Monogram Comfort Foods

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Oct 31, 2011

25-CA-031704 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 31, 2011)

JD–65–11
Muncie, IN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
MONOGRAM COMFORT FOODS, LLC,
and Case 25–CA–31704 (Amended)
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 700.
Derek A. Johnson, Esq. (NLRB Region 25),
for the General Counsel
Howard S. Linzy, Esq. (The Kullman Firm),
of New Orleans, Louisiana, for the Respondent
Alexander G. Barney, Esq. (The Karmel Law Firm),
of Chicago, Illinois, for the Charging Party
DECISION
DAVID I. GOLDMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. This case involves an employer that
withdrew recognition from its employees’ union based on an employee petition seeking removal
of the union. The petition contained the signatures of a (bare) majority of the unit employees
employed at the time. The employer thanked its employees in meetings called to announce the
petition, repeatedly announced it had withdrawn recognition from the union, but pledged to
abide by the extant collective-bargaining agreement until it expired in two and a half months.
The government alleges that the withdrawal of recognition and related conduct by the
employer was unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act. The government alleges that
the petition was tainted by supervisory involvement, and thus, the employer could not
demonstrate a valid lack of majority support for union representation based on the petition. In
any event, the government contends that the employer relied upon the petition to withdraw
recognition 2 1/2 months before the expiration of the labor agreement, rendering its unilateral
withdrawal of recognition unlawful. Further, the government alleges that changes in the
employer’s dealings with the union attendant to the withdrawal of recognition, constituted
unlawful changes in the employment terms and conditions. The government alleges that a
delay in providing the union requested information was unlawful. Further, the government
alleges a variety of unlawful threats, solicitations, and interrogations of employees, both as part
of the petition process and directed towards employees in the months after the withdrawal of
recognition. Finally, the government alleges that in an interview with an employee witness in
preparation for its defense of the unfair labor practice charges in this case, the employer ran
afoul of Board precedent.
JD–65–11
2
The employer denies all wrongdoing. However as discussed herein, my consideration of
the record evidence, observation of witnesses at trial, and review of precedent lead me to
conclude that the employer has violated the National Labor Relations Act as described below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5
On December 9, 2010, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union,
Local 700 (Union or Local 700) filed an unfair labor practice charge against Monogram Comfort
Foods, LLC (Employer or Monogram), docketed by Region 25 of the National Labor Relations
Board (Board) as Case 25–CA–31704. The Union filed amended charges on February 16 and 10
25 and April 7, 2011.
On May 11, 2011, based on an investigation into the charge filed by the Union, the
Acting General Counsel (General Counsel), by the Regional Director for Region 25, issued a
complaint and notice of hearing against Monogram alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) 15
of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). Monogram filed an answer denying all violations of
the Act.
A four-day trial in this case was conducted June 28–July 1, 2011, in Muncie, Indiana.
Counsel for the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union filed briefs in support of their 20
positions by August 10, 2011. On the entire record, I make the following findings, conclusions
of law, and recommended remedy and order.1
JURISDICTION
25
The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, and I find that the Respondent is a
corporation with an office and place of business in Muncie, Indiana, where it engages in the
business of food processing. The complaint further alleges, the Respondent admits, and I find
that during the 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint, the Respondent in
conducting its business operation in Muncie sold and shipped from its Indiana facilities goods 30
valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Indiana. The complaint
further alleges, the Respondent admits, and I find that at all material times the Respondent has
been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act. It is also alleged, admitted, and found that at all material times the Union has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 35

1Counsel for the General Counsel filed a post-trial motion to correct the transcript. His
motion is unopposed and granted. Joint Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4 (composed of 4(a) and 4(b)) are
contained in the joint exhibits file, however, the transcript’s index of exhibits at page 5 of the
transcript indicates they were not offered into evidence. They were. The offer and receipt of
“all” the joint exhibits referred to in the transcript (Tr. 18) was to Joint Exhibits 1–6. Similarly,
General Counsel’s Exhibits 11 and 12 are contained in the relevant exhibit file. They were
offered into evidence without objection (Tr. 55). However, it appears from the transcript that I
was diverted and neglected to receive the offer. I do so now. Accordingly, the transcript is
corrected as follows: at page 5, lines 6, 8, and 10, “(not offered)” is changed to “18.” At page 4,
lines 30 and 32, “(not offered)” is changed to “55.”
At trial, counsel for the General Counsel orally moved to amend the complaint to add an
allegation that the Respondent interviewed an employee in preparation for defense of these
unfair labor practice charges without providing the safeguards required by the Board in
Johnnie’s Poultry, Co., 146 NLRB 770 (1964). This matter is discussed at length herein.
JD–65–11
3
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects commerce and that the Board has
jurisdiction of this case, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
5
I. Background facts
Monogram manufactures corn dogs and pork fritters at its Muncie, Indiana facility.
Monogram assumed operation of the facility from the predecessor employer, Al Pete Meats Inc.,
in approximately May 2009. 10
Local 700 represents a bargaining unit of the employees. When Monogram assumed
the operation it recognized the Union and assumed the existing collective-bargaining agreement
between Al Pete Meats and the Union. This agreement was effective by its terms February 16,
2008, and was slated for termination no earlier than February 12, 2011.215
The plant manager and top Monogram official at the Muncie, Indiana facility is Greg
Staley. The chief departments of the plant are fry room, the fritter room, the pack room, and
shipping, along with quality assurance.
20
2. The petition to remove the Union
In November and early December 2010, a “petition to remove union as representative”
circulated within the plant. The petition (included in the record as Jt. Exh. 5) stated:
25
To be filed with the appropriate
National Labor Relations Board Regional Office
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30
PETITION TO REMOVE UNION AS REPRESENTATIVE
The undersigned employees of Monogram Comfort Foods (employer
name) do not want to be represented by UFCW 700 (union name), 35
hereafter referred to as “union.”
Should the undersigned employees constitute 30% or more, but less than
50%, of the bargain unit represented by the union, the undersigned
employees hereby petition the National Labor Relations Board to hold a 40
decertification election to determine whether the majority of employees also
no longer wish to be represented by the union.
In addition, should the undersigned employees constitute 50% or more of
the bargaining unit represented by the union, the undersigned employees 45

2The precise contours of the bargaining unit are not established in the record. The labor
agreement refers to “those as certified by the National Labor Relations Board on November 9,
1968, which includes production employees.” The testimony suggests that the bargaining unit
covered, at least the production employees, including “line leaders,” and excluding supervisors
and managerial employees.
JD–65–11
4
hereby request that our employer immediately withdraw recognition from
the union, as it does not enjoy the support of a majority of employees in the
bargaining unit.
On the petition there was space below the text for employees to print and sign their 5
names and to indicate the date. Twelve such sheets, some signed by more employees than
others, were submitted as part of the record in this case.
A total of 24 bargaining unit employees (and about 15 nonbargaining unit employees)
signed the petition. As of December 1, 2010, there were 46 bargaining unit employees listed on 10
the payroll register. In addition, one employee, Joshua Vance, had been discharged in
November and at the time of the hearing his grievance remained pending.
The parties stipulated to the authenticity of the signatures on the petition.
Notwithstanding the stipulation, one employee witness, Susana Bonilla, testified that her15
signature was not authentic, although later in her testimony, when she recalled how she signed
the petition from an awkward position, standing, as the petition was held out for her to sign by
another employee using a file folder as backing, she determined that it “could be my signature.”
Given my comparison of the petition’s signature to exemplars placed in the record, given that
Bonilla recalled signing the petition to remove the Union, given her description of the 20
circumstances of the signing, and given her ultimate conclusion that it could be her signature, I
find that it was.
Of somewhat more concern was Bonilla’s assertion that the petition entered into
evidence—Joint Exhibit 5—was not the petition she signed and that the text was different. 25
Another employee witness, Miguel Vazquez, also objected that the petition he signed was not
Joint Exhibit 5, although he agreed it was his signature that appeared on Joint Exhibit 5. A third
employee, Jeremy Toler, testified in some detail that the petition he was asked to sign differed
from Joint Exhibit 5. Toler pointed out the specific paragraphs in Joint Exhibit 5—which he was
presented with during the trial—that were not in the petition that he had been asked to sign. I 30
also note the unusual fact that every signature on the petition is dated December 1, 2011. If
accurate, it speaks of an impressive display of organization by the putative initiators, none of
whom testified.
While there was near endemic confusion exhibited by witnesses about the dates that 35
certain events in this case occurred,3 as discussed below, some, like former employee Holly

3Witnesses, including otherwise credible witnesses, provided varying recollections—
guesses in many cases—of the date of particular meetings or actions. Their testimony was
often in conflict on that score. The confusion was pronounced in this case, but not surprising,
or, in my estimation, of much consequence in determining credibility. “Dates, and even
sequence, are notoriously the subject of testimonial confusion without substantially affecting
credibility determinations relating to disputed conversations.” L.D. Brinkman Southeast, 261
NLRB 204, 209 fn. 5 (1982) (citations omitted); Hearst Corp., 281 NLRB 764, 779 (1986)
(“obvious inaccuracy of dates provided for certain events, such as [witness’s] account that he
had been interrogated whether he had signed an anti-union petition . . . on March 19, appears to
have been no more ‘than a 'confusion as to details.'" NLRB v. Longshoremen, Local 10, 283
F.2d 558, 562–563 (9th Cir. 1960)), enfd. mem. 837 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1988). The dates of
various meetings, encounters, and other events set forth herein reflect my view of the
preponderance of plausible and credible evidence. But there was little agreement between
witnesses as to the precise date of many events.
JD–65–11
5
Craig, testified credibly about signing and seeing others signing the petition to remove the Union
before Thanksgiving. Toler placed his discussions about the petition—and the solicitation that
he sign it—about a week before the mass employee meetings conducted by Plant Manager
Staley to announce receipt of the petition. Those meetings first occurred December 2, 2010.
Employee Michael Collins testified that he heard about the petition in early November from 5
Marvin Williams. Thus, there is significant evidence suggesting that the signatures for the
petition were not all garnered on December 1, as indicated on Joint Exhibit 5. However, given
my conclusions on other aspects of the case, I need not resolve the doubts I have that every
employee signed the petition December 1 as is stated on the petition next to each signature.
10
Four employees gave testimony suggesting that supervisory employees played a role in
the petition drive, including soliciting signatures and/or offering inducements to convince
employees to sign the petition. In each instance, the employee’s testimony was controverted by
the relevant supervisor. One employee, Miguel Vazquez, testified that Supervisor Anthony
Morgan was involved in the petition drive. Three employees, Holly Craig, Jeremy Toler, and 15
Kathy Abner, testified that Supervisor Tina Greene participated in the petition drive. I will
consider the evidence regarding each of these allegations.
3. Allegations regarding Anthony Morgan
20
Employee Miguel Vazquez testified that he signed the petition to remove the Union at
the behest of (admitted) Supervisor Anthony Morgan. Morgan is the night manager of the plant
and direct supervisor of the fry room. According to Vazquez, “When I was working, the
supervisor, Anthony, he called me to sign the sheet.” According to Vasquez, Morgan did not
explain anything to him, and his testimony suggested that Vazquez, who does not read English, 25
did not know what he was signing when he signed the document.4
Vasquez also testified that he signed the petition in the presence of “another person,
[bargaining unit employee] Jimmy [Cotes], and only that person,” and also agreed that “Jimmy
was the one who asked you to sign this sheet of paper.” 30
Cotes and Morgan testified. Cotes testified that he presented the petition to Vazquez in
the breakroom and asked him to sign it. Cotes testified that Vazquez signed it in the break
room, and that no supervisors were present. Morgan testified too. He denied ever talking to
Vazquez about the Union and denied seeing or even knowing about the petition to remove the 35
Union until it was announced by Plant Manager Greg Staley in a meeting December 2, after the
signatures were affixed.
This case poses some difficult credibility-based questions. This is one. Both Morgan
and Cotes were short witnesses. There was not a lot of time to judge their testimony, but what I 40
saw was offered with sureness and directness. Vazquez seemed out of place. He testified
through an interpreter, and this should have helped mitigate any language-based difficulties with
his testimony. I thought he was nervous and perhaps unhappy to be there. Neither is a
problem in and of itself. But his testimony was extremely tentative, vague, and confusing. And
at times contradictory. And it would have been even more difficult to follow had I not allowed45
the General Counsel to repeatedly ask leading questions of this witness. I believe the General
Counsel’s evidence falls short here. In the face of the credible contradiction by Morgan and

4Similarly, Vazquez testified that previously, at a union representative’s behest, he
signed a dues checkoff authorization card without knowing what he was signing.
JD–65–11
6
Cotes of Vazquez’ tentative testimony, I do not credit Vazquez’ story of Anthony Morgan’s
involvement in his card signing.
4. Allegations regarding Tina Greene
5
Three employees testified to Supervisor Tina Greene’s involvement in the petition effort.
I consider the testimony of Greene and the three employees below. Thereafter, I consider and
resolve the credibility issues raised by the testimony.
A. Holly Craig10
Holly Craig worked at Monogram from July 2010, until February 10, 2011, when she quit.
She worked in the fry room. Marvin Williams was her line leader in the fry room. Williams
reported to supervisor Tina Greene.
15
Craig testified that she learned of the petition to remove the Union when Williams
approached her in November 2010 and asked her to sign it. In her testimony she repeatedly
stated that this occurred before Thanksgiving.5 According to Craig, Williams approached her
last among employees on the line and she saw others signing the petition before she was
approached.20
Craig refused to sign the petition. According to Craig, after she “told him no, he took it
back to the office and Tina [Greene] called me into the office and tried to talk me into just
signing the petition.” Craig testified that when she told Greene she did not want to sign the
petition, Greene told her that the insurance Monogram offered was better than that offered by 25
the Union. Craig told Greene that she had heard people talking about signing the petition and
that Craig had heard that people who signed the petition to remove the Union would be fired
and Craig told Greene, “I don’t want to get fired.” Greene told her she wouldn’t get fired. During
this conversation they were alone, although Williams entered and exited the office at some
point, and Greene and Craig stopped talking for the short time he was there.630
According to Craig, Greene relented but then followed her out of the office into the boot
room and persisted in trying to get Craig to sign the petition:
She said, “I thought you wanted the union out.” I was like, “No, I don’t want the 35
union out.” She finally—basically, to me, it was harassment to get me to sign it. I
said alright just to get her off my back because she wouldn’t leave me alone
about it.
Greene gave her the petition and Craig signed it. 40

5Only once did she say she signed it “either before or after” Thanksgiving. But after being
pressed on this point, Craig testified with conviction that it was before Thanksgiving that this
occurred. Tr. 125 (“I thought it was before Thanksgiving because that’s what happened”).
6Contrary to the Respondent’s claim on brief (R. Br. at 9), Craig did not contradict herself
about who was in the office with her during the incident with Greene. She testified that first it
was just her and Greene. And then, in the middle of her conversation with Greene, Williams
entered the office.
JD–65–11
7
The next day, Craig approached Plant Manager Staley in the cafeteria and told him “that
I wanted my name off of it. He said it was too late, that he already sent it to the lawyer’s, or
something. I don’t know. He sent it somewhere. I don’t know where he sent it to. He said
something about the lawyers.”
5
Greene and Staley testified. Staley did not deny or even address Craig’s testimony
about her request to remove her name from the petition. I credit this uncontradicted assertion
by Craig. 7
Greene denied soliciting Craig to sign the petition. She testified that she followed 10
instructions she received when she became a supervisor eight years ago, that “we could not talk
about the union with the employees, but that, if they asked a question, we could answer it.”
Greene denied ever having seen the petition to remove the Union, and claimed she heard about
it for the first time on the evening of December 1, when her sister—a bargaining unit
employee—mentioned it to her (in discussions also in dispute in this case). Greene testified 15
that her only discussion with Craig regarding the Union occurred on December 2, at
approximately 9 a.m., during Craig’s first morning break, when Craig briefly—for a matter “of
seconds”—appeared in Greene’s office door and asked Greene about the prospects for the
guaranteed 32 hours of work promised to employees in the labor agreement. Greene told Craig
that in her opinion “[i]t would no longer be there if the union wasn’t there.” Craig then “turned 20
around and went back out.” Greene testified that line leader and bargaining unit employee
Marvin Williams, who had presented the petition to many of the employees, was in the office
when Craig came by to ask the question.
B. Jeremy Toler25
Jeremy Toler began working at Monogram in 2009. He is a line leader in the pack room.
Toler testified that he learned about the petition to remove the Union when Tina Greene called
him into her office one day around noon “and asked my opinion about being for the union or
against the union.” Toler did not recall the date of this event, estimating it to be “six months ago 30
or so,” but more concretely, “maybe a week or so” before the December 2 meeting with
employees conducted by Plant Manager Greg Staley regarding the petition to remove the
Union.
Only he and Tina were in her office. According to Toler: 35
Once I got in there, she asked was I for the union or against the union. I told her
that I really hadn’t made up my mind at the time. She asked me was I happy with
them taking $28 and some change out of my check every month. I told her, you
know, that’s their policy and I give everybody a fair chance. She told me if I 40

7The Respondent contends (R. Br. at 7) that “Craig became so muddled on cross-
examination that it was unnecessary to have Staley address” this portion of Craig’s testimony. I
did not observe that. On cross-examination the Respondent established only that this event
was not referenced in Craig’s pretrial affidavit. That is a point worth making, but it is not, in my
estimation a particularly compelling one. Craig said nothing in her direct or cross examination
that evinced any confusion about this incident or any lack of conviction that the incident with
Staley occurred. I found her credible on this point, and the fact that this significant claim went
unrebutted—though the case was litigated with great attention to detail—only adds to the view
that the testimony on this point should be credited.
JD–65–11
8
wasn’t happy with it that I could just sign the paper and it wouldn’t come out of
my check anymore. That’s when I told her that I wasn’t going to sign the paper.
Toler testified that the paper Greene was referring to was “[a] petition to vote the union
out” that Greene retrieved from the tray of the copier (or printer) in the office. The copier is 5
attached to a computer in the office, and sits on Anthony Morgan’s desk, the supervisor with
whom Greene shares the office. Only Greene and Morgan use the computer.
The petition Greene showed Toler was a single page. Toler described the petition
Greene had as similar to Joint Exhibit 5, but with less text. There were spaces for signatures, 10
but no signatures. Below is the text of the petition shown to Toler by Greene, based on his
testimony, with the differences in text from Joint Exhibit 5 struck:
To be filed with the appropriate
National Labor Relations Board Regional Office15
PETITION TO REMOVE UNION AS REPRESENTATIVE
The undersigned employees of Monogram Comfort Foods (employer
name) do not want to be represented by UFCW 700 (union name), 20
hereafter referred to as “union.”
Should the undersigned employees constitute 30% or more, but less than
50%, of the bargain unit represented by the union, the undersigned
employees hereby petition the National Labor Relations Board to hold a 25
decertification election to determine whether the majority of employees also
no longer wish to be represented by the union.
In addition, should the undersigned employees constitute 50% or more of the
bargaining unit represented by the union, the undersigned employees hereby 30
request that our employer immediately withdraw recognition form the union, as it
does not enjoy the support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit.
After Toler told Greene he was not going to sign the paper, “that was pretty much it. I
went back to work.”35
A couple of days later, at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 a.m., Greene again raised the
matter with Toler:
This time, it was pretty much her defending the reason [ ] why I should sign the 40
paper as far as better wages and more days off as far as like holidays and things
like that.
* * * * * * * * * *
45
She made a statement like, “Why would you want to pay the union your money
when they’ve done nothing for you to this point?” She went on about how long
she’d been there and what she’s experienced with the union. Like I said, she
made the point that by being company, not union, that our pay would be better
and we would—I think it was two extra days, holidays off on the calendar. That’s 50
when I told her that I just wasn’t going to sign it.
JD–65–11
9
In her testimony, Greene denied discussing the Union with Toler at any time in 2010,
denied having had a copy of the petition, denied having asked any employee to withdraw
support for the Union, and denied promising any employee that they would receive improved
benefits if the Union was removed. 5
C. Kathy Abner
Kathy Abner has worked at Monogram since 2000. She works in the fritter room. Tina
Greene is her immediate supervisor, and her sister.10
Abner testified that she first heard about the petition to remove the Union from her sister
in “November or December” when Greene called her one evening at home, around 7 or 8 p.m.,
and “asked me if I knew if there was a petition going around. I said no, and she said she’ll talk
to me more about it tomorrow.” Greene identified the petition as a petition “[t]o vote out the 15
union.”
In the morning, Abner reported to work at 6 a.m. She saw Greene who told Abner, “I will
call you.” Greene called for her between 8 and 9 a.m., and Abner went to Greene’s office.
Greene asked Abner if she would sign the petition. Abner expressed concerns about things 20
changing because “we always had a union” and Greene told Abner that “nothing was going to
change” if there was no union at the plant. Abner told Greene that she “wasn’t sure. I would
have to think about it.” Abner returned to work. At some point that day she told coworker
Ronnie Strunk that Greene wanted her to sign the petition, but she was unsure.
25
Later that day, around 2 p.m., Greene called Abner back to her office and again “asked
me if I wanted to sign” the petition. This time, according to Abner, line leader Marvin Williams
was in the office. Abner again said that she wasn’t sure, and Greene told her “[w]ell, you don’t
have to because with or without your signature, we have enough.” Abner reiterated that she
wasn’t sure what to do and Greene said, [i]t’s just between me and you,” to which Abner replied, 30
“[a]nd him,” referring to Williams. Greene said, “Marvin won’t say anything if she signs it, right?”
Williams said “Oh, no, no. it’s just between us.” Greene told Abner that she did not have to sign
the petition, “It was up to me.” The phone rang and Greene said, “that’s probably Greg. He’s
waiting on it. We’ve got to get it over there for him to send it in.” At that point the three left the
office. Greene and Williams left the room, with Greene saying she had to take the petition to 35
Staley. Abner declared that she was not going to sign the petition and she left.
Greene testified and told an entirely different story. She testified that she first heard
about the petition on the evening of December 1, when she called her sister Kathy Abner at
home to tell her that the fritter room was scheduled to operate the next day. According to 40
Greene, Abner asked Greene if she knew about “the petition going around.” Greene told her
no, and that “I couldn’t talk about the union with her, I could only answer any questions that
w[ere] asked to me.” Greene testified that the next day Abner came, unsolicited, to Greene’s fry
room office between 11 and 12. She sat down and said she wanted to ask Greene a question.
Williams was present. Greene testified that Abner asked her about seniority and “if seniority 45
would matter” if the Union was not there. During the conversation, Ronnie Strunk opened the
door and indicated he also wanted to ask a question. He asked about whether the employees
would still have the 32-hour guarantee if the union was voted out. Greene told him, in her
opinion, no, they would not. Strunk left, and Abner returned to her question about seniority.
Greene didn’t know the answer so she called Plant Manager Staley and after speaking to him, 50
JD–65–11
10
told Greene that everything would stay the same. Greene estimated that Abner was in her
office for two to three minutes. Williams did not speak during the time Abner was there.
D. Credibility resolutions regarding Toler, Craig, Abner, and Greene
5
I found Toler a particularly credible witness based on his demeanor. He testified in a
thoughtful direct manner, with assurance, but without embellishment. His testimonial account of
his encounters with Greene were offered in a serious and sure way, and with appropriate detail.
His manner was convincing to me. I do not believe he made it up. His assertion that Greene
picked up a shorter version of the petition off the computer printer sounds very much like she10
had printed out an early version of the petition.
Craig was also a good witness, though less precise and sure than Toler. She struck me
as disinterested (and at the end, a little uninterested), which comported with the fact that she no
longer worked at Monogram, and, to my mind, this added to her credibility: she has no stake in 15
the outcome. Together, Toler and Craig’s testimony, and the rough similarity of the conduct
they attribute to Greene, had the effect of adding to the weight of their individual testimony.
Barring a conspiracy between the current and former employee (and I have no reason to believe
and do not believe that) their testimony had the effect of corroborating the likelihood that if
Greene would act this way with one, she would act this way with the other. And as discussed 20
below, although more problematic, a third employee, Kathy Abner, also alleged similar conduct
by Greene.8
Greene was not a bad witness. I did not find anything suspect in her demeanor that was
of obvious concern. She denied ever talking to Toler about the Union, and given his testimony, 25
that is not something I believe. She admitted to only a very limited discussion with Craig. She
denied all misconduct and even knowledge of the petition prior to speaking with Abner—
according to Greene—the night of December 1. That seems unlikely, given that the petition
had, by that time, been signed by numerous bargaining unit and nonbargaining unit employees,
some while working. The weight, reasonableness, and compelling nature of Toler and 30
believability of Craig’s testimony lead me to credit them over Greene.
Abner’s demeanor was earnest, a little scared, but honest. Greene’s testimony was
unremarkable. As with her description of events with Craig, she admitted limited contact with
Abner about the Union, confined to Abner asking a question about the Union. She testified that 35
she called Staley from her office, with Williams and Abner present, to answer a question that
Abner had about adherence to seniority if there was no Union. Staley testified extensively but
did not corroborate this, which occurred, by Greene’s account, just a couple of hours before
Staley called the employees to a mandatory meeting at which he announced his receipt of the
petition. 40

8I recognize that a number of witnesses saying things happened do not have to be credited
over a single witness who says they did not. But credibly offered evidence does add up and
adds to the weight of the evidence. Toler and Craig were credible witnesses. The fact that they
both testified to distinct but similar incidents with Greene adds to my confidence that they were
telling the truth. Hearst Corp., 281 NLRB at 780 (“that so many witnesses testified to similar
remarks on separate occasions by Chamberlain is a probative consideration in assessing the
reliability of those descriptions”).
JD–65–11
11
Consideration of Abner’s credibility must take into consideration the pretrial effort by the
Respondent to bolster Greene’s testimony—and neutralize Abner’s. On March 16, 2011, three
months before the hearing, after the filing of unfair labor practice charges, but before the
issuance of the complaint, Abner was called into Greene’s office and asked to sign a statement,
prepared by a Monogram official from Memphis identified only as Carl. The statement was titled 5
“sworn statement” and stated:
I, Kathy Abner, am Tina Green[e]’s sister and I am employed at Monogram
Comfort Foods, LLC.
10
After being advised that I could answer questions without fear of reprisal or
promise of reward, I reviewed the statement (attached) signed by Tina Green[e],
and, to the extent I have personal knowledge, the statement is true and correct.
This statement was signed (albeit not sworn to) by Abner. The statement by Greene 15
allegedly attached (although Abner testified that it did not look the same and she did not seem
to have much familiarity with it) was a statement, also prepared by Carl, which recapitulated
events as later testified to by Greene.
I do not find this pretrial effort to develop corroboration for and impeachment of 20
testimony yet to be provided persuasive. Indeed, it reeks of a certain aggressive pretrial
“advocacy”—not factfinding—that reflects a fear of Abner’s uncoerced testimony. Even as
impeachment it is suspect. It is an inconsistent prior statement, but one that relies on—indeed,
is nothing more than—a conclusory endorsement of another allegedly attached statement with
which Abner did not appear familiar, and which she disputed when she viewed it at trial. In 25
other words, it is not, standing alone, her statement. In none of the accounts of this
encounter—from Greene, from Abner, or from Peter Chan, a quality manager at Monogram who
was involved in witnessing and procuring Abner’s signature—was there any explanation or
clarification of when, how, or if, Abner saw or considered the Greene statement prior to being
ushered into Greene’s conference room and confronted with the statement to sign, which she 30
quickly did sign “for Tina.” Chan testified that “the only thing I remember is that she seemed
hesitant to sign it because she was worried she was going to get in trouble or something like
that, but we reassured her that that wasn’t the case and I mean she signed it afterwards.”
In Chan’s testimony, he repeatedly (Tr. 458, 461) referenced telling Abner when she 35
entered Greene’s office that this was the statement “we talked about” and that “you had given
earlier” but the record does not reveal what these prior conversations involved or when they
occurred, or who was involved. At the conclusion of his testimony, I asked Chan about this. He
denied saying it. But he did.
40
What I am left with is a witness who, when called into her supervisor’s (and sister’s)
office, and with two supervisors present, signs a short statement stating she agrees with
another statement previously signed by her sister and shown to her, perhaps, for the first time
while the supervisors observe. There appears to be an earlier meeting or discussion that one of
the supervisors references in his testimony, but denies when asked about it. According to the 45
supervisor, the witness appears “hesitant” to sign but is then “reassured” and then signs. That
is what happened in the supervisor’s office.
However in the light of day, with the protection of courtroom procedures, and under oath,
the witness tells a very different story, and even disputes whether the statement provided in 50
court was the one attached to her own prior statement. Under these circumstances, I think the
JD–65–11
12
truth is to be found in the witness’ trial testimony, not her conclusory agreement to a
supervisor’s story garnered in the supervisor’s office.9
For the reasons stated, I credit the trial testimony of Toler, Craig, and Abner, regarding
their encounters with Greene regarding the employee petition. I discredit Greene to the extent 5
her testimony conflicted with these employees’ testimony.
5. the withdrawal of recognition of the Union; meetings with
employees; and the refusal to negotiate a successor agreement 10
On December 1, 2010, the Union wrote to Monogram notifying it of an intent to
renegotiate the labor agreement, due to expire February 12, 2011. The Union’s letter asked
Monogram to contact the Union to arrange for dates to commence negotiations.
15
On December 2, 2010, Staley sent an email to Union representatives Mike Merrell and
Jeff Thompson, with an attached letter from Staley to Thompson stating:
Please be advised that we have been served with a petition signed by a majority
of our employees indicating that they no longer wish to be represented by your 20
Union. As a consequence, we are, effective with this letter (also being sent by
email to you), withdrawing recognition from your Union. We will, of course, abide
by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement consistent with the
requirements of the law.
25
That day, Staley conducted meetings (one for first and one for second shift) with all
bargaining unit employees and with supervisors present. At the meeting he read (and then
posted in the plant) a letter to employees stating that
We have just been served with a petition signed by a majority of you indicating 30
that you no longer wish to be represented by the Union. We are advising the
Union of your decision but are not providing the Union with the signed petition.
CONGRATULATIONS on your decision. We support you 100% and are very
happy that you have taken this action.35
As you know, we still have a contract with the Union and must follow its terms
until it expires on February 12, 2011. We are considering the various
improvements in your pay and benefits, and other things, which we would like to
take and will get back to you on those as soon as we have some final thoughts to 40
share with you. Let’s continue making high quality corn dogs and fritters and
growing our business.
Again, CONGRATULATIONS ON A VERY WISE DECISION.
45
Former employee Michael Collins, who worked on the first shift, testified credibly
that at the first mandatory meeting held by the employer about the petition that Staley

9This finding is independent of but further buttressed by my conclusion, discussed below,
that this effort to have Abner sign a statement supportive of the Respondent’s version of events
was conducted unlawfully.
JD–65–11
13
had mentioned that the union was—had just showed back up. We were getting
ready for a union contract to be renewed. He said that the company was not any
longer recognizing the union and that they would still honor the contract with the
union until December—or February of 2011, but that they would no longer 5
recognize the union and that the petition that had been signed had [an]
overwhelming majority of people who had voted not to be represented by the
union. He thanked the employees for their decision and that was pretty much the
gist of the meeting, thanking everybody for voting out the [union].
10
Employee Travis Lusk, who worked on the second shift meeting (and attended the
meeting for second shift employees) recalled Staley reading the letter to employees. Lusk
credibly testified:
[Staley] then went on to say that the company was no longer recognizing the 15
union as our bargaining agent and that the company, in essence, preferred that
the plant be nonunion and congratulations on voting out the union.
Union Representative Mike Merrell learned of Monogram’s withdrawal of recognition
from Staley’s December 2 email to him and Thompson. The next day Merrell went to the facility 20
to speak to Staley about it. When Merrell arrived Staley was paged and came to meet him.
They walked to the building with Staley’s office and met there accompanied by another
management official named Curry. Merrell told Staley he was surprised by his letter and Merrell
asked if he could have a copy of the petition. Staley said he would not be allowed to provide a
copy in order to protect the people who signed it. Staley also told Merrell that he could not 25
provide him a copy of the petition if he wanted to because it had been sent down to the
corporate offices in Memphis. Staley would not tell Merrell who presented the petition to him
except to say that they were recognized as members of the Union. Staley denied having any
knowledge of the petition “until they walked in here and presented it in my office yesterday.”
Repeatedly throughout the conversation Staley told Merrell that “we no longer recognize your 30
union.”
Union Representative Thompson followed up his earlier request for bargaining dates
with an email to Greg Staley on December 10, asking for “available dates” for bargaining.
35
Staley responded that day, December 10, with an email stating:
Mr. Thompson, Monogram Comfort Foods, LLC has already been informed by
our employees that they no longer wish to be represented by your Union.
Consequently, we withdrew recognition. It would be improper for us to meet and 40
bargain with you. We decline your request for dates and will not meet with you
for that purpose.
There has been no collective bargaining between the parties since this exchange.
45
In a December 8, 2010 letter to employees Monogram again expressed support for the
employees’ petition, “congratulating” them “on a very wise decision.” The letter pointed out that
Monogram had to abide by the contract until it expired on February 12, 2011, promised that
“[w]e will not reduce any associates pay or benefits as the result of the decertification—now or
after the contract expires.” The letter warned employees to “[b]e leery of promises made by the 50
JD–65–11
14
union” and added that “[w]e are considering various improvements in your pay and benefits and
other matters and will get back with you as soon as we have final thoughts to share with you.”
At a second mandatory meeting, conducted in shifts, according to Staley, “probably
about a week or so” after the December 2 meeting, Staley read from “talking points” (GC Exh. 5
21) provided by another management official, probably—based on the commentary in the
talking points—Ray Stitle, from the corporate HR department.10 A meeting was held for each
shift. Stitle attended the meeting for the second shift and also spoke briefly. At this meeting,
Staley said that he wanted to address rumors that the Union could fire employees, and he said
this was not so, “he had the sole right to hire or fire anyone.” According to employee Travis 10
Lusk, at this meeting Staley stated that, in terms of pay and benefits, “they weren’t going to take
anything from us now. He quickly corrected himself to say they’re not going to take anything
from us. He said nothing is going to change because of this decision, he said, to be nonunion.”
Collins testified that at this meeting,
15
Greg had mentioned that it had been brought to his attention that several people
were still stating that there was a union that we were being represented by and
that there was no longer a union and for us not to fall for false promises that the
union was making; that the company was going to take care of us; and again,
that the union had been voted out. 20
A December 15, 2010 letter mailed (or posted) to employees from Logistics Manager
Paul Whitehair stated that he had reviewed the petition and confirmed that while nonbargaining
unit employees had signed the petition, their names were not counted, the signatures were
authentic, and that “a majority of your peers and associates signed the petition.”25
At a subsequent mandatory meeting with employees, Staley read employees a
December 17, 2010 letter he had written to employees. The letter urged employees not to
attend an upcoming union meeting and announced that the union meeting was not mandatory.
The letter concluded by stating: “Say NO to the Union, NO to the meeting and NO to their false 30
promises.” The letter was then posted on the bulletin board in the cafeteria.
6. Union employee meetings
In mid-to-late November 2010, in anticipation of upcoming negotiations for a successor 35
agreement, the Union sent questionnaires to employees to solicit input on bargaining issues.
Employees organized a meeting among themselves to go over the questionnaire. The meeting
was held December 4 at a facility in town called the Ross Center just two days after
Monogram’s December 2 announcement and meeting regarding the petition to remove the
Union. That announcement became the focus of the meeting, and the employees decided to 40
invite union representatives to the meeting.
The Union then scheduled its own meeting that took place December 8, at a local
restaurant in a conference or party room maintained by the restaurant. There were two
gatherings held this day, one for first shift at 6 p.m. and one for second shift employees at 3 45
p.m. Near the end of the meeting the union representatives circulated a petition prepared by

10The undated talking points (GC Exh. 21) suggest that the meeting is to be held on a
Monday, which makes the most likely date of the meeting December 13, 2010, eleven days
after the December 2 meeting. The talking points were very similar in message to the
December 8 letter, suggesting common authorship.
JD–65–11
15
Union Representative Merrell, “authorize[ing] our union, UFCW Local 700, to represent us and
demand[ing Monogram Foods to immediately negotiate a new Collective Bargaining Agreement
with our union.”
Another union meeting was conducted at the same restaurant on December 19. At this 5
meeting the employees in attendance voted on whether to keep the Union as the bargaining
representative and the tally showed that all 23 employees at the meeting voted in favor of
retaining the Union as representative. The union representatives were asked to leave the room
during the voting. After the voting was completed and the tally verified, the union
representatives were invited back into the room. After announcement of the vote results, the 10
employees also decided to vote for new union stewards—one for each shift. Michael Collins
and Travis Lusk were elected stewards.
The prounion petition was also circulated at this December 19 meeting. In total, at both
meetings, it garnered 26 signatures from bargaining unit employees. 15
Merrell mailed a letter to Staley, dated January 4, 2011, reporting that the employees
“reaffirmed” support for union representation at the December 19 meeting. The letter stated:
A meeting was held on December 19, 2010[,] during which a majority of 20
bargaining unit members unanimously reaffirmed their support for UFCW Local
700 as their exclusive bargaining representative. In addition, Michael Collins and
Jeremy Lusk were appointed and elected as shop Stewards.
In light of this unequivocal support, Local 700 demands that the Company 25
immediately cease its unlawful withdrawal of recognition of the Union and allow
Union Representatives access to the facility. In addition, the Company must
immediately and timely process grievances through the grievance procedure.
Finally, the Union demands that the Company cease harassing its employees
because of their support for Local 700.30
I look forward to your immediate response to these issues and concerns.
Merrell testified that the letter was mailed to Staley as addressed. Staley testified that
he did not receive the January 4 letter in the mail from the Union. He testified that he received a 35
copy of the letter from an employee who provided it to him on January 13. Staley claimed at
trial that he suspected the letter was not “authentic” and not really from the Union.11

11Staley testified that the copy of the January 4 letter he received had the “cc’s” added on in
a different typeface, and that the paper was “skewed”—i.e., copied slightly off center. Staley
testified (Tr. 551-552) that this made him concerned that the letter was not “valid” or “authentic”
(Tr. 583) though he resisted, for the most part, counsel’s assiduous effort to suggest that he
considered the letter “forged.” (Tr. 583-584.) Letters get photocopied less than perfectly all the
time, there is nothing suspicious in that. “Cc’s” are often added by secretaries. Reasonably, the
“cc’s” here did not indicate anything suspicious. There is no contemporaneous evidence for
Staley’s claim at trial that he thought the Union’s letter was not authentic. The claim appears to
have been developed for litigation to explain the decision to go forward with the withdrawal of
recognition in the face of the Union’s claim of majority support. In any event, as discussed
below, Staley’s opinion on the authenticity of the Union’s letter has no significance (other than to
Staley’s credibility).
JD–65–11
16
7. The Employer’s refusal to recognize union stewards; further
Employer meetings and communications with employees
On January 14, 2011, Staley conducted another mandatory meeting with bargaining unit
employees. At this meeting he read another letter from himself to employees. The letter 5
explained that Monogram had just received the Union’s January 4, letter. Staley’s January 14
letter stated that the “[t]he reason for this Notice is to clear up any misunderstanding which the
Union’s letter may cause” and included the following:
First, Monogram withdrew recognition because your petition, signed by a 10
majority, asked us to do so. When we withdrew recognition, the Union legally no
longer represented the associates.
Second, the Union has filed a charge with the Labor Board trying to overturn your
decision. That matter is before the Labor Board and we will cooperate with the 15
Government in its investigation. We will not turn our backs on you or your
decision to get rid of the Union.
Third, we have no information about the Union's meeting or what occurred in the
meeting or what the Union claims was a majority signing to get the Union back 20
in—other than what the Union is writing in its letters. We do not believe the
Union represents a majority of our associates.
Fourth, the Union says that new stewards have been elected and the Union has
given us their names. We do not recognize the Union and we have no intention 25
of dealing with the Union or its stewards as your representatives based on the
Union’s claims of a majority. None of you needs a "steward" to get a fair deal
and to be recognized for the work you do not have to pay union dues for that
recognition.
30
Fifth, there are no privileged characters in the plant. Everyone, including the 2
“union stewards", is expected to follow the rules and perform their jobs in the
same manner as everyone else. Being a "union steward" does not entitle
anyone to a special deal.
35
Sixth, we have, of course, continued your pay and benefits without any change
and have plans for improvements in pay and benefits. We wish the Union
situation would go away entirely so that we can get on with the future of this
business and the business of making this an even better place to work.
40
Finally, the Union accused me of "harassing" our associates because of their
support for the Union. The Union and you know that is untrue.
If any of you have questions about this or anything else, please do not hesitate to
ask me or any other supervisor. If we do not have the answer, we will get the 45
correct answer for you. Do not be misled by Union statements—to get the true
facts, ask me.
(Emphasis in original.)
50
Monogram’s assertion that it would not recognize the new stewards—as described
above in the January 14, 2011 letter to employees—was also conveyed directly to new steward
JD–65–11
17
Michael Collins. Collins was relieved of his line leader duties (and later discharged) in January
2011. In undisputed credited testimony, Collins testified that in a disciplinary meeting, when he
asked for union representation, corporate HR director Mindy Lane, who was in the meeting via
conference phone, said that Monogram “did not recognize the union any more. The company
did not recognize the union as of December 2nd, that it had been decertified.” Lane told Collins 5
“there was no way I could be the union steward because there was no longer a union.”
Finally, I note that at trial Staley testified that in the weeks after January 14, 2011, until
the expiration of the contract on February 12, 2011, he made himself “available to the
associates out on the floor . . . to allow them to approach me and talk to me about anything 10
they wanted to talk to me about.” According to Staley, “numerous associates came to me and
t[old] me that they did not want the Union there.” Based on these conversations, Staley made a
tally of the level of support or nonsupport for the Union right before the contract concluded
February 12, 2011. Based on that tally, which indicated 26 employees told him they did not
want a union—more than were garnered with the December 1 petition--and based on the 15
petition he received in December, Staley testified that he concluded that a majority of
employees did not want the Union.12
It seems to me not coincidental that such testimony came from the same witness who,
while testifying under oath, obdurately resisted admitting that the Employer withdrew recognition 20
from the union, even in the face of numerous letters he authored (or that went out over his
name) unequivocally stating that the employer was withdrawing recognition from the union.13 At
trial, Staley appeared to regard an initial admission that recognition had been withdrawn (Tr. 27)
as a mistake and proceeded to repeatedly refuse to admit that Monogram withdrew recognition
from the Union (Tr. 28, 31) and then asserting that “I think that we said we didn’t decide to 25
remove recognition, we decided to abide by the law.” (Tr. 31, 33 (“I said we didn’t decide to pull
recognition, that we decided to abide by the law”)). He even denied that Monogram withdrew
recognition after the labor agreement expired on February 12, 2011 (Tr. 33, 34), something
admitted by the Respondent in its answer and, indeed, a central assertion of the Respondent’s
case. All of this provided an eye-opening window into his credibility generally. Thereafter (and 30
this started five minutes into his testimony), it was hard to accept the credibility of any of his
testimony that was disputed by others, and, as discussed, here, some that was not.
More generally, I noticed in Staley, a penchant for the unverifiable explanation.14
Similarly, as to his late January/early February assessment of the Union’s lack of majority 35

12Staley did not produce the tally he claimed to have taken just before the end of the
contract. However, at counsel’s direction, the evening before his testimony at trial, Staley took a
roster of employees and marked the employees who he says approached him and told him that
they did not want to have a union.
13See, e.g., Staley’s December 2, 2010 letter to the Union: “we are, effective with this letter .
. . withdrawing recognition from your Union”; Staley’s December 10, 2010 letter to the Union:
“we withdrew recognition”; Staley’s January 14, 2011 letter read to employees: “Monogram
withdrew recognition because your petition, signed by a majority, asked us to do so. When we
withdrew recognition, the Union legally no longer represented the associates. . . . We do not
recognize the Union and we have no intention of dealing with the Union” (original emphasis).
14For example, he never received the Union’s January 4 letter in the mail; he advanced the
contrived claim, discussed above, that when he saw the letter he did not believe it was written
JD–65–11
18
support, there is absolutely no corroboration for Staley’s claim that he, the plant manager, hung
around on the floor and a majority of employees approached him and told him that they did not
want union representation. No one testified that they saw it. No one testified they overheard it.
Staley did not produce the contemporaneous “tally” of his discussions that he claimed to have
made. It strikes me as a highly unlikely scenario. As noted, within minutes of the 5
commencement of the hearing Staley proved willing to insist on the unbelievable in an effort to
advance what he perceived to be the Employer’s interest in this case. This testimony is more of
the same. I do not believe it, and I discredit it.
8. The Union’s request for information10
On December 10, 2010, by letter and by email (sent 40 minutes before the
emailed request for bargaining dates), Thompson requested from Staley a copy of an up-to-date
employee seniority list including name, addresses, social security numbers, date of hire, rate of
pay, and phone number for each employee.15
On February 11, 2011, Thompson reiterated the December 10 request for employee
seniority information in an email to Staley.
On February 24, 2011, after expiration of the labor agreement, Staley responded to the 20
Union’s December 10, 2010 (and February 11 followup) information request. Staley provided
the information with a cover note to Thompson stating:
In reviewing correspondence from you, I discovered that I had not responded to
your 12/10/10 request for a seniority list. I prepared the list as of 1/16/11 and am25
enclosing it. Please excuse my oversight.
At the hearing, Staley elaborated on his response. He testified that one reason for his
delay was that the same information had been sent to Merrell in mid-October 2010. Staley
added “Honestly, I forgot about it, because I had vacation coming up and we had the holidays 30
and everything else, and I forgot about sending it.” Staley claimed he did not remember it until
“around” February 24, 2011, when the information was provided.
9. Observance of the contract and other dealings with the Union
35
In the period after December 2, 2010, until the expiration of the labor agreement,
Monogram, by all evidence, continued to observe the express terms of the labor agreement. It
maintained the pay and benefits for employees. It continued to deduct union dues as
authorized from employee pay. It responded to grievances, and with regard to the only
grievance processed through the grievance procedure—that concerning the discharge of an 40
employee in November 2010—plans to arbitrate the dispute were underway at the time of the
hearing in June 2011.
Other dealings with the Union were not so smooth. In the Monogram cafeteria there is a
large corkboard bulletin board on which company announcements, mandated employment 45
related notices, contact numbers, and other communications are posted. A portion of the
bulletin board has long been devoted to union information, including scholarship information,
union rights, contact numbers for union representatives and other matters the Union wanted to

by the Union; as discussed below, he testified that he inadvertently forgot to respond to the
Union’s December 10 information request.
JD–65–11
19
post. Collins testified that one day in December near the end of his shift he saw Staley
removing the union information from the bulletin board. Collins’ was terminated January 27,
2011, and the union materials remained off the bulletin board through that time. Staley admitted
removing the union materials, but dated this as occurring in January 2011. Staley said he
removed the union materials to make room for safety team materials that he wanted to post. 5
Finally, three union representatives testified to their method of meeting with employees
at the Monogram facility. Union Representative Jeff Thompson, who was first assigned to the
Monogram unit in late August or early September 2010, visited the facility soon thereafter. He
went with Union representative Mike Merrell. They first went to the office, which is in a separate 10
building from the plant, and signed in, and the office contacted Staley to inform him of the
representatives’ presence. Merrell and Thompson then walked over to the plant. They sat in
the picnic table area, which is Monogram property beside the building that is abutted on one
side by a public walkway. Employees take breaks there to talk and to smoke. Then Thompson
and Merrell went into the cafeteria break room to talk with employees. In the fall, before 15
December 2, Thompson visited three or four additional times and, after signing in, confined his
visit to the picnic table area.
After December 2, Thompson visited the facility for the first time again on December 6 at
approximately 6 a.m. On the way there he received a call from Mike Merrell telling him that they 20
were no longer allowed on Monogram property and that they could not park at the Monogram
lot. They parked across the street and confined their visit to the public walkway that is adjacent
to the picnic table area. When the plant is closed there is a metal fence and gate that separates
the walkway from the picnic area. But when the plant is in operation the fence and gate are
retracted there is no barrier or division between the walkway and the picnic area. On December 25
6, and in many visits since then, Thompson has stayed on the walkway and not ventured onto
Monogram property because of his belief that union representatives are not allowed on the
property.15
Another union representative, David Villegas, testified to following a similar procedure for 30
visiting Monogram, which he first visited in October 2010. Villegas would park in the parking lot,
sign in at the office, the office would call Staley, and then Staley would walk Villegas over to the
picnic table area. Villegas never entered the Monogram facility during any of his visits.
However, he believed, presumably from talking to other union representatives, that he was
entitled to enter the breakroom, something he and Staley discussed during his first visit to the 35
facility in October 2010. Villegas testified that Staley “seemed to reluctant to allow that,” but
Villegas did not pursue the matter. Staley testified that he told Villegas that he could stand in
the picnic area and “catch the associates coming out of the building or coming in.” Staley
testified that he later intervened to stop an employee from calling other employees off the
production line to come outside and talk with Villegas. At that time, according to Staley, he told 40
Villegas it was a “breach of contract” to “disrupt” work and Staley claims he took the opportunity
to reiterate to Villegas that he was not to go in the building. I find that Villegas was told, even if

15I credit this unrebutted testimony. After Thompson repeated his testimony that he had not
ventured into the picnic table area since December 2, counsel for the Respondent asked if the
witness was aware that cameras surveil the area and asked once more if Thompson was saying
that he had not entered the picnic area. No evidence or claim that Thompson was seen on
camera entering the picnic area was ever produced. Indeed, Staley admitted that he could not
specifically identify Thompson on the camera monitors as having entered the picnic area.
JD–65–11
20
indirectly, and understood, during his first visit in October, that Staley was not permitting him to
enter the facility.
Villegas was parking his vehicle in the Monogram parking lot early the morning of
December 6 when Staley pulled up beside him, asked him who he was and when Villegas told 5
him he was a union representative, Staley told him to leave the property. Villegas complied and
drove down the road where he waited for Mike Merrell and Jeff Thompson to arrive.16
Since December 6, Villegas’ understanding (presumably based on the encounter in the
parking lot) has been that the union representatives are not permitted on Monogram property. 10
Since then, for the most part Villegas has confined himself to the public walkway by the picnic
tables, but admitted walking into the picnic table area a couple of times.
Merrell had been the union representative for the facility for many years. He testified
that in the past when he had visited the facility he would talk to employees in the picnic table 15
area but also in the breakroom and in the parking lot. Prior to December 3 he had never been
stopped from entering the facility. Merrell indicated that he visited the plant, on average,
monthly. He did not always see Staley, but he would usually report to the clericals in the
administrative office building.
20
When Merrell met with Stacy on December 3, regarding the withdrawal of recognition, he
and Staley walked to the entrance by the picnic tables. Staley asked Merrell to wait outside
while he contacted someone. Staley went inside the plant. Staley returned in about ten to
fifteen minutes and said “No, I’m sorry, I can’t let you in.” Merrell said, “So you are denying me
access to the plant?” Staley said “Well I guess so because I can’t let you in.” Merrell protested 25
this. Staley told Merrell that the Union was “okay to be on the property but we were not okay to
go inside the plant.” Staley testified that Merrell asked if he could go into the plant to post
materials on the bulletin board. Staley said “no, you have to stay right here.” Staley then left.
Merrell later heard from Villegas that, at the direction of Staley, the Union was not to 30
park in the parking lot. After that Merrell avoided entering Monogram’s property, including, for
the most part, the picnic area. He stayed on the sidewalk by the parking area because he knew
that would not be a problem. A few times during this period he did come onto the picnic area.
Staley testified that cameras that are trained on the plant grounds can be viewed from a 35
monitor in his office. He testified that since December he thought he observed union
representatives in the picnic area eight to ten times, but is positive he saw a union official there
once. Staley could not identify Villegas, Merrell, or Thompson, as having entered the picnic
table area. When he saw someone he believed to be affiliated with the Union in the picnic table
area he did not take any action. 40
Analysis
The government alleges that Monogram unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union45
on or about December 2, 2010, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The

16Staley testified that he saw cars with motors running in the parking lot and, because “we
are not in the best neighborhood of town,” he went over to the parking lot and approached one
of the cars and told the driver they could not park there. Staley claimed that only when the cars
pulled away did he see union stickers and surmised that the cars were with the Union.
JD–65–11
21
government further alleges that, pursuant to the withdrawal of recognition, and also in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, Monogram thereafter unlawfully limited union officials’
access to facility property, and to the bulletin board, refused to recognize the union stewards,
and unlawfully delayed providing the Union with requested relevant information.
5
The government also alleges an array of unlawful conduct by Monogram’s supervisors
and managers in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. This unlawful conduct relates to
supervisory involvement in the petition to remove the Union, and, after withdrawal of
recognition, to letters and statements of Monogram officials, pronouncements about the
withdrawal of recognition, soliciting employees to cease paying dues, and promising increased10
wages and benefits because of the removal of the Union. Finally, at trial, counsel for the
General Counsel alleged that in interviewing an employee in connection with preparing to
defend the unfair labor practice charges filed against it in this case, the Respondent unlawfully
ignored the safeguards required by the Board in Johnnie’s Poultry, Inc., 146 NLRB 770 (1964).
15
I will consider each alleged violation, beginning first with the various independent section
8(a)(1) violations and then turning to the 8(a)(5) allegations. Finally, I will consider the Johnnie’s
Poultry allegation raised by counsel at trial.
I. The Alleged Section 8(a)(1) violations (complaint paragraph 5)20
Section 7 of the Act grants employees, among other rights, “the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Pursuant to Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, it is “an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).25
A. Anthony Morgan (complaint paragraph 5(a))
The government alleges that Supervisor Anthony Morgan, on or about December 12,
2010, instructed employees to sign a petition withdrawing their support for the Union.30
The only evidence implicating Morgan in the petition effort is that offered by Miguel
Vazquez. As discussed above, I am not convinced of its accuracy, and I have not credited it.
Accordingly, this allegation of the complaint will be dismissed.17
35
B. Tina Greene (complaint paragraph 5(b))
The government alleges that in November 2010 Supervisor Tina Greene solicited
employees to withdraw support from the Union, interrogated employees about their union
activities, and promised employees there would be improvements in benefits if the Union was 40
removed as the bargaining representative.
These allegations are well founded based on the credited evidence. As I have found,
Supervisor Greene solicited employee Craig to sign the petition to remove the Union, calling her
into the office and then following her out again urging her to sign the petition. Craig described it 45
as “harassment to get me to sign it.” In the service of soliciting Craig, Greene told her that the

17The complaint also alleges in paragraph 5(a)(i) that Morgan informed employees that the
Respondent was going to get rid of the Union. On brief (G.C. Br. at 27 fn. 32) counsel for the
General Counsel moved to withdraw that allegation on grounds that the evidence offered at trial
does not support it. The motion is granted.

JD–65–11
22
Employer offered better insurance than the Union. Greene interrogated employee Toler as to
whether he was “for the union or against the union.” She then solicited him to sign the petition
to remove the Union, a copy of which was in the printer attached to the computer in her office.
She reiterated her solicitation of Toler a couple of days later, this time adding “that by being
company, not union, that our pay would be better” and employees would receive “two extra 5
days, holidays off on the calendar.” Finally, the credited evidence is that Greene solicited her
sister, employee Kathy Abner, to sign the petition to remove the Union.18
It is settled precedent that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by "actively
soliciting, encouraging, promoting, or providing assistance in the initiation, signing, or filing of an10
employee petition seeking to decertify the bargaining representative." Wire Products Mfg.
Corp., 326 NLRB 625, 640 (1998), enfd. mem. 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000). This includes
promising similar or more favorable benefits in the event the employees initiate and sign such
petitions. Central Washington Hospital, 279 NLRB 60, 64–65 (1986), enfd. 815 F.2d 1493 (9th
Cir. 1987); Fabric Warehouse, 294 NLRB 189, 191 (1989) (“Express promises of better benefits15
linked to getting rid of the Union clearly tend to undercut support for the Union. Accordingly, we
find that these statements violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act”), enfd. mem. 902 F.2d 28 (4th Cir.
1990). An employer also violates Section 8(a)(1) by interrogating an employee about their
union sympathies in the context, as here, where “[i[ts purpose was to induce and convince the
employees to sign the petition.” Hercules Automotive, Inc., 285 NLRB 944, 949 (1987); Hearst 20
Corp., 281 NLRB 764 (1986), enfd. mem. 837 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 1988).
I find that the Respondent, through Greene, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
soliciting employees to withdraw support from the Union, coercively interrogating employees
about their union sympathies, and promising improvements in benefits if the Union was 25
removed as the bargaining representative.
C. Respondent’s communications to employees (complaint paragraphs 5(c)—(f))
The government alleges that through the communications to employees by Staley and 30
other Monogram officials, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by telling
employees that it no longer recognized the Union and that the employees were no longer
represented by the Union, by promising improved wages and benefits because the employees
withdrew support from the Union, and by soliciting employees to stop paying union dues.
35
In paragraph 5(c), the government alleges that on or about early December 2010 Staley
told employees that the Respondent no longer recognized the Union as the employees’
collective-bargaining representative. The credited testimony of former employee Collins was
that at the first mandatory meeting conducted by Staley, Staley told the assembled employees
that “the company was not any longer recognizing union and that they would still honor the 40
contract with the union until . . . February 2011, but that they would no longer recognize the
union.” Employee Travis Lusk’s credited testimony was that at the first mandatory meeting
Stacy told the employees that “the company was no longer recognizing the union as our
bargaining agent and that the company, in essence, preferred that the plant be nonunion and
congratulations on voting out the union.” Similar declarations were made to employees at the 45
second mandatory meeting, telling them “there was no longer a union.”

18This last incident may have occurred in November as alleged or, more likely, it occurred on
December 2. I note that a discrepancy in dates, without more, is insufficient to find that a
respondent has been prejudiced. Parts Depot, Inc., 332 NLRB 733, 734 fn. 6 (2000).
JD–65–11
23
This credited testimony proves the violation alleged in paragraph 5(c). Spectrum Health,
353 NLRB 996, 1005 (2009) (two-member decision) ("’to tell employees that there was no union
when, in fact, there was, undermined the Union's representative role’ and, therefore, constituted
an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1)”), adopted 355 NLRB No. 101 (2010), citing Windsor
Convalescent Ctr., 351 NLRB 975, 987–88 (2007), enfd. in relevant part 570 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 5
2009).
However, contrary to complaint allegation 5(d)(i), the December 8, 2010 letter from
Staley, Stitle and Johnson does not announce to employees that they are no longer represented
by the Union. I will dismiss complaint allegation 5(d)(i).10
The letter does, however, implicitly promise improvements in pay and benefits as a
consequence of the employees indicating they no longer want be represented by the Union. In
the context of offering their “support” for the employees signing the petition, and expressing how
“pleased” they were by the employees’ action, the letter’s authors Stitle/Staley/Johnson stated 15
that “[w]e will not reduce any associates pay or benefits as the result of the decertification—now
or after the contract expires,” and stated that “[w]e are considering various improvements in
your pay and benefits and other matters and will get back with you as soon as we have final
thoughts to share with you.” The commitment not to cut pay or benefits (even after the contract
expires) and the suggestion of “various improvements in your pay and benefits” to come are 20
offered in the context of the authors’ express pleasure with and support of the employees’
decision to disavow the Union. There is little doubt, and I find, that these promises are, albeit
implicitly, a consequence of the employees’ putative disavowal of the Union.
Thus, as to paragraph 5(d)(ii), which alleges that the letter contained a promise of 25
improvement in pay and benefits, the allegation is proven.
Contrary to complaint paragraph 5(e), the December 15, 2010 letter from Whitehair does
not announce to employees that they were no longer represented by the Union and does not
promise employees improved wages and benefits because they withdrew support for the Union. 30
The letter makes no such representations. I will dismiss complaint paragraph 5(e)(i) and (ii).
Complaint paragraph 5(f)(i) alleges that Staley’s January 14, 2011 letter announced to
employees that they were no longer represented by the Union. The complaint alleges in
paragraph 5(f)(ii) that the letter promised employees improved wages and benefits because 35
they withdrew their support from the Union, and in paragraph 5(f)(iii) that it solicited employees
to cease paying union dues.
Each of these complaint allegations is accurate. First, the January 14, 2011 letter
explicitly stated that “Monogram withdrew recognition because your petition signed by a 40
majority, asked us to do so. When we withdrew recognition, the Union legally no longer
represented the associates.” Later in the letter, it states: “We do not recognize the Union and
we have no intention of dealing with the Union or its stewards as your representatives.”
(Emphasis in original.) This is a violation of Section 8(a)(1). Spectrum Health, supra, Windsor
Convalescent Center, supra. 45
Second, the January 14, 2011 letter states that “we have, of course, continued your pay
and benefits without any change and have plans for improvements in pay and benefits. We
wish the Union situation would go away entirely so that we can get on with the future of this
business and the business of making this an even better place to work.” Particularly in the 50
context of the whole letter, its hostility to union representation and vow to help the employees
JD–65–11
24
remove the Union, the “plans for future pay and benefits” and the wish that the union issues
(i.e., the Union) “would go away entirely” so that “we can make this an even better place to
work” are thinly veiled—if they may be said to be veiled at all—statements that the plans for
better pay and benefits are the result of and, indeed, conditioned upon, the removal of the Union
from the workplace. This constitutes an independent violation of the Act.5
Finally, in explaining that the Employer will not recognize the Union and will not deal with
its stewards, the letter asserts that “[n]one of you needs a ‘steward’ to get a fair deal and to be
recognized for the work you do and you do not have to pay union dues for that
recognition.” (Emphasis in original.) These exhortations constitute solicitation to employees to 10
revoke their dues check-off authorizations, which is unlawful for the Employer to actively
encourage. Rock-Tenn Co., 238 NLRB 403, 403–404 (1978); Roslyn Gardens Tenants Corp.,
294 NLRB 506, 516 (1989).
15
II. Alleged Section 8(a)(5) violations (complaint paragraphs 7 and 8)
A. The withdrawal of recognition (complaint paragraphs 7(a and b))
1. Summary20
Section 8(a)(5) requires an employer to bargain with the union that represents a
majority of its employees. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717 (2001). An
employer who withdraws recognition from an incumbent union will be found to have violated
Section 8(a)(5). Id.1925
The precondition for a union’s service as a bargaining unit’s exclusive representative is
the existence of majority support for the union within the unit. Auciello Iron Works, supra at
785–786. This reflects “the Act’s clear mandate to give effect to employees’ free choice of
bargaining representatives. Levitz, 333 NLRB at 720. However,
[t]he Board has also recognized that, for employees’ choices to be meaningful, 30
collective-bargaining relationships must be given a chance to bear fruit and so
must not be subjected to constant challenges. Therefore, from the earliest days
of the Act, the Board has sought to foster industrial peace and stability in
collective-bargaining relationships, as well as employee free choice, by
presuming that an incumbent union retains its majority status.35
Levitz, supra at 720.
The presumption of majority support is usually rebuttable, but in some periods of a
collective-bargaining relationship it is conclusive. One such period is during the life of a
collective-bargaining agreement that is not longer than three years duration. Thus, it is a “long-
established principle that a union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority support during 40
the term of a collective-bargaining agreement, up to 3 years.” Trailmobile Trailer, LLC, 343
NLRB 95, 97–98 (2004); Levitz, supra at fn. 17 (“a union’s majority status may not be
questioned during the life of a collective bargaining agreement up to 3 years”); Auciello Iron

19In addition, an employer’s violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act is a derivative violation of
Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. Tennessee Coach Co., 115 NLRB 677, 679, enfd. 237 F.2d 907 (6th
Cir. 1956). See ABF Freight System, 325 NLRB 546 fn. 3 (1998).
JD–65–11
25
Works, 517 U.S. at 791 (rejecting an exception “to the conclusive presumption [of majority
support] arising at the moment a collective-bargaining contract offer has been accepted”).
During a period when the presumption of majority support is rebuttable—i.e., when no
labor agreement is in effect or beyond the first three years of a long term agreement— an
"employer may rebut the continuing presumption of an incumbent union's majority status, and 5
unilaterally withdraw recognition, only on a showing that the union has, in fact, lost the support
of a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit." Levitz Furniture Co., 333 NLRB at 725.
However, as the Board in Levitz explained:
[A]n employer with objective evidence that the union has lost majority support—10
for example, a petition signed by a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit—withdraws recognition at its peril. If the union contests the withdrawal of
recognition in an unfair labor practice proceeding, the employer will have to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the union had, in fact, lost majority
support at the time the employer withdrew recognition. If it fails to do so, it will not 15
have rebutted the presumption of majority status, and the withdrawal of
recognition will violate Section 8(a)(5).
Of course, “an employer may only withdraw recognition if the expression of employee
desire to decertify represents “’the free and uncoerced act of the employees concerned.’” 20
Eastern States Optical Co., 275 NLRB 371, 372 (1985) (quoting KONO-TV-Mission Telecasting,
163 NLRB 1005, 1006 (1967)).
An employer confronted with evidence that a union has lost majority support during the
term of the agreement may announce an “anticipatory withdrawal,” pursuant to which it refuses 25
to negotiate a successor agreement and announces that it will not recognize the union after the
contract expires. As the Board explained in Parkwood Developmental Center, 347 NLRB 974,
975 fn. 10 (2006), enfd. 521 F.3d 404 (2008):
Under the "anticipatory withdrawal" cases, an employer faced with evidence that 30
an incumbent union has lost majority support during the term of a collective-
bargaining agreement may lawfully refuse to negotiate a successor agreement
and announce that it will not recognize the union after the contract expires,
provided that it complies with the existing contract in the interim. However, an
employer's "withdrawal of recognition [is] as to—and only as to—negotiating a 35
successor contract to the existing agreement." Abbey Medical, 264 NLRB [969,]
969 [(1982)]. Such an employer may not completely withdraw recognition until
the contract expires because until then the union enjoys an irrebuttable
presumption of majority status. See Levitz, 333 NLRB at 730 fn. 70.
40
In this case, Monogram was party to a three-year collective-bargaining agreement (that it
assumed midterm) that expired February 12, 2011. Accordingly, the Union enjoyed an
irrebuttable presumption of majority support on December 2, 2010. As of that date, in terms of
unilateral action to withdraw recognition, Monogram was limited to the following: it could rely on
legitimate objective evidence of the Union’s loss of majority support to “lawfully refuse to 45
negotiate a successor agreement and announce that it [would] not recognize the union after the
contract expire[d], provided that it complie[d] with the existing contract in the interim.” The
withdrawal of recognition must be “as to—and only as to—negotiating a successor contract to
the existing agreement." Parkwood, supra. It could act on its evidence of the Union’s loss of
support and withdraw recognition from the Union after expiration of the labor agreement on 50
JD–65–11
26
February 12, 2011, and only if it could prove there was a loss of majority support on the date
(after February 12) that recognition is subsequently withdrawn. Levitz, supra.
As discussed at length herein, the evidence shows that Monogram failed this test at
almost every point in the analysis. 5
First, the petition to remove the Union did not establish a loss of majority support—it was
tainted by supervisory involvement and unfair labor practices.
Second, even assuming, wrongly, that the petition proved a lack of majority support on 10
December 2, the irrebuttable presumption of majority support enjoyed by the Union on that date,
precluded Monogram from withdrawing recognition from the Union on December 2 or anytime
before expiration of the contract on February 12, 2011—but that is what it did during that time
frame. It is true that Monogram announced an intent to abide by the contract—part of its
continuing duty under a theory of anticipatory withdrawal—but its statements and conduct 15
evinced withdrawal of recognition other than a willingness to abide by contract. More is
required: in an anticipatory withdrawal situation, beyond a refusal to negotiate a successor labor
agreement, recognition cannot in any other manner be withdrawn during the period in which the
irrebuttable presumption of majority support is in effect.
20
Alternatively, even if the fiction is indulged—that the Respondent’s repeated assertions
of withdrawal of recognition were only (unlawful) assertions, and that by its conduct it did not
withdraw recognition until after the contract’s expiration—then its assertions of withdrawal (and
other conduct) still constitute unfair labor practices that interfered with employees’ Section 7
rights, and precluded it from relying on a lack of majority support in February 2011 to withdraw 25
recognition.
Finally, even assuming, very wrongly, that on December 2, Monogram lawfully
announced an anticipatory withdrawal based on lawful objective evidence of the lack of the
Union’s majority support, the Employer cannot prove that the Union did not have majority 30
support as of the expiration of the contract, when it claimed, in its answer, that it withdrew
recognition. The Union’s petition in favor of continued union representation, gathered on
December 8 and 19, 2011, and the composition of the bargaining unit on February 12, 2011,
undercut any effort to prove a lack of majority support based on the petition from December 1.
35
2. The petition to remove the Union
As discussed, above, the credited evidence reveals that in November 2010, after
employee Holly Craig refused to sign the petition to remove the Union, Supervisor Greene
called Craig into her office “and tried to talk [Craig] into just signing the petition.” In doing so she 40
suggested that Monogram’s insurance was better than that offered under the agreement with
the Union. She persisted in her efforts, following Craig out of the office until Craig agreed to
sign the petition, which she characterized as “harassment.” Further, about a week before the
December 2 withdrawal of recognition announcement, Greene interrogated employee Toler
about his union sympathies and solicited him to sign the petition, calling him into her office, and 45
handing him a copy of the petition from the printer in her office. A couple of days later Greene
renewed her solicitations to Toler, this time promising better pay and more holidays for
employees if the Union was removed. Finally, the credited evidence reveals that Greene
solicited her sister, employee Kathy Abner, to sign the petition, twice calling her into the office to
urge her to sign the petition to remove the Union. As found, all of this conduct violated the Act.50
JD–65–11
27
Under on point Board precedent, Greene’s unlawful efforts in support of the petition
invalidate the petition as a basis to prove the Union’s loss of majority support. As the Board
recently explained, in SFO Good-Nite Inn, LLC, 357 NLRB No. 16, slip op. at 1 (2011), and
applying the Board’s holding in Hearst Corp., 281 NLRB 764 (1986), enfd. mem. 837 F.3d 1088
(5th Cir. 1988), “an employer may not withdraw recognition based on a petition that it unlawfully 5
assisted, supported, or otherwise unlawfully encouraged, even absent specific proof of the
misconduct’s effect on employee choice.” In other words, in cases where the employer’s unfair
labor practices are part of the decertification effort, the Board “presumes that the employer’s
unlawful meddling tainted any resulting expression of employee dissatisfaction, without specific
proof of causation, and precludes the employer from relying on that expressed disaffection to 10
overcome the union’s continue presumption of majority support.” SFO Good-Nite Inn, supra,
slip op. at 2.
Notably, under this analysis, it is irrelevant whether the employees unlawfully solicited by
the employer to sign the decertification petition ended up signing the petition or whether the 15
other employees were aware of the employer’s unfair labor practices directed towards the
decertification effort. SFO Good-Nite Inn, slip op. at 3 (rejecting argument that petition signed
by 14 of 24 employees could be relied on to show lack of majority support for the union because
unlawfully pressured employees did not sign the petition and no evidence that any signers knew
of the Respondent’s coercive acts).20

Without more, the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition—anticipatory or otherwise—
which was squarely based on the petition to remove the Union, was unlawful.
3. The Employer unlawfully withdrew recognition as of December 2, 201025
Even assuming, wrongly, that the petition proved a lack of majority support on December
2, the irrebuttable presumption of majority support enjoyed by the Union on December 2,
precluded Monogram from withdrawing recognition from the Union at that time or anytime prior
to the expiration of the contract on February 12, 2011. 30
Monogram does not dispute this principle. Rather, it contends that its actions should not
be construed as withdrawing recognition, but rather, construed as an announcement that it was
going to withdraw recognition after the labor agreement expired. According to the Respondent:
35
Monogram’s unequivocal verbal and written statements that it would follow the
terms of the contract until its expiration, despite the language about withdrawing
recognition, were the legal equivalences of continuing recognition and placing
Local 700 on notice that it did not intend to negotiate a replacement agreement.
40
R. Br. at 32 (emphasis in original)).
Respondent’s argument is, obviously in my view, an afterthought—an effort to put the
best face on a clear failure to follow the Board precedent on “anticipatory withdrawal.” As a
matter of English it did not announce an anticipatory withdrawal to employees or the Union. It45
unequivocally withdrew recognition, and it repeated this to employees and the Union throughout
December 2010 and January 2011.
Staley’s initial December 2 letter to the Union “advised” that Monogram received a
petition signed by a majority of employees indicating that they no longer wished to be 50
JD–65–11
28
represented by the Union. “As a consequence,” wrote Staley, “we are, effective with this letter
(also being sent by email to you), withdrawing recognition from your Union.”
It is hard to imagine a clearer indication of immediate withdrawal of recognition. This
theme was repeated relentlessly in the following weeks and months: 5
December 2, 2010, first shift meeting with employees (Staley told
employees Monogram “would no longer recognize the union”).
December 2, 2010, second shift meeting with employees (Staley said “the 10
company was no longer recognizing the union as our bargaining agent”).
December 3, 2010 meeting with Merrell (Staley repeatedly told Merrell
“we no longer recognize your union”).
15
Staley’s December 10, 2010 written response to Union Representative
Thompson’s request for available dates for bargaining (“Monogram Comfort
Foods, LLC has already been informed by our employees that they no longer
wish to be represented by your Union. Consequently, we withdrew recognition.
It would be improper for us to meet and bargain with you”).20
On or about December 13, 2010, at the second mandatory employee
meeting (Staley “mentioned that it had been brought to his attention that several
people were still stating that there was a union that we were being represented
by and that there was no longer a union and for us not to fall for false promises 25
that the union was making; that the company was going to take care of us; and
again, that the union had been voted out”).
January 14, 2011 letter posted and read verbatim to employees
(“Monogram withdrew recognition because your petition, signed by a majority, 30
asked us to do so. When we withdrew recognition, the Union legally no longer
represented the associates. . . . [T]he Union says that new stewards have been
elected and the Union has given us their names. We do not recognize the Union
and we have no intention of dealing with the Union or its stewards as your
representatives based on the Union’s claims of a majority” (original emphasis)).35
It is also relevant to the issue of withdrawal of recognition that in either December or
January Staley cleared the Union’s materials from the breakroom bulletin board. And it is also
relevant that during employee Collins’ discipline meeting, on January 9, 2011, Collins declared
that he was the new union steward and “as the new union steward” requested to be represented 40
by a union representative at the meeting. HR Director Lane, participating in the meeting by
conference phone, told Collins that “[t]he company did not recognize the union as of December
2nd, that it had been decertified” and Lane told Collins “there was no way [he] could be the
union steward because there was no longer a union.”
The issue is not whether Collins was entitled to representation at the meeting. The issue 45
is that the Employer made clear that it was not recognizing him, or anyone, as a union steward
“because there was no longer a union.” (Emphasis added.)
This is a withdrawal of recognition.
50
JD–65–11
29
What the Employer did not do was terminate the labor agreement. From the outset of its
withdrawal of recognition it professed an intention to abide by the contract until its termination.
And by all evidence the employer continued to abide by the agreement, including the processing
of grievances arising during the life of the contract.
5
But this does not show that it engaged in a lawful anticipatory withdrawal. In a legitimate
case of anticipatory withdrawal, an employer is not required just to maintain the labor agreement
in effect. It is forbidden to otherwise withdraw recognition. Parkwood Developmental Center,
347 NLRB at 975. Under the Board’s anticipatory withdrawal doctrine “an employer’s
withdrawal of recognition [is] as to—and only as to—negotiating a successor contract to the 10
existing agreement. Such an employer may not completely withdraw recognition until the
contract expires because until then the union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority
status.” Parkwood, supra, 975 at fn. 10 (citing Abbey Medical, 264 NLRB 969 (1982), enfd.
mem. 709 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1983)), and Levitz, supra (citations and internal quotations
omitted)) (Board’s bracketing). 15
Thus, in order to effectuate an anticipatory withdrawal an employer cannot announce
that it is “effective with this letter . . . withdrawing recognition from your Union.” It cannot
announce to union representatives that, “we no longer recognize your union,” and it cannot
announce to employees that it refuses to recognize the union stewards and that “we have no 20
intention of dealing with the Union or its stewards” and that the “new union stewards . . . were
not recognized because as of December 2, the union has been decertified.”
However, this is precisely what Monogram did. These pronouncements are inconsistent
with a lawful anticipatory withdrawal. Even assuming, arguendo, this a legitimate anticipatory 25
withdrawal situation, Monogram’s obligation was to deal with Union, was to recognize and deal
with its stewards, until such time as it could lawfully withdraw recognition.20
Alternatively, if one stretches the truth and indulges the fiction that, despite its repeated
statements, Monogram, in fact, engaged in “the legal equivalences of continuing recognition,” its30
statements of withdrawal of recognition and refusal to work with the Union or its stewards still
constitute textbook violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Spectrum Health, supra, Windsor
Convalescent Center, supra ("to tell employees that there was no union when, in fact, there
was, undermined the Union's representative role" and, therefore, constituted an independent
violation of Section 8(a)(1)). These violations were repeated over and over by Monogram 35

20It is true, of course, that the Respondent’s conduct was not entirely consistent with a total
withdrawal of recognition. On December 3, when Staley met with Union Representative Merrell
and confirmed that Monogram was withdrawing recognition, Staley also told Merrell that while
he could not enter the facility (as he had in the past) that he could talk with employees in the
picnic table area on Monogram property. But this concession to the collective-bargaining
representative—itself a limitation on past practice—does not overcome the evidence that
Respondent made clear to anyone that was listening that recognition had been withdrawn. I
note also that from December 10, 2010 to February 24, 2011, the Respondent failed to respond
to the Union’s request for information. As discussed below, Staley attributed this to “forgetting.”
He also attributed it to the fact that the Union had requested and received the same information
two months before. The fact is the silence in response to the Union’s request is consistent with
the withdrawal of recognition and in marked contrast to the alacrity with which it responded to
the Union’s October request for information. Later, after the contract expired in February, after
the Region’s investigation was underway, Staley sent the information and apologized for the
“oversight.”
JD–65–11
30
between December and February 2011. In addition, as found, above, during this period the
Employer unlawfully promised wage and benefit increases and unlawfully solicited employees to
cancel their dues-checkoff authorizations. Such unlawful misconduct during the period of time
when the Union’s presumption of majority support was irrebuttable queers any effort to question
the Union’s majority support in February. The Respondent’s duty under Levitz was to “prove by 5
a preponderance of the evidence that the union had, in fact, lost majority support at the time the
employer withdrew recognition”—i.e., in February 2011. However, it can only do so “in a
context free of unfair labor practices.” Abby Medical, 264 NLRB 969, 969 (1982), enfd. w/o op.
709 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1983); Levitz, 333 NLRB at 717 fn. 1 (“We adhere to the Board’s well-
established policy that employers may not withdraw recognition in a context of serious 10
unremedied unfair labor practices tending to cause employees to become disaffected from the
union”).
The unfair labor practices engaged in by the Respondent strike at the heart of the
Union’s representational role and its status in the eyes of the employees during the very period 15
of time when the Union is entitled to rely on the irrebuttable presumption of majority support to
win back majority support in fact. To deem lawful a withdrawal of recognition at the contract’s
expiration under such circumstances would eviscerate the value of the irrebuttable presumption
of majority support as well as the purpose of an anticipatory withdrawal of recognition.
20
4. The Employer has not proven that as of February 12, 2011
the Union lacked majority support
Assuming, wrongly, that Monogram lawfully engaged in an anticipatory withdrawal of
recognition on December 2, 2010, based on a valid petition from employees, and without 25
committing subsequent unfair labor practices, it would still not be able to withdraw recognition
from the Union at the termination of the contract.
An employer withdrawing recognition must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the union had, in fact, lost majority support at the time the employer withdrew recognition. If 30
it fails to do so, it will not have rebutted the presumption of majority status, and the withdrawal of
recognition will violate Section 8(a)(5).” Levitz, supra. “The union does not have to
demonstrate conclusively to the employer prior to the withdrawal of recognition that it still has
majority status. Rather, it is the employer’s burden to show an actual loss of the union’s
majority support at the time of the withdrawal of recognition.” HQM of Bayside, LLC, 348 NLRB 35
787, 788 (2006), enfd. 518 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2008).
An employer moving to withdraw recognition based on a petition from employees does
so “at its peril.” Levitz, 333 NLRB at 725. If the withdrawal of recognition is later challenged
through an unfair labor practice proceeding, it is the employer’s burden to prove “that the union 40
had, in fact, lost majority support at the time the employer withdrew recognition.” Id.
Even putting to the side the unfair labor practices engaged in by Monogram, it has failed
to demonstrate the Union’s actual loss of majority support at the expiration of the agreement,
the time which it claims it could have and did withdraw recognition from the Union. 45
Monogram and the General Counsel agree that the petition to remove the Union
includes the signatures of 24 of the 46 bargaining unit employees employed as of December 1,
2010.21 However, at trial the General Counsel produced the petition circulated by the Union at

21The General Counsel points out that one additional employee, Vance, was discharged with
JD–65–11
31
its December 8 and 19 meetings, which authorizes continued union representation and calls for
immediate negotiations for a new labor agreement. This union petition included the signatures
of seven employees (Rose Hardin, Shamya Wills, Danny Johnson, Chris Sloan, Susana Bonilla,
Tony Figuaroa, and Miguel Vazquez) who previously signed the disaffection petition.
5
The evidence was undisputed that these were valid authentic signatures and the
testimony about the process through which they were solicited was credible, unobjectionable,
and undisputed. Under settled precedent, the Employer cannot rely on those seven signatures
in its effort to demonstrate the Union’s lack of majority support in February 2011. HQM of
Bayside, 348 NLRB at 787–788; Parkwood Developmental Center, 347 NLRB at 974–975.10
This reduces the number of employees objectively expressing opposition to union
representation to 17, which is less than a majority.
Moreover, the credited and undisputed evidence is that the day after signing the petition 15
Holly Craig told Plant Manager Staley that she wanted her name removed from the petition.
Staley told her it was too late, but it certainly undercuts the Employer’s reliance on her signature
as evidence that she does not support union representation. In any event, she left employment
with Monogram February 10, 2011, two days before the expiration of the contract, so her
signature cannot be counted in assessing the Union’s support as of the contract’s February 12, 20
2011 expiration. That brings the number to 16.
As the General Counsel points out, the February 12, 2011 payroll register introduced
into evidence shows that the bargaining unit had been reduced to 41, and that the reduction
included the loss of three unit employees who had signed the disaffection petition (Alex Estes, 25
Andrew Hall, and Chris Walker). The loss of those three unit employees brings the number of
unit employees as of February 12 who could be counted as not supporting the Union to 13.
Craig’s February 10 resignation brought the total unit complement to 40 as of the contract’s
expiration.
30
Thus, by the contract’s expiration Monogram possessed objective evidence of
disaffection from 13 of 40 bargaining unit employees. This is obviously inadequate to rebut the
Union’s presumption of majority support or on which to base a withdrawal of recognition.
On brief, the Respondent focuses considerable effort on challenging the validity of the 35
Union’s petition and its significance. Monogram’s arguments miss the mark.
Monogram objects that the Union did not show it the “prounion” petition in January 2011,
but only notified the Monogram in the January 4, 2011 letter that the Union was contending it
had majority support. Putting aside that the Respondent also refused to show the Union the 40
disaffection petition, the significance of the Union’s failure to produce the petition at that time is
zero. Similarly, there is no cause to dwell on Staley’s contrived claim (see discussion, supra)
that he doubted the authenticity of the union letter claiming majority support. The very point of
Levitz was to render Staley, and the Respondent’s, perceptions about the Union’s majority
status an irrelevancy. The Respondent took the risk that it subsequently would be proven 45

his grievance pending, and argues that he should be included as a member of the bargaining
unit. I need not resolve that question. I will assume, without deciding, that he is excluded from
the count.
JD–65–11
32
wrong when it ignored the Union’s claim of majority support and proceeded to withdraw
recognition. As the Board in Levitz, supra at 725, took care to “emphasize,”
an employer with objective evidence that the union has lost majority support—for
example, a petition signed by a majority of the employees in the bargaining 5
unit—withdraws recognition at its peril. If the union contests the withdrawal of
recognition in an unfair labor practice proceeding, the employer will have to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the union had, in fact, lost majority
support at the time the employer withdrew recognition. If it fails to do so, it will
not have rebutted the presumption of majority status, and the withdrawal of 10
recognition will violate Section 8(a)(5).
Thus, the issue is not what the Respondent thought or believed—even in good faith—
about the Union’s majority support when it withdrew recognition. The issue is not what the
Union did or did not do to help the Respondent determine the Union’s status. 15
The issue is whether the Respondent can prove at the hearing that at the time of the
unilateral withdrawal the incumbent Union did not have majority support. It is not the Union’s
burden to prove majority support in order to stop an employer from resorting to a unilateral
withdrawal of recognition. HQM of Bayside, LLC, 348 NLRB at 788. “The union does not have 20
to demonstrate conclusively to the employer prior to the withdrawal of recognition that it still has
majority status. Rather, it is the employer’s burden to show an actual loss of the union’s
majority support at the time of the withdrawal of recognition.” Id.

This is precisely what the Respondent has failed to prove, one of many reasons being 25
that the Union’s petition was shown at trial to be a valid and properly procured document that
contained seven signatures that cancel out the ability of the Respondent to count those
employees in its effort at trial to prove the lack of majority support. At trial, in part of because of
the Union’s petition, Monogram was not able to prove that the Union lacked majority support at
the time that it claims it withdrew recognition after February 12, 2011.30

The Respondent contends that the Union’s petition should not be relied upon because it
is undated on its face. There is no basis for that claim. The question is whether the Union’s
petition has been shown at trial to be an accurate and unobjectionably procured piece of
evidence that undercuts and rebuts the Respondent’s effort to prove that the Union did not have 35
majority support when the Respondent withdrew recognition. In this case, union representatives
and employees testified credibly about how and when the petition came into being. And though
undated, there was not the slightest evidence to suggest that the petition was fraudulent, or
signed and created at a time other than the witnesses explained: at Union meetings in
December 2010, conducted in response to the announcement by Monogram that it had received 40
an employee petition on which it was relying to withdraw recognition. Accordingly, the Union’s
petition is appropriate evidence that controverts the Respondent’s effort to prove the Union’s
lack of majority status.
Finally, the Respondent also presses, on brief, its contention that Staley developed his 45
own evidence that the Union lacked majority support by making himself “available” in the plant
in January and February, and allowing employees to approach and tell him they did not want a
union. As noted, above, I have rejected these claims by Staley as untrue and not worthy of
belief. I rejected his claims because they are uncorroborated—not a single other witness
testified to seeing or being part of this—because the contemporaneous tally Staley claimed to 50
have made documenting these conversations was discarded—he recreated it the night before
JD–65–11
33
his testimony—and because Staley repeatedly demonstrated himself to be a witness capable of
saying and sticking to any point that he believed would advance the Employer’s position, no
matter how unlikely.
I note that the Respondent takes much time in its brief arguing that oral evidence 5
received from employees is “objective” for purposes of Levitz. I am in full agreement with that.
The issue is the quality and force of the evidence. And in this case, for the reasons stated,
Staley’s claims about his encounters with employees are not credible.
B. Refusal to bargain a successor agreement10
(complaint paragraph 7(j))
It is undisputed that the Respondent rebuffed the Union’s December 1 and 10, 2010
requests to arrange dates to meet to bargain a successor labor agreement for the agreement
expiring February 12, 2011. In response to the Union’s requests, Monogram told the Union that 15
it “withdrew recognition” and that it “would be improper for us to meet and bargain with you. We
decline your request for dates and will not meet with you for that purpose.”
Having rejected the validity of the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition, and its
anticipatory withdrawal defense, its refusal to meet to bargain a successor agreement must also 20
be rejected. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by its refusal to meet to bargain a
successor agreement.
C. Limiting Union access to the facility, bulletin board, and property
(complaint paragraphs 7 (c) and (d))25
The government alleges that Monogram violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by,
after the December 2, 2010 withdrawal of recognition, on or about December 3, limiting union
officials’ access to the facility, denying union officials’ access to the bulletin board located in the
Respondent’s facility, and by, as of December 6, 2010, denying union officials access to the 30
Respondent’s property.
The evidence marshaled in support of these allegations involves the refusal to permit
Merrell into the facility to put information on the bulletin board on or about December 3, the
demand that the Union representatives not park in the parking lot early the morning of 35
December 6, and the Union’s understanding that, henceforth, they were not allowed on the
property to talk to employees, including the employee picnic table area that abuts the public
walkway.
In mounting this claim, the government makes two related but separate legal claims. It 40
claims (complaint paragraph 7(f), (g), and paragraph 10) that these developments amounted to
an unlawful unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment, made without notice to
the Union or providing the Union with an opportunity to bargain. It also alleges (complaint
paragraph 7(h), (i) and paragraph 11) that this conduct amounted to a violation of Monogram’s
obligations under Section 8(d) of the Act, in that this conduct amounts to a failure to continue in 45
effect all terms and conditions of the labor agreement without the Union’s consent to change or
abrogate terms and conditions of the contract.
This latter claim—the violation of Section 8(a)(5) premised on a failure to maintain the
contract—must be dismissed. The only references in the labor agreement to union agents’50
access to the facility is one (section 21) that permits up to two union representatives “after
JD–65–11
34
obtaining permission from the Employer to enter the plant to discuss grievances” and a second
provision (section 6) that restricts “the Union” from “solicit[ing] employees during working hours
or on Company property in order to persuade them to join the Union or continue their Union
membership.” There is no other reference in the labor agreement to union officials’ right to have
access to the facility, the bulletin board, or the property. There is no evidence that such a 5
practice was negotiated and incorporated into the labor agreement through a clause relating to
the parties’ practices. None of the incidents complained of by the Union involved barring a
union representative from entering the plant to discuss grievances and, to my mind, there is no
evidence or reason to believe they would have been excluded from the plant to discuss
grievances. Indeed, although the record does not speak directly to whether union 10
representatives were allowed or attempted to enter the facility to discuss grievances, the
evidence is clear that the Employer maintained the grievance process throughout the remaining
months that the labor agreement was in force. Accordingly, there is no violation of Section
8(a)(5) that is premised on the obligation, pursuant to Section 8(d), to continue in effect the
terms of the labor agreement.15
Somewhat different is a unilateral change of an ongoing practice that is unreferenced in
the collective-bargaining agreement. Generally, an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
if it makes a material unilateral change during the course of a collective-bargaining relationship
on matters that are a mandatory subject of bargaining. "Unilateral action by an employer 20
without prior discussion with the union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the affected
conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary
to the congressional policy." NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962).22
Below, I consider each of the government’s unilateral change allegations. 25
1. Access to the Facility. Merrell had been the union representative for the facility for
many years. He testified that in the past when he had visited the facility he would talk to
employees in the picnic table area but also in the break room and in the parking lot. Prior to
December 3 he had never been stopped from entering the facility. Merrell indicated that he 30
visited the plant, on average, monthly and had a long history of being permitted to enter. He did
not always see Staley, but he would usually report to the clericals in the administrative office
building.
Of course, it is undisputed that on December 3, Staley barred Merrell from entering the 35
facility to post information on the bulletin board. Staley told Merrell he could be in the picnic
table area, which is Monogram property, but that he could not enter the building. Villegas had a
similar, or at least, a consistent experience when he visited the facility for the first time in
October 2010. Staley made it clear to him that he could not enter the building. Villegas—
probably from talking to Merrell—believed he had a right to enter the facility, although he did not 40
attempt to on that occasion. Nevertheless, Staley made it clear to him that he could not, and
that he should stay in the picnic table area.
On brief, the Respondent does not deny that there was a unilateral change to its policy
of permitting union representatives to enter the facility. To the contrary, it admits it, asserting 45
(R. Br. at 17) that “ the "access" procedures were changed and that Villegas, and thus the
Union, were put on notice of the change on that (unspecified) day in October when he was
instructed by Staley that he was not to go into the facility. There is no question but that the

22Contractual waiver is a defense to a unilateral change, but it is not one advanced by the
Respondent in this case.
JD–65–11
35
Union was neither informed in advance nor provided an opportunity to bargain over this change.
Union access to a facility is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Frontier Hotel & Casino, 309
NLB 761, 766 (1992), enfd. 71 F.3d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995); Ernst Home Centers, Inc., 308
NLRB 848, 848–849 (1992). It would appear to be a straightforward violation of the Act.
5
The Respondent’s entire defense to this allegation (R. Br. at 17–19) is, to paraphrase it,
“yes, Merrell was denied access on December 3, but that was due to a unilateral change
implemented in October, not on December 3 as alleged in the complaint.”
Under the circumstances, this is not grounds for dismissal of the allegation. The Board’s 10
Pergament doctrine provides that the Board may find an unalleged violation “if the issue is
closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint and has been fully litigated.”
Pergament United Sales, Inc., 296 NLRB 333 (1989), enfd. 920 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1990). That is
the case here. This October incident is closely connected to the subject matter of the complaint.
Indeed, the October incident, which, by the Respondent’s account was undertaken without 15
advance notice or explanation to the Union, was the first manifestation of the same change in
access procedures to which Merrell was subjected in December. And the denial of access in
October is an issue that has been “fully litigated.” The "determination of whether a matter has
been fully litigated rests in part on whether . . . the respondent would have altered the conduct
of its case at the hearing, had a specific allegation been made." Pergament, supra at 335. That 20
rule "has been applied with particular force where the finding of a violation is established by the
testimonial admissions of the Respondent's own witnesses.” Id. In this case, the Respondent is
advancing the admission on which the finding relies.
Here, the Respondent admits the change occurred, unilaterally, and without notice to the 25
Union, but one to two months prior to the time specified in the complaint. A violation of the Act
is proven and found to have been occurring since October 2010.
2. Not allowing the Union to post on bulletin board. As described above, Merrell was
denied access to the facility on December 3. His purpose for entering at that time was to post 30
material on the bulletin board. But there is no evidence that he was denied access specifically
because he wanted to post on the bulletin board. Had he wanted to visit the breakroom or do
anything else within the facility, he would have been denied access. The unilateral change at
issue here is the one described above in the preceding section. The allegation is duplicative
and not a separate violation. I dismiss it on these grounds.35
3. Access to the Property. Apart from access to the facility, the practice was for the
Union to speak with employees at the picnic table area, which is outside the facility on
Monogram property. The picnic area is accessible from a public walkway. On December 3,
2010, when Staley prohibited Merrell from entering the building, he told him he could stay in the 40
picnic table area. Staley told Villegas the same thing in October.
On December 6, Villegas was told to leave the parking lot by Staley. Based on this
incident, the union representatives concluded that they were being barred from all Monogram
property, including the picnic table area. Henceforth, for the most part, the union 45
representatives avoided entering the picnic table area and confined themselves to the public
walkway abutting the picnic table area. However, there is no evidence that Staley or any other
Monogram representative told the union representatives they could not be in the picnic table
area. As Merrell noted, such a directive would have been at odds not only with past practice,
but with Staley’s direction to him December 3. Moreover, there is no evidence that the 50
JD–65–11
36
Respondent took any affirmative steps after December 3 to bar or remove any union
representative from the picnic table area (the few times they ventured onto the property).
The question then, is whether the undeniably unwarranted act of telling the union
representative, on one occasion, to leave the parking lot constitutes a change in practice 5
regarding access to the Employer’s property. I do not believe it does. It is, perhaps
understandable, in the context of repeated assertions by the Employer to employees and the
Union that it had withdrawn recognition, that the Union believed its representatives were not
permitted in the picnic table area. But the withdrawal of recognition is a separate violation. In
terms of access to property, the only variance from normal practice by the Employer was the 10
one time demand that the union representatives leave the parking lot. This is inadequate to
constitute a unilateral change in practice. Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, 346 NLRB
1319, 1354 (2006); Flambeau Airmold Corp., 334 NLRB 165, 177 (2001). I will dismiss this
allegation of the complaint.
15
D. Refusal to recognize union stewards (complaint paragraph 7(e))
The government alleges that Monogram violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
refusing to recognize the union stewards as of January 14, 2011. As with the allegations
relating to union access to the property, in mounting this claim the government offers two 20
related but separate legal claims. It claims (complaint paragraph 7(f), (g), and paragraph 10)
that the failure to recognize the stewards amounted to an unlawful unilateral change in terms
and conditions of employment, made without notice to the Union or providing the Union with an
opportunity to bargain. It also alleges (complaint paragraph 7(h), (i) and paragraph 11) that this
conduct amounted to a violation of its bargaining obligations under Section 8(d) of the Act, in 25
that the failure to recognize the stewards amounted to a failure to continue in effect all terms
and conditions of the labor agreement without the Union’s consent to change or abrogate terms
and conditions of the contract.
The labor agreement speaks specifically about the right of [“t]he Union steward” to 30
“attend the [grievance] meeting in all steps.” However, there is no evidence that a steward
attempted to attend a grievance meeting. While the Employer’s unequivocal declarations to
Collins and to employees generally that it was not recognizing the stewards certainly lead one to
question whether this provision of the contract was operable, the evidence is uncertain as to this
narrow contractual right.35
At the same time, there is no question but that any practice of recognizing the Union’s
stewards was swept away—subsumed—by the Employer’s withdrawal of recognition. As a
matter of logic and a matter of Monogram’s representations, the general withdrawal of
recognition precluded recognition of the union’s stewards. As Staley explained to the 40
employees on January 14, 2011: “We do not recognize the Union and we have no intention of
dealing with the Union or its stewards as your representatives based on the Union’s claims of a
majority.” (original emphasis). As HR Director Lane told employee (and union steward) Collins:
“[T]here was no way [he] could be the union steward because there was no longer a union.”
45
The difficulty I have with the General Counsel’s argument is the claim that the refusal to
recognize the stewards constitutes a separate violation, independent and distinct from the
general withdrawal of recognition from the Union. It is true that the Respondent refused to deal
with the new union stewards, but it did so because and as part of its refusal to recognize or deal
with the Union outside of its express contractually mandated obligations. I will dismiss it on 50
those grounds.
JD–65–11
37
E. Delay in providing requested information
(complaint paragraphs 8(a)-(c))
The government alleges that Monogram violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
delaying the furnishing of information requested by the Union. The Union requested information 5
about bargaining unit employees and their pay and service dates on December 1, 2010, and
reiterated the request on February 11, 2011. The information was provided February 24, 2011,
with a note from Staley saying that the delay was an “oversight.”
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to 10
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
As explained in A–1 Door & Building Solutions, 356 NLRB No. 76, slip op. at 2 (2011):
An employer's duty to bargain includes a general duty to provide
information needed by the bargaining representative in contract negotiations and 15
administration. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152–153 (1956)
[parallel citations omitted]. Generally, information concerning wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment for unit employees is presumptively
relevant to the union's role as exclusive collective-bargaining representative. See
Southern California Gas Co., 344 NLRB 231, 235 (2005).20
Like a flat refusal to bargain, "[t]he refusal of an employer to provide a bargaining agent
with information relevant to the Union's task of representing its constituency is a per se violation
of the Act." Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 220 NLRB 189, 191 (1975); Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
237 NLRB 747, 751 (1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1979). 25
“An unreasonable delay in furnishing such information is as much of a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act as a refusal to furnish the information at all.” Monmouth Care Center,
354 NLRB No. 2 (2009) (citations omitted), reaffirmed and incorporated by reference, 356 NLRB
No. 29 (2010). "[I]t is well established that the duty to furnish requested information cannot be 30
defined in terms of a per se rule. What is required is a reasonable good faith effort to respond
to the request as promptly as circumstances allow." Good Life Beverage Co., 312 NLRB 1060,
1062 fn. 9 (1993). “In evaluating the promptness of the employer's response, 'the Board will
consider the complexity and extent of information sought, its availability, and the difficulty in
retrieving the information.’” West Penn Power Co., 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003) (quoting 35
Samaritan Medical Center, 319 NLRB 392, 398 (1995)), enfd. in relevant part 394 F.3d 233 (4th
Cir. 2005).
In this case, it is clear that the Respondent did not respond as promptly as possible.
The information in question—basic information on the bargaining unit employees—was readily 40
available and could have been provided in days, as it was in October 2010. The fact that the
information had been requested in October provides no grounds for delay. There is nothing
remarkable about the Union requesting this type of simple information after two months to make
sure it had accurate and up-to-date information on the bargaining unit.
45
Similarly, Staley’s explanation that he “forgot” about the request does not excuse the
delay. Staley did not say that he did not respond because Monogram was no longer
recognizing the Union, but given Monogram’s other actions and pronouncements in December
2010, it has that appearance, corrected only on February 24, 2011, with the receipt of the
information and an accompanying note apologizing for an inadvertent delay. 50

JD–65–11
38
In any event, the failure to provide information, or a delay in doing so, is a per se
violation. The test is not scienter. The test whether there was an effort “to respond to the
request as promptly as circumstances allow." Good Life Beverage, supra. Here, taking Staley
at his word, the circumstances advanced by Staley are his vacation, the holidays, and 5
“everything else,” which caused him to “forg[e]t about sending” the information. This
explanation does not demonstrate an effort “to respond to the request as promptly as
circumstances allow.” Rather, it suggests a lack of care to the task at hand. Especially given
that the oversight occurred in the context of multiple unfair labor practices and a general refusal
to recognize the union, it is no wonder that the Respondent overlooked this obligation. But 10
“forg[etting]” is not a defense. Bethea Baptist Home, 310 NLRB 156, 191 (1993).
The Respondent violated the Act by delaying the furnishing of the information requested
December 10, 2010, until February 24, 2011.
15
III. Allegation of unlawful interrogation of Kathy Abner (oral amendment at trial)
At trial counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege a
failure by the Respondent to adhere to the safeguards required by the Board for interrogating an 20
employee as part of an employer’s preparation for unfair labor practice litigation. See Johnnie’s
Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770 (1964).23
In Johnnie’s Poultry, the Board held that “[d]espite the inherent danger of coercion,” an
interrogation of employees, for the purpose of investigating facts raised in a complaint or in 25
preparation a defense for trial is permitted, without a finding of Section 8(a)(1) liability.
However, an employer enjoys this privilege only so long as it follows “established specific
safeguards designed to minimize the coercive impact of such employer interrogation”:
Thus, the employer must communicate to the employee the purpose of the 30
questioning, assure him that no reprisal will take place, and obtain his
participation on a voluntary basis; the questioning must occur in a context free
from employer hostility to union organization and must not be itself coercive in
nature; and the questions must not exceed the necessities of the legitimate
purpose by prying into other union matters, eliciting information concerning an 35
employee's subjective state of mind, or otherwise interfering with the statutory
rights of employees. When an employer transgresses the boundaries of these
safeguards, he loses the benefits of the privilege.

23On brief, the Respondent contends that the motion to amend was never granted and that it
would be “manifestly unjust” to grant it post trial. I do not agree with either contention. In
response to the motion, I stated: “I’m inclined to allow the amendment. I’ll reserve ruling on the
merits.” I believe this served to grant the motion. At an irreducible minimum, it made it crystal
clear that a ruling on the merits of the claim was reserved and would be forthcoming. And, of
course, at the hearing, and in its brief, the Respondent knew to and did argue the merits of the
violation. Indeed, at trial the Respondent did not oppose the amendment, it voiced opposition
only to the merits of the Johnnie’s Poultry claim. (Tr. 463.) There is no prejudice to the
Respondent in having to defend the merits of this claim. To the extent the granting of the
amendment was unclear, I grant it now.
JD–65–11
39
Johnnie’s Poultry, 146 NLRB at 775 (footnotes omitted).
The Johnnie’s Poultry safeguards apply to interviews with respect to unfair labor practice
charges. Le Bus, 324 NLRB 588 (1997). With the exception of extraordinary circumstances,
the Board strictly follows these rules. WXGI, Inc., 330 NLRB 695, 712 (2000), enfd. 243 F.3d 5
833 (4th Cir. 2001).
The impetus for the General Counsel’s amendment was Supervisor Peter Chan’s
admission that when employee Kathy Abner was called into Supervisor Greene’s office and
presented with a statement for signature, prepared by the Employer and endorsing Greene’s 10
version of events with regard to her involvement with the petition to remove the Union, Abner
initially was not told that it was voluntary for her to be there and not informed that no action
would be taken against her if she chose not to participate in the meeting. According to Chan,
after Abner was provided the statement and reviewed it, she “seemed hesitant to sign it
because she was worried she was going to get in trouble or something like that, . . . we 15
reassured her that that wasn’t the case and I mean she signed it afterwards.” It is also the case
that on cross-examination Abner agreed that before the conversation began she had been
assured that she could answer questions without fear of reprisal (and without promise of
reward).
20
The analysis of this is complicated somewhat by the suggestion in Chan’s testimony—
affirmatively endorsed by the Respondent on brief (R. Br. at 29)—that there was a prior
interview with Abner to discuss her statement. It makes sense that there would have been and,
indeed, Chan specifically referenced the prior discussion in his testimony although he denied
doing so when I asked him about it. Regrettably, there is no record evidence about what 25
happened at this first interview, assuming it occurred. Abner was not asked about it. Greene
was not asked about it. Chan was not pressed on his reference to it.
Where does that leave us? The Respondent argues that the prior meeting is the one
where the safeguards should have been provided and there is no evidence they weren’t. 30
According to the Respondent, the introductory statement to Abner’s statement—which recites
that she had been “advised that I could answer questions without fear of reprisal or promise of
reward”—shows that in the first interview she must have been provided with the safeguards.
Respondent argues that the meeting described by Abner, Chan, and Greene was just the
“simple act of witnessing Abner sign a document” (R. Br. at 29) and there was no need to 35
provide any new safeguards.
It would have been easier if there had been testimony about what happened at this
previous interview, assuming it did occur. But in the absence of that luxury, analysis of the
Johnnie’s Poultry violation comes down to an assessment of the burdens of the parties in this 40
context.
In Le Bus, 324 NLRB 588 (1997), the administrative law judge dismissed an 8(a)(1)
allegation when the respondent failed to provide the Johnnie’s Poultry assurances before an
interview. The judge found that the employee had been provided the assurances on previous 45
occasions and, therefore, the failure to give the assurances before the later meeting constituted
special circumstances that excused the employer’s obligation to meet the Johnnie’s Poultry
requirements before the final interview. 324 NLRB at 588.24

