Narayanan Aravind et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 13, 2019

14707155 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 13, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/707,155 05/08/2015 Narayanan ARAVIND 83529864 1004
28395 7590 09/13/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
WU, ZHEN Y
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/13/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte NARAYANAN ARAVIND, VM DEVADAS,
SREEKANTH V S, and VYAMAJALA RADHA
____________________

Appeal 2018-008732
Application 14/707,155
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

STATEMENT OF CASE2
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 Appellants indicate the real party in interest is Ford Global Technologies,
LLC. App. Br. 2.
2 All citations herein to the “Final Action” are to a Final Action mailed on
October 18, 2017.
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Illustrative Claim3
Illustrative claim 1 under appeal reads as follows (emphases,
formatting, and bracketed material added):
1. A system comprising:
[A.] a processor configured to:
[i.] receive destination input;
[ii.] request contact input from a vehicle occupant to
which notification is to be made when a destination is
reached;
[iii.] recognize when a vehicle has reached a
destination specified by the destination input; and
[iv.] automatically notify a contact associated with the
contact input when the vehicle reaches the destination.
Reference
Creech US 2013/0307707 Al Nov. 21, 2013
Rejections4
A.
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3–7, 9, 11–15, and 17–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Creech. Final Act. 8–13.
We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this rejection.
Separate patentability, in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv), is not
argued for claims 3–7, 9, 11–15, and 17–20 (“Under each heading
identifying the ground of rejection being contested, any claim(s) argued

3 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) citations herein are to
MPEP Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
4 The Examiner states, “[t]he rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 USC § 101
[sic] has been withdrawn in view of applicant’s arguments.” Ans. 3.
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separately or as a subgroup shall be argued under a separate subheading that
identifies the claim(s) by number.”). Appellants’ independent claim 15
argument (App. Br. 12) does not comply with the rule and has not been
considered. Except for our ultimate decision, we do not address the § 103
rejection of claims 3–7, 9, 11–15, and 17–20 further herein.
B.
The Examiner rejects claims 2, 8, 10, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over various combinations of Creech and additional
references. Final Act. 13–16.
Appellants do not present separate patentability arguments for claims
2, 8, 10, and 16. To the extent that claim 8 is discussed, Appellants merely
repeat for claim 8 the notification occurs before arrival argument directed to
claim 1. We do not construe a repeated argument as an argument for
“separate patentability.” Thus, the rejections of these claims turn on our
decision as to claim 1. Except for our ultimate decision, claims 2, 8, 10, and
16 are not further addressed herein.

Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious?

