Morgan Services, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1987

284 N.L.R.B. 862 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

862 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Morgan Services, Inc. and Local Union No. 3017,
Laundry and Dry Cleaning International Union,
AFL-CIO and Christana Farris, Petitioner.
Cases 25-CA-17770, 25-CA-17770-2, and 25-
RD-924
30 June 1987
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
OF SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND BABSON
On 18 June 1986 Administrative Law Judge
Walter H. Maloney Jr. issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions, a supporting
brief, and a reply brief. The General Counsel filed
limited cross-exceptions, a supporting brief, and an
answering brief. The Union filed its posthearing
brief to the judge and filed an answering brief to
the Respondent's exceptions.'
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, 2 and
conclusions as modified below 8 and to adopt the
recommended Order.
1. The judge found that the Respondent's pro-
duction manager, Arthur McHargue, coercively in-
terrogated employees Mary Phelps, Jackie Ann
Abbott, and Sharon Rice, thereby violating Section
8(a)(1) of the Act and engaging in objectionable
conduct warranting setting aside the 10 January
1980 decertification election. Applying the frame-
work for analysis in Rossmore House, 269 NLRB
1176 (1984), 5 and Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277
1 The Respondent's posthearing motion to supplement the record is
denied. The General Counsel's and Union's motions to strike portions of
the Respondent's brief pertammg to its motion are also denied.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (3d Or 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings.
In fn. 3 of the judge's decision, he misidentified G.C. Exh. 1(u) as 1(a).
Also, in sec. I,C of his decision, the judge inadvertently referred to Sec.
10(c) whereas it is clear from context that he meant to refer to Sec. 8(c)
Neither inadvertent error affects our decision.
3 We agree with the judge's conclusion that after the election the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by threatening employees with reprisal if
they cooperated with the Board or the Union in the investigation of the
unfair labor practice charges and objections to conduct of the election
We find it unnecessary to rely on his alternative rationale concerning dis-
credited facts.
4 All dates refer to 1986 unless otherwise indicated.
5 Enfd. sub nom Hotel ti Restaurant Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 760
F.2d 1006 (9th Qr 1985).
NLRB 1217 (1985), we reaffirm the judge's fmd-
ings concerning Phelps and Abbott but we reverse
his fmding concerning Rice.
In late December or early January, McHargue
initiated approximately 25 private and individual
interviews with day-shift employees in his office.
Among those interviewed were Phelps, Abbott,
and Rice. Long-time employee Phelps testified that
she has never gone to McHargue's office on her
own initiative and it was an unusual event to be
summoned there individually. She said that McHar-
gue asked her what the Union had done for her.
She replied, "Nothing, except it was job security,"
explaining that with a union the Respondent could
not fire her without just cause. McHargue replied
that if he had wanted to get rid of her, he could
have done so by claiming there were no openings
when she had sought to return from her last sick
leave.
Abbott testified that McHargue, her immediate
supervisor, summoned her to his office about the
end of 1985. McHargue asked her if she had two
children, explaining that the question was for insur-
ance purposes. He then asked how she felt about
the Union. She said she would be better off with
the Union. He asked her why. Abbott replied that
she had not had any problems with the Union and
felt she would be better off with it. McHargue
asked her how she was going to vote. Abbott re-
plied, "I have not made up my mind yet."
Shop Steward Rice testified that she had been in
McHargue's office in the past to present grievances
and that McHargue knew she supported the Union
and opposed decertification. On direct examination,
Rice stated that McHargue asked her why she
thought she had to have a union. McHargue later
asked her how she knew that the "Labor Board"
would protect her job. She answered that she had
gone to the "Labor Board" for "several different
things" when employed by the Respondent's prede-
cessor. According to Rice, McHargue then
shrugged his shoulders and said he could get rid of
just about anybody, that he did not have to keep
anybody. Rice replied, "Well, I don't think that's
the way it works." On cross-examination Rice testi-
fied that McHargue question's concerning Board
protection of her job referred to earlier conversa-
tions. She testified, "Well, he rides me a lot," and
there had been a couple of occasions where she
said, "Hey, that's enough. I'll go the Labor Board,
if I have to." Rice also testified on cross-examina-
tion that McHargue told her she did not have to
worry about her job, that there would be no major
changes if the Union was voted out, that he could
not make any promises about increasing insurance
284 NLRB No. 95
MORGAN SERVICES 863
or pay, and that whether or not the Union was
going to stay was up to the employees in the plant.
In Rossmore House and Sunnyvale the Board
abandoned a per se test for evaluating employer-
employee conversations in favor of "a case-by-case
analysis which takes into account the circum-
stances surrounding an alleged interrogation and
does not ignore the reality of the workplace."6
This analysis includes practical consideration of
whether, under all the circumstances, the interroga-
tion reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with
the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by the Act. Among those circumstances which
may be relevant in a particular case are the back-
ground, the nature of the information sought, the
identity of the questioner, and the place and
method of interrogation.
