Mt. Vernon Tanker Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1975

218 N.L.R.B. 1423 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

MT. VERNON TANKER COMPANY 1423
Mt. Vernon Tanker Company and Candido Castulo
Lial. Case 23-CA-4940
June 30, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND KENNEDY
On January 31, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Leonard M. Wagman issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings,' findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by (1)
refusing to permit Charging Party Lial to have his
union representative present at a disciplinary inter-
view with Captain Carl H. Hope, of the Mt. Vernon
Victory, the ship on which Lial served, and (2)
punishing Lial for insisting on the presence of his
union representative at that interview. In so finding,
the Administrative Law Judge relied on our decisions
in J. Weingarten, Inc., and Quality Manufacturing
Co.,2 both of which have been affirmed by the
Supreme Court since the issuance of the Administra-
tive Law Judge's Decision. In affirming our decisions
in those cases, the Supreme Court noted that the
right to request representation as a condition of
participation in an interview is limited to situations
where the employee reasonably believes the interview
will result in disciplinary action. The Court also
reaffirmed our view that reasonable grounds for so
believing shall be measured by objective standards
under all the circumstances of the case.
Applying the above to the facts herein, we affirm
the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Lial had
reasonable grounds to believe he would be disci-
plined. Respondent asserts that Lial's testimony
I We find that the Administrative Law Judge did not abuse his discretion
in refusing to grant Respondent 's motion for a continuance of the hearing
from November 7, 1974, until sometime in March 1975 While Respondent's
motion was based on the alleged unavailability of its key witness , Captain
Hope , who was with his ship , the Mt Vernon Victory, the record discloses
that the ship was in San Francisco on the date of the hearing Thus, it
appears that the motion was based more on mconvemence to Respondent
than on the unavailability of Captain Hope. In any event , Respondent was
not prejudiced by the ruling since the affidavit of Captain Hope, later
submitted in lieu of his testimony with the agreement of the General
Counsel , was credited by the Administrative Law Judge . Presumably, if
218 NLRB No. 218
reveals he was unsure of what would take place in his
meeting with the captain and therefore Lial could not
have had reasonable grounds to believe he would be
disciplined. The credited affidavit of Captain Hope,
however, discloses that Hope had earlier informed
Lial he would be "logged" for failing to obey an
order. Moreover, the record is replete with Lial's
testimony that he was fearful of and anticipated the
possibility of discipline as a result of the interview.
The circumstances of this case, therefore, dictate the
conclusion that Lial had reasonable grounds to
believe he would be disciplined. He was, therefore,
entitled to the representation he insisted on at the
disciplinary interview unless countervailing consider-
ations are present which might override his right to
such representation.
Respondent contends that the paramount nature of
the maritime safety laws as illustrated in The Texas
Company v. N.L.R.B.,3 the Supreme Court's holding
in Southern Steamship Company v. N.LR.B.,4 and the
law concerning lawful commands at seas all require
a different result from that reached by the Adminis-
trative Law Judge. We disagree. In the Texas
Company case, the Ninth Circuit found that a union
leader who was also an habitual drunkard was
properly discharged for safety considerations. The
Supreme Court in Southern Steamship found that
merchant seamen who had engaged in a strike had
been properly discharged since the strike amounted
to a mutiny and was in violation of a criminal
statute. Penalties for offenses committed by mer-
chant seamen are prescribed in 46 U.S.C. § 701,
including the offense of willful disobedience of a
lawful command. We find nothing inconsistent
between our holding and the cited cases and statute.
We do not find that Lial may not be disciplined for
his refusal to obey the lawful order to leave the
engineroom pursuant to the dictates of 46 U.S.C. §
701. We do state that we are aware of no specific
prohibition, as was the case in Southern Steamship,
which would limit Lial's right under the Act to
representation at a disciplinary interview. We also
find that such representation would not interfere
with the safety of the ship. Indeed, the captain did
finally permit Lial union representation at his
logging, and there is no showing that the presence of
a union representative at the logging interfered with
Captain Hope had testified orally at the hearing , his testimony would have
been consistent with his affidavit Otherwise , his credibility would have been
questionable
2 J Weingarten , Inc, 202 NLRB 446 (1973), enforcement denied 485
F 2d 1135 (C A. 5, 1973), reversed 420 U S. 251 (1975), Quality Manufactur-
ing Company, 195 NLRB 197 ( 1972), enforcement denied 481 F.2d 1018
(C.A. 4, 1973), reversed 420 U S. 276 (1975).
