according to his testimony, was to either (1) get a CIO card out of the
desk and take it and the employee to Gallishaw with the information that the em-
ployee wanted to join the CIO, requesting Gallishaw to fill out the card and get the
employees signature thereon, or (2) take the employee to Gallishaw with the
same information and request plus the additional request that she get the CIO card.
Depending on how she felt, Gallishaw sometimes did, sometimes did not, accede to
any of these requests. When she did not, Bernadas himself performed the duties.
As distinguished from this haphazard and capricious reaction by Gallishaw, Schultz
testified that Gallishaw always assisted Bernadas in preparing the employees' CIO
cards. In addition Schultz' testimony shows that he was fully aware of the CIO
cards being kept in a company desk for Bernadas. Whatever the fact about who
got the cards, I find in accordance with Schultz' testimony that it was Gallishaw's
practice to fill them out at Bernadas' request.
It is clear from this evidence that the Company, as alleged by the complaint, as-
sisted employees at behest of the CIO in execution of the CIO authorization cards.
The question is, does this assistance amount to the kind of conduct contemplated
by the Act as being an unfair labor practice?
Whether or not the Company's assistance to Bernadas in filling out the union
cards and getting them signed could be considered illegal per se, a matter upon
which I venture no opinion, I am convinced and find that in the light of the facts
established in the record here as a whole that conduct was violative of Section
8 (a) (2) of the Act.17
There is no standard or degree of assistance specified in the language of the Act.18
Obviously, gradations of assistance can range from minuscule to the momentous.
Conceivably, the smallest kindness or most commonplace courtesy toward a union
or its representatives can be interpreted as being of illegal assistance to it or them.
The question is for the Board to decide. The responsibility of "applying the Act's
general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which
might be charged as violative of its terms" is properly left to the Board, Republic
Aviation Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 324 U. S. 793. In exercising this responsibility, the
Supreme Court has held even "minor favors ... without discrimination between
employee organizations" are within the Board's cognizance. N. L. R. B. v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 319 U. S. 50. Obviously the requirement of em-
ployer neutrality which pervades the Act and is implicit in rights guaranteed em-
ployees in Section 7 is the touchstone in determining "the extent and nature of the
conduct" constituting unlawful assistance. In determining the measure of the
neutrality required, "intimations of an employer's preference, though subtle, may
"Bernadas testified that lie never talked to new employees until after Gallishaw had
completed filling out their necessary company forms. Gallishaw testified that Bernadas
on occasion talked to them before she had done so
17 Operating as she was within the scope of her apparent authority, Gallishaw' s conduct
is attributable to the Company particularly in view of Personnel Manager Schultz'
knowledge of and overt acquiescence in it.
18 Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act, without limitation or condition as to degree, makes it
an unfair labor practice " to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it."
NEVI ORLEANS LAUNDRIES, INC. 10$9
be as potent as outright threats of discharge." N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311
U, S. 584.
In its brief the Company observed, "when it is remembered that the CIO's officers
may have, in varying terms, tried to impress on everyone the necessity for mem-
bership; that up until 1948 there was a closed shop which had been in effect for 4
years; that at one time or another virtually all employees must have wanted the CIO
to represent them; that employees under the closed shop were constantly leaving
and returning-it is easy to see how Bernadas' approach to employees on behalf of
the CIO in the personnel office could lead some employees to imagine that the
personnel clerk was saying union membership was mandatory especially if they
wanted to imagine this." How true, particularly when some of the "varying terms"
were coercive and violative of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) as found below. And how
much more cogent when applied to Gallishaw's conduct herein as distinguished from
anything she said.
Here is a union composed largely of colored employees whose economic, status
is far from discriminating or commanding. They are conditioned to a closed-shop
arrangement in their employment which arrangement is suddenly eliminated. At
this point the company personnel office begins keeping on hand CIO application
cards and the company personnel clerk in concert with the union business agent,
in the personnel office and as part of the hiring procedures, participates in the
function of soliciting CIO memberships among them.
It is easy to see, indeed, easier to see than in Respondent's example, how under
these circumstances the employees could imagine that the Company was implying
that membership in the CIO was mandatory or at least favored and supported by
the Company. I so find?9
The only other 8 (a) (2) allegation of 'the complaint established by the evidence
is that the Company deducted dues, assessments, and initiation fees from its em-
ployees' wages delivering them to the CIO. But here too, the question arises as to
the legal aspect of such conduct. There is no question and I find that the deduc-
tions were made pursuant to signed individual employee authorizations. Since there
is no specific showing that the employees were coerced into signing the authorization
cards, I find the deductions not to have been illegal.20
B. 8 (b) (1) (A) Restraint and Coercion by the Joint Board and Bernadas
Several of the General Counsel's witnesses 21 testified that at the Joint Board
regular monthly meetings of February and March, CIO Officials Bernadas and Stark,
in formal remarks directed to the entire membership, threatened loss of employment
with Respondent Company to anyone having any connection with or joining the AFL.
