National Telephone Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 29, 1974

215 N.L.R.B. 176 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
National Telephone Company, Inc. and Local 35, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, Petitioner . Case 1-RC-12842
November 29, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY,
AND PENELLO
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, a hearing
was held before Hearing Officer Kevin P. Donnellan of
the National Labor Relations Board. Following the
close of the hearing the Regional Director for Region
1 transferred this case to the Board for decision.
Thereafter, the Employer and the Petitioner filed
briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Hearing
Officer made at the hearing and finds that they are free
from prejudicial error. The rulings are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act and it will effectuate the purposes
of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. The parties
stipulated that the Employer is a Connecticut corpora-
tion engaged in the business of leasing, installing, and
maintaining commercial telephone equipment with its
principal place of business in East Hartford, Connec-
ticut, and that the Employer in the course and conduct
of its business annually purchases and receives goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located
outside the State of Connecticut.
2. The parties further stipulated that the Petitioner,
which claims to represent certain employees of the Em-
ployer, is a labor organization as defined in the Act.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning
the representation of certain employees of the Em-
ployer within the meaning of Sections 9(c)(1) and 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
4. The Petitioner seeks to represent a unit of all
telephone installers at the Employer's East Hartford,
Connecticut, branch office, excluding all other em-
ployees, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act.
The Employer, however, questions the scope of the
requested unit. The Employer contends that the small-
est appropriate unit must include installers at all eight
branches comprising the Employer's eastern division.
In addition, the parties are in disagreement concerning
two individuals (installation foremen) whom the Peti-
tioner would include in the unit, but whom the Em-
ployer would exclude as supervisors.
As noted above, the Employer leases, installs, and
maintains commercial telephone equipment. The proc-
ess encompasses installing cables in a building, hooking
it up to telephones or telephone equipment via terminal
blocks, and interconnecting it with the Bell System
lines . The latter process is performed by the installers
in the unit requested by Petitioner. The Employer also
employs service personnel to repair and maintain the
equipment. The parties stipulated, however, that the
servicemen are not installers and therefore were not
properly within the scope of the unit.
The Employer, which has its corporate headquarters
in East Hartford, Connecticut, was incorporated in
April 1971 and has been growing relatively rapidly
since that time. At the time of the hearing herein, only
two divisions-an eastern division and a central
division-had been established, but further expansion
is anticipated, and additional divisions will ultimately
be created. It is the plan of the Employer to limit its
divisions to approximately nine branches, which will in
turn be grouped on the basis of three branches per area
and three areas per division. While ultimately regional
and area managerial tiers may be established, the re-
cord indicates that the functional management at this
time is comprised essentially of the corporate head-
quarters tier, the divisional management tier, and the
branch management tier.
As indicated above, the petition is limited to the
telephone installers at one of the branches in the eastern
division, located at East Hartford, Connecticut. The
eastern division is approaching its maximum contem-
plated size, in that it currently has eight branches out
of an intended maximum of nine . These branches in-
clude locations at Syracuse, New York; Manchester,
New Hampshire; Providence, Rhode Island; East
Hartford, Connecticut; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Cam-
den, New Jersey; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Buf-
falo, New York.
Basic wages, hours, and fringe benefits are estab-
lished centrally by the president of the Company and
apply to all locations. Personnel needs, on the other
hand, are determined at the lowest tier of organiza-
tional structure-the branch level. Implementation of
personnel policies appears to be centered in the divi-
sional management, where authority resides with re-
spect to hiring, wage increases, serious disciplinary
measures, and transfer of employees. Temporary trans-
fers, for example, are limited to divisional borders and
the decision to temporarily transfer someone is made
by the divisional manager. Permanent transfers are also
centrally controlled. The latter, which may exceed divi-
sion boundaries, must be authorized by an officer of the
Employer.
The authority to grant wage increases within the
limits established on a companywide basis is also vested
in the divisional management . While recommendations
are obtained from the branch managers, many of those
recommendations-an estimated 25 percent-are
215 NLRB No. 17
NATIONAL TELEPHONE CO., INC.
changed, either upward or downward, by the divisional
management.
Hiring and disciplinary matters follow the same pat-
tern. The branch manager conducts hiring interviews
and makes recommendations for hire, but the hiring
decisions are made at the divisional level and the appli-
cants are generally reinterviewed by the division
manager . Our dissenting colleague concludes that re-
view of hiring and also wage increases is merely a
budgetary consideration. We disagree. Of the 80 install-
ers presently employed in the eastern division, in excess
of 60 were reinterviewed at the divisional level. This is
certainly not indicative of only a budgetary review and
a high degree of branch autonomy. As stated by Em-
ployer's vice president, Richardson, in his uncontrov-
erted testimony, the branch manager "has officially no
latitude in hiring or firing employees. I do quite often
follow the recommendation of my management, but
not so overly often that it becomes routine. I very care-
fully review the addition of every single individual that
comes into my organization and I do that for selfish
reasons. I want an efficient, effective organization. The
answer to your question•is, technically he has no au-
thority for hiring and firing, but in many cases I very
strongly agree with the recommendations that he
made. I think I understand what you are driving at, and
I can tell you what I don't do and that is simply rubber
stamp their recommendations. I very carefully review
every single recommendation and in most cases meet
and interview every single individual that they are go-
ing to add to the organization. It is not something that
is taken lightly. We are growing too rapidly in terms of
the number ofpeople to just let anybody hire anybody he
wants to. "(Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, if there ex-
ists such budgetary management , as the dissent claims,
this is but further evidence of lack of branch autonomy.
In addition, only very limited disciplinary authority is
granted to the branch managers , with all serious disci-
plinary measures being determined by the divisional
management. Similarly, the branch manager has no
authority to lay off or recall employees, such decisions
again being reserved to the divisional management.
The training of employees is also a divisional
responsibility,' at least with respect to new employees.
I Contrary to the view expressed by our dissenting colleague, the conclu-
sion that training is a divisional responsibility is indeed supported by the
record As stated by Richardson in his uncontroverted testimony in 215
NLRB No. 18 (Case 3-RC-5855)
Q How is training accomplished for installers?
A. Training is a divisional function The division manager has the
responsibility for training his employees and our training is two-fold,
classroom training and field training . Classroom training includes the
technical book work that's required in order to familiarize them with
the technical aspects of our equipment and the field training is simply
familiarization with the physical installation and service of our tele-
phone equipment in the field
Q Where's the classroom training accomplished?
177
Subsequent training which may be required on new
equipment is conducted at the branch level.
Special incentive pay plans, such as group bonuses
paid for exceeding certain specified levels of installation
activity, are determined by the divisional manager.
As to interchange within the division, the evidence
introduced at the hearing did not purport to be com-
plete, because the evidence of temporary transfers, in
particular, could be obtained only from perusing all of
.the individual timesheets , which was described as being
a "virtually impossible" task. A sampling, however,
covering what the witness described as `the majority"
of transfers evidenced approximately 36 temporary
transfers , during a period commencing in December
1972 and extending to the hearing date in October
1973, of which 31 were specifically read into the record.
The testimony showed that, of these transfers, 12 were
transfers occurring outside the Hartford-Bridgeport
area but within the eastern division, and 10 were across
area lines but within the eastern division.
The specifics in the record as to the identity of the
persons transferred and the length of the transfers leave
something to be desired in the way of clarity. The
dissenting opinion here attempts to dissect this tes-
timony and subject it to microscopic scrutiny, but we
doubt that the nature of the evidence is susceptible to
that close an analysis . For example , there was tes-
timony to the effect that there were 36 temporary trans-
fers as above indicated. Yet the actual list of transfers
read into the record, which, admittedly, was a sam-
pling, does not total to this figure. Similarly, the de-
tailed testimony listed certain separate transfers as oc-
curring in consecutive weeks, all of which the dissent
would construe as being single transfers of more than
one week in duration. At the hearing, however, the
parties stipulated that the records used to refresh the
witness' recollection did not accurately reflect the
amount of time which the person transferred spent in
the location to which he was transferred and further
stipulated that the typical temporary transfer does not
exceed 5 days. Thus, whether the dissent is correct or
incorrect in grouping together all transfers occurring in
consecutive weeks as constituting one single transfer is
a construction of the evidence which may or may not
be accurate.2
A. At the division location in East Hartford for this particular situa-
tion We have consistent seminars that are run in a division in Hartford
where men are brought back for training on new products, training on
existing products. We also have branch training whereby the installa.
tion manager trains his installers the service foreman trains his service
people on a classroom arrangement in the field and we also have train-
ing on-the-job whereby the supervisor , the crew chief, as an example,
would be constantly training his apprentice installers working for him.
It's a constant process of training that's going on within the organiza-
tion, both classroom and field training
In addition , Richardson stated that all employees would be cycled through
Hartford for training and that approximately half of the employees from
Buffalo have already gone to Hartford for training
178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We therefore shun any detailed attempt, on the basis
of the incomplete sampling submitted, to discern pre-
cisely what percentage of man-hours may have been
involved in temporary transfers or the precise nature or
purpose of each transfer. We do conclude that it is plain
enough, upon this record, that the movement of em-
ployees on a temporary basis from location to location
within the division is far from an uncommon
experience3 and is resorted to, as the testimony clearly
shows, not as a result of the growth or expansion of the
Company, but "to accommodate for a heavier work-
load in one branch than exists in the branch from which
the transfer takes place." While the testimony indicates
that individuals are on occasion sent to a new branch
for training, it also indicates that "most of these tempo-
rary transfers . . . are direct results of fluctuation of
business and that has nothing to do with our growth
situation."