3 120 F.2d 186 (C.A. 9, 1941).
4 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
S 46 U.S.C. § 701.
1424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the captain's ability and responsibility to secure the
safety of the ship.
Accordingly, we shall adopt the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision and his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Mt. Vernon Tanker Company,
New York City, New York, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent , a Delaware corporation with its principal
office located in New York City, New York, operates the
SS Mount Vernon Victory in interstate and foreign
commerce . During the past year, Respondent realized
gross revenues exceeding $50,000 for services performed by
SS Mount Vernon Victory in interstate and foreign
commerce . From the foregoing stipulated facts, I find that
Respondent is, and has been, at all times material herein,
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
It is found , as admitted, that Seafarers International
Union, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District , AFL-CIO
(referred to herein as the Union) is and has been, at all
times material herein , a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
LEONARD M. WAGMAN, Administrative Law Judge: The
amended complaint' herein alleged that in October 1973,
Respondent, Mt. Vernon Tanker Company,2 engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§151, et seq. (the Act), by refusing to permit Candido
Castulo Lial to be represented by Seafarers International
Union, Atlantic, Lakes and Inland Waters District, AFL-
CIO (referred to hereafter as the Union), during an
interview or disciplinary proceedings aboard the SS Mount
Vernon Victory, and by punishing Lial because he request-
ed the Union to represent him during that interview or
disciplinary proceeding.
Pursuant to notice, the hearing in this case opened at
Houston, Texas, on November 7, 1974, and was adjourned
that same day until November 26, 1974. At the hearing,
Respondent and General Counsel were represented by
counsel . On December 12, following a further adjourn-
ment, I issued an Order granting the parties' motion that I
receive the affidavit of Captain Carl H. Hope and other
evidence and formal papers as a joint exhibit in lieu of
further hearing,3 fix the date for filing briefs, and close the
record in this case . Both General Counsel and Respondent
filed briefs which I have carefully read and considered.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of
Candido Castulo Lial, the sole witness at the hearing, I
make the following:
1 The complaint was issued on May 7, 1974, upon a charge filed on
December 18, 1973, and an amended charge filed on December 21, 1973 At
the hearing, the complaint was amended to show Respondent , Mt. Vernon
Tanker Company , as the employer in this case and Victory Carrier, Inc, as
Respondent's operating agent
2 The name of the Respondent appears as corrected at the hearing.
3 lq my Order , I'rncorrectly designated this joint exhibit as "Joint
Exhibit L" However , as'pointed out in the General Counsel's brief (p 3, In.
2), that designation had previously been given to another exhibit.
Accordingly , I now'amend my Order of December 12 so that the joint
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts 4
Candido Castulo Lial joined the crew of the SS Mount
Vernon on August 31, 1973, as a chief pumpman. He left
the Mount Vernon's crew on November at Chittagong,
Bangladesh.
The events involved in the alleged unfair labor practices
began on the morning of October 23, while the Mount
Vernon was riding at anchor off Chittagong. Lial and
Flores, another crewmember, were in the engineroom's
machine shop attempting to fabricate a part for a deck
winch. While the two men were thus engaged, Chief
Engineer Donald H. Collins, an admitted supervisor within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act, approached them
with a clenched fist. Collins accused Lial of wasting time
and ordered him to leave the engineroom and return to the
deck. Lial replied that he would leave as soon as he and
Flores had completed their task. At this, Collins left the
engineroom and reported the incident to the ship' s master,
Captain Carl H. Hope. In his report to the Captain, Chief
Engineer Collins asserted that Lial had directed obscene
epithets at Collins along with his refusal to leave the
engineroom.
Upon hearing the chief engineer's report, Captain Hope
proceeded to the engineroom machine shop, where he
ordered Lial to "get out of the machine shop and go
topside." According to Hope's credited testimony he also
told Lial "that he would be logged 5 for willful disobedi-
exhibit referred to in that Order is redesignated as "Joint Exhibit 2."
