Misapplied Sciences, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 6, 2020

2019004471 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/002,164 01/20/2016 Paul Henry Dietz 3081-005US1 6354
22897 7590 11/06/2020
Kaplan Breyer Schwarz, LLP
90 Matawan Road, Suite 201
Matawan, NJ 07747
EXAMINER
MIDKIFF, AARON
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/06/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@kbsiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PAUL HENRY DIETZ, ALBERT HAN NG, and
DAVID STEVEN THOMPSON
Appeal 2019-004471
Application 15/002,164
Technology Center 2600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOHN A. EVANS, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–7, 9–18, 20–29. See Final Act. 1.
Claims 2, 8, and 19 have been cancelled. Appeal Br. 36, 38. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Misapplied Sciences, Inc. Appeal Br. 4.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to an individually interactive multi-view
display system and methods therefor. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for operating a multi-view display, wherein the
method comprises:
receiving, at a system controller, input from each of a
plurality of viewers, each viewer’s input being associated with
one viewing location of a plurality thereof, and wherein at least
some viewers’ input differ from other of the viewers’ input; and
displaying, via the multi-view display, content that is
based on each viewer’s input, wherein the content associated
with any one viewer’s input is viewable only at the viewing
location associated with the one viewer’s input.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Karaoguz US 2011/0159929 A1 June 30, 2011
Thoresson US 2011/0304613 A1 Dec. 15, 2011
Park US 2013/0169765 A1 July 4, 2013
Cai US 2014/0035877 A1 Feb. 6, 2014
Frusina US 2015/0020135 A1 Jan. 15, 2015
Jensen US 2015/0042771 A1 Feb. 12, 2015

REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3–7, 9–18, and 20–29 on the following
grounds:
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9–15, 26–
28
102(a)(1) Karaoguz
18, 22 –25 103 Karaoguz
5 103 Karaoguz, Thoresson
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Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
16, 17 103 Karaoguz, Jensen
20 103 Karaoguz, Park
21 103 Karaoguz, Frusina

OPINION
Claims 1, 3–7, and 9–17
Claim 1 recites, inter alia, that “each viewer’s input being associated
with one viewing location of a plurality thereof” and that “the content
associated with any one viewer’s input is viewable only at the viewing
location associated with the one viewer’s input.”
The Examiner finds Karaoguz discloses those limitations. Final
Act. 2–3, 8; Ans. 2–3. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Karaoguz
Figure 1 discloses the limitations. Final Act. 8 (stating “each viewer’s input
being associated with one viewing location of a plurality thereof
(Respectively from each among 106.sub.l . . . 106.sub.N)”). The Examiner
further finds that Karaoguz discloses that the content being communicated is
“location specific.” Id. at 2 (citing Karaoguz ¶¶ 97, 99). According to the
Examiner,
Due to a viewer physically occupying a single viewing location
at any one time, the input provided by said viewer operating the
remote control device is capable of only being associated with
said single viewing location at the time of operation. In other
words, a viewer can not (sic) provide input associated with a
viewing location at which they are not themselves located.
Ans. 3. The Examiner further concludes that the claims are not limited to
static locations which “may not vary over time.” Id.
Appellant argues that the language of the claim “recites that the
viewer’s input is associated with a viewing location, not a particular
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viewer.” Appeal Br. 14. According to Appellant, a person having ordinary
skill in the art “would understand and recognize the distinction between
associating the input with a ‘viewing location’ on the one hand, and a
‘viewer’ on the other.” Id. Appellant further argues this construction is
consistent with the definition of “associating” set forth in the Specification.
Id. (citing Spec. ¶ 19).
Appellant also argues that in contrast to the claimed invention,
Karaoguz “associates a viewer’s input with a viewer, not a viewing
position.” Appeal Br. 14; see also id. at 14–15 (citing Karaoguz ¶ 64).
According to Appellant, because “Kara[oguz]’s system doesn’t associate the
input with a viewing location, but rather with a viewer, it must track the
viewer (or the viewer’s remote control) via viewer tracking circuitry (3008),
to determine where to present the requested media, which is wherever the
viewer happens to be.” Id. at 15. Appellant further argues that the tracking
circuitry is shown in Figure 30 and the accompanying text. Id. (citing
Karaoguz Fig. 1, ¶¶ 216–217).
With regard to Karaoguz paragraphs 97 and 99 (cited by the
Examiner), Appellant argues that although the system displays different
content at different locations, “nothing in this section addresses the issue
under consideration here, which is whether viewer input is associated with a
viewing location, as claimed, or whether it’s associated with a viewer.”
Appeal Br. 15–16. According to Appellant, “the two passages cited by the
Examiner actually supports appellant’s position: ‘first and second images
932a and 932b may be delivered to different viewer locations.’” Id. at 16.
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Based on the specific findings and conclusions made by the Examiner,
we agree with Appellant that the Examiner erred.2
First, we agree with Appellant that the claim is limited to a static,
fixed location. During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation while reading claim language in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In
re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under
this standard, we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable
meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood
by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by
the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). An applicant may, however,
act as his or her own lexicographer and specifically define a claim term in
the Specification. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
In this case, the Appellant explicitly define the term “associating” as
“pertain[ing] to the particular viewing location.” Spec. ¶ 19. Allowing that
location to move as a viewer moves is inconsistent with that explicit
definition.
Moreover, this construction is consistent with the plain meaning of the
words of the claim. Claim 1 uses the word “only” in describing where the
content is viewed: “the content associated with any one viewer’s input is
viewable only at the viewing location associated with the one viewer’s

2 We limit our analysis to anticipation. Because the Examiner did not make
a rejection under section 103, we do not consider whether Karaoguz would
have made the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
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input.” Stating that the content is only viewable at the “viewing location
associated with the one viewer’s input” is consistent with a fixed, static
location and is inconsistent of the Examiner’s construction of allowing the
location to move.
Second, we also agree with Appellant that the cited sections of the
prior art relied on by the Examiner do not support the Examiner’s findings.
“To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of
the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128
F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The absence of a single limitation—even
if that limitation would be obvious from the cited reference—negates
anticipation. Id. Moreover, the reference must also “disclos[] within the
four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also
all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the
claim.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2008). However, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test.”
In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Although Figure 1 shows different content being shown at different
locations, nothing in the figure indicates if the content is being shown to a
particular location or to a particular viewer whose location may vary.
Similarly, the text cited by the Examiner is equally unclear on whether the
content is being projected to a specific location or to a specific viewer
wherever that viewer is located. See Karaoguz ¶¶ 97, 99.
Moreover, the Figure 30 remote control cited by Appellant supports
Appellant’s arguments. Specifically, the remote control includes “Viewer
Tracking Circuitry 3008” which can be used to determine the location of the
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viewer. Karaoguz Fig. 30, ¶ 216. With such a remote control, the system
can project images for a viewer regardless of the viewer’s location.
Accordingly, based on the specific findings of the Examiner, we agree
with Appellant the Examiner’s finding that Karaoguz discloses the disputed
limitations are in error because it is not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Examiner’s burden of proving non-patentability is by a preponderance of
the evidence); see also In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967)
(“The Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the factual basis for its
rejection. It may not, because it may doubt that the invention is patentable,
resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction to
supply deficiencies in its factual basis.”).
Therefore, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, along with
the rejections of dependent claims 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9–15. Additionally,
because the Examiner has not shown that Thoresson or Jensen cures the
foregoing deficiency regarding the rejection of claim 1, we do not sustain the
obviousness rejection of dependent claims 5, 16, and 17 for the same reason.

Claims 18 and 22–25
“Appellant is not contesting the rejection of claims 18 and 22–25.”
Appeal Br. 29. Accordingly, we summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 18 and 22–25. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI
2010) (precedential) (“If an appellant fails to present arguments on a
particular issue—or, more broadly, on a particular rejection—the Board will
not, as a general matter, unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the
rejection.”).
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Claims 20
Claim 20 depends from claim 18 and recites, inter alia, “an optically
sensed object, wherein the optically sensed object comprises characteristics
that provide an indication of at least one of a viewing preference pertaining
to presentation of content or an identity of a particular viewer.”
The Examiner finds Karaoguz teaches that “[i]nformation determined
by viewer tracking circuitry – which comprises camera – may be used in the
configuration of the image to be displayed.” Final Act. 20 (citing Karaoguz
¶ 216). The Examiner further finds Karaoguz teaches that detecting “view
qualities [may form] the basis for configuring the screen assembly, including
at least the delivery of a particular view to a respective viewer/eye location
is considered a fair example of viewing preferences having been indicated.”
Ans. 22 (citing Karaoguz ¶ 216). According the Examiner, “[t]he optically
sensed object may thus comprise any viewer appendage which may be
utilized in selections made using the remote control device.” Id.
Appellant argues that “[t]he tracking is performed by circuitry that can
capture information as to that viewer’s ‘viewing reference,’ which can be a
position of the viewer relative to the screen, or the viewer’s head orientation,
or point of gaze.” Appeal Br. 31 (discussing Karaoguz ¶ 216). According to
Appellant, however, Karaoguz “does not disclose that the information
acquired by the viewer tracking circuitry from a ‘characteristic’ of the
viewer provides an indication of a viewing preference pertaining to
presentation of content. Nor does it disclose that such a characteristic
provides an indication of the identity of a particular viewer.” Id. at 31–32.
Instead, Appellant argues Karaoguz “simply knows that a viewer holding a
particular remote control is the viewer that (1) it locates relative to the
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display, and (2) must receive the content that is requested by the remote
control that the viewer is holding.” Id. at 32.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred.
Although paragraph 216 of Karaoguz describes tracking a viewer to provide
content at a specific viewer location or eye location, it does not teach or
suggest using an optically sensed object to determine the viewing preference
or viewer identity as recited in claim 20.
Accordingly, based on the record, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 20.