Upon the above facts, we conclude that a bargaining
unit limited to a single branch is inappropriate. With
wage increase decisions and key personnel decisions
relating to the selection, promotion, layoff, recall, and
termination of employees all being made effectively at
the divisional level, and with not infrequent movement
of employees within the division in order to accommo-
date workload fluctuations, it would seem to us that the
minimum scope of any unit appropriate for collective
bargaining must necessarily be divisionwide.
We are of this view despite geographical factors
which, as the dissent strenuously argues, present one
factor favoring Petitioner's unit contention. This
Board, however, has not held that geography should or
can be the controlling factor in making unit determina-
tions. And when, as here, all the other factors which we
customarily consider militate against a single branch
unit, we do not deem it proper to give geography con-
trolling significance. We have not done so, for example,
as the dissent in effect concedes, in other cases such as
those arising in the public utility industry.'
2 The difficulty and possible distortion inherent in the dissent's attempts
to bring total certainty out of a less than certain record may be demonstrated
by its conclusions with respect to employee Brown, whom the dissent con-
cludes must have been transferred for a single 6-week period , although the
dissent itself recites that he was transferred both on December 2, 1972, and
on January 19, 1973, dates plainly in excess of 6 weeks apart
3 We disagree with the conclusion of our dissenting colleague that it seems
fair to assume that there were no temporary transfers into or out of Buffalo,
215 NLRB No. 18 (Case 3-RC-5855) While Richardson testified that he
did not know how many temporary transfers there were into or out of
Buffalo because he did not have the records before him, he did testify that
there were numerous temporary transfers throughout the division . He also
testified that if "installers in Buffalo are not being kept busy because of the
fact that there isn't enough work that particular month in that branch then
they can and have gone to another branch where there's more work " (Em-
phasis supplied .) Under these circumstances , we believe it is erroneous to
conclude that there were no temporary transfers into or out of Buffalo.
° We do not base our determination herein on the ground that the inter-
connect industry should be deemed , at this early point in its history and
development , to be directly parallel to the utility industry and governed by
all precedent therein relating to bargaining units It may nevertheless be
We do not seek herein to lay down any definitive
rules as to appropriate units in the interconnect indus-
try. Contrary to our dissenting colleague, however, we
are persuaded that the particular facts of the instant
case demonstrate the inappropriateness of a single-
branch unit here for the specific reasons we have de-
scribed in this opinion.
In view of our unit determination, we do not reach
the question of the supervisory status of the installation
foreman.
We find the requested unit herein inappropriate. As
the Petitioner has not indicated that it desires to pro-
ceed to an election in a broader unit, we shall dismiss
its petition.'
ORDER
It is hereby ordered that the petition filed herein be,
and it hereby is, dismissed.
MEMBER FANNING, dissenting:
In determining whether a unit may be appropriate
the Board's basic statutory standard guiding the exer-
cise of our discretion is Section 9(b) which directs as to
select units to "assure to employees the fullest freedom
in exercising the rights guaranteed by the Act." These
rights, of course, include both joining a labor organiza-
tion or refraining from doing so as provided in Section
7. I submit that if the majority's decision is not cal-
culated to totally deprive the employees, both here and
in 215 NLRB No. 18 (Case 3-RC-5855), of ever hav-
ing the opportunity to exercise such rights it at least
makes the availability of that opportunity illusory. I
further submit that in adopting the Employer's position
the majority is giving primary weight to the administra-
tive convenience of the Employer and ignoring the
.statutory rights of the employees. Since the majority
apparently has lost sight of the basic statutory consid-
eration, my views which are based on long-established
Board principles must be set forth in detail.'
The Board has consistently found that a single-loca-
tion unit in a multi-location enterprise is presumptively
worth noting that our unwillingness to permit geography to be a controlling
factor in unit determination in the utility industry has clearly not resulted
in unit determinations which have proved to be impractical or unworkable;
nor, so far as we know , has it been attacked as an abdication of statutory
responsibility in the manner in which the dissent attacks our finding here
5 Petitioner indicated that it would proceed to an election in both the
Hartford and Bridgeport , Connecticut , branches as a single appropriate unit,
but since we have found that no unit narrower in scope than a divisionwide
unit would be appropriate , and since Petitioner did not indicate its position
if only a unit broader than the Hartford -Bridgeport area should be deter-
mined to be appropriate , we shall dismiss the instant petition.
6 I first note that, contrary to the Employer's position , it is not and should
not be treated as a public utility where the Board has found systemwide units
appropriate because a work stoppage at an individual branch or location may
disrupt the operations of the entire system to the undesirable impairment of
public service . There is no evidence whatsoever that a work stoppage at one
of the Employer's branches would have any impact on the other branches
within the division
NATIONAL TELEPHONE CO., INC.
appropriate.' In deciding whether the presumed ap-
propriateness of a single-location unit of a particular
multilocation enterprise has been overcome in a par-
ticular case , the pertinent concerns are : Is there suffi-
cient local autonomy at the individual location sought?
Is there temporary transfer of employees to and from
other locations and, if so, is it frequent? Is there mean-
ingful geographic separation between the various loca-
tions? Where there is meaningful local supervision on
a day-to-day basis at a single location, infrequent inter-
change of employees from one location to another, and
geographical separation of the location , the Board has
found that employees have a real community of interest
in their daily working conditions such as to make a
single-location unit appropriate!
Since the majority would deprive these employees of
the opportunity to exercise the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act by emphasizing the degree of
centralized control by the Employer , the significance of
that factor deserves some comment . The Board has
consistently recognized the need for centralized ad-
ministration of an employer 's operation of its enter-
prise . It has also recognized that enterprisewide uni-
formity may be advantageous to employers ; however,
it has stressed that, although some lack of uniformity
of working conditions might result, centralized ad-
ministrative control in and of itself is not a valid reason
for denying the right of a separate , homogeneous group
of employees , possessing a clear community of interest,
to express their desires concerning collective represen-
tation . In short, while the Board has the statutory re-
sponsibility not to give controlling weight to the extent
of employee organization , it has likewise until recently
refrained from giving controlling weight to centralized
administrative control based on the extent of the em-
ployer 's administrative organization alone, as the
majority would do herein in total disregard of the em-
ployees' statutory rights.'
The Employer here leases , installs, and services com-
mercial telephone equipment . Its operation , as in many
cases where the Board has found single-location units
appropriate , is marked by a high degree of centralized
administrative control . Thus the Hartford headquar-
ters sets wage levels and fringe benefits , keeps payroll
records and prepares payroll checks, handles all cus-
tomer billing , determines normal working hours, work-
7 Thus the Board has found , among others , single-plant (Temco Aircraft
Corporation, 121 NLRB 1085, fn. 11 (1958)), single-store (Haag Drug
Company, Incorporated, 169 NLRB 877 ( 1968)), single-district insurance
office (Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Woonsocket, R.I.), 156
NLRB 1408 ( 1966)), and single-branch bank (Bank of America National
Trust and Savings Association, 196 NLRB 591 ( 1972)) units presumptively
appropriate.
8 See also Communications Satellite Corporation, 198 NLRB 1204
(1972).
9 See The Kostel Corporation , d/b/a Big Ben Shoe Store, 172 NLRB 1523
(1968), Haag Drug Co., Inc., supra. See also the dissent of Member Jenkins
and me in Frito-Lay, Inc., 202 NLRB 1011 (1973).
179
days, holidays, and vacations, and formulates hiring
and training procedures.l°
This type of centralized control, including the for-
mulation of general labor policies, has frequently been
pointed out by the Board to be little more than record-
.keeping or administrative functions which have little or
no direct relation to the employees' day-to-day work or
their interest in conditions of their employment.
Rather, the significant question, according to Board
decisions,[' is whether substantial autonomy is vested
in the local manager to handle day-to-day problems,
such as rating employees, grievances, discipline, and
hiring and firing, which have a real effect on the local
employees.
Here each branch manager is responsible for all
sales, installation, and service within his branch. As
Richardson, a regional vice president of the Employer
testified in the companion case,12 decided this day, the
branch manager has the ultimate authority as to what
jobs will be done and when they will be done and
coordinates all work within the branch. The majority
states, however, that the implementation of personnel
policies appears to be centered in the divisional man-
agement where authority resides with respect to hiring,
wage increase, serious disciplinary measures, and the
transfer of employees. In my opinion, however, this
conclusion is reached only by accepting the conclusion-
ary self-serving statements of Regional Vice President
Richardson and otherwise totally ignoring the record.
Before discussing hiring and wage increases, some
reference to the budgetary limitations placed on the
branch manager is appropriate since these limitations
do have some effect on his right to hire and recommend
wage increases. Each branch manager is given a budget
which he is free to manage according to his branch's
needs and problems. Thus, Richardson testified that a
branch's allowed expenses are dependent on the
volume of business the branch generates; the branch is
allowed a percentage of that business as an expense
budget. Richardson testified that company headquar-
ters sets this percentage guideline which the branch
manager cannot exceed. However, since the branch
manager is, according to Richardson, ultimately re-
sponsible for sales and installations, it is clear that the
branch manager has significant freedom with respect to
the overall control of his budget and expenses. If he can
increase his sales, he increases his working budget.
For the above reason, Richardson's testimony con-
cerning wage increases must be considered in light of
the budgetary limitations placed on the branch
lO All of these centralized administrative controls, plus others , were pre-
sent in numerous cases where the Board found single-location units appro-
priate. See cases cited in fns. 7, 8, and 9 , supra.