4 Except as noted below , I have based my findings of fact upon a
composite of Lial's testimony , Captain Hope's affidavit, and the exhibits
received in evidence
S Before me , Lial testified that on October 23, 1973, he did not know why
Hope summoned hum to the captain 's office However , Captain Hope's
testimony was given in an affidavit taken only 2 months after the incident,
and more consistently agrees with the documentary evidence Therefore I
have concluded that Hope is the more reliable of the two witnesses, and
accordingly , where there are conflicts in testimony, I have credited his
MT. VERNON TANKER COMPANY 1425
ence of Collins' command and that I would send for [Lial ]
when the log was written up."
Approximately 1 hour later, Captain Hope sent a
crewmember to summon Lial to the captain's office.
Captain Hope, Chief Engineer Collins, and First Assistant
Engineer James Edson were waiting in Hope's office when
Lial arrived promptly with James Schilling, the Union's
engineroom delegate. When Hope questioned Schilling's
presence, Schilling responded that he was a union
representative and would act as Lial's witness. At this,
Captain Hope told Lial that Schilling's presence was not
necessary for the logging because this was not a matter for
the Unions Hope directed Schilling to leave the office. As
Schilling started to leave, Lial followed suit. Hope ordered
Lial to remain "so the log could be read to him." Lial
persisted in his refusal, asserting that "this was a union ship
and he was entitled to union representation." Lial also
complained that Hope was "depriving him of his civil
rights." After Lial left the office, Hope went after him and
ordered him to return to the office. Lial refused to do so
without his "union representative as a witness." At this,
Captain Hope handcuffed Lial and led him below to the
ship's hospital. When Lial again refused to go to the
Captain's office without a union representative, Hope
ordered him into confinement in the hospital, and put him
on bread and water "until his disobedience ceased."
Lial was confined on bread and water until the morning
of October 25. Once each day, on October 24 and 25,
Captain Hope visited Lial's place of confinement and
asked him if he was "ready to obey [Hope's] command."7
In their encounter on October 24, Lial told Hope that he
would go to Hope's office "as long as I got a representative
with me, a union representative as a witness." Hope
replied: "You can stay in here until you learn your lesson.
You can ride in here until we get back to the States." (Tr.,
p. 45.)
During a considerable portion of his confinement, Lial
was subjected to the noise of hammers chipping paint on
the bulkheads surrounding him. This persistent noise
caused Lial's ears to ring and hurt.
On the morning of October 25, Hope returned and again
pressed Lial to obey his order. Lial agreed to come to the
office if Hope permitted him to bring a union witness and
if Collins were not present at the logging. Hope consented
to Lial's terms and released him from confinement.
Later in the morning, Lial went to Hope's office, where
the log entry regarding his refusal to leave the engineroom
on October 23, and the two log entries regarding his
refusals to present himself at the Captain's office on
October 23 and 24 were read to him before three witnesses.
As Schilling could not leave his duties, Lial chose Flores,
the second pumpman as his witness. Hope gave a copy of
each logging to Lial. In the first logging, Hope fined Lial 4
days' wages, amounting to $110. In the second and third
logging , Hope fined Lial a total of 16 days' wages,
amounting to $440.
version of the confrontation and subsequent events leading up to Liars
appearance at the captain 's office on October 23.
6 The quoted language in this paragraph was taken from Hope's
affidavit.
On November 1, following diagnosis and treatment of a
wrist injury Lial suffered prior to the foregoing events, a
local physician recommended that Lial be left ashore at
Chittagong for repatriation. On the same date, Captain
Hope complied with that recommendation.
On December 3, 1973, Respondent by its operating agent
Victory Carriers, Inc., filed charges against Lial with the
Union's Appeals Board (G.C. Exh. 7a). Respondent
alleged Lial's conduct on October 23 and 24 as recited in
the ship's log as grounds for disciplinary action under the
Union's shipping rules. Thereafter, in late January 1974,
Lial received the following letter from the Union's appeals
board:
Please be advised that a Hearing Committee, consisting
of Mr. P. Hederman and Mr. J. Perez, in the Port of
Houston on January 4, 1974 found you guilty of
charges invoked by Capt. Matarangas of Victory
Carriers Steamship Corp. pursuant to Rule 8-A of the
Shipping Rules.
It is the decision of the above named Hearing
Committee that for your actions while serving as a crew
member on board the SS Mt. Vernon Victory, you be
placed on probation for a period of eighteen months,
commencing January 4, 1974.
If you wish to appeal this decision, please write by
certified mail to the Seafarers Appeals Board, 275 20th
Street, Brooklyn, New York 11215 within ten days after
receipt of this notification, and explain in sufficient
detail to be understood, the basis for your appeal.
Please be further advised that any future acts of
misconduct on your part, could result in the loss of
your shipping rights, pursuant to 8-A of the Shipping
Rules.
Attached to the letter was the hearing committee's
decision . To date, Lial has not sought review of this
decision before the Union's appeal board.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
The questions in this case are whether the Respondent
violated the Act by: (1) refusing to permit Lial to have his
union representative present at a disciplinary interview
with Captain Hope; and (2) by punishing Lial for insisting
upon the presence of his union representative at that
interview. I find that Respondent has violated the Act both
by its refusal of Lial's request, and by punishing him for
requesting the presence of his union representative .8
The questions presented here are governed by the
Board's decisions in J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 NLRB 446
(1973), enforcement denied 485 F.2d 1135 (C.A. 5, 1973),
reversed and remanded 420 U.S. 251 (1975), and in Quality
Manufacturing Co., 195 NLRB 197 (1972), enforcement
denied 481 F.2d 1018 (C.A. 4, 1973), reversed and
remanded sub nom. International Ladies' Garlrient Workers
7 Joint Exh. 2, p. 3.
8 1 deem it unnecessary to determine whether Respondent 's conduct
violated Sec 8(aX3), as such additional finding would not alter my
recommended Order.
1426 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Union, Upper South Department, AFL-CIO v. Quality
Manufacturing Company, 420 U.S. 276 (1975). In Weingar-
ten, the Board held that an employer violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by refusing an employee's request for the
presence of his union representative at an interview which
the employee reasonably believed might result in discipli-
nary action, and by requiring the employees to undergo the
interview without such assistance. In Quality, the Board
held that an employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by punishing an employee for insisting upon the presence
of his union representative at an investigatory interview
with the employer which the employee reasonably believed
might result in disciplinary action.
Here, Respondent left no doubt of the purpose of the
interview. In his first encounter with Lial on October 23,
Captain Hope ordered Lial to report to the Captain's office
for logging. Thereafter, Hope never waivered from his
original intention of disciplining Lial. Yet, when Lial first
appeared at Captain Hope's office with Schilling, the
Union's engineroom delegate, and requested that Schilling
be present at the logging, the Captain denied the request
and sent Schilling away. Nor is there any question that
Captain Hope punished Lial for demanding union repre-
sentation at the logging, by placing him in irons, confining
him, reducing his rations, logging and fining him, and filing
charges against him with the Union's appeals board. I also
find from the foregoing evidence of the Captain's animus
and the timing" of the paint chipping that Respondent
inflicted this further punishment upon Lial because he
insisted upon union representation at his logging. In sum,
the foregoing facts bring this case within the scope of the
Board's holding in Quality and Weingarten.
Respondent challenges the application of Quality and
Weingarten, arguing that the Federal laws governing
discipline aboard U.S. merchant ships displace the Act in
this case. In support of its contention, Respondent relies on
the principles of Southern Steamship Company v. N.L.RB.,
316 U.S. 31 (1942), and on 46 U.S.C. §701, which declares
in pertinent part:
Whenever any seaman who has been lawfully engaged
... commits any of the following offenses, he shall be
punished as follows:
O O O O
Fourth. For willful disobedience to any lawful com-
mand at sea , by being, at the option of the master,
placed in irons until such disobedience shall cease, and
upon arrival in port by forfeiture from his wages of not
more than four days' pay, or, at the discretion of the
court, by imprisonment for not more than one month.
Fifth. For continued willful disobedience to lawful
command or continued willful neglect of duty at sea,
by being, at the option of the master, placed in irons,
on bread and water, with full rations every fifth day,
9 Respondent attempted to show from the ship's daily work record and
Captain Hope 's testimony that the paint chipping was not intended as
punishment for Lial , but rather was a routine maintenance chore (Resp. br ,
p. 6). However, the ship 's daily work record for October and November
does not mention or allude to the hospital as being scheduled for such work
or any work Further , in his affidavit, Captain Hope shied away from a
until such disobedience shall cease, and upon arrival in
port by forfeiture, for every twenty-four hours' continu-
ance of such disobedience or neglect, of not more than
twelve days' pay, or by imprisonment for not more than
three months, at the discretion of the court.
Review of the Supreme Court's decision in Southern
Steamship and the language of 46 U.S.C. §701 persuade me
that Lial's right to union assistance under the Act was
unimpaired by the Federal policy regarding discipline on
merchant ships. In Southern Steamship, the Supreme Court
struck down a Board backpay and reinstatement remedy
covering five merchant seamen who had been discharged
because they engaged in a strike against their ship, SS City
of Fort Worth, while docked at Houston, Texas. In
balancing the two Federal policies, the Court took note of
the need for discipline aboard a merchant ship, as follows:
Ever since men have gone to sea, the relationship of
master of seaman has been entirely different from that
of employer to employee on land. The lives of
passengers and crew, as well as the safety of ship and
cargo, are entrusted to the master's care. Every one and
every thing depends on him. He must command and
the crew must obey. Authority cannot be divided.
These are actualities which the law has always
recognized.
The Court then found that the strike was in fact a mutiny
which violated Section 292 and 293 of the Criminal Code
(18 U.S.C. §§2192 and 2193) (316 U.S. at 39); that
violation of Section 292 was punishable by a maximum
fine of $1,000 and a 5-year prison term (id. at 39 and 40);
and, that violation of Section 293 carried a maximum fine
of $2,000 and a 10-year prison term (id at 40). The Court
declared that the gravamen of the seamen's concerted
activity aboard the City of Fort Worth was defiance of
"direct commands to perform their duties in making ready
for the departure from port (316 U.S. at 40)."
However, in holding the seamen's strike unprotected by
the Act because of the overriding express congressional
prohibition against such conduct on a U.S. merchant ship,
the Court did not deprive U.S. merchant seamen of the
Act's protection in other contexts. Instead, the Court first
cautioned that in effectuating the policies of the Act, the
Board could not "wholly ignore other and equally
important Congressional objectives" (316 U.S. at 47).
Then, in closing, the Court limited the reach of its holding
to instances where conduct otherwise protected by the Act
"do[es] not come within the express prohibition of
Congress (316 U.S. at 49)."
Here, effectuation of the policies of the Act does not
clash with any other congressional objectives including
those contained in 46 U.S.C. § 701. For unlike the strike in
Southern Steamship, there is no showing here that Lial's
request for union assistance ran afoul of any congressional
precise description of the work . Rather, he attempted to conceal the
chipping under the euphemism "routine maintenance " In light of the gap in
Respondent's daily work record and Hope's resort to a euphemism , I do not
credit his testimony in this regard . Accordingly, I find no evidentiary
support for Respondent 's proffered excuse for the paint chipping.
MT VERNON TANKER COMPANY 1427
prohibition. Thus Lial's request came within the Act's
protection notwithstanding that he made it while on an
American merchant ship. I find, therefore, that under the
Board's holding in J. Weingarten, Inc., supra, Respondent's
refusals to accord him that right on October 23 and 24,
1973, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Further, in light of the Act's requirement that Lial be
accorded the union assistance he sought, the command
that he appear for logging without such assistance was
unlawful. It follows therefore that Lial's refusal to comply
with those commands did not violate the above-quoted
provisions of 46 U.S.C. § 701.
Moreover, unlike the strike in Southern Steamship, there
has been no showing that exercise of the Section 7 right 10
which Lial sought would have interfered with the operation
or safety of the SS Mount Vernon. On the contrary, Captain
Hope's affidavit shows that he refused Lial's request for
union assistance only because the union contract made no
provision for such assistance. It is also significant in this
regard that, without any claim of hardship, Respondent
ultimately provided Lial with his own witness at the
logging which eventuated on October 25, 1973.
Having considered and rejected Respondent's conten-
tion, I am compelled by the facts of this case to apply the
Board 's holding in Quality Manufacturing Company. Ac-
cordingly, 'I find that by punishing Lial, as outlined above,
because he insisted upon the participation of his union
representative at a disciplinary interview, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record
in the case , I make the following:
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By denying Candido Castulo Lial's request for union
representation at an interview or meeting which Lial, upon
reasonable grounds, believed would result in disciplinary
action against him, Respondent interfered with, restrained,
and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby engaged in, and is
engaging in, unfair labor practices proscribed by Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By placing Lial in handcuffs and confining him,
reducing his rations to bread and water, causing employees
to chip paint on the walls surrounding his place of
confinement, logging and fining him, and filing charges
against him with the Seafarers Appeals Board, all because
he requested union representation at an interview or
meeting which, Lial, upon reasonable grounds, believed
would result in disciplinary action against him, Respon-
10 Sec . 7 of the Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization , to form, join, or
assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection , and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
dent interfered with, coerced, and restrained employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act,
and thereby engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that Respondent be
required to cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
I have also found that Respondent illegally logged and
fined Candido Castulo Lial. Therefore, I shall recommend
that Respondent be ordered to rescind those actions and to
repay Lial for the illegal fines which he has paid to
Respondent, with interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum.
Upon the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 11
Respondent, Mt. Vernon Tanker Company, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Requiring any employee to take part in an interview
or meeting without union representation, if such represen-
tation has been requested by the employee and if the
employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the
matters to be discussed may result in his being subject to
disciplinary action.
(b) Disciplining or threatening to discipline any employ-
ee for requesting to be represented by a labor organization
at any interview or meeting held with the employees where
the employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the
matters to be discussed may result in his being the subject
of disciplinary action.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Rescind the two fines, totaling $440, which Respon-
dent imposed on Candido Castulo Lial because he refused
to appear in Captain Hope's office on October 23 and 24,
1973, and expunge from its records all references thereto,
including the loggings in which those fines are recorded.
(b) Reimburse Candido Castulo Lial for any and all
sums paid by him pursuant to the two fines referred to in
the preceding paragraph, together with interest thereon at
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8(ax3).
ii In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
1428 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the rate of 6 percent per annum, and advise Lial, in writing,
that the two fines have been rescinded and that the records,
including log entries showing the two fines, have been
expunged.
(c) Notify the Seafarers Appeals Board and Candido
Castulo Lial, in writing, that Respondent requests with-
drawal of its charges filed against Lial on or about
December 10, 1973, and the setting aside of the Seafarers
Hearing Committee' s decision of January 4, 1974, which
was based on those charges, including the 18-month
probationary period imposed on Lial by the said commit-
tee.
(d) Post aboard the SS Mount Vernon Victory, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Copies of said
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 23, after being duly signed by the Respondent,
shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof and be maintained by Respondent for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, on the
SS Mount Vernon Victory, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in
writing , within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered
us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all such
activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with,
restrains, or coerces employees with respect to these
rights.
WE WILL NOT require that any employee take part in
an interview or meeting without union representation,
if such representation has been requested by the
employee and if the employee has reasonable grounds
to believe that the matters to be discussed may result in
his being subject to disciplinary action.
WE WILL NOT punish any employee by handcuffing,
confinement, reducing rations, logging and fining, the
filing of charges against him with the Seafarers Appeals
Board, or by any other means for refusing to attend
without the presence of his union representative at
interviews or meetings, where the employee reasonably
believes that the matters to be discussed may result in
his being subject to disciplinary action.
WE WILL rescind the two fines totaling $440, which
we imposed on Candido Castulo Lial because he
refused to attend, without his union representative, a
logging at which he, Lial, was to be disciplined.
WE WILL expunge from our records all reference to
the aforementioned fines, including the loggings in
which those fines are recorded.
WE WILL reimburse Candido Castulo Lial for any
and all sums paid by him pursuant to the two fines
referred to above, together with interest at the rate of 6
percent per annum and advise Lial in writing that the
two fines have been rescinded and that our records,
including log entries, showing the fines have been
expunged.
WE WILL notify the Seafarers Appeals Board and
Candido Castulo Lial, in writing, that we request both
the withdrawal of the charges we filed with that Board
against Lial in retaliation for his refusal to attend a
logging without the presence of his union representa-
tive, and the setting aside of the Seafarers Hearing
Committee's decision based on those charges, including
the 18-month probationary period imposed on Lial by
the committee.
MT. VERNON TANKER
COMPANY