Applying this analysis to McHargue's interviews
with Phelps and Abbott, we note initially that nei-
ther employee was an active union supporter at the
time. The employees were summoned one by one
from work to Production Manager McHargue's
office, an unusual event creating an atmosphere of
• unnatural formality. McHargue possessed the au-
thority to hire, fire, and discipline. He, not the em-
ployees, introduced the topic of union activity.
McHargue's question to Phelps and Abbott sought
specific information about their union sentiments
that could provide the basis for retaliatory discrim-
ination. McHargue communicated to them no le-
gitimate purpose for asking these questions. Finally,
McHargue's specific inquiry about how Abbott in-
tended to vote, despite her truthful reply, preempt-
ed her statutory right to the secrecy of her ballot.
Under all these circumstances, we conclude that
the interrogations of Phelps and Abbott had a rea-
sonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce them in the exercise of their Section 7
rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
This conduct also constituted objectionable inter-
ference with the election.
By contrast, we find that McHargue's question-
ing of Shop Steward Rice did not violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Rice admitted to management
her open union adherence and opposition to decer-
tification. The general nature of the information
sought, why Rice thought she had to have a union,
was not particularly sensitive in this context. Fur-
thermore, contrary to argument by the General
Counsel in her cross-exceptions, McHargue's state-
ment in the same conversation that he "could get
rid of just about anybody with—you know, he
didn't have to keep anybody," cannot reasonably
be construed as a threat of reprisal for union activi-
6 Sunnyvale, supra at 1217
ty because there was no connection between his
statement and any such activity. 7 McHargue's
statement was made in response to Rice's apparent
belief that the "Labor Board" would protect her
job under any circumstances. We find, therefore,
that the statement, when viewed in context, is
more reasonably characterized as a reference to an
employer's authority generally to discipline em-
ployees. Additionally, McHargue specifically as-
sured Rice in this same conversation that her job
was not in jeopardy and that there would be no
major changes if the Union was voted out. Under
all these circumstances, we conclude that McHar-
gue did not unlawfully interrogate or threaten
Rice.
2. The judge also found that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and engaged in ob-
jectionable conduct by promising to implement a
grievance procedure if employees voted to decerti-
fy the Union. The judge credited the testimony of
the decertification Petitioner Christana Farris, at
the hearing, 8 finding that Plant Manager Ron Ren-
zoni flatly promised night-shift employees that, if
the Union were voted out, a "Fairness Group"
grievance procedure similar to that existing at the
Respondent's Cleveland laundry would be imple-
mented in Indianapolis. The record is silent wheth-
er Respondent's other laundries have this grievance
procedure for nonunion employees. Farris testified
that Renzoni referred to employee gossip that he
would fire anyone he disliked if the Union was
voted out. She avers he stated it would not be like
that because there would be a board of people con-
sisting of two employees and a supervisor which
would vote on employee dismissals.
The judge noted that sometime before this meet-
ing and the election, Renzoni wrote a letter to all
employees which McHargue posted on the compa-
ny bulletin board. Renzoni's letter stated, inter alia,
that Morgan has a "Fairness Group" grievance
procedure for nonunion employees at its Cleveland
laundry, that such procedure is illustrative of what
occurs elsewhere, but that the law proscribed a
7 Member Johansen cannot agree with his colleagues' fmdmg that
there was "no connection" between McHargue's statement that he could
get rid of just about anybody and any umon activity McHargue made
the statement in the course of satisfying his curiosity as to why Steward
Rice thought the Labor Board could protect her job. Member Johansen
nevertheless agrees with his colleagues' conclusion that McHargue's
statement did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) because, when viewed in the con-
text of the entire conversation, the statement cannot reasonably be con-
strued as a threat of retaliation for union activity.
8 The crucial portion of Farris' testimony concerning the Respondent's
promise of benefit for voting against the Union is contained in her pre-
trial affidavit, which counsel for the Charging Party read into the record
and which Farris affirmed in substantial part on the stand. In light of
Farris' reaffirmation of her affidavit on the stand, we find no merit in the
Respondent's hearsay exceptions.
864 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
promise of this or any other benefit if the Union is
decertified.
The judge found that in talking to night-shift em-
ployees concerning grievance handling and utiliza-
tion of a "Fairness Group," Renzoni went beyond
the careful statements in his posted letter and flatly
promised that, if the Union were decertified, such a
procedure would be implemented in Indianapolis as
it had been in Cleveland. The judge concluded that
Renzoni thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and en-
gaged in objectionable conduct by promising a ben-
efit if the Union were voted out.
We agree. Renzoni's statement to the effect that
if the Union were decertified there would be a joint
employer-employee board established to review
dismissals constituted a promise of benefit in ex-
change for votes against the Union. Renzoni's cred-
ited statement impermissibly exceeded the language
in his prior posted letter, which outlined what
could be done without a union and disclaimed any
promise of benefit. Contrary to our dissenting col-
league, we fmd that Renzoni',8 statement to a signif-
icant number of night-shift employees, notwith-
standing prior disclaimers of a promise of benefit,
went beyond mere assurance that employees would
not lose benefits and promised a grievance machin-
ery significantly different in kind from that existing
under contract with the Union and which was not
automatic or necessarily available to all the Re-
spondent's nonunion employees at its Indianapolis
laundry or elsewhere. In light of these facts, we
find the cases on which our dissenting colleague
relies clearly distinguishable 'from the instant case.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Morgan
Services, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.
[Direction of Second Election omitted from pub-
lication.]
CHAIRMAN DOTSON, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I would reverse the
judge's fmdings of coextensive preelection unfair
labor practices and objectionable conduct and
would certify the results of the election.'
I agree with my colleagues' adoption of the judge's finding that the
Respondent violated Sec, 8(a)(1) by a postelection threat of reprisal if
employees cooperated in the Board investigation. I also agree that it is
unnecessary to rely on the judge's alternative rationale. Finally, I agree
that Production Manager McHargue did not violate the Act in his con-
versation with Union Steward Rice
1. In viewing the credited evidence concerning
"the alleged unlawful interrogations of employees
Phelps and Abbott under the appropriate standards
set forth in Rossmore House and Sunnyvale, I fmd
that the private conversation between Production
Manager McHargue and each of these employees
was noncoercive speech protected by Section 8(c)
of the Act.
The Respondent had engaged in no unlawful
conduct at the time of the election campaign, nor
did it have any history of hostility towards or dis-
crimination against union supporters. In mid-De-
cember 1985, after the decertification petition had
been filed, Plant Manager Renzoni distributed to
employees copies of the Board document, "Your
Government Conducts An Election," and read to
employees specific passages relating to the protec-
tion of employee rights. Additionally, 2 days before
the election, the Respondent's president, Richard
Senior, told a joint assembly of day- and night-shift
employees, "I want you to feel secure in your job
and to feel good about Morgan. If you need a
union in order to do that, you should vote for the
Union."
The general assurances against adverse conse-
quences of the election campaign dovetailed with
the Respondent's efforts to contest the Union's
campaign predictions of a loss of job security and
benefits if it were decertified. As part of these ef-
forts and in order to convey the Respondent's
open, legitimate preference for a nonunion oper-
ation, McHargue had individual conversations with
several employees, including Phelps and Abbott.
Although such interviews with McHargue in his
office were an unusual event, this office was locat-
ed directly off and had picture windows open to
the production area. In addition, Phelps admitted
that McHargue frequently spoke to employees as a
group in the lunchroom about "a lot of things," in-
cluding the Union's campaign.,
The conversations with Phelps and Abbott were
brief, innocuous, and nonrecurring. They did not
contain any express threat, of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit. McHargue's inquiries were lim-
ited. He asked Phelps one rhetorical question,
"What has the Union done for you?" He asked
Abbott how she felt about the Union, and how she
was going to vote. There was no apparent pressure
for responses to the questions. In each instance the
questions resulted in immediate, truthful, and
candid responses. As Abbott testified, "He just
asked my opinion on what I was going to do. I just
told him I hadn't made up my mind yet." An elici-
tation of an employee's views on unionization and
voting sentiments is not violative of the Act when
unaccompanied by a threat of reprisal, promise of
MORGAN SERVICES 865
benefit, or other coercive circumstances. A & E
Stores, 272 NLRB 737 (1984). Under all the cir-
cumstances, McHargue's brief questioning of
Phelps and Abbott, unaccompanied by any threats,
promises of benefits, or other coercive circum-
stances, did not violate the Act or interfere with
the election.
2. I also disagree with my colleagues that the
Respondent unlawfully promised employees the
benefit of a different or improved grievance proce-
dure if they voted to decertify the Union. In my
view, Renzoni's alleged statement could not be
construed as a promise in the overall context of
other employer statements and contemporaneous
disclaimers of promises of benefits, but, if Renzoni
did promise anything, it was to maintain an existing
benefit, not provide a new one.
According to decertification Petitioner Christana
Farris, Renzoni addressed night-shift employees a
day before the election about the subject of em-
ployee benefits in the event of decertification. Ren-
zoni told the night shift they would not lose benefit
coverage if the Union was voted out and he could
not promise any raises. He sought to allay employ-
ee concern about arbitrary discharge if decertifica-
tion occurred by stating that there would be a joint
board established to vote on dismissals after two
writeups. At the time, the Respondent and the
Union had a four-step contractual grievance and
arbitration procedure for unit employees.
Contemporaneous with this speech, Renzoni had
posted a letter to all employees on the company
bulletin board. The letter addressed job security
concerns in the context of union campaign propa-
ganda engendering fear of job loss upon decertifi-
cation. The letter assured employees that no such
job loss would occur. It noted that nonunion com-
panies have effective and fair grievance procedures
and described the Respondent's "Fairness Group"
grievance procedure at its Cleveland facility. It
then explicitly disclaimed promising this or any
other benefit if the Union was decertified, noting
that the Cleveland procedure merely illustrated
what had been done elsewhere. The letter closed
with the statement that "No one will lose any ben-
efits or suffer any loss of job, wages or benefits be-
cause of the election."
In addition, Renzoni's uncontroverted testimony
is that the Respondent's president, Senior, ad-
dressed the issue of grievance procedures and the
"Fairness Group" alternative in a joint meeting of
day- and night-shift employees held a day before
Renzoni's speech to the night shift. Senior told the
employees that he could not guarantee implementa-
tion of the "Fairness Group" procedure there.
Renzoni's statement to night-shift employees,
when properly evaluated in light of his letter, Sen-
ior's remarks, and Renzoni's specific disclaimer of a
promise of raises could not reasonably be construed
as a promise to implement the "Fairness Group"
procedure in the event of decertification. Renzoni
was participating in the Respondent's efforts to re-
spond to the Union's contentions and employee
concerns regarding job benefit losses if the Union
were decertified. In the process, he legitimately
made comparison with existing benefits for non-
union employees elsewhere. 2 The single isolated
failure to repeat specific disclaimers when discuss-
ing the "Fairness Group" procedure should not be
removed from the overall context in order to justi-
fy finding an absolute promise.
Even assuming that Renzoni's statement could
properly be found to be a promise, however, I
would still find no violation. An employer in a de-
certification election situation has the right to
assure employees that they will continue to receive
benefits comparable to those enjoyed under a col-
lective-bargaining agreement. El Cid, Inc., 222
NLRB 1315, 1316 (1976). The General Counsel has
failed to prove here that Renzoni's alleged promise
of a "Fairness Group" grievance procedure consti-
tuted an offer of a new or increased benefit, rather
than a promise to maintain the equivalent of the ex-
isting contractual grievance and arbitration proce-
dure. Consequently, I would dismiss this complaint
allegation and overrule the parallel objection.
2 See, e g., Duo-Fast Corp., 278 NLRB 52 (1986); Viacom Cablevision,
267 NLRB 1141 (1983).
Steve Robles, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Thomas Canafax Jr., Esq., of Chicago, Illinois, for the
Respondent.
Neil E. Gath, Esq., of Indianapolis, Indiana, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FINDINGS OF FACT
WALTER H. MALONEY JR., Administrative Law Judge.
This case came on for hearing before me at Indianapolis,
Indiana, on a consolidated unfair labor practice com-
plaint,' issued by the Regional Director for Region 25,
1 The principal docket entries in this case are as follows:
Charge in Case 25-CA-17770, filed against the Respondent by Local
Union No. 2017, Laundry and Dry Cleaning International Union, AFL-
CIO (Union), on January 23, 1986, charge in Case 25-CA-17770-2 filed
against the Respondent by the Umon on January 27, 1986; consolidated
complaint issued against the Respondent by the Regional Director for
Region 25 on March 7, 1986, Respondent's answer filed March 18, 1986;
hearing held in Inchanapohs, Indiana, on April 21 and 22, 1986, briefs
Continued
866 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and later amended, which alleges that Respondent,
Morgan Services, Inc.,2 violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. More particularly, the consolidated complaint, as
amended, alleges that the Respondent coercively interro-
gated employees in a systematic fashion concerning their
union sympathies and that it threatened employees with
reprisal for their union activities and for cooperating
with the Board in the investigation of unfair labor prac-
tice charges and objections by the Charging Union. The
interrogations also constitute objectionable conduct that
the Charging Union alleges to be the basis for setting
aside an election held on January 10, 1986, and directing
the running of a second election. The Respondent denies
the commission of any unfair labor practices or objec-
tionable conduct. On these contentions the issues were
joined.3
I. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND
OBJECTIONABLE CONDUCT ALLEGED
Respondent is a Chicago-based concern that operates
laundries in Buffalo, Cleveland, Indianapolis, and else-
where. For several years it operated its Indianapolis
laundry at 938 East Georgia. During that period of time,
it was part of a multiemployer association, the Indianap-
olis Cleaners & Launderers Club. Its employees were
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement between
that Association and the Charging Union that expired on
January 25, 1986. American Linen Supply Co. operated a
laundry at 201 East Lincoln. It was a member of the
same association and its employees were covered by the
same multiemployer agreement.
In the fall of 1984, Respondent purchased the assets of
American Linen Supply Co. at the East Lincoln Street
address. On November 1, 1984, American Linen Supply
Co. ceased its operations and Respondent began moving
its George Street operation, including all its employees,
into the former American Linen plant. It now operates in
Indianapolis exclusively from that plant and has a bar-
filed with me by the General Counsel and the Respondent on or before
June 6, 1986.
The principal docket entries in the consolidated representation case are
as follows.
Petition filed by Chnstana Farris, an individual, on November 21,
1985, seeking a decertification election in a unit composed of all the Re-
spondent's production, mamtenance, custodial, and stockroom employees
employed at its Indianapolis, Indiana laundry, with the usual exclusions;
representation election held on January 10, 1986, resulting in a vote by 19
employees to decertify the Union and 11 to retain it as a bargaining rep-
resentative; objections to the conduct of the election filed by the Union
on January 17, 1986; Regional Director's report, recommendations to the
Board, and order consolidating cases issued on March 20, 1986, recom-
mending a hearing on two of the four objections and overruling two of
them; exceptions to report filed by the Respondent with the Board on
April 2, 1986; Board's Decision and Order, dated April 16, 1986, overrul-
ing exceptions and directing a hearing.
2 Respondent admits, and I find, that it is a Delaware corporation that
maintains its headquarters in Chicago, Illinois, and a place of business in
Indianapolis, Indiana, where it is engaged in the operation of a commer-
cial laundry. During the preceding 12 months, the Respondent, in the
course and conduct of its busmess, has purchased and received at its Indi-
anapolis, Indiana facility directly from points and places located outside
the State of Indiana goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 Ac-
cordingly, the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act The Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Sec 2(5) of the Act
The transcript corrections are noted and corrected.
gaining unit that is an amalgamation of its George Street
employees and former American Linen employees whom
it hired. 4 Before merging its operation, Respondent en-
tered into a letter agreement with the Charging Union in
which it agreed to hire American Linen employees at
their current 1984 wages but declined to offer them any
seniority which, for most purposes, would antedate their
date of hire as Respondent's employees.
In the fall of 1985, the Respondent's Buffalo plant un-
derwent a decertification election. The Buffalo decertifi-
cation effort failed and the employees at that plant voted
on November 8 to retain a Laundry Workers affiliate as
their bargaining agent. Following that election, the Re-
spondent put out a statement in the Morgan Review, a
quarterly house organ, in which its president, Richard
Senior, congratulated the 33 Buffalo employees who
voted for decertification and expressed the hope that the
day would come when a majority in Buffalo would see
things the same way. The newsletter went well beyond
merely trumpeting the virtues of a nonunion laundry. It
gave specific details about how a decertification petition
might be circulated and filed and informed the reader
about the 60- to 90-day period during which a petition
might be submitted to the Board. A copy of this newslet-
ter was handed out to all the Respondent's Indianapolis
employees.
Shortly thereafter, Christana Farris, a night-shift em-
ployee at the Indianapolis laundry, circulated a showing-
of-interest petition at the plant and, on obtaining the sig-
natures of 30 percent of the members of that bargaining
unit, filed a decertification petition on November 21. An
election was held on January 10, 1986, between the
hours of 2:45 and 4 p.m.
In mid-December, Ron Renzoni, the Indianapolis plant
manager, obtained a set of information pamphlets pub-
lished by the Board and distributed them at a meeting of
laundry employees in mid-December. He also read to
employees certain passages in the Board pamphlet relat-
ing to the protection of employee rights.
On December 18, the Union sent to each member of
the bargaining unit a letter in which it called their atten-
tion to the fact that the contract was about to expire. It
solicited suggestions for contract proposals and included
a form that employees might use to make known to the
Union their principal concerns. In the letter, the Union
criticized the Company for bragging that employees
would be better off without a union rather than devoting
its energies to good-faith bargaining. The letter extolled
the practice of having wages and benefits incorporated
into legally enforceable contracts and stated:
For the record, the Union doesn't believe that
the Company has changed into Santa Clause. If you
think they have, just ask them to put it in writing in
a new Union contract that will guarantee your
rights. The Union does not believe that the Compa-
ny has a better deal to offer you in the absence of
the Union. Without the Union, the only deal you
4 In addition to laundry workers, the Respondent employs a group of
truckdrivers, whom it calls service representatives. Service representa-
tives are represented by a Teamsters local in a separate bargaining unit.
MORGAN SERVICES 8-67
will get is a raw deal—lower wages, poorer health
insurance and no pension plan.
Beginning in late December or early January, Arthur
McHargue, the production manager, held a series of pri-
vate interviews with about 25 of the day-shift employees.
These one-on-one talks took place in McHargue's office,
a small glass-enclosed area located on the first floor of
the building near the production area. McHargue admits
telling each of the employees during the course of these
interviews that he felt the Union had done little or noth-
ing for them and they would be better off without it. In
a few instances, he spoke about his own membership in
another union several years before and based his state-
ments, at least in part, on his own experience. McHargue
denies asking employees any questions about their union
activities. However, McHargue was an evasive witness
who gave contradictory testimony and made a number
of patently unbelievable statements. I discredit his testi-
mony in this regard.
I credit the testimony of Mary L. Phelps, a longtime
employee of the Respondent, who stated that, in the
course of an interview with McHargue, McHargue spoke
to her about insurance, telling her the Company's health
insurance program was better than the one offered by
the Union. He told her it had paid all of the medical ex-
penses associated with his heart attack. He went on to
ask Phelps what the Union had done for her. She re-
plied, "Nothing, except it was security." She explained
her answer by stating the Respondent could not fire her
under the union contract without just cause. McHargue's
reply was, "I don't know where you get that. If I
wanted to get rid of you, I could have done that. I could
simply have said there were no openings," referring to
the time when Phelps came back to work after an ex-
tended illness.
An interview took place shortly before the election be-
tween McHargue and Sharon Rice, the former shop
steward in the old American Linen unit. McHargue
asked her why she thought she had to have a union. She
replied that she had worked for other employers, some
with unions and some without unions, and that one em-
ployer had closed up and pulled out when a union start-
ed to come in. He then asked her if there was something
that he needed to tell her and she replied the only thing
she needed to talk about was health insurance. Rice was
expecting to go into the hospital soon and she asked
whether the Union would continue to pick up the costs
if it was voted out or whether the Company would pro-
vide health benefits without any waiting period. McHar-
gue said that he was covered by the Company's policy
and it was better. However, he was unable to answer her
specific question and said he would get the information
and give it to her.
McHargue went on to ask her how she knew the
Labor Board would protect her. She told him she had
gone to the Labor Board when she was employed by
American Linen. McHargue then went on to say he
could get rid of anyone he wanted and he did not have
to keep anyone. Her reply was, "I don't think it works
that way."
In his interview with Jackie Ann Abbott, McHargue
began by asking her if she had two children. Abbott re-
plied that she did, but they were living with her mother.
McHargue justified the question by saying he was asking
it for insurance purposes. He went on to ask her how she
felt about the Union. She replied she felt she was better
off with a union. McHargue then asked her why_ She
told him that, in her opinion, there were no problems.
She stated she had not filed any grievances but felt she
was better off with the Union. McHargue then asked her
how she was going to vote. She replied she had not yet
made up her mind. During the course of this conversa-
tion, McHargue was making notes on a yellow pad.
As noted previously, the election took place on
Friday, January 10. On Wednesday afternoon, January 8,
Company President Senior addressed a joint assembly of
day- and night-shift employees which took place about 2
p.m. In the course of his talk, he outlined the percent-
ages of gross revenue that resulted in wages, utility pay-
ments, and profits and told the employees about the
Morgan philosophy that wished employees to feel secure
in their jobs and to feel good about the Company. He
said employees who felt as he did should vote the union
out. If they did, he would not let them down. After the
speech, Renzoni asked employees if there were any ques-
tions. Nothing in this speech nor any subsequent ques-
tions has been challenged as either unlawful or objection-
able.
On the following day, Renzoni spoke to day-shift em-
ployees in a gathering that took place in the cafeteria at
2 p.m. His speech lasted 15 or 20 minutes. Nothing stated
in this speech has been challenged as either unlawful or
objectionable. Renzoni also wrote an open letter "To All
the People at Morgan," which was placed on the compa-
ny bulletin board. 5 Among the matters discussed in the
letter is a grievance procedure which the Respondent
had instituted at its Cleveland laundry. The letter states,
in part:
Some people believe that without a union, there
would be no grievance procedure to appeal deci-
sions of supervisors. That simply is not true. Many
non-union companies have effective and fair grievance
procedures. Morgan itself has a grievance procedure
that is used by some of its non-union employees. In
Cleveland there is a "Fairness Group" for non-
union employees. Under this procedure, the em-
ployee picks one half of the Review Board which
hears his or her grievance. Instead of arbitration,
which could take 6, 8, or 12 months to complete,
the final decision under the Fairness Group is made
by either the General Manager or the President of
the Company, at the employee's choice. This proce-
dure works. It is quicker than arbitration and the
company can deal more directly with the problems
of employees because it is not a party to a legal
action, as in arbitration.
5 McHargue testified he could not remember if he posted RenzonPs
letter before or after the election. The text of the letter begins "In the
upcoming election . . " I conclude it was posted before the election.
868 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The law prohibits me from promising this or any
other benefits if the union is decertified. However,
it illustrates what has been done elsewhere and that
unions are not the best answer when it comes to job
security.
Senior made reference to this procedure in his talk to
employees and so did Renzoni.
Christana Farris, the proponent of the decertification
petition, testified credibly 6 about a meeting which Ren-
zoni held at 3 p.m. with night shift employees. In the
course of this meeting, he attempted to persuade them to
vote against the Union in the decertification election.