11 See cases in fns. 7, 8, and 9, supra.
12 Case 3-RC-5855, National Telecommunications, Inc., 215 NLRB No.
18 (1974).
180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
manager, for it appears clear that his review of the
branch manager's recommendations for wage increases
are made primarily on the basis of budgetary considera-
tion and not employee qualifications. Thus, Richard-
son testified with regari: to branch managers' recom-
mendations for wage increases:
I would say I overrule them fairly infrequently. I
do change the recommendations quite frequently.
In reviewing budgets, as an example, if I determine
that a branch manager has gone overboard in
terms of his recommendations, then I will cut
those wage increases back, based on the perfor-
mance of his men, which I can calculate from the
review sheet, and their past performance in terms
of installation activities and also based on the
budget he has to work under. I can quite frequently
reduce their recommendations for increases ... .
I would say between the rejection of the recom-
mendations and the changes in the recommenda-
tions, 25 % of the time , again taking a flying guess
at it . [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, what the majority characterizes as an es-
timated 25-percent change in wage increase recommen-
dations, Richardson, after first testifying that such
changes were infrequent, characterized his 25-percent
estimate as a "flying guess." Moreover, stripped of the
doubletalk, Richardson's testimony appears to indicate
that he reviews the branch managers' recommenda-
tions for wage increases primarily from a budgetary
standpoint and changes those recommendations only
when the branch manager exceeded his budget.
Likewise, although the majority stresses that hiring
and firing decisions are made on the divisional level, it
relies again only on Richardson 's generalized self-serv-
ing testimony; for the record shows that Richardson
infrequently, if ever, overrules a branch manager's
recommendations. Moreover, it appears that when he
does change such a recommendation that it is from the
standpoint of whether the branch's expense budget or
business can tolerate the expense rather than because
he is dissatisfied with the applicant's capabilities. Thus,
in describing "how a hiring is made from start to fin-
ish," Richardson testified:
The ultimate authority, the ultimate individual re-
sponsible for that kind of thing, is the branch
manager . It is his duty and responsibility to ana-
lyze the requirements of his branch on a consistent
basis . If he determines from that analysis that an
individual is required . . . in installation . . . then
he goes about a personnel search , finds that in-
dividual, interviews that individual, and if he feels
that individual is qualified, recommends that spe-
cific individual to be hired. . . . That recommen-
dation is submitted to an officer of the company.
I would review it. Quite frequently I would
interview the individual . . . . [Emphasis
supplied.]
Richardson then indicated that he reviews applica-
tions on two different bases: (1) whether the branch
needs a man, and (2) whether the person recommended
is capable. He further testified that, once he determines
that the additional man recommended is required:
I would be very reluctant to turn down [the branch
manager's] recommendation, and in most cases-I
probably would not . . . because . . . I have con-
siderable confidence in all our managers.. . .
It is therefore clear that the branch manager, in ef-
fect, hires his own employees since Richardson not
only is extremely reluctant to overrule the recommen-
dation of the branch manager but probably would not.
The majority states that very limited disciplinary
authority is granted to the branch manager with all
serious disciplinary measures being determined by divi-
sional management. This statement finds absolutely no
support on the record. At the instant hearing when
asked if the, branch managers have authority to invoke
disciplinary measures less than termination, Richard-
son testified that branch managers can withhold the
pay of an employee out on unauthorized leave, chastise
employees for poor performance, and withhold an em-
ployee's use of tools and vehicles if the employee does
not comply with company policy. He testified to
the same effect in 215 NLRB No. 18 (Case
3-RC-5855). On cross-examination in the instant case,
Richardson was asked "what would be the procedure
in something less than a termination ." He answered:
[The reprimand] would be made through the chain
of command to the branch manager who would
make the decision as to whether the reprimand was
effected or not. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear that all disciplinary authority except termi-
nation is vested in the branch manager and the record,
when dealing with particulars and not Richardson's
generalized self-serving statements , nowhere shows
otherwise. And as to the ultimate form of discipline,
termination, Richardson testified:
Q. How often do you overrule a [branch
manager 's] recommendation to terminate?
A. I can't recall of an instance where I overruled
a decision to terminate.... If it is that bad where
he has to be terminated, then I usually go along
with the branch manager.
It is thus clear that, contrary to the majority, and
Richardson 's self-serving generalized statements, in
NATIONAL TELEPHONE CO., INC. 181
fact, all discipline originates at and is effected at the
branch level by the branch manager.
The majority states that the branch manager has no
authority to layoff and recall employees, such authority
being vested in the divisional level. Yet in 215 NLRB
No. 18 (Case 3-RC-5855), it was conceded that there
had never been a layoff and that the question was there-
fore hypothetical. Richardson testified in response to
the hypothetical that layoffs would be handled like
hirings and terminations. If so, that would mean that
the branch manager would, in fact, be responsible for
them since Richardson has never overruled a branch
manager 's recommendation to terminate an employee
and "probably would not" overrule a branch manager's
recommendation to hire an employee.