Claim 21
Claim 21 depends from claim 18 and recites, inter alia, that “the
interactive display is immovably installed at a location other than any of the
viewing locations.”
The Examiner finds Karaoguz teaches a multi-view display system
with an input device that can be used by a viewer to input a viewing
location. Final Act. 21 (citing Karaoguz ¶¶ 187, 219).
The Examiner further finds that Frusina teaches an immovable display
that is installed at a location other than any of the viewing locations. Final
Act. 22. Specifically, the Examiner finds Frusina teaches
real-time management of the transmission of video and audio
data streams [0002] which disposes an operator in a control room
[0141] to regulate parameters of the data streams using a browser
interface [0124]. Among various means within which the
browser may be implemented are at least a personal digital
assistant and a server [0092], said server being interpreted as a
stationary computing device accessible in the aforementioned
control room.
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Id.; see also Ans. 23. The Examiner also finds a person having ordinary
skill in the art would have modified Karaoguz in light of Frusina’s control
room “to provide a range of accessibility to controls to accommodate various
media viewing experiences.” Final Act. 22; see also Ans. 24.
According to Appellant “Frusina discloses a system for collection,
selection, and management of large volume of live, real-time, or near-real
time video and audio content for users and broadcasters” and that its
operations take place in a control room distant from the location where the
content is viewed. Appeal Br. 33.
Appellant argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would
not have used Frusina’s control room with Karaoguz’s system. Appeal
Br. 33. Specifically, Appellant argues that the operators, not the viewers,
have access to the control room. Id. According to Appellant, because
viewers do not use the system in the control room, there is no “motivation to
convert, for end-user access (i.e., a viewer of the multi-view display),
Kara[oguz]’s hand held remote control into a server in a control room.” Id.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred.
Rejections based on obviousness must be supported by “some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with
approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). The
Examiner has not provided sufficient articulated reasoning as to why a
person having ordinary skill in the art would modify Karaoguz’s remote
units, which are controlled by a viewer, with a fixed control room which is
not accessible by the viewer. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 21.
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Claims 26–29
Claim 26 recites, inter alia, “generating a datum for each of a plurality
of viewing locations, wherein each datum for each of the viewing locations
is different from one another and is therefore uniquely associated with the
viewing location for which the datum is generated and is viewable only at
the associated viewing location.” (Emphasis added).
Relying on the same evidence for the disputed associated limitation
recited in claim 1 and discussed above, the Examiner find Karaoguz
discloses that limitation. Compare Final Act. 13 (claim 26, citing Figure 1,
¶¶ 62, 97, 99), with id. at 2–3, 8 (claim 1, citing Figure 1, ¶¶ 62, 97, 99).
Similarly, Appellant relies on substantially the same argument to challenge
the Examiner’s findings. See Appeal Br. 27.
Although the language recited in claims 1 and 26 are not identical,
both claims recite associating either datum (claim 26) or a user’s input
(claim 1) with a viewing location. Because Appellant’s arguments and the
Examiner’s finding are based on the construction of the term associating, the
claims are, for purposes of this Appeal, substantially the same. Because the
Examiner has not identified how Kara teaches or suggests the claimed
limitation so as to remedy the above deficiency in the anticipation rejection
of claim 1, for the same reasons as discussed above with claim 1, based on
the record before us, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 26,
or dependent claims 27 and 28, which depend from claim 26.
Additionally, because the Examiner has not shown that Cai cures the
foregoing deficiency regarding the rejection of claim 26, we do not sustain
the obviousness rejection of dependent claim 29 for the same reason.
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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 18 and 22–25 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–7, 9–17, 20, 21, and 26–29 is
reversed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 6, 7,
9–15, 26–28
102(a)(1) Karaoguz 1, 3, 4, 6, 7,
9–15, 26–28
18, 22 –25 103 Karaoguz 18, 22–25
5 103 Karaoguz,
Thoresson
5
16, 17 103 Karaoguz, Jensen 16, 17
20 103 Karaoguz, Park 20
21 103 Karaoguz, Frusina 21
Overall
Outcome
18, 22–25 1, 3–7, 9–
17, 20, 21,
26–29

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRM-IN-PART