MuSigma Business Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 30, 2020

14150735 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/150,735 01/08/2014 Dhiraj Rajaram 17033-000010-US 1099
30593 7590 03/30/2020
HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, P.L.C.
P.O. BOX 8910
RESTON, VA 20195
EXAMINER
STARKS, WILBERT L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2122
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
dcmailroom@hdp.com
jcastellano@hdp.com
jhill@hdp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DHIRAJ RAJARAM
____________

Appeal 2019–001248
Application 14/150,735
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before: JOHN A. EVANS, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and MICHAEL T.
CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final rejection of claims 1–20. App. Br. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies MuSigma Business Solutions Pvt.
Ltd., as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we
refer to the Appeal Brief filed June 8, 2018, (“App. Br.”); the Reply Brief
(none filed); the Examiner’s Answer mailed September 27, 2018, (“Ans.”);
the Final Action mailed May 17, 2017, (“Final Act.”); and the Specification
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims relate to a data management system. See Abstract.
Invention
Claims 1 and 14 are independent. An understanding of the invention
can be derived from a reading of claim 1, which is reproduced in Table 1.
Rejections3
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to an
abstract idea. Final Act. 2–9.
Claims 14–20 stand additionally rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as not
directed to a statutory class. Final Act 2.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of claims 1–5, 8–10, and 12–20 in
light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered
in this Decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Brief.
Any other arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to
make in the Brief are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

filed January 8, 2014, (“Spec.”) for their respective details.
3 The present application was examined under the pre-AIA first to invent
provisions. Final Act. 2.
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We provide the following explanation to highlight and address specific
arguments and findings primarily for emphasis.

CLAIMS 14–20: STATUTORY CLASS.
The preamble of independent Claim 14 recites: “[a]n analytical
problem defining tool configured to identify at least one attribute
contributing to a problem for which a corresponding statement is received
the data management tool comprising.”
The Examiner finds Claim 14 recites a “tool,” but fails to recite a
statutory class, i.e., an “apparatus,” “method,” “product of manufacture,” or
“composition of matter.”
Appellant contends a machine is defined as “a concrete thing,
consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices [] This
includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and
devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.”
Appeal Br. 24 (quoting MPEP § 2106). Appellant argues the claimed “tool”
comprises mechanical parts. Id.
The Examiner finds Appellant contends “the current claims do not
recite ‘memory circuitry.’” Final Act. 8.4 Therefore, in view of Appellant’s
contention, the Examiner finds Appellant has excluded “standard computer
memories from the definition of ‘memory’” and is estopped from asserting
that the recited memory includes “standard computer memory in the future
via file wrapper estoppel.” Id.

4 Quoting “Argument 3,” but without a pin cite to the Appeal Brief.
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We have reviewed Appellant’s statements and the Examiner’s
rejection. We disagree with the Examiner that Appellant is estopped from
asserting that the recited “memory” encompasses “standard computer
memory” and that claim 14–20 do not recite a statutory class of subject
matter We decline to sustain the rejection of Claims 14–20.
Claims 1–20: INELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant argues these claims as a group without specific reference to
the recitations of any specific claim. Therefore, we decide the appeal of the
35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection on the basis of illustrative Claim 1 and refer to the
rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(iv); see also In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

Appellant contends “under recent precedential Federal Circuit
decisions and the subsequent USPTO memorandum that control the
examination guidelines for 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejections, the § 101 rejection is
improper.” Appeal Br. 11. Based upon our review of the record in light of
recent policy guidance with respect to patent-eligible subject matter rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we affirm the rejection of the claims for the specific
reasons discussed below.5
Preemption
Appellant contends the claims do not pose any risk of preempting, or
monopolizing, any idea the Office may identify as abstract. See Appeal Br.
8–9. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does

5 See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.”).
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not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning, IP, LLC v. Iatric
Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a
patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and
made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
We conduct such an analysis below.
35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” See 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court
has long recognized, however, that 35 U.S.C. § 101 implicitly excludes
“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm of
patent-eligible subject matter, as monopolization of these “basic tools of
scientific and technological work” would stifle the very innovation that the
patent system aims to promote. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–78 (2012); and Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
Under the mandatory Revised Guidance, we reconsider whether
Appellant’s claims recite:

1. any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas
(i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
interactions such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
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processes), and
2. additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim, (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then reach the
issue of whether the claim:
3. adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
4. simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.

A. Whether the claims recite a judicial exception
The Revised Guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts
identified by the courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract-idea
exception includes the following groupings of subject matter, when recited
as such in a claim limitation(s) (that is, when recited on their own or per se):
(a) mathematical concepts,6 i.e., mathematical relationships, mathematical

6 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“The concept of hedging . . .
[reduced] to a mathematical formula . . . . is an unpatentable abstract idea.”).
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formulas, equations,7 and mathematical calculations;8 (b) certain methods of
organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices
(including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions);9 and (c) mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).10
The preamble of independent claim 1 recites: “[an] analytical
problem defining system comprising.” Each limitation, recited in the body
of the claim, is analyzed in Table I against the categories of abstract ideas as

7 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 (“A mathematical formula as such is not accorded
the protection of our patent laws.”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594
(1978) (“[T]he discovery of [a mathematical formula] cannot support a
patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”).
8 SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(holding that claims to a “series of mathematical calculations based on
selected information” are directed to abstract ideas).
9 Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20 (concluding that use of a third party to mediate
settlement risk is a “fundamental economic practice” and thus an abstract
idea); see also Revised Guidance, at 52 n.13 for a more extensive listing of
“certain methods of organizing human activity” that have been found to be
abstract ideas.
10 Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (“[M]ental processes[ ] and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)).
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set forth in the Revised Guidance.
Table I
Claim 1 Revised Guidance, p. 52
[a]11 a memory having computer-
readable instructions stored therein;
and
An additional element that adds
insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception. 84 Fed.
Reg., 55.
[b] a processor configured to
execute the computer-readable
instructions to,
An additional element that adds
insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception. 84 Fed.
Reg., 55.
[c] receive a statement
corresponding to a problem;
An additional element that adds
insignificant extra-solution activity
to the judicial exception, i.e., mere
data-gathering. 84 Fed. Reg., 55.
[d] identify at least one attribute
contributing to the problem by,
creating a situation control question
(SCQ) matrix for the statement in
order to enable one or more users to
define a current state and a desired
state for the problem;
Certain methods of organizing
human activity, i.e., managing
relationships or interactions
between people.
[e] creating a factor map for the
statement in order to enable the one
or more users to enumerate a
plurality of factors contributing to
the problem;
Certain methods of organizing
human activity, i.e., managing
relationships or interactions
between people.
[f] creating a hypothesis matrix with
one or more hypothetical statements
corresponding to the statement to be
Certain methods of organizing
human activity, i.e., managing

11 Step designators, e.g., “[a],” were added to facilitate discussion.
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completed by the one or more users; relationships or interactions
between people.
[g] generate a comprehensive
version of the problem based on the
identified at least one attribute; and
Mental processes, i.e., concepts
performed in the human mind
including observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion.
[h] store the comprehensive version
of the problem for further analysis.
Insignificant extra-solution activity.

In view of Table I, we find limitations [c]–[g] of independent Claim 1 recites
a judicial exception, per se, i.e., certain methods of organizing human
activity and mental processes. For example with respect to Limitation [c],
“[A]ctivity that involves multiple people . . . and thus, certain activity
between a person and a computer . . . may fall within the “certain methods of
organizing human activity” grouping.” October 2019 Update 5. Here, the
claimed invention is designed to enable users to provide input as to, for
example, “the current state of the problem, the desired solution of the
problem, the gaps, and the challenges.” Spec. ¶ 36. Accordingly, the claims
recite managing interactions between people in addressing a problem, and
thus recite an abstract idea.

Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims recite a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above,
we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) wherein we determine
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and
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(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
For the reasons which follow, we conclude that Appellant’s claims do
not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
MPEP § 2106.05(a): “Improvements to the Functioning of a
Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field.”
“In determining patent eligibility, examiners should consider whether
the claim ‘purport(s) to improve the functioning of the computer itself’” or
“any other technology or technical field.” MPEP § 2106.05(a).
With respect to technological improvements, Appellant non-
specifically analogizes to Enfish,12 DDR Holdings,13 and McRO14 and
contends:
the instant claims are directed towards an improved computer
graphical user interface (GUI) that provides an interface for
defining a problem statement, other inputs related to the
problem statement, and a desired solution for the problem that
has been input by a client through the GUI in an unstructured
format, and then generating a structured and well-defined
situation control question (SCQ) matrix that is defined by the
problem and solution.
Appeal Br. 12 (citing generally Spec., ¶¶ 1–7, 20, 33, 35, and 45). Appellant
argues:
As explained in the instant application, the claimed
invention improves conventional computer GUIs by allowing
clients to accurately represent and scope unstructured business
problems and unstructured data associated with the business
problem using the created SCQ matrix that allows the one or