The majority states, again relying on Richardson's
generalized self-serving testimony, that the training of
employees is also a divisional responsibility with re-
spect to new employees, although subsequent training
on new equipment is conducted at the branch level.
This statement finds no support on the record. In 215
NLRB No. 18, Richardson discussed training in detail.
Among other things, he testified:
We have consistent seminars that are run . . . in
Hartford where men are brought back for training
on new products, training on existing products.
We also have branch training whereby the installa-
tion manager trains his installers . . . on a class-
room arrangement in the field and we also have
training on the job ... whereby the supervisor
... would be constantly training his apprentice
installers.... [Emphasis supplied.]
On cross-examination, Richardson testified:
Q. Would you agree with me when I say that the
bulk of the training is done primarily in Buffalo?
A. Yes, I would say that would be a fair. . . .
It thus appears, contrary to the majority, that the
branch manager is primarily responsible for the train-
ing of his employees.
To sum up, the branch manager is, in effect, respon-
sible for hiring, firing, wage increases, promotions,
training, and discipline. In addition, Richardson testi-
fied that the branch manager assigns the work, handles
employee grievances, approves overtime, grants time
off, changes working hours on a job when necessary,
orders reductions in pay for unauthorized absences,
and can within his discretion allow additional sick days
beyond the number set by company policy. It is there-
fore clear that the branch manager, although he oper-
ates within the framework of centrally established per-
sonnel policies, has the responsibility for the day-to-day
supervision of the branch employees, which the Board
has heretofore considered to be of paramount signifi-
cance in making unit determinations." The majority,
contrary to Board precedent, has given primary weight
to the administrative convenience or organization of
the Employer in total disregard of the employees' statu-
tory rights.
Another criterion usually considered significant in
determining if a single-branch unit is appropriate is
geographical separation; and I say "usually" because
the majority chooses to ignore this factor, and for obvi-
ous reasons. Thus, according to standard road maps
the approximate distance from each of the branches to
Hartford are: 14
From Appx.
Bridgeport , Conn. 54
Providence , R.I. 74
Manchester , N.H. 136
Camden , N.J. 207
Philadelphia, Pa. 208
Syracuse , N.Y. 256
Buffalo , N.Y. 391
It is also interesting to note some of the other dis-
tances between branch offices, particularly the dis-
tances between Buffalo. and the others. Thus: 15
Appx.
From To Miles
Buffalo Hartford ,'Conn. 391
Buffalo Syracuse , N.Y. 149
Buffalo Philadelphia, Pa. 356
Buffalo Camden, N.J.
Buffalo Bridgeport , Conn. 396
Buffalo Manchester , N.H. 434
Buffalo Providence , R.I. 441
Phila.-Camden Syracuse , N.Y. 260
Phila.-Camden Manchester , N.H. 325
Phila.-Camden Bridgeport , Conn. 149
Phila.-Camden Providence , R.I. 268
Syracuse Bridgeport , Conn. 261
Syracuse Manchester , N.H. 287
Syracuse Providence , R.I. 294
The majority also relies on the amount of inter-
change among branches in finding only a divisionwide
unit appropriate. Richardson, the Employer's vice
president, testified as to a sample he had taken of tem-
porary transfers, which the Board has always consid-
ered the significant factor in discussing interchange, is
concededly ambiguous or, as the majority states,
13 See Communications Satellite Corp., supra, where this unanimous
Board found the requisite degree of local autonomy existed where the de-
gree of centralized control was much stronger than in this case. See also the
cases cited in fns . 7 and 9.
14 Note particularly that Buffalo, New York, sought by a different peti-
tioner as a separate unit in 215 NLRB No. 18, is 391 miles from Hartford,
hardly within the geographical proximity of Hartford even in the age of the
jet plane.
15 Camden is just across the bridge from Philadelphia, at most a distance
of 5-7 miles from center-city to center-city. Therefore the distances be-
tween the various branches and Camden are approximately the same as from
Philadelphia.
182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"leaves something to be desired." I agree . For this
reason, the majority states that the evidence is not sus-
ceptible to the close analysis that I have attempted.
Maybe so, but it is all we have. Moreover, the Em-
ployer knew that, in contending that only a division-
wide unit was appropriate, it would have to show that
the amount of interchange involved was substantial
enough to preclude a single-branch unit. And this is
particularly true because such evidence is peculiarly
within the Employer's knowledge. The majority,
however, accepts the Employer's failure to provide
what it considers satisfactory evidence of interchange
and instead shuns any detailed attempts to analyze
interchange by merely asserting that the movement of
employees on a temporary basis is far from an uncom-
mon experience. I am unwilling to deprive the em-
ployees herein of their statutory right to "the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by the Act"
because the Employer failed to provide what the
majority apparently considers adequate evidence on
which to make a determination with respect to the
amount of interchange. Since only the Employer's fig-
ures are available, I have used them, and conclude that
the amount of temporary interchange between the Em-
ployer's branch offices is at best minimal . My reasons
follow.