Renzoni told night-shift employees on this occasion that
employees would still be covered with health insurance
and benefits if the Union was voted out. He did not
make any kind of comparisons between the union's
health and pension plans and what employees would be
getting if they voted against the Union. He said employ-
ees would not lose their vacations and would still have
personal days if they need them. However, he stated he
could not promise anything concerning raises. He men-
tioned talk that was going around that he would fire em-
ployees if he did not like them if the Union was not
there to protect them. He stated this was not so because
there would be a board of people set up composed of
two employees and a supervisor and this board would
vote on whether the employee would be dismissed. He
stated further that an employee would have to have two
writeups before a vote by the board would take place.
In her affidavit, Farris also stated that the above-recit-
ed talk took place beginning at 3 p.m. on January 9 and
thus less than 24 hours before the beginning of the elec-
tion on January 10. On the stand, she said she could not
remember whether the talk was given on that date. Re-
spondent's witnesses denied such a talk took place on
January 9, although Renzoni admitted talking exclusively
to a group of night-shift employees on January 2. No
witnesses were produced by the General Counsel for the
Charging Party to corroborate the portion of the affida-
vit relative to the timing of Renzoni's talk. Accordingly,
I conclude the talk took place before the election, as re-
cited by Farris, but there is insufficient evidence to find
that it took place on January 9.
The employees supported decertification by a vote of
19 to 11. Following the election, timely objections were
filed. Two of those objections were referred to hearing
in conjunction with unfair labor practice charges which
were filed a few days later. McHargue learned by phone
6 The Respondent objected to the fact some of Farris' testimony is
found in a pretrial affidavit that, m substantial part, she affirmed when
she took the stand. Respondent claims the contents of the affidavit are
not probative because they are hearsay. From a party to the proceeding,
an out-of-court affidavit that contains adnnsmons against interest is pri-
mary evidence and an exception to the hearsay rule. The affidavit was
affirmed by Farris in all but one portion when she testified, so the Re-
spondent was at liberty to cross-examine her, either on the original affida-
vit or the contents thereof as affirmed Accordingly, it is not hearsay. It
should be remembered that Fams was called by the union attorney, and
the procedure utilized by him was appropnate in examining an adverse
witness Because Farris was the proponent of the decertification petition,
any statements made by her that might be adverse to the validity of the
election carry a ring of credibility, and this fact influenced the credibility
determination
of the filing of the objections to the election. Shortly
thereafter, he spoke to a gathering of day-shift employ-
ees in the cafeteria. He informed them of the filing of ob-
jections, and he may have mentioned the charges as well.
I credit corroborated testimony that McHargue went on
to say that, if the Board or the Union approached em-
ployees in connection with these items, they did not
have to talk to them and, if they did, it would be used
against them and their jobs. 7 McHargue's statement had
the reverse effect on two or three employees, who went
directly to the Board office after work that day to give
affidavits.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
I find the interrogations of Phelps, Rice, and Abbott
by McHargue were coercive and conclude they were
unfair labor practices and objectionable conduct that af-
fected the result of the decertification election on Janu-
ary 10. These interrogations took place in the locus of
highest managerial authority, as far as the day-to-day op-
erations of the Company are concerned. It is idle for the
Respondent to suggest otherwise simply because any em-
ployee could go to Renzoni if she did not like what
McHargue said or did. As a normal operating routine,
McHargue did the hiring and firing and the disciplining
of employees. Indeed, he even suggested that higher
management had an obligation to clear with him before
calling employees off the floor for any purpose. At least
some of the employees questioned in McHargue's office
had rarely gone in there in the course of their duties, and
none had gone in there for the purpose of being ques-
tioned about their union sympathies. The questions posed
to these employees by McHargue concerning their union
activities and sentiments were not innocuous or casual.
They were part of a systematic campaign by McHargue
to produce a "No" vote at the January 10 election. The
questions were posed in the course of private one-on-one
conversations that were designed to intimidate. Concern-
ing at least two of the three subjects of this intimidation,
there is no basis for concluding that they were known
union adherents, and there is no basis for arguing, as the
Respondent does, that the Act or recent constructions
thereof by the Board authorize the intimidation of
known union adherents. This kind of probing into union
sentiments, into the reasons for those sentiments, and into
how employees intend to vote is a violation of the Act.
Moreover, there is no basis for arguing that Section 10(c)
of the Act applies to objectionable conduct, whatever
effect it may have in the aret of unfair labor practices.
Fiber Industries, 267 NLRB 840 (1983). By coercively in-
terrogating employees in the manner found above, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and en-
gaged in objectionable conduct that affected the outcome
of the' January 10 election.
The statements made by Renzoni to night-shift em-
ployees, as recounted by Farris, did not take place within
the period of time covered by the Peerless Plywood rules
7 McHargue's version of his statement, which I discredit, is that em-
ployee statements to the Board could be used as evidence against them or
the Company
8 107 NLRB 424 (1953).
MORGAN SERVICES 869
and are not objectionable on that account. However, in
his talk with night-shift employees, Renzoni went
beyond what he said in the letter that was posted on the
bulletin board. In the posted letter, Renzoni hedged in
discussing the Fairness Group and the manner in which
grievances were handled at the Respondent's Cleveland
laundry. The procedure outlined in the letter was
couched in language of what could be done relative to
grievance handling if the union were voted out. Renzoni
also stated in his letter that he could make no promises
concerning grievance handling or other matters.
In talking to night-shift employees concerning griev-
ance handling and the utilization of a Fairness Group,
Renzoni was not so careful. He flatly promised them that
if the union were voted out such a procedure would be
implemented in Indianapolis, as it had been in Cleveland.
Such a promise of benefit for voting against a union vio-
lates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is objectionable con-
duct which affects the result of an election. Whiting Mfg.
Co., 258 NLRB 429 (1981); NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 270 (1973). It was properly referred to the
Board and me by the Regional Director as part of the
catchall provision in Objection 4, and it was fully litigat-
ed in the proceeding which took place on April 22 and
23. American Safety Equipment Corp., 234 NLRB 501
(1978); Knight Electrical Displays, 234 NLRB 975 (1978).
After the election took place and objections and
charges were filed, McHargue attempted to preserve the
fruits of his illegal activity by a further illegal act. He
warned the day shift that if they attempted to cooperate
with the Board or the Union in the forthcoming investi-
gation it would go against them and their jobs. Even his
discredited version of the statement he made carries a
menacing overtone. He admits giving employees the
equivalent of a Miranda warning, telling them that any
evidence provided the Board in the performance of its
statutory duty could be held against either the employees
themselves or the Company. This admitted statement, on
its face, is an interference with protected rights because
it is an attempt to discourage free access to the Board.
Having been uttered after the election, McHargue's state-
ment is not a basis for setting aside the election, but it is
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I so find and
conclude.
On the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire
record herein considered as a whole, I make the follow-
ing
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.Respondent, Morgan Services, Inc. is now and at all
times material herein has been engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. Local 3017, Laundry and Dry Cleaning Internation-
al Union, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively interrogating employees concerning
their union activities and sympathies, by promising to im-
plement a grievance procedure if they voted to decertify
the Union, and by threatening employees with reprisal if
they should cooperate with the Board in the investiga-
tion of unfair labor practice charges and objections to
the conduct of an election, the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The first two referenced actions of the Respondent
in Conclusion of Law 3 constitute objectionable conduct
affecting the results of a decertification election which
was conducted among certain of the Respondent's Indi-
anapolis, Indiana employees on January 10, 1986.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices and objection-
able conduct have a close, intimate, and adverse effect
on the free flow of commerce within the meaning of
Sections 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices and objectionable conduct af-
fecting the outcome of an election, I will recommend
that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and to
take other affirmative actions designed to effectuate the
purposes and policies of the Act. I will also recommend
that the Respondent be required to post the usual notice,
advising its employees of their rights and of the results in
this case.9
On these fmdings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed"
ORDER
The Respondent, Morgan Services, Inc., Indianapolis,
Indiana, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
their union sympathies and activities.
(b) Promising to implement a grievance procedure or
any other benefit if employees vote to decertify the
Union.
(c) Threatening employees with reprisal if they coop-
erate with the Board in the investigation of unfair labor
practice charges or objections to the conduct of an elec-
tion.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at the Respondent's place of business in Indi-
anapolis, Indiana, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." 11 Copies of said notice, on forms provided
9 The General Counsel filed a standard brief requesting that the recom-
mended Order include a visitatonal clause permitting the Board to
engage in discovery in order to monitor compliance with the Order. No
necessity for such an order has been demonstrated in the record in this
case or in the General Counsel's brief as it concerns the facts and circum-
stances of this case Accordingly, I decline to recommend such a remedy.
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findmgs, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided m Sec. 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
" If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
Continued
870 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by the Regional Director for Region 25, after being
signed by Respondent's authorized respesentative, shall
be posted immediately on receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Case 25-RD-924
be severed from Cases 25-CA-l7770 and 25-CA--17770-
2; that the objection to the conduct of the election relat-
ing to a Peerless Plywood violation be overruled and the
remainder of the objections referred be sustained; that
the election conduct be set aside; and that Case 25-RD-
924 be remanded to the Regional Director for Region 25
for the purpose of conducting another election at such
time as he deems the circumstances will permit the free
choice of a bargaining agent.
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees con-
cerning their union sympathies and activities.
WE WILL NOT promise to implement a grievance pro-
cedure or any other benefit in exchange for a vote to de-
certify the union.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with reprisal if they
cooperate with the Board in the investigation of unfair
labor practice charges or objections to the conduct of an
election.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them by the Act.
MORGAN SERVICES, INC.