12 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
13 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (2014).
14 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (2016).
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more users to define the current state of the defined problem
and the desired state (e.g., the solution state) of the problem,
and enables accurate data analysis by providing a factor map
and the hypothesis matrix in the graphical user interface that
collects data related to the client's problem, such as a plurality
of factors contributing to the problem, and hypothetical
statements corresponding to the problem, in a structured fashion
through input into the novel SCQ matrix, consequently
improving the data analysis to be performed related to the
defined problem.
Appeal Br. 15.
Appellant discloses:
The invention relates generally to data management systems,
and more particularly to a system and tool for collating data for
a defined problem to enable accurate data analysis.
Spec., ¶ 1 (cited by Appellant). “Data collation or collection is a
common component to all fields of study including physical and social
sciences, humanities, [and] business.” Spec., ¶ 2 (cited by Appellant).
In current data management systems, the data is typically
collected using an unstructured format leading to inadequate
and sometimes irrelevant data. Moreover, some systems employ
using several questions to collect data. However, such questions
are subjected to bias based on the individual(s) framing the
questions and the knowledge of the assignment.
Spec., ¶ 4 (cited by Appellant).
As framed by Appellant, the problem to be solved relates to collection
of unbiased data from individual humans. This problem relates to methods
of organizing human behavior, but not to a technology, per se.
Appellant discloses the claimed data collation system comprises:
a situation control question (SCQ) module configured to create
a SCQ matrix. The SCQ matrix is configured to enable one or
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more users to define a current state and a desired solution of a
problem defined by the problem statement. The data collation
system also comprises a factor map module configured to create
a factor map. The factor map is configured to enable one or
more users to enumerate a plurality of factors that directly
and/or indirectly contribute to the problem. The data collation
system further comprises a hypothesis module configured to
create a hypothesis matrix. The hypothesis matrix is configured
to enable one or more users to formulate one or more
hypotheses based on the problem statement. The data
management system further comprises memory circuitry
coupled to the data collation module and configured to store
data related to the problem statement.
Spec., ¶ 6 (cited by Appellant).
As described by Appellant, the claimed data collation system also
relates to methods of organizing human behavior, but not to a technology,
per se.
Appellant contends “the instant claims are directed towards an
improved computer graphical user interface (GUI).” App. Br. (citing Spec.,
¶¶ 20, 33, 35, and 45). However, none of cited passages disclose technical
improvements to a GUI. Nor is a GUI claimed. The present claims are
directed towards a system which embodies a method. The Alice Court held
that “method claims, which merely require generic computer
implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. 2357. The claims collect data, recognize
certain data within the collected data set, and present the data for display,
which the courts have recognized as abstract. See Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
MPEP § 2106.05(b) Particular Machine
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The Bilski machine-or-transformation test is only applicable to
method (process) claims. Nonetheless, because the “system” (Claim 1) and
“tool” (Claim 14) claims on appeal in the present application embody a
method, we analyze the claims according to the “machine” prong of the
machine-or-transformation test.
Appellant discloses generic computer devices. See Spec. ¶ 6 (“[t]he
data management system further comprises memory circuitry coupled to the
data collation module and configured to store data related to the problem
statement”) and Spec., ¶ 9 (“FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a general purpose
computer implemented according to aspects of the present technique”).
Nor do we find disclosure of anything other than generic computer hardware
or software. Applying the guidance, we conclude Appellant’s claims fail to
satisfy the machine prong of the Bilski machine-or-transformation test.
MPEP § 2106.05(c) Particular Transformation
This section of the MPEP guides: “Another consideration when
determining whether a claim recites significantly more is whether the claim
effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state
or thing.” “Transformation and reduction of an article to a different state or
thing is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include
particular machines.” See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 658 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S.
at 70).
The claims select and analyze certain electronic data. The selection of
electronic data is not a “transformation or reduction of an article into a
different state or thing constituting patent-eligible subject matter[.]” See In
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also
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CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“The mere manipulation or reorganization of data . . . does not satisfy
the transformation prong.”). Applying this guidance here, we conclude
Appellant’s method claims fail to satisfy the transformation prong of the
Bilski machine-or-transformation test.
MPEP § 2106.05(e) Other Meaningful Limitations