Richardson read into the record a list of 31 transfers
that had occurred within a year from the date of the
hearing, October 16, 1973. Later in the hearing he
testified that his list included a total of 36 temporary
transfers, although there is some question, again the
record is not clear, as to whether the period in which
the 36 transfers occurred was a year or a year and a
half. In the companion case, 215 NLRB No. 18, de-
cided this day, although he was not very specific and
offered no data, Richardson testified that there were
about-30 to 40 divisionwide transfers in the last year.
Of the 31 temporary transfers Richardson read into
the record, at least 7 cannot, in my opinion, be consid-
ered transfers for the following reasons . When Rich-
ardson originally testified, he noted after each transfer
the duration of the same. Later, however, he admitted
error as to the duration of these transfers, and as a
result the parties stipulated that the duration of the
transfers were inaccurate and should be ignored. The
reason for this stipulation was obvious; Richardson
testified that one Brown was transferred from Bridge-
port to Hartford for the weeks beginning December 2,
1972, December 23, 1972, December 30, 1972, and
January 19, 1973. Later he admitted Brown had been
transferred for about 6 weeks during that period of
time . Obviously this constituted one transfer and not
three or four as Richardson had first testified.16 Like-
16 The majority concludes that because the January 19, 1973, transfer
occurred beyond the 6-week period testified to by Richardson it shows the
wise, Richardson indicated separate 1 week transfers
for McDonald, Castelot, McCuda, Baldwin, and Saulin
or 10 transfers when, in fact, each of the 5 was trans-
ferred only for 1 consecutive 2-week period. In short,
there were 24, giving the majority the benefit of the
doubt on Brown, and not 31, transfers.
Accepting the list that Richardson read into the
record-in spite of the majority's protestations it is the
only evidence available-the number of temporary
transfers in evidence was 24 and not 36. An analysis of
these 24 transfers is interesting. Thus, within the last
year there were only 6 and not, as stated by majority,
14 transfers between Hartford and Bridgeport and 7
instead of 10 transfers between Hartford, Bridgeport,
and other branches. Of the 11 remaining transfers (the
majority states there were 12) among the other bran-
ches (excluding Hartford and Bridgeport) 8 were be-
tween the Camden, New Jersey, and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, branches. Camden is just over the bridge
from Philadelphia." In addition, two of these trans-
fers, between Providence, Rhode Island, and Manches-
ter, New Hampshire, occurred approximately the same
time the new Manchester branch opened." In my
opinion, it is fair to assume the two temporary transfers
to Manchester were a result of the new opening and
that such transfers will not be necessary when all the
eastern division branches become stabilized with re-
spect to manpower. Thus, it appears that there was
only one temporary transfer of the type the Board con-
siders significant among the four other eastern division
branches. 19
Three of the temporary transfers to Hartford were
from branches other than Bridgeport. Richardson testi-
difficulty and possible distortion inherent in my attempt to bring certainty
out of an uncertain record Notwithstanding the majority 's quibble, three of
the so-called transfers did occur within the 6-week period testified to by
Richardson . These purported transfers should be counted as one transfer
and not three or even four as the Employer has done However, since the
majority objects to the purported January 19 transfer as being outside the
6-week period, I will give them the benefit of the doubt and count the four
purported transfers as two in my calculations
17 Because of the lack of geographical separation between Camden and
Philadelphia and the number of temporary transfers between these two
branches, I might find that Camden or Philadelphia do not constitute sepa-
rate appropriate units, and that only a Camden-Philadelphia unit is appropri-
ate Of course, that issue was neither fully explored nor is it before the Board
at this time
Is This is established by the fact that three of the six permanent transfers
testified to by Richardson, which occurred at approximately the same time
as these two temporary transfers , were to Manchester and according to
Richardson's testimony resulted from the fact that the Manchester branch
had just been opened.
19 This is of significance with regard to the companion case, 215 NLRB
No 18, decided this day, because the list provided by Richardson shows no
transfers to or from Buffalo Moreover, Richardson , who testified in the
Buffalo case , 10 days after the hearing herein (October 26, 1973), testified
that he did not know how many temporary transfers there were in and out
of Buffalo Thus his sample of transfers introduced herein shows no transfers
to or from Buffalo Based on both records it seems fair to assume there were
none. The fact that there was no interchange to or from Buffalo also explains
why the majority used this case to find only a divisionwide unit appropriate
and then merely cited this case to dismiss the petition in the Buffalo case
NATIONAL TELEPHONE CO., INC. 183
feed that temporary transfers occurred for two reasons.
The first is because of business fluctuations or the need
for manpower in another branch, which he testified
accounts for most transfers. He also testlfied'that em-
ployees are transferred for training purposes. This in-
cludes either sending an experienced employee to
another branch or sending new employees to Hartford
for classroom training. Since in 215 NLRB No. 18
Richardson placed great emphasis on training, particu-
larly classroom training , it would appear that at least
a few of the transfers to Hartford were for this purpose.
This type of transfer, however, is not considered signifi-
cant to our inquiry as such transfers are not considered
evidence of functional integration among the
branches.20
By either standard, the majority's figure of 36 trans-
fers for the last year or the actual number of transfers
supplied by the Employer, the amount of interchange
is at best minimal . Thus, using the Employer's cor-
rected figure of 24 transfers and original length of time
given by Richardson as to the duration of these
transfers'21 the total percentage of transfer man-hours
is .93 of the total number of man-hours worked by all
installers in the division.22 Actually, using the figures
relied on by the majority (36 transfers) at an average of
1 week per transfer, the percentage of overall transfer
hours would be even smaller or .87.
Using the number of transfers between Hartford and
Bridgeport provided by the Employer, and as corrected
supra; the percentage of transfer hours to total man-
hours for those two branches is 1.8.23 Thus, even the
amount of interchange between Hartford and Bridge-
port, only 54 miles apart, is at best minimal . Based on
the Employer's figures, again .as corrected, the percent-
age of transfer to total manpower hours between Hart-
ford, Bridgeport, and the other six branches, is .22.24
Finally, the percentage of transfer hours to total man-
power hours for transfers among the branches when
transfers to and from Hartford and Bridgeport are ex-
cluded is .36.25
If the majority's figure (36) is used, the result is not
significantly different on a percentage basis for the rea-
sons explained in footnote 21. The seriousness of ac-
cepting the majority's figure only becomes important if
the majority prefers to speak of transfers in whole num-
bers rather than percentages. There is some difference
between 24 and 36 transfers. In any event, by any
standard the amount of interchange must be considered
minimal and not sufficient to destroy the presumptive
appropriateness of the Hartford unit sought
herein.26
By finding only a divisionwide unit appropriate, the
majority is ignoring its statutory responsibility to "as-
sure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by the Act." Based on the factors
usually considered determinative in such cases, includ-
ing local autonomy vested in the branch manager, geo-
graphical separation, minimal interchange, and the fact
that there is no history of bargaining and no union
seeks to represent a broader unit, I would find the
Hartford branch an appropriate unit.
20 Richardson testified that there are two basic reasons for temporary
transfers ' business fluctuations and training The majority emphasizes Ri-
chardson 's self-serving testimony that most temporary transfers are due to
business fluctuations and not for training purposes Yet, I note that Richard-
son stressed as a means of showing centralized administrative control that
training is a divisional and not a local responsibility The majority relies on
Richardson 's testimony However, with respect to training , Richardson tes-
tified in 215 NLRB No 18 that 1 / 2 or four of the eight installers in Buffalo
had been sent to Hartford for training , in spite of the fact that the record
in 215 NLRB No 18 shows no temporary transfers to or from Buffalo. I
submit that the Employer, and the majority, cannot have it both ways
Either the Buffalo employees were sent to Hartford for training, which
shows some degree of centralized administrative control at least with re-
spect to training , but also shows that a substantial number of transfers were
for training purposes and thus not significant in determining the degree of
functional integrations , or they were not
2i Although the parties stipulated that the duration of each transfer as
given by Richardson should be considered inaccurate and therefore should
be ignored , I will use those figures since they put the Employer's case in the
best possible light For example , I have used the full 6 weeks of Brown's
transfer although the parties stipulated that the typical transfer does not
exceed 1 week In addition, although some of the transfers were admittedly
for less than a week. I have used at least 1 full week for each transfer.
Similarly, the other employees mentioned above were given credit for 2
weeks in all the computations that follow
22 This computation is based on 2,080 man-hours per man per year (40
hours per week times 52 weeks) I also used the figure given by the employer
of 80 installers in the division
If the working installation foremen, two per branch, whom I would not
find to be supervisors, are included , the percentage of transfer hours
becomes 78 of the total man-hours worked, and if the majority's figures are
used the percentage is even lower or 72
23 If the working foremen are included in this figure , the percentage
becomes 1 4
24 If the hours of the working foremen are included , this percentage
becomes 12 of total manpower hours
25 If the working foremen are exluded, this figure becomes .29 However,
if we exclude the transfers between Camden , New Jersey , and Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (eight to eleven ), we have a percentage of 14 Including
foremen, the percentage is 13
26 However , if the Hartford-Bridgeport interchange (six instances in 1
year) were considered substantial , which I do not , then at worst a
Hartford -Bridgeport unit might be considered appropriate , lust as a Cam-
den-Philadelphia unit might be appropriate