Natticot Industries, L.P.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 6, 2008

11-CA-021827 (N.L.R.B. May. 6, 2008)

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Boykins, VA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA BRANCH OFFICE
NARRICOT INDUSTRIES, L.P.
and CASES 11-CA-21827
(formerly 5-CA-33831)
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS 11-CA-21828
AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, CARPENTERS (formerly 5-CA-33845)
INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL, LOCAL NO. 23161 11-CA-21856
(formerly 5-CA-34030)
Jasper C. Brown, Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel.
James M. Powell, Esq. and J. Mark Sampson, Esq.,
for the Respondent.
Ira H. Weinstock, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
MARGARET G. BRAKEBUSCH, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried
in Jackson, North Carolina on February 26, 27, and 28, 2008. The charges in Case 11-CA-
21827 and Case 11-CA-21828 were filed by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, Carpenters Industrial Council, Local No. 2316 (Union) on October 5,
20072. The charge in Case 11-CA-21856 was filed by the Union on January 7, 2008.
On February 7, 2008, the Regional Director for Region 11 of the National Labor
Relations Board (Board) issued a Second Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint
and Notice of Hearing based upon the allegations contained in Cases 11-CA-21827, 11-CA-
21828, and 11-CA-21856. The consolidated complaint alleges that on various dates occurring
between June and September, 2007, Narricot Industries, L.P. (Respondent) engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). Specifically,
the consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent, acting through its supervisors and agents,

1 The formal papers were amended at hearing to reflect the correct name of the Charging Party.
2 All dates are in 2007, unless otherwise indicated.
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promised its employees increased benefits if its employees removed the Union as their
bargaining representative. The consolidated complaint further alleges that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting employees to sign a petition to remove the
Union and/or withdraw from membership in the Union and revoke dues checkoff and by
unlawfully providing assistance to employees in the circulation of a petition to remove the
Union. Additionally, the consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the Union as its employees exclusive
collective bargaining representative, and by unilaterally implementing changes in wages,
benefits, and other conditions of employment for its bargaining unit employees.
On the entire record,3 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, Union, and Respondent, I make the
following:
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Respondent, a Georgia corporation with an office and place of business in Boykins,
Virginia, has been engaged in the business of manufacturing woven narrow fabrics, including
seatbelt webbing. During the past twelve months, Respondent purchased and received goods
and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the Commonwealth of
Virginia. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent further admits, and I find,
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Background
Respondent is engaged in the business of manufacturing and dyeing narrow textile
fabrics used to construct vehicle seatbelts. Respondent has maintained a manufacturing
facility in Boykins, Virginia, since the early 1960’s and the Union has represented
Respondent’s production and maintenance employees at that facility since 1976. The most
recent collective bargaining agreement covering the employees at the Boykins, Virginia,
facility was executed in February 2005 and remained in effect until October 2, 2007. By
agreement of the Union and Respondent, the Union’s representation of the production and
maintenance employees was extended to also cover employees who work at Respondent’s
satellite facility in Murfreesboro, North Carolina. While the most recent contract did not

3 Because of transcribing errors, a portion of the testimony of Kris Potter and Eric Hayes was
omitted from the transcript. Following the hearing, the parties reached an agreement and stipulation concerning
the testimony that was erroneously omitted from the transcript. Both joint stipulations are received into the
record and I have considered the stipulated testimony. The document captioned as Joint Stipulation Regarding
Eric Hayes’ Testimony on Direct Examination is received as Joint Exhibit #2. The document captioned as Joint
Stipulation Regarding Portions of Kris Potter’s Testimony on Cross-Examination is received as Joint Exhibit #3.
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provide for a wage increase for Respondent’s employees, the contract provided for a bonus or
incentive pay for employees.
The International Textile Group (ITG) is a textile group that owns various textile
plants throughout the world. In early 2007, ITG acquired the Boykins and Murfreesboro
facilities. There is no dispute that the majority of ITG’s facilities are non-union. The Union
became aware of the acquisition in or about April 2007 and met with representatives of ITG
in approximately April 2007. As of October 1, 2007, Respondent employed a total of
approximately 329 bargaining unit employees at its Boykins and Murfreesboro facilities. The
majority of the employees are employed at the Boykins facility and approximately 15
employees work at the Murfreesboro facility. Respondent operates three (3) shifts of eight (8)
hours each, and four (4) shifts of twelve (12) hours each.
A majority of the complaint allegations relate to conduct by Kris Potter and Anja
Baumann. Kris Potter (Potter) has been Respondent’s Human Resource Manager since April
2007. He serves as Human Resource Manager for not only Respondent’s Boykins and
Murfreesboro plants, but also for Respondent’s non-union plant in South Hill, Virginia. Anja
Baumann (Baumann) is a German citizen who came to the United States on a work Visa. She
began working for Respondent as a Quality Control (QC) intern in November 2006. Her
contract for employment provided for her to receive $200 in weekly wages. In addition to
paying Baumann a set wage amount, Respondent also provides Baumann with an apartment,
utilities, and the personal use of a company car. In September 2007, Baumann began
reporting to Training Manager Mary Worley; who reports to Potter. General Counsel asserts
that Baumann acted as an agent of Respondent during the relevant time period.
B. Bargaining
By letter dated July 20, 2007, the Union notified Respondent that it desired to
negotiate a new or modified collective bargaining agreement and proposed dates for the
parties’ negotiations. During the first bargaining session on July 30, 2007, the Union
presented Respondent with proposals for contract modification. Union Representative Jason
Weitzel testified that Potter was unable to set a date certain for the next bargaining session.
After a series of e-mails, voice mails, and a certified letter to the Respondent by the Union,
the parties set a second bargaining session for August 28, 2007.
Bargaining sessions were also held on September 19 and 20. The last bargaining
session occurred on September 26, 2007. Weitzel testified that based upon the progress that
the parties had made during negotiations; he believed that the parties could have reached an
agreement4 during the next scheduled negotiations meeting on October 1, 2007. The meeting
never occurred, however, due to the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition on September
29, 2007.