24In finding special circumstances obviating the need for the Johnnie’s Poultry safeguards,
the judge in Le Bus also relied upon the fact that the employee was perceived as an ally of the
JD–65–11
40
The Board reversed the judge’s failure to find a violation in reasoning applicable here:
Although the Board has generally required strict application of the
Johnnie's Poultry safeguards, the Board has also found that unusual settings and 5
special circumstances may excuse or mitigate an employer's failure to give the
required assurances.
We find, contrary to the judge, that no such special circumstances are
present in the instant case. Here, Reiter failed to give any assurances to 10
Meadows when questioning him about his knowledge of a statement by the
Respondent's operations manager that employee Janice Redmond would be
discharged for possessing a union letter. Although the record shows that
Meadows received such assurances in prior interviews, the Respondent has not
shown that those earlier interviews were close in time to, and encompassed the 15
same subject matter as, the instant questioning of Meadows. Thus, the
Respondent has not met its burden of showing that special circumstances exist
which would warrant excusing the Respondent from its obligations under
Johnnie's Poultry. Accordingly, we find that by questioning employee Meadows
in preparation for this hearing and failing to give Meadows the requisite20
assurances the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
324 NLRB at 588 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, the Board places the burden on the respondent to show that safeguards offered in 25
prior meetings were adequate to constitute special circumstances that warrant excusing the
obligation to provide the Johnnie’s Poultry safeguards at the later meeting. In this case, the
Respondent cannot shoulder that burden because we do not know—assuming, as I do, that
there was a prior interview—what was said at the meeting. We do not know if the safeguards
were given, or in what manner. And even if we assume as the Respondent would have us do, 30
that the recitation in Abner’s written statement was provided to her at the initial interview, this
still is insufficient, as there is no evidence that Abner was told that her participation in the
process was voluntary. This is particularly significant given that Abner was summoned to
Greene’s office (an “inherently coercive setting” (Pratt Towers, Inc., 339 NLRB 157, 172 (2003)).
Moreover, the questioning did not “occur in a context free from employer hostility to 35
union organization” as required in order to rely on the Johnnie’s Poultry privilege. Johnnie’s
Poultry, 146 NLRB at 775. As found herein, the context of the questioning was the employer’s
unlawful withdrawal of recognition based on an employee petition tainted by supervisory
involvement, the denial of which was the precise object of the interrogation. Indeed, as in the
Johnnie’s Poultry case, the interview was “but part and parcel of [the respondent’s] efforts to 40
avoid recognizing and bargaining with a statutory representative.” The Board holds that “[i]n
circumstances such as these we do not believe that Respondent may rely upon privilege to
justify an unwarranted intrusion into the protected activity of employees.” Id. Given this, the
Johnny Poultry safeguards were not complied with and the questioning of Abner about her
interactions with Supervisor Greene and the petition was coercive.2545

employer in opposing the union, a factor not present here.
25I note that the Respondent does not advance the argument that the subject matter of the
statement it sought from Abner—her interactions with Greene about the antiunion drive—was
an innocuous interrogation that did not require the safeguards set out in Johnnie’s Poultry.
JD–65–11
41
Notably, while the Board holds that compliance with all Johnnie’s Poultry safeguards is a
minimum requirement to avoid liability, the Board recognizes that some courts, including the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in which this case arose, do not apply a
“per se” rule in Johnnie’s Poultry cases, but rather examine the totality of the circumstances in 5
determining whether the interview is coercive. Wisconsin Porcelain, Co., 349 NLRB 151, 153
fn. 11 (2007). Given the fact that the interview took place with two supervisors, in a supervisor’s
office, to which Abner was summoned but then not informed that the enterprise was voluntary,
and particularly, given that the entire process occurred in the context of and was inextricably
related to the unlawful withdrawal of union recognition by the employer, I would find the 10
interview unlawful under a totality-of-circumstances standard.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
15
1. Respondent Monogram Comfort Foods, LLC (Respondent) is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 700
(Union) is a labor organization with the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.20
3. At all material times, the Union has been the designated exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the bargaining unit of employees identified in section 2 of the collective-
bargaining agreement, effective from February 16, 2008 until February 12, 2011, and
assumed by the Respondent when it assumed the Muncie, Indiana operations in 25
approximately May 2009.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by withdrawing recognition of the
Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the bargaining unit employees, as of
December 2, 2010, and thereafter failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the 30
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by implementing unilateral changes
in terms and conditions of employment, without notifying the Union or providing an
opportunity to bargain, including, as of October 2010, limiting Union officials’ access to the 35
facility.
40
6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the act by, delaying the furnishing of relevant
information requested by the Union on December 10, 2010, until February 24, 2011.
7. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing and refusing since
December 10, 2010, to meet and bargain with the Union for the purpose of negotiating a 45
successor collective-bargaining agreement.
8. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by, among other acts, soliciting employees to
withdraw support from the Union, promising employees improved benefits if the Union was
removed as the employees’ collective-bargaining representative, coercively interrogating 50
employees about their union sympathies, announcing to employees that the Respondent no
JD–65–11
42
longer recognized the Union as the employees’ collective-bargaining representative,
announcing to employees that they were no longer represented by the Union, promising
employees improved wages and benefits because they withdrew their support for the Union,
and soliciting employees to cease paying union dues, on various dates between November
2010 and January 2011.5
9. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating an employee on March 16,
2011, for the purpose of preparing a defense to unfair labor practice charges in violation of
the rights of the employee guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
10
10. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY15
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it
must be ordered to cease and desist there from and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
20
Respondent shall recognize the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the
bargaining unit of employees described above, and upon request, bargain for a reasonable
period of time (as set forth in Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp., 334 NLRB 399 (2001)) with
the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement.2625

26In remedying the Respondent’s refusal to bargain with an affirmative bargaining order, I
am imposing “the standard Board remedy for more than 50 years when an employer has
refused to bargain with an incumbent Section 9(a) union.” Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64,
66 (1996). However, in Caterair, the Board recognized that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit requires that an affirmative bargaining order be justified by a
reasoned analysis that includes the balancing of three considerations applied to the particular
facts of the case: (1) the employees' Section 7 rights; (2) whether other purposes of the Act
override the rights of employees to choose their bargaining representatives; and (3) whether
alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the violations of the Act. Applying the test set out
by the D.C. Circuit, I find that the balancing of these three factors warrants an affirmative
bargaining order in this particular case.
An affirmative bargaining order vindicates the Section 7 rights of the Monogram unit
employees who were denied the benefits of collective bargaining by the Respondent's unlawful
withdrawal of recognition and refusal to collectively bargain with the Union. Of course, there are
employees who may oppose continued union representation, but their Section 7 rights are not
unduly prejudiced by the affirmative bargaining order because the duration of the order is no
longer than is reasonably necessary to remedy the ill effects of the violation. Since the Union
was never given an opportunity to attempt to reach a successor agreement with the
Respondent, it is only by restoring the status quo ante and requiring the Respondent to bargain
with the Union for a reasonable period of time that all employees will be able to fairly assess for
themselves the Union's effectiveness as a bargaining representative. The bargaining order
affords employees a fair opportunity to assess the Union's performance in an atmosphere free
of the Respondent's unlawful conduct.
An affirmative bargaining order also serves other policies of the Act by fostering
meaningful collective bargaining and industrial peace. It removes the Respondent's incentive to
JD–65–11
43
Respondent shall, upon the Union’s request, rescind the unilateral change in terms and
conditions of employment it made in limiting union officials’ access to the facility and restore the
practices in effect for union officials to have access to the facility that were in existence prior to
October 2010. The Respondent shall notify the Union and, on request, bargain with the Union 5
before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment of unit employees.
The Respondent shall further be ordered to refrain from in any like or related manner
abridging any of the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Act. 10
The Respondent shall post an appropriate informational notice, as described in the
attached appendix. This notice shall be posted in the Employer’s facility or wherever the notices
to employees are regularly posted for 60 days without anything covering it up or defacing its
contents. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed 15
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed any facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former 20
employees employed by the Respondent at any time since October 1, 2010. When the notice is
issued to the Employer, it shall sign it or otherwise notify Region 25 of the Board what action it
will take with respect to this decision.27

delay bargaining in the hope of discouraging support for the Union, and ensures that the Union
will not be pressured by the Respondent's withdrawal of recognition to achieve immediate
results at the bargaining table following the Board's resolution of its unfair labor practice charges
and issuance of a cease-and-desist order.
A cease-and-desist order, alone, would be inadequate to remedy the Respondent's
withdrawal of recognition and refusal to bargain with the Union because it would allow another
such challenge to the Union's majority status before the taint of the Respondent' previous
unlawful withdrawal of recognition dissipated. Allowing another challenge to the Union's
majority status without a reasonable period for bargaining would be particularly unfair in light of
the fact that the litigation of the Union's charges took several months and, as a result, the Union
needs to reestablish its representative status with unit employees. Indeed, permitting a
decertification petition to be filed immediately might very well allow the Respondent to profit
from its own unlawful conduct. I find that these circumstances outweigh the temporary impact
the affirmative bargaining order will have on the rights of employees who oppose continued
union representation. For all the foregoing reasons, I find that an affirmative bargaining order
with its temporary decertification bar is necessary to fully remedy the violations in this case.
27I decline the General Counsel’s request (G.C. Br. at 38) that the remedy in this case
include an order that a management official read aloud the posted notice to employees on
working time or have an agent of the Board read it to employees in the presence of a
management official. This remedy is imposed by the Board in cases where traditional remedies
are inadequate to remedy the violations committed by the Respondent (often where a
bargaining order is inappropriate). That has not been demonstrated here. To be sure, the
Respondent here committed serious unfair labor practices. I do not want to minimize the
misconduct. The Union was denied its right to recognition, employees who wanted union
representation were denied their right to it, and employees were subjected to an aggressive and
unlawful display of contempt for the Union by this Employer. However, the unlawful conduct
JD–65–11
44
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended28
5
ORDER
The Respondent Monogram Comfort Foods, LLC, Muncie, Indiana, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall10
1. Cease and desist from:
a. Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 700 (Union) as the exclusive 15
collective-bargaining representative of the bargaining unit of employees set
forth in the collective-bargaining agreement assumed by the Respondent and
that expired February 12, 2011.
b. Failing and refusing to bargain with the Union by unilaterally implementing 20
changes in terms and conditions of employment without notifying the Union
and without providing an opportunity to bargain.
c. Delaying the furnishing to the Union of relevant information requested by the
Union. 25
d. Failing and refusing to bargain with the Union by refusing to meet for the
purpose of negotiating a successor collective-bargaining agreement.
e. Soliciting employees to withdraw support from the Union.30
f. Promising employees improved benefits if the Union is removed as the
employees’ collective-bargaining representative.
g. Coercively interrogating employees about their union sympathies.35

chiefly involved a withdrawal of recognition based on an overzealous (and independently
unlawful) effort to cajole and encourage employees to reject the Union. The pressure brought to
bear against employees by the use of these tactics is not benign. But the Board sees much
worse: discriminatory discharges of employees, trumped up discipline against union activists,
and pointed threats of retaliation against employees for exercising their section 7 rights or failing
to abide by the employer’s demands. Here, there are no findings (or allegations) of any of that
kind of harsh, retaliatory misconduct. Given that, and given that as part of the remedy the
Union’s status as bargaining representative will be restored, I do not believe the General
Counsel’s “special” remedy is warranted.
28If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
JD–65–11
45
h. Announcing to employees that the Respondent no longer recognizes the
Union as the employees’ collective-bargaining representative.
i. Announcing to employees that they are no longer represented by the Union.
5
j. Promising employees improved wages and benefits because they withdrew
support from the Union.
k. Soliciting employees to cease paying dues to the Union.
10
l. Coercively interrogating employees for the purpose of preparing a defense to
unfair labor practice charges in violation of their rights guaranteed by section
7 of the Act.
m. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing 15
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the20
purposes of the Act:
a. Recognize the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
bargaining unit of employees described above and, upon the Union’s request,
bargain for a reasonable period of time with the Union for a collective-bargaining 25
agreement to cover the unit employees and embody any understanding reached in a
signed agreement.
b. Upon the Union’s request, rescind any unilateral changes in terms and conditions of
employment implemented without notifying the Union in advance and providing an 30
opportunity to bargain, including as of October 2010, limiting union officials’ access
to the facility, and continue those terms and conditions of employment unless and
until they are changed through collective bargaining.
c. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Muncie, Indiana facility the 35
attached notice marked "Appendix."29 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 25, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to the physical posting of paper 40
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of 45

29If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–65–11
46
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed any facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since October 1, 2010.
5
d. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the 10
Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 31, 2011
15
____________________
David I. Goldman
U.S. Administrative Law Judge20
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize the Union and WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain a successor
collective-bargaining agreement with the Union to replace the agreement that expired on
February 12, 2011.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally implement changes in terms and conditions of employment without
first notifying the Union and without providing the Union an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT delay furnishing to the Union relevant information requested by the Union.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to withdraw support from the Union.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees about their union sympathies.
WE WILL NOT promise employees improved benefits if the Union is removed as the
employees’ collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT announce to employees that we no longer recognize the Union as the
employees’ collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT announce to employees that they are no longer represented by the Union.
WE WILL NOT promise employees improved wages and benefits because they withdrew
support from the Union.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to cease paying dues to the Union.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogating employees for the purpose of preparing a defense to
unfair labor practice charges in violation of their rights guaranteed by federal labor law.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees and WE WILL, upon the Union’s request, bargain with the Union for a new
collective-bargaining agreement, and embody any understanding reached in a signed
agreement.
WE WILL, upon the Union’s request rescind any unilateral changes in terms and condition of
employment we implemented without notifying the Union in advance and providing an
opportunity to bargain, including as of October 2010, limiting Union officials’ access to the
facility, and WE WILL continue those terms and conditions of employment unless and until they
are changed through collective bargaining.
MONOGRAM COMFORT FOODS, LLC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
575 North Pennsylvania Street, Room 238, Indianapolis, IN 46204-1577
(317) 226-7381, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (317) 226-7413.