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments (Appeal Brief) that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with
Appellants’ conclusions. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from
which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We concur
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with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following
additional points.
A. First Contention
Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
[In Creech,] the monitoring is activated at a remote location
[0011] (such as by a bus passenger). Thus, Creech not only fails
to teach or suggest “request contact input from a vehicle
occupant to which notification is to be made when a destination
is reached,” but that limitation does not make sense under the
teachings of Creech (because passengers and bus drivers are not
taught to, nor would, add contact information of non-
passengers).
App. Br. 10.
As to Appellants’ above assertion, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred. Rather, we agree with the reasons set forth by the
Examiner. Particularly:
From page 9 to page 11 second paragraph [of the Appeal
Brief], applicant appears to argue Creech’s user is not a vehicle
occupant and is not obvious to modify the user to be a vehicle
occupant. Therefore, Creech fails to teach the claim limitation.
However, the claimed invention is a system or apparatus.
According to MPEP section 2114, subsection II states “A claim
containing a ‘recitation with respect to the manner in which a
claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not
differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus’ if
the prior art apparatus teaches all the structural limitations of the
claim”. In other words, the claimed invention of a vehicle
occupant inputs the contact information does not structurally
differentiate from Creech’s user input monitoring
system. . . . The difference is the person who inputs the contact
information but the intended use by the vehicle occupant to input
the contact information instead of another person does not make
the claimed system structurally different than Creech’s
monitoring and notification system.
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Ans. 5–6 (emphasis added).
B. Second Contention
Appellants also contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Applicant points out that Creech states “an advantage of the
present invention is that a particular vehicle can be monitored . . .
and a user can be notified when the arrival of the vehicle at a
predefined destination is imminent.” Thus, the idea of Creech is
that notification occurs before the vehicle arrives, not when the
vehicle arrives. This is because, as noted, Creech is about
tracking transportation vehicles like busses, and knowing when
the bus has actually arrived likely means that it is too late to catch
the bus. Thus, the noted limitations are also not anticipated by
Creech, as Creech is concerned with notification prior to arrival,
not upon arrival.
App. Br. 11 (emphasis modified).
As to Appellants’ above assertion, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred. Rather, we agree with the reasons set forth by the
Examiner. First, we particularly agree:
From page 11, third paragraph to page 12 [of the Appeal
Brief], applicant appears to argue Creech fails to teach claim
limitation “automatically notify a contact associated with the
contact input when the vehicle reaches the destination” as
recited in claim 1 and similarly presented in claims 7 and 15.
In response, Creech at paragraphs [0042] and [0085]
disclose the message system updates and notifies the contact
when the vehicle reaches a destination location or within a
proximity of the destination. Also depicted in Fig. 7, a vehicle
reached destination would satisfies step 151 as being within the
proximity of the destination to automatically transmit a message
to the contact.
In addition, Creech’s abstract discloses “[w]hen the
vehicle is a predetermined proximity from the location identified
by the location data (i.e., arrival of the vehicle at the location is
imminent), the data manager automatically transmits a
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notification message to the user at the remote location.”[] Since
the claim language fails to define “the destination” is a point
destination or an area destination, then by using broadest
reasonable interpretation, the area that triggers the notification of
imminent arrival is being interpreted as a destination which
meets the claim limitation.
Ans. 6–7 (emphasis added).
Second, we agree with the Examiner’s finding (Final Act. 8) that
Creech teaches notification of an impending arrival based on proximity.
When the monitoring mechanism 69 determines that a user
should be notified of an impending arrival of a VCU 15, the
monitoring mechanism 69 is designed to send a notification
command to message manager 82. The notification command
may include travel data to be sent to the user, such as data
indicating that a particular vehicle is [at] a certain proximity
from the destination defined by the preference data.
Creech 55 (emphasis added).
For example, the user can be prompted to select a VCU 15, a
destination (or other particular location), and a notification
preference to indicate a time or distance that the VCU 15 should
be from the selected destination or other particular location
when a notification is to be sent to the user. In response, the
user specifies, through any known suitable communications
technique, which VCU 15 the user wishes the system 10 to
monitor and how the user wishes to be notified of an impending
arrival of the selected VCU 15 at the selected destination.
Creech 57 (emphasis added). Based thereon, the Examiner further reasons
that “[i]t is obvious . . . to notify the contact upon the arrival of the vehicle.”
Final Act. 9. We agree. We conclude that Creech’s “impending arrival” is
reasonably suggestive of actual arrival.
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C. Other Teachings in Creech
Although not necessary to affirm the Examiner’s rejection, we find
the following additional teaching (not cited by the Examiner) in Creech
suggestive of and/or explicitly teaching the argued claim features:
Thus, generally, it is desirable to know when a vehicle (such as
a bus, truck, train, plane, user, or the like) is (a) a particular time
period (for example, a certain number of minutes or seconds)
away from arriving at a destination, (b) a particular distance (for
example, number of feet or miles) away from the destination, or
(c) at a particular location among a set of predetermined
location points.
Creech 8 (emphasis added).
First, the example of vehicle including a “user” is suggestive that the
user can be a vehicle occupant as claimed.
Second, the statement “it is desirable to know when a vehicle . . . is
. . . at a particular location” teaches the claimed “when the vehicle reaches
the destination.”

CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–20 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(2) Claims 1–20 are not patentable.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED