Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 22, 1982

265 N.L.R.B. 206 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring
Company and International. Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, (UAW) and its Local
547. Case 30-CA-7067
October 22, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS
Upon an unfair labor practice charge filed on
April 8, 1982,1 by International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, (UAW) and its Local 547
(hereinafter called the Charging Party or the
Union), the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, by the Acting Regional Director
for Region 30, issued, on May 27, a complaint,
amended on July 13, against Milwaukee Spring Di-
vision of Illinois Coil Spring Company (hereinafter
called Respondent or the Company), alleging that
Respondent engaged in and was engaging in unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5), Section
8(d), and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended. Copies of the
charge, complaint, amended complaint, and a
notice of hearing were served on Respondent.
Thereafter, Respondent filed a timely answer to the
complaint and amended complaint denying the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
On August 25, Respondent, the Charging Party,
and the General Counsel filed a stipulation of facts
with the Board, and requested that the proceeding
be transferred to the Board. The parties agreed that
the stipulation of facts and attached exhibits consti-
tute the entire record in this case, and that no oral
testimony is necessary or desired by any of the par-
ties. The parties further stipulated that they waive
a hearing before an administrative law judge. The
parties further moved for expedited consideration
of this case by the Board. The parties also filed
briefs, in the event that the Board granted the
motion to transfer the proceeding to the Board.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board, having duly considered the matter,
orders that the stipulation of facts be, and it hereby
is, approved and made a part of the record herein,
and further orders that the above-entitled proceed-
ing be, and it hereby is, transferred to the Board in
I All dates hereinafter refer to 1982. unless otherwise indicated.
265 NLRB No. 28
Washington, D.C., for the issuance of the instant
Decision and Order.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board
makes the following findings:
I. JURISDICTION
1. At all times material herein, Respondent, a
Delaware corporation with an office and place of
business in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has been en-
gaged in the manufacture of molds and wires for
automobile hood release attachments and other
items. During the past calendar year, a representa-
tive period, Respondent, in the course and conduct
of its business operations, sold and shipped goods
valued in excess of $50,000 from its Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, facility directly to points located out-
side the State of Wisconsin.
2. Respondent is now, and has been at all times
material herein, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is now, and has been at all times ma-
terial herein, a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The issue presented for decision in this matter is
whether an employer, after engaging in decision
bargaining and while offering to engage in further
effects bargaining, may, without union consent, re-
locate bargaining unit work during the term of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement from its
unionized facility to its nonunionized facility, and
lay off employees, solely because of comparatively
higher labor costs in the collective-bargaining
agreement at the unionized facility which the union
declined to modify.
A. The Stipulated Facts
Illinois Coil Spring Company, with headquarters
in McHenry, Illinois, was, at times material herein,
comprised of three divisions-Holly Spring,
McHenry Spring, and Respondent (Milwaukee
Spring). Illinois Coil Spring Company, Holly
Spring, McHenry Spring, and Respondent are each
employers within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act, and collectively constitute a
single employing enterprise and a single employee
within the meaning of the Act, made up of separate
bargaining units at each of the locations.
Illinois Coil Spring Company's three divisions
have been in operation for a number of years. The
Holly Spring division, whose employees are repre-
206
MILWAUKEE SPRING DIVISION
sented by Local 524 of the United Automobile
Workers, was assimilated into the McHenry Spring
division as of June 30. The McHenry Spring facili-
ty, located in McHenry, Illinois, is not unionized.
Respondent and the Charging Party have been par-
ties to a series of collective-bargaining agreements,
the most recent of which became effective April 1,
1980, and is to remain in effect until at least March
31, 1983. Respondent employed (at least until re-
cently) about 99 bargaining unit employees. Ap-
proximately 35 of those employees worked in Re-
spondent's assembly operations, and approximately
42 in the molding operations.2
On January 26, Respondent asked the Union to
forego a wage increase due April 1, and to grant
other contract concessions. On March 12, Re-
spondent told the Union that the company had lost
a contract with Fisher Body which would result in
a $200,000-a-month decline in revenues, and further
advised that the Milwaukee Spring financial situa-
tion was worse than estimated in January; Re-
spondent proposed relocating its assembly oper-
ations to the McHenry Spring facility. Following a
meeting with the Union on March 12, Respondent
posted a bulletin apprising employees of the pro-
posed assembly operations relocation and of the
company's discussion with the Union.
On March 22, Respondent informed the Union
that concessions were still needed in order to keep
the molding operations in Milwaukee economically
viable, and that it was willing to bargain over alter-
natives to the relocation of the assembly oper-
ations. Respondent noted that its assembly labor
costs were $8 an hour in wages and $2 an hour in
fringe benefits, as contrasted with McHenry labor
costs of $4.50 and $1.35. On March 23, the Union
notified Respondent that the union membership
voted against accepting $4.50 wages and $1.35
fringe benefits, but was willing to continue discus-
sions with Respondent.
On March 29, at a meeting with the Union, Re-
spondent presented a document entitled "Terms
Upon Which Milwaukee Assembly Operations will
be Retained in Milwaukee." Respondent and the
Union discussed the proposal item-by-item, and, in
response to a union question, Respondent stated
that these proposals came close to the lowest levels
that it could accept, but that this would not fore-
close bargaining with the Union. On April 4, the
Union informed the company that the union mem-
bership rejected consideration of labor contract
concessions.
Respondent plans to complete relocation of its
assembly operations as of December 31. Approxi-
2 The type of work performed by the remaining unit employees does
not appear in the parties' stipulation.
mately 32 of the assembly employees will have
been laid off by that date. The relocation of the as-
sembly operations is due solely to the comparative-
ly higher labor costs under the collective-bargain-
ing agreement between Respondent and the Union.
The relocation decision is economically motivated
and is not the result of union animus. The failure to
provide an adequate return on investment prompt-
ed the decision to relocate the assembly operations,
not an inability to pay the contractual wage rates.
Respondent has bargained with the Union over the
decision to relocate the assembly operations, and
Respondent has been willing to engage in effects
bargaining with the Union.
In July 1976, Respondent relocated a spring op-
eration from the Milwaukee facility to McHenry,
Illinois, during the term of the collective-bargain-
ing agreement. That agreement contained the same
recognition and management-rights clauses found
in the current collective-bargaining agreement. Re-
spondent eliminated 12 to 15 jobs as a result of the
1976 relocation, but no employees were laid off or
terminated as a consequence.
Between April 15 and July 1, Holly Spring
closed its plant and transferred its operations to the
nonunion operations at McHenry, Illinois. Local
524 of the United Automobile Workers represented
the Holly Spring employees. The United Auto-
mobile Workers and Holly Spring executed a plant
closure agreement on June 4.
No grievance or unfair labor practice charge
protesting the 1976 relocation was filed. No unfair
labor practice charge has been filed regarding the
closing of the Holly Spring facility. No grievance
complaining of the relocation of the assembly oper-
ations has been filed.
B. Contentions of the Pprties
The General Counsel and the Charging Party
contend that Respondent's decision to relocate unit
work from a union plant to a nonunion plant (and
its decision to lay off unit employees as a conse-
quence) during the terms of a collective-bargaining
agreement solely because of the comparatively
higher labor costs under that agreement, absent the
Charging Party's consent, constitutes a midterm re-
pudiation of the agreement in violation of Section
8(d) and Section 8(aXl), (3), and (5). They further
argue that the Charging Party has not, by contract
or by prior practice, waived its statutory right to
challenge Respondent's mid-contract conduct.
Respondent maintains that the Charging Party,
in the parties' collective-bargaining agreement,
waived any right it might have had to object to
Respondent's relocation decision. Respondent fur-
ther asserts that, in any event, it may, after engag-
207
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing in decision bargaining and while offering to
engage in further effects bargaining, relocate unit
work from a union plant to a nonunion plant
during the term of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment and lay off unit employees as a consequence,
where it is motivated solely by economic consider-
ations and where the agreement does not expressly
prohibit such relocation.
C. Discussion of Law and Conclusions
We find that Respondent's decision to transfer its
assembly operations and to lay off unit employees
as a consequence during the term of the collective-
bargaining agreement constitutes a midterm modifi-
cation within the meaning of Section 8(d). Re-
spondent may not take such action without the
consent of the Union (which Respondent did not
obtain) or a waiver of the Union's statutory right
to object to such action. And, the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement does not clearly and un-
equivocally waive the Union's statutory right to
object to Respondent's action.
Section 8(d) of the Act defines the obligation to
bargain with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, but cautions
that "the duties so imposed shall not be construed
as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any
modification of the terms and conditions contained
in a contract for a fixed period, if such modifica-
tion is to become effective before such terms and
conditions can be reopened under the provisions of
the contract." The Board has held that Section 8(d)
forbids alteration by an employer of the terms and
conditions of employment embodied in a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement during the term of the
agreement without the consent of the union (Oak
Cliff-Golman Baking Company, 207 NLRB 1063,
1064 (1973), enfd. 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied 423 U.S. 826 (1975)), even though the
employer may have previously offered to bargain
with the union about the change and the union has
refused. C & S Industries, Inc., 158 NLRB 454, 457
(1966).
Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., a Division of
Mission Marine Associates, Inc., 235 NLRB 720
(1978), enfd. 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979), applied
the above-mentioned principles in a factual context
very similar to the instant case. The respondent re-
located a portion of its business from a unionized
facility to nonunionized facilities, while a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement was still in existence.
The respondent, which had been confronted with a
legitimate adverse economic problem, made its de-
cision to relocate based on the fact that its labor
costs under the contract were significantly higher
than those of its competitors. The respondent noti-
fied the union of its financial difficulties and at-
tempted to bargain about its decision to relocate
and the effects of its decision.
The Board found that the respondent violated
Section 8(d) and Section 8(aX1) and (5) when,
during the term of its collective-bargaining agree-
ment, it relocated a portion of its business from a
unionized facility to nonunionized facilities without
the consent of the union. The Board found critical
that the respondent was bound by a collective-bar-
gaining agreement which had not expired when it
decided to relocate a portion of its business, and
that it made that decision because of its need to
obtain economic relief from the terms of that
agreement. The Board, referring directly to the
above-stated principles, held that the mandate of
Section 8(d) (i.e., that one party's proposed modifi-
cation of a contract can be implemented only if the
other party consents) "is not excused either by sub-
jective good faith or by . . . economic necessity
.... " 235 NLRB at 735. 3 The Board also found
that respondent's termination of employees at its
unionized facility violated Section 8(aX)(1) and (3).
The Board held that where, as part of a plan to
escape the economic obligations of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement, an employer terminates and re-
fuses to reinstate employees, its actions are "inher-
ently 'destructive of employee interests." 235
NLRB at 736.
The Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's decision
in Los Angeles Marine. The court specifically af-
firmed that an employer cannot alter mandatory'
contractual terms during the effective period of a
contract without consent of the union, and that re-
pudiation of mandatory contractual terms without
the union's consent during the term of the contract
is not excused because the employer acted in good
faith or was motivated solely by economic necessi-
ty. 602 F.2d at 1307. The court also agreed with
the Board's finding that the respondent's termina-
tion and refusal to reinstate employees was "inher-
ently destructive" of employee rights. According
to the court, the respondent's "desire to escape the
financial burden [it] contracted for voluntarily is
not an adequate business justification that would
excuse the unlawful terminations." 602 F.2d at
1307.
We believe Los Angeles Marine controls the in-
stant case. Here, Respondent decided to relocate
bargaining unit work because the labor costs of
performing that work at Milwaukee Spring was
3 Chairman Van de Water would not find that "economic necessity"
can never be a factor as he construes such language to cover an unprofit-
able product line, or an unprofitable division in a particular corporation.
For example, a corporation facing bankruptcy or if the short-term viabil-
ity of a corporation was in jeopardy, might warrant a different result.
208
MILWAUKEE SPRING DIVISION
greater than the labor costs of performing that
work at McHenry Spring.4 This economic motiva-
tion for Respondent's decision to relocate is strik-
ingly similar to the Los Angeles Marine respond-
ent's need to obtain economic relief from the terms
of its contract. Here, also, there is no question that
Respondent was bound by a collective-bargaining
agreement which had not expired when it decided
to relocate its assembly operations.
The Board found that Los Angeles Marine vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5), even though the
respondent had been confronted with a legitimate
adverse economic problem which contributed to its
decision, respondent had not displayed hostility
toward the union or union adherents, and there
was no basis for finding that the respondent failed
to satisfy any bargaining obligation owed to the
union concerning the relocation and its effects.
Similar factors are present in the instant case. Mil-
waukee Spring lost the Fisher Body contract,
which resulted in a significant decline in monthly
revenues. The company had not exhibited union
animus. And, the company had bargained with the
Union over its decision to relocate its assembly op-
erations and was willing to negotiate over the ef-
fects of its decision.
Nonetheless, as in Los Angeles Marine, "Respond-
ent [Milwaukee Spring] was bound to a collective-
bargaining agreement which was not scheduled to
expire until [at least March 31, 1983]. That agree-
ment covered and had been applied to the [assem-
bly operations] employees. [Respondent] admit[s]
that the decision to move from [Milwaukee] had
been based upon the need to obtain economic relief
from the terms of that agreement. It is this which
gives rise to the violation in the instant case," 235
NLRB at 735, unless the Union has waived its stat-
utory right to object to the modification. Accord-
ingly, we now turn to this question.
4 This cue is distinguishable from The University of Chicago, 210
NLRB 190 (1974), enforcement denied 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975). In
that case the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Board's finding that the
respondent's transfer of custodial work from one bargaining unit to an-
other was violative of Sec. 8(aXI), (2), and (5). The court concluded that
the employer's decision to transfer unit work was not attributable to a
desire to avoid the contract wage rate. Rather, the court held that the
sole reason for the decision to transfer was the necessity to raise the qual-
ity of work at issue to a level in keeping with the high standards demand-
ed by the University's professional staff Here, the decision to relocate
was prompted by the desire to reduce labor costs.
We further note that, here, the parties' stipulation and Respondent's ar-
guments admit that the company's relocation decision was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. According to the stipulation, Respondent's decision
was predicated upon the company's comparatively higher labor costs
under the Milwaukee Spring contract. Respondent's argument that the
Union waived its right to demand bargaining over its decision and that
the company in any event bargained to impasse over its decision implies
that the company had an obligation to bargain-an obligation which
would be imposed only if the decision to relocate were a mandatory sub-
ject. Consequently. First National Maintenance Corporation v. N.LR.B..
452 U.S. 666 (1981), which deals with what is a mandatory subject, has
no bearing on this case.
Contractual waiver of a statutory right must be
clear and unmistakable. The language allegedly es-
tablishing that a waiver has been granted must be
explicit. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Company
v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied 376 U.S. 971 (1964). Respondent contends
that, by the contract's preamble, article I, and arti-
cle II, the Union authorized the company to relo-
cate without its consent, thereby waiving any right
it might otherwise have had to object to the trans-
fer.
The preamble specifies that Milwaukee Spring's
facility is located at a particular address in Milwau-
kee, and article I states that the company recog-
nizes the Union as the bargaining agent of the pro-
duction and maintenance employees in the compa-
ny's plant in Milwaukee. Respondent urges that to-
gether these clauses make clear that the collective-
bargaining agreement applies to Wvork done by pro-
duction and maintenance employees at the location
in Milwaukee and has no application at other Illi-
nois Coil Spring Company plants.
In Los Angeles Marine, the respondent made a
similar argument, which the Board and the court
rejected. The court, noting that the parties' con-
tract stated that the company entered into it on
behalf of the operations "located at San Pedro,
California, and vicinity," found that the agree-
ment's effectiveness was not by this phrase limited
expressly to a particular area, nor was there evi-
dence that the parties intended such a geographic
limitation. Rather, according to the court, the con-
tract language was merely the parties' descriptive
recitation of the physical location of the facilities at
the time of the contract's negotiation.5
We believe the same analysis appropriate in the
instant case. We note that, although the location of
Respondent's operations appears in two different
clauses, there is nothing in those clauses that ex-
pressly limits the agreement's effectiveness to Mil-
waukee, nor is there evidence that the parties in-
tended such a limitation. Rather, those clauses
appear to be words of description, merely stating
what was in fact the case at the time of the con-
tract's negotiation.
Article II, the contract's management-rights
clause, provides:
Except as expressly limited by the other Ar-
ticles of this Agreement, the Company shall
have the exclusive right to manage the plant
and business and direct the working forces.
These rights include, but are not limited to,
the right to plan, direct and control operations,
Accord NLR.B. v. Marine Optical Inc., 671 F.2d 11, 16 (Ist Cir.
1982).
209
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to determine the operations of services to be
performed in or at the plant or by the employ-
ees of the Company, to establish and maintain
production and quality standards, to schedule
the working hours, to hire, promote, demote,
and transfer, to suspend, discipline or dis-
charge for just cause or to relieve employees
because of lack of work or for other legitimate
reasons, to introduce new and improved meth-
ods, materials or facilities, or to change exist-
ing methods, materials or facilities.
Respondent contends that this provision, especially
the phrase granting the company the right "to de-
termine the operations or services to be performed
in or at the plant or by the employees," constitutes
a waiver.
We read the management-rights clause as a gen-
eral reservation tp the employer of the right to
make decisions about the types of products to be
manufactured, what equipment will be used, what
methods will be used, production schedule-in
short, the clause reserves to management the right
to decide whether, and how, its products will be
manufactured. But, we find nothing in this clause
which expressly grants Respondent the right to
move, transfer, or change the location of part of its
operations from its Milwaukee facility to another
facility in order to avoid the comparatively higher
labor costs imposed by the collective-bargaining
agreement containing the management-rights
clause.6
The contract containing no explicit language per-
mitting Respondent to transfer a part of its oper-
ations during the term of the contract without the
Union's consent, we cannot find that the Union has
waived its statutory right to object to Respondent's
decision to transfer its assembly operations and to
lay off unit employees as a consequence in order to
avoid the contractual labor costs.
In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we find
that Respondent, even though it bargained with the
Union about its decision to relocate and is willing
to bargain about the effects of its decision, by de-
ciding, without the consent of the Union, to trans-
fer its assembly operations and to lay off unit em-
ployees at its Milwaukee facility during the term of
I Respondent asserts that the Union's prior conduct demonstrates that
art. 11 is a waiver. According to Respondent, the Union failed to question
the company's 1976 decision to relocate its spring operation because it
recognized that art. II precluded it from challenging such action. Howev-
er, we note that no employees were laid off or terminated as a result of
the 1976 relocation. Thus, that transfer did not adversely affect the em-
ployee complement, as the instant transfer concededly does. Where the
prior conduct did not occasion layoffs or terminations, we do not find
that a union's acquiescence to that conduct sheds any light on the ques-
tion whether the collective-bargaining agreement waives the union's stat-
utory right to object to a transfer of operations which affects directly the
employee complement in the bargaining unit.
its collective-bargaining agreement in order to
obtain relief from the labor costs imposed by that
agreement, acted in derogation of its bargaining ob-
ligation under Section 8(d), and hence violated
Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) of the Act.7
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth above
have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship
to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
Upon the basis of the foregoing facts and upon
the entire record in this case, we make the follow-
ing:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
2. Respondent, by deciding without the Union's
consent to transfer its assembly operations from its
Milwaukee Spring facility to the McHenry Spring
facility during the term of the collective-bargaining
agreement between Respondent and the Union be-
cause of the comparatively higher labor costs
under that agreement, has unlawfully modified the
terms and conditions of that agreement in violation
of Section 8(d) and Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act.
3. Laying off unit employees as a consequence of
the unlawful decision mentioned above is violative
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain af-
firmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Having found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5), we shall order that it rescind its de-
cision to transfer its assembly operations from the
Milwaukee Spring facility and, to the extent that it
has begun to implement its decision, that it restore
the status quo ante by returning the assembly oper-
ations to the Milwaukee Spring facility. Having
I In finding the violations herein, Chairman Van de Water emphasizes
the parties' stipulation that the reason for Respondent's decision to trans-
fer its assembly operations was not an inability to pay the contractual
wage rates, but was solely due to the comparatively higher labor costs at
Milwaukee Spring and an inadequate return on investment.
210
MILWAUKEE SPRING DIVISION
found that laying off unit employees as a conse-
quence of its decision to transfer its assembly oper-
ations violates Section 8(aXl) and (3), we shall
order that Respondent recall any employees so laid
off and offer to reinstate them to the positions they
held before their unlawful layoff or, if those posi-
tions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent po-
sitions, without prejudice to their seniority and
other rights and privileges. We shall further order
Respondent to make these employees whole for
any loss of earnings they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them, by pay-
ment to them of a sum of money equal to that
which they normally would have earned from the
date of layoff to the date of Respondent's offer of
recall, less net earnings during such period, with
backpay computed on a quarterly basis, with inter-
est, in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel
Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See, generally,
Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent,
Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil Spring
Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Deciding without the Union's consent to
transfer its assembly operations from its Milwaukee
Spring facility to the McHenry Spring facility
during the term of their collective-bargaining
agreement because of the comparatively higher
labor costs under that agreement.
(b) Laying off unit employees as a consequence
of that decision.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Bargain collectively with the Union with re-
spect to the decision to transfer the assembly oper-
ations from Milwaukee Spring because of the com-
paratively higher labor costs under their collective-
bargaining agreement in compliance with Section
8(d) of the Act.
(b) Restore at the Milwaukee Spring facility the
work previously performed at that facility by unit
employees represented by the Union which has
been transferred pursuant to the above-mentioned
unlawful decision.
(c) Recall any employees laid off as a conse-
quence of the above-mentioned unlawful decision
and offer them reinstatement to the positions they
held before their unlawful layoff or, if those posi-
tions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent po-
sitions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result
of the discrimination against them, in the manner
set forth above in the section entitled "The
Remedy."
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and copy-
ing, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Post at its Milwaukee, Wisconsin, facility
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."8
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 30, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30,
in writing, within 20 days from the date of this
Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to
comply herewith.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shll read "Poaed Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeah Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT decide without the consent of
the Union which represents our production
and maintenance employees to transfer our as-
sembly operations from our Milwaukee Spring
facility to the McHenry Spring facility during
the term of our collective-bargaining agree-
ment because of the comparatively higher
labor costs under that agreement
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT lay off unit employees as a
consequence of that decision.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
WE WILL bargain collectively with the
Union with respect to a decision to transfer
the assembly operations from Milwaukee
Spring because of the comparatively higher
labor costs under our collective-bargaining
agreement, as required by the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL restore at the Milwaukee Spring
facility any work previously performed at that
facility by unit employees represented by the
Union which has been transferred pursuant to
the above-mentioned unlawful decision.
WE WILL recall any employees laid off as a
consequence of the above-mentioned unlawful
decision and offer them reinstatement to the
positions they held before their unlawful layoff
or, if those positions no longer exist, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions, without preju-
dice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and WE WILL make them whole for
any loss of earnings they may have suffered as
a result of the discrimination against them,
with interest.
MILWAUKEE SPRING DIVISION OF IL-
LINOIS COIL SPRING COMPANY
212