Monarch Marking Systems

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1998

325 N.L.R.B. 1041 (N.L.R.B. 1998)

1041
325 NLRB No. 194
MONARCH MARKING SYSTEMS
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
We disavow the judge’s finding that the August 1996 suspension
of William Stamm by the Respondent was ‘‘suspect.’’ There was no
allegation in the complaint that the August suspension was violated
of the Act, nor was there was any evidence of any union activity
during the period leading up to the suspension. In light of this, we
also find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s rationale in making
this finding.
2 In adopting the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by suspending Stamm on November
14, 1996, we rely solely on his credibility-based determination that
Stamm was at work repairing Jennifer Lynn Miller’s machine during
the incident at issue. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to rely on
the judge’s drawing an adverse inference from the Respondent’s fail-
ure to produce its production records for that period. Based on our
adoption of the finding that the November suspension was unlawful,
we further find the November 19, 1996 discharge unlawful, because
the suspension led directly to the discharge under the Respondent’s
progressive disciplinary procedure.
Additionally, Member Brame disavows the judge’s statement that
the conduct allegedly engaged in by Stamm was a ‘‘trivial matter’’
for which to discipline and discharge a long-term employee. This
statement amounts to the judge’s substitution of his own judgment
for the Company’s business judgment with respect to the penalties
to be imposed for misconduct. In Member Brame’s view, the Board
should resist the temptation to become a personnel department and
interject itself into an employer’s managerial functions and decision-
making. See Bridgeport & Port Jefferson Steamboat Co., 313 NLRB
542, 545 (1993); and Super Tire Stores, 236 NLRB 877 fn. 1
(1978).
In adopting the judge’s dismissal of the allegation concerning Tim-
othy Sams, which was not excepted to by the parties, we note that
the judge incorrectly stated that the General Counsel argued that
Sams was a supervisor.
Monarch Marking Systems, Inc. and General Truck
Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers Local Union No. 957, an affiliate of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–
CIO. Case 9–CA–34406
June 30, 1998
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND BRAME
On July 9, 1997, Administrative Law Judge James
L. Rose issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Monarch Marking Sys-
tems, Inc., Miamisburg, Ohio, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
Substitute the following for paragraph 2(d).
‘‘(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region,
post at its Miamisburg, Ohio facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked ‘Appendix.’3 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being signed by the Respondent’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since November 15, 1996.’’
Julius U. Emetu, II, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Timothy P. Reilly, Esq., of Cincinnati, Ohio, for the Re-
spondent.
Keith Jones, of Dayton, Ohio, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES L. ROSE, Administrative Law Judge. This matter
was tried before me at Cincinnati, Ohio, on April 14, 1997,
on the General Counsel’s complaint which alleged that the
Respondent discharged William R. Stamm in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Re-
spondent is also alleged to have made certain statements to
employees violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Respondent generally denied that it committed any
unfair labor practices and affirmatively contends that Stamm
was discharged for cause.
On the record as a whole, including my observation of the
witnesses, briefs, and arguments of counsel, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is engaged in the manufacture of marking
labels at its facility in Miamisburg, Ohio. In the conduct of
this business, the Respondent annually sells and ships to
points outside the State of Ohio goods valued in excess of
$50,000. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an em-
ployer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
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1042 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 All dates hereafter are in 1996 unless otherwise indiciated.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers, Local Union No. 957, an affiliate of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO (the Union) is
admitted to be, and I find is, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Although the Respondent has about 1200 employees, the
events giving rise to this complaint took place on the second
shift (3 to 11 p.m.) in the conventional department (IPS).
There were about 30 employees on the second shift, includ-
ing about 6 slitter operators, 2 group leaders, and William R.
Stamm, the senior machine adjuster. The supervisor was Jo-
seph Cashman.
In August 19961 the Union began an organizational cam-
paign among the Respondent’s employees. There were meet-
ings, employees wore union buttons, and literature and au-
thorization cards were distributed.
Stamm had worked for the Respondent nearly 31 years,
during which time he had never been given any kind of dis-
ciplinary action. His job was to perform quick fix repair of
machines which had malfunctioned, make setups, and per-
form related functions. He was to keep the downtime to a
minimum; however, if he could not fix a machine in about
30 minutes then he was to report it to the machine repair de-
partment and the operator would be assigned another ma-
chine.
In August Stamm received a 3-day suspension because, ac-
cording to Cashman, certain operators had complained about
Stamm. Specifically, Cashman testified that he had received
complaints that Stamm was not appropriately attentive in re-
sponding to requests that down machines be fixed. He was
also accused of harassing certain of the operators.
Following this suspension, Stamm took a short leave of
absence and returned to work in early September. He testi-
fied that when he returned to work Cashman told him there
was a union drive going on and ‘‘we know you are
pronion.’’ Stamm told Cashman that he was unaware of any
union activity and in fact did not know of any. However, he
later became active, wearing a button, passing out cards and
literature, and attending meetings.
On November 14, Stamm was again accused of not per-
forming his job by ignoring requests to fix machines.
Cashman testified that he observed Stamm sitting at the ma-
chine of Jennifer Miller, when lights were on indicating the
necessity to repair other machines. Cashman checked with a
group leader, and determined that Stamm should be sus-
pended. A second suspension in a year would mean termi-
nation pursuant to company policy, and Cashman so rec-
ommended to John Hartwell, his immediate superior. Since
Stamm had been employed more than 10 years, his termi-
nation was finally passed on by the company president, and
was finalized on November 19.
B. Analysis and Concluding Findings
1. The Alleged 8(a)(1) Violations
a. Disparate enforcement of the no-solicitation/no-
distribution rule
Stamm testified that in September he laid a union maga-
zine he had been given on a picnic table in the area where
IPS department employees eat their lunch. Several employees
were eating and Cashman joined them. Cashman picked up
the magazine, leafed through it, and put it down. According
to Stamm, when the buzzer sounded for them to return to
work, Cashman said, ‘‘Is this yours and I said nope. He said
can I have it and I said Joe you can’t take something that
doesn’t belong to you. He stood out in the hall and he was
looking at it and he said can I have it. It’s not mine and he
took it to the office with him.’’
The Respondent’s information guide sets forth a rule
which prohibits ‘‘distribution of literature in working areas’’
at any time. The general validity of this rule is not contested
by the General Counsel. However, because employees have
sold sandwiches, cookies, jewelry, dolls, and Avon products
and have distributed literature relating to these items,
Cashman’s act is alleged to have been disparate enforcement
of an otherwise valid rule.
In effect the General Counsel contends that when union
literature is distributed on an employer’s premises at permis-
sible places, agents of the employer violate the Act if they
look at or take the literature. counsel for the General Counsel
has cited no authority for such a proposition. The cases cited,
holding unlawful disparate enforcement of valid no-
solicitation/no- distribution rules, do not consider a fact situa-
tion similar to the one here.
Cashman asked if he could have the magazine and Stamm
said only that it was not his, and that Cashman should not
take what did not belong to him. But there was no prohibi-
tion by Cashman on leaving the magazine or other union lit-
erature on the picnic table. On these facts I conclude there
was no attempt to enforce, disparately or otherwise, a no-dis-
tribution rule. I shall recommend that paragraph 5(c) of the
complaint be dismissed.
b. Coercion of employee for wearing a union badge
John Hart, a third shift employee (11 p.m. to 7 a.m.) testi-
fied that in November just before his shift was to start, he
saw Cashman who said, referring to the two union buttons
Hart was wearing, ‘‘I thought you were smarter than that.’’
By this statement, Cashman is alleged to have violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. I conclude he did not.
Counsel for the General Counsel cited Highland Yarn
Mills, 313 NLRB 193 (1993), in which the judge found ille-
gal interference with union activities where a supervisor
called an employee ‘‘a loser’’ in front of the employee’s
girlfriend ‘‘insisting that he had no hope of victory because
the Union was going out and that the solicitors already had
enough cards to eliminate the Union.’’ Id. at 207. However,
this statement was accompanied by the threat that when the
union was voted out, the company was going to fire some
people.
The statement of Cashman neither contained a threat, ex-
press or implied, nor was it a uttered in the context of a
threat. Standing alone, as it does, this statement is protected
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1043MONARCH MARKING SYSTEMS
by Section 8(c) of the Act and cannot be the basis of an un-
fair labor practice finding. E.g., Central Broadcast Co., 280
NLRB 501 (1986) (supervisor giving employees his negative
views on unionism lawful); Harper Packing Co., 310 NLRB
468 (1993) (supervisor telling employees that he hated
unions lawful). Accordingly, I shall recommend that para-
graph 5(c) be dismissed.
c. Threat for wearing a union badge
Timothy Sams has been a group leader on the first shift
since January 1997, prior to which he was group leader on
the third shift. At that time his supervisor was Mel Knight.
Although there is minimal evidence concerning the super-
visory status of group leaders, counsel for the General Coun-
sel argues that Sams was a supervisor. Sams testified that he
gave employees orders and filled in for Knight when he was
on vacation. The Respondent does not contest the assertion
that Sams was a supervisor, and I conclude there is no basis
to find other than during the material time he was.
Paragraph 5(d) of the complaint alleges that in December,
Knight threatened Sams with the loss of his ‘‘supervisory po-
sition’’ because he wore a union button. Sams testified that
Knight and another supervisor approached him, and Knight
twice tapped him on the shoulder and asked why he was
wearing the union button. Sams testified:
Knight then took a piece of paper and he wrote down
different positions starting from the president of the
company down to my position and he told me that the
last position was group leader. He circled that position
and said this is where you’re at, this is where you could
go. Well, my response to that was I’m happy were I’m
at. I have no desire to go any further.
Q. And, what did he say?
A. He said well, in your position it doesn’t look
good you wearing a Union badge.
Q. What else did he say?
A. He said you do whatever you want to do. I can’t
tell you what to do but just in your position it just
doesn’t look good.
Sams testified that he took the button off, and shortly
thereafter was transferred to the first shift, for which he had
applied some 2 years’ previously. On these facts, the General
Counsel argues that the Respondent threatened an employee
that he would lose his ‘‘supervisory position’’ because he en-
gaged in protected activity.
Aside from whether there was any kind of a threat in
Knight’s statement, which is doubtful, since Sams was a su-
pervisor, Knight was correct. Sams should not have been
wearing a union button. Indeed, as a general matter, super-
visors can be disciplined for engaging in union activity.
Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 NLRB 402 (1982), affd.
sub nom. Automobile Salesmen Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711
F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, I conclude that the
Respondent did not violate the Act by Knight’s statement to
Sams and I will recommend that paragraph 5(d) be dis-
missed.
2. The Discharge of William Stamm
In October 1995, Joseph Cashman first became a super-
visor, though at the time he had worked for the Respondent
more than 28 years. Cashman testified that early in his tenure
as a supervisor he had complaints from machine operators
about Stamm not being sufficiently attentive in fixing their
machines when down. Cashman asked Vicki Thomas, a
former supervisor in that department, for suggestions. Thom-
as offered a procedure she had used. If the adjuster worked
on a machine for 15 minutes without success, the operator
would be instructed to go to another machine, and if after
another 15 minutes the machine still could not be fixed, then
the adjuster was instructed to turn the machine over to ma-
chine repair. Cashman and Stamm agreed that Stamm would
abide by such a procedure, and apparently he did so.
Cashman testified that in August he received some com-
plaints from machine operators about Stamm ignoring their
requests for repairs and that he was ‘‘harassing’’ them.
