NEOPOST TECHNOLOGIES

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 2, 2021

2020005443 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/166,293 01/28/2014 Olivier BECHIR 690187.418/439369 8393 157716 7590 03/02/2021 Cozen O''Connor - Neopost 999 Third Avenue Suite 1900 Seattle, WA 98104 EXAMINER ERB, NATHAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3628 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): nyipdocketing@cozen.com ppogson@cozen.com sclayton@cozen.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte OLIVIER BECHIR and BRUNO ROSTAING ____________ Appeal 2020-0054431 Application 14/166,293 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and JAMES P. CALVE, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–17 and 19, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claim 18 has been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). SUMMARY OF DECISION We affirm and enter a new ground of rejection (37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)). 1 Appellant identifies Neopost Technologies as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 2 THE INVENTION Appellant states, [t]he present invention relates to the field of mail processing devices and more particularly to the management of the date, which is printed on a mail piece with the mail carrier marking, and the management of the rate tables used by a mail processing device for computing the postage value, which is franked on a mail piece. Spec. p. 1, ll. 4–8 . Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method of operation of a mailing system to frank mail pieces in advance and manage different rate tables stored in the mailing system, comprising: provisioning of said mailing system with a control module, which can store more than two rate tables at the same time, at least one of which being a future rate table for franking mail pieces in advance, in a non-volatile memory accessible by said control module, each of said more than two rate tables having a respective and distinct application date, provisioning of a volatile memory accessible by said control module, which stores an active rate table that is currently used by the mailing system for franking mail pieces, when a determined triggering event initiates a change of the active rate table, selecting by said control module of said active rate table corresponding to said future rate table amongst the more than two rate tables stored in said non-volatile memory, and loading of said active rate table by said control module in said volatile memory, franking mail pieces in advance with said active rate table corresponding to said future rate table, Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 3 when a franking date change initiates a change of the active rate table for a previous rate table which was in use before said franking mail pieces in advance, selecting by said control module a new active rate table from amongst the more than two rate tables stored in said non- volatile memory, based on a franking date defined by an operator or by the mailing system and the distinct application dates associated with each of said more than two rate tables, and loading of said new active table rate in said volatile memory, and franking mail pieces with said new active rate table corresponding to said previous rate table. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Crawley et al. (“Crawley”) US 4,928,246 May 22, 1990 Thiel US 5,699,258 Dec. 16, 1997 Klein et al. (“Klein”) US 2004/0088256 A1 May 6, 2004 Charroppin US 2004/0220889 A1 Nov. 4, 2004 Kumar et al. (“Kumar”) US 7,523,506 B1 Apr. 21, 2009 Reisinger US 7,577,617 B1 Aug. 18, 2009 Reisinger ’205 US 7,739,205 B1 June 15, 2010 Parker III et al. (“Parker”) US 2014/0081938 A1 Mar. 20, 2014 Ristock et al. (“Ristock”) US 2014/0177821 A1 June 26, 2014 Pierce WO 98/57305 Dec. 17, 1998 SchreyP, Computer data storage – Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Computer_data_ storage&oldid=472148021, Last accessed: 11/27/2018 The following rejections are before us for review. Claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, and further in view of Klein. Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Pierce, Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 4 Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, and further in view of Kumar. Claims 6 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, Kumar, and further in view of Ristock. Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, and further in view of Parker. Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, and further in view of Crawley. Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, and further in view of Thiel. Claims 16 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, and further in view of Charroppin. Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, and further in view of Reisinger ’205. FINDINGS OF FACT We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–12 in the Final Office Action2 and on pages 3–27 in the Examiner’s Answer. 1. Pierce discloses: The user selects, at step 210, the rate or print functions. At step 215, the system checks if there is a new rate table in 2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action mailed on June 13, 2019. Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 5 addition to the 15 current active rate table. If not, then, at step 240, the current rate table is used to perform the rating function. If a new rate table exists, then, at step 220, the system determines if the selected date of mailing is later than or the same as the effective date of the new rate table. If the system, at step 225 determines that the date of mailing is earlier than effective date of the new rate table, then, at step 240, the current rate table is used to perform the rating function. If the date of mailing is the same as or later than effective date of the new rate table, then, at step 230, the new rate table is used to perform the rating function. P. 13, ll. 13–22 2. Pierce discloses: If new rate tables do not exist, then, at step 340, the appropriate functions, such as refill or audit, are performed. If new rate tables do exist, then, at step 330, the new rate tables are downloaded to PC 20. At step 335, the new rate tables are activated if the effective date is current or past. P. 14, ll. 4–9. 3. Pierce discloses In accordance with the present invention, when a new rating structure is announced and declared ready for use, for example by a meter vendor, mailers may load the new rating files onto their respective systems immediately, rather than having to wait for the effective date of the change. This prevents typical problems associated with a rating change, such as loading a file too early, or forgetting to load the file on the correct date. Rating files may be distributed via standard methods, including diskette, CD-ROM, online BBS and the Internet. P. 12, ll. 26–32. 4. Pierce discloses At step 105, the date is obtained, preferably from a secure real- time clock in meter box 44. (For a PC metering system the date is obtained from a secure real-time clock in the PSD). At step 110, the system determines if a new rate table is available. If not, then at step 125, normal system operation continues. If a new rate Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 6 table is available, then at step 115, the system checks if the effective date of the new rate table has been reached. If not, then at step 125, normal system operation continues. If yes, 15 then at step 120, the new rate table is activated. P. 12, ll. 8–15. 5. Pierce discloses: At step 315, communications with Data Center 30 have been established, and, at step 320, the user logs into Data Center 30. At step 325, during the communication session a check is made to determine if new rate tables exist. If new rate tables do not exist, then, at step 340, the appropriate functions, such as refill or audit, are performed. If new rate tables do exist, then, at step 330, the new rate tables are downloaded to PC 20. At step 335, the new rate tables are activated if the effective date is current or past. At step 340, the appropriate functions are performed and the user logs out, at step 345. As with Fig. 3, this process is also 10 suitable for a PC metering system with the rating engine and rating table residing in a local PSD, a host PC or a network metering system or some combination thereof. P. 14, ll. 1–12 6. Pierce discloses: It has also been found that the present invention provides a solution to the problem of a mailer printing an updated date for an indicium previously printed and a rate change having taken effect since the indicium was printed. The present invention requires date entry of original indicium, or selection from a transaction log of the original mailpiece, by the user requesting an updated date to be printed. The system determines if additional postage is required because of a rate change and notifies the user if additional postage is required instead of printing the updated date. PC 20 prints the indicium for additional postage. The system could also notify the user if the rate change has lowered the required postage so that the user may apply for a refund. P. 14, 13–22 Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 7 ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTION The Appellant argues claim 1 as the representative claim for the group 1–17, and 19 (App. Br. 9), and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015). Appellant argues, … even when Pierce refers to a plurality of new rate tables (see, Pierce at page 14, lines 1-12), Pierce describes the effective date (i.e., one effective date for all tables). Thus, Pierce only teaches how to perform switching between a current table and a new rate table using a single effective date. Consequently, Pierce never teaches how switching among three or more tables would work with three or more application dates. (Appeal Br. 10). We disagree with Appellant’s reading of Pierce page 14, lines 1–12. (FF. 5). In this passage, Pierce discloses “[a]t step 335, the new rate tables are activated if the effective date is current or past.” The sentence references plural “new rate tables,” and thus we interpret the phrase, “if the effective date is current or past,” to mean if the effective date of a respective one of the new rate tables is current or past. We thus read Pierce to say for each new rate table that exists, there is a corresponding effective date tied to it. (See FF. 2, 4, 5). Appellant next argues, “Figure 3 of Pierce represents operation during operation (e.g., toward end of workday), for example using the downloaded new rate table when mail is being franked to be sent the next day when new postage rates go into effect. Pierce does not envision returning to an earlier franking rate, in the manner claimed.” (Appeal Br. 10–11). Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 8 We disagree with Appellant. Figure 3 of Pierce illustrates a logic loop in which the date of mailing is selected, and the logic thereafter cycles through determining steps to insure the correct rate is applied: “[t]he system determines if additional postage is required because of a rate change and notifies the user if additional postage is required instead of printing the updated date.” (FF. 6). We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that since the loop cycles anew with each date of mailing selected (205) (FF. 1), Pierce would select a new active rate table from the plurality of rate tables stored in memory to frank mail pieces with the correct active rate table based on the mail date entered. By inference, Pierce’s logic loop would ascertain the table corresponding to the franking date inputted by the user including one which was earlier than the date last inputted. This would occur in Pierce even if only two rate tables were involved, with the user franking only against the effective dates of the two involved rate tables. See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). (In making the obviousness determination one “can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”). Appellant argues, “all of the cited passages of Pierce concern selection between two rate tables, as opposed to more than two rate tables, as claimed.” (Appeal Br. 12 ); “Pierce never teaches how switching among three or more tables would work with three or more application dates.” (Appeal Br. 10). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that because the claims require storing more than two rate tables and Pierce allegedly only discloses two, the Examiner erred in the rejection. Here, Appellant is arguing only the mere existence of differences between the prior art and the Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 9 claims which does not establish nonobviousness. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230 (1976). The issue is “whether the difference between the prior art and the subject matter in question ‘is a differen[ce] sufficient to render the claimed subject matter unobvious to one skilled in the applicable art.’” Absent such evidence by Appellant, we find storing more than two rate tables would be a mere repetition of parts. Merely adding a like element or repeating a step has no patentable significance unless it produces a new or unexpected result– which evidence Appellant has not showed. See Slawson v. Grand Street P. P. & F. R. Co., 107 U.S. 649 (1883); see also Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We are further unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that “Pierce does not envision returning to an earlier franking rate” (Appeal Br. 11–12) because the passage on Page 5 referenced in the Brief is taken from the BACKGROUND of the Pierce patent which discusses the prior art systems, and only those using diskettes. We disagree with Appellant that “the stated motivation for combining Klein with Pierce, and the numerous other references is conclus[ory].” The Examiner found: The modified Pierce fails to disclose each of said more than two rate tables having a respective and distinct effective date. Klein discloses each of said more than two rate tables having a respective and distinct effective date (Figure 4 (Each of the columns can be viewed as a separate rate table having its own effective date); paragraph [0013]; paragraph [0016] (meaning of effective time vs. belief time); paragraphs [0061 ]-[0064]). (Final Act. 7). To the extent Appellant seek an explicit suggestion or motivation in the reference itself, this is no longer the law in view of the Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 10 Supreme Court’s recent holding in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007). Since the Examiner has provided some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning for why a person with ordinary skill in the art would modify Pierce to include more than two rate tables as taught by Klein as set forth above, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection. Appellant’s arguments concerning independent claims 10 and 16 (Final Act. 18–20) only rely on those advanced against the applicability of Pierce as set forth in the arguments to independent claim 1. Thus, for the reasons set forth above for why those arguments fail to overcome the rejection of claim 1 based on Pierce, we find those advanced against the rejection of claims 10 and 16 to be unpersuasive. 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION We enter a new ground of rejection against claims 1–17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 11 See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 12 environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1.4 3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). 4 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.04 and also supersedes all versions of the USPTO’s “Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas.” Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 13 Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on now superseded USPTO guidance. 5 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54– 55. Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 14 to claims, considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.04–2106.05. The Specification states: When the new rate table becomes effective, it replaces the current rate table in the non-volatile memory so that the mailing system can only make use of this new rate table for calculating postages. Periodically, the mailing system compares in step 300 the franking date with the application date stored in the third pre- determined memory area 2c. This periodic comparison would take place each time a franking process is initiated, typically when the data for computing the postage value are gathered. If the application date is the same as or earlier than the franking date as checked in step 310, the rate table needs to be updated. In step 320, the rate table #b in the first predetermined memory area 2a is transferred in the second pre-determined memory area 2b and overwrites the past rate table #a. The application date in the Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 15 third pre-determined memory area is inactivated or erased. The new rate table #b is thereafter used in the mailing system, in particular for computing postage values. Specification 2:20–33. The preamble of claim 1 states it is for, “frank mail pieces in advance and manage different rate tables.” (Claims App.). Claim 1 recites in pertinent part, …store more than two rate tables at the same time, at least one of which being a future rate table for franking mail pieces in advance, …, each of said more than two rate tables having a respective and distinct application date,…store[]an active rate table that is currently used …for franking mail pieces, when a determined triggering event initiates a change of the active rate table, selecting by said…active rate table corresponding to said future rate table amongst the more than two rate tables stored , and loading of said active rate table, … in advance with said active rate table corresponding to said future rate table, when a franking date change initiates a change of the active rate table for a previous rate table which was in use before said franking mail pieces in advance, selecting … a new active rate table from amongst the more than two rate tables …, based on a franking date defined by an operator … and the distinct application dates associated with each of said more than two rate tables, and loading of said new active table rate…. Accordingly, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites a method of selecting an appropriate rate table based on a given franking date which is associated with a correct rate table irrespective of the order in time in which franking occurs. Limitations such as, loading of said active rate table, … in advance with said active rate table corresponding to said future rate table, when a franking date change initiates a change of the active rate table for a previous rate table which was in use before said franking mail pieces in advance, selecting … a new active rate table from Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 16 amongst the more than two rate tables …, based on a franking date defined by an operator … and the distinct application dates associated with each of said more than two rate tables, mimic human thought processes of selecting certain information over others, i.e., evaluation, and creating perhaps with paper and pencil, graphic data interpretation perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, under the first prong, claim 1 also recites the patent ineligible judicial exception of a mental process. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Since claim 1 recites rate changes, it is also directed to the fundamental economic principle of profit margins which is one of certain methods of organizing human activity that are judicial exceptions. Id.; see also Spec. 1:12–22 (discussing the practice of postal offices changing the prices of their services and mailing systems suppliers updating rate tables in their mailing systems with new rate tables via diverse methods in the prior art). The step of “franking mail pieces with said new active rate table corresponding to said previous rate table,” is merely a post solution activity similar to outputting the results of the analyses, a post-solution activity. See id.; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11. Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only generically requires “a mailing system,” “a control module,” “a volatile memory”, and a “non–volatile memory.” These components are described in the specification at a high level of generality. See Spec. 8:25–36, 9:1–36, ¶ Fig. 1. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 17 exception.” Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exceptions of a mental process and a fundamental economic principle that are not integrated into a practical application. That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited to rate table association, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 72–73). Concerning this step, we find the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 18 exception. “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. Limitations such as, “active rate table corresponding to said future rate table amongst the more than two rate tables” and “distinct application dates associated with each of said more than two rate tables” are not steps, but rather are recitations of data characterization, viz. an expectation, which is aspirational. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the claims do not effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec. 8:25–36, 9:1–36, ¶ Fig. 1). Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 19 precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent- eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–226. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (provisioning/determining/ selecting) and storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction. The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. The remaining method claims 2–9, 16, 17, and 19 merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical application of that concept. As to the structural claims 10–15, they are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long ‘warn[ed] . . . against ‘interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 101’ in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’’ Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any particular machine. Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 20 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–17 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. A new ground of rejection is entered for claims 1–17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (effective September 13, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 49960 (August 12, 2004), 1286 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 21 (September 7, 2004)). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” 37 CFR § 41.50(b) also provides that the appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: • (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner . . . . • (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record . . . . No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). In summary: Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 21 Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s) /Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 1–4, 7–8, 10, 12, 13 103 Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein 1–4, 7–8, 10, 12, 13 5 103 Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, Kumar 5 6, 14 103 Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, Kumar, Ristock 6, 14 9 103 Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, Parker 9 11 103 Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, Crawley 11 15 103 Pierce, 15 Appeal 2020-005443 Application 14/166,293 22 Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Klein, Thiel 16, 17 103 Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin 16, 17 19 Pierce, Reisinger, Wikipedia, Charroppin, Reisinger ’205 19 1–17, 19 101 Eligibility 1–17, 19 Overall Outcome 1–17, 19 1–17, 19 AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)