4 The parties stipulated that prior to withdrawing recognition from the Union, Respondent bargained
in good faith.
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C. Removing the Union
1. Respondent’s preparation of the petition
Potter testified that sometime in late July or early August, employee Henry Vaughn
met with him and asked what the employees could do to remove the Union. Potter recalled
that he told Vaughn that he didn’t have any idea and that he would find out and get back with
him. When Potter met with Vaughn a few weeks later, he provided Vaughn with a prepared
petition for circulating among the employees. Potter testified that he had received the sample
petition from the corporate Human Resource (HR) department. The document was entitled
“PETITION BY EMPLOYEES OF THE BOYKINS PLANT.” The document contained the
specific words: “WE THE EMPLOYEES OF THE BOYKINS PLANT OF NARRIOTT
INDUSTRIES DO NO WANT TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE CARPENTERS UNION
ANY LONGER.” The wording specifically misspells “Narricot” as “Nariott” and
erroneously uses the words “do no” rather than “do not.” Following the descriptive language
at the top of the petition were lines for the employees’ names and signatures. Potter
acknowledged that while he only gave Vaughn one copy of the document, he was sure that
Vaughn made additional copies. Although Potter denied that he specifically gave employees
permission to copy the petition forms on company equipment, he admitted that the employees
may have done so.
On cross-examination, Potter was asked why the Respondent’s name was misspelled
in the sample petition provided by the corporate HR department. While Potter acknowledged
that Respondent’s name was misspelled, he could provide no explanation. He was also
unable to explain why the petition contained the apparent misspelling of “do no” rather than
“do not.”
Vaughn confirmed that he received the petition from Potter after he inquired about
how the employees could get rid of the Union. Vaughn also recalled that Potter told him that
approximately 220 signatures were needed for the petition. Vaughn explained that after
receiving the petition form, he went to the library and made copies of the form. Vaughn
denied that Potter told him what to tell employees when he solicited signatures for the
petition. Vaughn recalled that when he spoke with employees, he told employees that there
was a possibility that employees could get different insurance without the Union. Because he
knew that the collective bargaining agreement was going to expire the first of October,
Vaughn hurried to get the number of signatures needed on the petition.
2. Baumann’s Participation in the Petition Solicitation
Baumann testified that she heard from other employees that Henry Vaughn had a
petition to get rid of the Union. After speaking with Vaughn, Baumann signed the petition.
Vaughn also suggested that if she were interested in helping with the petition, she should
speak with Potter. At Vaughn’s instruction, Baumann met with Potter in late August or early
September. Baumann told Potter that she had just signed the petition and that she was
interested in learning about what she had just signed. Baumann testified that because she was
from Germany, she had not understood how unions function in the United States. Potter told
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her that there was a union at the facility and that it cost Respondent money. He also explained
to her that the contract was expiring in October and that about two hundred signatures were
needed on the petition. During the same meeting, Potter provided Baumann with a list of
employee names and a blank copy of the petition form. After her meeting with Potter,
Baumann returned to the Quality Control Lab and made at least 10 copies of the petition form.
Using her own computer, Baumann retyped the list of employees. She explained that
she created a list that better reflected employees’ shifts and departments. The following work
day, Baumann began using the list to speak with employees. She estimated that she solicited
employees to sign the petition for approximately four hours a day for a week and a half.
Although Baumann worked on first shift, she came to work early and stayed beyond her shift
to talk with employees on second and third shifts. She admitted that she was paid for the time
that she solicited employees to sign the petition. During this period of time, she was also paid
for six to seven hours overtime.
When Baumann met with employees she told them that she was working on an HR
project. She recalled that she told employees: “I’m working on this petition here and we
need signatures to get the Union out of here.” Baumann said that she told employees that she
was working on an HR project in order to have something to say in starting the conversations.
She confirmed that even though many of the employees did not personally know her, the
employees spoke with her after she told them that she was working on an HR project.
Baumann asked them what they knew about the Union and what they thought about the
Union. Baumann told employees that about 200 signatures were needed on the petition.
Baumann recalled that when she spoke with employees she tried to pull them away
from where they were working on the production floor in order to better speak with them with
less noise. She recalled that she either took them into the break room or just outside the
production area. Baumann explained that she stopped the petition solicitation after a week
and a half because employees would no longer talk with her and because she heard other
employees talking about her.
At the end of each day that she solicited employee signatures, she took the copies of
the petition to Potter. She recalled that after the second or third day that she gave him the
petitions; Potter began telling her that he needed more signatures. In order to get more
signatures, Baumann worked overtime. She recalled that during the period that she circulated
the petition, she came in an hour early and stayed over an hour in the afternoons. Baumann
testified that Potter would have known that she was working overtime to circulate the petition
because he saw her arrive early during this period of time.
Potter testified that between April and October 1, he had only one conversation with
Baumann about the Union and the conversation occurred in mid to late August. He
specifically denied that she ever asked him any questions or that they had any conversations
about the Union other than the one conversation. He also denied that he had any
conversations with Baumann when she submitted the petition forms to him.
In contrast to Potter, Baumann testified that when she submitted the signed petition
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forms to Potter each day, he responded by saying “good” or telling her that they needed more
signatures. Baumann recalled a specific conversation with Potter after her second or third day
of circulating the petition. During the conversation, Potter gave her materials to show a
comparison between the employees’ current insurance benefits and those that would be
available to employees with ITG. The materials reflected that there were more doctors and
hospitals available to employees under the non-union plan. Potter also told her that the
employees in Respondent’s non-union facility (South Hill) had received a raise. Potter
explained that all of the employees working at the ITG’s non-union plants have a higher pay
scale. Baumann recalled that Potter told her that without the Union, the employees would earn
a “bit more money.” After her conversation with Potter, Baumann told employees about the
raise for employees at the South Hill facility. Baumann testified that she also told employees
that she had been told that ITG benefits were not coming to the Boykins plant as long as the
Union was there. She told employees that the employees at the Boykins plant would receive
more money if they didn’t have a union. Baumann also told employees that most of the ITG
companies did not have unions and she pointed out the fact that employees at the South Hill
had received a raise and the employees at the Boykins plant had not. She told the employees
that while she could not tell them when or how much, she could see a raise coming for them.
Additionally, she showed the insurance comparison to the employees.
During the first week in September, Union Vice President Brenda Fields observed
Baumann talking with employees in the production area between 7:45 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.
After seven or eight minutes of observing Baumann, Fields approached her. Fields asked
Baumann if she had the petition that was being circulated in the plant and Baumann
confirmed that she did. When Fields asked Baumann why she had the petition, Baumann told
her that she was doing the job that she was told to do by Potter. Fields also asked Baumann
why she had the petition when she was only going to be at the facility for the short term and it
didn’t matter to her. Baumann pulled out some papers that Fields understood to pertain to
insurance information. Baumann told her that with the new insurance policy, employees
could go to a wider range of doctors. Fields countered by pointing out that a new insurance
plan would probably have a higher premium and higher doctors’ fees and prescription costs.
Union President Vickie Eley joined Baumann and Fields during their conversation. Eley
testified that she heard Fields ask Baumann why she was circulating the petition. She recalled
that Baumann responded that she had to do it because Potter told her to do it. Eley also
recalled that although Baumann told them about the new insurance, she also assured them that
she would no longer circulate the petition.
Employee Willie Mitchell recalled that during the first part of September, Baumann
approached him while he was working in the production area. Baumann told him that she had
paperwork that management had asked her to get employees to sign in order to get rid of the
Union. She asked Mitchell if he wanted to sign it. Mitchell saw that she also had a typed list
of names on a clipboard. Mitchell declined to sign the petition and she left to speak with
someone else.
While Baumann was soliciting employee signatures, employee Katrina Powell asked
about removing her signature from the petition. Baumann told her that she would have to talk
with Potter because he had the petitions.
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3. Potter’s Involvement with Other Employees
Potter initially testified that he also spoke with employees Shelton McGee and Shirley
Lewis about the petition and that both Lewis and McGee submitted signed copies of the
petition to him. Later in the hearing, Potter testified that he only remembered receiving
copies of the petition from Baumann and Vaughn. Potter, in fact, testified that he did not
think that he gave Lewis a copy of the petition. Lewis, however, testified that she approached
Potter and asked for his help in getting a copy of the petition. Lewis maintained that
approximately five or six years previously, she had also tried to get the Union out of the plant.
After receiving the copy of the petition from Potter, she went back to her department and
began talking with employees about signing the petition. Lewis explained that she asked the
employees in the work area and then took them into the bathroom to sign the petition. Lewis
testified that while she obtained one copy of the petition from Potter, she obtained a second
copy of the petition form from Vaughn. She placed one of the copies of the petition in the
break room and the other copy she used when talking with employees. Lewis gave no
testimony as to how long the copy of the petition remained in the break room. There was no
testimony that any supervisor or manager restricted her placing the petition in the break room.
Lewis denied that Potter told her what to say to employees or that Potter told her that
employees would get a raise or better benefits without the Union.
4. Potter’s Continuing Involvement with the Petition
While Potter admitted that he spoke with both Vaughn and Baumann about the
petition, he denied giving them instructions as to what they should say to employees. He
asserted that he told them that they could talk with employees about the petition during their
break times, before or after work, and off Respondent’s premises, however, they could not
talk with employees during work time. Baumann, however, denied that Potter ever told her
that she was restricted in soliciting employees’ signatures during working time.
Potter admitted that he told Vaughn and Baumann to return the petition forms to him
and that he told these employees that a majority of the employees’ signatures were needed.
While Potter denied that he ever told any of the employees circulating the petition the number
of signatures that were needed, he also acknowledged that he kept a running tally for his own
personal information. As Potter collected the petition forms, he reviewed a list of employees,
and checked off the names of employees as their names appeared on the petitions.
5. The Circulation of the Petition at the Murfreesboro Facility
Tim Beals is the Weave Manager at Respondent’s Murfreesboro facility. He estimates
that approximately 155 hourly employees work at the Murfreesboro facility. Beals testified
that he first saw a copy of the petition on the break room table sometime during the month of

5 He estimates that this same number of employees have been present since September 2005 when he
transferred from the Boykins facility.
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August and the petition remained there until sometime before September 17, when Vaughn
removed the petition. Although he could not recall the date, he recalled that Vaughn removed
the petition one morning between 7:30 and 7:45 a.m. He denies that he ever physically
received a copy of the petition. He recalls however, that when he observed the petition, the
document contained five or six signatures. He testified that only employee Tarkesha Beale
asked him about the petition. He told her that it was a petition and it was “pretty simple.” He
asserts that he told her that she could either sign it or not sign it.
It is undisputed that Rule 9 of Respondent’s Plant Rules provides for progressive
discipline for “selling, collecting, soliciting, or distributing literature on Company time or
property without prior Company approval (except there may be solicitation or distribution for
Union purposes on Company property but not on Company time).” The progressive
discipline provides for a verbal warning for the first offense, a written warning for the second
offense, and discharge for the third offense. Supervisor Beals acknowledged that while the
petition violated Rule 9, no discipline was ever issued to any employees as a result of the
violation. Beals also testified that he had observed magazines, newspapers, and paperwork to
raise money for churches or charities. Beals denied that he had ever issued any discipline for
literature or information in the break room.
6. Supervisor Eric Hayes and the Circulation of the Petition
Employee Shelton McGee worked in the Seatbelt Weaving Department until his
transfer to the Warehouse in the summer of 2007. While working in the Seatbelt Weaving
Department, he was supervised by Eric Hayes. In approximately August 2007, McGee
received a copy of the petition to remove the Union from employee Henry Vaughn. After
receiving the petition from Vaughn, McGee spoke with Supervisor Eric Hayes about the
petition. McGee asked Hayes if he could put the petition in the supervisors’ office. The
office is shared by Hayes and two other supervisors. Hayes told him that he didn’t have
anything to do with the petition because he was a salaried employee. McGee then placed the
petition on Hayes’ desk in the supervisors’ office. McGee estimated that the petition
remained in the office for a period of no more than three days. During the time that the
petition remained on Hayes’ desk, McGee told other employees about the petition. He told
them that the petition was to get rid of the Union and that it was located in the office. McGee
did not know how many employees signed the petition while it remained on Hayes’ desk.
When McGee retrieved the petition several days later, the petition form was half-filled with
signatures. McGee acknowledged, however, that he collected approximately fifty (50)
signatures in total.
Employee Oddie Mercer was aware of the petition’s circulation in August 2007. He
specifically recalled a conversation that he had with Hayes around the latter part of August.
Hayes came to the work area and asked Mercer and two other employees to accompany him
to the office. Mercer identified the other employees as Bridgette Newell and another
employee whose first name is Kim. Once inside the office, Hayes handed Mercer a piece of
paper. Mercer recalled that Hayes told him: “I just came from my meeting and Charles wants
to get rid of the Union. If you sign this paper to get rid of the Union, you’ll get a two dollar
raise.” In his testimony, Mercer never identified the last name or title for “Charles.” Mercer
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told Hayes that he had been looking for a two dollar raise since he first began working for
Respondent. Mercer handed the paper to the other two employees and walked away without
signing it. Employee Bridgette Michelle Newell testified that Shelton McGee told her about
the petition in Hayes’ office. She denied, however, that she was ever present when Hayes
spoke with Oddie Mercer about signing the petition or about the employees getting a two
dollar raise. Newell recalled, however, that during the time that the petition was circulated,
she heard the rumor that if the employees got rid of the Union, they would get a $2 an hour
raise. She acknowledged that all of the employees were talking about getting the $2 an hour
raise and better benefits. Newell acknowledged that her signature appeared twice on the
petition. While she identified both signatures as her own, she testified that she could not
remember adding one of the signatures. She recalled that the second signature appeared to be
signed at the same time as employee Kimberly Carter.
Employee Willie Mitchell testified that on or about mid to late August, he had a
conversation with Hayes in the Seatbelt Weaving Department. Mitchell testified that Hayes
told him that there was a petition going around to eliminate the Union. He told Mitchell that
the petition was in the office if Mitchell wanted to sign it. Mitchell also recalled that Hayes
said: “And if you go ahead on and sign it and get rid of the Union, you ought to get more
money. You get more money, you get a raise.” Mitchell’s only response was “Okay.”
Hayes acknowledged that McGee asked him about leaving the petition on his desk.
While Hayes testified that he told McGee that he could not be involved with the petition, he
does not dispute that the petition was placed in the supervisors’ office and remained on his
desk for as long as a week. Supervisors Roger Langley and Randy Long also use the same
office. Hayes’ desk is approximately 2 feet by 4 feet in size and contains a telephone. Hayes
admitted that he never told McGee not to put the petition on his desk. Hayes also testified
that when the petition appeared on his desk, he never called HR or asked what he should do
with the petition. He confirmed that neither of the other two supervisors did anything with the
petition or removed the petition. He also denied that he told any employees that the petition
was in his office or that he encouraged them to sign the petition. Hayes admitted that he knew
that employees were coming into his office to sign the petition because he saw their signatures
on the petition. He denied, however, that he promised any employee better insurance or a pay
raise if the Union was removed.
D. Revocation of Union Membership
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent, acting through various supervisors,
unlawfully solicited employees to withdraw from membership in the Union and revoke dues
checkoff. There is no dispute that Respondent prepared the letters for employees to revoke
their authorization for payroll deductions for Union membership, fees, and assessments. The
record contains letters dated September 17, 2007 that were signed by Phillip Bell, Betty
Whitfield, and Angela Towns. Each signed letter contains a certified mail number. There is
no dispute that these letters were sent by certified mail by Respondent to the Union.
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1. Supervisor Beals’ Involvement
Beals testified that sometime in July 2007, employees Betty Whitfield, Angela Towns,
and Phillip Bell asked him how they could get out of the Union. Beals recalled that when Bell
asked him about how he could get out of the Union, he referred Bell to Potter. When
Whitfield and Towns asked him, he told them that he would get an answer for them because
he did not know what to tell them. Beals contacted the HR office at the Boykins plant and
was told that there were two periods when employees could “get out” of the Union. He
learned that employees could do so at their anniversary date and during a time frame specified
in the collective bargaining agreement. He also learned that the employee would have to sign
a document and send it to Respondent and to the Union by certified mail. Beals testified that
the same day that he received the information from HR, he reported the information back to
these employees who had inquired.
Beals confirmed that on September 17, Danny Mallon6 in the Boykins HR office
brought three copies of a letter to the Murfreesboro facility for the employees to revoke their
authorization for dues deduction. He denied that he had been previously notified that he was
going to receive the letters. He asserted that he only learned of the letters when they appeared
on his desk. Beals told Whitfield and Towns that he had the letters for them. Whitfield and
Towns signed the letters and returned them to him on September 17. Beals returned the
signed letters to Respondent’s HR office.
Employee Betty Whitfield testified that she asked Beals about how employees could
get out of the Union and she recalled that her initial conversation with Beals concerning this
issue occurred sometime in September. Beals told Whitfield that he did not know, however,
he would get back with her. On September 17, 2007, Whitfield and Beals again spoke in the
break room. Employee Angela Towns was also present during the conversation. Beals told
Whitfield and Towns that there was a paper on the break room counter that they needed to
see. Beals told the employees that they could sign the paper or they could not sign the paper.
Whitfield testified that the paper that Beals referenced was a typewritten letter to the Union
and Respondent revoking authorization for Union dues deduction. Whitfield signed and dated
the document and left it on the counter. Whitfield confirmed that she never sent the letter to
the Union or the Respondent and she did not know who did so or who added the certified mail
number that was added after she signed the document. Angela Towns also testified that
sometime prior to September 17; she had also asked Beals how she could get out of the
Union. When Beals spoke with her on September 17, he told her that since she had signed the
petition, she could sign the paper to change the withholding of Union dues from her check.
Towns signed the authorization for dues revocation letter on September 17. After signing the
document, Towns returned it to Beals. Beals recalled that Towns asked him if she should sign
the letter since she had already signed the petition. He recalled that he told her that one
document was to get the Union out of the plant and the other document was for her to get out
of the Union. He explained that they were two different documents.