Though Stamm denied doing anything wrong, he neverthe-
less apologized. He was given a 3-day suspension and then
took the rest of the month off as a leave of absence.
Though Stamm was unaware of any union activity when
he was suspended, upon his return to work he became a
leading supporter of the organizing effort. He also was a
leader among employees, having been elected by them to be
the employee spokesman at company meetings held to im-
prove communications between management and employees.
This was referred to in the record as PPI, but no other details
were proffered.
On November 14, Stamm was called to fix the machine
of Jennifer Miller. While working on her machine, Miller
confided to him some personal problems she was having.
Miller testified that Stamm sat on the edge of her chair and
made adjustments to the machine as she operated it. How-
ever, he was unable to get it fixed when group leader Mary
Jane Gibson approached telling him that another machine
needed attention. Stamm told Miller he would return after the
PPI meeting, then scheduled for 5 p.m.
Cashman testified that he observed Stamm sitting on a
chair at Miller’s machine taking with her. He testified that
he ‘‘never saw him doing anything. So, I saw him sitting
there for approximate ten or fifteen minutes.’’ He then ap-
proached Stamm, and asked if he was working on Miller’s
machine. According to Cashman, Stamm said he wasn’t.
Cashman then said there were lights on (indicating machines
were in need of repair) and Stamm said he would get right
to them.
Cashman testified that he talked to Gibson and then
Hartwell, who instructed Cashman to send Stamm home, and
they would take the situation under advisement. Stamm was
thus given a 3-day suspension and, according to Cashman,
since this was the second suspension within 12 months, he
recommended Stamm be discharged, pursuant to the policy
set forth in the Respondent’s information guide.
In effect, Stamm was discharged because, according to
Cashman, he was observed talking to a machine operator for
about 15 minutes when he should have been fixing machines.
I do not believe Cashman. I conclude that Cashman’s as-
serted reason for suspending Stamm was a pretext. This is
a very trivial matter for which to suspend and then discharge
an employee of nearly 31 years. Further, Cashman made no
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1044 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
effort to determine whether what he claims to have observed
was indeed true. He did not interview Miller. If Stamm’s ac-
tual job performance was the real issue, experience in these
matters suggests that Cashman would have attempted to get
the facts—from Miller and/or from Stamm. I simply do not
credit Cashman’s contention that when he asked Stamm if he
had been working, Stamm said no. Rather, I credit Stamm’s
version—that he told Cashman they were continuing to have
problems with Miller’s machine.
In the Written Reprimand of November 19, the rule viola-
tions cited by Cashman are ‘‘Pg. F/4, Level III, Rule 6 &
9.’’ Level III sets forth ‘‘examples of misconduct for which
a disciplinary suspension or disimissal will be issued.’’ Rule
6 is: ‘‘Deliberate refusal to follow work-related directions
given by your supervisor.’’ Cashman could not state any par-
ticular order he gave Stamm which Stamm refused to follow
on November 14, or any other time. His testimony about this
purported violation was general, and vague—that Stamm did
not repair machines sequentially. Rule 9 is: ‘‘Threatening
damage to plant or facilities.’’ Cashman admitted that Stamm
did not engage in any such acts; however, he testified that
in the information guide he was using rules 9 and 10 were
‘‘flip flopped’’ and that Stamm was guilty of ‘‘Engaging in
harassment.’’
The explanation that the two rules were reversed is simply
not credible, nor was Cashman’s testimony supported by oth-
ers or any documentary evidence. Further, there is no evi-
dence even that Stamm ‘‘harassed’’ anyone on November 14.
Indeed, Cashman admitted that there was no such occurrence
on November 14—that the harassment had happened earlier,
presumably in July or August, for which Stamm received the
first suspension. In short, I conclude that the written rep-
rimand, which served as the basis for the discharge, was an
after-the-fact attempt by Cashman to bolster his decision.
The written reasons given by Cashman are not consistent
with his testimony and have no basis in fact.
In addition to his long tenure, Stamm was recognized as
an outstanding employee. In the record are four commenda-
tions, the most recent of which was a November 6 memo
from Hartwell giving ‘‘thanks to Bill Stamm for his efforts.’’
Miller credibly testified, without contradiction, that she
was required to fill out a daily form showing her production
and machine downtime. In order to verify or disprove the
Respondent’s contention that Stamm had not been doing his
job on November 14 counsel for the General Counsel caused
to be issued a subpoena for these records. The Respondent
claimed at the hearing that such records no longer exist—that
the records for 1996 have been destroyed. While there is no
basis to discredit the representation of ounsel for the Re-
spondent in this regard, I do not credit Cashman’s assertion
that the records were no longer kept after June or August.
The destruction of clearly material evidence shortly after the
charge was filed herein leads me to conclude that these
records would have been adverse to the Respondent’s inter-
est. I infer that it is more probable than not that production
records for November 14 would have tended to establish that
Stamm was not derelict in his work.
I credit Stamm that shortly after returning to work in Sep-
tember, Cashman said to him, ‘‘Bill, there’s a Union drive
going on. He said we know you’re pro-Union and there will
be no Union activities during working hours.’’ Stamm told
Cashman that he was unaware of the union campaign at that
time, though he later became involved. I discredit any testi-
mony of Cashman tending to deny this testimony of Stamm.
That Cashman would consider Stamm a leader in the orga-
nizational campaign is consistent with Stamm’s leadership
among employees. As noted, he was a very long term em-
ployee and had been elected by fellow employees as their
spokesman at the PPI meetings.
Finally, I conclude that the August suspension of Stamm
is suspect. Cashman testified he had statement from several
machine operators who maintained that Stamm was not prop-
erly doing his job. But when Cashman confronted Stamm he
refused to show these to Stamm, or to consider Stamm’s ver-
sion of such events as may have been in these statements.
One such employee, Priscilla Woods, testified that she had
had a lot of problems with Stamm ‘‘through the years.’’
Such is a clear exaggeration and is incredible, given Stamm’s
long and meritorious tenure.
I conclude that Cashman’s act (and those of his superiors
adopting his recommendation) was a pretext; and I infer that
the true motive for the suspension and discharge of Stamm
was to ‘‘chill’’ the union activity among employees. Shattuck
Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966);
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved
in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393
(1983). Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by suspending and discharging
Stamm and I shall recommend an appropriate remedy.
IV. REMEDY
Having concluded that the Respondent committed an un-
fair labor practice, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act, including reinstating William
R. Stamm to his former job, or if that job no longer exists,
to a substantially identical position of employment and make
him whole for any loss of wages or other benefits he may
have suffered in accordance with the formula set forth in
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950); and New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact, conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Monarch Marking Systems, Inc.,
Miamisburg, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against em-
ployees because of their activity on behalf of General Truck
Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local
Union No. 957, affiliated with the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, AFL–CIO.
(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restrain-
ing or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
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1045MONARCH MARKING SYSTEMS
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer William R. Stamm immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his se-
niority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed,
and make him whole for any loss of earnings and other bene-
fits suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in
the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge and
within 3 days thereafter notify the employee in writing that
this has been done and that the discharge will not be used
against him in any way.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make avail-
able to the Board or its agents for examination and copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
facility copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’3
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 9, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed its facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since the date of this Order.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible
official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
(f) Those allegations of the complaint not specifically
found unfair labor practices are dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against
employees because of their activity on behalf of General
Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
Local Union No. 957, an affiliate of the International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this notice, re-
move from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge
and within 3 days thereafter notify the employee in writing
that this has been done and that the discharge will not be
used against him in any way.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer William R. Stamm immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists,
to a substantially equivalent position of employment and WE
WILL make him whole for any loss of wages or other benefits
he may have suffered as a result of our discrimination
against him, with interest.
MONARCH MARKING SYSTEMS, INC.
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