New Orleans Cold Storage

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1998

326 N.L.R.B. 1471 (N.L.R.B. 1998)

NEW ORLEANS COLD STORAGE CO. 1471
New Orleans Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., Ltd.
and Nelson Pierre. Case 15–CA–12931
September 30, 1998
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, HURTGEN, AND BRAME
On October 14, 1997, Administrative Law Judge
George Carlson II issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Charging Party filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, New Orleans Cold Storage &
Warehouse Co., Ltd., New Orleans, Louisiana, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.

Charles R. Rogers, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Murphy J. Foster III, and Matthew M. Courtman, Esqs., for the
Respondent.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In addition, some of the Respondent’s exceptions imply that the
judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions demonstrate bias and preju-
dice. On careful examination of the judge’s decision and the entire
record, we are satisfied that the Respondent’s contentions are without
merit.
In sec. II,C, of his decision, the judge stated that “so long as em-
ployees did not attempt to exercise their rights under the contract the
relationship [between the Respondent and the Union] was good.” In
the same section, the judge also described comments made by Com-
pany President Gary Escoffier at an August 16, 1994 meeting, with the
Charging Party as a confirmation of “Respondent’s animosity towards
employees who filed grievances.” The record in this case describes the
parties’ relationship and the Respondent’s animus solely as they relate
to the Charging Party’s grievance activity and his exercise of rights
under the collective-bargaining agreement. This evidence is insuffi-
cient on which to base the judge’s more general characterizations. We
disavow these statements.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by issuing discriminatory written warnings to
employee Pierre, Member Brame disavows the following statement by
the judge in sec. II,A, par. 16, of his decision: “Respondent introduced
no documentary evidence to corroborate Rickey Calligan’s testimony
that Respondent had to buy any pallets. The record does not establish
that Respondent sustained a monetary loss.” No company purchase in
predetermined, fixed quantities is ever likely to have sure proof.
2 We deny the Respondent’s request for oral argument, as the record,
exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of
the parties.
Guy C. Curry, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in New Orleans, Louisiana, on June 4 and 5, 1997.
The charge was filed October 25 and was amended on Novem-
ber 10, 1994, and September 11, 1996.1 The complaint issued
on September 11, 1996. The complaint alleges one threat in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
and the reinstatement of Charging Party Nelson Pierre to a
more onerous position, the issuance of warnings to Pierre, and
the discharge of Pierre, all in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. Respondent’s timely answer denies any violation of the
Act.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs2 filed
by the General Counsel, Charging Party, and Respondent, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in the business of
providing refrigerated warehousing for domestic and foreign
cargo at its facilities in New Orleans, Louisiana, where it annu-
ally receives in excess of $50,000 for such services provided to
customers located outside the State of Louisiana. The Respon-
dent admits, and I find and conclude, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
The Respondent admits, and I find and conclude, that Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 270, the
Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
The Respondent, headquartered in New Orleans, provides re-
frigerated warehousing at several cities in the United States.
Gary Escoffier is its president and chief executive officer
(CEO). Respondent operates three warehouses in New Orleans,
including the Nashville Avenue warehouse, the only facility
involved in this proceeding. That warehouse contains some
80,000 square feet. In 1994 it had three “chill rooms” where
products that were not frozen, such as fresh fruits and vegeta-
bles, were stored, and five freezers. Currently, there are no chill
rooms. Cargo from ships and trucks is unloaded onto the docks
at the warehouse by “lumpers.” Thereafter, Respondent’s
checker/lift operators (CLTs) place the cargo in the warehouse.
The Respondent employs approximately 15 CLTs at the Nash-
ville warehouse. These employees are represented by the Un-
ion. The warehouse manager is Rickey Calligan.
1
All dates are 1994 unless otherwise indicated.
2 Subsequent to the hearing, I accepted G.C. Exh. 33, a compilation
of receiving records subpoenaed by the General Counsel that were not
produced until after the hearing closed. Respondent requested, and I
granted to all parties, the opportunity to file supplemental arguments
following my receipt of this evidence. The Charging Party filed a re-
vised copy of his brief that helpfully cited the pages to which he re-
ferred in G.C. Exh. 33.
326 NLRB No. 161
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1472
Prior to 1985, Respondent operated with job categories that
included warehousemen, checkers, and lift truckdrivers, each
classification receiving a different rate of pay. Due to competi-
tiveness in the warehousing business, Respondent desired to
assign employees to whatever task needed to be done. It negoti-
ated with the Union to abolish the separate classifications, and
the Union agreed to a single classification, CLT, and a single
pay rate. Thereafter, through attrition, employees who could not
perform all job functions were eliminated. By 1994, all unit
employees were classified as CLTs, with the same pay rate.
Charging Party Nelson Pierre was a CLT at the Nashville
warehouse. Initially employed on February 22, 1982, Pierre
first worked as a lift driver in the freezer. Employees who work
in the freezer wear a freezer suit for protection from the ex-
tremely cold temperatures. Pierre experienced physical prob-
lems, diarrhea, excessive sweating, and nausea when perform-
ing this work. He sought medical attention. His physician
placed him on medication, but Pierre experienced no significant
improvement. Despite Pierre’s physical problems, there is no
evidence of any deficiency regarding his work in the freezer.
Although Escoffier testified that he was not satisfied with the
manner in which Pierre stacked pallets, there is no probative
evidence, such as a warning, documenting any such shortcom-
ing. In 1983, having worked in the freezer for about 9 months,
Pierre obtained a note from his physician. Upon presentation of
the note to the warehouse manager, Pierre was assigned to work
on the dock. Pierre worked on the dock for several years. In
about 1986 Pierre began working in the produce department.3
This work was performed in the chill rooms.
Pierre received three warnings when working in the chill
rooms. On January 19, 1989, he was warned for tardiness. On
June 17, 1992, he was warned for mistakenly pulling a wrong
order which resulted in the loss of six sacks of carrots for which
the Respondent had to pay. Pierre filed a grievance over this
warning. On February 25, 1993, he was warned for missing 4-
1/2 days of work.
In April 1993, Pierre began performing the duties of ware-
house porter. He had sought this job assignment when he
learned that the individual who had previously performed these
duties was going to retire. Shortly after beginning this job, Pi-
erre began experiencing problems with broken equipment. He
requested to return to working in produce in the chill rooms,
but no action was taken on his request. On December 28, 1993,
Pierre filed a grievance protesting that he had not been properly
paid for overtime for a 4-month period. On this same date, Re-
spondent notified Pierre, who had been working from noon
until 8 p.m., that his hours were to be changed so that he would
work from 2 until 10 a.m. Since boats often dock late in the
day, Pierre sometimes had to wait until the cargo was unloaded
and placed in the warehouse before he could clean the loading
dock. This change in hours assured that unloading would be
complete and that Pierre would not have to wait to clean,
thereby precluding overtime, the subject of Pierre’s grievance.
Pierre immediately filed another grievance over this change in
hours. In this grievance he requested to be reassigned to the
produce department. The grievance was denied.
There is no probative evidence of any deficiency in Pierre’s
performance as porter. Although Escoffier and Calligan testi-
fied that Pierre was not doing a particularly good job as porter,

3 The record does not establish exactly when Pierre began working
in produce.
I do not credit their testimony. Pierre was never warned regard-
ing any deficiency in his performance. Calligan testified that he
worked too slowly. This assertion is belied by the uncontra-
dicted evidence that, while Pierre was working as porter, Re-
spondent assumed responsibility for assuring that that offices
used by the military were clean. Pierre was assigned this work
and awarded overtime in order to perform it. In view of Re-
spondent’s position that CLTs can be assigned any job, I find it
incredible that Pierre, rather than another CLT, would have
been assigned these additional duties if Respondent had been
dissatisfied with the speed or quality of the job Pierre was per-
forming.
On January 29, 1994, a Saturday, Pierre went to the ware-
house and performed his duties as porter. He was absent on
Monday, January 31. On February 1 he advised management
that he had worked on Saturday because he knew he would be
unable to work on Monday. Respondent issued Pierre a warn-
ing for insubordination, and on that same day, February 1, sus-
pended him. Pierre wrote two grievances, one in response to the
warning and another in response to the suspension. Pierre was
discharged on February 8 and filed another grievance. This
grievance was arbitrated, and the arbitrator, in a decision dated
June 29, found, inter alia:

It is a fundamental right of Management to set the hours of
employment. I can also understand that Pierre was faced with
a situation where he attempted to reduce the inconvenience to
the Company when he worked on the Saturday so that the
work of the porter would be completed when the office was
opened on Monday morning. . . . Pierre was an employee of
twelve years. While his working record was not entirely satis-
factory to the Company, in my opinion discharge [i]s an ex-
cessive penalty for his offense. . . . The penalty of discharge is
reduced to suspension without pay.

On July 6, Union Business Agent Robert Louis, after learn-
ing of the arbitration award, telephoned CEO Gary Escoffier
and discussed Pierre’s reinstatement. Escoffier stated that he
thought the best place for Pierre was as a lift driver in the
freezer. Louis called Pierre, saying that Respondent wanted him
to return to work as a lift driver in the freezer. Pierre protested,
stating that he wanted to return to performing the duties of por-
ter. He advised Louis of his prior physical problems, but it does
not appear that Louis ever mentioned Pierre’s past physical
problems to Escoffier. Louis again called Escoffier who, this
time, was adamant that Pierre would return to the freezer.4 He
cited the management rights clause of the collective bargaining
agreement which, inter alia, provides that Respondent has the
right to manage the plant “in order to provide a maximum of
operating efficiency.” Louis called Pierre and told him that
Respondent had given “an ultimatum. Either you work in the
freezer or you stay home.” Louis advised Pierre to return and
then file a grievance.
At the time of Pierre’s reinstatement, Calligan assigned a
new employee, Joe Ortega, who had been working in the
freezer, to work in produce. He asserted that this was so that
Ortega could learn this job; however, the record does not estab-
lish any significant difference in the skills required of a CLT
who works in the freezer as opposed to the chill rooms in which
4 When Louis first called him, Escoffier had not received his copy of
the arbitrator’s award. The record does not reflect when Escoffier be-
came adamant that Pierre was to return to the freezer.
NEW ORLEANS COLD STORAGE CO. 1473
produce was stored. Rather, the difference is in the working
conditions. CLTs who work in the freezer must wear freezer
suits. Although Escoffier did not testify concerning consulta-
tion with Calligan, Calligan testified that he decided to assign
Pierre to the freezer because I “had a full crew back there, and
he [Pierre] had poor performance up there [in produce]. And
the reason why I put him up in front with the freezers is that I
can really keep an eye on his duties.” Calligan’s subsequent
testimony that he sought to “keep an eye” on Pierre because “I
was really trying to help him out,” is not credible.
On July 11, Pierre returned to work. He reported to ware-
house manager Rickey Calligan. Before starting work, Pierre
asked why he was not “put back in my position.” Calligan told
him, “Gary [Escoffier] said you was writing too many griev-
ances. That’s why you didn’t get your job back.”5 On July 11,
Pierre, consistent with his conversation with Louis, filed a
grievance seeking reinstatement to “my job . . . as a porter or in
the produce dep[artmen]t.” He cited his seniority. This griev-
ance was not heard until August 16.6
On July 11, Calligan had advised Pierre that he would be
given a 3-week grace period to reacquaint himself with the job.
On July 15, Calligan prepared a written memorandum of a ver-
bal warning that he gave to Pierre for making a mistake on a
receiving tally. Calligan acknowledged that he had never be-
fore, or after, made a written memorandum of a verbal warning.
On July 20, Pierre applied for, and received, a 1-week vacation
from July 25 until August 1.7
Although Pierre had experienced an adverse physical reac-
tion when performing work in the freezer over a decade ago, in
1982 and 1983, he acknowledged that his physical symptoms
were less severe when he worked in the freezer in July and
August 1994.8 Pierre testified that he had been taught how to do
the job and that “I did a good job at it. . . . I never had an acci-
dent in there.” After describing the manner in which he had
been taught to stack the product, he testified that he “never had
[any] problems” with regard to the work.9
On August 8, Calligan prepared a warning stating that Pierre
had taken too much time to unload an order. He attached a re-
ceiving record to the warning which bears two time stamps
reflecting the times of 9:32 a.m. and 1:56 p.m. Calligan testi-
fied that 9:32 a.m. is when he handed the receiving record to
Pierre. He did not recall whether he or his assistant stamped the
receiving record back in. CLTs do not stamp the receiving re-

5 Calligan denied making this statement, but I credit Pierre. In doing
so, in addition to considering the demeanor of both Calligan and Pierre,
I note that Escoffier made a similar comment on August 16 when he
met with Pierre to discuss the grievance protesting his assignment to
the freezer.
6 Respondent contended that Pierre had skipped step 1 of the con-
tractual grievance procedure, which provides for oral presentation of
grievances at step 1. This was resolved, and the step 1 meeting was
held on August 16.
7 Respondent argues that this negates any basis for finding that Re-
spondent harbored any animus against Pierre. The Charging Party
argues that the vacation was required by the contract. I do not accept
Respondent’s argument, although, contrary to the argument of the
Charging Party, it does not appear that the vacation was mandated by
the contract.
8 In 1994, Pierre experienced only intermittent problems with diar-
rhea.
9 Although Escoffier asserted that Pierre had, in 1982 and 1983, ex-
perienced problems with stacking, Calligan did not cite this alleged
shortcoming in 1994.
cords. Calligan testified that the time-stamping of receiving
records was the standard practice, although there had been
times that he or his assistant “messed up” and forgot to stamp a
ticket. The record establishes that this testimony is simply false.
Jake Langston testified that there was no indication on the re-
ceiving tickets regarding the time taken to perform a task. This
is confirmed by General Counsel’s Exhibit 33. This exhibit
consists of over 225 receiving records. Only 17 contain any
time stamp, and only 7 contain two time stamps.
The record does not establish that Pierre was ever notified
concerning this warning dated August 8. Neither Pierre’s signa-
ture nor the signature of Shop Steward Lionel Toney, whose
signature appears on the other written warnings issued to Pi-
erre, appears on the August 8 warning. When asked about issu-
ing this warning, Calligan was uncertain, ultimately acknowl-
edging, “I can’t really remember the whole thing.” I find that
Pierre was never advised that this warning had been written.
On August 9, Assistant Warehouse Manager Nathan Deville
wrote a warning stating that Pierre had taken an excessive
amount of time, from 9:02 until 11:30 a.m., unloading an order.
No documentation was attached. Calligan presented this warn-
ing to Pierre on August 10.10 When presented with the warning,
Pierre explained to Calligan that he had been unable to get to
the freezer because another employee, Mike Kent, was taking
orders for shipment to the military out of the freezer. Once
given access to the freezer, the job had taken him only 45 min-
utes. After hearing Pierre’s explanation, Calligan said, “I’m
sorry.” The warning was not rescinded.
On August 10, Calligan wrote two warnings to Pierre. The
first related to Pierre’s alleged failure to fill in the number of
pallets used in shipping an order and that Pierre “had failed to
notify the office that the driver had to pay for the pallets.” Cal-
ligan testified that this error had cost Respondent $108. When
presented with this warning, Pierre explained to Calligan that
there had been two trucks from the same company, one with no
pallets and one with 50. The one with no pallets had come first,
and the driver had used 17 of Respondent’s pallets. After the
second driver came, Pierre noted on the ticket that he had
brought 50 pallets, enough to replace the pallets used by the
first truck and to load the second truck. Calligan listened to
Pierre’s explanation and said, “Okay.”11 Although the warning
also states that Pierre failed to fill in the case quantity shipped,
Calligan testified that the reason he gave the warning was “he
cost the company $108 for pallets, and the driver got away
without paying for pallets, which causes me to buy pallets.”
Notwithstanding Pierre’s explanation, the warning was placed
in his file. Respondent introduced no documentary evidence to
corroborate Calligan’s testimony that Respondent had to buy
any pallets. The record does not establish that Respondent sus-
tained a monetary loss.
A second warning, also dated August 10, stated that Pierre
took too much time to unload a container. The time taken was
not reported on the warning; however, the receiving record on
which Calligan purportedly based this warning bears time
stamps of 1:32. and 6:27 p.m. As already noted, the CLT does
not stamp the document. The record establishes that CLTs are
10 I do not credit Deville’s testimony that, since Calligan was absent
on August 9, he gave Pierre the warning. Pierre testified that Deville
never gave him the warning, and that he explained the circumstances
when Calligan gave him the warning on August 10. I credit Pierre.
11 I do not credit Calligan’s denial that Pierre told him that the sec-
ond driver brought extra pallets.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1474
often unable to store the product immediately after it is un-
loaded since it has not been inspected. It is not unusual for
cargo to sit for an hour or longer before being inspected. Pierre
testified to occasions when the entire dock had been filled with
uninspected meat. This testimony was corroborated by former
employee Jake Langston, who noted that, when awaiting in-
spection, the produce was left on the front dock and also a side
dock.12
As already noted, only seven of the receiving records in the
General Counsel’s Exhibit 33 contain two time stamps. Of
those seven, three are for jobs assigned to Pierre and two of
those, dated August 8 and 10, respectively, are duplicates of the
receiving records that Calligan states he relied on when writing
the warnings of August 8 and 10. An additional 10 receiving
records bear one time stamp. It is, of course, impossible to de-
termine whether these receiving records were stamped when
they were given to the CLT or when they were stamped in as
being completed. I note that 3 of these 10 receiving records
with one time stamp were for jobs assigned to Pierre.13
On August 10, at the end of the workday, Calligan, in the
presence of shop steward Toney, presented Pierre with three
warnings, the two he had written on August 10 and the one
Deville had written on August 9.14 Calligan acknowledged that,
prior to issuing the warnings to Pierre, he had not sought to
speak to Pierre regarding the alleged errors. Despite Pierre’s
explanations, Calligan did not rescind any of the warnings.
On August 16,15 a step 1 meeting was held concerning Pi-
erre’s July 11 grievance, in which he requested reinstatement to
the position of porter or a job in produce. Escoffier, Calligan,
and Shop Steward Lionel Toney were present. Pierre protested
that Business Agent Louis was absent, and, when Escoffier

12 None of Respondent’s witnesses disputed this testimony.
13 Counsel for the Charging Party has submitted 642 delivery tickets
as a posthearing exhibit. I rejected these documents when I issued an
order admitting G.C. Exh. 33. In resubmitting these exhibits, counsel
for the Charging Party correctly notes that my Order stated that these
documents reflected receipt of a shipment whereas they actually reflect
shipments loaded and delivered out of Respondent’s facility. Notwith-
standing my mischaracterization of the function of these documents in
my Order, I adhere to my ruling that these documents add nothing to
my consideration of the issues before me. The documents on which
Respondent purportedly relied are the receiving records that were the
subject of testimony at the hearing. No delivery ticket was placed into
evidence. The delivery tickets, although apparently produced by Re-
spondent with the receiving records, were not the subject of a sub-
poena. The General Counsel’s posthearing exhibit establishes, contrary
to Calligan’s testimony, that time stamps were the exception, not the
normal practice. The delivery tickets are cumulative. For all the forego-
ing reasons, the delivery tickets proffered by the Charging Party are
rejected. I shall place these documents in a rejected exhibit file to as-
sure their preservation in the form in which they were sent to me.
14 I do not credit Calligan’s uncorroborated testimony that the warn-
ings were presented at different times. These three warnings all bear
Shop Steward Toney’s signature. Toney, called as a witness by Re-
spondent, was not questioned about this. Pierre credibly testified that
Calligan gave him three warnings at the same time.
15 The date of this meeting was not established in testimony at the
hearing. A September 8 letter from Escoffier to Louis regarding the
grievance Pierre filed after his discharge reveals that this meeting at-
tended by Escoffier, “with Lionel Toney present,” was August 16, after
Pierre had received the three warnings from Calligan, one dated August
9 and two dated August 10. Pierre, in testifying about this meeting,
specifically referred to “three papers” that related to his allegedly tak-
ing too much time to do his work. I find that he was referring to these
three warnings.
pointed out that Toney was present, Pierre objected, stating that
Toney “talks with two tongues. I can’t trust him.”16 Despite
Pierre’s objection, the meeting proceeded. Escoffier told Pierre
that the only reason he had been reinstated was because the
arbitrator felt “sorry for you; you didn’t win anything.”17 Pierre
responded that, in view of the aggravation being given to him,
he should receive a raise. Pierre testified that, in further conver-
sation at the meeting, Escoffier told Pierre that he “was writing
too many grievances for him to put me anywhere.”18 Pierre
responded, “If you stop writing these letters to me, I’ll stop
writing the grievances.”19 After this meeting, shop steward
Toney talked with Pierre. He noted that Respondent had been
giving him a lot of warnings and that Pierre had been writing
grievances. He pointed out to Pierre that the Respondent was
giving him another chance. Pierre continued to be assigned as a
fork lift driver in the freezer.20
At the hearing, Escoffier testified that he believed Pierre did
not want to work as porter. He was asked, “[I]s that [conclu-
sion] based on his grievance from December 1993 [in which
Pierre sought to return to produce]”? Escoffier responded,
“Yes, it is.”
On August 31, Pierre was terminated. Shop Steward Toney
stopped Pierre as he was leaving work, stating that he was
wanted in the office. In the office, Calligan handed him a ter-
mination notice and asked him to read it.21 Pierre did so. No
specific deficiencies were cited by Calligan. Pierre was not
asked to explain any discrepancies on Respondent’s receiving
records. The notice, signed by Calligan, states:

Nelson Pierre has previously been warned about errors
he was making. He has been verbally warned, written up
and suspended. Due to the history of his poor workman-
ship[,] I have no other option but to terminate him.