This section of the MPEP guides:
Diamond v. Diehr provides an example of a claim that recited
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment.
450 U.S. 175 . . . (1981). In Diehr, the claim was directed to
the use of the Arrhenius equation (an abstract idea or law of
nature) in an automated process for operating a rubber-molding
press. 450 U.S. at 177-78. . . . The Court evaluated additional
elements such as the steps of installing rubber in a press,
closing the mold, constantly measuring the temperature in the
mold, and automatically opening the press at the proper time,
and found them to be meaningful because they sufficiently
limited the use of the mathematical equation to the practical
application of molding rubber products. 450 U.S. at 184, 187
. . . . In contrast, the claims in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea of
mitigating settlement risk. 573 U.S. . . . . In particular, the
Court concluded that the additional elements such as the data
processing system and communications controllers recited in
the system claims did not meaningfully limit the abstract idea
because they merely linked the use of the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment (i.e., “implementation via
computers”) or were well-understood, routine, conventional
activity.
MPEP § 2106.05(e).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
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generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. Similarly as in Alice, we find
that “[t]aking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” Id. “In
short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform
generic computer functions.” Id. We find that Appellant’s claims do not
add meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment.
MPEP § 2106.05(f) Mere Instructions to Apply an Exception
Appellant does not persuasively argue that their claims do any more
than to merely invoke generic computer components merely as a tool in
which the computer instructions apply the judicial exception.

MPEP § 2106.05(g) Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity
The claims acquire, display, and store data, which are classic
examples of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., Bilski, 545 F.3d
at 963 (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.
MPEP § 2106.05(h) Field of Use and Technological Environment

[T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not
wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited
meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token pre- or
post-solution activity—such as identifying a relevant audience,
a category of use, field of use, or technological environment.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We
find the claims manipulate problem data which is simply a field of use that
attempts to limit the abstract idea to a particular technological environment.
We do not find Appellant’s arguments to be persuasive because “[t]he courts
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have also identified examples in which a judicial exception has not been
integrated into a practical application.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55.
The claims fail to recite a practical application where the additional element
does more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular
technological environment or field of use. Id. The mere application of an
abstract idea in a particular field is not sufficient to integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See id. at 55 n.32. In view of the
foregoing, we conclude the claims are “directed to” a judicial exception.
3. Well-understood, routine, conventional
Because the claims recite a judicial exception and do not integrate that
exception into a practical application, we must then reach the issue of
whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception
that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
The written description describes the claimed computer system
consistent with its being “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional:”
Depending on the desired configuration, processor 14 may be
of any type including but not limited to a microprocessor (μP),
a microcontroller (μC), a digital signal processor (DSP), or any
combination thereof.
Spec., ¶ 23.
Depending on the desired configuration, system memory 16
may be of any type including but not limited to volatile memory
(such as RAM), non- volatile memory (such as ROM, flash
memory, etc.) or any combination thereof. System memory 16
may include an operating system 30, one or more data collation
module 32 and data 34.
Spec., ¶ 24.
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4. Specified at a high level of generality
It is indicative of the absence of an inventive concept where the
claims simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
The claims fail to recite any specific steps of an algorithm, nor does
Appellant cite any Specification disclosure for the required specificity.
We find the limitations are specified at such a high level of generality
consistent with the absence of an inventive concept. Considering the claim
limitations as an ordered combination adds nothing to the abstract idea that
is not already present when the limitations are considered separately. See
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. The ordered combination of limitations amounts to
nothing more than certain mental processes implemented with generic
computer components that operate “in a conventional way.” See also Alice,
573 U.S. at 225–26. Therefore, we conclude that none of the claim
limitations, viewed “both individually and as an ordered combination,”
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in order to
sufficiently transform the nature of the claims into patent-eligible subject
matter. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quotations omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 79).
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.§ Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
14–20 101 Eligibility 14–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED