Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 16, 2021

2020001995 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/896,344 12/04/2015 Yu Zheng 339021-US-
PCT (1777.409US
1136
144365 7590 06/16/2021
Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.
P.O. Box 2938
Minneapolis, MN 55402
EXAMINER
VASQUEZ, MARKUS A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2121
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/16/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
SLW@blackhillsip.com
usdocket@microsoft.com
uspto@slwip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte YU ZHENG, XING XIE, WEI-YING MA,
HSIAO-WUEN HON, and ERIC I-CHAO CHANG
_____________

Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–15 and 17–20. The rejection of claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
was withdrawn by the Examiner and is therefore not before us. See Ans. 3.
We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is
Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. See Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
Introduction
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates generally to “techniques for
inferring air quality information for areas in a region based on historical and
real-time air quality data from existing air quality monitor stations, as well
as spatial and temporal data from other data sources.” Spec. ¶ 3.

Representative Independent Claim 1
1. One or more non-transitory computer-readable media
storing computer-executable instructions that are executed to
cause one or more processors to perform acts comprising:
obtaining labeled air quality index data for a pollutant in
a region from one or more air quality monitor stations;
extracting spatial features for the region from spatially-
related data for the region, the spatially-related data including
information associated with fixed infrastructures in the region;
extracting temporal features for the region from
temporally-related data for the region, the temporally-related
data including data for the region that changes over time,
wherein a temporal feature of the temporal features is
determined based on changes in location data of cellular phones
indicating traffic flow;
applying a co-training based learning framework to co-
train a spatial classifier and a temporal classifier based at least
on the labeled air quality index data, the spatial features for the
region, and the temporal features for the region; and

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed Feb. 4, 2019 (“Final
Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed Sept. 6, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s
Answer, mailed Nov. 19, 2019 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Br., filed Jan. 16,
2020.
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

3
generating a heat map for the region indicating
suitability for building an air quality monitoring station by
using the spatial classifier and the temporal classifier to
generate air quality index levels for areas within the region.
Appeal Br. 15, “CLAIMS APPENDIX” (disputed limitations emphasized).
Patent Prior Art Evidence
Name Reference Date
Chapman et al.
Moshe
Martin
US 2008/0071465 A1
US 2013/0110400 Al
US 2013/0174646 Al
Mar. 20, 2008
May 2, 2013
July 11, 2013
Non Patent Literature Prior Art Evidence
Hanefi Bayraktar & F. S. Turalioglu, “A Kriging-based approach for
locating a sampling site – in the assessment of air quality,” Stochastic
Environmental Research and Risk Assessment, May 13, 2005 (“Bayraktar”).

Chee-Yong Chan et al., “On High Dimensional Skylines,”
International Conference on Extending Database Technology, Springer,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006 (“Chan”).

Kamal Nigam & Rayid Ghani, “Analyzing the Effectiveness and
Applicability of Co-training,” Proceedings of the ninth international
conference on Information and knowledge management, ACM 2000
(“Nigam”).

Omid Madani et al., “Co-Validation: Using Model Disagreement on
Unlabeled Data to Validate Classification Algorithms,” Advances in neural
information processing systems, 2004 (“Madani”).

Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

4
Rejections
A. Claims 1–8, 10–14, and 17–19 are rejected as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Moshe, Nigam, Chapman, and Bayraktar.
B. Claim 9 is rejected as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over
Moshe, Nigam, Chapman, Bayraktar, and Martin.
C. Claims 15 and 20 are rejected as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 over Moshe, Nigam, Chapman, Bayraktar, Madani, and Chan. 3

ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. In our analysis below, we highlight and address specific findings
and arguments for emphasis.

Rejection A of Independent Claim 1 under § 103
Issues: Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, we focus our analysis on the
following argued limitations that we find are dispositive regarding Rejection
A of claim 1:
Did the Examiner err by finding that the cited references teach or
suggest the disputed “generating” limitation:
generating a heat map for the region indicating
suitability for building an air quality monitoring station by
using the spatial classifier and the temporal classifier to
generate air quality index levels for areas within the region[,]

3 As previously noted, the Examiner withdrew Rejection C of claim 16. See
Ans. 3. The Examiner also withdrew a rejection of all claims under 35
U.S.C. § 101. See Final Act. 2.
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

5
within the meaning of representative claim 1?4 (Emphasis added). See Final
Act. 3–7.
Appellant contends that in Moshe “there is no teaching or suggestion
that the ground source particulate map is indicating suitability for building
an air quality monitoring station by using the spatial classifier and the
temporal classifier to generate air quality index levels for areas within the
region.” Appeal Br. 8–9 (emphasis omitted). Appellant contends that
Bayraktar also does not teach the disputed limitation. Id.
Appellant additionally contends: “[i]n contrast to the Examiner’s
combination, claim 1 generates a heat map that shows suitable locations for
placement of air quality monitoring stations. Such a feature cannot be found
in the prior art of record.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant urges that Chapman “is
silent regarding the aforementioned feature of the instant claims.” Appeal
Br. 10.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because we find
Appellant is arguing the references separately. See In re Merck & Co., 800
F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (One cannot show non obviousness by
attacking references individually where the rejections are based on
combinations of references.).
The Examiner cites to Moshe as the primary reference for teaching
“generating a heat map for the region” and “generat[ing] air quality index
levels for areas within the region,” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 5
(citing Moshe Fig. 7, 15B, element 419(e), ¶ 48).

4 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation (BRI) consistent with the Specification. See In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

6
We agree with the Examiner’s findings, because we find Moshe’s
Figure 7 at least suggests generating a heat map for a region. See Moshe
Fig. 7, Ans. 4. The Examiner specifically cites Bayraktar as teaching the
disputed limitation “indicating suitability for building an air quality
monitoring station.” See Final Act. 7 (citing Bayraktar 301).
We agree with the Examiner’s findings because we find Bayraktar’s
description of locating air quality measurement sites, and Bayraktar’s use of
a smoke contour map that displays air quality data, collectively suggest
“generating a heat map for the region indicating suitability for building an
air quality monitoring station,” as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 9 (citing
Bayraktar 301, 303, Fig. 2); see also Ans. 4.5
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s ultimate legal
conclusion of obviousness, which relies upon the combination of Moshe,
Nigam, Chapman, and Bayraktar as teaching or suggesting the disputed
limitations. See Final Act. 3–7, Ans. 3–5. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant avers that Bayraktar teaches a contour
map, not a heat map. Reply Br. 2. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
argument, because the Examiner cites Moshe, not Bayraktar, for teaching a
heat map (see Final Act. 5, citing Moshe, Fig. 7). Further, we are also of the
view that Bayraktar’s smoke contour map is at least suggestive of a heat
map. See Bayraktar, Figs. 2–4.

5 “[T]he question under 35 USC 103 is not merely what the references
expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time the invention was made.” Merck & Co. v. Biocraft
Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting In
re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)). See also MPEP § 2123.
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

7
Appellant urges in the Reply Brief that “while Moshe illustrates a
multi-color coded map of distribution of ground source particulate, the
reference do[es] not show [a] heat map for the region indicating suitability
for building an air quality monitoring station as recited in the claims.”
Reply Br. 2.
However, it is irrelevant that the prior art and the claimed subject
matter may have different purposes. It is sufficient that references suggest
doing what Appellant did, although the Appellant’s particular purpose was
different from that of the references. In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (citing In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 539 (CCPA 1967)). Thus,
for a prima facie case of obviousness to be established, the reference(s) need
not recognize the same problem solved by the Appellant. See In re Kemps,
97 F.3d 1427, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court provides more
recent controlling authority: “In determining whether the subject matter of a
patent claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation nor the avowed
purpose of the patentee controls.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 419 (2007) (emphasis added). This controlling legal reasoning is
applicable here.
Moreover, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments, because
we conclude the scope of the disputed claim terms under BRI broadly
encompasses the teachings and suggestions of the above cited references.
We conclude the scope of claim 1 is broader than the interpretation imputed
by Appellant’s arguments, given that the Specification does not contain a
limiting definition for the disputed claim term “heat map.” We emphasize
that, because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad
construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

8
patentee.” In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Therefore, on this record, and based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying
factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness regarding
Rejection A of representative independent claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A of representative
independent claim 1, and also Rejection A of grouped claims 2–8, 10–14,
and 17–19, not separately argued, which fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Rejection B of Dependent Claim 9
Claim 9 recites:
The one or more computer-readable media of claim 1, wherein
the spatial classifier is an artificial neural network (ANN)
classifier, and wherein the temporal classifier is one of a linear-
chain conditional random field (CRF) classifier, a hidden
Markov model (HMM) classifier, or a maximum entropy
Markov model classifier.
(emphasis added).
Appellant contends:
While Martin may include a list of artificial intelligence and
machine learning techniques, there is nothing in Martin that
would suggest a configuration where the spatial classifier is an
artificial neural network (ANN) classifier . . . and . . . the
temporal classifier is one of a linear-chain conditional random
field (CRF) classifier, . . . a hidden Markov model (HMM)
classifier, or a maximum entropy Markov model classifier . . . as
recited.
Appeal Br. 11–12.
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

9
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because Appellant is
again arguing the references separately. The Examiner cites to Moshe and
Nigam for collectively teaching or suggesting the “classifiers” recited in
claim 9. See Moshe ¶ 24; Nigam 87; but cf. with Martin (“Inferences can be
based at least in part on explicit training of classifiers.” ¶ 108). See Final
Act. 25–26.
Moreover, the Examiner cites to Martin’s neural network (in the
context of determining residential air quality monitoring) for at least
suggesting “wherein the spatial classifier is an artificial neural network . . .
classifier,” as recited in claim 9. See Final Act. 25 (citing Martin ¶ 108, i.e.,
“artificial intelligence component 1106 can employ artificial intelligence
and/or machine learning techniques . . . [and] server 108 can employ any
suitable scheme (e.g., neural networks, expert systems . . . Markov
Models”) (emphasis added).
As an additional issue of claim construction, we find no limiting
definition in the Specification or claims that would preclude the Examiner’s
broader reading, nor has Appellant argued a specific definition for a “spatial
classifier” or a “temporal classifier.” Claim 9. We emphasize that claim 9
recites the “temporal classifier is one of a linear chain conditional random
field, a hidden Markov model classifier, or a maximum entropy Markov
model classifier.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, we conclude a teaching
in a reference for at least one of these three classifiers is sufficient to show
obviousness.6 (emphasis added).

6 When a claim covers several alternatives, the claim may be unpatentable if
any of the alternatives within the scope of the claim are taught by the prior
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

10
We are not persuaded the Examiner erred, because we find Martin’s
neural networks and Markov models teach or suggest the disputed claim 9
limitations: “wherein the spatial classifier is an artificial neural network
(ANN) classifier, and wherein the temporal classifier is one of a linear-chain
conditional random field (CRF) classifier, a hidden Markov model (HMM)
classifier, or a maximum entropy Markov model classifier.” (emphasis
added). See Martin ¶ 108.
Appellant further argues “[a] person having ordinary skill in the art
would have to go well beyond simple experimentation to arrive at the
configuration of classifiers as arranged in claim 9” and this would be “a
daunting task” because “the outcome of co-training classifiers is not
predictable.” Appeal Br. 12.
But the Examiner finds an artisan would have:
modified the combination of Moshe, Nigam, Chapman and
Bayraktar to have used an artificial neural network or a hidden
Markov model (or one of its generalizations) to perform the
classification. These classifications algorithms are known in the
art, as evidenced by their use in Martin. A person skilled in the
art in possession of the combination of Moshe and Nigam
would have found it necessary to find some classification
algorithms to use in the context of the co-training taught by
Nigam. That person would have been motivated to use one of
the many classification algorithms known and used at the time,
which include artificial neural networks and hidden Markov
models (and generalizations). The combination amounts to no
more than combining prior art elements according to known
methods to yield predictable results.

art. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also
Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(citing Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d at 1352).

Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

11
Final Act. 26.
Our reviewing court guides that evidence of “some superior property
or advantage that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have
found surprising or unexpected” tends to indicate nonobviousness. In re
Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995). But unexpected results as a
secondary consideration “must be shown to be unexpected compared with
the closest prior art.” Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 970
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
Appellant’s argument that the outcome of the classifiers recited in
claim 9 is “unpredictable” is understood by the Board as an inference that
the claimed invention produces unexpected results. See Appeal Br. 12. In
support, Appellant urges that Nigam, as cited by the Examiner, “appears to
suggest the unpredictability of co-training.” Id.
However, a close review of Nigam shows it is actually unclear
whether the co-training would do better than EM. See Nigam, § 4. Without
more, we find unavailing Appellant’s mere assertion that “the task of a
proper combination of classifiers for a co-training solution as recited in
claim 9” would be a “daunting task” because “the outcome of co-training
classifiers is not predictable.” Appeal Br. 12.
On this record, we find Appellant has not met the burden of
persuasion because Appellant has not shown that the results of claim 9
would be unexpected when compared to the closest prior art. See Kao, 441
F.3d at 970. Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded of error
regarding the Examiner’s ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness for
Rejection B of dependent claim 9, and we sustain the rejection.
Appeal 2020-001995
Application 14/896,344

12
Rejection C of Dependent Claims 15 and 20
Appellant does not advance any separate, substantive arguments for
Rejection C of dependent claims 15 and 20. See Appeal Br. 10 (¶ 2).
Arguments not timely made are forfeited. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
As noted above, the Examiner withdrew Rejection C of dependent claim 16
in the Answer. See Ans. 3.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejections A, B,
and C of claims 1–15 and 17–20 over the cited prior art of record, and we
sustain the rejections.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–8, 10–14,
17–19
103 Moshe, Nigam,
Chapman, Bayraktar
1–8, 10–14,
17–19

9 103 Moshe, Nigam,
Chapman, Bayraktar,
Martin
9
15, 20 103 Moshe, Nigam,
Chapman, Bayraktar,
Madani, Chan
15, 20
Overall
outcome
1–15, 17–20
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED