Morris I. Onyewuchi, Complainant,v.Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Citizenship and Immigration Services), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 4, 2007
0120063943 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 4, 2007)

0120063943

12-04-2007

Morris I. Onyewuchi, Complainant, v. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Citizenship and Immigration Services), Agency.


Morris I. Onyewuchi,

Complainant,

v.

Michael Chertoff,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security

(Citizenship and Immigration Services),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120063943

Hearing No. 110-2005-00251X

Agency No. 060148

DECISION

On June 17, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's May 11,

2006, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely

and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as an Assistant Chief Counsel, GS-13, in the agency's Atlanta, Georgia

office. On October 20, 2004, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging

that he was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American),

national origin (Nigerian), and disability when on June 10, 2004, the

agency failed to select him for the position of Associate Area Counsel

in the Office of Chief Counsel in Dallas, Texas. At the conclusion of

the investigation, complainant was provided with a copy of the report

of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing

but subsequently withdrew his request. Consequently, the agency issued

a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision

concluded that complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to

discrimination as alleged. Specifically, in that decision, the agency

concluded that complainant failed that he was an individual with a

disability under the Rehabilitation Act. The final decision further

concluded that complainant failed to prove that the agency's articulated

reasons for its actions were pretext for unlawful discrimination.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant contends that the agency improperly found no

discrimination and makes arguments in support of his contention.

Specifically, complainant argues that he is an individual with

a disability entitled to coverage under the Rehabilitation Act; the

agency's reasons for not selecting him for the position were not credible;

and the agency pre-selected the applicant selected for the position.

In its brief, the agency requests that the Commission affirm its finding

of no discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case claiming

discrimination is a three-step process as set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973), and its progeny. See

Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc.,

425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976)

(applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation cases). For complainant to

prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an

inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a

factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden

then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is

pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133

(2000).

This order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step

normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case,

need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue,

the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions

were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal Service Board of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department

of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900150 (June 28, 1990).

We find that the agency provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for its actions. Specifically, two recommending officials stated

that complainant was not among the three candidates recommended to the

deciding official for the position. Unlike the top three recommended

applicants, complainant declined to appear for an in-person interview;

complainant had less experience practicing immigration law; complainant

laughed inappropriately during the telephonic interview; complainant

refused to assess his weaknesses during the interview; and, complainant

appeared to answer some questions insincerely during the interview.

One of the recommending officials further stated that she had personally

supervised the selectee and knew that he was "exceptionally hard-working,

intelligent, independent, and possess[ed] inter-personal skills that would

enable him to effectively counsel the client and contribute to our field

area team." The officials further stated that they determined that the

selectee was the best candidate for the position because he graduated

from a top-ranked law school; had worked for a private law firm; had

experience in EEO and labor law; had served as served as Acting Deputy

Chief Counsel in Miami, Florida; and, had presented himself very well

during the interview. The deciding official stated that the selectee

was chosen for the position because of the positive impression he made

during the interview and his superior qualifications for the position.

Complainant disputes the agency's claim that he laughed inappropriately,

answered questions insincerely, and asked one of the recommending

officials a succession of inappropriate questions during the interview.

However, a hearing may have allowed an AJ to determine which version of

the facts was more credible, but complainant withdrew his request for

a hearing. Complainant also argues that although he did not interview

in-person, he was informed by the agency that a telephone interview

would be acceptable. We determine that while a telephone interview

may be acceptable, it does not mean that it is equivalent to appearing

in person. Finally, complainant contends that he was more qualified

than the selectee, and the selectee was pre-selected for the position by

his former supervisor. However, we determine that complainant failed to

prove that his qualifications for the position were plainly superior to

the selectee's qualifications or that the agency's action was motivated by

unlawful discrimination. Consequently, we find that the agency properly

found no discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the final

agency decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_December 4, 2007_______________

Date

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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