This was denied by Bernadas and Raymond Edwards, the president of the inside
local.22 I have no difficulty or hesitancy in resolving this conflict against Respondent
CIO witnesses. Apart , from the debating society type of persuasiveness totally
devoid of any sanctions 23 the union officials contend they utilized to counteract
the AFL campaign (which under the circumstances herein seems somehow in-
congruous), their demeanor on the witness stand, and the entire flavor of their testi-
mony, at times evasive, equivocating, confused, and conflicting makes it less worthy
of credence than that of the foregoing witnesses of the General Counsel.
19A stipulation that "large numbers" of former employees attended the representation
hearing in which there was testimony that it was not necessary to join the CIO to be
employed by the Company and that 550 people were employed by the Company since that
hearing, all, of whom joined the CIO, does not impress me as being of sufficient significance
to affect thee above finding.
29 Superficially , this finding might appear to be inherently inconsistent with my finding
of assistance above. However , it is well established that actual interference , restraint,
or coercion of employees need not be shown as a result of an employer's'conduct to establish
such conduct as illegal under the Act. Boss Manufacturing Company, 78 NLRB 538;
Chicopee Manufacturing Corporation of Georgia, 85 NLRB 1439 ; Lane Drug Stores,
Incorporated, 88 NLRB 584. "The test is whether the employer engaged in conduct
which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights under the Act." N. L. R. B. v. Ford Brothers , 170 F. 2d 735, 738 (C. A. 6).
= Adele Walker, Ozea Littles, and Era Brown.
29 Edwards testified that he attended all the union meetings . Stark'was not called as
a -witness i, at the time of the hearing he was living in New York in retirement.
` According to CIO witnesses , in spite of pointing out a 'CIO constitutional provision
against dual unionism , the only sanction admittedly adverted to by the CIO officials in
these meetings was the possible loss of CIO membership.
1090 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Both Ida Tyson and Mae Dochie Walker testified that about the first or middle
part of February, Shop Chairman Elsie Thomas made the statement that anyone affili-
ating with the AFL would lose his job. Tyson in her testimony identified the occa-
sion as one upon which the AFL had handbilled. According to Tyson, Thomas
was standing near the water fountain about 20 feet from Tyson's table with a
"white paper" in her hand when she said "anyone caught with AFL cards" would
be discharged. Between Tyson and Thomas a mangle was in operation at the time
and employees were working. Tyson was unable to say to whom Thomas was
directing her remarks.
Walker's testimony about the matter was that she had given one of the truck-
drivers an AFL leaflet to give to Thomas and saw him deliver it to her. Thereafter
Thomas came over to get paper from the wrapper located 3 or 4 feet from Walker's
post 24 and as she started walking away said something to the effect that "if any-
body be affiliated with that union, they was going to be laid off." 25
Thomas denied the incident, claiming never to have had an AFL leaflet in her
hands in the plant Not so much that Thomas' testimony on the matter is entirely
unassailable, but largely because of the vague quality of the General Counsel's
testimony in the incident and some seeming conflicts therein, which detract from
the force of preponderance necessary to prove the point, I credit Thomas.
On the other hand I credit Harris' testimony against Thomas' denial that a week
or so before Harris' discharge Thomas told her that anyone caught signing an AFL
card would lose his job.
Harris also testified that 2 or 3 days after the above incident in connection with
a strike demonstration which apparently had occurred in the morning before Harris'
arrival at the plant, Thomas had told a group of employees which included Harris
that "as many people that walk out on the strike, the CIO had that many to put back
in their place." Nothing in this testimony connects the matter with the AFL activity
of the employees and thus does not establish the allegation of the complaint that
Respondent CIO told employees the CIO would furnish replacements if they struck
on behalf of the AFL. In any event, Thomas' explanation of the incident is so
convincing I would be inclined to credit her version for that reason alone.
Amanda Smith testified that about a week before her discharge she had been
trying to get Elizabeth Barry to sign an AFL card outside the plant. Barry
demurred. Going into the plant Smith saw Edwards and Barry at the door talking
together. They came over and Edwards asked Barry if Smith was "the one."
Receiving confirmation Edwards proceeded to tell Smith that Barry had told him
Smith was "out there trying to influence people to join the AFL union.. ." and
went on to say, "I want you to leave these people alone about the A. F. L. mess;
and if you don't leave them alone you are going to lose your job." In his testimony
Edwards denied the incident. I credit Smith.
Smith also testified credibly that at the union office a day or so after her discharge
when she was talking to Bernadas, Stark, and Edwards about the matter, Bernadas
told her, "The boss got wind that you were going through the plant trying to in-
fluence the people to sign for the AFL Union, and that is why you got fired.