6 During the course of the hearing, the complaint and answer were amended to include Mallon as a
supervisor.
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2. Potter’s Involvement
Potter recalled that employees Phillip Bell and Henry Vaughn approached him about
how they could stop paying Union dues and revoke their membership in the Union. Potter
denied that he gave Phillip Bell (Bell) a form by which he could resign his Union membership
and denied knowing how Bell obtained such a form. Potter acknowledged, however, that he
was familiar with the language contained on Bell’s revocation form dated September 17,
2007. He further explained that the wording for the revocation document was forwarded from
his corporate HR department to his HR Assistant Christine Murphy at his request. Murphy
prepared the revocation document for the employees at Potter’s direction. The signed
revocation forms were collected by Respondent and sent to the Union by certified mail.
There is no dispute that Respondent paid for the certified mailing. Potter testified that he did
not recall if he had given the dues revocation letters to supervisors for distribution. He
acknowledged that he had heard rumors that supervisors had collected such letters.
Employee Edna Worrell recalled that in August she told Henry Vaughn that she was
considering getting out of the Union. Vaughn told her that if she wanted to do so, she needed
to speak with Potter. Worrell did not, however, go to Potter as Vaughn suggested. Worrell
recalled that on September 17 she was approached by Potter as she was walking toward the
bathroom near the QC lab. Potter asked: “Don’t you need to see me?” Worrell asked: “About
the Union” and Potter said “Yes.” Worrell recalled that she then told Potter that she was not
getting out of the Union. Potter then asked Worrell “Are you just going to stay in and govern
yourself?” When Worrell asked what he meant by “govern,” Potter clarified by asking if she
just wanted the rules to stay the same. Potter also told her that she had a limited time to get
out of the Union and to sign the paper that was in Christine Murphy’s office.
E. Events Occurring in Late September
Potter acknowledged that during the time that the petition was circulated in the
facility, there was discussion and rumors in the plant about Respondent granting a wage
increase and changing the insurance benefits. Specifically the rumors involved employees’
getting a change in insurance benefits and wage increase if the Union were gone.
On September 24, 2007, Respondent’s Plant Manager Ed Hull gave a notice to
employees addressing a Union handbill. In the notice, Respondent denies the Union’s
assertion that without a Union, ITG would act improperly. Potter testified that Respondent’s
notice was specifically prepared to respond to a Union handbill that was published on
September 24, 2007. In the notice, Hull asserts that the vast majority of ITG employees is not
represented by a union and yet has competitive wages and benefits as well as a safe
environment and access to a grievance procedure. The notice further informs employees that
if they have any questions about the petition concerning the Union, they are free to talk with
Hull, someone in HR, or their department managers or supervisors. Potter confirmed that the
notice was prepared by corporate HR and posted on all of the bulletin boards in the facility.
Potter and Hull also distributed the notice to employees during shift change.
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F. Respondent’s Withdrawal of Recognition
In describing his discussions with corporate HR, Potter initially testified that
Respondent was “gathering” petitions and then he corrected his testimony to reflect that he
told corporate that Respondent “had petitions being submitted by employees.” Potter initially
testified that he never told corporate HR the specific number of petitions that he had received.
He opined that at some point he notified corporate HR that he had the signatures for an excess
of fifty percent of the employees. Upon further examination, however, he confirmed that he
told corporate HR that he had two hundred and twelve (212) signatures.
By letter dated September 29, 2007, Respondent’s attorney informed the Union that a
majority of its employees had presented a petition to Respondent stating that they did not
want to be represented by the Union any longer. The letter was sent to the Union by regular
mail and by e-mail. Respondent confirmed in the letter that it was withdrawing recognition
from the Union at the end of the collective bargaining agreement on October 2, 2007. After
Union Representative Weitzel opened his e-mail on Sunday, September 30, he sent a letter in
response to the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition. In his letter of October 1, Weitzel
asked Respondent’s attorney to identify the objective evidence that supported the allegation
that the Union no longer represented Respondent’s employees. In a letter dated October 1,
Respondent’s counsel informed the Union that Respondent had received a petition signed by
over 200 bargaining unit employees, stating that they no longer wanted to be represented by
the Union. Respondent’s counsel informed the Union that the petition was available for
inspection at a mutually convenient date and time. When the Union representatives inspected
the petition, they discovered that some of the names had been signed more than once and
there was no indication when the signatures were obtained. Weitzel testified that he also
noted that Respondent’s name was misspelled in the petition.
G. Respondent’s Unilateral Changes
The parties stipulated that on November 11, 2007, Respondent implemented a wage
increase and eliminated a double time overtime premium for working in excess of 48 hours in
a week. The parties further stipulated that effective January 1, 2008, Respondent
implemented a change to its health and welfare benefit plans, holidays, and 401(k) plan.
Potter acknowledged that Respondent did not negotiate or bargain with the Union prior to
making the changes in wages and benefits on November 11, 2007 and January 1, 2008.
III. Analysis and Conclusions
A. Whether Respondent Unlawfully Solicited Employees to Withdraw Union
Membership
General Counsel alleges that Respondent, acting through supervisors Tim Beals and
Kris Potter, unlawfully solicited employees to withdraw their membership in the Union and to
revoke dues checkoff. There is no dispute that employees Angela Towns, Betty Whitfield,
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and Phillip Bell7 asked supervisor Tim Beals how they could resign their Union membership.
Not knowing the correct answer, Beals consulted HR. He discovered that employees could
resign their membership and revoke the authorization for dues payment during two specific
time periods. He also learned that the notification must be in writing and sent by certified
mail. Beals credibly testified that he relayed this information to Towns and Whitfield.
Having provided the requested information, Beals apparently took no further action. On
September 17, HR Supervisor Danny Mallon gave Beals three letters that had been prepared
for his employees. The three letters prepared for Whitfield, Towns, and Bell were fully typed
with the requisite language needed to revoke authorization for Union dues, fees, or
assessments and included the mailing addresses for the Union and Respondent. The only
items requiring completion were the date, certified mail number, and the employee’s
signature. Potter acknowledged that Respondent’s corporate office provided the revocation
wording and the letters were then prepared at Potter’s direction. Beals gave the forms to the
employees for completion. After receiving the signed forms, Beals returned the forms to
Respondent’s HR Department. Respondent does not dispute that it sent the signed forms to
the Union and paid the certified mail expense.
Employee Edna Worrell testified that when she had told Henry Vaughn in August that
she was thinking about getting out of the Union, he referred her to Potter. Even though she
did not follow Vaughn’s suggestion, Potter approached her on September 17. Potter initiated
the conversation by asking her if she did not need to talk with him. He then questioned her
choice to maintain the status quo and reminded her that she only had a limited time to get out
of the Union and to sign the necessary document in the Human Resources office. While
Potter did not recall speaking with Worrell about the petition, he did not rebut the September
conversation about her withdrawing from the Union.
Based upon the record as a whole, I find that Respondent, acting through Kris Potter,
unlawfully solicited Worrell to resign her membership in the Union and revoke her
authorization for dues deduction as alleged in complaint paragraph 8(b). In doing so,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Almaden Volkswagen, 193 NLRB 706,
709 (1971).
Whitfield credibly testified that when Beals presented her and Towns with the
revocation letters, he told her that it was her choice as to whether she signed the letters.
Towns testified that Beals told her that since she had already signed the petition, she could
also sign the letter revoking her membership. Beals, however, recalled that Towns asked him
if she should sign the letter since she had already signed the petition. Beals testified that he
explained to her how the documents were entirely different. Although Whitfield was also
present during the conversation, she did not corroborate Towns’ more coercive version of the
conversation. Overall, I found Beals to be a credible witness and his testimony appeared
straightforward and genuine. Accordingly, the record does not support a finding that Beals
specifically solicited employees to resign their membership in the Union. It is apparent that

7 Potter testified that Bell also asked him about the process for withdrawing his membership from the
Union.
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he simply passed on to employees the document prepared at the direction of Potter and crafted
by Respondent’s corporate HR office. Although Beals may have told employees that they had
a choice as to whether they signed the revocation letters, the record evidence reflects that
Respondent unlawfully assisted in the employees’ revocation of dues authorization. While
the Board has found that an employer may lawfully provide information on how to resign
from the Union, the employer may not attempt to ascertain whether employees will avail
themselves of this right nor offer assistance, or otherwise create a situation where employees
would tend to feel peril in refraining from such revocation. Erickson’s Sentry of Bend, 273
NLRB 63, 64 (1984); R. L. White Co., 262 NLRB 575, 576 (1982). In the present case,
Respondent did not simply provide information in response to employees’ inquiries. Without
being asked to do so, Respondent prepared the letters of revocation and presented them
through Supervisor Beals. It is understandable that these employees would have felt
compelled to sign the documents that had been specifically prepared for them. Employees
were not told to take the letters and sign them after reflection or consideration. The
employees were placed in a situation of either signing the letters or rejecting the letters.
Because the letters contained reference to the certified mail number that was to be added, it
was apparent that Respondent intended to send the letters to the Union after the employees
signed the letters. Overall, it is apparent that employees would tend to feel coerced to resign
their Union membership and revoke their dues authorization. Under similar circumstances,
the Board has found similar aid and support to employees in the filing of union membership
withdrawal cards to taint the withdrawals and to be violative of the Act. In American Linen
Supply Co., 297 NLRB 137, 138 (1989), 945 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1991), the employer’s
personnel manager solicited at least one employee to withdraw from the union and the
employer further aided employees in withdrawing from the union by furnishing withdrawal
forms and notaries during work time to help them in processing the withdrawal forms. In the
instant case, Respondent prepared letters for the employees to sign, encouraged the employees
to sign the letters, and then mailed the letters to the Union by certified mail and at
Respondent’s expense. Accordingly, Respondent’s assistance and solicitation violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in complaint paragraph 8(b).8
B. Whether Respondent Unlawfully Assisted Employees in the Circulation of the
Petition
General Counsel alleges that acting through supervisors Potter, Beals, and Hayes,
Respondent unlawfully provided assistance to employees in the circulation of a petition to

8 Complaint paragraph 8(c) alleges that Respondent unlawfully provided assistance to employees in
the circulation of the petition through the conduct of Supervisor Tim Beals in September 2007. Specifically, the
complaint alleges that Beals informed employees of a petition to remove the Union and instructed employees to
read it. As discussed above, Respondent used Beals as a conduit to solicit employees to sign the forms to
withdraw their membership from the Union. The record is not clear, however, that Beals was involved in
soliciting employees to sign the petition. I recommend the dismissal of complaint paragraph 8(c) as it relates to
the allegation that Beals informed employees of a petition to remove the Union and instructed employees to read
it. The record does reflect however, that Beals was aware of the petition’s presence in the break room and there
is no evidence that Beals did anything to remove it or to dispel the appearance of management support and
approval for the petition. Thus, his conduct supports a finding of unlawful assistance that is discussed in another
portion of this decision.
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remove the Union. There is no dispute that it is unlawful for an employer to initiate a
decertification petition, solicit signatures for the petition, or lend more than minimal support
and approval to the securing of signatures and the filing of the petition. Sociedad Espanola
De Auxilio Mutuo Y Beneficencia de P.R., 342 NLRB 458, 459 (2004). Eastern States
Optical Co., 275 NLRB 371, 372 (1985). While an employer may not violate the Act by
giving “ministerial aid,” the employer’s actions must occur in a “situational context free of
coercive conduct.” The essential inquiry is whether “the preparation, circulation, and signing
of the petition constituted the free and uncoerced act of the employees concerned.” KONO-
TV-Mission Telecasting, 163 NLRB 1005, 1006 (1967).
1. Potter’s Involvement in the Unlawful Assistance
Henry Vaughn testified that when he asked Potter how the employees could remove
the Union, Potter told him that he would check into it for him. Potter did not, however,
simply report back to Vaughn to explain the decertification process. Potter responded by
providing Vaughn with a prepared petition and told him that approximately 220 signatures
were needed on the petition. Interestingly, there was no testimony from Potter, Baumann, or
Vaughn to confirm that Potter ever informed Vaughn, Baumann, or any other employee that
they could contact the Board or about their right to file a decertification petition with the
Board. Vaughn never testified that he asked Potter to prepare the petition or even to give him
sample language for the petition. The petition was created by Respondent’s corporate office
and given to Vaughn and Baumann by Potter. I find it suspect that the petition was drafted
with two very obvious mistakes; the misspelling of Respondent’s name and the misspelling of
the word “not.” As discussed above, “Narricot” was misspelled as “Narriott” and “not” was
spelled as “no.” Because the word “not” is central to the message of the document, it is
difficult to believe that the misspelling is simply an oversight. It is also unlikely that
Respondent’s corporate personnel accidentally misspelled the company name. It seems much
more likely that this document was created to appear as though it had originated with rank-
and-file employees. The fact that Respondent attempted to disguise the origination and author
of the document creates the impression of unlawful assistance and involvement.
In addition to working through Vaughn, Potter also provided a copy of the petition to
Anja Baumann and to employee Shirley Lewis. In addition to giving her the copy of the
petition, Potter provided Baumann with a list of all of the employees in order to facilitate her
solicitation for signatures. Additionally, Potter gave Baumann documentation concerning the
insurance that would be available to employees if they removed the Union as their bargaining
representative. Baumann used these materials in talking with the employees. Baumann
testified that Potter never cautioned her to solicit employee signatures only during non-
working time. Baumann approached employees while they were working and pulled them
away to talk with them about the petition. There is no evidence that any supervisor interfered
with her doing so. She also received overtime in order to reach more employees.
There is no dispute that once Vaughn and Baumann secured signatures on the petition,
the signature pages were submitted to Potter. Potter kept a running tally of the employee
signatures. As he collected the forms, he reviewed a list of employees and checked off the
names of the employees as their appeared on the petitions. Baumann recalled that after her
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second or third day of soliciting signatures, Potter told her that he needed more signatures.
Baumann recalled that at the same point in time in which Potter told her that he needed more
signatures, he told her about the raise that the employees had received at Respondent’s non-
union plant and about the insurance available to employees if they were non-union. Baumann
took this information and used it in her conversations with employees as she solicited
signatures.
As discussed above, there is ample record evidence that Potter unlawfully provided
assistance to employees in the circulation of the petition. The evidence demonstrates that
with the benefit of corporate office, Potter created the petition for employees to remove the
Union. He not only gave Baumann a roster of employee names to assist her in circulating the
petition, he gave her information to use with employees to promise them better insurance
benefits and increased wages if they rejected the Union. He required the employees soliciting
signatures to return the petitions to him and he maintained a running tally of the number of
signatures. The Board has found that where an employer has provided the specific petition
language and instructed employees to return the signed petition to management, the employer
has exceeded lawful assistance. Marriott In Flite Services, 258 NLRB 755, 768-769 (1981);
Silver Spur Casino, 270 NLRB 1067, 1071 (1984).
In asserting that it provided only lawful and ministerial assistance to employees,
Respondent points to the Board’s decision in Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry, Inc.,
268 NLRB 338, 339 (1983). In preparing a decertification petition to circulate among his
fellow employees, a bargaining unit employee sought the advice of the employer’s labor
consultant. The consultant reviewed the employee’s draft of the petition language and
recommended one change in wording and recommended using the union’s full name in the
petition. The judge determined that there was no showing that the employer instigated the
petition and noted that the only conduct in drafting the petition was to provide some
“inconsequential” phrases upon the specific request of an employee. Unlike the
circumstances involved in the instant case, the employees then circulated the petition without
further manifestation of the employer’s approval and without further involvement by the
employer during the solicitation process. The Board affirmed the judge’s decision without
comment concerning the alleged unlawful assistance.
Citing the Board’s decision in Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 335 NLRB 941 (2001),
Respondent argues that it lawfully prepared the petition and provided it to Vaughn only in
response to his inquiry about removing the Union. Respondent is correct that the
circumstances in Bridgestone/Firestone involved an employer’s suggestion and preparation of
a petition in response to an employee’s inquiry. Had Respondent only provided petition
language in the instant case without more, Respondent’s assistance might also be merely
“ministerial.” Unlike the circumstances involved in Bridgestone/Firestone, however,
Respondent did more than simply provide petition language in response to Vaughn’s inquiry.
Potter went on to provide copies of the petition to Baumann and Shirley Lewis. He not only
collected the petition sheets from the employees and monitored the accumulation of
signatures; he also encouraged Baumann to get more signatures. He did not rely upon the
employees to independently circulate the petition or file a decertification petition with the
Board; he took possession of the petition, engineered its progression, and used it as a basis for
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withdrawing recognition. See Pic Way Shoe Mart, 308 NLRB 84 (1992).
Respondent also argues that it did nothing unlawful in providing Baumann with the
list of employees because Baumann asked Potter for the list.9 Although both Potter and
Baumann testified that Baumann asked for the list, I do not find their testimony credible.
Baumann testified that one of the reasons that she contacted Potter was to understand what
she had signed when she signed the petition. She recalled that she told Potter that she did not
understand how unions functioned in the United States. If Baumann did not understand the
union process or the petition procedure, it is illogical that she would have requested either the
petition or a roster of employees from Potter in this initial conversation. Although Baumann
appeared to provide candid answers to many of the questions posed by Counsel for the
General Counsel and the Union, she was also somewhat evasive and less direct in response to
other questions. She testified under subpoena by the General Counsel and acknowledged that
she had declined to speak with Counsel for the General Counsel prior to the hearing. Based
upon her overall testimony, it is apparent that she viewed herself as aligned with management
rather than the rank-and-file members of the bargaining unit. Her testimony that she asked
Potter for a list of employees in that first meeting was simply an affirmation to Respondent’s
leading question. She was not asked, and she did not explain, why she asked for the list of
employees. In fact, during the earlier examination by Counsel for the General Counsel, she
only recalled that Potter gave her the list of employees and her testimony included nothing
about having asked for the list. Accordingly, I credit neither Potter nor Baumann’s testimony
that Baumann independently asked for the list of employee names.
Respondent submits that there was nothing unlawful about Potter’s tracking the
number of employee signatures. Respondent argues that inasmuch as the tracking was
accomplished after the employees’ signing the petition, it could have had no impact on the
employees’ willingness to sign the petition. In support of its argument, Respondent relies

9 In its argument that an employer may lawfully provide employees with a list of employees in
connection with a decertification campaign, Respondent relies upon the Board’s decisions in McClatchy
Newspapers, Inc., 337 NLRB 1161, 1178 (2002) and Times-Herald, Inc., 253 NLRB 524, 524 (1980). In Times-
Herald, the Board found that an employer was not responsible for a supervisor’s participation in a decertification
effort, noting that he was also a member of the bargaining unit. Although a member of management provided the
supervisor/unit employee with the telephone number for the Board’s Regional Office, there was no evidence
relating to the circumstances in which solicitations were made. During its discussion, the Board referenced its
earlier decision in Consolidated Builders, Inc., 171 NLRB 1415 (1968), in which an employer had lawfully
provided a list of employee names and addresses to an attorney representing a decertification committee. There
was no discussion, however, in the Board’s decision in Times-Herald to indicate that the employer had provided
such a list to the supervisor/bargaining unit employee in issue. In McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., the
administrative law judge found that the employer did not unlawfully assist in the inception or fruition of a
decertification petition. No exceptions were filed and the Board dismissed the complaint; which also included
other allegations of 8(a)(1) and (3). In her discussion of the alleged unlawful coercion related to the petition, the
judge cited the Board’s decision in Times-Herald in relation to an employer’s providing a list of employee names
to a decertification committee. While the judge listed the conduct that was alleged to have constituted unlawful
assistance, providing a list of employee names was not included in the alleged conduct. I note, however, that in
Consolidated Builders, Inc., the case cited by the Board in its Times-Herald Inc. decision, there was no evidence
that the employer did anything to assist in the decertification effort and simply responded to the attorney’s
written request for the names and addresses of employees.
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upon McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., above at 1178 in which the employee circulating the
petition gave periodic reports on his progress to management and was complimented and
praised on his efforts. Although management received the reports of the progress without
remonstrance, the judge noted that the employer’s tacit approval of the decertification effort
did not equate to assistance.
Without a doubt, Potter did far more than simply provide “ministerial assistance” to
employees. He engineered, directed, and supported the petition effort. The Board dealt with
similar employer involvement in Condon Transport, Inc., 211 NLRB 297 (1974). In Condon
Transport, the Board affirmed the judge in finding that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1)
by its overall assistance to, and support of decertification activity. The judge explained: “It
may well be that the law permits an employer, upon request of employees, to provide on an
isolated and limited basis certain information otherwise unavailable to them or beyond their
personal knowledge. However, such privilege may not be construed as a license for an
employer to use employee requests as a pretext for enmeshing itself in virtually every stage of
the decertification process.” The judge went on to find that the degree of involvement was
such as to make the employer a full partner in the effort to oust the union, and would “create
an atmosphere whereby employees, despite indifference or only marginal opposition to the
union, would be encouraged to support management’s implicit intention in this regard.” In
the instant case, the overall evidence demonstrates that by virtue of Potter’s sustained
interaction with Vaughn, Baumann and other employees, in addition to the support given by
Hayes and Beals, Respondent clearly became a significant participant in the petition process
and engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Hayes’ Involvement in the Unlawful Assistance
Respondent does not dispute that employee Shelton McGee placed a copy of the
petition in the supervisors’ office and left it there for several days. During this period, McGee
told employees about the petition’s presence in the office. Hayes admitted that although
McGee asked permission to put the petition on Hayes’ desk, Hayes did not forbid him to do
so. Although Hayes saw the petition on his desk, he did not tell McGee to remove it. He
denies that he contacted HR to find out what he should do about the petition. Hayes was also
aware that employees were adding their names to the petition while it remained in his office.
Although supervisors Langley and Long also shared the office, there is no evidence that either
supervisor made any attempt to remove the petition or forbid its presence in the office.
Certainly the Board has found similar assistance to be unlawful. In Placke Toyota,
Inc., 215 NLRB 395 (1974), an employee placed a decertification petition on a supervisor’s
desk that was used by the supervisor to distribute work orders to employees and to retrieve
completed work orders from the employees. The petition remained on the desk for several
days, during which time employees signed the petition. The Board found that by allowing the
petition to remain on the supervisor’s desk for several days, the employer gave the petition its
open support or at least the clear impression of open support. An employer does not maintain
a “neutral position” when it not only drafts the petition, but also allows employees to sign the
petition during working time and with supervisory assistance in making the petition available
to potential signers. Corrections Corporation of America, 347 NLRB No. 62, slip op. at 33
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(2006). Thus, by allowing the petition to remain in the supervisors’ office for employees to
sign during working hours or whenever they wished to do so, Respondent conveyed to
employees that the petition was supported and promoted by management.
Counsel for the General Counsel also presented the testimony of employees Oddie
Mercer and Willie Mitchell concerning Hayes’ alleged involvement in circulating the petition.
Mercer contends that Hayes brought him into the office along with employee Bridgett Newell
and another employee whose first name is Kim. Mercer alleges that Hayes told the
employees that he had just come from a meeting with “Charles” who wanted to get rid of the
Union. Hayes is alleged to have added that if the employees signed the petition, they would
get a two dollar raise. Overall, I do not credit Mercer’s testimony. Although he alleges that
Hayes told him that he had just come from a meeting with “Charles,” he does not disclose the
identity or title for “Charles.” Mercer provides no further information that would identify the
significance of this meeting and why Hayes allegedly made such a statement. Additionally,
Mercer’s description of the conversation is uncorroborated by Newell. Newell testified that
although she heard rumors about employees getting a two dollar an hour raise and getting
better benefits, she denied being present for the conversation with Hayes and Mercer. She
did, however, sign the petition while it was in the supervisors’ office. Counsel for the General
Counsel argues that Newell should not be credited because she signed the petition twice and
yet recalled signing it only once. Newell does not dispute that her signature is included twice
on the petition. The fact that she may not recall the specific circumstances of the second
signing is not sufficient to discredit her entire testimony. Considering the overall testimony of
Newell and Mercer, I do not credit Mercer’s testimony concerning the alleged promise of
benefits by Hayes. Had Hayes called three employees into the office at the direction of higher
management to promise raises, it is likely that he would have done so with a more organized
and informative appeal. Mercer’s alleged recall of the conversation lacks sufficient detail or
foundation to be credible.
With respect to the alleged conversation between Hayes and Mitchell, however, I find
Mitchell’s recall to be credible. He alleges that when he passed Hayes on the work floor,
Hayes told him about the petition in the supervisors’ office. Mitchell recalled that Hayes
opined that if the employees got rid of the Union, they “ought to get more money.” Hayes
gave a blanket denial that he every told any employee that the petition was in the office or that
he promised employees a pay increase if they signed the petition. I found Mitchell’s
testimony to be more credible10 with respect to this conversation. Mitchell did not appear to
embellish or exaggerate his description of the conversation. Inasmuch as Hayes’ admittedly
allowed the petition to remain in his office and available for employee signatures, it is not
implausible that he casually directed employees to the petition.

10 Respondent submits that Mitchell should not be credited because he had previously received
counseling from Hayes. Mitchell denied that the prior counseling constituted a warning. While Mitchell was
terminated from Respondent’s facility in December 2007, he did not report to Hayes at the time of his discharge.
Based upon his testimony as a whole, I do not find the circumstances of Mitchell’s discharge or counseling
sufficient to discredit his testimony concerning this brief conversation with Hayes. Even assuming that Mitchell
harbored some animus toward Hayes for this unidentified non-disciplinary counseling, Mitchell did not appear to
exaggerate or embellish his testimony.
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As discussed above, I find that Respondent, acting through Eric Hayes, unlawful
provided assistance to employees in the circulation of the petition and unlawfully promised
increased benefits if the employees removed the Union as their bargaining representative, as
alleged in complaint paragraphs 8(a) and (c).
3. Beals’ Involvement in the Unlawful Assistance
Complaint paragraph 8(c) alleges that in September 2007, Beals informed employees
of a petition to remove the Union and instructed them to read it. It appears that General
Counsel and the Union rely upon the testimony of employees Betty Whitfield and Angela
Towns as a basis for this allegation. I do not find however, that their testimony supports this
allegation. As discussed above, Whitfield testified that she had a conversation with Beals
about how she could resign her membership in the Union. On further examination, she was
asked if she ever had “another discussion” with Beals about the “petition.” It is apparent from
her entire testimony that Whitfield misunderstood this question and answered in the
affirmative. As she began to explain the second conversation, however, she clarified that
Beals was talking with her about the letter to revoke her dues authorization. When she was
asked to identify the document that she signed that had been referenced by Beals, she
specifically pointed out that it was the letter and not the petition. In fact, on still further
examination, Whitfield confirmed that while she signed the petition, she had not done so
during her meeting with Beals. She testified that she had no recall as to when she had signed
the petition or how the petition had been given to her.
Towns confirmed that both she and Whitfield had been present in the break room
during a September discussion with Beals. Towns testified that after she and Whitfield signed
the petition that was present in the break room, she asked Beals how to get out of the Union.
Towns recalled that Beals did not initially have an answer for her. Towns recalled that it was
during a later conversation that Beals gave her the letter authorizing the revocation of Union
dues deduction.
Accordingly, based upon the testimony of both Towns and Whitfield, there is no
evidence that Beals informed employees of the petition or instructed them to read or sign it.
Beals acknowledged that during the month of August, he observed the petition in the break
room and saw that it contained employee signatures. The petition remained in the break room
for approximately a week. As discussed above, there is no evidence that Beals attempted to
remove the petition or take any action that would dispel the perception that management
supported and authorized the petition. Thus, Beals’ tacit permission to allow employees’ free
and undisturbed access to the petition throughout the work day aided in the support and
endorsement of the petition and violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. Baumann as Respondent’s Agent
Section 2(13) of the Act provides that:
In determining whether any person is acting as an “agent” of another person so
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as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified
shall not be controlling.
In determining whether an employer is responsible for the actions of a rank-and-file
employee, the Board has historically applied the general rules of agency and particularly the
rules of apparent authority. Corrugated Partitions West, 275 NLRB 894, 900 (1985). “The
Board has long held that where an employer places a rank-and-file employee in a position
where employees could reasonably believe that the employee spoke on behalf of management,
the employer has vested the employee with apparent authority to act as the employer’s agent,
and the employee’s conduct is attributable to the employer.” Ibid.
Paragraph 8 of the complaint alleges that acting as an agent of Respondent, Baumann
unlawfully promised employees increased benefits if they removed the Union as their
bargaining representative and solicited employees to sign the petition to remove the Union.
Baumann not only admits that she solicited employees to sign the petition, but she also admits
that in soliciting employees, she told them about better insurance benefits and wage increases
that would be available to them as non-union employees. Respondent maintains that
Baumann is not an agent of Respondent as she did not have actual or apparent authority.
General Counsel and the Charging Party assert that Baumann possess both apparent as well as
actual authority with respect to her solicitation activities.
The overall record evidence indicates that Baumann told employees that she was
working on a HR project and that signatures were needed to get rid of the Union. During her
talks with employees she asked them what they knew about the Union and what they thought
of the Union. Based upon the information given to her by Potter, she told employees that
Respondent’s non-union plant received a raise and that all ITG plants that didn’t have a union
would get a raise. She told employees that the ITG benefits would not be available to the
employees at the Boykins plant as long as they had a union and she showed them the
insurance comparisons that she had received from Potter. While she did not promise a date
certain, she told employees that they would earn a “bit more money” if they didn’t have a
union. Clearly, as an agent of Respondent, Baumann promised employees better insurance
benefits and a wage increase if they rejected the Union as their bargaining representative.
Such conduct by an agent of Respondent would also serve to taint the petition upon which
Respondent has relied in withdrawing recognition from the Union.
Citing Precipitator Servs. Group, 349 NLRB No. 77, slip op. at 5 (2007) and
California Gas Transport, Inc. 347 NLRB No. 118, slip op. at 4 (2006), Respondent argues
that General Counsel may not rely on statements by the putative agent herself to establish
agency. Respondent maintains that evidence of agency status must be derived from conduct
or statements by the employer. Respondent argues that Baumann’s solicitation of signatures
and the statements that she made to employees while soliciting signatures are solely
Baumann’s; without instruction or ratification by Respondent. Respondent further argues that
General Counsel presented no testimony whatsoever concerning anything that mangers told
employees about Baumann’s circulation of the petition or her collection of signatures, or that
Respondent otherwise held out Baumann as representing or speaking for Respondent.
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The question is whether, under all the circumstances, employees would reasonably
believe that Baumann spoke for, and acted on behalf of, Respondent’s management.
Futuramik Industries, 279 NLRB 185 (1986); Community Cash Stores, 238 NLRB 265
(1978). Phrased differently, the inquiry is whether the employer has placed the employee in
the position of a conduit where employees reasonably believe that he or she speaks for
management. Three Sisters Sportswear Co., 312 NLRB 853, 865 (1993). Either the principal
must intend to cause the third person to believe the agent is authorized to act for him, or the
principal should realize that its conduct is likely to create such a belief. Pan-Oston Co., 336
NLRB 305, 306 (2001).
Although it is apparent that Baumann promised employees better benefits and wages if
they removed the Union as their bargaining representative, Baumann never testified as to why
she wanted to get rid of the Union. On the contrary, she asserted that she initially spoke with
Potter to get information about the Union. She testified that unions in Germany were
different than those in the United States and that she spoke with Potter to learn more about the
American unions. While Baumann was listed as an employee in the bargaining unit, her pay
was actually established by her contract as a foreign intern. Her compensation included a
contractually determined monthly amount as well as free lodging, utilities, and the personal
use of a company vehicle. Thus, her pay and benefits were substantially different than those
of other bargaining unit employees. There is no record evidence that Baumann had any
personal interest or motivation to remove the Union. Having no interest of her own, it is
apparent that she acted in what she perceived to be the interest and direction of management.
There is no dispute that she solicited employees to sign the petition during working hours and
in the working area.11 In order to speak with them more easily, she pulled them away from
their work area. She came in to work early and stayed late to see employees on second and
third shifts. When she spoke with employees, she carried a list of the names of the bargaining
unit employees as well as documents showing the comparison between the union insurance
and the insurance available through ITG for non-union employees. Carrying the list of
employee names and the insurance comparisons, Baumann told employees that she was
working on an HR project and promised them better benefits and wages if they got rid of the

11 Complaint paragraph 8(c) alleges that acting through Potter, Respondent allowed the use of work
time to solicit signatures on the petition. Respondent argues that there is no evidence that Potter or any other
managerial employee was specifically aware of any employee solicitations during work hours. Respondent is
correct that no witness testified that Baumann or any other employee solicited signatures on working time in the
presence of a supervisor. While there is no evidence that management officials specifically witnessed and
sanctioned the working-hours solicitations, Baumann admitted that she did so. While this conduct may not
demonstrate Respondent’s unlawful assistance, it supports the finding that Baumann acted with apparent
authority. Baumann credibly testified that Potter never told her that she could not solicit during working time.
Carrying her clipboard with the list of employees and the petition, she began soliciting employees the very next
day after meeting with Potter. Although there is no evidence that Potter or any other management official
observed Baumann in her solicitation efforts, other employees most certainly were aware of what she was doing.
There was no evidence that any of the other employees involved in the solicitation acted with such disregard for
Respondent’s rules prohibiting solicitation during working hours. The fact that Baumann openly did so only
bolstered employees’ perception that she was acting with management’s authority and approval. Her conduct,
coupled with her telling employees that she was working on an HR project, provided strong evidence of her
agency status to her fellow employees.
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Union. Employee Willie Mitchell credibly testified that when Baumann spoke with him, she
had a typed list of employee names on a clipboard. She told him that she had the paperwork
because management had asked her to get employees to sign to get rid of the Union. While
Respondent argues that it cannot be responsible for what Baumann told employees about her
agency status, Respondent cannot dispute that Potter provided her with the documents and the
information that she needed to make these promises. Potter admits that he gave her this
information to use in soliciting employee signatures. I don’t find it credible that Potter gave
Baumann information and tools that would assist her in obtaining employee signatures
without his wanting employees to believe her and to rely upon what she told them. It is also
unrealistic that Respondent would not have known that employees would believe that
Baumann was speaking for management under these circumstances. Therefore, it is apparent
that Respondent clothed her with apparent authority to act in its behalf and is responsible for
her actions even if Respondent did not specifically tell employees that she spoke for
management. Tyson Foods, 311 NLRB 552, 561(1993).
In analyzing agency, the Board will also consider whether the statements or actions of
an alleged employee agent are consistent with statements or actions of the employer. Such
consistencies support a finding of apparent authority. Pan-Oston, above at 306; Hausner
Hard Chrome of KY, Inc., 326 NLRB 426, 428 (1998). Baumann’s apparent authority is
bolstered by Respondent’s treatment of the petition in other parts of the facility. There is no
dispute that the petition was allowed to remain in the supervisors’ office for a number of days.
During this time, supervisor Hayes was aware of the petition and yet neither he nor the other
supervisors using the office did anything to remove the petition or disavow management’s
support of the petition. The record also reflects that the petition was allowed to be placed in
the break room for approximately a week at the Murfreesboro facility without removal or
disavowal by management. It is also significant that Baumann’s statements were consistent
with Plant Manager Hull’s notice to employees. In the September 24, 2007 notice, Hull told
employees that the vast majority of ITG employees are not represented by a union and that
ITG provides competitive wages and benefits including vacations, holidays, overtime,
insurance coverage, and retirement benefits. While Respondent argues that this notice was
only in response to a Union leaflet, the notice nevertheless, follows the theme of Baumann’s
solicitations.
Aside from the issue of whether Baumann acted with apparent authority, the record
also reflects that Baumann acted with actual authority. She solicited employee signatures
using the petition form provided by Potter. There is no evidence that Baumann asked for a
copy of the petition. She testified that when she first spoke with Potter, she told him that she
had signed the petition and she asked him to explain what she had signed. Potter responded
by giving her a copy of the petition and telling her that approximately 200 signatures were
needed to remove the Union. She then began soliciting employee signatures and submitting
the signatures to Potter at the end of each day. Baumann worked overtime to allow more
opportunity to speak with employees on the other shifts. Baumann testified that Potter never
told her that she could not speak with employees during working time. Although Potter
testified that he cautioned employees that they were to only solicit signatures before or after
work and during non-working time, I find Baumann to be more credible in this regard.
Inasmuch as she followed through on using the employee list and the insurance information, it
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is reasonable that she would also have followed Potter’s directive to solicit on non-working
time, had she been directed to do so. The fact that Potter gave Baumann no restrictions on
when and how to contact employees further demonstrates that she acted with Potter’s actual
authority. After two to three days of soliciting signatures for the petition, Potter told her that
he needed more signatures and he told her about the raise at Respondent’s non-union plant
and gave her the insurance documents to use when talking with employees. While
Baumann’s comments to employees that she was working on a HR project may not serve as
direct evidence of agency, it is certainly indicative of her understanding that she was acting on
behalf of management. Although she asserted that she simply told employees that she was
working on the HR project in order to have something to begin her solicitation, it is also
apparent that she did so in order to garner credibility with employees and because she
apparently likely believed that she was acting with actual authority from Potter.
The overall record evidence supports a finding that Baumann acted as an agent of
Respondent in soliciting employees to sign the petition. It is well settled that an employer
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by “actively soliciting, encouraging, promoting, or
providing assistance in the initiation, signing, or filing of an employee petition seeking to
decertify the bargaining representative.” Mickey’s Linen & Towel Supply, Inc., 349 NLRB
No. 76, slip op. at 2, (2007); Wire Products Mfg. Corp., 326 NLRB 625, 640 (1998), enfd.
sub nom. NLRB v. Blankenship & Associates, Inc., 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000). Clearly, as
an agent of Respondent, Baumann actively solicited, encouraged, and promoted the signing of
the petition in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Additionally, Potter’s comments to Baumann about better wage rates and more
extensive insurance at Respondent’s non-union facilities tended to encourage Baumann in the
circulation of the petition and thus also violated Section 8(a)(1). Fabric Warehouse, 294
NLRB 189, 191 (1989), enfd. 902 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1990). As an agent of Respondent,
Baumann’s subsequent promise of the raise and the improved benefits to employees was also
violative of the Act.
C. Respondent’s Unlawful Recognition Withdrawal
Respondent argues that as an employer, it not only had “the right – it had the duty – to
withdraw recognition” from the Union because a majority of its employees exercised their
Section 7 right not to be represented by the Union. As discussed more fully below, I find
neither duty nor right to withdraw recognition and find that Respondent acted in violation of
8(a)(5) by its withdrawal of recognition from the Union.
In its 2001 decision in Levitz Furniture Co., 333 NLRB 717, 724 (2001), the Board
overruled Celanese Corp., 95 NLRB 664 (1951), and its progeny insofar as those decisions
permitted an employer to withdraw recognition from an incumbent union on the basis of a
good-faith doubt of the union’s continued majority status. As Respondent asserts, the
employer under Levitz, has the burden of showing that, at the time it withdrew recognition, a
majority of employees did not support the union. Thus, Respondent relies upon Levitz to
support its argument that an employer may lawfully withdraw recognition from a union when
it is able to show a numerical loss of majority status. It should also be noted however, that the
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Levitz case was decided in the absence of any other alleged unfair labor practices. In Levitz,
there was no allegation that the employer was involved in any way in the circulation, support,
or initiation of the petition that was relied upon by the employer.
1. Respondent’s Argument Concerning the Union’s Loss of Support
Respondent asserts that once it shows that a majority of its employees did not support
the Union at the time of its withdrawal, the burden shifts to General Counsel to show that
Respondent violated 8(a)(1) and that there was a “causal connection” between the 8(a)(1) and
the loss of majority. Respondent maintains that other than the signing of the petition,
employees evidenced their non-support of the Union by their failure to pay Union dues.
In its brief, Respondent submits a comprehensive graph demonstrating union
membership in each of its departments. The Respondent argues that prior to the initiation of
the petition, only 24% of the bargaining unit employees were members of the Union and thus
argues that the Union no longer had the majority support of the bargaining unit employees.
Although it would appear that Respondent appears to equate a decline in Union membership
and dues deduction authorizations as a justification for withdrawal of recognition, the Board
has been reluctant to view a decline in membership as a singularly significant factor and the
absence of a majority of employees on dues checkoff has not established an objective basis
for an employer’s doubt of a union’s representational status. Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 278
NLRB 474, 480 (1986). Majority support, in fact, has been determined to refer to whether a
majority of unit employees support union representation, and not to whether they are union
members. Manna Pro Partners, 304 NLRB 782, 783 (1991), enfd. 986 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir.
1993); Petoskey Geriatric Village, 295 NLRB 800, fn. 9 (1989). The Board has long held that
there is no necessary correlation between membership and the number of union supporters.
Orion Corp., 210 NLRB 633 (1974); Terrell Machine Co., 173 NLRB 1480, 1481 (1969).
In General Dynamics Corp., 169 NLRB 131, 138 (1968); a case that proceeded the
Levitz decision, the employer withdrew recognition from the union, arguing that it had a good
faith doubt in questioning the union’s majority. Although the Board ultimately found that the
employer had a reasonable basis for doubting that the union still represented a majority of its
employees based upon a number of factors, the Board specifically added:
We must, however, emphasize that, in reaching this conclusion, we do not rely
to any significant extent on the fact standing alone that less than a majority of
the employees supported the Union through the checkoff arrangements. For
we are aware of the fact that individual employees may not authorize checkoffs
for wholly personal reasons unrelated to their interests in supporting a union as
their bargaining representative.
Thus, a union may enjoy majority support even if less than a majority of employees
maintain union membership or authorize their employer to deduct union dues from their
paychecks. Furniture Rentors of Am. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (3rd Cir. 1994); NLRB
v. Koenig Iron Works, Inc., 681 F.2d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Respondent also cites two recent court decisions in its argument that a decline is union
membership is relevant in withdrawal of recognition cases. Respondent cites Tri-State Health
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 374 F.3d 347, 354-355 (5th Cir. 2004) and McDonald Partners, Inc., v.
NLRB, 331 F.3d 1002, 1005-07 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In both case, the courts admonished the
Board and the respective administrative law judges for a failure to consider membership and
dues checkoff data as one of the factors in evaluating the employers’ alleged good-faith doubt
of the unions’ majority status.
Interestingly, these same cases were analyzed by the Board in a recent case involving
an allegation that the employer unlawfully polled its employees to determine their support for
the incumbent union. In Wisconsin Porcelain Company, Inc., 349 NLRB No. 17, slip op. at 2
(2007), the employer argued that the judge erred by failing to give any weight to evidence that
only a minority of the unit employees were union members and that dues checkoff had
declined from 43 percent in the fall of 1997 to 28 percent at the time of the poll. The Board
stated that in both Tri-State Health Service, Inc. v. NLRB and in McDonald Partners, Inc. v.
NLRB, the courts acknowledged that in light of Allentown Mack Sales and Service v. NLRB,
522 U.S. 359 (1998),12 union membership and dues check-off evidence can “in some
circumstances,” be probative “to some degree” of good-faith uncertainty. The Board also
noted that both courts emphasized that the weight to be given to such evidence is dependent
on the circumstances of each case. Special attention was given to the fact that in Tri-State,
dues checkoff fell from 11 to zero in a unit of 30-40 employees and in McDonald, dues
checkoff fell from nearly all the employees to zero in a unit of 100 employees. The Board
contrasted this level of acute decline to the circumstances in Wisconsin Porcelain Company,
Inc., where 28 percent of the bargaining unit still authorized dues checkoff. This percentage
is only slightly higher than the 24 percent upon which Respondent relies in the instant case.
In Wisconsin Porcelain, the Board not only considered the existence of the 28 percent
of employees who continued to authorize dues deductions, the Board also found it significant
that the number of union members and dues payers had been less than 50 percent for many
years, and yet the parties had still enjoyed a long and stable collective bargaining history. In
the instant case, Respondent argues that in June 2005, the Union’s membership represented
only 45 percent of the bargaining unit employees and that by June 2006, the membership
declined to 31 percent of the bargaining unit employees. There is, however, no evidence to
indicate that the parties have had anything other than a stable collective bargaining
relationship during this period of decline and prior to the Respondent’s September 2007
withdrawal of recognition.
Respondent not only argues that the petition demonstrates an actual loss of majority
support, but also asserts that the decline in membership solidifies the loss. I not however, that
despite the fact that Union membership may have been declining over a period of years,
Respondent did not rely upon the decline as a basis for the withdrawal of recognition. In its
letter to the Union of September 29, 2007, Respondent told the Union that it was withdrawing

12 In Allentown Mack, the Court clarified that the Board must interpret “doubt” to mean uncertainty
rather than disbelief. The burden is on the employer to prove good-faith reasonable uncertainty.
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recognition because a majority of its employees had presented the petition. There was no
reference to declining Union membership or any other evidence of a loss of majority. Thus,
while Respondent now asserts the loss of membership as further evidence to bolster its
reliance upon the petition, the Board has determined that it will only examine the factors that
were actually relied upon by the employer when determining the adequacy of an employer’s
defense to a withdrawal of recognition allegation. RTP Company, 334 NLRB 466, 469
(2001), enfd. 315 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2003); Holiday Inn of Dayton, 212 NLRB 553, 556 fn. 1,
(1974), enfd. 525 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1975).
2. Conclusions with Respect to the Recognition Withdrawal
It is well settled that a withdrawal of recognition must occur in a context free of unfair
labor practices. Mathews Readymix, 324 NLRB 1006, 1007 (1997); Detroit Edison, 310
NLRB 564, 565-566 (1993). Citing Champion Home Builders Co., 350 NLRB No. 62 at 4
(2007), Respondent asserts that the mere presence of unfair labor practices under 8(a)(1) does
not, in and of itself, invalidate the employees’ petition or Respondent’s withdrawal of
recognition. As the Board pointed out in its decision in Lee Lumber and Material Bldg.
Corp., 322 NLRB 177 (1996), not every unfair labor practice will taint evidence of a union’s
subsequent loss of majority support and there must be some “specific proof of a causal
relationship between the unfair labor practice and the ensuing events indicating a loss of
support.”
Respondent argues that all of the complaint allegations involve isolated incidents and
would only have affected a small percentage of the number of employees who signed the
petition. Accordingly, Respondent asserts that there is an insufficient causal nexus between
the alleged misconduct and employee disaffection as a whole to taint its withdrawal of
recognition. Certainly there were a total of 212 employees who signed the petition and they
did so under different circumstances and for varying reasons. While not all of the signatures
on the petition may have been tainted by Respondent’s unlawful assistance and support,
General Counsel need not prove that the employees were aware of Respondent’s unfair labor
practices. The Board has found that where an employer engages in unlawful conduct aimed
specifically at causing employee disaffection with their union, the employer’s conduct will
bar any reliance on an expression of disaffection by its employees, even if some of the
employees may be unaware of the employer’s misconduct. Vanguard Fire & Supply Co., 345
NLRB 1016, 1045 (2005); Hearst Corp., 281 NLRB 764, 765 (1986). Additionally, when an
employer commits unfair labor practices in connection with an employee decertification
effort, the Board does not require proof of how many employees were exposed to, or were
aware of, the employer’s illegal conduct. House of Good Samaritan, 319 NLRB 392, 396
(1995); Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital, 280 NLRB 113, 115 fn. 7 (1986).
Additionally, this case does not involve simply random 8(a)(1) comments that
occurred during the course of an otherwise independent circulation of a petition to remove the
Union. The essence of the allegations involves Respondent’s conduct which suggested
sanction, support, and sponsorship of the petition. Although Vaughn may have initially
contacted Potter about the decertification process, Respondent became an active participant in
the petition process. In analyzing the processing of this petition, there is a valid question as to
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whether there would have been a petition and the 212 signatures without Respondent’s
unlawful involvement. See Dayton Blueprint Co., 193 NLRB 1100, 1108 (1971).
In order to lawfully withdraw recognition from an incumbent union, an employer
cannot rely upon a tainted petition or the results of the employer’s own efforts. Shen-Lincoln-
Mercury-Mitsubishi, Inc., 321 NLRB 586, 595 (1996); Weisser Optical Co., 274 NLRB 961,
962 (1985). As discussed above, Respondent has clearly tainted the atmosphere for a free
choice among its employees and in doing so, has precluded its reliance upon the petition to
justify its withdrawal of recognition. Pirelli Cable, 323 NLRB 1009, 1010 (1997); Williams
Enterprises, 312 NLRB 937, 940 (1993), affd. 50 F.3d 1280 (4th Cir. 1995).
Inasmuch as Respondent relied solely on the petition as the basis for its decision to
withdraw recognition from the Union and because the petition was tainted by the
Respondent’s unfair labor practices, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
RTP Company, 334 NLRB 466, 469 (2001), enfd. 315 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2003).
D. Respondent’s Unilateral Changes
In November, Respondent held meetings with employees to announce changes in
wages and benefits. During one of the meetings, Plant Manger Hull announced that there
would be a new health care plan and that employees would receive pay raises. On November
1, Respondent implemented a wage increase and eliminated double overtime premium pay for
work in excess of 48 hours in a week. On January 1, 2008, Respondent implemented a
change in its health and welfare benefit plan, and changed its holiday schedule as well as its
401K plan.
Potter admitted that Respondent did not notify or bargain with the Union prior to
making any of the changes in November 2007 and January 2008. General Counsel also points
out that the unilateral changes in wages and insurance benefits were the same type of wage
and benefits promised by Baumann when she solicited employees to sign the petition.
Inasmuch as Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union, the Respondent
has additionally violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally implementing changes in
wages and benefits for its employees. Goya Foods of Florida, 351 NLRB No. 13, slip op. at
1 (2007); Alexander Linn Hospital Assn., 288 NLRB 103, 105 (1988).
Conclusions of Law
1. Narricot Industries, L.P., Respondent, is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Carpenters
Industrial Council, Local No. 2316 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. By promising its employees increased benefits and wages if they removed the
Union as their bargaining representative, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
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4. By soliciting employees to sign a petition to remove the Union as their
bargaining representative, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).
5. By soliciting employees to withdraw their membership in the Union and
revoke dues checkoff, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).
6. By unlawfully providing assistance to employees in the circulation of a petition
to remove the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).
7. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act since September 29,
2007, by failing and refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit:
All production, maintenance, and plant clerical employees employed at
Respondent’s Boykins, Virginia, facility to include its operation at
Murfreesboro, North Carolina; excluding all office clerical employees,
professional and technical employees, guards, truck drivers, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
8. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing
recognition from the Union.
9. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally
changing wages, the 401(k) plan, health and welfare plans, holidays, and other conditions of
employment of its bargaining unit employees.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action, including the
posting of appropriate notices, designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
A determination has been made that Respondent has unlawfully refused to bargain
with the Union as the collective bargaining representative of its employees and that
Respondent has unlawfully withdrawn recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of its employees. I shall therefore recommend that Respondent be
ordered to cease and desist there from and, further, that it be ordered to recognize and bargain
collectively upon request with the Union as the exclusive representative of Respondent’s
employees with respect to their wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
I further recommend that Respondent, upon the request of the Union, rescind any or all
unilateral changes to unit employees’ wages, holidays, overtime premiums, health and welfare
benefit plans, Section 401(k) retirement plans, and other terms and conditions of employment,
and to maintain the unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment unless and until the
parties bargain in good faith to an agreement or lawful impasse concerning any proposed
changes. Additionally, I recommend that Respondent make whole employees for any losses
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that they have suffered as a result of Respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition and the
unlawful unilateral changes in wages and benefits. Counsel for the General Counsel argues
that the current practice of awarding only simple interest on backpay and other monetary
awards be replaced with the practice of compounding interest. General Counsel also asserts
that the Board should compound the interest owed on a quarterly basis, citing the practice of
the Internal Revenue Service in assessing daily compounded interest with regard to the
overpayment or underpayment of federal income taxes. While I am mindful that the Board at
one time referenced its consideration of modifying its interest calculation procedures, there is
no existing Board authority to deviate from the past practice of ordering the award of simple
interest. Rogers Corp., 344 NLRB No. 60, slip op. at 1 (2005). Accordingly, I do not
recommend the award of compound interest as requested by General Counsel.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended:13
ORDER
The Respondent, Narricot Industries, L.P., Boykins, Virginia, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Promising its employees increased benefits and wages if they remove
the Union as their bargaining representative.
(b) Soliciting its employees to sign a petition to remove the Union as their
bargaining representative.
(c) Soliciting employees to withdraw their membership in the Union and
revoke dues checkoff.
(d) Providing assistance to employees in the circulation of a petition to
remove the Union as their bargaining representative.
(e) Failing and refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees.
(f) Withdrawing recognition from the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the following unit:
All production, maintenance, and plant clerical employees employed at
Respondent’s Boykins, Virginia, facility to include its operation at

13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
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Murfreesboro, North Carolina; excluding all office clerical employees,
professional and technical employees, guards, truck drivers, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
(g) Unilaterally changing wages, the 401(k) plan, health and welfare plans,
holidays, and other conditions of employment of its bargaining unit employees.
(h) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain in good faith with the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Carpenters Industrial Council Local No.
2316 with respect to the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for its
bargaining unit employees and, if an understanding is reached, reduce the agreement to
writing and sign it.
(b) Upon the request of the Union, rescind any or all unilateral changes to
unit employees’ wages, holiday, overtime premiums, health and welfare benefit plans, Section
401 (k) retirement plans, and other terms and conditions of employment, and maintain the unit
employees’ terms and conditions of employment unless and until the parties bargain in good
faith to an agreement or lawful impasse concerning any proposed changes thereto.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Boykins,
Virginia and Murfreesboro, North Carolina facilities copies of the attached notice marked as
“Appendix.”14 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
11, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings,
the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since August
2007.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional

14 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the
notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD” shall read
“POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING
AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
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Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2008.
Margaret G. Brakebusch
Administrative Law Judge
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APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT promise our employees increased benefits and wages if they remove the
Union as their collective bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully assist employees in their attempt to remove the Union by
soliciting employees to sign a petition to remove the Union.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully solicit our employees to resign their Union membership or their
authorization for dues deductions.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or to bargain with United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, Carpenters Industrial Council, Local No. 2316 as the exclusive
bargaining representative of our employees in the following appropriate unit:
All production, maintenance, and plant clerical employees employed at
Respondent’s Boykins, Virginia, facility to include its operation at
Murfreesboro, North Carolina; excluding all office clerical employees,
professional and technical employees, guards, truck drivers, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change wages and benefits for our bargaining unit employees
without first notifying their exclusive collective bargaining representative and affording it a
reasonable opportunity to meet and bargain about the decision to increase wages and
employee benefits and its effects on employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, recognize and, on request, bargain in good faith with the United Brotherhood of
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Carpenters and Joiners of America, Carpenters Industrial Council, Local No. 2316 as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit set forth above regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
and if an understanding is reached, reduce the agreement to writing and sign it.
WE WILL, upon the request of the Union, rescind any or all unilateral changes to unit
employees’ wages, holidays, overtime premiums, health and welfare benefit plans, 401(K)
retirement plans, and other terms and conditions of employment, and maintain the unit
employees’ terms and conditions of employment unless and until the parties bargain in good
faith to an agreement or lawful impasse concerning any proposed changes thereto.
WE WILL make whole, with interest, our bargaining unit employees for any loss of wages or
loss of benefits they may have suffered due to our unilateral changes in wages and benefits.
NARRICOT INDUSTRIES, L.P.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal Agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and
how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to an agent with the
Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s
website: www.nlrb.gov
4035 University Parkway, Republic Square, Suite 200, Winston-Salem, NC 27106-3323
(336) 631-5201, Hours: 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY
ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER. (336) 631-5244.