Naomi Pena, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast/Southwest areas), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 12, 1999
01971765 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 12, 1999)

01971765

03-12-1999

Naomi Pena, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast/Southwest areas), Agency.


Naomi Pena v. United States Postal Service

01971765

March 12, 1999

Naomi Pena, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01971765

v. ) Agency No. 4G-7601245-95

) Hearing No. 310-96-5139X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service )

(Southeast/Southwest areas), )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

Appellant timely appealed the final decision of the United States Postal

Service (agency), concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted by the

Commission in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.

Appellant filed a formal complaint alleging that the agency discriminated

against her on the basis of national origin (Hispanic) when: (1) she

was denied a schedule change on March 23, 1995, to fill a posted detail

position of Claims and Inquiry Clerk (EAS11); and (2) she was not made

available to fill a posted detail position of Account Representative in

June, 1995. Following the agency's investigation, a hearing took place

before an administrative judge (AJ) who subsequently issued a recommended

decision of no discrimination. The agency thereafter adopted the AJ's

findings and recommendation. It is from this decision that appellant

now appeals.

Appellant, a Window Clerk, was permanently assigned to the Trinity River

Station. The record reveals that appellant's manager (RO) permitted her

to leave her assigned station to serve in detailed positions during the

months of January, March, and September, 1995<1>.

In approximately, late March, 1995, appellant was selected to be one of

five individuals who would rotate in one-month details into a Claims

and Inquiry Clerk position. However, appellant was not released by

RO to accept the detail. The other individuals who were selected

for details worked in another location under a different supervisor.

Sometime thereafter, appellant was chosen for a different detail as

Account Representative but was not permitted by RO to accept the detail.

The detail would have begun in June, 1995 for an undetermined period

of time.

The record further reveals that during the relevant time period, the

Window Clerk positions were understaffed at the Trinity River Station.

Two Window Clerks were absent for an extended period of time; one absence

related to a pregnancy and the other absence related to a serious

medical condition. In addition, the record reveals that all Window

Clerks were permitted, pursuant to collective bargaining agreements,

to take vacations during the summer months and accordingly, management

anticipated a shortage of staff during that time period.

The record also indicates that in December, 1995, RO made arrangements

for appellant to receive the Account Representative detail (the same

position he did not release appellant to work in during the summer

of 1995). Appellant began this detail on January 8, 1996.

The AJ found that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case

of national origin discrimination because she failed to show that a

similarly situated employee, outside her protected class, was permitted a

detail during the relevant time period. With respect to the Claims and

Inquiry Detail, appellant's co-selectees were selected by a different

supervisor. In addition, the AJ noted that the co-selectees were not

selected to replace appellant. The selectees were chosen as a group

to serve on a rotating detail. Moreover, no individual was selected to

replace appellant. With respect to the Account Representative detail,

the individual who ultimately filled the detail was not chosen by RO

and did not work in appellant's duty station.

The AJ also determined that the agency articulated a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. The record reveals

that the agency permitted appellant the opportunity to serve on details

before and after it denied appellant the two details during the late

spring/summer of 1995. The agency also explained that, in addition

to having the normal summer-time scheduling difficulties, two of the

station's regular Window Clerks were out for extended periods. Moreover,

the record reveals that replacement clerks are arranged months in

advance, making it difficult to obtain additional clerks on short notice.

Accordingly, the agency denied appellant's detail because it anticipated

a Window Clerk shortage during the late spring/summer of 1995.

The AJ also found that appellant failed to show, by a preponderance

of evidence, that the agency's articulated reasons for its employment

action were pretextual to hide national origin discrimination. The AJ

specifically found RO's testimony credible and more logical than

appellant's assertions that a higher official (PM) made the decision

to deny appellant the details rather than RO. According to appellant,

RO advised her that PM made the employment decision. In addition,

appellant's former acting supervisor testified that RO told him that PM

decided that appellant could not go on any future details until further

notice. While the AJ found, based upon PM and RO's testimony, that

PM was not the responsible official, even assuming PM was responsible

for refusing appellant's detail, the record is devoid of any specific

probative evidence which suggests that PM's employment decision was

based upon discriminatory motives.

After a careful review of the entire record, including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission finds

that the AJ's recommended decision properly analyzed appellant's complaint

as a disparate treatment claim. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993);

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981).

The Commission concludes that, in all material respects, the AJ accurately

set forth the facts giving rise to the complaint and the law applicable

to the case. We further find that the AJ correctly determined that

appellant failed to establish discrimination based on national origin.

We also find that appellant's contentions on appeal are without merit. For

instance, she alleges that because employees who worked in her station

were detailed during the relevant period she sufficiently presented a

prima facie case of discrimination. In addition, appellant asserts that

the agency did not articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for its employment conduct. The record indicates that those employees

outside appellant's protected class who shared the same supervisor as

appellant, did not share the same position, or even a substantially

similar position, as appellant. Accordingly, the Commission agrees

with the AJ in finding that the record is devoid of similarly situated

individuals who were treated more favorably than appellant. In addition,

we agree with the AJ in finding that the agency articulated a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its employment action; that it anticipated

it would be understaffed during the relevant time period. Accordingly,

it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to

AFFIRM the agency's final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS -- ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

3/12/99

_______________ _______________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

1Each detail lasted approximately one month.