And if the boss heard that you was going around through the plant trying to
influence the people to sign with the AFL Union and fired you, he did exactly
right, and there is nothing we can do for you or about it. And furthermore, I
have a long list more that are going to be in your shoes. All I can tell you, you
are in bad shape. I have a long list, and when I get through turning them out,
Tulane aint going to be big enough to hold them." Clearly, the foregoing accepted
evidence reveals conduct on the part of Respondents' CIO and Bernadas which
trangressed the rights guaranteed employees under Section 7 of the Act. Specifi-
cally, these transgressions were (1) Bernadas' and Stark's threats at the Respondent
Union's meetings of discharge for AFL activity; (2) Thomas' similar threat to
Harris at the plant; (3) Bernadas' threat to Smith at the union hall that additional
people would lose their jobs because of their AFL activity; and (4) Bernadas' same
comments his pointed position in refusing to intercede with Respondent Company
concerning Smith's discharge as she had a right to expect under the customary
grievance procedure described as being in effect in the plant by Respondents'
witnesses.
w Walker was reluctant to but finally did estimate the distance between her and Thomas
at the time the remark was made. It appears from Walker's testimony that she and
Tyson worked near and adjacent to each other.
25Walker at first testified that she could not testify as to the words Thomas used but
could only convey her meaning.
NEW ORLEANS LAUNDRIES, INC. 1091
Mae Dochie Walker testified that 3 or 4 weeks before her discharge employee
Josephine Anderson told her (after learning that Walker had been at another
employee's house trying to sign the employee into the AFL) to refrain from such
activity. In Walker's words, "She asked me if I had been by and I told her yes.
She said well, I had better not do that because, something, I can't recall the exact
things , but anyway she told me not to do it." Then asked if Anderson had told
her why she should not do it, Walker testified, "I would be laid off, that is why,
I knew that."
Harris testified that a day or two before her discharge she had asked for Brown
Gus' address to give to the AFL president so the latter could call on Gus to talk to
him about the AFL. The next day Gus told Harris to stop talking about the AFL or
she would be discharged.
Objections were made to the above testimony on the grounds that neither Ander-
son nor Gus were shop chairmen or agents of Respondent Union. The testimony
was admitted on the General Counsel's representation that the necessary connec-
tion between the Union and the two persons would be shown. The evidence reveals
that some years previous to the events herein both Anderson and Gus were shop
chairmen, but that Stark had consolidated the shop chairman functions eliminating
one such position on each floor which at the time happened to have been held by
Anderson and Gus. However, it also appears that both Anderson and Gus are and
were at times material herein duly elected members of the Joint Board and so-called
committeemen , whose duties were at least to report employee complaints and who
were described by Bernadas in his testimony as shop chairmen of limited authority.
On these facts, and the entire record, I conclude and find that Anderson and Gus at
all times material herein were in positions of sufficient authority in the Respondent
Joint Board to bind it with responsibility for their misconduct and were acting within
the-scope of their apparent, authority in the above matters.
Since neither Anderson nor Gus testified, the General Counsel' s testimony stands
undenied and is credited. Accordingly, I find that by the above conduct of An-
derson 26 and of Gus the Respondent CIO further interfered with the rights of the
employees in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (a) of the Act.
C. 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) The Alleged Discrimination and its Instigation
The evidence shows that Mae Dochie Walker and Nevetta Harris were discharged
by Respondent Company on March 3 and February 29, respectively, and that
Amanda Smith was laid off by the Company on February 28. These terminations are
alleged in the complaint as discriminatory discharges made pursuant to Respondent
CIO's request.
The circumstances surrounding the employment and terminations of these three
members of the CIO and their contemporaneous activity on behalf of the AFL
create strong suspicions that the allegations of complaint are true. Nevertheless,
notwithstanding my suspicions (which, of course, are no grounds upon which to
base a finding of unfair labor practices) 27 because of two fatal deficiencies in the
General Counsel's proof, I find he has failed to establish that Respondents have,
violated Sections 8 (b) (2) and 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
There is no evidence that Respondents' CIO or Bernadas made any request to
Respondent Company or in any other manner attempted to cause or caused the
terminations of the employees in question. While the coercive threats of Bernadas
and the CIO to the employees regarding loss of employment with Respondent Com-
pany because of AFL activity clearly shows their illegal attitude toward the em-
ployees and their possible desires and inclinations as to a course of action to counter-
act the AFL campaign, such desires and inclinations are not, without some con-
necting link, proof of action itself. And nowhere do the suspicions raised by the
evidence on this matter go far enough to provide that link and to permit a sufficiently
valid inference to the contrary.
Nor is there any proof in the record that Respondent Company (as it denies) had
any-knowledge of the AFL activity of the three employees when they were terminated.
Apparently the General Counsel relies on an incident testified to by Nevetta Harris
'rn Even though Walker's testimony is too ambiguous to support a finding that Anderson
told her she would be discharged if she did not discontinue 'her activity on behalf of the
AFL, the direction itself to cease such activity I find to by coercive . Cf. The Advertiser
Company, Inc., 97 NLRB 604, Phillips c& Bottorff Manufacturing Company, i96 -NLRB
1091, 1092.
27 Punch and Judy Togs, Inc. of California, 85 NLRB 499.
387644--56--vol. 114--70
1092 DECISIONS OP NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as,establishing knowledge of her AFL activity on the part of Respondent Company.
She testified that on the day she was discharged she had a conversation about the
AFL with a truckdriver she identified as Peter Gander whose bin was located near
her chute. This was during working hours while the plant was in full operation
with machinery running and in the view of Plant Manager Cocuzzi and Business
Agent Bernadas, who were talking together about 36 feet away.
Gander asked if any AFL men had been to her house to sign her up, to which
she replied in the negative. He then told her, "Don't you get into that AFL be-
cause they are going to beat you out of your vacation money and your holidays
with pay, and all your insurance." She replied, "Negroes, used to be fools, but
they are not fools anymore, and they wasn't going to let anybody beat them out of
anything." In my view of the plant I became convinced that even unusually loud
conversation would be difficult to understand at a distance of 36 feet while the
machinery was in operation. I find, therefore, that Harris' conversation with the
truckdriver could not have been heard by Cocuzzi as alleged by the General Counsel
in connection with this incident. In any event, even had Harris' remarks been
overheard there was nothing in them to indicate her adherence or approval of
the AFL.
Respondents argue, with validity I believe, that this is not the kind of situation
where by reason of a small sized plant and its location in a small community, an
employer's knowledge of his employee' s union activities can be inferred.28 Thus,
in spite of testimony by Bernadas and Thomas to the effect that information traveled
fast and freely in the plant, I feel that no inference can be drawn which contradicts
Respondent Company's denial of knowledge of the AFL activities of the employees
in question . Accordingly, without going into the merits of the terminations, I
find that the allegations of violations of Section 8 (b) (2) by the Union and Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) by the Company have not been sustained by the required preponder-
ance of evidence.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent Company described in section I,
above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in certain unfair labor practices,
I shall recommend that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent Company unlawfully assisted the CIO, it will
be recommended that it cease and desist from such conduct. It will be further
recommended in accordance with Board practice that Respondent Company be
ordered to withdraw recognition from Respondent CIO and cease giving effort to
its current contract with that organization, unless and until Respondent CIO has
been certified by the Board as the bargaining representative of Respondent Com-
pany's employees.29 Nothing in the recommended order, however, shall be deemed
to require Respondent Company to vary or abandon their wage, hour, seniority, or
other substantive features provided for in said agreement or to prejudice their as-
sertion by the employees.
Having further found that Respondents New Orleans Joint Board and Albert
H. Bernadas have interfered with and coerced the employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them in the Act, it will be recommended that said Respondents cease
and desist from such conduct.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. New Orleans Joint Board of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
CIO, and Laundry Workers International Union, Local 402, AFL, successor to
Local 320, AFL, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of
the Act.
28 Jasper National Mattress Company, 89 NLRB 75 , 77, 92.
29 The Carpenter Steel Company , 76 NLRB 670, 673; Seamprufe, incorporated, 82
NLRB 892 , 893; The Standard Transformer Company, 97 NLRB 669, 671.
ROBINSON FREIGHT LINES 1093
2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed 'in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent Company has engaged in
and 'is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a-)---(I)
,of the Act.
3. By contributing support to the New Orleans Joint Board of Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, CIO, Respondent Company has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (2) of the
Act.
4. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent New Orleans Joint Board of Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, CIO, and Respondent Albert H. Bernadas have en-
gaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
S (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
-5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent New Orleans Laundries, Inc., has not violated Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act as alleged in the complaint.
7. Respondents New Orleans Joint Board of Amalgamated Clothing Workers
,of America, CIO, and Albert H. Bernadas have not violated Section 8 (b) (2)
of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Jack C. Robinson, doing business as Robinson Freight Lines and
Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union
No. 621, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL
Jack C. Robinson, doing business as Robinson Freight Lines and
A. J. Buckner, John Brooks, Perry Coward and Ed Carnes.
Cases Nos. 10-CA-2236 and 10-CA-23.6. November 16,1955
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 25, 1955, Trial Examiner Louis Plost issued his Interme-
diate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
spondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme-
diate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations
,of the Trial Examiner, with the following modifications and addi-
tions.
1. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act by making loans to certain strikers. We do not
agree.
114 NLRB No. 162.