Pierre had received no further warnings after August 10. On
August 31, Calligan did not advise Pierre of any additional
deficiencies in his performance. At the hearing, Calligan con-
tended that Pierre had made three errors in tallies on August 29
and 30. He referred to a receiving record dated August 29 (G.C.
Exh. 32, p. 3) upon which Pierre had shown 734 cartons were
received, whereas his tally of 19 pallets with 35 cartons and a
partial pallet with 34 cartons yielded a total of 699. Despite this
apparent discrepancy, Calligan testified that the 734 figure was
correct; however, a duplicate of this receiving record included
in the General Counsel’s posthearing exhibit reflects that the
16 Neither Escoffier nor Louis are required to be present at a Step 1
grievance meeting. The presence of Escoffier, but absence of Louis
who had told Pierre to file the grievance, was clearly a concern to Pi-
erre since he did not trust Toney.
17 Escoffier did not deny making this statement.
18 Escoffier’s statement is not alleged as a violation of the Act. Al-
though he denied taking any adverse action against Pierre because of
his filing of grievances, he did not deny making this statement.
19 Insofar as step 1 grievances are to be presented orally within one
week of the occurrence, Pierre’s refusal to sign the three warnings, and
his protest of them at this meeting, would have constituted the simulta-
neous presentation of three grievances. Escoffier’s comment, that Pierre
was “writing” too many grievances may well have related to his posi-
tion that a grievance should not be written until step 2 of the grievance
procedure, after completion of the oral step, step 1.
20 The grievance was not processed to step 2 of the grievance proce-
dure.
21 The document is dated August 30. It is undisputed that it was
given to Pierre on August 31.
NEW ORLEANS COLD STORAGE CO. 1475
number was corrected to 699. (G.C. Exh. 33(232).)22 Thus Pi-
erre’s tally was correct. Calligan did not speak with Pierre con-
cerning this alleged discrepancy. On one of the August 30 re-
ceiving records, Calligan testified that Pierre had shown receipt
of 475 cartons, whereas the tally showed 13 pallets of 35 and a
partial pallet of 21, which would have resulted in a total of 476,
a discrepancy of one carton. On the other August 30 receiving
record, Pierre correctly recorded that 370 cartons were re-
ceived; however his tally reflects only 367. Pierre had ex-
plained to Calligan that the inspector had taken three cartons.
Thus, although 370 cartons had been shipped and received,
when Pierre tallied the cartons, there were only 367. The total
was correct. Although Calligan stated in a pretrial affidavit that
“I let this mistake go,” he did not mention this in his testi-
mony.23 I fail to see that this was a “mistake.” Even if it was a
mistake, Calligan said that he “let this mistake go.”
Typically, employees corrected tally errors before they came
to management’s attention. When asked about who caught mis-
takes on tallies when shipments came into the plant, former
employee Jake Langston responded that it was the “secretary,”
an individual who worked in the office. The secretary would
notice any discrepancy in the tally and “call you and ask
you.”24 Documentary evidence reveals that employees received
warnings for tally errors that resulted in a monetary loss to
Respondent, such as signing for product not received or over-
shipping (shipping too much product), or that had an impact on
a customer, such as shipping the wrong product or undership-
ping.25 There is no evidence that any employee, other than Pi-
erre, was ever disciplined for a clerical error on a tally that did
not result in a monetary loss, shipment of the wrong product, or
undershipment to a customer.
On receiving the termination notice, Pierre told Calligan,
“This is wrong again.” He then left. Pierre attempted to contact
business agent Louis, but was unable to do so. Thereafter he
attempted to file a grievance. The manner in which he did so
does not appear in the record; however, by letter dated Septem-
ber 8, 1994, Escoffier advised Louis that he had “received a
Step 2 Grievance from Nelson Pierre and once again Mr. Pierre
has ignored the grievance procedure and skipped Step 1.” The
subject of the letter is stated to be “Grievance by Nelson Pierre
8/31/94.” Thus, it would appear that Pierre, as was his practice,
had reduced his grievance to writing. Escoffier appears to con-
sider the reduction of a grievance to writing to constitute skip-
ping the first step of the grievance procedure. A letter from
Escoffier to Louis, dated November 8, denied the request of the
Union to waive step 1 of the grievance procedure. At the hear-
ing, Respondent presented Business Agent Louis, who testified

22 I additionally note that the extraneous writing that appears on G.C.
Exh. 32 p. 3, to which Calligan referred when he testified, does not
appear on G.C. 33(232).
23 I have made the foregoing finding on the basis of a pretrial affida-
vit given by Calligan and included in the formal papers as an attach-
ment to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, G.C. Exh. 1(p).
A duplicate of this motion was placed into evidence, without the affi-
davit, as R. Exh. 6. At that time I was unaware that this evidence was
already before me and noted that I would rely on the testimony. There
is no testimony reflecting that Pierre reported the basis for this discrep-
ancy and that Calligan “let this mistake go.” I therefore am relying on
this statement in Calligan’s affidavit which is in the record before me.
24 Receiving records in evidence reflect various tally corrections.
See, e.g., G.C. Exhs. 33(32), (41), and (73).
25 The record contains one warning issued to an employee in 1996
for undershipping.
that the relationship between Respondent and the Union was
“rather good. We had our arguments from time to time, but
nothing that lasted overnight.” Shop Steward Toney testified
that, except for Pierre, he “did not know of any other employ-
ees who filed grievances against the company.”
On December 21, the Acting Regional Director for Region
15 issued an Order to Show Cause why the issue concerning the
position to which Pierre should have been reinstated should not
be submitted to the arbitrator who had directed Pierre’s rein-
statement. In a supplemental decision dated July 31, 1995, the
arbitrator noted that the only classifications in active use at
Respondent’s warehouse were “engineers” and “checkers/lift
truck”, that there was no classification of “porter.” He found
that it was beyond his authority to order Respondent “to assign
job duties to the grievant that would impinge on the manage-
ment right of the employer to exercise discretion and control of
the management of the plant in order to provide a maximum of
operational efficiently.” Thus he found that Pierre could be
assigned any set of job duties other than “engineer.”
B. Respondent’s Motions
Respondent has moved for dismissal of the 8(a)(1) allegation
relating to the threat of unspecified reprisals as a result of Pi-
erre’s grievance filing activity.26 Respondent argues that this
allegation, which was specifically set out in a charge for the
first time on September 11, 1996, is barred by Section 10(b) of
the Act. The original charge in this case, filed on October 25,
1994, alleges that Pierre was terminated for filing grievances.27
This allegation is repeated in the first amended charge, filed on
November 25, 1994, which also alleges the failure of Respon-
dent to reinstate Pierre to the position of porter. The second
amended charge, filed on September 11, 1996, additionally sets
out the allegation of a threat.
Amendments to a timely charge are deemed to relate back to
the date of filing of the original charge, so long as the matters
alleged are similar and arise out of the “same course of con-
duct” as is contained in the original charge. Pankratz Forest
Industries, 269 NLRB 33 (1984); see also Helnick Corp., 301
NLRB 128 (1991). The initial charge in this case specifically
alleges that Pierre was discriminated against as a result of his
grievance filing activity. Thus, there is no question but that the
8(a)(1) allegation set out in the second amended charged is
similar to, and arises out of the same course of conduct as, the
conduct that was the subject of the original charge. Respon-
dent’s motion to dismiss the 8(a)(1) allegation on procedural
grounds is denied.
Respondent has also moved for dismissal of the complaint
allegation that Pierre was reinstated to a more onerous position.
Respondent argues that this allegation is precluded by the sup-
plemental finding of the arbitrator that Respondent was not
required to reinstate Pierre to his duties as porter since the clas-
sification of porter did not exist. Rather, as set out above, em-
ployees work in the classifications of engineer or checker/lift
truck (CLT).
26 Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 23,
1997. The Board, on May 28, 1997, denied the motion as untimely
since it was filed less than 28 days before the scheduled hearing date of
June 4, 1997. At the hearing, counsel raised the same issues that had
been the subject of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
27 Respondent’s brief inadvertently states that this charge related to
Pierre’s reinstatement rather than his termination.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1476
In addressing this argument, I note that Pierre filed a charge,
Case 15–CA–12507, alleging that his termination in February
1994 was unlawful. Case 15–CA–12507 is not before me.
When Pierre raised the issue of his reinstatement, by filing the
charge in the instant case, Case 15–CA–12931, the Acting Re-
gional Director issued an Order to Show Cause why the issue
relating to Pierre’s reinstatement should not be submitted to the
arbitrator. By letter dated January 17, 1995, the Acting Re-
gional Director noted that he had deferred the prior charge, and
he referred to Pierre’s reinstatement as “a continuation of the
arbitral proceeding concerning the February 1994 discipline of
Pierre.” The arbitrator’s supplemental decision does not address
Pierre’s allegation, set out in the charge in Case 15–CA–12931,
that he was discriminatorily reinstated because of his protected
Section 7 activity. Rather, the decision is limited to interpreta-
tion of the contract. The arbitrator is explicit in stating that he
has “no authority to create a classification of ‘porter’ [or] to
order the company to assign job duties to the grievant that
would impinge on the management rights of the employer as
set out in article XIII” of the collective-bargaining agreement.
I find no merit to Respondent’s argument that consideration
of the issue regarding Pierre’s reinstatement is precluded by the
arbitrator’s supplemental award. Although the Acting Regional
Director referred to the issue of Pierre’s reinstatement as a
“continuation of the arbitral proceeding” in his letter dated
January 17, 1995, the issuance of the complaint herein suggests
otherwise. The issue raised by the complaint, and the issue that
is before me, is whether Pierre was discriminatorily assigned
more onerous job duties in retaliation for his grievance filing
activities. The only issue decided by the arbitrator was that the
contract did not preclude the assignment of whatever CLT du-
ties management decided to assign. The issue regarding dis-
criminatory reinstatement is not factually parallel to the issue
decided by the arbitrator, and it was not considered by him.
The deferral of the charge in Case 15–CA–12507 does not
preclude my consideration of the unfair labor practices raised
by the instant complaint in Case 15–CA–12391. In Barton
Brands, 298 NLRB 976, 979 (1990), as in the instant case, the
charging party had been discharged after being reinstated. The
charging party had filed a prior unfair labor practice charge to
which the Regional Director deferred regarding the original
discharge. Id. at 977. In that case, as in the instant case, the
second charge was filed after the charging party was fired a
second time. In Barton Brands, the arbitrator’s award had pro-
hibited the charging party from holding union office. The
charging party was discharged after being elected president of
the local union. In finding the second discharge unlawful, the
Board found it unnecessary to pass on the prior discharge, not-
ing that the prohibition on holding union office was repugnant
to the Act. The Board specifically stated that its determination
was not dependent on a finding that the original discharge had
been for engaging in protected activity. Id. at 980 fn. 14. Simi-
larly, in the instant case, I need not consider the original dis-
charge. The arbitrator, in his supplemental decision, clearly sets
out that his supplemental decision is rendered within the con-
fines of the contract. He did not consider the unfair labor prac-
tice issue of discriminatory reinstatement. The issue before me
is whether Pierre was discriminatorily reinstated as a result of
his grievance filing activity. This issue is not factually parallel
to any issue decided by the arbitrator, and it was not considered
by him. Consequently, I am not precluded from considering the
unfair labor practice allegation.
C. Analysis and Concluding Findings
The analytical framework of Wright Line28 is applicable in
dual or mixed motive cases after the General Counsel has
established employee union activity, employer knowledge of
that activity, animus towards such activity, and adverse action
taken against those involved in, or suspected of involvement in,
that activity.

Pierre engaged in the union activity of filing grievances, and
Respondent was aware of that activity.
In evaluating the evidence relating to Respondent’s animus
towards employee involvement in union activity, I am mindful
that Respondent presented Business Agent Louis who described
the relationship between Respondent and the Union as “rather
good.” The record confirms that, so long as employees did not
attempt to exercise their rights under the contract, the relation-
ship was good. Escoffier acknowledged that Respondent re-
ceives “[m]aybe one” grievance from the Nashville warehouse
each year, and that, from Respondent’s three New Orleans
warehouses, Respondent annually receives “[j]ust a couple.
There are years that go by with no grievances.” Pierre had filed
two grievances in 1993, and three grievances in February 1994.
He had partially prevailed in an arbitration in which Respon-
dent’s discipline had been found to be excessive, and his dis-
charge been reduced to a suspension. Calligan let Pierre know
where he stood when he informed Pierre that “Gary [Escoffier]
said you was writing too many grievances. That’s why you
didn’t get your job back.” The complaint alleges this statement
as a threat of unspecified reprisal, but I find it quite specific.
Calligan informed Pierre that he was not being returned to his
former position because of his grievance filing activity. In so
doing, Respondent threatened retaliation against employees
who exercised their rights under the collective-bargaining
agreement and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent’s animosity towards employees who filed griev-
ances was confirmed by Escoffier when he met with Pierre on
August 16 regarding the job assignment grievance Pierre had
filed on July 11, the day of his reinstatement. Escoffier made it
a point to tell Pierre that the arbitrator felt sorry for him: “you
didn’t win anything,” and then noted that he “was writing too
many grievances for him [Escoffier] to put . . . [Pierre] any-
where.” Business Agent Louis had told Pierre that Respondent
had issued an ultimatum, that Pierre had no recourse but to
return to the one job Respondent offered and file a grievance.29
The record amply demonstrates that Respondent bore animus
towards Pierre and that this animus was a direct result of his
grievance filing activity.
The complaint alleges that Respondent discriminatorily as-
signed Pierre to a more onerous position. Before addressing the
issue of whether the assignment was discriminatory, I must
determine whether the work was, in fact, more onerous. The
record here establishes that the driving of forklifts into Respon-
dent’s freezers, either to store cargo or to remove cargo for
shipment, was the job performed by 10 of Respondent’s 15
28 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
29 The explicit comments of Calligan and Escoffier were reinforced
by shop steward Toney when he cautioned Pierre about filing griev-
ances. When doing this, Toney did not acknowledge that Pierre had
won the grievance regarding his discharge. Rather, Toney said that the
Respondent was “allowing you another chance.” Toney’s attribution of
Pierre’s reinstatement to Respondent’s largesse, rather than to Pierre’s
exercise of his contractual rights, provides insight into why Pierre be-
lieved that Toney talked with “two tongues.”
NEW ORLEANS COLD STORAGE CO. 1477
CLTs. Despite the fact that this job was performed by the ma-
jority of Respondent’s CLTs, I find that it was more onerous
than working in produce or performing the duties of porter
since it required significant exposure to below freezing tem-
peratures and the inconvenience of wearing special clothing, a
freezer suit. Indeed, when Pierre was assigned the job he was
asked if he still had his freezer suit. Furthermore, there is no
question that Pierre considered it more onerous; he wanted to
be assigned to his former duties as porter or to the produce
department where he worked in the chill rooms and was not
exposed to below freezing temperatures. I find that working in
below freezing temperatures, thereby creating the necessity for
wearing special clothing, a requirement that did not apply to
CLTs performing porter duties or forklift driving duties in pro-
duce, did constitute assignment of Pierre to a more onerous
position.
Respondent’s assignment of Pierre to the freezer was dis-
criminatory. Calligan told Pierre that he was not getting his job
back because he filed too many grievances. Escoffier’s testi-
mony that he concluded that Pierre did not want to perform the
duties of porter because of his December 1993 grievance is
disingenuous. Business Agent Louis had specifically informed
Escoffier that Pierre wanted to return to performing the duties
of porter. Calligan moved an employee from the freezer to pro-
duce, thereby creating a position in the freezer. Calligan testi-
fied that the “reason why I put him [Pierre] up in front with the
freezers is that I can really keep an eye on his duties.” Thus
Pierre, by Respondent’s own admission, was a marked man.
Despite Calligan’s incredible assertion that he placed Pierre in
the freezer in order to help Pierre, the real motive was revealed
when, on July 15, only 4 days after Pierre returned to work,
Calligan issued Pierre a verbal warning. This warning was is-
sued despite the 3-week grace period that Calligan testified he
and Escoffier had decided to give Pierre. Not only did Calligan
issue a verbal warning to Pierre, he made a written record of it,
an action that was unprecedented. Contrary to his testimony,
Calligan relied on this warning when he discharged Pierre. The
termination notice recites, inter alia, that Pierre “has been ver-
bally warned.” I find that the assignment of Pierre to drive a
forklift in the freezer was discriminatorily motivated, and, as
hereinafter discussed, specifically made so that Calligan could
create a paper trail upon which Respondent could purportedly
rely as justification for Pierre’s termination.
The record reveals no occasion in which any employee, ex-
cept Pierre on July 15, has been disciplined simply because of a
tally error. Indeed, most such errors are caught by the secretary
and corrected by the responsible CLT. Any error that Pierre
made was, of course, going to come to Calligan’s attention
since, as he testified, he placed Pierre where he could “keep an
eye on his duties.” The documentary evidence in this case re-
veals that the only warnings issued for tally errors have been
when the errors cost Respondent money or have had an impact
on a customer, such as shipping the wrong product or under-
shipping.
On August 10, Calligan presented Pierre with three written
warnings. He had not investigated the circumstances regarding
any of these warnings. Pierre explained, regarding the warning
written by Deville, that he had no access to the freezer because
employee Kent was taking orders for shipment to the military
out of the freezer. After being given this explanation, Calligan
said, “I’m sorry,” but he did not destroy the warning. Similarly,
regarding the pallets, Pierre explained that the second driver
had brought sufficient pallets. Calligan said, “Okay,” but did
not destroy the warning. The failure to conduct a meaningful
investigation and to give the employee who is the subject of the
investigation an opportunity to explain are clear indicia of dis-
criminatory intent. K & M Electronics, 283 NLRB 279, 291
(1987). In the instant case, Calligan did not conduct an investi-
gation. When Pierre was presented with the warnings, he ex-
plained what had occurred. Calligan did not challenge Pierre’s
explanation of the facts. Calligan’s retention of the warnings,
after learning that Pierre’s access to the freezer had been
blocked and that the second driver had brought 50 pallets, re-
veals that Respondent was intent on building a case against
Pierre.
I totally reject any contention that Respondent’s records es-
tablish that Pierre performed his duties improperly or slowly.
There are two time stamps on only 7 of over 225 receiving
records produced by Respondent. Two of these resulted in
warnings to Pierre. It obviously was not Respondent’s practice
to stamp the receiving records out and in. The CLT does not
control when the receiving record is stamped in. I have no basis
for assuming that the stamped receiving record accurately re-
flects either when a job was completed or how long it took to
actually perform the job. Pierre specifically explained the cir-
cumstances when he had no access to the freezer. No witness
disputed that delays in storing cargo often occur due to delays
in inspection. Calligan relied only on the time stamps. He did
not testify to, or investigate, the circumstances that allegedly
caused Pierre to take excessive time.
Where it is found that a respondent’s reasons for its pur-
ported actions are pretextual, the respondent has failed to sus-
tain its Wright Line burden since the effect of this “is to leave
intact the discriminatory motive established by the General
Counsel.” Champion Rivet Co., 314 NLRB 1097, 1098 (1994).
Calligan’s written documentation of his verbal warning to Pi-
erre, during Pierre’s supposed 3-week grace period, was un-
precedented. Respondent had no basis for any of the written
warnings it gave Pierre. There is no probative evidence that he
worked too slowly. There is no probative evidence that the
confusion regarding the pallets resulted in any monetary loss to
Respondent. Thus, I find that the warnings issued to Pierre
were pretextual. Having so found, I find that that Respondent
has not sustained its Wright Line burden. I find that Respon-
dent, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, issued the warn-
ings to Pierre in retaliation for his grievance filing activity and
in order to create a paper trail that could ultimately be used to
justify his discharge. Respondent’s documentation of Pierre’s
verbal warning with a written memorandum further confirms
this finding.
Pierre specifically explained what had occurred regarding
two of the warnings that Respondent issued to him on August
10. About 3 weeks later, on August 31, Respondent did not risk
receiving an explanation from Pierre. It discharged him without
confronting him with the alleged mistakes that he had made.
Regarding the receiving record of August 29, as noted above,
on a duplicate copy of the document upon which Calligan sup-
posedly based his warning (G.C. Exh. 33(232)), the total has
been corrected. Regarding the alleged error when an inspector
took three cases, Calligan stated in an affidavit that he “let that
mistake go.” The remaining receiving record on which Calligan
supposedly relied reflects, at the worst, a discrepancy of one
carton. Calligan did not speak to Pierre to discuss what ap-
peared to be a tally that was inconsistent with the total. There is
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1478
no contention that any of the above purported errors cost Re-
spondent any money or resulted in the shipment of the wrong
product or undershipment to a customer.
I find that the General Counsel has established Pierre’s union
activity, Respondent’s knowledge of that activity, and its ani-
mus towards Pierre because he exercised his rights under the
collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent has not estab-
lished that it would have taken the same action against Pierre if
he had not filed grievances. As discussed above, the record is
devoid of evidence reflecting that any other employee has even
been disciplined, much less discharged, for a tally error that did
not result in monetary loss to Respondent or that had an impact
on a customer, such as shipment of the wrong product or under-
shipment. Having created a paper trail of warnings, which I
have found were pretextual, Respondent discharged Pierre
without giving him an opportunity to address the alleged tally
errors on which Calligan asserted he relied. The record estab-
lishes, and I find, that Respondent discharged Pierre in retalia-
tion for his union activity in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By threatening retaliation against employees who exercise
their rights under the collective-bargaining agreement, the Re-
spondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. By assigning Nelson Pierre to a more onerous position, by
issuing warnings to him, and by discharging him in retaliation
for his grievance filing activities, the Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Having discriminatorily warned Nelson Pierre, the Respon-
dent must rescind the warnings of July 15 and August 8, 9, and
10, 1995.
Having discriminatorily assigned Nelson Pierre to a more
onerous position and having discharged him, the Respondent
must offer him reinstatement to the position of CLT performing
the duties of porter and make him whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits computed on a quarterly basis from date
of discharge to date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any
net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons
for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended30

30 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
ORDER
The Respondent, New Orleans Cold Storage & Warehouse
Co., Ltd., New Orleans, Louisiana, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening retaliation against employees who exercise
their rights under the collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Assigning more onerous job duties to employees because
they exercise their rights under the collective-bargaining
agreement.
(c) Discharging, warning, or otherwise discriminating
against any employee for supporting International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Local Union No. 270, or any other union.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Nelson
Pierre full reinstatement to the position of CLT performing the
duties of porter or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Nelson Pierre whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion.
(c) Rescind the warnings of July 15 and August 8, 9, and 10,
1994, issued to Nelson Pierre.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful discharge and warnings
and, within 3 days thereafter, notify Nelson Pierre in writing
that this has been done and that the discharge and warnings will
not be used against him in any way.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Nashville warehouse in New Orleans, Louisiana, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”31 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after
being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respon-
dent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
31 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

NEW ORLEANS COLD STORAGE CO. 1479
notice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since October 25, 1994.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT threaten retaliation against you because you file
grievances.
WE WILL NOT assign more onerous job duties, warn, dis-
charge, or otherwise discriminate against any of you because
you exercise your rights under the collective-bargaining agree-
ment or support International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
Union No. 270 or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
offer Nelson Pierre full reinstatement to the position of CLT
performing the job duties of porter or, if that job no longer ex-
ists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to
his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed, and WE WILL make him whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits resulting from his discharge, less any net
interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge
of, and warnings issued to, Nelson Pierre and WE WILL, within 3
days thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been done
and that the discharge and warnings will not be used against
him in any way.

NEW ORLEANS COLD STORAGE & WAREHOUSE CO., LTD.